

Operation Oasis

Maidstone
9th October 2008

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This structured debrief report supports the vision of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA).

The NPIA supports the Police service in reducing crime, maintaining order, bringing criminals to justice and protecting and reassuring the public.

The NPIA will seek to improve:

- **Intelligence, Information and Interoperability;**
- **Core Policing Functions;**
- **Innovation in Science and Technology;**
- **People;**
- **Critical National Policing Infrastructure;**
- **Responsiveness and Accountability.**

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PREFACE

This report relates to the debriefing of officers and staff who were involved in various roles in the 'policing' of Operation Oasis.

Four structured debriefs in relation to the event were held at the Hilton Hotel, Maidstone, Kent on Thursday 9th October 2008.

The overall aims of the structured debrief were:

- To provide Kent Police with a means by which they can review the event. Following the results Kent Police and partners will have the opportunity to consider process and performance aspects for future operations.

It should be noted that independently of this debrief process Kent Police conducted a number of internal operational de-briefs the recommendations and conclusions of which are not included within this report.

DEBRIEF DETAILS

Place: Hilton Hotel, Maidstone, Kent

Date: Thursday 9th October 2008

Debrief Leader(s): Chief Superintendent Mike Ismay,
Inspector Graham Wright,
Sergeant Chris Kendall,
Sergeant Paul Bristo

Total Participants: 43

INTRODUCTION

Operation Oasis was the largest police mutual aid mobilisation of 2008, involving over 1400 officers to assist the considerable resources of Kent Police in response to the 'Camp for Climate Action' and associated protest activity focused upon Kingsnorth Power Station, Isle of Grain, Kent over the period 28th July – 12th August 2008.

This event was the third of such similar mass demonstrations and protest activity. The first being centred on the Drax Power Station, North Yorkshire in 2006 and in 2007 a similar event took place in the Metropolitan Police Area focussing upon the proposed runway expansion at London's Heathrow Airport. These mass demonstrations and protest activity are gathered together under the loose umbrella of 'Camp for Climate Action'. They attract protesters from all the recognised National protest groups, a variety of environmental activists and a number of individuals who use opportunities from such events to further their own aims, not necessarily connected with the main 'umbrella movement'.

The ability of all these protest groups involved to organise and communicate should not be underestimated.

Similarly the skill, experience, training and resources required in order to plan and successfully police such an event should not be underestimated.

During the structured debrief staff were given the opportunity to reflect on their roles and to contribute in an open and honest manner verbally and in written form. The debrief was divided into the following groups to illicit the learning and experience of the staff involved:

1. Command
2. Logistics and Silver Support

3. Intelligence, Custody, Forward Intelligence Officers and Crime Support
4. Police Support Unit Commanders

Participants were asked to respond to the following questions which formed the structure of the debrief process:

- (i) What aspects of the Operation from your own role/Force perspective did not go well and need further development and/or improvement?
- (ii) What aspects of the Operation from your own/Force perspective went well and should be highlighted as good practice for future operations?
- (iii) The two key areas for my role/department to develop for the future are?

Despite the fact that the policing of this event saw the largest mobilisation of police resources in 2008 it was disappointing that this was not reflected at the debrief, with only two other Forces represented alongside Kent Police.

A summary of recommendations made has been constructed to both inform Kent Police and also for the benefit of the wider Police Service in its preparedness for future operations of this kind.

It should be noted that the content, comments, recommendations and observations recorded within this report have been compiled based upon the feedback of officers and staff present and involved throughout the structured debrief process conducted on 9th October 2008.

A record of all the written responses of participants can be found at Appendix A - D.

SUMMARY OF DEBRIEF SESSIONS

COMMAND

MAIN AREAS THAT DID NOT GO WELL:

Although it was recognised that the Operation Oasis 'full time' Planning Team provided a good service it was felt by this team that this service was not replicated by their Kent Police BCU planning peers, who appeared ambivalent towards the complexity and sheer size of the task involved.

Both the Silver Commander and the Planning Team highlighted difficulties in getting engagement and buy-in from other departments within Kent Police. The financial planning of the operation was one such area which required considerable effort with a requirement to have access to appropriately trained staff outside of normal office working hours. This was also alluded to in relation to media services, engineering services and the Police Federation.

During the planning stages for this operation and the subsequent request for mutual aid resources contact was made with the Metropolitan Police to discuss and agree resourcing requirements. The early indication from preliminary enquiries with the Metropolitan Police was that their resources would travel on a daily basis from London to Kent. The practical elements of this were soon realised that this would be unworkable and was subsequently rectified with MPS officers being accommodated along with other visiting officers.

The deployment and despatching of police resources could have been made easier, smoother and more effective by building this into the briefing process at the THA, when in fact this was done by Silver.

Due to the lack of face to face contact and personal briefing during the operation from the Silver Commander with Basic Mobilisation Unit (BMU)

Commanders, wrong interpretation was placed on some of Silver's aims. Whilst Bronze Commanders were engaged and had ownership of the development of their respective tactical plans the insertion of BMU Commanders provided another dynamic which may have been resolved had the majority of BMU Commanders attended the event pre-briefing facilitated by Kent Police.

Comment was also highlighted by the Briefing Team that tactical plans were not given to them until late in the process which impacted upon their ability to interpret these in preparation for briefings.

There was a lack of understanding within the command structure of Gold's strategy and provision was not made to allow time for this to be effectively communicated and understood. No strategic overview was given to officers, which extended to the lack of a clearly defined and articulated search strategy. A consequence of this was that the full extent of searching was underestimated together with the amount of property seized throughout the operation. Another aspect which impacted upon the lack of strategic overview was a perception by officers that media management was not fully considered when in fact it was. A more proactive approach by Kent Police towards appropriate resourcing of the media management role may have reduced this perception and provided enhanced support to the policing operation.

Bronze Commanders raised a number of significant issues surrounding the lack of attention paid to the establishment and understanding of effective command protocols. This was at its most prominent with the insertion of BMU Commanders into the resourcing plan. This role which is advocated in the Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP) effectively inserts an additional layer of command into the process. This role was not understood by many and as a consequence did not add any value to the command and control process. Equally, there were a number of BMU Commanders who were reluctant to accept command decisions and directions from a Bronze Commander who was junior in rank. This issue was addressed at the pre-event briefing for all Commanders; however,

owing to the lack of attendance by BMU Commanders at the pre-event briefing they were not present to hear this instruction

The lack of command protocols also had a negative effect between the role of Protester Liaison Bronze and the Camp Site Bronze, who despite the closeness of their working environment lines of communication and decision making was lacking.

Kent Police officers highlighted their view that they felt the full extent of this operation and its impact upon Kent Police and its officers and staff did not appear to be fully appreciated at a strategic level. Comment was also made that the senior command of the Force did not fully engage in their understanding and realisation of the sheer demand and complexities of planning and organising a policing operation of this magnitude.

National advice and guidance illustrates that those individuals tasked with performing a command role should be appropriately trained and accredited to carry out that role. The command structure for this operation was staffed at Silver and Bronze level with appropriately accredited officers at Initial and Advanced Public Order Commander status. However, the Gold Commander was not a nationally accredited Advanced Public Order Gold Commander. Kent Police should harness the national advice available and take steps to ensure that its Commanders are suitably trained and accredited. Consideration was given by Kent Police to ensure that appropriate resilience was built into the command structure but the fact is that the Force ran out of trained and accredited officers to perform these roles. This had the potential to undermine the command infrastructure in the event that the nominated Silver Commander was taken ill or could not carry on in the role.

THE MAIN AREAS THAT WENT WELL:

Although it was acknowledged that in the initial stages the planning team was under-resourced, many aspects of this process such as logistics,

accommodation, catering, tactical holding area etc all received considerable praise. This was enhanced by only utilising support staff on a voluntary basis and administration staff performing some logistical functions.

The early and close liaison established between Kent Police and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and deployment of Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) officers ensured quick time intelligence feedback.

Early investment in the planning process by Kent Police's Chief Superintendent – Tactical Operations ensured significant attention was also focused upon the operational infrastructure to support National police mobilisation to Kent. This is reflected in the detail attached to the accommodation plan for police resources and also the use of the Strategic Holding Area (SHA) and the subsequent mustering of resources.

The Silver Commander established a very effective daily tasking and coordinating process. This was a very structured approach towards reviewing daily intelligence determining the policing priorities for the operation. Throughout this process the Silver Commander engendered clear lines of accountability and responsibility which significantly contributed towards the effectiveness of those involved in the process.

Kent Police identified a Superintendent to perform the role of Protestor Liaison. This role was seen as key to establishing a partnership with protest groups and also proved to be valuable when it came to negotiating with the respective groups.

It was seen by Kent Police that the pro-active execution of a search warrant on the Camp in the initial stages of the operation deprived protesters of resources.

Security group consultation worked well, which together with the employment of private security services by Kent Police ensured that

proper and appropriate attention was paid to the security of the Tactical Holding Area (THA) which did not denude police resources into being provided for security purposes.

Kent Police Commanders were complimentary of the supportive approach extended to them by the Silver Commander.

The planning of the operation also invested in a pre-brief and site familiarisation and tour for non Kent Police Commanders. Those Commanders who attended the pre event briefing spoke positively of the information and detail shared by Kent Police.

The implementation of a devised five shift pattern was perceived to be a success together with having the benefits of officers in attendance for four days which provided essential continuity.

Finally, the welcoming and accommodating attitude extended by all Kent staff had a positive aspect and contributed to the effectiveness of the operation.

LOGISTICS AND SILVER SUPPORT

THE MAIN AREAS THAT DID NOT GO WELL:

The lack of a bespoke Silver Control Room did cause frustrations and difficulties for this event which meant that a dedicated Silver Control Room had to be built and established at Medway Police Station. The Silver Commander and the Planning Team highlighted difficulties in progressing logistical issues associated with the Control Room. The slowness in progressing these issues appeared to be centred upon the fact that Medway Police Station is a PFI managed building which seemed to create difficulties with the team in moving issues along. This is very much an issue for Kent Police which only can be resolved locally.

There were further issues highlighted within the Control Room environment which appeared to have a negative effect upon the management of the policing operation. Officers at the debrief highlighted that they felt the communications staff were not appropriately trained to work within such a dynamic environment which does differ considerably to the call centre environment in which these staff usually work. It was also felt that more staff were required to be trained in the use and maintenance of Atlas Ops. It was also felt that communication within the Control Room hindered the effective changes and implementation of tactics. A significant observation throughout the event was the sheer number of officers and staff working within the Control Room. There were allocated seats for 42 people which throughout the peak periods of each day were all occupied. This volume of people working within a relatively confined space without much room between individual consoles may undoubtedly lead to confusion and disturbance. It may have been more appropriate to have located the call taker consoles into another room thereby providing additional space. However, with the difficulties of accommodation already alluded to this may not have been a viable option.

The briefing strategy and approach raised a number of significant comments from participants as an area for improvement. Mindful that this operation witnessed the largest mobilisation of policing assets in 2008 the commitment from non Kent Police individuals providing mutual aid to attend the pre-event briefing was sadly lacking. Kent Police invested heavily to ensure that attending forces were adequately briefed and provided with a tour of the geographic location prior to the commencement of the operation. This investment was undermined by a number of forces not being represented which meant that the initial impetus, style and tactical briefing were lost. The subsequent outcome of this resulted in a feeling that the standard of limited briefing for officers deployed to the event was poor. Officers felt that there was no initial overview of why they were deployed to Kent. The strategic overview was missing and Commanders felt that they were not adequately sighted upon the tactical plan. On realising that a number of mutual aid forces were not represented at the pre-event briefing Kent Police should have addressed this at subsequent briefings once mutual aid forces arrived for their deployments.

Officers also commented that the briefing provided in relation to initial deployments was lacking which was compounded by the fact that PSU and BMU Commanders were not being provided with key tasking and deployment information. This in turn resulted in excessive enquiries to determine these requests. Officers felt that a focused briefing addressing the specific issue of suitable and appropriate legislation would have been valuable. Despite the fact that this may have been valuable there is a professional responsibility upon all forces to ensure that officers understand and can make effective use of appropriate legislation. Receiving forces, in this case Kent Police, have an expectation that officers providing mutual aid are properly and adequately trained to carry out the role required of them. It should be highlighted that once the briefing team became aware of this concern they did address and resolve it. Positive comments were raised in relation to a few forces who had provided mutual aid assets that their officers understood and effectively implemented

suitable legislation. It can only be surmised that if a few forces can achieve this professional standard why cannot others.

The sitting of the briefing and intelligence functions at two different locations caused unnecessary fragmentation of the process and subsequent lack of communication. It was felt that the intelligence flow and provision of briefing material from the Intelligence Team was too slow for such a dynamic operation and that the material provided for briefings was sometimes out of date. It was also felt that the audit trail for briefing items were hampered due to the different locations of Silver, the Intelligence Team and the actual delivery of briefings.

Considerable feedback was given in respect of the lack of a cohesive search strategy for the operation. Visiting officers on mutual aid wrongly assumed that there would be blanket powers to stop and search individuals throughout this operation. Feedback from the structured debrief would suggest that this assumption was mainly expressed from officers whose own force area has an airport and is granted Section 44 powers of search under the Terrorism Act 2000. This perceived blanket power to stop and search was not the case as the Silver Commander felt that the information, intelligence and circumstances did not justify the granting of a Section 60 authority to search power. Subsequently the extent of searching was not understood from the outset which caused considerable problems. Officers were informed to use their statutory power of search under Section 1 of PACE. This in turn was interpreted as an instruction to search everyone which was counter productive. Significant amounts of property were seized from individuals which resulted in major capture and seizure issues. Enhanced briefing with a clearly defined search strategy complimented by the appropriate use of legislative powers may have avoided this situation.

The lack of commonality of public order tactics and roles needs to be standardised, with apparent numerous interpretation of tactics causing confusion. The team consistency of Evidence Gathering Teams and FIT Officers also needs standardising as this too caused confusion. A policing

operation of this nature should also give due consideration to the officer profile that makes up a PSU. It was reported that there was a reasonable lack of female officers deployed to this event which in turn had knock on effects for PSU's in carrying out searching. There is national good practice whereby forces have made very effective use of both dedicated Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) Serials or dedicated all Female Serials based upon the profile of those being policed, which in turn has raised confidence and maximised the effectiveness of the policing operation.

It was felt that a lack of continuity of PSU officers at the campsite resulted in the protestors receiving different messages and styles from police officers. This was a deliberate tactic by the Silver Commander who was keen to avoid familiarity and complacency at the camp site. The Silver Commander had implemented a well established and resourced Site Liaison Team which supports the good practice in the area of establishing nominated site liaison officers and teams at such a significant location.

Kent Police highlighted a number of limitations with their Human Resource systems to manage the unique requirements of this operation. This comment is probably true of a number of other forces and is being considered with the work being conducted for ACPO in respect of a national Skills Audit.

Mention has already been made of the command confusion that was caused with the role of BMU Commander and the interface of this role with geographic Bronze roles. Command confusion was further aggravated by some senior officers who should not have formed part of PSU deployments who attended as unannounced observers from their respective forces and deployed onto the ground causing difficulties. This practice caused an unhealthy and unnecessary relationship for Bronze Commanders and should be avoided where possible. Should respective Commanders from any force wish to visit an event of this nature they must seek the authority of the host force to attend and also ensure they understand what their role is which should be documented and captured.

The lack of visibility of senior police officers, especially those of ACPO rank throughout the operational deployment phase of this operation has received negative feedback. It was felt that the presence of a senior officer at the Tactical Holding Area together with considered foot deployment on the ground and in the vicinity of the camp site would have been welcomed.

THE MAIN AREAS THAT WENT WELL:

The advantages of having a Kent Police officer located within PNICC was again highlighted as good practice and something which is advocated that hosting Forces in the future make use of.

Kent Police were initiative in their preparation of a comprehensive map surrounding Kingsnorth Power Station illustrating all the Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). This was subsequently served upon the protester groups and had a significant impact upon where the protesters choose to locate and establish their camp. This approach provided Kent Police with a real tactical advantage.

The active involvement of the NPOIU from the outset together with the effective and focused deployment of FIT officers provided a very good and valuable service.

The planning process and approach evolved into an effective team, with regular, structured and disciplined meetings. This included learning the lessons from Camp for Climate Action in 2007 at Heathrow Airport and also liaison with North Yorkshire Police following protest action at Drax Power Station in 2006.

The establishment and management of the Tactical Holding Area was seen as a real success throughout this operation. This together with investment in the preparation of briefing packs for visiting officers contributed

significantly towards the view from visiting forces that Kent Police had really got to grips with the policing plan for Camp for Climate Action 2008.

The command structure is a key element of any policing operation. It was felt that two key roles at Bronze level contributed significantly to the overall policing style and consistency of approach for this event. These two roles were Bronze Community Engagement and Bronze Protestor Liaison, both of which are advocated for future operations of this nature, the latter of which should build on the national policing relationship with Climate Action individuals.

The daily tasking and coordinating group meetings conducted four times a day were seen as a disciplined and structured way to focus upon the key issues of the operation. One of these meetings was viewed by the NPIA during the operation and the complimentary approach commented upon by those officers involved in the debrief process are echoed by the NPIA. Much attention was focused during these meetings which were recorded and auditable.

The establishment of a Scrutiny Group within Kent Police provided a system of 'cheques and balances' and overview for the event command team and also the planning team. This approach was further enhanced by Kent Police in securing the services of Essex Police to carry out a peer review of the tactical plan being adopted.

INTELLIGENCE, CUSTODY, FORWARD INTELLIGENCE TEAM OFFICERS AND CRIME SUPPORT

THE MAIN AREAS THAT DID NOT GO WELL:

It was noted that any form of Intelligence Cell training has been very limited and is under review by ACPO. Officers were of the opinion that this lack of training resulted in congestion within the Intelligence Unit and contributed towards difficulties associated with processing data in a timely manner. The quality of data received from officers also contributed towards unnecessary difficulties. This is illustrated in the submission of some 8,000 search forms conducted throughout the event under Section 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), of which only 2,000 were readable. The poor quality of submitted search forms should have been identified earlier in the operation and addressed at subsequent daily briefings thereby rectifying the issue. The fact that so many forms were submitted in such poor quality also raises questions regarding the effectiveness of supervision and also the overall knowledge of police powers which was felt to be lacking.

Officers reported that clarity is needed in respect of agreed cost recovery protocols between forces nationally. This is an area which PNICC are progressing to establish a national agreement.

Common minimum training and standards in public order tactics is not adopted across the Service. This had a negative impact between mobilised forces which was confusing for both ground assets and also communications staff working the Silver Control Room. It was also reported that there appeared to be a general lack of understanding between officers of specific public order terminology, i.e. the term FIT was not readily understood as was some other public order language.

Only two custody sites were utilised for this operation, one of which had been mothballed with a subsequent lack of all facilities. Prisoner processing capacity was further hindered by difficulty in accessing prisoner

transport. Better co-ordination in relation to location of prisoners was needed together with the ability to input prisoner details into the Intelligence system sooner. Custody staff also reported difficulties in getting adequate engagement from other departments to support the infrastructure and running of custody facilities, i.e. Livescan and PNC access. Custody staff further identified the need that many detainees from this event were vegans requiring specific toiletries and food.

Kent Police Trainers were tasked with responsibility for conducting daily briefings, and whilst these staff demonstrated their ability and competence in presentation skills they did lack an understanding of the particular content required for an event of this nature.

THE MAIN AREAS THAT WENT WELL:

The close working and tasking of Intelligence assets resulted in the effective and early deployment of Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) officers who were easily identifiable in National tabards enabling the implementation of disruptive tactics to good effect.

The significant value of having a Kent Officer who was both informed and sighted on policy and decision making for the operation deployed and located within the Police National Information and Coordinating Centre (PNICC) prior to the event added real value to the effectiveness of the operation. This eased communication and provided a single point of contact for mutual aid forces. This approach is commended as good practice nationally for future operations of this magnitude.

Structured and detailed planning enabled early scoping of policing skills required together with consultation with PNIIC and specific forces resulted in the right people with the right skills being mobilised. Kent Police were able to select those specialist officers best suited to provide an effective service.

Dedicated custody Inspectors were assigned to this operation who had been briefed in relation to relevant legislation for this type of operation, which together with early liaison between the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) also proved of value. The custody officers were familiar with the nature of the event and nature of protestors which contributed towards the overall effectiveness of the custody strategy.

POLICE SUPPORT UNIT (PSU) COMMANDERS

THE MAIN AREAS THAT DID NOT GO WELL:

The PSU Commanders felt that they would have benefited from a Silver Commander who was more physically present and engaging with them. It was felt that this lack of presence contributed towards a lack of cohesive understanding of the strategic intention, tactical plan and subsequent tactical consequences. This lack of understanding may be contributable to the fact that not all forces providing mutual aid allowed their Commanders to attend the pre-event briefing. This approach would naturally lead to the fact that those Commanders who did not attend the pre-event briefing would be at an obvious disadvantage compared to those officers who did attend. This is illustrated in the fact that Kent Police officers who had the benefit of such face to face meeting did not comment upon this issue.

Frustration was caused by the constant need to repeat contact details to the communications room staff who appeared very inexperienced in public order terminology and processes. This was compounded by the fact that Commanders experienced difficulties in communications room staff not tracking and being aware of resource deployments and tasking. This in turn created problems for Commanders when requesting updates on resource deployments.

It was recognised that the remote search sites would have benefited from having a dedicated Bronze Commander. This may have negated the considerable problems caused by the lack of resources and also the significant volume of searching needed and property seized. This problem was exacerbated by the lack of a designated property officer and a clearly defined search strategy.

The guidance and policy adopted surrounding the search strategy attracted adverse comment throughout the operation. The implementation of a Section 60 search authority was considered as being much too late

despite the perceived evidence to support its authorisation. The Silver Commander was quite robust in his approach towards searching and made it clear that officers would use their power under Section 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act to carry out any searching. This instruction was interpreted by officers that they were required to carry Section 1 searches on everyone. This had the ultimate effect that very significant numbers of people were searched with the resulting outcome that a huge amount of property was seized. It should also be highlighted that in adopting this approach to search does raise issues surrounding the lawfulness of this practice.

Crime related arrests were supported by process teams but not traffic related arrests which did not demonstrate a holistic approach towards prisoner handling. It is fair to say that Kent Police did not anticipate the level of activity generated by the roads policing tactical approach which was hugely successful in terms of its overall effectiveness.

Difficulties arose by having separate sites for intelligence briefings and PSU deployment briefings. As a consequence some information and intelligence was lost at briefings and it was further noted that these briefings should have been supplemented by a tactical overview. Tactical plans were also not passed to the briefing team until the process was well advanced which caused difficulties for the preparation of the briefing team.

It was felt that good information and intelligence was being fed into the centre from officers on the front line but subsequently there was a 36 hour delay before this was processed and disseminated back into the operation. PSU Commanders felt that the daily briefings were not adequately focused enough to providing appropriate and suitable updates in relation to the developing situation and the tactical policing plan.

Roads Policing would have benefited from an earlier involvement in the planning process to have a fuller understanding of public order tactics. This they felt would have enabled them to make a more effective contribution to the overall operational priorities.

THE MAIN AREAS THAT WENT WELL:

Very positive comments were made in relation to the significant investment in the logistical infrastructure and the excellent facilities provided at the Tactical Holding Area (THA). This praise extended to the vehicle fleet and the maintenance programme adopted. This approach demonstrated that out of a total of 203 vehicles utilised only one broke down, with obvious minimal disruption to the operation.

The utilisation of a peer review for the operation along with the use of trained and skilled planners aided the overall approach. The independent and objective overview provided by the National Policing Improvement Agency also supported the planning phase of the operation.

Marine Support was used to great affect, with excellent liaison with other local units, the Ministry of Defence and the Port authority. The learning in this area which included very positive and appropriate use of legislation in partnership with the Harbour Master needs to be captured for all similar future operations. Having a dedicated Bronze with the Marine Support would have added further value to this very successful aspect of the operation.

Although some negative comments were passed in relation to the dissemination of Silver's policing intention and tactics, the tactical plan was recognised as being good with no breach to Kingsnorth Power Station. Some comment was made that officers did not feel that they knew and understood the whole policing plan. It was not necessary or desirable for all officers to know the policing plan as this may have undermined the tactical approach. The Silver Commander ensured that where necessary officers understood the plan as it related to their area of operational deployment.

The inclusion of a roads policing strategy as part of the overall policing plan delivered a very effective disruptive tactic towards protesters. Kent

Police very effectively deployed Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) Interceptor Teams along the strategic road network leading to the Camp which worked extremely well. This was made all the more effective in the additional support provided by Essex Police's ANPR Interceptor Teams.

The mobilisation and deployment of PSU's from the accommodation venue to the THA worked very well. This approach which was supported by appropriate escort vehicles ensured that PSU's arrived in a timely and joined up way. The value of this service should not be underestimated bearing in mind the number of mutual aid forces deployed to support Kent Police throughout this operation.

Early liaison the Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) to exploring and utilise their specialist technical assets proved useful.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

1. Kent Police and the wider Police Service should ensure that all commanders involved in a public order policing operation must be suitably and appropriately trained and accredited to Initial (Bronze) and Advanced (Silver and Gold) Public Order Commander level. The training and accreditation process encompassed within this programme would minimise a number of the problems and difficulties that have been highlighted throughout this debrief process associated with:
 - Command protocols
 - Policing style
 - Media strategy
 - Appropriate use of legislation
 - Resourcing
 - Briefing
 - Ensuring compliance with the nationally recognised planning process i.e. strategic planning group and tactical planning meeting as per the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace enabling fuller liaison and understanding between all roles and inclusion of partners.

The above areas are fully and specifically identified in Keeping the Peace under 'strategic considerations' and some are reiterated and reinforced under 'tactical considerations' and 'planning'.

2. For future operations Kent Police along with hosting forces for future Camps for Climate Action should consider the inclusion of a comprehensive search strategy within their policing operation which includes any appropriate tactical parameters, style, appropriate and suitable legislation and resourcing to ensure tactical delivery and understanding by those tasked with implementing it.

3. Kent Police may also wish to review the extent to which the policing strategy and any subsequent tactical plan considered specific legal powers including the Human Rights Act 1998.
4. Kent Police should consider that officers responsible for operational planning attend a nationally recognised and auditable training course for this discipline such as the Operational Planning Course run by NPIA.
5. The provision of a suitable Silver Control Room appropriately equipped is vital for the effective command and control of an operation of this scale. Kent Police may wish to review their present facilities.
6. Kent Police should ensure that they have appropriately trained communication staff who are not only technically competent but have some occupational competence within public order to deal with the demands placed upon them by an operation of this complexity.
7. The sitting of the intelligence function away from the briefing site caused unnecessary loss and delaying of the intelligence and briefing inputs. Kent Police should review this approach together with their capacity to process intelligence and information dynamically.
8. Kent Police and hosting forces for future Camps for Climate Action may wish to consider the introduction of a 'shadowing' programme to accommodate officers who are seeking to develop their professional competence in a command role in a dynamic public order environment. This programme should be appropriately documented and agreed with officers so that they fully understand their role.

9. The Kent Police practice of locating a local officer with good knowledge and understanding of mobilisation protocols within PNICC thereby establishing very early liaison between the home force and mutual aid force was seen as good practice and is recommended nationally as such.
10. Kent Police successfully complied with many key aspects of the *Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP 2006)* and accompanying *Matrix (2007)* resulting in minimal logistical problems. Supplying forces need to ensure similar strict compliance with these principles and any deviation should be negotiated and agreed in advance. The ACPO Lead for PNMP should remind forces of their requirement to release officers to attend pre-event briefings and familiarisation exercises.
11. Kent Police's approach towards the preparation of a comprehensive map surrounding Kingsnorth Power Station illustrating Sites of Special Scientific Interest and then served on the protester groups was seen as providing a real tactical advantage to the police. This consideration is advocated as good practice for future operations.
12. The Kent Police Marine Unit adopted some first class working practices and established close relationship with the Harbour Master in order to invoke appropriate, proportionate and necessary legislation and powers. This is recommended as good practice and should be shared nationally by the ACPO Diving and Marine Working Group.
13. The role of the Basic Mobilisation Unit Commander in the PNMP should be reviewed and considered how this role fits into the command structure. In a pre-planned event of this scale the introduction of a further level of command may be unnecessary and cause confusion. The ACPO Lead for PNMP should have responsibility to review this and factor the findings into the ACPO commissioned review of PNMP.

14. The Police Service through the ACPO Public Order Working Group should consider its approach towards public order policing in adopting a more robust manner towards the inclusion of public order specific legislation and other key legislation as part of their public order training regime.
15. ACPO Public Order Working Group should address the discrepancies and variations in public order tactics and the subsequent lack of understanding of roles by reinforcing the requirements for forces to train too and adopt common national public order standards.
16. The ACPO Public Order Working Group commissioned review of the National Public Order Tactical Advisors programme which together with an embedded process of ongoing professional development will provide trained officers with up to date relevant competencies, skills and knowledge.
17. To enhance the knowledge, understanding and delivery of public order tactics along with an understanding of the capabilities of PSU's all Public Order Bronze Commanders should be trained in Level 2 Public Order tactics. This recommendation should be considered by the ACPO Public Order Working Group with suitable advice circulated nationally.

APPENDIX A - COMMAND

QUESTION 1: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, did not go well and needs further development and/or improvement?

BCU duty planners need better support, training and management. Despite detailed and meticulous human resource planning by Oasis team, poor local duty planning caused problems.

Force HR technology hinders accurate and timely mobilisation, duty recording and overtime management.

Kent Police media services staff need a pro-active operational role in order to coordinate and manage media expectations, without exposing police officers to interview and challenge 'in the field' by intrusive reporters and camera crews.

Local collaborative arrangements with Essex Police need refinement.
(Principal Planner)

Continuity of policing by different forces, i.e. stop and search.

Maintaining police presence within camp.

Role of silver to bronze, found that tactics were being dictated that couldn't be enforced, i.e. told to get patrol regime onto camp and what or how to do not possible.

Protest liaison bronze contradicted camp bronze tactics.
(Day Camp Public Order TA)

Gold liaison/direction appeared lacking in build-up, but as end result was positive, perhaps not!

Further liaison with partners during planning phase.

Unnecessary difficulties created by PFI during planning phase.
(Deputy Planner & TA to Silver)

Daily briefing – both content and delivery.

Interpretation of command responsibility for visiting commanders.

Properly seized during the search regime was not controlled or collated properly.

(Night Duty Silver TA/National Mobilisation Planner for Op Oasis)

The command structure at bronze level – some forces found it difficult to take directions from a bronze commander who was of a lower rank than the 'sub bronze'.

Clarity of communications – on occasion the request for an active comeback from the operator, i.e. the request went round in a circle without any actions.

The pre event liaison between the police and demobilisation worked well, but once the operation went 'live' some of the actions of protesters caused some issues for officers on the ground, i.e. return of some of the terms that were seized.

A more robust media strategy.

Pre planned strategy around seizure of property.
(Dayshift Campsite Bronze)

Timeline – we should have begun perhaps 2 days earlier than we did. Activity/protesters arrived before Oasis fully kicked in.

Communication of strategy – as a bronze commander it would have been beneficial at the commencement of each deployment to understand silver's day to day strategy/tactics and how they were thinking. This was not always clear to bronzes and in my view could have been shared. (This has now been explained by silver at the debrief).

Clearer resource requirement – some duty planners have said that better information/detail needed on resource requirement which they claimed were unclear/not specific enough.

March 9/8 tactical issues – 1 PSU for escorting the march of 400-600 people was not enough. Needed a minimum of 4 PSUs (to understand the wider picture). Difficulties on return from Lingsnorth. KAJ serials held/stuck at the rally stage. Possibly used by bronze rally and shouldn't have been or physically got stuck w/I the rally meaning they could not escort the return march which was strung out and difficult to control. Helicopter issued wrong sky shots to disperse prior to 1300/agreed time. It was disproportionate to mentioned long batons. I understand this was an error.

Proportion of female officers (MAST trained) – insufficient at times to carry out large number of searches.

(Bronze)

Communications – too many radio channels and how to communicate with outside resources, i.e. marine as silver control had problems at times knowing who was where, in particular on red/side.

Command – BMU bronze commander changing plan. Role not rank.

Command resilience – loss of commander due to birth.

(Tactical Advisor)

Although I am trained in direct protest and have awareness of the other specialist resources, it is important to be cited on exam capabilities.

Limitations on availability of specialist resources.

Limitations on handling of media.

Dispatcher would have been beneficial.

(Tactical Advisor Specialist Resources)

Clarity of roles of PSU C/Insp/call signs and communication of this to officers.

Lines of communication between commanders particularly protestor liaison and camp, and effective briefing of decision making where it impacts on other commanders.

All command roles to be staffed 24/7.

Better briefing to all staff deployed and not solely reliant on cascade.

(Bronze Camp Nights)

Structure and resilience in liaison team – still make up to consider negotiation skills.

Concentrate on decision making process with protestor liaison team.

National development of the role.

(Bronze – Protestor Liaison)

Tours of duty has been changed weeks prior to deployment but none of the Welsh forces had been informed.

Kent mobiles were allocated and signed for yet on contacting silver they never know the number.

Change of tour meant first meal of day was at FOP at midday – not satisfactory.

Silver allocating a BMU to point 1 and not informing me when I was in command of that search point. Too many resources lead to confusion.

More clarity once deployment channels during briefing.

(Bronze 7)

Force wide understanding of the scale of an operation this size – including risk of not getting it right first time, complexity, resource demand etc.

During deployment need to invest in the right people to provide briefings and operational updates – some operational officers needed to be brought out of PSU mentality.

Opportunity to debate, interpret, discuss Gold strategy and how it may be interpreted on the ground.

Force wide resource management.

Media need to go further forward.

(Night Silver Commander)

Officers' knowledge of powers and policy basic policing skills. Tactical plan everyone assume they had a right to know it. (Forgot we are police officers – basic skills).

Property seizure and recording (we simply underestimated the task).

Interference from outside the command structure by people who had no understood the complexity/enormity of task.

PSU groupies and wildcards.

(Silver Commander)

QUESTION 2: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, went well and should be highlighted as good practice for future operations?

Scrutiny committee programme.

Embedded Kent Police officer at PNICC.

Protester liaison and negotiation.

NPOIU involvement and FIT development.

Community, business, partners and farmer liaison.

Early investment in planning provides significant operational time cost dividends."

(Principal Planner)

Warrant executed, deprived protesters of resources.

Search regime, persons and around camp and route.

Liaison between camp and FITs NPIOU manager PS Sully.

(Day Camp Public Order TA)

Embedded officer at PNICC.
Dedicated, well resourced planning team.
Scrutiny group consultation."
(Deputy Planner & TA to Silver)

During the planning stage placing a rep at PNICC.
Time spent planning and investigating who was 'best in class' especially for specialist roles.
Search regime.
Scrutiny group.
(Night Duty Silver TA/National Mobilisation Planner for Op Oasis)

The expectation of a search warrant on the camp site.
Remote vehicle search site.
A 'robust' firm but fair style of policing.
The intelligence provided by FIT teams.
Support from silver.
Use of legislation – particularly traffic.
(Dayshift Campsite Bronze)

The national pre-brief/familiarisation/briefing days for all commanders. In my view this is essential for future such operations.
The THA and associated logistics were excellent. Feedback from internal and external officers received to this effect.
Use of the city and S Wales horses was invaluable on the marches. Their tactical ability afforded significant advantage.
Good pre planning/early dialogue with METpol re 'caravan' as it crossed MET into Kent was very helpful, including formal cross border protocol.
(Bronze)

Good liaison with EON security.
CCTV specifically for site controlled by police from site.
(Tactical Advisor)

Selecting diverse protest teams that were multi-skilled and covered the range of possible options.
Having stables at THA meant that the mounted unit could function longer.
(Tactical Advisor Specialist Resources)

Pre-briefing to visiting commanders.
Autonomy to meet silvers plan.
Enthusiasm and creativity brought by other commanders."
(Bronze Camp Nights)

Pre meeting with protestor liaison team, multi agency meeting, communication methods.
Development of the role – the role itself.
(Bronze – Protestor Liaison)

Running of THA FOP was very good.
Robust stop/search policy.
(Bronze 7)

Get the best people engaged in planning as early as possible.

Protestor liaison.

Benefit in heavy investment in facilities, food, kit, accommodation was key for such a long deployment.

Disruption to prevent crime and disorder.

(Night Silver Commander)

Briefing.

Logistics.

Tactical plan.

Policy.

Protester liaison/negotiation.

H&S risk assessment.

FIT.

TCGs.

NPIA (critical friend) – Essex MPD.

Relationship with CJ system.

Key staff in key roles.

Mutual aid.

Sites special scientific interest.

Regatta.

(Silver Commander)

QUESTION 3: The two key areas for my role/department to develop for the future are?

PNMP compliance.

Local mobilisation planning.

(Principal Planner)

Bronze to be more involved in planning decisions already made to how and resources therefore not able action bronze tactics.

Protester liaison to be more inline with bronze tactics, the contradicted bronze tactics.

(Day Camp Public Order TA)

Ensure a TA is present during all operational briefings.

(Deputy Planner & TA to Silver)

Comprehensive briefing packages delivered by experienced tactical officers.

"The development of effective communication staff in public order operations.

(Night Duty Silver TA/National Mobilisation Planner for Op Oasis)

Command resilience (training/accreditation).

Personal resilience.

(Dayshift Campsite Bronze)

Ensure there are sufficient PSU commanders (Inspectors) trained to deploy as ground commanders (weed 'up and coming' sgts/Insp now).
As above in relation to IPOC/APOC to ensure this in Kent there needs to be a change in policy and/or incentivisation.
(Bronze)

Improved officer knowledge of legislation/powers.
(Tactical Advisor)

Diverse protest capability – limited at present.
(Tactical advisor specialist resources)

Closer liaison between protestor liaison and camp commanders.
(Bronze Camp Nights)

Development of good practice.
Consideration of team, structure and composition of particular skills.
(Bronze – Protestor Liaison)

More clarity re direct comms with silver.
(Bronze 7)

Command resilience.
Briefing.
(Night Silver Commander)

Resilience (balance leadership/role).
Capability and capacity (organisational, APOC/IPOC).
(Silver Commander)

QUESTION 4: Any further comments would be appreciated.

Please facilitate liaison with the next force to pass on good practice/tactics/advice.
(Principal Planner)

Future operations – consider use of Gurkhas for security of tactical holding area.
(Bronze)

Facilities for the specialists were very good THA etc.
(Tactical Advisor Specialist Resources)

The success of the operation was based on the success of the planning team.
(Night Silver Commander)

There is a need to resolve funding rules and arrangements for operations of this sort. Sort out mutual aid – Hertfordshire agreement?
(Silver Commander)

APPENDIX B – SILVER SUPPORT, LOGISTICS, THA'S

QUESTION 1: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, did not go well and needs further development and/or improvement?

Communication within room as to policing tactics and changes.
Specific control of specialist units.
Briefing of commanders as to our roles.
(FIT Controller – Silver)

Availability of bespoke Silver control facilities (large incident protracted).
More trained staff for altas ops command and control or do not use and silver trained staff.
Use of PFI facilities organisational/logistical issues.
Planning team, not big enough (day job v operation).
(Silver Coordinator (days))

Communications on the days of the event.
Briefing on initial deployments – overview.
Policy/procedure/legislation – dissemination to troops on ground, eg searching.
(Event Planning Sgt)

Financial arrangements for mutual aid and parity for forces travelling is required within PNMP.
Property seizure and returns.
Provision of 'out of hours' service for support systems, media, engineering services, pol fed.
Legislation briefing in early days not robust enough to provide officers with confidence to complete task. Message was addressed immediately by briefing team.
(Silver Staff)

Standard of limited briefing process was poor. No initial over 'why you were here' – strategic overview missing. Not sighted on tactical briefing etc. Also all logistical issues, equipment issue should be dealt with on initial welcome day.
Accommodation liaison. MPs were self sufficient Kent ended up dealing with other forces' problems, eg City. Home force should have dedicated staff to assist visiting focus/BMUs.
Degree of lack of clarity with whom we were dealing with in home force. Some confusion due to assumptions of role of Kent staff which differ from MPS.
(Resources Coordinator)

Tasking/deployment information were not available to BMU/PSU commanders, as intended. This resulted in excess queries in the logistics function.

The extent of searching was not understood from the outset and this resulted in a lag in terms of logistics provision at the main search location. Property seized was underestimated.

The planning element for logistics was under-resourced in the planning team and this translated to high demands immediately prior to the operation commencing.

The logistics function must enjoy a 3 shift approach as 2 x 12 hour shifts became very long for officers when travel is added."

(Bronze Logistics)

The interface between the briefing function and intelligence function was not slick enough because we were sighted at two different locations.

Intelligence flow/briefing material from intel was too slow for such a dynamic operation. Material being provided for the briefing was sometimes out of date.

Audit trails for items in the briefing were hampered due to the different locations of silver/intel and briefing."

(In charge of Briefing session)

Dispatch of officers from silver control.

Property capture and storage.

Intelligence cell – needs to be located with briefing.

Comment on several police blogs – negative round the lack of visible presence of ACPO officers at THA/campsite/ground.

(Briefing Deputy Bronze)

I felt there would have been better placed as THA to prepare delivery of briefings for tactical deployment.

Some visiting forces did not send a representative to pre-brief day that caused issues on initial deployment.

Tactics/roles, ie EGT/FIT, must be standardised. Too many interpretations at a time.

(ITPOU Sgt)

QUESTION 2: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, went well and should be highlighted as good practice for future operations?

Receptive commanders to information and intelligence.

Willingness of Kent staff to cost involved and carry out duties to the best of their ability. Involving NPOIU in whole process.

(FIT Controller – Silver)

Good prep planning – regular planning meetings, weekly, structured and disciplined.

Silver command and command and control structure went well. Good silver commander, disciplined meetings. Engagement with force T&CG process. THA/briefing facility went especially well.

(Silver Coordinator (days))

Early discussions with the Oasis planning team.

Lessons learnt from climate camp 2007 were taken aboard.

Catering.

(Event Planning Sgt)

Embedded staff at PNICC to support mobilisation.

Catering and welfare for attending staff.

Community engagement.

Peer review – Essex – NPIA; table top; scrutiny group; QA process.

(Silver Staff)

THA process worked well. Large, good standard of accommodation.

Surface for vehicle maintenance etc very good. Staff very helpful.

Support for MPS staff went very well with good liaison with Kent.

Accommodation team worked very well.

Good liaison with Kent in general.

(Resources Coordinator)

The FOS/THA provision based on an umbrella contract with an expert contractor for events meant the systems were established rather than reinvented.

The provision of dedicated security (via contract) prevented/reduced likelihood of THA compromise and reduced unnecessary use of police resources.

(Bronze Logistics)

The close working relationships of logistics and briefing were excellent in resolving many issues.

Thorough planning enable a robust set up to be put in place. Allowed time to put in place all needed.

Closing Kent Police College for resources ensured the briefing function ran smoothly and effectively.

Correctly skilled staff in specific roles was highly effective. Briefers, Intel, admin, IT etc and team leader.

(In charge of Briefing session)

Staff performed their role as briefers and logistics officers professionally reflected well at Kent Police.

Force – policing of the main march was good (appropriate level of officers and community approach).

Production of the welcome to Kent pack.

IT expertise/disclosure expertise and regime.

(Briefing Deputy Bronze)

Briefing packs and model.

Functional bronzes in specialist areas eg power station and camp site.
(ITPOU Sgt)

QUESTION 3: The two key areas for my role/department to develop for the future are?

Learn from briefing and employ proper intelligence briefings.

Identify intelligence gaps.

(FIT Controller – Silver)

Review of force silver control facilities, staffing and training.

Decision around command and control, do not mix storm with altas ops command and control systems.

(Silver Coordinator (days))

Intelligence – new tactics etc.

(Event Planning Sgt)

Financial accounting post op.

(Silver Staff)

Ensure close links with home force to ensure clarity of roles and expectations both from home force and of us.

Tighten up internal MPS procedures to ensure conformity of response.
(Resources Coordinator)

TCU function within the THA if physically removed from silver control.

“Exit strategy for FOB/THP decommissioning.”

(Bronze logistics)

Ensuring robust IT and fast systems.

Link with intel is vital – it needs to be closer/slicker.

(In charge of briefing session)

Tactical plans to be presented much earlier so that briefing slides could have been prepared earlier.

Combine briefing/logistics function.

(Briefing Deputy Bronze)

Tactical briefing officer.

(ITPOU Sgt)

QUESTION 4: Any further comments would be appreciated.

In general, highly professional and motivated commanders and officers (Kent especially) ensured that this was a very successful operation. Planning before had was key thorough and well thought out. Innovative use of legislation for disruption especially traffic.

(FIT Controller – Silver)

Generally from a logistics support aspect Kent did policy well and were ready to learn from our experience and develop their own ideas as well. Most important of all whoever inherits climate camp 2009 needs to talk to Kent and MPS to learn lessons of previous climate camps.

(Resources Coordinator)

The logistics function received overwhelmingly positive comment and I am proud to have led such a professional team.

(Bronze Logistics)

Database of roles/responsibilities and staff experienced in those roles should be created.

Officer safety staff should provide first aid cover to cut the costs of the operation.

(Briefing Deputy Bronze)

APPENDIX C – INTELLIGENCE, CUSTODY, FIT AND CRIME SUPPORT

QUESTION 1: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, did not go well and needs further development and/or improvement?

Intel cell training – since 7/7 ACPO TAM has been reviewing the CT/OE moved and training has largely been suspended.

Data quality – details/information on PACE1/S60 forms was incomplete/poor. FIT debrief needed clarity about identity.

Logistics – duty planning, accommodation 5x5 inputting and structure of briefings all lead to frustrations and lost opportunities.

(Director of Intelligence)

Communication lines from others on the ground through to custody on the main day of action (SAT) – command and control.

Considering the needs of vegan D/P re toiletries/food.

Adequate equipment in custody.

Support required for other teams/teams/parts of the business (IT) (Livescan) (PNC).

(SCJD T/CI)

Clarity in the cost recovery issues between forces. Complicated – Hertfordshire agreement, ie officers time and wages only or additional admin charges etc.

Common standard for all public order training nationally, ie what is a PSU/FIT team etc.

Atlas ops?

(PNICC)

Command and control was at times a bit confusing, ie trying to get other resources deployed to assist our units.

Briefing was initially an issue but improved as event developed.

Communication around what other policing units were doing and planning was not always as good as it could be.

(Fit Coordinator in silver)

QUESTION 2: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, went well and should be highlighted as good practice for future operations?

Close working of intelligence assets (preparatory and on the day, is my role).

Structured and detailed planning (of all functions over protracted person).

High level of commitment and clarity of purpose (early ownership by ACPs and silver).

(Director of Intelligence)

Adequate number of cells for Oasis prisoner – due to planning/prep/briefing to staff.

Did not impact on area business – use of US custody suite.

Custody resources/staffing spot on.

Dedicated custody Inspector.

(SCJD T/CI)

The placing of an officer from the planning team in the PNICC officer with direct links into Kent (finance).

Kent using their own contacts regionally to source (scope) availability of specialist resources.

(PNICC)

FIT deployment was highly effective and gained good intelligence and disruption.

Willingness of commanders to listen to or seek advice before making decision.

(Fit Coordinator in Silver)

QUESTION 3: The two key areas for my role/department to develop for the future are?

"Ops room training.

"Data quality improvement processes.

(Director of Intelligence)

Vegan issues to be consolidated in more detail.

Familiarisation for custody staff.

(SCJD T/CI)

Better recording of what skills each force has and accurate numbers (currently under way with national skills audit).

(PNICC)

Stronger suggestions around briefing.

Redeployment of assets.

(Fit Coordinator in Silver)

QUESTION 4: Any further comments would be appreciated.

Although formal identification processes were not required, the possibilities of potential demand may need to be considered in future circumstances.

(Identification Officer)

APPENDIX D – PSU COMMANDERS

QUESTION 1: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, did not go well and needs further development and/or improvement?

Briefing of tactical plans and strategies to outside commander, ie Kent and internal BCU reps were present during the day of bronze commanders individual briefings. Outside commanders questioned tactical parts of plans which had been QA'd previously – this delayed actions on the ground.

Remote search point – not properly planned, resourced or thought through. Audit trail of decisions, continuity of seizure policy, audit trail of property seized that stands up to scrutiny.

Tasking information booklet – details of what was required at a given point including expectations, H&S RA, tactical options etc.
(Bronze Site/Camp ND)

Better briefing of all staff in tent of what to expect and their role.

Arrest/process strategy did not include non-crime matters, ie EBA, disqual drivers, warrant arrests.

Communicational between different areas of responsibility.
(Bronze Traffic)

Earlier involvement with RPU issues in conjunction with public order tactics to realise full potential of role.

Consider resource implications of the exit strategy to deal with resolution of normality (vehicles returned to locations).

Management understanding of the scale of mobilisation of vehicles and importance of fleet manager (dedicated).

Property issues need far more consideration.
(Traffic Sgt)

Support during planning phase. I was left to plan on my own due to specialist nature of role and environment – senior commanders do not fully understand role.

Briefing specific to water environment.

Specialist commanders that understand role and tactics and environment etc.

Practice of tactics.

(Marine Unit Bronze)

Communication between forces – liaise with other forces. Be given time to get to know geographical area. Area not happy to release officers for recces.

(Tac Ad)

Points brought up to silver comm. During planning about contingencies for early arrival of camp and request for extra resources to be available.

Silver control not tracking deployments and unable to update commanders with current deployments.

Structure of responsibility not made clear. BMU commanders being called bronze confused responsibilities.

Briefing overview not given should have had a tactical overview.

(Tac Ad to Camp Commander)

Visibility of the command team.

Briefing of the tactical plan (what was it?).

Lack of updates/intelligence of daily briefings.

(Day duty BMU commander of 3MPS PSUs)

QUESTION 2: What aspects of the operation, from your own role/force perspective, went well and should be highlighted as good practice for future operations?

Embed officer in PNIICC.

Good planning team process.

(Peer review)

Enthusiasm and commitment, experience, behaviour, professionalism or commanders and resources provided.

TSG ND.

Dedicated command and planning teams.

Early involvement with partners and community.

Support from HOSDB re technical equipment.

Cooperation with SECO and security partners group.

THA – organisation, food, infrastructure, support was excellent.

BMU commanders bring their own vehicle, driver and staff officer and tac advisor – latter subject to SOP and agreement.

(Bronze Site/Camp ND)

Use of traffic legislation to disrupt protestor activity.

Traffic officer part of the planning team – working with partners.

Planning – many advantages of utilizing experience of other forces in these type of events.

(Bronze Traffic)

Roads policing officers potential in dealing with public order situations/events.

Ability to significantly disrupt protesters through use of vehicles/traffic law.

Transport services, vehicle maintenance, fleet.

(Traffic Sgt)

Mutual aid – between marine units co-ops with agencies – port authority.

Special directive by Harlow master launch as command platform.

(Marine Unit Bronze)

Logistics.

Working with other forces.

(Tac Ad)

Logistics – well set up and run.
Operational deployment by officers swift and professional.
(Tac Ad to Camp Commander)

A good tactical plan devised for the power station and there was no effective breach – success.
Very good support mechanism at THA, accommodation and associated activity/issues.
(Day Duty BMU Commander of 3MPS PSUs)

QUESTION 3: The two key areas for my role/department to develop for the future are?

Communications – Airwaves use and operations experience; directory of call signs, telephone numbers, forces etc; briefing.
Specialist resources – numbers and availability eg marine, TSG, dogs – partnership working and mutual aid exercises.
Personally – command training, debating and understanding of tactics, experience, knowledge.
(Bronze Site/Camp ND)

To be aware that involvement in direct hostilities may be more than less likely.
(Traffic Sgt)

Mutual training and tactics.
(Marine Unit Bronze)

From a TA perspective get to know area.
Work with other forces.
(Tac Ad)

Don't assume knowledge from other forces – ensure tacticians involved in planning.
(Tac Ad to Camp Commander)

Command protocols between forces.
MPS internal command structure.
(Day Duty BMU Commander of 3MPS PSUs)

QUESTION 4: Any further comments would be appreciated.

Resources available were fitted to the problem whereas the problem should identify the resources.
(Bronze Site/Camp ND)

Convoys assisted greatly for discipline and timeliness of deployments.
(Traffic Sgt)