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Tenth
emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem
and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory
|
Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant
to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10
Summary
This report
was prepared on the basis of General Assembly
resolution ES-10/10, adopted on 7 May 2002, in which the Assembly
requested the Secretary-General to present a report, drawing upon the
available resources and information, on the recent events that took
place in Jenin and other Palestinian cities. The General Assembly requested
the report following the disbandment of the United Nations fact-finding
team that had been convened by the Secretary-General in response to
Security Council
resolution 1405 (2002) (2002) of 19 April 2002.
The report was written without a visit to Jenin or the other Palestinian
cities in question and it therefore relies completely on available resources
and information, including submissions from five United Nations Member
States and Observer Missions, documents in the public domain and papers
submitted by non-governmental organizations. The Under-Secretary-General
for Political Affairs wrote to the Permanent Representative of Israel
and the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations requesting
them to submit information but only the latter did so. In the absence
of a response from Israel, the United Nations has relied on public statements
of Israeli officials and publicly available documents of the Government
of Israel relevant to the request in resolution ES-10/10.
This report covers the period from approximately the beginning of March
to 7 May 2002. The report sets out the context and background of the
situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
the security, humanitarian and human rights responsibilities of both
parties. It briefly charts the rising violence since September 2000,
which had by 7 May 2002 caused the deaths of 441 Israelis and 1,539
Palestinians.
The report describes the pattern of attacks carried out by Palestinian
armed groups against Israel operating from the West Bank and Israel's
military action during Operation Defensive Shield, which began on 29
March with an incursion into Ramallah, followed by entry into Tulkarm
and Qalqilya on 1 April, Bethlehem on 2 April, and Jenin and Nablus
on 3 April. By 3 April, six of the largest cities in the West Bank,
and their surrounding towns, villages and refugee camps, had been occupied
by the Israeli military. Operation Defensive Shield was characterized
by extensive curfews on civilian populations and restrictions, indeed
occasional prohibitions, on the movement of international personnel,
including at times humanitarian and medical personnel as well as human
rights monitors and journalists. In many instances, humanitarian workers
were not able to reach people in need. Combatants on both sides conducted
themselves in ways that, at times, placed civilians in harm's way. Much
of the fighting during Operation Defensive Shield occurred in areas
heavily populated by civilians and in many cases heavy weaponry was
used. As a result of those practices, the populations of the cities
covered in this report suffered severe hardships. The Israeli Defence
Forces announced the official end of the operation on 21 April but its
consequences lasted until the end of the period under review and beyond.
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution ES-10/10 adopted
on 7 May 2002 by the General Assembly at its tenth emergency special
session. In paragraph 6 of the resolution the Assembly requested the
Secretary-General to present a report, drawing upon the available resources
and information, on the recent events that took place in Jenin and other
Palestinian cities.
II. Security Council resolution 1405 (2002)
2. On 19 April 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
1405 (2002), in which it welcomed my initiative to develop accurate
information regarding recent events in the Jenin refugee camp through
a fact-finding team. This resolution was tabled in the Council by the
delegation of the United States of America following telephone conversations
that I had with Israel's Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers at their
initiative, during which I was assured that Israel would cooperate fully
with the team that I would designate.
3. Pursuant to resolution 1405 (2002), on 22 April 2002, I established
a fact-finding team composed of Martti Ahtisaari, Sadako Ogata and Cornelio
Sommaruga. Headed by Mr. Ahtisaari, the team's members also included
four senior advisers: Major General (ret.) William Nash, as Military
Adviser; Deputy Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, as Police Adviser; Ambassador
Tyge Lehmann, as Legal Adviser; and Helena Ranta, as Medical/Legal Adviser.
In addition, the team was provided with technical expertise in military,
security and counter-terrorism issues, as well as forensic science and
general support staff. The team gathered at Geneva and began to prepare
a work plan based on three elements: (a) events in Jenin in the period
immediately prior to Israel's military operation; (b) the battle in
Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield; and (c) efforts by humanitarian
workers to gain access to the civilian population in Jenin after the
end of hostilities.
4. After the appointment of the members of the team, the Government
of Israel raised a number of concerns regarding the work of the team
that made its timely deployment impossible and led me to disband the
team. On 1 May 2002 I sent a letter to the President of the Security
Council (S/2002/504) describing my efforts to implement resolution 1405
(2002), which read, in part:
(a) I instructed that the team should gather in Geneva on 24 April and
proceed to the area on 25 April. However, soon after I announced my
plan to deploy the team, the Government of Israel began to express concerns
related to the composition of the team, the scope of its mandate, how
this mandate would be carried out and various procedural matters. At
the request of the Government of Israel, I agreed that the Secretariat
would meet with a delegation from Israel and listen to Israel's concerns
and engage in a clarificatory process. I set back the arrival of the
team in the area to 27 April.
(b) The discussions with the Israeli delegation were held in a very
constructive atmosphere on 25 and 26 April. By the time the Israeli
delegation was able to report back on the results of those meetings,
the Sabbath had begun in Israel. The Foreign Minister of Israel informed
me that the Israeli Cabinet would address the issue at its scheduled
meeting on 28 April and requested that the team delay its arrival for
another day. I acceded to this request and the Under-Secretary-General
for Political Affairs briefed the Security Council accordingly.
(c) On 27 April, I spoke on the telephone with the Prime Minister of
Israel, after which I dispatched letters to the Permanent Representative
of Israel and the Permanent Observer of Palestine setting out the parameters
of work of the team. These letters were circulated to Security Council
members on the same day. The Permanent Representative of Israel sent
me a reply late on 27 April, in which he put forward several concerns
on the part of his Government. The Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs responded orally to the Permanent Representative of Israel.
(d) On 28 April, the Israeli Cabinet did not reach a decision on the
fact-finding team; I was informed by Israel that the matter would be
reviewed by the Cabinet at a meeting the following day. The Secretariat
briefed the Security Council on the information I had received on 28
April, and the Council agreed that the President of the Council would
express its continuing support for my efforts to implement resolution
1405 (2002).
(e) The Israeli Cabinet did not meet on 29 April. Instead, I was informed
by the Permanent Representative of Israel that the Cabinet had scheduled
a meeting for early on 30 April. The Secretariat briefed the Security
Council accordingly.
(f) Israel's Ministerial Committee on National Security (the Security
Cabinet) met early on 30 April, after which it issued the following
statement: "Israel has raised essential issues before the United
Nations for a fair examination. As long as these terms have not been
met, it will not be possible for the clarification process to begin."
In the absence of a formal indication of the terms on which the Government
of Israel would cooperate with the fact-finding team, this statement
was reviewed against the backdrop of various public statements by, and
telephone conversations that I held with, senior Israeli officials.
I was drawn reluctantly to the conclusion that, while continuing to
express its concerns to the United Nations mainly in the form of procedural
issues, Israel had developed concerns about Security Council resolution
1405 (2002) that were fundamental in nature.
(g) Throughout this process, the United Nations has made every effort
to accommodate the concerns of the Government of Israel within the mandate
given to me by the Security Council. It was made quite clear that the
team was tasked specifically to develop information about the recent
events in Jenin and that the facts established would be used solely
for its report to me. In my view, the team would have conducted its
assignment in the field in a professional and fair manner and produced
an accurate, thorough, balanced and credible report.
(h) Clearly the full cooperation of both sides was a precondition for
this, as was a visit to the area itself to see the Jenin refugee camp
at first hand and to gather information. This is why the Secretariat
engaged in a thorough clarification process with the Israeli delegation.
(i) In the light of yesterday's announcement by the Government of Israel,
it seems evident that the team will not be able to proceed to the area
and begin its mission in the near future. While I have not received
any further written communication from the Israeli Government since
27 April, in my telephone conversations over the past two days, high-level
Israeli officials have broached issues additional to those raised by
the delegation that came to New York last week and there have been indications
that this list may not be exhaustive.
(j) As the Secretariat noted in its briefings to the Council, time is
also a critical factor. With the situation in the Jenin refugee camp
changing by the day, it will become more and more difficult to establish
with any confidence or accuracy the "recent events" that took
place there.
(k) For these reasons, it is my intention to disband the fact-finding
team tomorrow. I regret being unable to provide the information requested
by the Council in resolution 1405 (2002), and especially that the long
shadow cast by recent events in the Jenin refugee camp will remain in
the absence of such a fact-finding exercise.
5. On 3 May 2002 I disbanded the team. In writing to the President of
the Security Council to inform him of this, I expressed my deep appreciation
to President Ahtisaari, Mrs. Ogata, Mr. Sommaruga and all the members
of the team for their efforts to support my actions intended to implement
resolution 1405 (2002). I stated that I had every confidence that the
team would have conducted itself in a professional and fair manner in
producing the report requested by the Council.
III. Report prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution ES-10/10
A. Introduction
6. In order to comply with the General Assembly's request in resolution
ES-10/10, on 14 May 2002, the Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs addressed letters to the Permanent Representative of Israel
and the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, requesting
them to submit information relevant to the implementation of that resolution.
In addition, on 14 May 2002, the Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs addressed a note verbale to all other Member States and Observer
Missions requesting the submission of relevant information. On 3 June
2002, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs addressed another
note verbale to Member States and Observer Missions extending the deadline
for submissions to 14 June 2002.
7. On 3 June 2002, in response to the letter of the Under-Secretary-General
for Political Affairs, the Permanent Observer of Palestine submitted
materials regarding recent events in Jenin and other Palestinian cities
(see annex I). In addition, five Member States and Observer Missions
have submitted information, responding to the note verbale of 14 May
(see annexes II-IV). As at the date of submission of this report, the
Government of Israel has not responded to the information request. In
the absence of a response from Israel, the United Nations has relied
on public statements of Israeli officials and other publicly available
documents of the Government of Israel relevant to the request in resolution
ES-10/10.
8. This report covers the period from approximately the beginning of
March to 7 May 2002. In keeping with the request of the General Assembly,
the substantive portion of the report is based on sources of information
available to the United Nations, including those in the public domain
and submitted by non-governmental organizations. The report begins by
setting out the context and background, before describing recent events.
B. Security, humanitarian and human rights responsibilities
9. Subsequent to the signing on 13 September 1993 of the Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, the Government
of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a further
agreement that, inter alia, specified the security-related responsibilities
of the two sides. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip signed on 28 September 1995 by Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization details the mechanisms for the extension
of Palestinian self-rule to portions of the West Bank. The main feature
of the Agreement was the provision for the division of the West Bank
into three areas, each with varying degrees of Israeli and Palestinian
responsibility. Area A consisted of the seven major Palestinian towns
- Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and
Hebron - in which Palestinians would have complete responsibility for
civilian security. In area B, which comprised all other Palestinian
population centres (except for some refugee camps), Israel would retain
"overriding security responsibility". In area C, which includes
all settlements, military bases and areas, and State lands, Israel would
retain sole security responsibility. Area A comprises approximately
10 per cent of the territory of the West Bank.
10. The Interim Agreement also provides that "Israel shall have
the overall responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting
Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism". It states that
"both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent
acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other,
against individuals falling under the other's authority and against
their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders".
11. Israel's obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are set
out in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to which Israel is a High
Contracting Party. Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territory are
"protected persons" under the Convention, which provides that
they may not be wilfully killed, tortured, taken as hostages or suffer
humiliating or degrading treatment. Israel has obligations not to engage
in acts of collective punishment or reprisals and is to refrain from
appropriating or extensively destroying the property of protected persons
unless such destruction is "rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations".
12. The Government of the State of Israel has not, as at the submission
of this report, accepted the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 to all Territory occupied since 1967. Israel has
stated that it has undertaken to comply with the humanitarian provisions
of the Convention in its administration of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory. All other High Contracting Parties, as well as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, maintain that the Convention does apply
de jure to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
13. The Palestinian Authority is obligated under international customary
law to respect human rights, including to refrain from carrying out
attacks against civilians, and is required to prevent groups within
its territory from engaging in such attacks. Thus, the Palestinian Authority
has the responsibility to protect Israeli civilians from attacks, including
suicide bombings, emanating from areas under its security control. Those
Palestinian groups that have carried out attacks against civilians have
also violated the basic international legal principle of the inviolability
of civilian life and property. Acts of terror that take life violate
the right to life set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. In addition, those groups, and other armed personnel,
are prohibited under international humanitarian law from establishing
military bases in densely populated civilian areas.
C. Rising violence
14. Since the outbreak of crisis in September 2000, the origins of which
have been comprehensively set out in the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh
Fact-Finding Committee headed by former Senator George Mitchell, there
has been sustained violence between the parties, fluctuating in intensity,
causing by 7 May 2002 the deaths of 441 Israelis and 1,539 Palestinians.
By the beginning of 2002, the parties were already locked in an accelerating
cycle of violent attacks. This cycle of violence further increased in
intensity through the early months of this year. The violence reached
a high point in the months of March and April, which saw suicide bomb
attacks against Israelis by Palestinian groups increase in frequency,
and two waves of incursions by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) into
Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank, including areas under
the administrative and security responsibility of the Palestinian Authority.
15. On 12 March 2002, after a series of terrorist attacks carried out
by Palestinians earlier in that month, and as the first wave of IDF
incursions into the West Bank was coming to a close, I told the Security
Council in a briefing that I believed that Israeli-Palestinian tensions
were at boiling point and that the situation was the worst in 10 years.
I called on Palestinians to stop all acts of terrorism and all suicide
bombings, stating that such attacks were morally repugnant and caused
harm to their cause. I called on Israelis to stop the bombing of civilian
areas, the extrajudicial killings, the demolitions, and the daily humiliation
of ordinary Palestinians. I asserted that such actions gravely eroded
Israel's international standing and fuelled the fires of hatred, despair
and extremism among Palestinians. Finally, I urged the political leaders
of both peoples - Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat - to lead
their peoples away from disaster.
16. Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis continued, followed
by Israeli military incursions into Palestinian areas. On 4 April, one
week into the second wave of incursions in the West Bank - the Israeli
Defence Forces' Operation Defensive Shield - I again briefed the Security
Council and called on all members of the international community to
consider urgently how best to intercede with the parties to persuade
them to draw back from their present course. I told the Council that
self-defence was not a blank cheque, and that responding to terrorism
did not in any way free Israel from its obligations under international
law, nor did it justify creating a human rights and humanitarian crisis
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Equally, the Palestinian Authority
seemed to believe that failing to act against terrorism, and inducing
turmoil, chaos and instability, would cause the Government and people
of Israel to buckle - which I believed they would not. I called on the
Government of Israel to comply with Security Council resolution 1402
(2002) and withdraw its forces from the Palestinian territory it had
occupied during Operation Defensive Shield. I urged Chairman Arafat
to exercise political leadership and set the course for the future of
his people.
17. On more than one occasion during this very difficult period, I expressed
to the Security Council my view that, despite the fact that bitterness
and despair were at an all-time high on both sides, we all needed to
cling to the conviction that, in the end, however long it would take,
there would one day have to be a peaceful settlement of this conflict.
While the road back to the negotiating table would not be easy or smooth,
both sides, with the help of the international community, must restart
a process based on Security Council resolutions
1397 (2002) and 1402 (2002) which, taken together, provide the vision for a permanent settlement
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the immediate security and political
steps needed to move beyond the present crisis.
18. From the beginning of March until 7 May, Israel endured approximately
16 bombings, the large majority of which were suicide attacks. More
than 100 persons were killed and scores more wounded. Throughout this
period, the Government of Israel, and the international community, reiterated
previous calls on the Palestinian Authority to take steps to stop terrorist
attacks and to arrest the perpetrators of such attacks.
19. During this same period, IDF conducted two waves of military incursions
primarily in the West Bank, and air strikes against both the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. The first wave began on 27 February 2002 and ended
on approximately 14 March. Those incursions, which Israel stated were
in pursuit of Palestinians who had carried out attacks against Israelis,
involved the use of ground troops, attack helicopters, tanks and F-16
fighter jets in civilian areas, including refugee camps, causing significant
loss of life among civilians.
20. Over the course of two days, 8 and 9 March, 18 Israelis were killed
in two separate Palestinian attacks and 48 Palestinians were killed
in the Israeli raids that followed.
21. Israeli military retaliation for terrorist attacks was often carried
out against Palestinian Authority security forces and installations.
This had the effect of severely weakening the Authority's capacity to
take effective action against militant groups that launched attacks
on Israelis. Militant groups stepped into this growing vacuum and increased
their attacks on Israeli civilians. In many cases, the perpetrators
of these attacks left messages to the effect that their acts were explicitly
in revenge for earlier Israeli acts of retaliation, thus perpetuating
and intensifying the cycle of violence, retaliation and revenge.
22. It was against this backdrop that the most extensive Israeli military
incursions in a decade, Operation Defensive Shield, were carried out.
The proximate cause of the operation was a terrorist attack committed
on 27 March in the Israeli city of Netanya, in which 28 people were
killed and 140 injured. I condemned the terrorist attack from the Beirut
Summit of the League of Arab States as morally repugnant and later described
it to the Security Council as a blow against the very possibility of
coexistence. On 29 March 2002, the Cabinet of the Government of Israel
issued a communiqué approving "a wide-ranging operational
action plan against Palestinian terror" and, to that end, "the
mobilization of reserves as per operational need". The objective
was to "defeat the Palestinian terror infrastructure and to prevent
the recurrence of the multiple terrorist attacks which have plagued
Israel".
D. Operation Defensive Shield
23. Operation Defensive Shield began on 29 March with an incursion into
Ramallah, during which IDF seized most of the buildings in the headquarters
compound of Chairman Arafat. Operations followed in Tulkarm and Qalqilya
on 1 April, Bethlehem on 2 April, and in Jenin and Nablus on 3 April.
By 3 April, six of the largest cities in the West Bank, and their surrounding
towns, villages and refugee camps, were occupied by the Israeli military.
The Israeli Defence Forces announced the official end of the operation
on 21 April as they completed their withdrawal from Nablus and parts
of Ramallah, while continuing negotiations to lift the siege at the
Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The IDF withdrawals from Palestinian
cities were, in general, not to pre-29 March positions, but rather to
positions encircling the cities. Since then, the Israeli Defence Forces
have made additional incursions into many of the Palestinian towns and
cities from which they had withdrawn at the conclusion of Operation
Defensive Shield, and as this report was being prepared had re-entered
many Palestinian towns.
24. A few generally applicable observations can be made about the incursions
during Operation Defensive Shield. In each incursion, Israeli troops,
tanks and armoured personnel carriers entered the cities and IDF imposed
curfews on their civilian populations. In each case, the incursions
were accompanied by the entry of IDF into nearby villages and refugee
camps. The Israeli Defence Forces declared the cities they had entered
"special closed military areas", imposing restrictions on,
and at times completely barring, the movement of international personnel,
including at times humanitarian and medical personnel as well as human
rights monitors and journalists. As a result of these restrictions on
movement, including the round-the-clock curfews that lasted with periodic
liftings throughout the incursions, the civilian populations of the
cities suffered severe hardships, compounded in some places by the extensive
fighting that occurred during the operation. As was the case with the
first wave of incursions from 27 February to 14 March described above,
during Operation Defensive Shield, in many instances, IDF made use of
heavy weaponry in Palestinian civilian areas.
25. In each of these incursions, the Israeli Defence Forces arrested
Palestinians who they believed were involved in armed actions against
Israel, including suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks against
Israeli civilians. IDF also, in most of these incursions, destroyed
infrastructure they believed to be part of the operating capacity of
militant groups, as well as the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority
security services. In addition, widespread damage was caused to the
civilian capacity of the Palestinian Authority and to private property.
26. It was not only the Palestinian people whose movement was restricted
during Operation Defensive Shield. In many instances, humanitarian workers
were not able to reach people in need to assess conditions and deliver
necessary assistance because of the sealing of cities, refugee camps
and villages during the operation. There were also cases of Israeli
forces not respecting the neutrality of medical and humanitarian workers
and attacking ambulances.
27. The Government of Israel has asserted that ambulances were used
to transport Palestinian combatants and weapons; and that the Israeli
Defence Forces have in many instances acted to prevent that misuse.
It has also stated that IDF policy is to allow free passage in cases
of humanitarian need, and that Israeli forces continuously provided
food and medical assistance to the Palestinian population.
28. As a result of the severe restrictions on movement, human rights
workers and journalists were unable to observe the conduct of the parties
and provide independent reporting on that conduct. Some journalists
reported being fired at by members of IDF.
29. There were numerous reports of IDF compelling Palestinian civilians
to accompany them during house searches, check suspicious subjects,
stand in the line of fire from militants and in other ways protect soldiers
from danger. Witnesses claim that this was done in the Jenin camp and
other Palestinian cities. While IDF soldiers have acknowledged in press
reports that they forced Palestinians to knock on doors for house searches,
they deny the deliberate use of civilians as human shields. The Government
of Israel has denied that its military personnel systematically engage
in this practice. In response to a petition filed on 5 May by five Israeli,
Palestinian and international human rights organizations, the State
Attorney's Office of the Government of Israel informed the High Court
of Justice of Israel that "in light of the various complaints received
and so as to avoid all doubt, the [IDF] has decided to immediately
issue an unequivocal order
that forces in the field are absolutely
forbidden to use civilians as a means of 'living shield'".
30. According to local human rights groups, more than 8,500 Palestinians
were arrested between 27 February and 20 May. Reportedly, most of the
2,500 Palestinians arrested during the first wave of incursions in February
and March were released within a week, whereas many of the more than
6,000 Palestinians arrested during Operation Defensive Shield after
29 March were held for longer periods without any outside contact. On
5 April, the Commander of the Israeli Defence Forces in the West Bank
issued Military Order 1500, which gave soldiers the authority to hold
detainees for a period of up to 18 days without access to a lawyer,
family members or judicial review. This type of detention can be extended
by a military judge for up to 90 days. The order was retroactive to
29 March and was valid for 60 days. By 6 May an alleged 7,000 Palestinians
had been arrested under Operation Defensive Shield, of whom 1,500 were
still in detention. In many instances during the operation, IDF followed
a pattern of using loudspeakers to summon males between 15 and 45. According
to human rights reports, significant numbers of the men arrested were
blindfolded and handcuffed, not allowed to use a lavatory, and deprived
of food or blankets during their first day in detention.
31. In addition to Military Order 1500, the Government of Israel has
access to a procedure of administrative detention under which detainees
can be held without charge or trial, and which can be renewed indefinitely.
The Israeli Defence Forces and the State Attorney have told Amnesty
International that from 450 to 990 people were in administrative detention
as of May 2002.
32. Of particular concern is the use, by combatants on both sides, of
violence that placed civilians in harm's way. Much of the fighting during
Operation Defensive Shield occurred in areas heavily populated by civilians,
in large part because the armed Palestinian groups sought by IDF placed
their combatants and installations among civilians. Palestinian groups
are alleged to have widely booby-trapped civilian homes, acts targeted
at IDF personnel but also putting civilians in danger. IDF is reported
to have used bulldozers, tank shelling and rocket firing, at times from
helicopters, in populated areas.
33. Operation Defensive Shield resulted in the widespread destruction
of Palestinian private and public property. Nablus was especially hard
hit, especially in its old city, which contained many buildings of cultural,
religious and historic significance. Much of the destruction appears
to have occurred in the fighting as a result of the use by IDF of tanks,
helicopter gunships and bulldozers. United Nations agencies and other
international agencies, when allowed into Ramallah and other Palestinian
cities, documented extensive physical damage to Palestinian Authority
civilian property. That damage included the destruction of office equipment,
such as computers and photocopying machines, that did not appear to
be related to military objectives. While denying that such destruction
was systematic, the Israeli Defence Forces have admitted that their
personnel engaged in some acts of vandalism, and are carrying out some
related prosecutions.
34. The Government of Israel justified each of the incursions as being
necessary to destroy the infrastructure of Palestinian militant groups
that had carried out attacks on Israel with increasing frequency in
February and March 2002. In each case, Israel has published information
about its assessment of the infrastructure of militant groups. More
details regarding such information are included in the sections of the
report that describe events in specific Palestinian cities.
35. Closures of cities, villages and refugee camps and curfews exacted
a substantial humanitarian price from the civilian populations in the
affected areas. That burden was exacerbated in most cities occupied
during Operation Defensive Shield by significant periods of time during
which utilities (electricity, water and telephone) were cut or severely
curtailed. After an initial period of round-the-clock curfews without
any relief, the Israeli Defence Forces instituted a periodic lifting.
The closures and curfews posed particular problems for those with chronic
medical problems, who were unable to obtain care and medications. After
the lifting of the closures, when they were able to assess the condition
of the affected populations, humanitarian agencies reported shortages
of food and other basic supplies among Palestinians affected by the
incursions. In addition to these humanitarian consequences of the closures
and curfews, the restrictions had a devastating economic impact, virtually
shutting down the economy of the Palestinian Authority by impeding normal
business activity and preventing Palestinians from going to work.
36. Terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians continued in the aftermath
of Operation Defensive Shield, and most Palestinian cities endured further
incursions after the end of the operation up to the end of the period
under consideration in this report.
E. Overall effects of the incursions on the Palestinian population
37. According to a report prepared by United Nations agencies in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the humanitarian and development effects
of the two waves of incursions were as follows:
(a) A total of 497 Palestinians were killed in the course of the IDF
reoccupation of Palestinian area A from 1 March to 7 May 2002 and in
the immediate aftermath;
(b) Palestinian health authorities and the Palestinian Red Crescent
Society reported approximately 1,447 wounded with some 538 live-ammunition
injuries (for the same period);
(c) Round-the-clock curfews were imposed in cities, refugee camps, towns
and villages affecting an estimated 1 million persons; over 600,000
of them remained under a one-week curfew, while 220,000 urban residents
lived under curfew regimes for a longer duration and without vital supplies
and access to first aid;
(d) Severe internal and external closures continue to paralyse normal
economic activity, and movement of persons and goods throughout the
West Bank; in the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented 38-day-long internal
closures divided the Strip into three intermittently isolated areas;
(e) Protracted curfews, compounded by severe restrictions on commercial
circulation of supplies, rendered the food security situation in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory precarious: over 630,000 persons or roughly
20 per cent of the resident population were considered food security
vulnerable;
(f) Food deficit was increasingly observed in various regions of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Gaza food market being particularly
distorted. Restrictions on food imports resulted in a mild increase
in the overall food price level in the West Bank and in a considerable
rise (up to 25-30%) of prices for staple commodities in the Gaza Strip;
(g) Over 2,800 refugee housing units were damaged and 878 homes were
demolished or destroyed during the reporting period, leaving more than
17,000 people homeless or in need of shelter rehabilitation;
(h) Non-refugee housing in Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin town and
Tulkarm and a number of surrounding villages sustained damage ranging
from minor to structural;
(i) Students in eight West Bank districts were prevented from attending
school. It is estimated that, during the reporting period, some 11,000
classes were missed and 55,000 teaching sessions were lost;
(j) Fifty Palestinian schools were damaged by Israeli military action,
of which 11 were totally destroyed, 9 were vandalized, 15 used as military
outposts and another 15 as mass arrest and detention centres.
38. Even before the recent military operation, economic and social conditions
in the West Bank and Gaza were in a state of crisis. According to an
assessment by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator,
the 18 months of confrontations and restrictions on movement prior to
March and April had witnessed a more than 20 per cent reduction in domestic
production levels, unprecedented levels of unemployment, a 30 per cent
decline in per capita income and a more than doubling of the poverty
rate, to some 45 per cent of the Palestinian population.
39. While it is difficult to ascertain with precision the magnitude
of the socio-economic effects of the incursions, available preliminary
information indicates a sharp intensification of the hardships faced
by the population. That information suggests that the principal economic
result has been a near-complete cessation of all productive activity
in the main West Bank centres of manufacturing, construction, commerce
and private and public services. Activities in those centres account
for at least 75 per cent of the value of goods and services produced
in the West Bank. The production stoppage has imposed immediate income
losses on employees and owners of businesses, as well as losses in tax
revenues for the Palestinian Authority. In addition, suppliers and buyers
in the urban areas directly affected have close economic links to rural
areas; the isolation of the former has significant negative effects
on the latter. This is also true of the relationship between businesses
in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
40. In addition to the inability of households to access medical, educational
or other services during Operation Defensive Shield, people have been
separated from their means of income. This has resulted in lost opportunities
to earn income, further compressing household income and savings and
exacerbating the severe decline in living levels of the last 18 months.
As a result, the West Bank will witness even higher levels of poverty
in the short- to medium-term.
41. According to the World Bank, reconstruction costs for physical and
institutional damage to Palestinian Authority civilian infrastructure
resulting from the incursions in the West Bank in March and April 2002
would total US$ 361 million.
42. While the United Nations does not have a mandate to monitor and
report on conditions in Israel, as it does in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, it is apparent that the violence, specifically terrorist
attacks, has caused enormous suffering for the Israeli people and the
country's economy.
F. Recent events in Jenin
Introduction
43. In the early hours of 3 April 2002, as part of Operation Defensive
Shield, the Israeli Defence Forces entered the city of Jenin and the
refugee camp adjacent to it, declared them a closed military area, prevented
all access, and imposed a round-the-clock curfew. By the time of the
IDF withdrawal and the lifting of the curfew on 18 April, at least 52
Palestinians, of whom up to half may have been civilians, and 23 Israeli
soldiers were dead. Many more were injured. Approximately 150 buildings
had been destroyed and many others were rendered structurally unsound.
Four hundred and fifty families were rendered homeless. The cost of
the destruction of property is estimated at approximately $27 million.
Jenin refugee camp before 3 April 2002
44. On the eve of Israel's military incursion in April, the Jenin refugee
camp, established in 1953, was home to roughly 14,000 Palestinians,
of whom approximately 47 per cent were either under 15 or over 65 years
of age. It was the second largest refugee camp in the West Bank in population
and was densely populated, occupying a surface area of approximately
373 dunums (one square kilometre). The Jenin refugee camp came under
full Palestinian civil and security control in 1995. It is in close
proximity to Israeli settlements and is near the "green line".
45. According to both Palestinian and Israeli observers, the Jenin camp
had, by April 2002, some 200 armed men from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,
Tanzim, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas who operated from the camp.
The Government of Israel has charged that, from October 2000 to April
2002, 28 suicide attacks were planned and launched from the Jenin camp.
46. The Government of Israel has published information regarding infrastructure
within the Jenin camp for the carrying out of attacks. The Israeli Defence
Forces point to their discovery in the camp of arms caches and explosive
laboratories and the numbers of Palestinian militants killed or arrested
there during Operation Defensive Shield. They cite posters glorifying
suicide bombers and documents describing Jenin as a "martyr's capital"
reportedly found by Israeli soldiers in the camp during the incursion.
47. The Government of Israel and IDF have acknowledged that their soldiers
were unprepared for the level of resistance they encountered in Jenin
camp, noting that it was "probably the most bitter and harsh"
that they had faced. The IDF soldiers who took part in the operation
were, for the most part, reservists who had been mobilized only on or
after 17 March. Many were called up only after the Passover bombing
in Netanya (27 March).
Israeli Defence Force incursion into Jenin city and refugee camp,
3-18 April 2002
48. Although available first-hand accounts are partial, difficult to
authenticate and often anonymous, it is possible, through Government
of Israel, Palestinian Authority, United Nations and other international
sources, to create a rough chronology of events within the Jenin camp
from 3 to 18 April 2002. The fighting lasted approximately 10 days and
was characterized by two distinct phases: the first phase began on 3
April and ended on 9 April, while the second phase lasted during 10
and 11 April. Most of the deaths on both sides occurred in the first
phase but it would appear that much of the physical damage was done
in the second.
49. There are allegations by the Palestinian Authority and human rights
organizations that in the conduct of their operations in the refugee
camp the Israeli Defence Forces engaged in unlawful killings, the use
of human shields, disproportionate use of force, arbitrary arrests and
torture and denial of medical treatment and access. IDF soldiers who
participated in the Jenin incursion point to breaches of international
humanitarian law on the part of Palestinian combatants within the camp,
including basing themselves in a densely populated civilian area and
the use of children to transport and possibly lay booby traps.
50. In the account of the Government of Israel of the operation, IDF
first surrounded and established control of access into and out of the
city of Jenin, allowing its inhabitants to depart voluntarily. Approximately
11,000 did so. According to Israeli sources, in their incursion into
the camp IDF relied primarily on infantry rather than airpower and artillery
in an effort to minimize civilian casualties, but other accounts of
the battle suggest that as many as 60 tanks may have been used even
in the first days. Interviews with witnesses conducted by human rights
organizations suggest that tanks, helicopters and ground troops using
small arms predominated in the first two days, after which armoured
bulldozers were used to demolish houses and other structures so as to
widen alleys in the camp.
51. Using loudspeakers, IDF urged civilians in Arabic to evacuate the
camp. Some reports, including of interviews with IDF soldiers, suggest
that those warnings were not adequate and were ignored by many residents.
Many of the inhabitants of the Jenin camp fled the camp before or at
the beginning of the IDF incursion. Others left after 9 April. Estimates
vary on how many civilians remained in the camp throughout but there
may have been as many as 4,000.
52. As described by the Government of Israel, "a heavy battle took
place in Jenin, during which IDF soldiers were forced to fight among
booby-trapped houses and bomb fields throughout the camp, which were
prepared in advance as a booby-trapped battlefield". The Palestinian
Authority acknowledges that "a number of Palestinian fighters resisted
the Israeli military assault and were armed only with rifles and
crude explosives". An IDF spokesman offered a slightly different
portrayal of the resistance, stating that the soldiers had faced "more
than a thousand explosive charges, live explosive charges and some more
sophisticated ones,
hundreds of hand grenades
[and] hundreds
of gunmen". Human rights reports support the assertions that some
buildings had been booby-trapped by the Palestinian combatants.
53. That the Israeli Defence Forces encountered heavy Palestinian resistance
is not in question. Nor is the fact that Palestinian militants in the
camp, as elsewhere, adopted methods which constitute breaches of international
law that have been and continue to be condemned by the United Nations.
Clarity and certainty remain elusive, however, on the policy and facts
of the IDF response to that resistance. The Government of Israel maintains
that IDF "clearly took all possible measures not to hurt civilian
life" but were confronted with "armed terrorists who purposely
concealed themselves among the civilian population". However, some
human rights groups and Palestinian eyewitnesses assert that IDF soldiers
did not take all possible measures to avoid hurting civilians, and even
used some as human shields.
54. As IDF penetrated the camp, the Palestinian militants reportedly
moved further into its centre. The heaviest fighting reportedly occurred
between 5 and 9 April, resulting in the largest death tolls on both
sides. There are reports that during this period IDF increased missile
strikes from helicopters and the use of bulldozers - including their
use to demolish homes and allegedly bury beneath them those who refused
to surrender - and engaged in "indiscriminate" firing. IDF
lost 14 soldiers, 13 in a single engagement on 9 April. IDF incurred
no further fatalities in Jenin after 9 April.
55. Press reports from the days in question and subsequent interviews
by representatives of non-governmental organizations with camp residents
suggest that an average of five Palestinians per day died in the first
three days of the incursion and that there was a sharp increase in deaths
on 6 April.
56. Fifty-two Palestinian deaths had been confirmed by the hospital
in Jenin by the end of May 2002. IDF also place the death toll at approximately
52. A senior Palestinian Authority official alleged in mid-April that
some 500 were killed, a figure that has not been substantiated in the
light of the evidence that has emerged.
57. It is impossible to determine with precision how many civilians
were among the Palestinian dead. The Government of Israel estimated
during the incursion that there were "only dozens killed in Jenin
and the vast majority of them bore arms and fired upon [IDF]
forces". Israeli officials informed United Nations personnel that
they believed that, of the 52 dead, 38 were armed men and 14 were civilians.
The Palestinian Authority has acknowledged that combatants were among
the dead, and has named some of them, but has placed no precise estimates
on the breakdown. Human rights organizations put the civilian toll closer
to 20 - Human Rights Watch documented 22 civilians among the 52 dead,
while Physicians for Human Rights noted that "children under the
age of 15 years, women and men over the age of 50 years accounted for
nearly 38 per cent of all reported fatalities".
58. The Israeli Defence Forces stated at the time that their methods
might not change, "because the basic assumption is that we are
operating in a civilian neighbourhood". Other accounts of the battle
suggest that the nature of the military operation in Jenin refugee camp
did alter after 9 April 2002. On that day, in what both the Palestinian
Authority and the Government of Israel describe as a "well-planned
ambush" 13 IDF soldiers were killed and a number of others wounded.
A fourteenth soldier died elsewhere in the camp that day, bringing the
IDF death toll during the operation in Jenin to 23.
59. Following the ambush, IDF appeared to have shifted tactics from
house-to-house searches and destruction of the homes of known militants
to wider bombardment with tanks and missiles. IDF also used armoured
bulldozers, supported by tanks, to demolish portions of the camp. The
Government of Israel maintains that "IDF forces only destroyed
structures after calling a number of times for inhabitants to leave
buildings, and from which the shooting did not cease". Witness
testimonies and human rights investigations allege that the destruction
was both disproportionate and indiscriminate, some houses coming under
attack from the bulldozers before their inhabitants had the opportunity
to evacuate. The Palestinian Authority maintains that IDF "had
complete and detailed knowledge of what was happening in the camp through
the use of drones and cameras attached to balloons
[and] none
of the atrocities committed were unintentional".
60. Human rights and humanitarian organizations have questioned whether
this change in tactics was proportionate to the military objective and
in accordance with humanitarian and human rights law. The Palestinian
Authority account of the battle alleges the use of "helicopter
gunships to fire TOW missiles against such a densely populated area
anti-aircraft guns, able to fire 3,000 rounds a minute
scores of tanks and armoured vehicles equipped with machine guns
[and] bulldozers to raze homes and to burrow wide lanes". Other
sources point to an extensive use of armoured bulldozers and helicopter
gunships on 9 and 10 April, possibly even after the fighting had begun
to subside. During this stage, much of the physical damage was done,
particularly in the central Hawashin district of the camp, which was
effectively levelled. Many civilian dwellings were completely destroyed
and many more were severely damaged. Several UNRWA facilities in the
camp, including its health centre and sanitation office, were badly
damaged.
61. Within two days after 9 April, IDF brought the camp under control
and defeated the remaining armed elements. On 11 April, the last Palestinian
militants in Jenin camp surrendered to IDF, having requested mediation
by B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization that operates in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, to ensure that no harm would come to
them. According to Palestinian Authority sources, those surrendering
included wanted Islamic Jihad and Fatah leaders; others were three injured
people and a 13-year-old boy.
Conclusion and aftermath of the IDF incursion, 11 April-7 May 2002
62. As the IDF incursion into Jenin wound down, a range of humanitarian
problems arose or worsened for the estimated 4,000 Palestinian civilians
remaining in the camp. Primary among these was the prolonged delay in
obtaining medical attention for the wounded and sick within the camp.
As the fighting began to subside, ambulances and medical personnel were
prevented by IDF from reaching the wounded within the camp, despite
repeated requests to IDF to facilitate access for ambulances and humanitarian
delegates, including those of the United Nations. From 11 to 15 April,
United Nations and other humanitarian agencies petitioned and negotiated
for access to the camp with IDF and made many attempts to send in convoys,
to no avail. At IDF headquarters on 12 April, United Nations officials
were told that United Nations humanitarian staff would be given access
to the affected population. However, such access did not materialize
on the ground, and several more days of negotiations with senior IDF
officials and personnel of the Israeli Ministry of Defence did not produce
the necessary access despite assurances to the contrary. On 18 April,
senior United Nations officials criticized Israel for its handling of
humanitarian access in the aftermath of the battle and, in particular,
its refusal to facilitate full and safe access to the affected populations
in violation of its obligations under international humanitarian law.
63. UNRWA mounted a large operation to deliver food and medical supplies
to needy refugees who had fled the camp and to Jenin hospital but was
not allowed to enter the camp. The humanitarian crisis was exacerbated
by the fact that, on the first day of the offensive, electricity in
both the city and the camp were cut by IDF. Electric power was not restored
until 21 April.
64. Many of the reports of human rights groups contain accounts of wounded
civilians waiting days to reach medical assistance, and being refused
medical treatment by IDF soldiers. In some cases, people died as a result
of these delays. In addition to those wounded in the fighting, there
were civilian inhabitants of the camp and the city who endured medication
shortages and delays in medical treatment for pre-existing conditions.
For example, it was reported on 4 April that there were 28 kidney patients
in Jenin who could not reach the hospital for dialysis treatment.
65. The functioning of Jenin Hospital, just outside the camp, appears
to have been severely undermined by IDF actions, despite IDF statements
that "nothing was done to the hospital". The hospital's supplies
of power, water, oxygen and blood were badly affected by the fighting
and consequent cuts in services. On 4 April, IDF ordered the Palestinian
Red Crescent Society (PRCS) to stop its operations and sealed off the
hospital. Hospital staff contend that shells and gunfire severely damaged
equipment on the top floor and that at least two patients died because
of damage to the oxygen supplies. None of the Palestinians within the
hospital was permitted to leave until 15 April.
66. It appears that, in addition to the denial of aid, IDF in some instances
targeted medical personnel. Before the Jenin incursion, on 4 March,
the head of the PRCS Emergency Medical Service in Jenin was killed by
a shell fired from an Israeli tank while he was travelling in a clearly
marked ambulance. On 7 March, a staff member of UNRWA was killed when
several bullets were fired by Israeli soldiers at an UNRWA ambulance
in which he was riding near Tulkarm in the West Bank. On 3 April, a
uniformed Palestinian nurse was reportedly shot by IDF soldiers within
Jenin camp and on 8 April an UNRWA ambulance was fired upon as it tried
to reach a wounded man in Jenin.
67. The Government of Israel repeatedly charged that medical vehicles
were used to transport terrorists and that medical premises were used
to provide shelter. This, according to Israel, necessitated the strict
restrictions on humanitarian access. Furthermore, in the specific case
of Jenin camp, IDF spokesmen attributed denials of access to the clearance
of booby traps after the fighting had subsided. The IDF spokesman also
maintained that the "Palestinians actually refused our offers to
assist them with humanitarian aid" and that "everyone who
needed help, got help". There is a consensus among humanitarian
personnel who were present on the ground that the delays endangered
the lives of many wounded and ill within. United Nations and other humanitarian
personnel offered to comply fully with IDF security checks on entering
and leaving the camp, but were not able to enter the camp on this basis.
Furthermore, United Nations staff reported that IDF had granted some
Israeli journalists escorted access to the camp on 14 April, before
humanitarian personnel were allowed in. United Nations personnel requested
similar escorted access to assess the humanitarian condition of people
in the camp, but were unsuccessful, despite assurances from senior IDF
officials that such access would be possible.
68. On 15 April, 12 days after the start of the military operation,
IDF granted humanitarian agencies access to the Jenin refugee camp.
The Palestine Red Crescent Society and the International Committee of
the Red Cross were permitted to enter the camp under military escort
but reported that their movement was strictly confined to certain areas
and further constrained by the presence of large quantities of unexploded
ordnance including booby traps. After evacuating only seven bodies,
they aborted their efforts. A United Nations team including two trucks
with water and supplies was forbidden from unloading its supplies and
was also forced to withdraw. Supplies were distributed to the camp inhabitants
only beginning the following day, 16 April. Acute food and water shortages
were evident and humanitarian personnel began calls for specialized
search-and-rescue efforts to extract the wounded and the dead from the
rubble.
69. Once IDF granted full access to the camp on 15 April, unexploded
ordnance impeded the safe operations of humanitarian personnel. Non-United
Nations humanitarian agencies reported that large amounts of unexploded
ordnance, explosives laid by Palestinian combatants as well as IDF ordnance,
slowed their work. Negotiations carried out by United Nations and international
agencies with IDF to allow appropriate equipment and personnel into
the camp to remove the unexploded ordnance continued for several weeks,
during which time at least two Palestinians were accidentally killed
in explosions.
G. Recent events in other Palestinian cities
70. Brief descriptions of recent events in Ramallah, Bethlehem and Nablus
follow.
Ramallah
71. Ramallah was the first city occupied by the Israeli Defence Forces
in Operation Defensive Shield. IDF entered on 29 March and withdrew
from most of Ramallah on 20 April and the remaining sections of the
city on 30 April. While many of the features of the incursion were common
to incursions in other cities - a curfew, the severing of telephone,
water and electricity services to most of the city, the prevention of
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and detentions - the status
of Ramallah as the administrative centre for the Palestinian Authority
appeared to be a factor in the actions of IDF.
72. The Government of Israel avers that Ramallah has played a central
role in terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians because of the presence
there of the headquarters of a number of Palestinian security forces
(the National Security Force, Preventive Security, Civil Police and
Force-17) and the cooperation between those security forces and militant
groups. According to IDF, militant groups both collaborate with the
security forces and enjoy their protection. The Government of Israel
contends that Fatah, which is headquartered in Ramallah and shares personnel
with Palestinian Authority security forces, is a terrorist organization.
It asserts that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine also
uses Ramallah as its base of operation and that Hamas uses Ramallah
as a "relay station" for suicide attacks. The Palestinian
Authority denies any involvement of its security forces in terrorist
attacks.
73. During the course of the military operation in Ramallah, Palestinian
Authority civil institutions suffered extensive damage. Reports of human
rights monitoring groups contend that those institutions were specifically
targeted by IDF, and the World Bank stated in a report that the offices
of 21 ministries and agencies were entered and ransacked to varying
degrees. According to the Palestinian Authority, IDF entry into the
Authority offices appeared to be focused on information-gathering. They
cite the common removal of computer servers, hard disc drives, computers
and paper records as indicative of this goal. The World Bank states
that the destruction was focused on office equipment, computers and
data storage facilities; it estimates replacement and repair costs for
Palestinian Authority office interiors at $8 million. In addition, the
Authority asserts that IDF made efforts to disrupt the ministries' capacity
to function effectively, pointing to what they believe was the systematic
destruction of office and communication equipment and removal or destruction
of records and data from ministries. Records from the Education, Health
and Finance Ministries and the Central Bureau of Statistics were removed
during the operation and, as at 7 May, had not been returned. The Palestinian
Authority and non-governmental organizations cite cases of vandalism
and theft of private property. IDF also caused heavy destruction at
the compound of Chairman Arafat. The Government of Israel has denied
that IDF personnel engaged in systematic destruction, vandalism and
theft during Operation Defensive Shield.
Bethlehem
74. On 2 April, IDF entered Bethlehem using tanks and armoured personnel
carriers. Exchanges of fire occurred around the city on 2 and 3 April.
IDF assert that Palestinian militants fired on Israeli soldiers from
churches, while the Palestinian Authority says that IDF attacked civilians
and clerics on church premises. On 4 April, according to IDF, Palestinian
militants took over the Church of the Nativity. The Palestinian Authority
contends that on 3 April 150 people, including women and children, sought
refuge in the Church. Israeli forces surrounded the Church of the Nativity
and for 37 days a stand-off ensued. Israeli forces withdrew from the
city on 10 May, three weeks after the formal end of Operation Defensive
Shield, after the conclusion of protracted negotiations over the fate
of Palestinian militants who had sought refuge in the Church of the
Nativity.
75. The Israeli Defence Forces assert that Bethlehem had been a base
for operations of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. According
to IDF, five attacks on Israelis emanated from Bethlehem from 18 February
to 9 March 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 24 people and dozens
wounded. IDF say that the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility
for four of those attacks.
76. A curfew was imposed on Bethlehem and its surrounding villages from
2 April, and from the start of the incursion IDF declared Bethlehem
a closed military area. From 2 April to 10 May, the Israeli forces lifted
the curfew in parts of the greater Bethlehem area approximately every
three days for periods of two to four hours. According to an Israeli
human rights organization, in some of Bethlehem's nearby villages it
became difficult to obtain medical care during the brief liftings of
the curfew because of the need for residents to travel to Bethlehem
or other larger towns to visit hospitals or clinics. As a result, pregnant
women were unable to get prenatal care and people with chronic medical
problems were unable to replenish medications or receive care. One village,
al-Walaja, remained under round-the-clock curfew from 2 April to 10
May.
Nablus
77. The IDF incursion into Nablus began on 3 April 2002 and ended on
21 April. Heavy fighting reportedly occurred in various parts of the
city, the most intense combat happening in the old city. Most accounts
estimate that between 70 and 80 Palestinians, including approximately
50 civilians, were killed in Nablus during the operation. IDF lost four
soldiers during the incursion. Of all the Palestinian cities entered
during Operation Defensive Shield, Nablus appears to be the one that
suffered the most extensive physical damage to property. This is in
part because of the substantial damage to the old city, some of which
had been restored with the help of UNESCO. According to the World Bank,
the reconstruction costs for Nablus alone account for approximately
$114 million, more than one third of the total reconstruction cost for
all of the cities affected by Operation Defensive Shield.
78. After encircling Nablus on 3 April, IDF entered the city using helicopter
gunships, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and ground troops. From
6 to 11 April the most intense fighting occurred in the warren of narrow
streets in the old city, where armoured bulldozers were put to use destroying
buildings to clear a path for the entry of tanks. By 11 April, most
of the fighting had ended. IDF imposed a curfew on 3 April and completely
lifted it on 22 April. The first temporary lifting occurred on 10 April
for one hour, and thereafter IDF lifted the curfew for two to three
hours approximately every two days.
79. The Israeli Defence Forces have alleged that Nablus is a centre
for the planning and organization of terrorist attacks on Israel and
say that groups in the city directed the work of militant groups in
the northern part of the West Bank. IDF hold those groups responsible
for 19 attacks in 2002, which resulted in 24 deaths and 313 people injured.
According to IDF, the various militant groups operated cooperatively,
with Palestinian Islamic Jihad planning attacks, Hamas preparing explosives
and Fatah/Tanzim providing suicide bombers.
80. As a result of Operation Defensive Shield and the earlier incursions,
IDF assert that 18 explosives laboratories, seven Qassam rocket laboratories,
10 explosive belts, and hundreds of kilos of explosives were found in
the old city of Nablus and the nearby Balata refugee camp. They say
they found tunnels for hiding and smuggling arms under the old city
and discovered arms caches in the homes of the mayor of Nablus and the
city's police commander.
81. Humanitarian and human rights groups report that the population
of Nablus was particularly affected by the extent of the fighting as
well as by the curfew. Substantial portions of the city suffered from
water, electricity and telephone cuts throughout the operation. There
are also reports of Israeli forces severely hampering the movement of
medical personnel and ambulances. The substantial destruction in Nablus
included houses, numerous other buildings and religious and historical
sites. According to local Palestinian Authority officials, 64 buildings
in the old city, including 22 residential buildings, were badly damaged
or destroyed and up to 221 buildings suffered partial damage.
H. Observations
82. As I wrote on 3 May 2002 to the President of the Security Council,
I share the assessment of President Ahtisaari and his fact-finding team
that a full and comprehensive report on recent events in Jenin, as well
as in other Palestinian cities, could not be made without the full cooperation
of both parties and a visit to the area. I would, therefore, not wish
to go beyond the very limited findings of fact which are set out in
the body of the text. I am nevertheless confident that the picture painted
in this report is a fair representation of a complex reality.
83. The events described in this report, the continuing deterioration
of the situation and the ongoing cycle of violence in my view demonstrate
the urgent need for the parties to resume a process that would lead
back to the negotiating table. There is very wide support in the international
community for a solution in which two States, Israel and Palestine,
live side-by-side within secure and recognized borders, as called for
by the Security Council in resolution 1397 (2002). I believe that the
international community has a compelling responsibility to intensify
its efforts to find a peaceful and durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, as a key element in the search for a just, lasting and comprehensive
settlement in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions
242 (1967) and 338 (1973).
Annex I
Letter
dated 3 June 2002 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
Enclosed please find the Palestinian report on the recent events that
took place in Jenin and in other Palestinian cities. For practical reasons,
the annexes to the report have been submitted to the United Nations
Special Coordinator's Office. This report is being submitted with the
intention of assisting you in preparing your report, requested in paragraph
6 of General Assembly resolution ES-10/10, adopted on 7 May 2002 by
the General Assembly at its resumed tenth emergency special session.
It is also being submitted in response to the letter addressed to me
by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which requested
that the Palestinian Authority provide any information relevant to the
implementation of that resolution.
* Only section I is reproduced in the present document.
The Palestinian report is composed of the following sections:*
Section I. Main submission
Section II. Support documents
1. Letters from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council
and the President of the General Assembly (see documents of the tenth
emergency special session)
2. Israeli position on the fact-finding committee on the Jenin refugee
camp/names of some Israeli persons who might be implicated in the atrocities
committed against the Palestinian people
3. Chronology of events from 29 March to 15 May 2002 (prepared by the
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs)
4. Summary/indicative information on the annexes
5. List of annexes
Section III. Annexes
1. Palestinian Authority reports
2. International non-governmental humanitarian and human rights organizations
3. Israeli human rights organizations
4. Palestinian non-governmental organizations and institutions (humanitarian
and human rights organizations)
5. United Nations related reports
6. World Bank
7. Local Aid Coordination Committee/Donor Support Group
8. Media
9. Video tape (22 minutes from local and international media archives)
10. Photographs (150 photographs)
We trust that your report will be accurate and comprehensive. We also
believe that it is necessary for the report to contain specific conclusions
and recommendations to Member States and relevant organs of the United
Nations. The international community must be enabled to know the facts
of what occurred and to respond to them so that the atrocities committed
by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including Jerusalem, are not repeated. This would then open the road
for the establishment of real peace in the region.
(Signed) Nasser Al-Kidwa
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations
Attachment
Palestinian report submitted to the Secretary-General, pursuant to
General Assembly resolution ES-10/10 of 7 May 2002, on the recent events
in Jenin and in other Palestinian cities
Section One: Main Submission
Introduction
This report on the recent events that occurred in Jenin and in other
Palestinian cities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is being submitted
by the Palestinian Authority to the United Nations Secretary-General
with the intention of assisting him in preparing the report requested
in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution A/ES-10/10, adopted on
7 May 2002 by the resumed tenth emergency special session. The report,
including this main submission, also addresses Israeli actions prior
to 29 March 2002 and some overall longstanding policies and practices
of Israel, the occupying Power, as a nary background for understanding
the recent events that occurred in many Palestinian populated centers,
including the cities of Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus, Tulkarem Qalqilya,
Jenin and Al-Khalil. Earlier, the Palestinian people had hoped that
the fact-finding team established by the Secretary-General would, in
implementation of Security Council resolution 1405 (2002), be enabled
to present a comprehensive report on the events that took place in the
Jenin refugee camp. This, regrettably, was not possible due to Israel's
refusal to cooperate with the fact- finding team and with the Secretary-General
and its rejection of the Council's resolution.
The Palestinian Authority sought to undertake its own investigation
into the events of the last two months, to document cases and to provide
complete and reliable evidence required to assess the atrocities and
serious violations of international humanitarian law that were committed
by the Israeli occupying forces. However, Israel's systematic and continuous
attacks on Palestinian Ministries and other official bodies and local
government institutions, combined with the continuous military siege,
have severely obstructed basic functions of government and have effectively
prevented the Palestinian Authority from fully undertaking such a comprehensive
investigation. In submitting this report, the Palestinian Authority
wishes to also draw the attention of the U.N. Secretary-General to the
findings presented in the support documents as well as in the annexes
of the report, including the video and photographs.
The Palestinian Authority condemns the refusal of the Israeli government,
in reversal of its own position, to comply with Security Council resolution
1405 (2002) and its refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team
and with the Secretary-General. In condemning this Israeli position,
the Authority joins the worldwide condemnation of such an Israeli position,
which impeded efforts to establish the facts in a quick and determined
manner. This refusal falls in line with Israel's refusal to comply with
relevant Security Council and with its legal obligations and responsibilities
under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.
Israel, the occupying Power, has persistently rejected the de jure applicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Arab territories it occupied
in 1967, despite the international consensus affirming the Convention's
applicability, including in 26 Security Council resolutions. In addition,
it has consistently disregarded the provisions of the Convention and
the international humanitarian law principle concerning the protection
of the civilian population under occupation. Israel's refusal to accept
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, has rendered the internal mechanism
of the Convention inoperable. Moreover, the High Contracting Parties
have failed to adopt measures to ensure compliance by the occupying
Power with the provisions of the Convention and have thus failed to
ensure respect of the Convention "in all circumstances" in accordance
with article 1 common of the four Geneva Conventions.
Consequently, over the last 35 years, the Palestinian population in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, has been left
without any effective protection against Israel's oppressive policies
and measures, including its excessive use of lethal force. The absence
of enforcement has fostered an environment in which Israel acts with
impunity, disregarding international humanitarian law, international
law and the will of the international community.
An important attempt to redress this situation has been the convening
of the. Conference of High Contracting Parties on Measures to Enforce
the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, at Geneva on 15 July 1999, and the resumption of this Conference
on 5 December 2001. An extremely important Declaration was adopted by
the participating High Contracting Parties at the resumed Conference
of 5 December, which, inter alia, affirmed that "the Fourth Geneva Convention
has to be respected in all circumstances". The Declaration specified
the legal obligations of the parties to the conflict, of the occupying
Power and of the States Parties. Such an important document should provide
the basis for further action to ensure respect of the Convention in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem.
The Palestinian Authority submits this report with the expectation that
the U.N. Secretary-General will present a report that is both accurate
and comprehensive. It is necessary for the report to contain specific
conclusions and recommendations to Member States and relevant organs
of the United Nations. The international community must be enabled to
know the facts of what occurred and to respond to them so that the atrocities
committed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, are not repeated. This would then open
the road for the establishment of real peace in the region, including
a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
We expect the Secretary-General to also help in formulating the response,
including cooperative efforts aimed at bringing Israel into compliance
with relevant Security Council and with international humanitarian law;
establishment of mechanisms to ensure the protection of the Palestinian
population; and support of efforts to establish legally required mechanisms
to determine accountability for violations of international humanitarian
law, in particular war crimes, including the commission of grave breaches
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Factual and Legal Context
"The Palestinians must be hit and it must be very painful. We must
cause them losses, victims, so that they feel the heavy price."
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, 5 March 2002.
An informed understanding of Israel's policies and practices, including
the systematic and deliberate violation of the basic rights of the Palestinian
population as defined by international humanitarian law and human rights
law, is necessary for an accurate understanding and assessment of Israeli
actions throughout the last two months. The context in which any assessment
must be made is the context of foreign occupation.
The Israeli occupation and the policies and practices executed by the
occupying Power have been driven by an overriding and ongoing Israeli
goal to actively colonize the Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem,
with a vast and continuously expanding colonial structure manifested
in the form of illegal Israeli settlements. The occupying Power, since
the beginning of the occupation in 1967, has illegally transferred more
than 400,000 Israeli civilians into the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including Jerusalem. It has confiscated Palestinian land, exploited
and abused natural resources arid created a separate structure of life,
including a different system of law, to carry out its illegal settlement
campaign, which is the only remaining colonial phenomenon in the world
at the beginning of the 21st Century.
Israel's 35-year settlement campaign has not been, and could not have
been, executed without the forceful dispossession and confinement of
the indigenous Palestinian population. Moreover, to gain the full submission
of the entire occupied population to Israel's expansionist designs on
the Palestinian Territory, Israel has systematically employed countless
repressive means, including socioeconomic suffocation, detention, deportation,
home demolition, collective punishments, the use of lethal force and,
more recently, the use of heavy weaponry reserved for warfare.
Over the past 20 months, Israel, the occupying Power, has waged a bloody
military campaign against the Palestinian people and has escalated many
of its unlawful policies and practices, routinely violating the provisions
of international humanitarian law guaranteeing protection to the Palestinian
civilian population, in addition to violating the existing agreements
between the two sides. Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada on
28 September 2000, which began in response to the infamous visit of
Mr. Ariel Sharon to Al-Haram Al-Sharif, Israel has been expanding its
use of "retaliation" and "deterrence" and intensifying its illegal practices,
including willfully killing civilians; using excessive, disproportionate
and indiscriminate force; using lethal force a gainst demonstrators,
including children throwing stones; imposing military siege and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods; imposing collective
punishments; targeting of ambulances and medical personnel and obstructing
their access to the wounded; and destroying agricultural fields and
uprooting of trees. Israeli occupying forces also bombarded and destroyed
many institutions of the Palestinian Authority, including police and
security installations, and even the Gaza International Airport. These
serious violations and breaches of international humanitarian law have
caused extensive harm to the Palestinian civilian population, the Palestinian
infrastructure and the Palestinian Authority and its institutions.
On 29 March and throughout the period under report, the Israeli occupying
forces waged a large-scale military assault against the Palestinian
people, unprecedented in its scope and intensity since the start of
the Israeli occupation. The Israeli occupying forces invaded and reoccupied
most Palestinian populated centers, including cities, villages and refugee
camps and practically all areas under Palestinian control in the West
Bank. The Israeli occupying forces dramatically increased the indiscriminate
use of lethal force, using heavy weaponry, including tanks, helicopter
gunships and warplanes, to attack and, in some cases bombard, heavily
populated Palestinian areas. A large number of Palestinians, including
civilians, were killed, many willfully. The occupying forces also continued
the practice of extrajudiciary executions, using snipers, helicopter
gunships and sometimes tank fire, killing identified people as well
as others. In some cases, extrajudiciary executions were even carried
out against surrendered fighters and people in Israeli custody.
While the exact number of Palestinians killed is still not final, given
the circumstances of the situation on the ground, as of now reports
indicate that 375 Palestinians were killed from 29 March to 7 May 2002.
Hundreds Palestinians were also wounded, many suffering permanent disabilities
as a result of serious injuries, in addition to suffering psychological
and mental trauma, which has been especially prevalent among children.
The Israeli occupying forces also imposed harsh measures of collective
punishment against hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians, including
a widespread military siege and extensive curfews, often lasting for
days. Such policies and measures led to a critical shortage of basic
necessities, including food and medicines; a situation that was dramatically
worsened by the restrictions and, in many cases, complete prevention
of emergency ambulances and humanitarian aid from reaching those in
need. In several cases, this even included the prevention of the removal
and burial of the Palestinian dead. Attacks also targeted some medical
installations, including hospitals. Moreover, some areas were declared
closed military zones and made completely off limits to the media. Palestinians
were also continuously subjected to humiliation and harassment by the
Israeli occupying forces at the numerous roadblocks and checkpoints
throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Many Palestinians died
after being prevented by the occupying forces at such roadblocks from
reaching hospitals or clinics to receive medical care. In addition to
the increased number of roadblocks, the Israeli occupying forces also
obstructed movement by digging trenches and bulldozing roads as well
as erecting barbed wire in many locations.
During the period under examination, the Israeli occupying forces also
rounded-up thousands of Palestinian males and approximately 7,000 were
detained by Israel in a mass arbitrary detention. Many of the detainees
were subjected to ill-treatment and, according to reports, some were
tortured. The occupying forces raided and searched innumerable Palestinian
homes, humiliated and harassed residents and in many instances looted
homes. An even more condemnable practice was the use of Palestinian
civilians as human shields while conducting those searches and while
carrying out military advances in Palestinian cities, villages and refugee
camps.
The Israeli Occupying forces also invaded the headquarters of President
Yasser Arafat in the city of Ramallah and, imposed a strict military
siege, while carrying out almost continuous military actions, which
endangered the safety and well being of the persons inside the headquarters,
including the President. The occupying forces also imposed a military
siege on the Church of the Nativity, the birthplace of Jesus Christ,
in the city of Bethlehem, seeking several Palestinians who took refuge
in the Church. During the more than five-week siege, the Israeli occupying
forces repeatedly endangered the integrity of the Church and actually
caused some destruction, including fire damage, to parts of the Church
compound. In addition, the Israeli occupying forces attacked several
other churches and mosques in several Palestinian cities, causing damage
to them.
The Israeli occupying forces, during the same period of time, also caused
broad and extensive destruction to the Palestinian infrastructure in
all major Palestinian cities and refugee camps, including to electricity
and water networks and to roads. Reports indicate that the occupying
forces destroyed and/or damaged about 4,000 structures, including houses
and institutions. Some of the structures destroyed by the occupying
forces were in historic areas, such as the Old City of Nablus, which
suffered extensive damage. The occupying forces destroyed property belonging
to several Palestinian Ministries, such as the Ministries of Education
and Agricultural, including computers, records and furniture. The occupying
forces also destroyed various other Palestinian properties, including
350 vehicles, among them several ambulances.
The World Bank assessed the overall damage incurred during the period
under report at US$361 million, in addition to the assessment of US$305
million worth of destruction caused by the occupying forces during the
preceding 18 months. These estimates of course do not include the much
more substantial losses in terms of loss of income suffered by the whole
population and the destruction of the nascent Palestinian economy, which
is being estimated by the Palestinian side to stand at US$3 billion
for the entire 20 month period.
Then comes the Israeli military assault on the Jenin refugee camp, one
square kilometer in which 13,000 Palestine refugees, who were uprooted
from the homes and properties in 1948, had been living. The assault
began on 3 April and continued for 10 days. The Israeli occupying forces
used helicopter gunships to fire TOW missiles against such a densely
populated area. The occupying forces also used anti-aircraft guns, able
to fire 3,000 rounds a minute. They deployed scores of tanks and armored
vehicles equipped with machine guns and used snipers. The occupying
forces also used bulldozers to raze homes and to burrow wide lanes throughout
the camp, knocking down whole blocks of homes, in many instances while
the inhabitants were still inside. The occupying forces intensively
used civilians in the camp as human shields while conducting this military
assault.
Most of the camp was obliterated and most of its inhabitants were displaced
for the second time in their lives. A number of Palestinian fighters
resisted the Israeli military assault and were armed only with rifles
and, as some reports indicate, crude explosives. The Israeli occupying
forces had complete and detailed knowledge of what was happening in
the camp through the use of drones and cameras attached to balloons
that monitored the situation, indicating complete control of the situation
by the commanders and that none of the atrocities committed were unintentional.
The occupying forces, even after the end of the Israeli military actions
in the Jenin camp, continued to prevent international humanitarian organizations,
including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNRWA,
from entering the camp to treat the wounded and to deliver emergency
medicine and food aid, including for children, women and the elderly,
for more than 11 days. As a result of all of the above, numerous Palestinians
were killed, including some that had been buried under the rubble of
bulldozed homes. Some are still missing and many were wounded and seriously
traumatized. It is an understatement that the entire population of the
Jenin refugee camp experienced horrific suffering throughout and as
a result of this Israeli military assault.
Many credible sources have reported about atrocities committed in the
camp and about the presence of prima facie evidence of war crimes. In
addition, it is probable that a massacre and a crime against humanity
might have been committed in the Jenin refugee camp - a probability
that was enhanced by the statements made at some point by the occupying
forces about hundreds of Palestinians being killed in the camp and their
reported attempts to move bodies from the camp to what they referred
to as the graveyards of the enemy.
The broad Israeli military assault continued in full defiance of Security
Council resolution 1402 (2002)-of 30 March 2002 and even Security Council
resolution 1403 (2002) of 4 April 2002, which demanded the implementation
of resolution 1402 (2002) "without delay". Israeli occupying forces
only withdrew from the last Palestinian city after 6 weeks from the
beginning of the assault and even then maintained a hermetic siege on
the cities and maintained the reoccupation of large parts of surrounding
areas through a heavy military presence. Since then, the Israeli occupying
forces repeatedly raided and reoccupied parts of those cities, at times
for days, killing and abducting people and causing further destruction
and acting in a way intended to erase the lines defining the Palestinian-controlled
areas under existing agreements.
It is apparent that the above-mentioned Israeli atrocities, committed
during the period under report, were intended to cause the socioeconomic
collapse of the Palestinian society. They aimed to destroy not only
the present but also the future of the Palestinian people, including
the destruction of the Palestinian Authority. The current Israeli attempts
to institutionalize the situation created by the Israeli military assault
as the norm, through the creation of several isolated areas and through
the reemergence of the civil administration of the Israeli military
government, are just further proof in this regard. In fact, the Israeli
political aim has clearly been to take us back to a pre-Oslo situation,
only under severely devastated living conditions for the Palestinian
people.
In sum, the Israeli occupying forces have, without a doubt, committed
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Also, without
a doubt, war crimes, including grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
have been committed by Israel, the occupying Power, in several Palestinian
cities, including in the Jenin refugee camp. Those war crimes include
"willful killing", "inhuman treatment", "unlawful confinement of protected
persons" and "extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly".
These have been committed in addition to countless other grave breaches
as defined in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This
is clear and documented. What is now necessary is an accurate assessment
of the exact scope of these atrocities.
It is imperative to stress the personal responsibility of the perpetrators
of the abovementioned war crimes at both the poetical level, which might
have given the orders, and, more obviously, the military level, including
the commanders and soldiers of the military units that committed those
atrocities. In this regard, the personal responsibility of General Shaul
Mofaz, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, is very clear. The liability
of every High Contracting Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, in
accordance with article 148, whether incurred by itself or another in
respect of grave breaches of the Convention, must also be stressed.
In addition, many of the above-mentioned Israeli actions constitute
State terrorism, as actions aimed at harming and terrorizing a population
to serve and advance political ends, and, in this specific case, to
force submission of the whole population. Reference must also be made
to settler terrorism committed by the many armed and extremist illegal
settlers against Palestinian civilians.
Israel, the occupying Power, has tried to justify its actions during
the last two months, as well as during the preceding 18 months, as actions
against "terrorists", with the aim of destroying the "terrorism infrastructure".
It should be pointed out that no argument and no reasoning can justify
serious violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian
law. Further, the record shows clearly that the nature of the actions
taken, the amount of harm inflicted on the population and the practical
results prove completely different political goals, as noted above.
In this regard, the Israeli occupying forces have consistently targeted
the Palestinian police and security forces, instead of "terrorists",
and have consistently tried to destroy the Palestinian Authority and
declared it an "enemy", instead of groups hostile to peace in the Middle
East.
Further, Israel, the occupying Power, cannot, under any circumstances,
be allowed to conceal or distort the fact that it exists in the Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, as an occupying Power and that the origin
of all the problems is the existence of this occupation. This applies
to the degree of frustration, despair and hopelessness that has greatly
contributed in the creation of suicide bombers.
In this regard, the Palestinian Authority has taken a very clear position
against, and has repeatedly condemned, suicide bombings against civilians
in Israeli cities. Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory and Palestinian reactions to their presence and conduct are
a completely different matter under international law however. The Palestinian
people have the right to resist occupation and even the duty to defend
themselves and to resist Israeli military attacks, a situation to which
international humanitarian law is still fully applicable. The policy
of the Palestinian Authority remains the pursuit of a peaceful settlement
to end the Israeli occupation, to establish the State of Palestine and
to achieve peace in the region. That, however, does not change the legal
nature of the status of occupation or of any possible Palestinian actions
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. In the end,
it is the hope that can replace the prevailing frustration and it is
political progress and not military action that will create a culture
of peace based on a two-state solution.
As of the date of the submission of this report, Israel, the occupying
Power, continues to pursue its illegal political objectives as well
as the accompanying illegal policies and practices in. the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. As such, the Palestinian
people under occupation continue to suffer from Israeli human rights
violations, war crimes and State and settler terrorism. The occupying
Power continues to act with intransigence and impunity, flouting international
humanitarian law and international law and disregarding relevant Security
Council resolutions and the will of the international community.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The culture of impunity that exists within both the Israeli political
and military echelons is of grave concern to the Palestinian Authority
because of the resulting daily humanitarian implications of the incessant
illegal Israeli practices being carried out against the Palestinian
people in the Occupied 'Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem.
As noted, it is the on-going failure of the international community
to ensure Israeli respect for humanitarian law that has created this
dangerous culture of impunity. Moreover, the inaction by States to provide
adequate protection for the occupied Palestinian population has placed
the burden of protection onto the Palestinian people themselves, seriously
undermining the very purpose and indeed integrity of international humanitarian
law.
The failure to ensure Israel's compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention
has had, and continues to have, far-reaching, detrimental consequences
and implications. Israel's violations and grave breaches of the Convention
have not only inflicted severe harm on the Palestinian civilian population
but have also resulted in decreased security for both Israeli and Palestinian
civilians. The failure to ensure Israeli compliance has also directly
and negatively impacted the ability of the Israeli Government and the
Palestine Liberation Organization to reach a just, comprehensive and
lasting peace.
On the basis of all of the above, the Palestinian Authority wishes to
make the following recommendations:
a) The Palestinian Authority calls upon the High Contracting Parties
to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, Switzerland, in its capacity
as depositary of the Convention, and the IC_ RC to ensure respect of
the Convention in accordance with article 1 common of the four Conventions.
In this regard, the Palestinian Authority specifically calls upon them,
individually and collectively:
* To intensify their efforts to fully adhere to and implement the Declaration
of 5 December 2001 and to take further action based on that Declaration.
* To consult on and utilize their foreign policy instruments and mechanisms.
(For example:. Enforcing article 2, human rights clause of the EC-Israel
Association Agreement; ensuring the proper application of trade agreement
regarding rules of origin; ensuring that sales of military equipment
to Israel not be used against the Palestinian population.)
* To consider mechanisms to enable Palestinian victims of Israeli violations
of international humanitarian law to receive compensation as part of
alleviating their humanitarian suffering.
* To arrange their cooperative efforts in such a way as to prevent attempts
by States to block enforcement of international humanitarian law.
b) The Palestinian Authority calls upon the U.N. Secretary-General to
encourage the abovementioned actions by the High Contracting Parties
and to encourage actions to ensure that the protection of the civilian
population under belligerent occupation is not subject to negotiations
between the occupying Power and the occupied population.
c) The Palestinian Authority calls upon the U.N. Security Council to
fulfill its responsibilities under the Charter of the U.N. for the maintenance
of international peace and security, and accordingly calls upon the
Council to play an active role and to ensure compliance with its own
resolutions.
d) The Palestinian Authority calls upon the General Assembly to continue
its valuable work in upholding international law and in support of the
realization of the rights of the Palestinian people. It specifically
calls upon the Assembly to continue, in the case of failure of the Security
Council to act, with the valuable work of the tenth emergency special
session, in accordance with Uniting for Peace resolution 377 (V) of
1950.
e) The Palestinian Authority calls upon the United Nations and the Secretary-General
to establish an international presence to monitor compliance with international
humanitarian law, to help in providing protection to Palestinian civilians
and to help the parties to implement agreements reached. In this regard,
the Palestinian Authority calls for serious follow-up of the Secretary-General's
proposal for the establishment of a robust and credible multinational
force under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the U.N.
f) The Palestinian Authority calls for efforts by States on the national
level to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of grave breaches
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
g) The Palestinian Authority calls for the establishment of an international
criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute alleged war crimes committed
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. It calls
for the establishment of such a tribunal by the Security Council or,
alternatively, by the General Assembly.
Annex
II
Note
verbale dated 31 May 2002 from the Permanent Mission of Qatar to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
The Permanent
Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations presents its compliments
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in reference to
his note dated 14 May 2002 in which he requested the Government of the
State of Qatar to submit information relevant to the implementation
of paragraph 6 of resolution ES-10/10 adopted by the General Assembly
at its resumed tenth emergency special session on 7 May 2002, has the
honour to forward herewith a videotape of Al-Jazeera Channel containing
the requested relevant information.
Annexe III
Note
verbale dated 2 July 2002 from the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
The Permanent
Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan presents his compliments
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to
refer to the latter's notes verbales dated 14 May and 4 June 2002, regarding
relevant information to facilitate the preparation of the report requested
under paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution ES-10/10 of 7 May 2002.
The Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the
United Nations further has the honour to inform the Secretary-General
that the Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the
United Nations has received pertinent information from Amman relating
to the events in Jenin and elsewhere in the occupied Palestinian Territories,
which it hopes will be helpful to the Secretary-General. The information
is attached to this note verbale.
Attachment
[Original: Arabic]
Direct eyewitness accounts by survivors of the massacre at the Jenin
refugee camp
The Israeli army began the siege of the Jenin refugee camp on 3 April
2002 and continued it for 13 days, during which time Israeli tanks,
numbering approximately 200, attacked the camp with heavy fire. Apache
helicopters and F-16 fighters joined in. The occupying forces cut off
the supply of water and electricity in the camp and prevented ambulances,
first aid vehicles and medical teams from entering the camp throughout
the siege. On 10 April, the Israeli army attacked the camp and began
a systematic operation to destroy houses, killing hundreds of young
people. Eyewitness accounts have confirmed that the Israeli army carried
out summary executions of captured Palestinians.
The present report contains a number of eyewitness accounts by casualties
who survived the massacre and close relatives and friends of martyrs,
inhabitants of the camp, volunteers who participated in the relief operations
and journalists.
Eyewitness accounts by casualties treated in Jordanian hospitals
A mission from the Palestinian affairs service visited a number of casualties
who escaped from the Jenin refugee camp and were being treated in Jordanian
hospitals. It went to Al-Urdun hospital in Amman on 20 June 2002 and
spoke to seven casualties who had seen for themselves what happened
in the camp and were there during the siege and the shelling. They gave
the following accounts:
Death of a group
Those in the camp are still telling the story of the seven young people
who were hiding together in the room of a house where relatives and
neighbours had the habit of meeting, the men and young men on one side
and the women and children on the other. A mood of fear and apprehensiveness
gripped these people, causing some of them to go outside to see what
was happening, including one young man who went into the street then
returned to the room where the others were gathered. However, an Apache
helicopter which was hovering over the camp targeted the spot and fired
a missile. The room was blown up and all seven young men were killed.
Their bodies remained in the room for more than five days, since they
were in the middle of the camp and nobody could reach them. When people
were able to go there, the spectacle they encountered was horrible:
bodies were dismembered and burnt, and body parts gave off an odour
of decay. The victims were unrecognizable. One man said that when he
entered the room he stumbled over the leg of a victim and fell in front
of him. He tried to identify the body and was able to recognize one
of his relatives by the spectacles his relative was wearing. People
then began the operation of placing the body parts of each martyr in
a separate bag for burial before the arrival of the mothers and sisters,
in order to spare them the trauma of seeing the bodies of their loved
ones mutilated and in pieces.
The martyr Jaber
The story of Jaber will remain buried in the memories of the inhabitants
of the Jenin refugee camp, who are overcome by sadness when the story
of his death is told, how he suffered before dying and the distress
of the person who tried to save him and, unable to bring him help, stayed
with him until he died in his arms. Jaber had been hit by fire from
an Apache helicopter. An elderly man pulled him from the street into
his house. He tried to find first aid for him but that was not possible
because his injuries were so serious and because the ambulance team
could not enter the camp. Jaber asked the owner of the house for water
but the latter refused to grant his request out of fear for his life,
on the ground that giving water to the injured caused a more rapid onset
of death. Jaber continued to lose blood for hours and then began to
die. The owner of the house placed a towel soaked in water on his lips
and recited the shahada until Jaber took his last breath, and then placed
a blanket on the body. Then the owner of the house fled with his family,
since the Israeli army had already begun to destroy the houses in the
camp.
After the withdrawal of the Israeli army, people began the operation
of looking for casualties and the bodies of martyrs among the ruins
of the houses with the help of simple equipment, such as building and
agricultural tools. The search took a long time because there were tons
of ruins. After approximately 25 days, when the search arrived at the
site where Jaber had died, the owner of the house described how he had
died and showed the rescue workers exactly where they would find his
body. They found his remains covered with a blanket.
One of the Palestinian Red Cross volunteers thought that the martyr
might be her brother, saying that her brother was wearing clothing which
matched the tatters found on the body of the martyr. They then asked
the owner of the house the name of the martyr, and he gave his name
as Jaber Hosni Jaber. The girl was overwhelmed and began to run and
howl and tear her garments. The girl was Hala, the sister of Jaber.
The martyrs Abdulkarim Al-Saadi and Jamal Al-Sibagh
The Israeli soldiers killed mercilessly. If they had the least doubt
they shot and killed innocent people. This is what happened to Abdulkarim
Al-Saadi and Jamal Al-Sibagh. Abdulkarim was approximately 20 years
old and worked for the municipality of Jenin. He had been married for
four months and his wife was expecting a baby. He suffered from chronic
backache. When the Israeli army entered the camp, it assembled young
men and men in the streets and squares, and Abdulkarim and his father
left the house. The soldiers asked Abdulkarim to undress. When the soldier
saw the medical corset around his waist, he thought that Abdulkarim
was wearing a belt filled with explosives, and he fired a hail of bullets
which went right through him causing his father to be covered in blood.
The father in shock fell to the ground next to the body of his son.
The way in which Jamal Al?Sibagh was killed was scarcely different.
Jamal was a young man, nearly 40 years old and diabetic. When the Israeli
army asked the men and young men to leave the houses in order to be
searched and arrested, Jamal was carrying a bag with his medication.
When he began to undress on the orders of the soldiers, the zipper in
his trousers jammed. He tried to unjam it, but the soldiers thought
that he was going to act against them and fired at him. He was killed
and his blood spattered a young child of five years who was by his side.
The martyrs Abu Siba and Muhammad Mufid
The inhabitants of the camp all know the story of Abu Siba, an old man
of 80 who could not move because of his age. When the Israeli bulldozers
and excavators began to destroy the neighbourhood of Hawashin, the soldiers
destroyed his house and arrested his children, then began the operation
of destroying the house regardless of the fact that Abu Siba was in
the house and was unable to leave. Abu Siba died as the house collapsed.
Muhammad Mufid was mentally ill, as was obvious from his ragged appearance
and his gait and movements. He spent his time wandering the streets
and begging alms from those passing by. Despite his condition, soldiers
opened fire on him, even though he represented no threat to them.
Eyewitness accounts
Many newspapers have published interviews with inhabitants of the camp
who escaped when the siege was over. Press and television reporters
were shocked when they entered the camp and heard accounts from survivors,
who provided terrible details about the siege, the shelling and the
killings.
The inhabitants of the camp described how the soldiers arrested them
in humiliating conditions, obliging them to sleep for days on the ground,
handcuffed and in undergarments. Water and bread were distributed to
them once a day, and they had to beg in order to be allowed to urinate
in an iron pot. The soldiers and the investigators from Shabak, the
Israeli General Security Service, manhandled them and finally released
the majority of them once they had been cleared of all suspicion.
One of the persons who had fled the massacre in the camp said that the
search for bodies was carried out on the basis of citizens' accounts
indicating the presence of martyrs in houses or streets which had become
piles of ruins. He added that one of the escapees had informed the teams
working in the camp that he had found the bodies of four martyrs. He
showed them exactly where the spot was, stating that mechanical shovels
had destroyed the houses after the death of the martyrs.
Those accounts include the following:
Testimony of Hajj Ahmad Abu Kharj
With his face all in tears, Hajj Ahmad Mohammad Khalil Abu Kharj walked
up to his house, which had been bombed by the Zionist air force during
the offensive against the camp, guiding rescue teams towards the room
where the body of his 65-year-old sister, Yousra Abu Kharj, lay. He
was seeing her for the first time since she had been killed on the third
day of the attack. He broke down and sobbed when he saw the martyr's
body on the ground, torn apart by shrapnel. It was an unbearable sight
even for the members of the rescue teams. Mr. Abu Kharj made the following
statement: "On the third day of the invasion, we heard a very loud
explosion on the top floor of our house (a three-storey house), where
my sister was getting her things together and preparing to join the
13 members of my family. They had fled to the ground floor, seeking
refuge from the indiscriminate bombing. After the explosion shook the
entire building, one of my sons went upstairs to look for my sister,
but the endless bombing prevented him from entering the room where she
was. Looking through the keyhole, he saw his aunt motionless on the
floor, bleeding profusely. We immediately called for an ambulance and
asked the hospital and the Red Crescent to help us, but despite our
successive pleas, no one was able to come and help us."
The Chief of the Red Crescent's Relief and Emergency Department made
the following statement: "The family of Yousra Abu Kharj called
us and told us that she was wounded and bleeding profusely. Immediately
after that call, one of our emergency teams left for the camp. That
is when armoured vehicles from the Israeli army fired on the vehicle
carrying our team, preventing it from entering the camp. We then called
the International Committee of the Red Cross, which made all the necessary
contacts but was unable to ease the situation. As a result, we were
not able to reach the Abu Kharj family to do our job." Unfortunately,
that was not the end of it, for Hajj Ahmad, who is over 80, added: "A
few hours after the explosion, an Israeli army unit composed of a number
of soldiers forced its way into our house, searched us, confined us
to one room, arrested four of my sons and took them away to unknown
locations, then occupied the house, transforming it into a military
barracks and taking up positions on the second floor. I asked the officer-in-charge
for permission to go to the third floor to get my sister and make sure
she was safe and sound. The officer refused at first, but when I insisted,
he eventually told me that Yousra was dead and that I did not need to
see her. I then asked for permission for the Red Crescent to remove
the body to a hospital. That request was denied. We remained locked
up on the ground floor while the martyr lay in her room. Afterwards,
Israeli soldiers forced us, under threat of arms, to leave our home,
expelling us and scattering family members. That is why I don't know
what has happened to my daughters and my sons. This is a catastrophe
and a real tragedy. My sister posed no danger to the Israeli soldiers.
In no way was she threatening their lives. But despite that, they killed
her in cold blood and left her body unburied for 16 days. Under what
laws or rights are such crimes authorized?"
Testimony of the wife of martyr Nasser Abu Hatab
In an area near to the Al Damj district, the army of the Zionist enemy
targeted Mr. Nasser Abu Hatab, a married man with four children, whose
wife made the following statement: "I will never forget those moments.
The soldiers, disregarding the laws guaranteeing the inviolability of
the home, shot my husband in front of his children for no reason ...
It was a Saturday afternoon, about 4 o'clock, on the third day of the
offensive against the Jenin refugee camp. Israeli soldiers knocked on
our door and my husband rushed to open. Terrible things happened. The
soldiers grabbed my husband by his neck and immediately started shooting
him, even though he had not kept them waiting, had not resisted in any
way and had followed all their instructions. My husband fell to the
ground, covered in blood. Horrified by what was happening, I began to
scream and cry. The soldiers pointed their weapons at me, shouting "Sheket,
sheket", and then locked me in another room with my children. That
is when I called the hospital and the Red Crescent and asked them to
help us and to save my husband's life. But the Israeli army refused
the emergency teams permission to come to our house." Mr. Abu Hatab
died in front of his wife and children. But what was even more horrible
for them is the fact that the soldiers, having confined them for several
hours, locked them up in the house as they left and ordered them not
to remove the body. Mrs. Abu Hatab added: "I can't find words to
describe conduct that was so contrary to the most basic human rights.
The occupying army locked me up with my children in a room with my husband's
corpse, ordering us not to bury it, not even in the little yard ...
What life and what future can my children look forward to after witnessing
this bloodshed with their own eyes and being unable to help their father
or bury his body, which remained unburied for a whole week?"
Story of martyr Ashraf Abu Al-Hija'
Another tragic story is that of the family of Ashraf Mahmoud Abu Al-Hija',
a young man whose charred body was found at the home of one of his relatives
in Jaourat Al?Dhahab, in the Jenin camp. Mr. Abu Al-Hija's family made
the following statement: "When the aerial bombing and the shelling
of our homes grew worse and the area where we lived became dangerous,
we began to leave our house one by one and go to neighbours' houses.
At that point, a shell fell at the entrance to the second floor, starting
a fire. We began to scream, shouting to Ashraf to get out as soon as
possible. We called the civil defence people and the emergency workers
to come and rescue Ashraf, who we believed was under fire from all directions.
We later learned that the shells had hit our child directly. He died
on the spot and was burnt to a cinder." The Director of the Civil
Defence Department made the following statement: "We received a
call from Jaourat Al-Dhahab confirming that a house was on fire. We
immediately dispatched one of our emergency teams, but unfortunately
it was blocked by armoured vehicles of the occupying army. The soldiers
opened fire on the civil defence vehicle, then on the ambulance, preventing
us from reaching the bombed house." Abu Al-Hija's family stated
that Ashraf's body remained unburied for over two weeks, until the Israeli
army evacuated the area. In addition, occupation forces destroyed 90
per cent of the homes and killed a number of residents. Ashraf's mother
made the following statement: "My son was in a civilian area, not
a military area. Despite that, the Israeli army bombed it for over a
week, until its bulldozers and armoured vehicles came in to finish off
the job left undone by its aircraft. Clearly, those operations were
planned in advance with the aim of wiping out men, women, children and
buildings, in other words, all living creatures and anything that could
remain standing."
Testimony of Mrs. Hind `Aweiss
Mrs. Hind `Aweiss, the mother of 10 children, stated that about a hundred
Israeli soldiers invaded her house, remaining for five days and leaving
nothing but ruins in their wake. According to what the residents reported,
the soldiers behaved in a savage manner without any justification, making
insolent remarks, pillaging household furniture, breaking a number of
articles, writing the names of their military units on walls, and stealing
money and items of value.
The soldiers who invaded Mrs. Hind `Aweiss's home asked all the occupants
to leave. She refused, pointing out that she and her children had nowhere
to go, because fighting was raging outside. Initially, the soldiers
were content to occupy the two upper floors. They came back the next
day and asked the occupants to evacuate the ground floor. Mrs. `Aweiss
later made the following statement to reporters: "At that point,
one of the soldiers grabbed my nephew Rateb, a boy of one and a half,
held him under his arm, pointed his gun at his temple and threatened,
in halting Arabic, to shoot him if we refused to leave. That is how
they got us to leave." Mrs. `Aweiss added that the soldier who
threatened to kill her nephew was not an officer, but that she could
not identify him, because, like the other soldiers, he had covered his
face with black paint. On the other hand, she knew the name of the unit
to which he belonged because his companions in arms had written it in
black letters on the walls of her home. It was the Golani brigade. Mrs.
`Aweiss also said that the soldiers set fire to her house before leaving.
It was also possible that the fire was started by a helicopter strike.
Testimony of Oum Haitham
When they returned, the camp's residents began to search through the
rubble for documents, identification papers, jewellery that they had
buried underground before they were expelled from their homes, furniture
and clothing. However, Oum Haitham found no trace of what had been her
home, and all the clothing and furniture she was able to recover are
unusable. She made the following statement: "They wiped us out
and drove us out in the space of a few minutes, destroying the fruits
of a lifetime of hardship and labour. Little Isra' wept bitterly when
she reached the place where her house used to stand. She recognized
it when she saw her father searching through the pillars and the debris
littering the ground."
Testimony of Mr. Maher Hawwashin
Sitting on a cement block in the middle of the Jenin camp, his head
in his hands, Mr. Maher Hawwashin contemplated the pile of rubble under
which his memories and all his family possessions were buried. Mr. Hawwashin
stated that after his house had been completely destroyed, he had been
left without resources, not knowing how he and his family would have
a roof over their heads and be able to meet their needs. For the time
being, he was staying temporarily with his brother, until his problem
and that of everyone whose house had been destroyed by the enemy troops
was settled.
Testimony of persons injured by mine explosions
The camp residents live in terror, fearing for their future and their
lives, following the repeated explosion of mines which the Israeli soldiers
left behind.
Mr. Abu Ahmad stated as follows: "They were not satisfied with
destroying our houses; they also placed mines everywhere, so that our
lives are constantly threatened. Last Sunday, for instance, as I was
entering my house, a mine exploded, injuring me and my son Mohammed."
The camp residents state that after soldiers had placed mines in the
districts and in the houses, 10 of the devices had exploded, injuring
20 Palestinians, most of them children. The chief of the demining unit
of the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that the unit
had detected the presence of a large number of suspect devices and mines,
which it had managed to remove and disable, while imploring the camp
residents to cooperate with the unit to preserve their lives and safety.
Moreover, the unit had formed several local volunteer teams composed
of camp residents who would assist it in detecting and collecting mines
and inspecting houses and local buildings.
Assad Faisal Arssane, aged 10, and Saad Subhi Al-Wahshi, aged 12, are
two small boys who were playing with other boys their age in one of
the camp alleys when they were injured by a mine which residents said
was placed by soldiers of the occupying army. Assad, who had to undergo
several surgical operations, stated as follows: "I was sitting
with my friends from the district, talking about the raids and killings
by the Israeli army. A device exploded as we began playing. I lost consciousness,
and when I came round, I realized that I had lost all my limbs."
The doctors at Jenin Hospital said that Assad was very critically injured
and had to have both arms and legs amputated. Saad, for his part, was
burned and his body is full of shrapnel.
Testimony of journalists and humanitarian organizations
Even journalists were shocked by the scenes of horror that they witnessed
in the Jenin camp. Some of them admitted that they had difficulty expressing
and describing what they were seeing. Walid al-Amri, a reporter for
the Qatar television station Al-Jazeera, stated: "While the Israeli
authorities had decided to deny access to the Jenin camp to media outlets
and to prosecute them, we were determined to overcome the difficulties
and face up the dangers. We had managed to enter the camp in order to
reveal the truth, which could only be determined by going there. But
tanks and snipers tried to prevent anyone from entering the camp."
Al-Amri was one of the first journalists to enter the Jenin camp during
the massacre. He stated: "The road we had taken was dangerous and
'largely impassable. It wasn't easy to enter the camp, and the scenes
that we saw from the first moment were dreadful. We saw burned and dismembered
corpses and dozens of houses destroyed, to the point where it seemed
we were in an area hit by a huge earthquake .... The scenes were especially
terrible and tragic because the victims were Palestinians who had been
driven from their homes 50 years earlier, and who had been driven out
again by the very State that had been established on the ruins of their
houses. ... The most terrible scenes were those of Palestinians, who
had been encircled in their homes for over 20 years. ... The main question
we were asking ourselves was how to save the lives of the survivors,
after everything that had happened in the camp and after the unparalleled
humanitarian situations we had seen there - people searching for live
persons or corpses under the rubble, a mother or a father searching
for their children, a child searching for his brothers and sisters and
his family, or people searching for their homes under the ruins."
In New York, the United States journalist Mary Seral, a correspondent
for the Sunday Times, said that she had seen many scenes in the camp,
and that all the images that had been shown and broadcast did not reflect
the reality. The facts showed that the Israeli army had deliberately
destroyed the camp and attacked its population in violation of every
law. Israeli soldiers prevented the family of the martyr Gamal Fayed
from taking him out of his house, even though he was crippled, was not
fighting and did not pose any security threat to the soldiers. As to
the Chinese journalist Shu Suzki, a television cameraman, he stated,
while wiping away tears: "I realize now that the whole world, without
exception, is responsible for this tragedy. I have covered a great many
events and tragedies around the world, but the scenes I have witnessed
in the Jenin camp are the most violent and the ones that have touched
me the most. All of the victims were civilians. The bodies that were
found under the rubble were those of children, women and teenagers,
and all were civilians. We discovered that some of them had not been
fatally injured, and that their deaths were attributable to the fact
that they had been unable to receive treatment. This is why I say again
that a huge massacre was committed, and that any person who has a conscience
anywhere in the world should work to bring an end to this war, this
destruction and this tragedy."
Chips, the United States volunteer
Chips, a United States Red Cross volunteer, was one of the first persons
to go through the streets of the Jenin camp, to which the medical units
of humanitarian relief organizations had been denied access for two
weeks. Although she had taken part in many relief operations in a number
of countries, Chips said that she was deeply shocked by what she had
seen. She stated: "I shared and experienced with the Palestinians
moments of pain and suffering as they tried for several days to enter
the camp. But the Israeli army prevented them from doing so. In spite
of the hundreds of calls for help from children and women and from the
camp population in general, none of us was in a position to play our
role and come to the aid of anyone. The tanks were everywhere and were
even firing on the ambulances, backed up by snipers who were occupying
a number of buildings. ... The Red Cross did what it could and set up
countless contacts so that the Red Cross staff and ambulances, which
display the organization's logo, could be permitted to bring relief
to the injured and remove the bodies of the martyrs, but in vain. The
Israeli army prevented us from moving, which is both horrible and contrary
to international law." Describing the situation in the camp as
catastrophic and tragic, Chips added: "When the Israeli army authorized
us to enter the camp, it was too late. As soon as we set foot on the
ground, we smelt the odour of death and of the corpses that the army
had left in the streets and alleys and under the rubble. ... I have
been to several regions of the world and have seen destruction of various
kinds, but the scenes in the Jenin camp were different, terrible and
tragic. We retrieved charred corpses and others that were rotting, and
they all belonged to civilians, including women, children and elderly
persons. Some bodies were buried under the rubble of houses destroyed
by the army. It was a real massacre and the scenes were terrible.
Annex IV
Note
verbale dated 7 June 2002 from the Permanent Mission of Spain to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
[Original
: Spanish]
The Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations presents its compliments
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in connection with
his note of 14 May 2002, has the honour to transmit the report drawn
up by the European Union on the events in Jenin and in other Palestinian
cities.
Attachment
Report of the European Union
[Original: English]
The Presidency of the European Union transmits hereby to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations the report on the events that took place in Jenin
and other Palestinian cities during the month of April. This report
has been elaborated by the European Union Consul Generals in Jerusalem
and the heads of mission in Ramallah.
1. Preliminary remarks
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that reports on the events
in Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp have been produced by a number of
NGOs, international organizations and United Nations agencies (UNRWA,
Human Rights Watch, ICRC, ...), as part of other global reports on the
situation and events in the Occupied Territories or referring exclusively
to the situation in Jenin.
It must also be noted that no independent observers were present in
the area during the fighting, especially in the refugee camp. The IDF
prohibited entry to the camp for 12 consecutive days.
Since the military operations in early April, at least on two other
occasions the IDF have made additional incursions in Jenin, thus making
very difficult the task of the humanitarian and reconstruction aid agencies
and confirming the perception of the population and security services
of the Palestinian Authority on the fragility of their situation.
The massive destruction, especially at the centre of the refugee camp,
to which all heads of mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah can testify,
shows that the site had undergone an indiscriminate use of force, that
goes well beyond that of a battlefield.
2. Introduction
On 3 April 2002, the IDF started a military operation against the West
Bank Palestinian city of Jenin and its refugee camp. This operation
came as part of a major military campaign against Palestinian urban
centres in the West Bank.
The operation followed a first major operation in mid-March and was
justified by Israel as a part of its fight against terrorism and as
a retaliation against a series of terrorist attacks in the previous
days.
The city of Jenin and the camp were declared a closed military area,
the IDF not allowing anyone access to the city. At the same time a curfew
was enforced, which lasted for 13 consecutive days and was only lifted
for the refugee camp on 18 April.
This situation prevented observers from entering Jenin and especially
the refugee camp, where only on 15 April personnel from ICRC and PRCS
were allowed to enter the refugee camp for the first time in 12 days.
As a result, all independent reports on the events that took place in
the Jenin refugee camp are based on statements by individuals, comments
by officials of the Palestinian Authority and comments coming from some
official sources in the IDF, as well as reporting from officials from
UNRWA, ICRC or other international agencies present on the ground.
Direct observation was only possible in the aftermath of the events,
at first by humanitarian teams bringing aid to the population, later
by visitors to the refugee camp and the city.
On the basis of the reports and direct observation, some facts can be
established.
3. Background to the Jenin refugee camp
According to the UNRWA figures, the Jenin refugee camp was home to 13,929
refugees (3,048 families). Other estimates place the figure a little
over 13,000. It is the second largest refugee camp in the West Bank,
established in 1953 on 373 dunums (1 dunum = 1,000 m2), occupying now
a surface equivalent to 1 square kilometre, within the Jenin municipal
boundaries. Reports from UNRWA suggest that a number of refugees had
moved out of the limits of the refugee camp itself within the city limits.
Of that population, about 47 per cent are children and elderly (42.3
per cent under 15 years of age and 4.3 per cent over 55 years of age).
According to a survey from the Bir Zeit University, around 50 per cent
of the population of Jenin city are refugees.
The camp is mainly constituted of buildings, of two to three storeys,
in concrete and brick.
4. Relevant information
The fighting in the camp lasted from 3 to 11 April.
Between the end of the fighting and the first access permitted to the
refugee camp, there was a period of four days considered by all observers
as critical.
Humanitarian assistance by UNRWA, ICRC and PRCS only started on 15 April,
at first under IDF control. They were not allowed at first to carry
it on a systematic and organized way and prevented from performing forensic
operations.
The curfew was lifted only on 18 April, partially on 16 April.
Of the population of the refugee camp, at least 4,000 remained inside
and did not evacuate the camp at any moment.
IDF systematically used bulldozers, tanks, armoured personnel carriers
and infantry, also armoured helicopters. The operations took a broader
scope after the death of 13 Israeli soldiers in an ambush inside the
refugee camp.
IDF cut electricity in both the town and the camp. Water pipes to the
refugee camp were also broken.
IDF prevented access to the camp to UNRWA, ICRC and PRCS even to evacuate
the wounded and the dead. Only after a decision by the Israeli High
Court of Justice, on 14 April, was access granted, though on a very
limited basis and conditions.
Fighting was fierce in the refugee camp. A number of Palestinian fighters,
estimated at around 150, handed themselves in to the IDF on the last
days.
Palestinians had claimed that between 400 and 500 people had been killed,
fighters and civilians together. They had also claimed a number of summary
executions and the transfer of corpses to an unknown place outside the
city of Jenin.
The number of Palestinian fatalities, on the basis of bodies recovered
to date, in Jenin and the refugee camp in this military operation can
be estimated at around 55. Of those, a number were civilians, four were
women and two children. There were 23 Israeli fatalities in the fighting
operations in Jenin.
The number of Palestinian fatalities could increase when the rubble
is removed. Most observers share the certainty that there must be some
bodies lying under the debris.
Nevertheless, the most recent estimates by UNRWA and ICRC show that
the number of missing people is constantly declining as the IDF releases
Palestinians from detention. In any case, a figure is very difficult
to estimate. There are a number of reports about Palestinian civilians
being used as human shields.
The IDF made a very large number of detentions, though most of the Palestinians
were later set free.
The estimate of physical damage is as follows:
o Destruction of security buildings and infrastructure in Jenin city.
o Destruction of security buildings of the Palestinian Authority in
Jenin city.
o 160 buildings totally destroyed in the refugee camp.
o 100 buildings partially damaged. 800 families without shelter, an
overall estimate of over 4,000 persons.
o 10 per cent of the camp totally destroyed.
o The centre of the refugee camp has been totally levelled. The area
has a diameter of about 200 m and a surface of about 30,000 m2, with
approximately 100 buildings totally destroyed.
The IDF launched a well-prepared operation converging on the centre
of the refugee camp as shown by the destruction of buildings in the
streets and alleys leading there.
The certainty of buried explosives under the rubble has made it very
difficult for specialized teams to move on the ground. Unexploded ordnance
belongs to both the IDF and the Palestinians.
From the very first minute, civilians from the camp were eager to come
back and started collecting their personal belongings, making the situation
even more difficult and dangerous.
The civilians were under a huge shock. Not only were they deprived of
water, food and electricity for many days, but they were also seeking
information about the fate of relatives with whom they had lost contact.
For many days after the fighting ended, there was neither law nor order
inside the camp. The Palestinian Authority was unable to provide security
and law enforcement, as the security apparatus had been destroyed.
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