HOBBES

OBJECTIONS TO DESCARTES' MEDITATIONS,
WITH DESCARTES' REPLIES

Translation © George MacDonald Ross, 1975–1999

HOBBES’S FIRST OBJECTION

Against Meditation I, on what can be called into doubt

It is clear enough from what has been said in this Meditation, that there is no criterion for distinguishing our dreams from waking and genuine sensation. It follows from this that the phantasms we have when awake and sensing are not accidents inhering in external objects, and that they do not even provide any evidence that such external objects exist at all. Consequently, if we simply follow our senses without any further reasoning, we shall be justified in wondering whether anything exists or not. So I accept the validity of this Meditation. On the other hand, Plato and other ancient philosophers disagreed as to whether or not the existence of sensible things could be doubted; and in ordinary life, people are aware of the difficulty of distinguishing waking from dreams. So it is a pity that such a distinguished originator of fresh ideas should come out with this old stuff.

DESCARTES’ FIRST REPLY

The reasons I gave for doubting, which the Philosopher accepts as valid, I put forward only as plausible. My purpose in introducing them was not to claim any originality for them. In fact I had three aims: (1) to prepare the minds of my readers for thinking about objects of the intellect, and distinguishing them from material objects, for which purpose I think such arguments are absolutely necessary; (2) to give myself the opportunity to answer them in later Meditations; and also (3) to demonstrate the solidity of the truths I put forward later, since they cannot be overturned by such metaphysical doubts. I was not seeking any credit for reviewing these arguments; but I think I could no more have left them out, than a medical writer could leave out the description of a disease he wanted to explain how to cure.

 

HOBBES’S SECOND OBJECTION

Against Meditation II, on the nature of the human mind

‘I am a thinking thing’ [n.1] — true. From the fact that I think, or have phantasms, whether awake or while dreaming, it follows that I am thinking. After all, ‘I think’ and ‘I am thinking’ have the same meaning. From the fact that I am thinking it follows that ‘I am’, because what thinks is not nothing. But when he goes on to say, ‘That is, mind, soul, [n.2] understanding, reason,’ there is room for doubt. It does not seem to be valid to argue from ‘I am thinking’ to ‘I am thought’, or from ‘I am walking’ to ‘I am a walk’. Mr. Descartes assumes that an intelligent thing [n.3] is the same as intellection, which is the action [n.4] of an intelligent thing; or at least that an intelligent thing is the same as the intellect, which is the capacity possessed by an intelligent thing. But all philosophers distinguish the underlying subject [n.5] from its capacities and actions, that is, from its properties and essences. A being itself is completely different from its essence. Consequently, it could be that a thinking thing is that which underlies mind, reason, or understanding as its subject, and hence that it is something corporeal. Mr. Descartes assumes without proof that it is not corporeal. And yet the conclusion he seems to want to establish depends on this inference.

On the same page he writes: ‘I know I exist, and I ask what the "I" is that I know. It is absolutely certain that my knowledge of it, in this strictly limited sense, does not depend on things I do not yet know to exist.’

It is absolutely certain that knowledge of the proposition ‘I exist’ depends on the proposition ‘I think’, as he himself rightly tells us. But from where do we get our knowledge of the proposition ‘I think’? It can only come from our inability to conceive any action of a thing independently of its subject — e.g. dancing without a dancer, knowing without a knower, or thinking without a thinker.

It seems to follow that a thinking thing is something corporeal. This is because it seems that the subjects of all actions are comprehensible only if they are conceived as corporeal or material. He himself shows this later, in the example of the wax. Despite changing its colour, hardness, shape, and other states, it is still understood to have remained the same thing throughout — that is, the same matter subjected to all those changes. It does not follow that I think by virtue of some other thought. Even though you can think about your having thought (this form of thinking is nothing other than remembering), it is absolutely impossible for you to think about your present thinking, any more than you can know that you know. That would lead to an infinite regress: how do you know that you know that you know that you know?

So, since knowledge of the proposition ‘I exist’ depends on knowledge of the proposition ‘I think’; and knowledge of the latter on the fact that we cannot separate thought from thinking matter, it seems that we must conclude that the thinking thing is material rather than immaterial.

DESCARTES’ SECOND REPLY

When I said, ‘That is, mind, soul, understanding, reason,’ etc., I did not mean by these names simply the capacities themselves, but things endowed with the capacity of thinking. This is what everyone always understands by the first two, and often by the second two. I have explained this so explicitly, and in so many places, that I do not see how there could have been any room for doubt.

In this respect, the terms ‘walk’ and ‘thought’ are utterly different: the term ‘walk’ is usually taken as applying only to the action itself, whereas ‘thought’ applies sometimes to the action, sometimes to the capacity, and sometimes to the thing itself which has the capacity.

Nor do I say that ‘intelligent thing’ and ‘intellection’ are the same, nor even ‘intelligent thing’ and ‘intellect’, if ‘intellect’ is taken as a capacity, but only when it is taken as the thing itself which is intellectually active. On the other hand, I agree that I used words which were as abstract as I could find, in order to refer to the thing or substance which I wanted to divest of everything that did not belong to it; whereas our Philosopher uses words that are as concrete as possible (such as ‘subject’, ‘matter’, or ‘body’) for signifying the thinking thing, so as not to allow it to be separated from body.

I have no fear that anyone will think that this method of his, of running different things together, is more suitable for discovering the truth than my method of distinguishing individual items as far as I can. But enough of verbal quibbles: let us get down to the substantial issue.

He says ‘It could be that a thinking thing is something corporeal; and he assumes without proof that it is not something corporeal.’ But I did not take this as an assumption, and in no way did I use it a basic axiom. I left if completely undecided right up to the sixth Meditation, where it is proved.

Then he rightly refers to ‘our inability to conceive any action independently of its subject,’ e.g. thought without a thinking thing, since that which thinks is not nothing. But without any reason, and contrary to all linguistic usage and to all logic, he goes on: ‘It seems to follow that a thinking thing is something corporeal. This is because it seems that the subjects of all actions are comprehensible only if they are conceived as . . .’ — ‘substantial’, I would accept, or even ‘material’ if he wants, provided this is understood in the sense of metaphysical matter. But it does not follow that they must be categorised as corporeal.

Not only logicians, but all ordinary people say that some substances are spiritual, and others corporeal. All that I proved by the example of the wax, was that its colour, hardness, and shape do not belong to the essence [n.6] of the wax itself. In that passage I was not dealing at all with the essence of mind, or even with the essence of body.

The philosopher’s remark here, that one thought cannot be the subject of another thought, is irrelevant. Who would ever have imagined this, apart from the Philosopher himself? To explain the matter itself in a few words, it is certain that thought cannot exist without a thing that is thinking, since generally there cannot be any action or accident without a substance it inheres in. Unquestionably, it stands to reason that we are not acquainted with substance itself directly and as it is in itself, but only through its being the subject of various states. Besides, practical considerations require that we should give distinct names to the substances we recognise as being subjects of completely distinct actions or accidents, and that we should then consider whether these distinct names signify distinct things, or one and the same thing. Now there are some characteristics which we call physical — for example, size, shape, motion, and anything else which cannot be thought independently of their having extension in space. We call the substance these inhere in ‘body’. Nor is it possible to imagine that there is one substance which is the subject of shape, and a different substance which is the subject of motion, and so on, since all these characteristics are united by a single, common principle, namely that they are all essentially spatial. Then there are other characteristics which we call mental, [n.7] such as understanding, willing, imagining, sensing, and so on. All these are united by having in common the essential principle of thought, or perception, or consciousness. [n.8] We say that the substance which they inhere in is a thinking thing or mind. We could even use any other name we like, provided we do not confuse it with corporeal substance, since acts of thought have nothing whatever in common with bodily acts; and thought, which is the essential principle they have in common, belongs to a completely different category of being from extension, which is the essential principle common to the rest. Having formed two distinct concepts of these two distinct substances, it is easy to assess whether they are one and the same or distinct, on the basis of what is said in the sixth Meditation.

HOBBES’S THIRD OBJECTION

‘So what is there that can be distinguished from my thinking? What is there that can be said to be separate from myself?’

Someone will perhaps give the following reply to the latter question: I myself who am thinking, am distinct from my thinking. While not separate from me, my thinking is different from me, in the same sense as dancing is distinct from the dancer (as I have already said). If Descartes has shown that understanding is identical with the person who understands, we shall be back with the jargon of university philosophers: understanding understands, seeing sees, willing wills, and, by a perfect analogy, walking, or at least the capacity to walk, will walk. All this is obscure, a misuse of language, and quite unworthy of Mr. Descartes’ normal lucidity.

DESCARTES’ THIRD REPLY

I do not deny that I who am thinking, am distinct from my thinking, in the sense in which a thing is distinct from its modes. But when I asked, ‘So what is there that can be distinguished from my thinking?’, I was referring to the various modes of thought just listed, and not to my substance. Again, when I went on to say, ‘What is there that can be said to be separate from myself?’, I merely meant that all those modes of thinking are in me; and I cannot see what doubt or obscurity can be imagined here.

HOBBES’S FOURTH OBJECTION

‘So nothing remains but for me to admit that I cannot imagine what this wax is, but that I can conceive it only with my mind.’

There is a great difference between imagining, i.e. having a certain idea, and conceiving with the mind, i.e. using a piece of reasoning to conclude that something is the case, or that a certain thing exists. But Descartes has not explained to us how they are different. It is also an old Aristotelian doctrine that substance is not perceived clearly enough by the senses, and has to be inferred by reasoning.

What are we now to say, if perhaps reasoning is nothing other than using the word ‘is’ to join names or appellations together, and link them into sequences? If so, reasoning can tell us nothing at all about things in the real world, but only about their names. This is so whether or not we combine the names of things in accordance with arbitrary agreements we have made about their meanings. And if this is true (as is possible), then reasoning will depend on names; the names will depend on images; and the images will perhaps (as I believe) depend on the motion of the bodily organs. It follows from this that mind will be nothing other than motions in various parts of an organic body.

DESCARTES’ FOURTH REPLY

In this passage, I did explain the difference between an image, and a concept belonging to the mind alone — as when, in the example, I listed what there is in the wax which we know through images, and what we conceive by means of the mind alone. In another passage, I also explained how we have different ways of knowing one and the same thing, e.g. a pentagon, both intellectually and by means of imagery. In reasoning, it is not names that are joined, but the things signified by the names; and I am amazed that the opposite could ever have entered anyone’s head. Does anyone doubt that a Frenchman and a German can reason about precisely the same things, even though they have completely different words in their minds? [n.9] And is not the Philosopher refuting himself, when he talks of our making arbitrary agreements about the meanings of words? If he admits that something is signified by words, then why is he not prepared to accept that our reasonings are about these somethings that are signified, rather than about the words alone? And in any case, if he is justified in concluding that mind is motion, he could with equal justice conclude that earth is sky, or anything else he fancied.

 

HOBBES’S FIFTH OBJECTION

Against Meditation III, on God

‘Some of these’ (human thoughts, that is) ‘are like images of things. Strictly speaking, it is only these that should be called "ideas". Examples are when I think of a person, a chimera, the sky, an angel, or God.’

When I think of a person, I agree that I have an idea or image consisting of colour and shape, and that I can wonder whether it resembles a person or not. Similarly, when I think of the sky. When I think of a chimera, I agree that I have an idea or image, and that I can wonder whether or not it resembles a certain animal which does not exist, but which could exist, or could have existed at some other time.

But when people think of angels, they sometimes have in their minds an image of a flame, and sometimes an image of a pretty little boy with wings. This makes me feel certain that the image does not resemble an angel, and therefore that it is not an idea of an angel. But since I believe that there do exist various created beings which serve God, and that they are invisible and immaterial, I apply the name ‘angel’ to the thing I believe in or suppose to exist, even though the idea through which I imagine an angel is a compound of ideas of visible things.

In the same way, we have no image or idea corresponding to the holy name of God. This is why we are forbidden to worship God through images, in case we come to think we can form a conception of Him who cannot be conceived.

So it seems we have no idea of God within ourselves. Rather we are like people who are born blind, but having on a number of occasions come near fires and felt their warmth, they recognise the existence of something causing the warmth; and hearing it called ‘fire’, they conclude that fire exists. However, they do not know what shape or colour fire has — in other words, they have before their minds absolutely no idea or image of fire. So if people know that there must be some cause of their images or ideas, and that there must be some other previous cause of the cause, and so on for ever, they are eventually forced to call a halt, by assuming some eternal cause, which cannot have any cause earlier than itself, since it never had a beginning to its existence. So they conclude that necessarily something eternal exists. However, they have no idea which they can call the idea of that eternal being, but they give a name to the thing they believe in or accept, and call it God.

Now, since Descartes derives his proof of the theorem that there exists a God (i.e. an all-powerful, all-wise creator of the world) from the assumption that we have an idea of God in our souls, it is incumbent on him to give a better explanation of this idea of God, and not only to deduce his existence from it, but also his creation of the world.

DESCARTES’ FIFTH REPLY

Here, by the name ‘idea’, he means only the images of material things portrayed in the corporeal imagination. Given this, it is easy for him to show that there cannot be any idea which is appropriate for an angel or for God. But all over the place, and especially in this very passage, I make it clear that I use the word ‘idea’ to mean anything which is directly perceived by the mind. So, when I will something or am afraid, since I simultaneously perceive my willing or being afraid, I classify willing and being afraid as ideas. I used this name because it was already current among philosophers for signifying the forms of the perceptions of the divine mind, even though we recognise that there is no imagery in God. No more suitable name was available. I think I have explained my idea of God adequately enough for people who are willing to pay attention to my meaning; but I could never hope to satisfy people who prefer to give my words meanings different from the ones I give them. Finally, what he goes on to say here about the creation of the world is completely irrelevant.

HOBBES’S SIXTH OBJECTION

‘But some’ (thoughts) ‘have an extra dimension, as when I will something, am afraid of something, assert something, or deny something. In each case, I am aware of some particular thing as the subject of my thought; but I include in my thought something additional to its mere resemblance to the thing. It is by virtue of this additional element that some thoughts are called volitions or affections, and others are called judgments.’

When people will something or are afraid of something, they do indeed have an image of the thing they are afraid of, or of the action they will; but Descartes fails to explain what more is included in the thoughts of people who are willing or afraid of something. Even if fear is a thought, I fail to see how it can be anything other than the thought of the thing you are afraid of. What else is fear of being attacked by a lion, than the idea of a lion attacking you, together with the effect such an idea causes in the heart, by which the person suffering from the fear is stimulated to the bodily motion we call ‘running away’? But this motion involved in running away is not a thought; so it remains the case that, in being afraid, there is no thought other than that which consists in similarity to the thing. The same could be said of willing something.

Besides, assertion and negation cannot exist without language [n.10] and names, which is why animals cannot assert or deny anything; nor can they exist without thought, which is why dumb animals cannot make judgments either. All the same, thought can be similar in humans and animals. When we assert that a person is running, we do not have a thought which is any different from that had by a dog watching its owner running. So the only thing that assertion or negation adds to simple thoughts is perhaps the thought that the names which the assertion consists of are the names of the same things in the mind of the person doing the asserting. This is not to involve in a thought anything more than its resemblance to its object, but to involve that resemblance twice over.

DESCARTES’ SIXTH REPLY

It goes without saying that seeing a lion and being frightened of it at the same time, is different from merely seeing it. Similarly, it is one thing to see a person running, and quite another thing to assert to yourself that you are seeing them running — and this happens without language. I cannot find anything here which requires a reply.

HOBBES’S SEVENTH OBJECTION

‘I still have to consider how I got this idea from God. After all, I did not extract it from the senses; it never simply happened to me without [n.11] my expecting it, as is normally the case with ideas of sensible things, when the things themselves impinge on, or seem to impinge on, our external senses; nor even did I construct it myself, since I am quite unable to take anything away from it, or add anything to it. So the only remaining alternative is that it is innate to me, just as the idea of my own self is also innate to me.’

The whole of this inquiry collapses if there is no idea of God. It has not been proved that there is any such idea, and it does not seem that there is one. As for the idea of my own self, if we are talking about my body, I get it from looking at my body; and if we are talking about the soul, there is no idea of the soul at all. Rather, we deduce by reasoning that there is something internal to the human body, which gives it the animal motion [n.12] by which it senses and moves. Whatever it is, we call it the ‘soul’, but without having any idea of it.

DESCARTES’ SEVENTH REPLY

The whole of this objection collapses if there is an idea of God — and it is obvious that there is such an idea. And when he goes on to say that there is no idea of the soul, but that it is deduced by reasoning, it is just as if he were to say that there is no image of it portrayed in the imagination, but that all the same there is what I myself have called an idea of it.

HOBBES’S EIGHTH OBJECTION

‘But there is another idea of the sun derived from astronomical reasoning, i.e. drawn from various ideas that are innate to me.’

I think that at any given time there is only a single idea of the sun, whether it is being looked at with the eyes, or whether it is being understood by reasoning to be many times larger than it seems. This latter idea is not an idea of the sun, but a rational deduction that the idea of the sun would be many times larger, if it were looked at much closer.

Ideas of the sun can be different at different times — for example, if it is looked at with the naked eye at one time, and through a telescope at another time. But astronomical reasoning does not make the idea of the sun any larger or smaller. All it shows is that the sensible idea is liable to be misleading.

DESCARTES’ EIGHTH REPLY

Here, too, what he says is not an idea of the sun, yet which he describes, is precisely what I myself call an ‘idea’.

HOBBES’S NINTH OBJECTION

‘It is beyond doubt that ideas which represent a substance to me are something more, and, if I may put it this way, contain more objective reality in themselves, than ideas which represent only modes or accidents of things. Again, the idea through which I understand a certain supreme God, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and the creator of everything that exists other than himself, obviously contains more objective reality in itself, than ideas which represent finite substances.’

I have already pointed out many times that there is no idea either of God or of the soul. I now go further, and say that there is no idea of substance either. Substance, in the sense in which it is the matter which underlies accidents and changes of state, is arrived at by reasoning alone. We have no conception of it, and it presents us with no idea of itself. If this is the case, how can it be said that ideas which represent substances to me are something more, and have more objective reality, than ideas which represent accidents? Besides, Descartes should reconsider what he means by ‘more reality’. Does it make sense to talk of reality being ‘more’ or ‘less’? Again if he thinks that one thing is more a thing than some other thing, he should consider how this can be made as comprehensible to us as is required for any demonstration, and as he himself has made other things comprehensible elsewhere.

DESCARTES’ NINTH REPLY

I have pointed out many times that what I mean by ‘idea’ is anything which is arrived at by reasoning, together with anything else which is perceived in any way whatever. I have also given a sufficient explanation of how thingliness is capable of being more or less: A substance is a thing to a greater degree than a mode is; and if there exist thing-like qualities, or incomplete substances, they are things to a greater degree than modes are, but to a lesser degree than complete substances; and lastly, if there is an infinite and independent substance, it is a thing to a greater degree than a finite and dependent substance. All this is absolutely self-evident.

HOBBES’S TENTH OBJECTION

‘So the idea of God is the only idea remaining for me to consider whether it contains anything which could not have originated in myself. By the name "God" I mean a certain substance which is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and by which I myself was created, along with everything else (if anything else in fact exists). Clearly, all these components of the idea are such that, the more carefully I consider them, the less they seem to have originated in myself. Consequently, it must be concluded from what was said earlier, that God necessarily exists.’

Descartes says that we can get the idea of God from considering his attributes, and that we should see whether the idea includes anything which could not have originated from within ourselves. Unless I am mistaken, I find that the thoughts we attach to the name of God do not indeed originate in ourselves, but that they do not necessarily come from anything other than external objects. By the name ‘God’, I understand a substance, that is, I understand that God exists (not through the having of an idea, but as the result of reasoning). Infinite — this means that I cannot conceive or imagine limits to him, or outermost parts, such that I cannot also imagine yet more remote ones. From this it follows that the name ‘infinite’ does not conjure up any idea of divine infinity, but only of my own finitude, or limits. Independent — this means that I cannot conceive of any cause which could give rise to God. From this it is obvious that the only idea I attach to the name ‘independent’ is the memory of my ideas coming into being at different times, and therefore being dependent.

This is why describing God as ‘independent’ is simply to say that God is one of those things I cannot imagine coming into being. In the same way, describing God as ‘infinite’ is equivalent to saying that he is one of those things we cannot conceive any limits to. This rules out any idea of God — after all, what sort of idea could lack any coming into being or limits?

Supremely intelligent. At this point, I ask: by means of what idea does Descartes have an understanding of God’s understanding?

Supremely powerful. Again, by means of what idea does he have an understanding of a power over things in the future, i.e. over things which do not exist? I myself certainly have an understanding of power, and it comes from imagery. I derive it from my memory of past actions, in the following way: someone did such-and-such, therefore they could do such-and-such; therefore as long as the same person exists, they could do the same again — i.e. they have the power to do it. But all these are ideas which could have come from external objects.

The creator of everything that exists. I myself can conjure up some sort of image of creation on the basis of things I have seen — e.g. the formation of a human baby in the womb, growing from virtually a point to the shape and size it has at birth. This is the only sort of idea anyone attaches to the name ‘creator’. But in order to prove that the world was created, it is not enough that we can have an image of the world after its creation. So, even if it had been proved that there exists something ‘infinite, independent, supremely powerful,’ etc., it does not follow that there exists a creator. One would have to think that it followed validly from the fact that there exists a being which we ourselves believe to have created everything else, that this being did in fact create the world at some particular time.

One final point: when Descartes says that the ideas of God and of our souls are innate in us, I should like to know whether the souls of people in a deep and dreamless sleep are thinking. If not, they have no ideas at all during that period; and it follows that no idea is innate, since anything which is innate must always be there.

DESCARTES’ TENTH REPLY

No element of our idea of God can have been derived from an original among external objects, since nothing in God bears any resemblance to any aspects of external, i.e. corporeal things. So it is obvious that anything in our thinking which bears no resemblance to corporeal things cannot come from them, but must come from the cause of this dissimilarity in our thought.

And at this point, I ask: How does the Philosopher derive his intellectual understanding of God from external things? I can easily explain the idea I have of him, by saying that by ‘idea’ I mean everything which is the form of some perception. And surely, whenever anyone understands something, they perceive that they understand it? So they must have a form, or idea, of intellectual understanding. By extending this idea indefinitely, they can form an idea of the divine understanding. The same goes for the other attributes of God.

I used the idea of God which is within us for proving his existence. This idea includes power so great, that we understand that, if God exists, it would be a contradiction for anything apart from God to exist without having been created by him. So it obviously follows from the fact that his existence has been demonstrated, that it has also been demonstrated that the whole universe, or absolutely all things in existence which are distinct from God, were created by him.

Finally, when I say that a given idea is innate in us, I do not mean that we are always aware of it — if that was what I meant, then of course no idea would be innate. All I mean is that we have within ourselves the capacity of summoning it up.

HOBBES’S ELEVENTH OBJECTION

‘The whole force of the argument lies in my recognising that it would be impossible for me to exist with the nature I have (namely having the idea of God within me), unless it was also the case that God actually existed, and was exactly the God whose idea is within me.’

It has not been demonstrated that we have an idea of God; and the Christian religion requires us to believe that God is inconceivable, which I interpret as meaning that no idea can be had of him. So it follows that the existence of God has not been demonstrated, still less his creation of the universe.

DESCARTES’ ELEVENTH REPLY

When it is said that God is inconceivable, this refers to the possibility of a concept that would completely embrace him. As for how we obtain an idea of God, I have repeated this ad nauseam. Nothing at all that has been brought up here counts against my demonstrations.

HOBBES’S TWELFTH OBJECTION

Against Meditation IV, on the true and the false

‘And so I certainly understand that error has no positive being as such, but consists solely in a lack of something. Consequently, God does not need to bestow on me any special capacity in order for me to be able to make mistakes.’

It is certain that ignorance consists merely in the lack of something, and that there is no need for any positive faculty of ignorance; but the question is not so clear-cut in the case of mistakes. The only reason why stones and other inanimate objects cannot make mistakes, seems to be simply that they have no faculty of reasoning, or of forming images. So it straightforwardly follows that what is needed for making mistakes is the faculty of reasoning, or at least of forming images. These faculties are both positive, and are bestowed on all and only those who make mistakes.

Descartes also says: ‘I notice that the former’ (sc. ‘my mistakes’) ‘depend on the combination of two simultaneous causes: the faculty I have of knowing, and the faculty of choosing, or free will.' This seems to be inconsistent with the earlier quotation. It should also be noted that the freedom of the will is assumed without proof, even though Calvinists deny it.

DESCARTES’ TWELFTH REPLY

The reason why the faculty of reasoning (or rather that of judging or of asserting and denying) is essential for the making of mistakes is because it is the relevant faculty where something is lacking. But it does not follow that the lack has any positive being. Analogously, stones do not have a sense of sight; but that alone is not enough for them to be described as blind, since blindness is not something positive in itself. I am amazed that I have not yet come across a single valid argument among all these objections. In this passage I have made no assumptions about the freedom of the will, beyond what we all experience in ourselves. It is perfectly evident by the light of nature, and I cannot understand what grounds there can be for saying it is inconsistent.

Perhaps there are many people who, bearing in mind God’s pre-determination, cannot understand how our freedom is consistent with it. But on introspecting, no-one will fail to experience in themselves the essential identity of willing and being free. However, this is not the right place to go into other people’s views on the matter.

HOBBES’S THIRTEENTH OBJECTION

‘For example, during these past days, while I was wondering if anything in the world existed, I came to see that my existence clearly followed from the very fact that I was wondering. I could not help deciding that what I understood so clearly was true — not because I was impelled by some external force, but because a great illumination in my understanding brought about an inclination in my will. So, the more spontaneous and free the belief, the less I was prepared to suspend judgement about this particular belief.’

The expression ‘a great illumination in my understanding’ is metaphorical, and so it is inappropriate for logical reasoning. Anyone lacking in self-criticism claims illumination of this sort, and yet they have no less an inclination of the will to assert what they have no doubts about, than people who really know. Consequently, although this illumination can be the cause of someone’s obstinately defending or maintaining an opinion, it cannot constitute grounds for the truth of that opinion.

Besides, to know that something is true, and even to believe it or give assent to it, has nothing to do with the will, since we believe willy nilly anything that is proved by valid arguments, or said in a plausible way. It is true that it is an act of the will to assert or deny, and support or oppose a position put forward by someone else; but it does not follow that internal assent depends on the will.

So Descartes has not provided a sufficient demonstration of his subsequent conclusion: ‘and it is in the improper exercise of this freedom of the will that there is to be found the deficiency which constitutes the essence of making a mistake.’

DESCARTES’ THIRTEENTH REPLY

It is irrelevant to ask whether the expression ‘a great illumination’ is appropriate for logical reasoning or not, provided it is appropriate for explaining what is meant — as indeed it is. Everybody knows that talk of light in the understanding refers to the self-evidence of knowledge. Perhaps not everyone who thinks they have such knowledge actually has it; but this does not prevent it from being completely different from a dogmatic opinion conceived without any evidently true perception.

When he says here that we assent to things which we grasp clearly willy nilly, it is as if he were to say that we desire something that is clearly recognised as good willy nilly. But the word ‘nilly’ is out of place in such contexts, since it implies that we both will and do not will one and the same thing.

 

HOBBES’S FOURTEENTH OBJECTION

Against Meditation V. On the Essence of Material Things

‘For example, suppose I imagine a triangle. It may perhaps be that nothing with that precise shape exists, or ever did exist, anywhere in the whole wide world outside my own thinking. On the other hand, there clearly is a certain determinate nature which it has (or an essence, or an unchangeable and eternal form), which was not created by me, and which is not dependent on my mind. This is obvious from the fact that a range of properties can be demonstrated of the triangle I imagine.’

If the triangle exists nowhere in the whole wide world, I fail to understand how it can have any sort of nature. That which is nowhere has no being, and therefore has no essential being, or any sort of nature. A triangle in the mind comes from a triangle that has been seen, or is made up from components which have been seen. Once we have given the name ‘triangle’ to the thing which we think the idea of the triangle comes from, the name remains even if the triangle itself disappears. In the same way, suppose that, through our own thinking, we have conceived that all the angles of a triangle taken together are equal to two right angles, and have given triangles the alternative name of ‘that which has three angles equal to two right angles’. Once we have done this, the name would remain even if there were no angles at all in the world, and the proposition: ‘A triangle is that which has three angles equal to two right angles’ will be everlastingly true. But the nature of the triangle will not be everlasting, if everything triangular happens to be destroyed.

Similarly, the proposition: ‘Humans are animals’ will be true to eternity, because names are eternal; but once the human race has died out there will no longer be any human nature.

From this it is obvious that essential being, in so far as it is distinct from actual existence, is nothing over and above the joining of names by the verb to be. Consequently, essential being, as something independent of actual existence, is our own invention. Essential being and existence seem to have the same relationship as an image of a person in the mind, and the actual person in question. Again, the essential being of Socrates and his existence have the same relationship as the propositions: ‘Socrates is a human being’, and ‘Socrates is, or exists’. Now that Socrates no longer exists, the proposition: ‘Socrates is a human being’ signifies only a connection between names; and the word ‘is’ (or ‘being’) refers to an image of the unity of a thing which is named by the two names.

DESCARTES’ FOURTEENTH REPLY

Everybody is familiar with the distinction between essential being and actual existence; and I have already demolished what he says here about eternal names, when he should be talking about concepts or ideas of eternal truth.

 

HOBBES’S FIFTEENTH OBJECTION

Against Meditation VI: On the Existence of Material Things

‘Clearly God did not provide me with a capacity for knowing this’ (whether ideas are emitted from bodies or not); ‘what he did provide me with is a great inclination to believe that they are emitted by corporeal things. So I do not see how it could intelligibly be denied that God was a deceiver, if ideas were emitted from any other source than corporeal things. So it follows that corporeal things exist.’

The general opinion is that it is no sin for doctors to deceive their patients for the sake of their health; or for parents to deceive their children for their own good; nor does the wrongness of deception consist in the falsity of what is said, but in the harm caused by the deception. So Descartes should have considered whether the proposition that ‘there are no circumstances in which God can deceive us’ is true, if taken in a universal sense. If this proposition is not universally true, then the conclusion ‘therefore corporeal things exist’ does not follow.

DESCARTES’ FIFTEENTH REPLY

My conclusion does not require that there are no circumstances under which we can make mistakes (after all, I have already admitted that we often make mistakes). What it requires is that we are not mistaken in circumstances where our error would imply that God had deliberately decided to deceive us, since that would be inconsistent with his nature. Again, the inference is invalid here.

HOBBES’S LAST OBJECTION

‘Now I see that there is a major difference between these two states’ (that is, between waking and dreaming), ‘namely that my memory never connects my dreams with all the other events of my life.’

My question is whether it is certain that, if you dream that you are wondering whether you are dreaming or not, you cannot dream that your dream coheres with ideas of past events succeeding each other in a long chain. If this is a possibility, then things which seem to you in your dream to be events belonging to your past life can equally well be deemed genuine, no less than if you are awake. Besides, according to Descartes, the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends on a single item of knowledge, namely that there is an undeceiving God. But it follows, either that atheists cannot infer that they are awake from their memories of their past lives, or that someone can know that they are awake, despite not recognising the existence of the undeceiving God.

DESCARTES’ LAST REPLY

A dreamer cannot really connect the contents of their dream with the ideas of past events, although they can dream that they are making the connection. Does anybody deny that people can make mistakes in their sleep? But later, on waking up, they will readily see that they had been wrong.

Atheists can infer that they are awake from their memories of previous events in their lives; but they cannot know scientifically that this is a sufficient indication for them to be certain that they are not mistaken, unless they know that they were created by an undeceiving God.


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