CNAS has just released another of the major projects I've been working on this spring:  Rhetoric and Reality, an analysis of the Obama administration's strategy for combating terrorism and countering violent extremism.   I'll have more to say about this soon, but for now, allow me to quote from the press release:

President Barack Obama shifted away from the rhetorical framework of former President George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terror” because he believed this would allow America to more effectively combat the challenge posed by violent extremists such as al-Qaeda.  Despite this change in rhetoric, and dramatic changes from the early years after 9/11, the Obama administration's approach demonstrates striking continuity with the policies and philosophies adopted by the Bush administration in its final two years. This report - authored by Marc Lynch - examines the Administration's efforts to change America's rhetoric and adapt to new threats.  Lynch calls on the Obama administration to more clearly articulate its counterterrorism strategy, adapt to new domestic threats, coordinate efforts to engage publics and counter extremist narratives and prepare for a successful attack well in advance.  He also warns of the inherent tensions that arise from the administration’s rhetorical commitment to the rule of law as essential to a durable, legitimate campaign against violent extremists even as it escalates its covert drone operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and counterterrorism partnerships in ungoverned territories.

Download the report from CNAS here! 

One year ago today, President Obama delivered a much anticipated speech in Cairo, Egypt in which he pledged "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect." That new beginning seemed a long time ago this week, as Muslims expressed outrage over America's seeming support for Israel's naval commando attack on an aid convoy headed towards Gaza. It is no accident that the anniversary of Obama's speech has gone virtually unremarked in the Arab media this week, except for a few comments about unmet promises and some juxtaposition of that glorious moment with America's anemic response to Gaza. 

The President's spokesman, Robert Gibbs, told a press conference that he did not believe that the American position would have a great impact on Obama's relations with the Muslim communities of the world. Nothing could be further from the truth. If the Obama administration does not change its cautious approach quickly and forcefully address the blockade of Gaza which is the real heart of this week's scandal, it will confirm the crystallizing narrative of a President which either can not deliver on its promises or did not mean what he said. This would be a sad epitaph for the President's  carefully nurtured outreach to the Muslim world.

Washington DC woke up this Memorial Day morning to the shocking news that an Israeli commando team had stormed the "Freedom Flotilla", a Turkish aid ship headed towards Gaza, killing (at last count) ten and wounding dozens.   Israeli claims that their actions were a necessary move against an extremist-linked threat fall flat in the face of what looks to the world like an outrageously disproportionate military response to a publicity-seeking aid mission in international waters.  The details are still murky, and I expect that as all sides throw out their propaganda fast and furious they will become murkier yet.  

I'm not going to try to keep up with the breaking events, as world governments and publics scramble to figure out how to react.  Instead, I'll just say that the bottom line for Washington is that the U.S. can not ignore this or try to hope that it will pass quickly so that it can resume business as usual.  It is rapidly spiraling into one of the most intensely galvanizing issues in the Arab media -- and around the world -- since the Israeli war on Gaza itself.   If Obama goes ahead and meets with Netanyahu as if nothing happened, then his administration's outreach to the Muslim communities of the world is effectively over. 

The Obama administration's new National Security Strategy is about to be unveiled today. I got hold of an advance copy of it yesterday, and then joined about a dozen other people at the White House to talk about it with three senior administration officials (on background). It's an impressive document, and goes a long way towards providing a coherent framework for American foreign policy and national security which makes sense of what the administration has been doing and offers a roadmap to where it wants to go. From my perspective, the most interesting -- and strongest -- part of the NSS deals with the administration's new approach to al-Qaeda. The most problematic is the gap between its strong commitment to civil liberties and the rule of law and its practice thus far with regard to things like drone strikes.

The NSS lays out "a comprehensive strategy" in what it repeatedly calls a war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, one "that denies [al-Qaeda and its affiliates] safe haven, strengthens front-line partners, secures our homeland, pursues justice through durable legal approaches, and counters a bankrupt agenda of extremism and murder with an agenda of hope and opportunity." It defines this in narrow terms: "this is not a global war against a tactic -- terrorism or a religion -- Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa'ida, and its terrorist affiliates." It places this war within the perspective of broader foreign policy concerns, and warns against overreaction to terrorist provocations -- pointing out, correctly, that al-Qaeda's strategy hopes to trigger such American overreactions, leading to counterproductive political responses and interventions which drain our resources, alienate our friends, and radicalize Muslims around the world. Much of the NSS can be read as a multi-level, robust strategy to prevent such self-defeating responses, while doing everything actually necessary to disrupt and defeat the threat which actually exists.

The strategy outlined in the NSS closely tracks what I describe in detail in my forthcoming CNAS paper on the subject, which Spencer Ackerman describes briefly here. This robust strategy makes a mockery of the political attacks against the administration for ignoring the threat posed by al Qaeda or "pretending that we are not at war" (in the words of Dick Cheney, the man most responsible for supporting al Qaeda's strategy by falling into their every trap and fueling their narrative at every opportunity). Its practice largely follows and builds upon the course corrections of the last two years of the Bush administration, which quietly abandoned most of the failed policies of the 2001-2006 period. It actually expands some of those practices -- notably the drone strikes, but also the aggressive campaigns against safe havens in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. At the same time, it takes advantage of the Presidential transition and Obama's personal appeal to reap the gains of a fresh start with other countries and publics. And its Global Muslim Engagement strategy seeks to build robust relations with Muslims around the world on issues beyond terrorism, denying al Qaeda the ability to define their relations with America and to argue that America is at war with Islam. This broader Muslim Engagement is somewhat underplayed in the NSS, though, placed in a minor supporting role rather than as the key part of the overall strategy against al Qaeda which it is -- an issue I discuss at some length in the forthcoming June CNAS report. It is also beginning to adapt to the seeming new pattern of attempts to target the U.S. homeland, as previewed in John Brennan's appearance at CSIS yesterday.

The NSS doubles down on the President's May 2009 National Archives speech, insisting that "we need durable legal approaches consistent with our identity and our values." I was delighted to see such a vigorous and prominent place for these concerns, which were central to the Obama campaign and administration's rhetoric. But, as I pressed the senior administration officials on yesterday, there are serious concerns about whether the U.S. is actually meeting those commitments. If they seriously believe that demonstrating our commitment in practice to civil liberties and the rule of law is vital to our national security -- which I think they do believe, and which I do believe -- then how can they reconcile that with the way drone strikes are being used, with the perpetuation of Bush era practices governing surveillance, with the use of military commissions, and so forth?

Some of these problems aren't really their fault, given the toxic political environment and the determination by many of their opponents to politicize terrorism and make every aspect of it a wedge issue. They can't easily create a durable legal foundation without Congress or the courts. They have done many things which they can do unilaterally, such as the ban on torture, and they are slowly emptying out Guantánamo by finding takers for its detainees. But nevertheless, this seems to me to be a dangerous hole in the overall strategy which needs more careful attention and higher priority in their deliberations --- on a case by case basis, and as part of the overall strategy.

Overall, then, I am very pleased with the new National Security Strategy. It marks a clean break with the past. In 2006, the NSS declared America's war with "radical militant Islam" to be the single most important overarching framework for its relationship with the world. The 2010 NSS clearly meets that threat, but defines it far more narrowly and places it within a much broader context. I will leave it to others to work through its arguments about the domestic and economic context, the adaptation to rising powers and the recognition of declining American primacy, the concern with nuclear proliferation and disarmament, and more. From my perspective, the new NSS gets the big things right and offers a clear and effective framework for American foreign policy and national security in the coming years.... even as potentially dangerous potholes can be seen in the road ahead. (Sorry for that last line... I got stuck in traffic on the Beltway on the way to the meeting in the White House, and potholes are on my mind.)

Yesterday afternoon CNAS released another of the papers which has been keeping me away from the blog:   America's Extended Hand:  An Assessment of the Obama Administration's Global Engagement Strategy, written with my former Elliott School colleague and current CNAS Vice President Kristin Lord. This report started out with a meeting I convened in September with a group of high-level administration officials to talk about the follow-up to Cairo and the overall approach to public diplomacy.   Kristin and I originally planned to do a 5 page policy brief, but then it began to grow. We ended up talking to around 50 current and former government officials involved with public diplomacy and strategic communications, and greatly expanding the scope of the analysis. America's Extended Hand presents a comprehensive overview of how the Obama administration thinks about public engagement, how it has attempted to reorganize the government to deliver on that vision, and how it has performed across a number of crucial issues (including Muslim engagement, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, China, democracy promotion, and combating violent extremism).  

We argue that the administration has succeeded in its initial goal of "re-starting" America's relations with global publics, taking advantage of the fresh start offered by the Presidential transition, and has effectively used President Obama's particular gifts to focus attention and global debate on issues which he has identified as key American priorities. The administration has been less successful, however, at executing engagement campaigns in support of specific tactical objectives, at adapting to changing circumstances and at meeting the high expectations generated by those speeches. With a palpable sense of the Obama bubble deflating, and a pernicious consensus emerging of a "say-do" gap in which the U.S. fails to deliver on its highly public promises, we urge the administration to do more to prepare the ground and to follow through on its engagement.  

America's Extended Hand goes into considerable detail about the administration's philosophy, its efforts to reshape the inter-agency process and individual government agencies (from the Defense Department and State Department to the NSC and the BBG), and its efforts across a range of issue areas.  And it makes a number of specific recommendations for how to adapt to the emerging second phase of the administration's foreign policy.  I'm not going to rehearse all of that detail here -- if you're interested in America's public diplomacy and strategic communications, download the paper here from the CNAS website.   This report has been a long time in the making --- I look forward to feedback and debate! 

Hi everyone --- I am almost, but not quite, dug out of the hole in which I've been buried for the last month or so. Over the last two days I hosted the inaugural conference for a the Project on Middle East Political Science, a major new initiative I'm directing aimed at building the professional, public and policy impact of academic political scientists specializing in the Middle East.  We had 25 political scientists from all over the country, along with several current and former top policy officials talking about the state of the field.  I'll have much more to say about this soon.   POMEPS is also hosting a book launch event this afternoon at 4:00 for Thomas Hegghammer, of Jihadica fame, who will be discussing his newly published book Jihad in Arabia -- come join us at 4:00 at the Elliott School for Hegghammer, wine and cookies! 

In the meantime, I wanted to let those of you who are interested know that I have the lead article in the new issue of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism:  "Islam Divided Between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan."  From the abstract:

The Muslim Brotherhood poses a unique challenge to efforts to combat Al Qaeda and like-minded groups. It is one of the key sources of Islamist thought and political activism, and plays a significant role in shaping the political and cultural environment in an Islamist direction. At the same time, it opposes Al Qaeda for ideological, organizational, and political reasons and represents one of the major challenges to the salafi-jihadist movement globally. This dual nature of the Muslim Brotherhood has long posed a difficult challenge to efforts to combat violent extremism. Does its non-violent Islamism represent a solution, by capturing Islamists within a relatively moderate organization and stopping their further radicalization (a “firewall”), or is it part of the problem, a “conveyor belt” towards extremism? This article surveys the differences between the two approaches, including their views of an Islamic state, democracy, violence, and takfir, and the significant escalation of those tensions in recent years. It concludes that the MB should be allowed to wage its battles against extremist challengers, but should not be misunderstood as a liberal organization or supported in a short-term convergence of interests. 

The full article is behind a paywall, and I can't post it for copyright reasons but if you're not a subscriber and you want to read it then drop me an email I may be able to help you out.  

Hey all, sorry that I forgot to put up a placeholder post a few weeks back explaining that I wasn't going to be posting for a while.  The usual explanations.  It's that time of year in the academic calendar, and I've been doing a bit of traveling and giving a few talks.  My available blogging time has been taken up editing the Middle East Channel (to which I recently donated my "banner" spot, in the spirit of the greater good).    The six (!) major reports and articles I've got coming out in the next couple of months will soon give y'all an idea of how I've been spending the rest of my time.   While I may throw up the occasional post, regular blogging probably won't resume until June.    And then I'll be back! 

What role could an international military force play in securing a two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace?  That's the question addressed in "Security for Peace", released today by the Center for a New American Security after nearly a year of discussions and meetings.  I wrote the final chapter for the report, which was edited by Andrew Exum and which includes four comparative case studies and a sweeping overview by Ambassador James Dobbins.   The report does not advocate for an international military force to be deployed.  Instead, it asks what role such a force could play in making a peace agreement succeed, should one be proposed, and the conditions under which it is most likely to be productive.  It's a pretty hot issue for CNAS to take up -- and some of its conclusions will likely be controversial.  Hopefully, the report will generate some fresh and productive thinking about concrete ways to make a two state solution work in practice.