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The Making of Turkish-Muslim Diaspora in Britain: Religious Collective Identity in a Multicultural Public Sphere

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Abstract

Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world. Today there are increasing numbers of Muslim diasporic communities in the Western world. Since 9/11 Islam and Muslim communities were put under the spotlight and public gaze. Although numerous publications hit the bookshelves, a number of ill-informed analyses of Islam and approaches to Muslim communities still dominate the media. Misperceptions about Islam and Muslims in particular gave rise to the essentialist views of this faith and its followers as fundamentalist, pro-violence, uncompromising and anti-Western. Based on extended research findings, this article challenges the monolithic perception of Muslims in Europe and argues that Turkish-Muslims constitute a changing diasporic community defying clichés and common stereotypes about Muslims. This article shows that the Turkish community in Europe is part of the emerging 'European Islam' and has its own diversity in the expression of Turkish-Muslim identity. This article concludes that the existence of Turkish and other Muslim diasporic communities should be seen as an opportunity to establish a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. Moderate Islam as represented by the overwhelming majority of Turks in Europe can be a source of dialogue, mutual understanding and communication between Muslims and the West.

Introduction

Population movements have always been one of the prevalent aspects of human life. Movements of individuals and groups from one location to another have been taking place since the origin of man[1] and, especially over the last three or four decades, migration has emerged as a major force throughout the world.[2] The world's migrant population has been gradually increasing over the years.[3] United Nations' estimates indicate that the number of people living outside the country of their birth and citizenship has more than doubled since 1975. Today, around 175 million people reside outside the country of their birth or their state of nationality, which is about 3% of the world's population. International migrants have had many destinations including Europe which has received millions of immigrants over the years. On the other hand, the number of refugees in the world at the end of 2000 stood at 16 million.[4]

Immigration to West European countries resulted in the settlement of foreigners in the receiving countries in increasing proportions against expectations of return to the country of origin. Despite the widespread attempt in 1973–1974 to control or prevent further migration, the proportion of foreign workers continued to rise.[5] Family reunion and the growth of the young generation led to the establishment of organizations and institutions that addressed the welfare, and cultural and religious needs of the ethnic communities. Further developments, such as economic investments and demand for

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political participation in the receiving countries, suggest that immigrant workers, as they were once called, are becoming rooted in the host societies and becoming a part of these societies with their distinct cultural characteristics and religious values, thus changing the cultural and religious landscape of Western cities. It has been observed that 'the foreign workers, migrant workers or guest workers of the 1950s and 1960s have become permanent or at least quasi-permanent settlers in the 1980s'[6] and many of these settled migrants are opting for the citizenship of receiving countries where second and third generations are already a part of the social fabric, contributing to the emergence of multicultural public spheres in Europe. The arrival of foreigners with their own social customs and cultural characteristics such as different languages, religions, foods and dress, as well as organizations such as mosques, temples, synagogues and gurdwaras, entered the public domain alongside the churches. A large flow of immigrant workers as well as an influx of refugees in recent years and their settlement established heterogeneous and multicultural communities across Western Europe.

Muslims in Europe

Muslims constitute a significant community with an estimated number of 6.8 million who live in the European Union countries among these new communities.[7] In Western Europe, however, it is estimated that there are 12.5 million Muslims.[8] In Europe at large, an estimated 23 million Muslims live.[9] Although the presence of Muslims in Europe is not a new phenomenon, it could be argued that the expression of Islamic identity has become more pronounced and Muslims have become more visible in recent years. The growth of Western-educated young generations and the rise of global/trans-national Islamic movements are important sources of motivation for Muslims in Europe to express their identity in Western public spheres. For example, in recent years, Muslims in Europe have become more concerned with the religious education of their children and have shown strong reactions against the prohibition of headscarves in schools and have demanded legal recognition on local levels. Expression of Islamic identity has also taken place more strongly in the face of international struggles involving Muslims such as in Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and currently in Iraq. The marginalization of Muslims on local levels and their victimization on a global level mobilized Muslims in Europe and strengthened their sense of belonging to the Muslim *ummah*. However, despite this universal sense of belonging, Muslims in Europe display a great deal of diversity. Even a cursory look at the Muslim communities such as Pakistanis, Turks, Algerians, Moroccans and Bangladeshis in the West would reveal that all these communities have diversities of Islamic movements within themselves.

The existence of a large number of migrants with different cultures, religious affiliations and languages, who are increasingly becoming 'naturalized citizens' in European societies, raises many questions regarding cultural belonging, political loyalty, allegiance, group identity and the changing meaning of citizenship. The unfortunate attacks on US targets in 2001 and discussions following 9/11 highlighted the demarcation lines on civilizational levels. Samuel Huntington's widely read article and his book[10] on the clash of civilizations were circulated once more and some important figures in Europe and elsewhere such as the Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi made unexpected comments suggesting that the Western civilization is superior and thus its roots should be revived. Speaking at a news conference in Berlin, Mr Berlusconi is quoted to have said, 'We must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights and—in contrast with Islamic

countries—respect for religious and political rights'.[11] Migrants who belonged to other faiths and civilizations are subjected to implicit and explicit condemnation by ill-informed people. Moreover, misperceptions about Islam and Muslims in particular give rise to the essentialist views of this faith and its followers as fundamentalist, pro-violence, uncompromising and anti-Western. However, drawing upon a pool of long-term research on Muslims in Europe, I argue in this article that Turkish-Muslims constitute a changing diasporic community defying clichés and common stereotypes about Muslims.

Today, many Western European countries have a sizeable immigrant population of different ethnic, racial, religious and national origins, including Turkish-Muslims, as a result of trans-national migration and settlement. The estimated number of Turkish-Muslims in European countries is more than three million. Contrary to the expectations of policy makers, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish immigrants decided to settle in their host countries rather than return to Turkey.

The Turkish community in Europe is part of the emerging 'European Islam' and has its own diversity in the expression of Turkish-Muslim identity. Therefore a proper understanding of Muslim communities in Europe depends upon the analysis of multiple 'Islams' as perception and interpretation of a universal religion, rather than looking at 'Islam' as a static, fixed and monolithic faith which is resistant to social change. As this article suggests, the Muslims in diaspora display a great diversity in their perceptions and practices of Islam as well as the ways in which they relate their faith to the larger society. The Turkish-Muslim community in this context can play a positive role in bridging the 'imagined civilizational gap' between Muslims and the West through the expression and institutionalization of their tolerant, pluralist and embracing understanding of moderate Islamic faith, which emerged in Turkey under the influence of Sufi interpretation in interaction with local customs and religious traditions, in a frontier state throughout the centuries.

Turkish Presence in Europe

The presence of Turks in Europe is not a new phenomenon. Their presence can be traced to the arrival of Turkish workers to West European countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A review of the movement of Turkish people towards Europe will reveal that, although in a different nature, several thousand Turks came to Europe as early as the thirteenth century. The advent of the Anatolian Turks in the Balkans dates back to the 1260s.[12] The expansion of the Ottomans extended to Thrace in the reign of Orhan Gazi (1324–1359) whose son Suleyman managed to establish the first permanent Ottoman base at Gallipoli in Europe from which the initial conquests of the Balkans were made in the following years. Settlements of Turkoman nomads in large numbers from Anatolia followed Orhan's conquests in Europe. Ottoman expansion in the Balkans continued gradually and the Ottoman state encouraged immigration to the newly conquered territories.

Historically speaking the conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) by the Ottoman forces in 1453 during the reign of Mehmet II (1451–1481) was an historical turning point with regards to the Turkish presence in Europe and the consequent relations between the Turks and the Europeans. Nevertheless, like many empires in the past, the Ottoman Empire has also lost its military and political powers. The rise of nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century opened a new phase in the region. The weakened Ottomans were forced to retreat from Europe, leaving a substantial number

of Turkish-Muslims behind, some of whom later emigrated to Turkey either forcefully or by bilateral agreements. Bulgaria and Greece still have a significant number of Turkish-Muslim minority populations.[13] There are also smaller Turkish communities in Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Turkish Migration to Europe

A large-scale labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe started in the late 1950s and early 1960s, predominantly for economic reasons. The beginning of organized labour migration from Turkey goes back to October 1961 when Turkey and Germany signed a bilateral agreement for the recruitment of Turkish workers in Germany. Before 1961, participation of Turkish workers in post-war labour migration to Western Europe had, at least officially, not taken place.

The initial wave of Turkish labour migration was mainly directed to West Germany. However, labour migration from Turkey was not confined to Germany. Several other West European countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Britain also received Turkish labour migrants. It should be noted here that, in contrast to several other manpower-supplying countries, labour migration was a rather new phenomenon for Turkey. There was a colonial background of immigration to France, Britain and the Netherlands, as they received a significant number of migrant workers from their former colonies. Turkey differs in this respect in that, as a labour-sending country, it had no colonial links with countries where a large Turkish migrant population was accumulating.[14] Whereas, for example, Britain received immigrants from the West Indies, India and Pakistan, France turned to Algeria, and the Netherlands hosted migrants from Indonesia as colonial or ex-colonial territories, Turkey had no direct colonial relationship with any of the receiving countries. Therefore, this fact should be taken into account when drawing any general conclusions about labour-exporting experiences on the one hand, and the social and cultural characteristics of migrants, which have important bearings on their relations with the host society and its values, on the other hand.

As shown in Table 1, the migration and settlement of Turks in European countries steadily increased over the years and their number exceeded three million in 2003. In addition to Europe, according to the official figures, there are 130,000 Turks in the USA, 30,000 in the Russian Federation, 100,000 in Saudi Arabia and 52,000 in Australia.

Turkish Presence in Britain: Migration from Cyprus and Turkey to Britain

Migration from Cyprus to Britain started as early as the 1920s and by the 1930s almost 1,000 Cypriot immigrants had settled in Britain. However, early immigrants from Cyprus were exclusively Greek-Cypriots.[15] The annexation of Cyprus by Britain took place in 1914 and, thereafter, residents of Cyprus acquired a new status as subjects of the British Crown. The migration continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s until the Second World War. The immigration of Cypriots was regulated through the issuance of affidavits and passports.[16] The outbreak of war in 1939 halted Cypriot migration and the issuance of affidavits was suspended to prevent further population movement. Hence no further migration was observed until 1945. There were only a few Turks among these early immigrants. According to Home Office statistics, for example, the number of Turkish-Cypriots recorded between 1933 and 1934 was only three and, in 1936, only four.[17]

TABLE 1. Turks in selected European countries

Country	1973	1984	1995	2003
Germany	615,827	1,552,328	1,965,577	2,053,600
France	33,892	144,790	254,000	311,356
Netherlands	30,091	154,201	252,450	299,909
Austria	30,527	75,000	150,000	134,229
Belgium	14,029	63,587	90,425	70,701
Denmark	6,250	17,240	34,700	35,232
Britain	2,011	28,480	65,000	79,000
Norway	–	3,086	5,577	10,000
Sweden	5,061	20,900	36,001	38,844
Switzerland	19,710	48,485	76,662	79,476
Italy	–	–	–	10,000
Spain	–	–	–	1,000
Finland	–		–	3,325
Liechtenstein	–	–	–	809
Luxemburg	–	–	–	210
Total Turks	777,727	2,108,097	2,930,392	3,127,691

Sources: SOPEMI, 1995; *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur die Belange der Auslander (Federal Government's Office for Foreigners)*, 1995; Annual Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 1984, 1992, 1993; 2003; Statistics on Turkish Migrant: Report of the Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, available online at: <http://www.calisma.gov.tr>.

The independence of Cyprus in 1959 and its joining with Commonwealth countries was a turning point in facilitating a significant number of immigrants from Cyprus until the Immigration Act of 1962. Within a short space of time, a significant number of Cypriots had left for Britain and the estimated number of Cypriots in Britain had risen to 78,486 by 1964. Although the Immigration Act of 1962 prevented large-scale migration from Cyprus, migration of Cypriots still took place to Britain, but on a much smaller scale, in the form of family union until 1974–1975 when ethnic tension in Cyprus turned to open confrontation. It is reported that, following the 1974 war in Cyprus, 'several thousands of Cypriots entered Britain on a short stay basis as unofficial "refugees" from the fighting and territorial displacement'.[18] The number of Cypriots, regardless of their ethnic origin, was 160,000 in the 1980s, of which 20–25% are said to be Turkish-Cypriots.[19]

As seen in Table 2, it is very difficult to make an accurate estimate regarding the total number of Turks living in Britain. The above figures, for example, may not include Turks with British citizenship who have not registered with the Turkish Consulate. It should also be remembered that current estimates on Turks do not take asylum-seekers from Turkey into account. It is estimated that there are more than 13,000 asylum-seekers from Turkey.[20] This seems to be a significant figure in proportion to all Turks living in Britain. Therefore, the recent trend in asylum applications from Turkey should also be examined in order to reach a reliable statistical estimation about Turks in Britain. In contrast to migration to other European countries, Turkish migration from both Turkey and Cyprus to Britain was neither organized nor regulated by the government. This means that emigration centres were not chosen by the Turkish government policy, as was the case with immigration to other European countries. Instead, they were largely determined by individual initiatives which were followed by a chain migration by using social networks. It is difficult to single out particular centres of migration to

TABLE 2. Number of mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots: various estimates, dating from 1977 to 1996

Country of origin	Sources and estimated numbers			
Mainland Turks	26,597[a]	65,000[b]		
Turkish-Cypriots	60,000[c]	45,000[d]	40,000[e]	
Total Turks	86,597	110,000	115,000[f]	300,000[g]

Sources: [a]D. Owen, 'Country of Birth: Settlement Patterns', 1991 Census Statistical Paper No. 5, CRER, Coventry: University of Warwick, 1993; [b]Annual Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 1992, 1993; [c]J. S. Nielsen, 'Islamic Communities in Britain', in ed. P. Badham, *Religion, State and Society in Modern Britain*, Lampeter: Edwin Melen Press, 1989, pp. 225–241; [d]M. Anwar, 'Muslims in Britain Demographic and Social Characteristics', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 14, Nos 1 and 2, 1993, pp. 124–134; J. S. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992; [e]F. M. Bhatti, *Turkish Cypriots, op. cit.*; S. Ladbury, 'The Turkish Cypriots: Ethnic Relations in London and Cyprus', in ed. James L. Watson, *Between Two Cultures, Migrants and Minorities in Britain*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp. 301–331; [f]S. Gazioglu, 'The Influence of Education in the Labour Market: Turkish Speaking Immigrants in London Boroughs', Occasional Paper, London: Birkbeck College, 1989; [g]*The Independent*, 2 January 1996, based on a statement by a Customs and Excise Officer.

Britain especially in the early stages of migration. However, social networks such as family and kinship ties, village connections and friendship influenced the migration flow in the later stages.

Settlement Pattern

The overwhelming majority of the Turks live in the Greater London area, although one can see the opening of Turkish-owned businesses elsewhere in the country. The settlement pattern of Turkish immigrants to Britain is similar to that of Greek-Cypriots. Social networks, kinship relations and patronage seem to have perpetuated the concentration of Turkish people in the same quarters of the city. Research findings indicate that at least 54% of the respondents in London preferred living with Turkish neighbours[21] which partly explains the concentration of Turkish people in particular locations of London. A similar phenomenon exits in Berlin where Turks have created particular neighbourhoods. For its large numbers of Turkish residents, Kreuzberg in Berlin is also called Mandel, 'the Little Istanbul', a nickname that reflects the origins of its inhabitants and its ethnic features marked by Turkish lifestyles, shops, cafés and mosques. In addition, the underground line passing through this district is named 'Orient Express' which echoes the image of Little Istanbul, a common joke that Berlin is another province of Turkey.[22]

Research published by the London Borough of Hackney suggests that some 10–15% of Turkish-Cypriots and 20–30% of the Turks from Turkey are self-employed workers. The same report indicates that the unemployment rate among the Turkish community in Hackney is 35–45%. The data on housing conditions of Turks in London are also insufficient. The above-cited report notes that 'some 80 per cent of Turkish mainlanders live in council housing, 20 per cent of Turkish-Cypriots are owner occupiers'.[23] However, one speculates that the number of self-employed Turks is increasing especially in catering, food and textile industries.

Reproducing Traditional Values, Social Structures and Cultural Practices in Britain

Traditional family structure was revived and conventional roles and inter-family relations were reproduced once families joined together in Britain. Within the traditional Turkish family, its members assumed different responsibilities and duties reflected in the hierarchy of authority which was rooted in Turkish customs and practices. The early immigrants in particular seemed to have preserved the traditional structure of the Turkish family. Traditional family values are still very important for older members of the Turkish community in Britain. Nevertheless, spatial movements of Turkish immigrants and the reconstruction of traditional family structures in a culturally different atmosphere have inevitably challenged the resistance of the underlying family composition of the Turkish community. On the one hand, immigration to another country where there are no or only a few relatives made women more dependent on their husbands in the public sphere in the early period of settlement. Women who joined their husbands were mostly confined to the home and deprived of kin relations which are very important as a source of help and assistance in times of difficulties. The dependence of women on their men was further exacerbated by the lack of socializing among the Turkish community. Women have continued to carry out their traditional roles such as taking responsibility within the internal domains of the home. In addition to this traditional role, women have found more space in economic and political life in Britain in recent years. Some migrant Turkish women are also entering public life in Britain more often than before, and the number of women professionals is increasing. The entrance of women into professions such as teaching, social work, interpretation, law and journalism, among others, indicates that the status of Turkish women in Britain is changing. The Turkish women who were elected as local councillors in Hackney and Enfield may also be seen as clear signs of changes in the role of women.

The establishment of family and marriage practices in the Turkish community informs us that traditional values are constantly reproduced as an expression of Turkish identity. First of all, marriage is still seen as an important institution for socialization. Therefore, considerable social pressure is brought on single individuals to get married. Parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son, for example, are still seeking for intact 'honour' and 'reputation' of the prospective bride. Therefore, girls are encouraged to avoid situations which may damage their honour and family reputation. However, the meaning of 'honour' and 'reputation' is changing for the young generation. In contrast to parental attitudes, they do not see, for example, social outings with unrelated male friends as damaging their honour and reputation, and increasingly they want to make their own choices for marriage. This article argues that family 'control' over the girls, in contrast to boys, has much to do with cultural practices, and is not necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification for parental control cannot be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been so, they should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously for their sons as religious principles apply to both sexes equally.

The generational differences are not confined to the issue of marriage. One can argue that migration experience might cause a 'paradigm shift'. This means that traditionally-loaded meanings of some concepts and symbols may loose their importance with the fusion of novel ideas through acculturation, social interaction and schooling in Britain. Such a paradigm shift is taking place between generations in the multicultural context

where young people interact with the new cultural codes and social practices. Therefore, Turkish parents are deeply concerned with the transmission of traditional values to the young generation in order to protect their identity from 'cultural contamination'. Thus, parents consistently put pressure on them to 'absorb' and 'internalize' the cultural values of the Turkish community.

Although there is no total rejection of traditional values, it appears that the young generation are developing different attitudes towards parental values. Although most of the Turkish young people agree with the preservation of parental culture, they seem to attribute different meanings to some of the elements of traditional values. There is a tendency among young Turks to see marriage, social relations and sexuality in a somewhat different way than that of their parents. The overwhelming majority of young people claim that they have disagreements with their parents over 'meeting and socializing with the opposite sex', 'type of clothing', 'spending time outside the house', 'restriction of freedom', 'friendship with non-Turks and non-Muslims' and 'the way marriages are arranged'.[24]

The development of different attitudes towards these issues may be attributed to the socialization experience of the younger generation in Britain. In contrast to their parents, young people have to deal with multiple identity choices. Parents as the first generation maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host society's social and cultural values. Young Turks, on the other hand, as a 'bridge generation', seem to have ambiguous tendencies towards some of the values and habits of their community. They have a desire, on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home, and on the other, to adopt some elements of the host culture outside. This means that there is an emergent identity construction taking place among the young generation. This emergent identity is not exclusively shaped by 'Turkey/Cypriot inspired perceptions', but rather it is increasingly based on 'local/British inspired perceptions'.

It can be argued that there is a constant identity negotiation among the Turkish youth. On the one hand, they accept and desire to have British citizenship as an umbrella identity; on the other hand, they do not want to see a conflict in being Turkish as well as being British. For them, British-ness does not require them to get rid of their national, ethnic and cultural identity. While Scots, Welsh and English identities are becoming more detached from 'British identity', Turks as well as others in diaspora are increasingly embracing British identity and calling themselves by hyphenated identities. 'Do not call me Black, I am a British' is just one example of having a hyphenated identity in multiethnic and multiracial British society. Being a British-Pakistani, a British-Asian, a British-Muslim or a British-Turk is not seen as odd. Rather, they exist under the wider umbrella of British identity as forms of being British. These hybrid and hyphenated identities are not only self-ascribed. These communities are also seen and described by politicians, the media and the general public as British citizens, giving legitimacy to their claim for British-ness.[25]

Religion as a Source of Group Identity

As Table 3 shows, Britain has more than 1.5 million Muslim residents with various ethnic, racial and national backgrounds. However, British-Muslims should not be seen as a monolithic social entity. There is a great deal of diversity among the Muslim communities in Britain as elsewhere in the West and the Muslim world. Turkish-Muslims are part of the larger Muslim community in Britain and religion is one of the significant markers of Turkish collective identity. Therefore, the first generation of the

TABLE 3. Faith communities in Britain

Religious affiliation	Number	Percent
Christian	37,338,486	71.7%
Muslim	1,546,626	3.0%
Hindu	552,421	1.1%
Sikh	329,358	0.6%
Jewish	259,927	0.5%
Buddhist	144,453	0.3%
Other	150,720	0.3%
No religion	7,709,267	14.8%
Religion not stated	4,010,658	7.7%
Total Population	52,041,916	100.0%

Source: <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/727>.

Turkish community established Islamic institutions as soon as they acquired sufficient resources. These institutions were meant to facilitate the transmission of religious values to young Turks. However, attitudes of young people towards religion are changing. Although the majority of young Turks still believe in the basic principles of Islam, it seems that religion is becoming a symbolic attachment for many of them. Intellectual dimension of religious commitment among young Turks clearly indicates that young people know very little about Islam. The lack of knowledge about the basic principles of Islam might be attributed to several factors. It can be argued, for example, that they do not learn much about their religion in the schools because there seem to be no special provisions for the teaching of Islam and Turkish culture. Another reason may be the failure of Islamic institutions to address a larger young audience because of their mostly outdated teaching curriculum and methods.

As far as the performance of rituals is concerned, only a small number of young people observe prescribed Islamic practices. Young Turks know little about their religion and they generally do not fulfil the required religious duties. Yet most of them still believe in Islam. This means that a symbolic religiosity is developing among the Turkish youth who seem to be increasingly feeling the tension generated by the continuity of traditional values and changes in social and cultural environments. It appears that young Turks will experience this tension at least for the foreseeable future. Parents and religious organizations will continue to teach the young generation the importance of religion and will try to inculcate an Islamic belief in their sense of belonging to the Turkish-Muslim community. However, social and cultural effects of the British context will also influence the young generation throughout their life which will to a certain extent inevitably induce changes in the emergent Turkish identity among the young generation, which would enable them to accommodate a sense of belonging to the multicultural community in Britain.[26]

Associational Life and Collective Identity Mobilization

Cultural, religious and religio-political organizations also play a role in the construction and maintenance of Turkish identity in the British context. Organizations and associations of various kinds were established and used by the Turkish community in Britain as elsewhere as a response to changing social and cultural conditions. These organiza-

tions have different membership and clientele profiles, different administrative structures, strategies and purposes.

Turkish/Cypriot associations in Britain display diversity in terms of their foundational purposes and subsequent activities. The activities and services made available by the existing organizations address various issues such as welfare, education, social and cultural challenges and the religious needs of the Turkish community in Britain. These associations cluster around a set of ideals and purposes. The names of the organizations usually indicate their priorities and orientation, and the clientele/membership structure of these Turkish/Cypriot organizations. The classification and categorization of the organizations according to their functions, such as welfare, cultural, educational, political and religious, would be of little use since there is no clear cut differentiation between ethnic-based formations. There is juxtaposition and proximity across the interests and activities of the Turkish/Cypriot associations.

The foundational aspirations and priorities of Turkish organizations, reflected in their activities and functions, reveal that there are overlapping as well as dissimilar and even conflicting concerns among the Turkish community. This means that the institutionalization of identity politics assumes diverse meanings according to the cultural, religious and political orientations of Turkish organizations. In the Turkish immigrant community, the process of community formation, with its own 'cultural boundaries' from that of fragmented individuals, through family unions and marriages was accompanied by the process of institutionalization in various areas.

The *raison d'être* of Turkish organizations lies in the fact that settlement and post-settlement processes generated numerous problems for the community and these challenging problems needed to be addressed. The issues revolving around culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation preoccupied parental and familial concerns. It can be argued that Turkish organizations emerged in response to these concerns which are related to the expression of ethnicity and identity.

Education of the Turkish Minority

Almost all Turkish/Cypriot associations place a special emphasis on education because education is seen as a key to transmit traditional values to the young generation and to generate a sense of belonging to the ideals of the Turkish community. It is a widely held view among the first generation that their children are exposed to the cultural influences of the larger society. Schooling, peer-group relations and media are constantly exerting cultural influences on young people and presenting new identity choices in conflict with the Turkish culture and Islamic values. Turkish/Cypriot organizations with few exceptions are devising policies and strategies to counterbalance the acculturation of young Turks in order to prevent their assimilation, because assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity. However, although the meaning of Turkish identity is the same in principle, Turkish/Cypriot organizations seem to emphasize different components of their identity as the most basic and indispensable elements. Some organizations, for example, place priority on teaching the Turkish language as it is perceived to be the most effective means of communication with the culture which defines Turkish/Cypriot identity.

The Turkish Educational Attaché and some Turkish organizations in Britain claim that the number of young Turkish students at the supplementary weekend schools has reached 2,500 and it is estimated that their size will grow steadily. Increasing attendance in classes on Turkish 'language', 'culture', 'music' and 'folklore' indicates that

parental concern about the future of their children is growing. They do not want to see young Turks lose their 'Turkish identity'; therefore the first generation is trying to mobilize the Turkish community to prevent 'cultural contamination' of children. It seems that institutionalization of education is regarded as one of the most effective ways of reproducing Turkish culture and instilling an identity among the young generation by transmitting 'reproduced values' within the British context. However, despite parental pressure and organizational efforts, the meaning of a Turkish identity is changing for the young generation as mentioned earlier.

Turkish/Cypriot organizations sometimes resort to political mobilization of the community to revive the 'collective identity'. The rationale behind such a strategy seems to be the expression of a political identity which is considered to be a prerequisite to becoming a 'politically conscious community', rather than a prerequisite of a 'silent ethnic community'. Therefore, some organizations keep the issue of Cyprus alive because it is expected that such issues reawaken nationalist feelings and aspirations as sources of political identity. Political mobilization inevitably requires involvement in the politics of the country of origin. Involvement in the politics of the country of origin in the diaspora reproduces attachments, alliances and hostilities which crystallize 'identity boundaries'.

Cyprus has been a divided island between Greek-Cypriots in the south and Turkish-Cypriots in the north since 1974. Both sides engaged in negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations to reach a sustainable solution. The end of the Cold War and acceleration of Turkey's efforts for full membership in the European Union led to a gradual shift in attitudes towards the situation in Cyprus. The Turkish government persuaded the Turkish-Cypriot side to accept the UN plan, crafted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan, to reunify the island. Except for the ultra nationalists and hardliners, Turkish/Cypriot organizations in Britain and elsewhere supported the UN plans. A referendum took place on 24 April 2004. The results, however, were disappointing for the Turkish-Cypriot side where 64.9% said 'yes' to the UN plan, whereas on the Greek-Cypriot side 75.8% said 'no'. Cyprus joined the EU on 1st May 2004, leaving the Turkish side outside the Union. However, Turkish/Cypriot civil organizations in the diaspora launched a policy of lobbying EU states to put pressure on Greek-Cypriots as a sign of the Turks' desire to be a part of Europe.

Varieties of Religious Trends: Faces of Islam among the Turkish Community

As mentioned earlier, Islam is one of the indispensable components of Turkish/Cypriot identity. Even those who defined themselves as 'not religious' or 'nominal' Muslims feel that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Institutionalization of Islam and the growth of Islamic movements among the Turkish community confirm that this perception is widely held. This means that Turkish ethnicity, identity and Islam are closely intertwined and cannot be readily separated from one another. Therefore, it is almost impossible to analyse Turkish identity without reference to Islam. However, it should be borne in mind that Turkish-Islam is as diversified as Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Arab Islam. This means that national and religious identities influenced each other throughout history and it is this factor that lies at the heart of the non-monolithic nature of Islamic movements. Even within Turkish-Islam there is a wide diversity of expression of Islamic identity in Britain. Almost all Turkish-Islamic organizations were offshoots of umbrella organizations/groups in Turkey or Cyprus and they implicitly, and more often explicitly, claim allegiance to the 'national-model' organizations.

As far as the Islamic organizations in Britain are concerned, it appears that rivalry, competition and conflict rather than negotiation and cooperation are prevalent features of their politics. It seems that such a state of affairs is inherited from the conflicts among the Islamic groups in Turkey, and then reproduced in Europe. The influence of the 'model' organizations is very well documented on the institutionalization of religious groups among Turks in Europe and in Britain. Therefore, it would not be possible to analyse the diversity of approaches to Islamic identity and politics among Turks in Britain without understanding the current developments in Turkey. However, the focus of Islamic politics for the young Turkish generation seems to be changing. The young generation are increasingly becoming disillusioned by the priorities of organizations established and run by their elders. They want to see more novel and diverse activities inspired by the local conditions. No longer do they want to see these organizations as the extensions of mainland Turkish organizations, but they want to see them as European organizations.

The Role of Mosques

The establishment of mosques has always been a priority for the Turks as they are considered to be traditional centres of Islamic learning, religious socialization and education, which contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity. Activities held in mosques are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the group, and pass the traditional values onto the young generation. The growth of the young generation especially seems to be causing some changes in the traditional politics of the mosques. Some of the Islamic organizations, for example, seem to have recognized that classical teaching methods were not very fruitful within the British context. Therefore, they introduced new strategies for teaching, recruiting and appealing to a wider audience. For example, one of the mosques opened an independent primary school in London despite its ongoing insistence on traditional teaching methods.[27] Another mosque, on the other hand, had negotiated with the Local Council and was granted permission to register weddings in the mosque. The novelty was even extended to allow the formation of small market places in one of the Turkish mosques. It should be pointed out that these are significant changes in the politics of mosques compared to Turkey or Cyprus where mosques are only used for prayers under the strict control of the state apparatus. This also suggests that Islamic groups in Europe enjoy more freedom of expression since they do not challenge the state system in the public sphere, whereas many Islamic movements are seen as a threat to the establishment in Muslim countries.

The development of new strategies indicates that Islamic groups in Britain are aware of the social and cultural influences of the wider society. Nevertheless, new policies and strategies also carry the imprint of particular groups who have different approaches to Islamic issues. This means that Turkish-Islamic organizations in Britain have more differences than convergence in terms of their methods of teaching, ideological standpoints, expression of Islamic identity and participation in the public sphere. Three main Turkish-Islamic groups as represented by the Aziziye, Suleymanci and Sheikh Nazim[28] groups differ in their interpretations of what Islamic behaviour really is and what an authentic Islamic identity means. The Nur[29] movement, with its study circles (*dershane*) and courses open to the public, and the Alevi[30] interpretation of Islam are also taking root in Britain after the establishment of a *Cemevi*[31] in London. In addition to these groups, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, a governmental institution, also provides religious services to the Turkish community throughout Europe by appointing

attachés for religious affairs and by sending *imams* to many cities. The long-term competition among Turkish religious associations, institutions, and Islamic groups in the religious market still continues in several forms.

Trans-national Islamic Networks

One of the overlooked aspects of Islamic organizations among Turks in Britain and Europe in general is their contribution to the development of 'Islamic networks'. Religious communities are among the oldest trans-national movements that are not confined to territorial boundaries of nation-states. In today's post-modern era, religious communities have become vigorous creators of an emergent trans-national civil society.[32] The development of trans-national Islamic networks seems to be taking place on two levels. The first level relates to Turks as a micro-Muslim community. Almost all Islamic organizations among Turks in Europe have their origins in Turkey. Islamic groups such as Suleymanci, National Vision (Milli Gorus)[33] and the Nur movements are widening their networks in Europe. These movements use the trans-national space and the European public sphere to strengthen religious collective identity on the one hand, and try to increase their clientele by addressing a larger audience through the mass media, internet, group studies, weekend schools and numerous publications, on the other hand. The second area of network development relates to non-Turkish-Muslim communities in Europe. Some of the Turkish-Islamic organizations are also contributing to the widening of trans-national Islam. Political and mystical Islam especially do not confine their appeal to one ethnic/national group; rather they try to recruit Muslims and win converts from all national origins. The Sheikh Nazim group, for example, is comprised of Muslims who have different racial, ethnic and national origins. The National Vision, on the other hand, is increasingly trying to get involved in the affairs of Muslims in a wider context. All of these groups have already opened branches in major European and American cities to widen their sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Population movements have been a permanent feature of human history. In many quarters of the globe, one can observe the emergence of multicultural societies as a result of voluntary migration, population exchange or flow of refugees, which involved a massive volume of human groups throughout history. These migratory waves are conditioned by varying forces such as wars and ethnic clashes, economic demise or industrial development, and political pressures which determined the direction and nature of population movements. Whether it is voluntary or forced, migration has become a global phenomenon with a wide range of social, cultural, economic and political consequences. Globalization, migration, widening democracy, rapid developments in communication technology and improved access to education provided new channels for religious movements to articulate and disseminate their ideas. Settlement of immigrants with trans-national political and religious connections raises important questions regarding state, citizenship, civil society and political participation, as well as raising concerns for security and conflict in the post-Cold War era.

European societies are predominantly secular and there is a growing Muslim population in the very heart of secular Europe. Secularized European social life, political culture and public sphere are all facing the enormous challenge of accommodating a relatively religious population of around seven million from different Muslims coun-

tries. Despite settling in Europe many Muslims attach great importance to their sacred and religious values, trying to express their demands and identities in the public spheres. Unlike America, there is not a great wall of separation between religion and state in most European countries where the church either enjoys a partnership status or is recognized as an important actor. While Europe tries to integrate Muslims in the secular culture, 9/11 has once more drawn our attention to the secular–religious divide, and more importantly, trans-national religious networks and Muslim diasporas in various parts of the world.

It should be noted that there is significant diversity among the Muslim diaspora communities and among religious movements regarding their approaches to the problems of Muslim communities and current crisis involving Muslims. Their structures, membership, clientele, and language in articulating their collective identity discourses also differ from each other.[34] Therefore, one should not essentialize Muslim identity by having a monolithic approach to current developments and Muslim diaspora in Europe and beyond, because this will strengthen stereotypes and lead to misguided judgements about Islam and its followers.

The Turkish-Muslim community in Britain is part of the world Muslim diaspora communities with its own diversity, in accommodating different Islamic trends. Turkish-Muslim diasopra in Britain and elsewhere in Europe is now a permanent social and cultural reality. They should not be viewed as immigrants anymore because they are citizens of European countries. Existence of Turkish and other Muslim diasporic communities should be seen as an opportunity to establish a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. Moderate Islam as represented by the overwhelming majority of the Turks in Europe can be a source of dialogue, mutual understanding and communication between Muslims and the West.

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