

DEBATING U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

by
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Resolved:

That the United States federal government should establish a foreign policy substantially increasing its support of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

"Interpreting the resolution in different ways will have different implications for affirmative and negative strategic options."

Introduction

Next year's high school debate resolution asks the question of whether or not the United States should substantially increase its support for United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). The purpose of this article is to provide you with some of the background information that you need to start researching the answer to the question and to introduce some important topicality and strategy-related ideas that will help you to direct your research. Primarily, I will examine what it may mean to "establish" a "foreign policy substantially increasing" our "support of United Nations peacekeeping operations." Interpreting the resolution in different ways will have different implications for affirmative and negative strategic options.

At first glance, the resolution is quite broad. There are a number of different ways that support for UNPKOs could be increased. After some thought, however, a number of general/generic negative strategies that will work to reign-in the breadth of the topic become obvious. Many of these strategies are the same strategies that have proven effective on the oceans topic, giving students who debated that topic a large advantage.

Background on United Nations Peacekeeping

Existing Operations and Trends

Before one could even begin to understand different potential interpretations of the resolution and what those interpretations could mean for debate, it is important to understand some basic background material relating to UNPKOs. This includes general information about the current state of peacekeeping, what it is, and how it is authorized.

Since 1948, the United Nations has launched 56 different peacekeeping operations. Forty-three of the operations have been established since 1988. (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Q&A, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm). As of October 15, 2003,

there are currently 13 U.N. Peacekeeping operations. These include:

- United Nations Troop Supervision Organization (1948-)
- United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (1949-)
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964-)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (1974-)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (1978-)
- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (1991-)
- United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (1993-)
- United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (1999-)
- United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (1999-)
- United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999-)
- United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-)
- United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (2002-)
- United Nations Mission in Liberia (2003-)

The number of existing missions actually represents a downward trend in the total number of peacekeeping missions. Although there are thirteen existing missions, including some missions that began decades ago, between 1988 and 1994 the 20 different peacekeeping operations were set-up (Congressional Research Ser-

vice, UN PEACEKEEPING: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. 2003, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB90103.pdf>).

In 1992, the United Nations created the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) to manage the growing number of operations. Although the number of operations has since declined, the DPKO remains established as a way to manage the operations.

The number of operations set-up since 1994 are few as a “result of the U.S. decision, in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), signed May 1994, to follow strict criteria

for determining its support for an operation” (Ibid). This made it much more difficult for the U.N. to acquire funding for operations.

The U.S. funding restriction was not the only thing that curtailed the growth of UNPKOs in the mid-to-late 1990s. Although the United Nations had experienced a lot of success in places like El Salvador and Mozambique, places where peace had already been agreed to by the parties prior to UN intervention, establishing peace in places like Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, proved to be much more difficult. One of the primary problems was a lack of resources and a lack of formal approach to conducting the operations.

In 1999, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan requested that a panel of international experts review UN PKOs and report on where and how the operations might be improved. The REPORT OF THE PANEL ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS (2003) (www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/), also known as the Brahimi Report for the top Algerian diplomat who led the panel, was finished in August of 2000. The Panel recommended some advice for “peacekeeping to “stand a chance of success. These include: a clear and specific mandate, consent to the operation by the parties in conflict, and adequate resources – from professional and appropriate personnel to equipment and finances” (UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING, Q&A, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm).

Since the release of the report, the UN has tried to follow through with its recommendations. As discussed in the section on affirmatives, a good amount of additional research has done on the effectiveness of the UN and how to improve those operations.

What is “United Nations Peacekeeping?”

Traditionally, UNPKOs have been conceived of as military operations that were designed to maintain the peace between two parties that had agreed to some sort of truce. The Congressional Research Service (2003) explains that:

United Nations peacekeeping might be defined as the placement of military personnel or forces in a country or countries to perform basically non-military functions in an impartial manner. These functions might include supervision of a cessation of hostilities agreement or truce, observation or presence, interposition between opposing forces as a buffer force, maintenance and patrol of a border, or removal of arms in the area.

The Congressional Research Service (2003) explains, how-

ever, that the definition of what is understood to be “peacekeeping” has expanded considerably to include disarmament, humanitarian assistance, land mine clearing, maintaining law and order, election monitoring, and human rights monitoring.

Peacekeeping has come to constitute more than just the placement of military forces into a cease-fire situation with the consent of all the parties. Military peacekeepers may be disarming or seizing weapons, aggressively protecting humanitarian assistance, and clearing land mines. Peacekeeping operations also now involve more non-military tasks such as maintaining law and order (police), election monitoring, and human rights monitoring.

This second definition encompasses what most of the broader definitions that I’ve found imply. Additional definitions that I think are useful are included at the end of the article.

While the definition of what a UNPKO is very broad and has moved in the direction of expansion, it is important to note that all operations that the UN has in areas of conflict are *not* PKOs. As a Stimson Center REPORT ON THE BRAHIMI REPORT (2003, www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf) notes, “the UN continues to run fact-finding missions, 13 peacekeeping operations, and 12 peacebuilding and political missions in post-conflict societies.” The Stimson Center explains in more detail:

United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: *conflict prevention* and *peacemaking*; *peacekeeping*; and *peacebuilding*. Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low -profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether. *Peacemaking* addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently. *Peacekeeping* is a 50-year plus enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars to one that incorporates a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.

Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something

that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques (p. 2).

How is United Nations Peacekeeping Authorized?

Under the charter of the United Nations, the 15 member Security Council (www.un.org/Docs/sc/) can authorize efforts to establish and protect peace (UN Department of Peacekeeping, Q&A, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm). The Security Council is primarily responsible for creating, defining, and conducting the PKOs.

In order for a new mission to be established, at least 9 of the 15 members of the Security Council must vote for it. If any permanent member of the Security Council – United States, Russia Federation, China, France, or the United Kingdom – votes against the mission, it cannot be supported by the Security Council.

Only a few of the senior soldiers are actually employed by the U.N. Most are usually under command of their own deployed forces. Governments that send troops assume the responsibility to pay them, as well as “disciplinary and personnel matters” (IBID). Governments who contribute the troops are then reimbursed by the U.N. at a rate of slightly over \$1,000/month.

Member States of the United Nations are obligated to pay their fair share of peacekeeping costs. Those costs are calculated based on a formula that considers a nation's economic status.

Current U.S. Policy

There are various ways a country can support United Nations peacekeeping operations. These include financial support, troop support, and “indirect” support such as through the contribution of development assistance in an area that has a peacekeeping operation¹.

Troop Support

Although the United States makes a substantial financial contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations, very few U.S. personnel are involved in them. “As of December 31, 2001, 750 U.S. personnel served in 8 operations and as of the end of 2002, 631” and by the end of 2004 it was down to 430. The European Union also contributes a low number – 3,209. U.S. personnel served in 7

1 There is a debate over whether or not to count “indirect” support of UNPKOs as “support” for those operations. The General Accounting Office () argues that it should be counted, but the State Department, in a letter submitted to the GAO argues that it should not because it would not support other countries counting similar assistance as part of their funding under the U.N. obligation.

operations. (Congressional Research Service, 2003). Currently, 42,746 troops and civilian policy serve in U.N. operations, making the US contribution relatively insignificant. A list of countries and the number of troops they contribute can be found at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/December2003Countrysummary.pdf. A list of operations and the number of troops the U.S. contributes to those specific operations can be found at www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20030620565

Financial Support

For a number of years the United States fell behind paying its fair share of peacekeeping costs. The money that the United States owed the U.N. was known as its **arrears** — past debts to the UN for peacekeeping.

After September 11th, the Bush administration encouraged Congress to pay the arrears in as a show of support to the United Nations. Congress paid off the debt and the U.S. has made sustainable contributions to UNPKOs since. The current status of the peacekeeping budget is relayed by the Congressional Research Service (2003)

On February 3, 2003, President Bush requested \$550.2 million for FY2004 assessed accounts and \$94.9 million to fund U.S. assistance to international peacekeeping. On February 20, 2003, President Bush signed the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (H.J.Res. 2) that provided \$673.7 million for peacekeeping assessments and \$120.2 million to fund international peacekeeping efforts of special concern. On April 24, 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended, in S. 925, authorization of \$550.2 million, as requested by the President, for payment of U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations (CIPA) in FY2004. The House International Relations Committee is currently marking up its proposed authorization.

What Does the Resolution Mean?

“Establish a foreign policy substantially increasing its support of United Nations peacekeeping operations”

Establish

Definitions of “establish” articulate two different meanings: to bring into existence (“To originate and secure the permanent existence of; to found; to institute; to create and regulate” (WORDS AND PHRASES, Permanent Edition, p. 249) and to “make stable or firm” Ibid).

Both definitions are accurate descriptions of the meaning of the word, but crafty negatives always try to argue that “establish” only means to bring into existence or only to make firm. They will argue that this “interpretation” of the word provides them with more unique, generic disadvantage ground because if the affirmative can simply “firm up” an existing peacekeeping operation the affirmative will always be able to win that the disadvantages are non-unique.

Similarly, negatives can argue that establish should be inter-

preted to mean “firm up” because it limits affirmatives to improving existing operations and that that set of existing operations (13 as of the time of this writing) is predictable and easy to research.

It is important to note here that the word “establish” modifies “foreign policy” and not “peacekeeping operations.” The affirmative has to *establish a foreign policy that supports UNPKOs*, it does not actually establish the PKO.

Foreign Policy

The term “foreign policy” was likely added to the resolution to prevent affirmatives from engaging in primarily domestic actions (like building tanks or training troops) that would have the indirect benefit of supporting UNPKOs.

Although a definition of foreign policy that claims that foreign policy is “more than domestic” is not likely to provide much of a limiting function, definitions of foreign policy that require it to be an “interaction” between states is likely to be more practically useful. This interpretation was popular on the weapons of mass destruction topic, and is likely to be popular again.

Increasing

“Increase” is generally defined as to “become greater or larger” (DICTIONARY.COM, dictionary.reference.com/search?q=increasing).

Support

One of the most interesting terms to unpack this year is the word “support.” I think that there are a couple ways to define it.

First, the word “support” can be defined in a way that requires the affirmative to provide *tangible/physical* assistance to UNPKOs. This would include things like money, troops, or tanks. Contextually, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping explains that “Many countries have voluntarily made additional resources available to support United Nations peacekeeping efforts on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs” (HOW PEACEKEEPING IS FINANCED, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/5.htm)

Second, the word “support” can be defined to suggest that it is possible for the United States to provide only *diplomatic* support. Dictionary.com defines “support” to mean “To argue in favor of; advocate” (dictionary.reference.com/search?q=support).

One of the most important topicality controversies this year will be over what it means to “support” UNPKOs – can the affirmative only lend aid/diplomatic assistance to one of the thirteen *existing* operations or can it support the creation of a new operation? Definitions of the word “support” do not make it clear and there are good arguments on both sides.

Arguments in favor of defining “support” to mean assistance to current operations: 1) It’s predictable – the negative can research existing operations and prepare to debate changes in them, 2) You cannot support something that doesn’t exist. 3) As just discussed, “increase” means to “make greater.” In order to increase support, then, you arguably have to expand the amount of support given to current operations.

Arguments in favor of defining “support” to mean assistance to creating/maintaining *new* operations. 1) It makes disadvantages relative more “unique” – there are more general disadvantages and arguments against expanding the number of UNPKOs than there are to making small changes in current ones. 2) This interpretation is more predictable because it will be difficult, if not impossible, to predict all of the different types of assistance (like assistance for AIDS prevention) that could be given to current operations. 3) There are practical limits – there will only be so many proposals to expand peacekeeping into new areas, creating a practical, effective limit on the number of such cases. 4) Assisting with the creation of new PKOs will bolster overall “support” for the *existing system* of UNPKOs. 5) As discussed in the section on U.S. policy, the U.S. currently gives little, if any, support to *any* of the operations discussed in the introductory section. In fact, the U.S. currently provides *no* troop support for the UN operation in Lebanon (www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20030620565). In this instance, it is not possible to “increase support” in the way that the negative has defined the terms.

Regardless as to which interpretation you may think is more accurate, the negative will have a reasonable topicality argument that they can make against the affirmative. Different affirmatives that fit under each interpretation will be discussed below.

Affirmative Case Areas

Structural Reforms

One set of affirmative this year will deal with US efforts to support structural reforms in the United Nations. As discussed, the Brahimi Report made a number of recommendations to improve the effectiveness of U.N. Peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report continues to be the focus of scholarship relating to the effectiveness of the U.N. and recommendations along those lines are continually made. In this section I will briefly discuss some of those possibilities.

U.N. Standing Army. The Clinton administration supported an proposal that would effectively establish a “U.N. Standing Army” with “headquarters with a planning staff, with access to timely intelligence, with a logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment’s notice, and a modern operations center with global communications (Congressional Research Service, 2003, U.N. PEACEKEEPING: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/24360.pdf). Although a discussion of this issues has fallen out of popular discourse relating to the U.N. an affirmative could potentially support it in their plan.

Gender mainstreaming. This approach involves incorporating a greater role for women in peacekeeping and looking at the impact on PKOs on women.

New Operations

As discussed in the section on the definition of “support,” support could come through increasing assistance to newly proposed missions, including encouraging the U.N. to adopt such a mission.

Areas for new missions. The XINUA NEWS SERVICE reported on January 9th of this year (news.xinhuanet.com/english/

2004-01/10/content_1268888.htm) that United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that the UN Security Council to consider deploying a peacekeeping force to Cote d'Ivoire. Although there is currently and UNPKO with a few dozen liaison officers, this mission is set to expire and Annan has proposed adding over 6400 troops. There has also been demands for additional peacekeepers in Burundi (Reuters January, 9, 2004 www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L09210512.htm)

New types of missions. The Congressional Research service reported that "internal instabilities and disasters in the Persian Gulf region and in Africa, and conditions in the former Yugoslavia have prompted demands for the use of U.N. peacekeeping to expedite peaceful settlement in internal conflict situations or to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to starving and homeless populations within their Countries" (2003). The affirmative could have U.S. troops provide that type of support to the U.N.

Supporting existing operations

As discussed in the topicality section, the definition of "support" can also be construed to mean to add support to existing operations. There are a number of ways to do this.

Expanded Troop Commitments. ALL AFRICA reported on January 9th of this year that (allafrica.com/stories/200401090386.html) that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is only at 60% troop strength. The U.S. could contribute additional troops. Additional troop support for the operation in Sierra Leone could also be provided (www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=9402&Cr=sierra&Cr1=). The U.N. PKO in East Timor is set to expire in June and there have been requests to extend it beyond June and to expand it (Australian, January 8, 2004, www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,8346687%5E401,00.html).

Hospitals. "A MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) unit that was originally deployed from Germany to Zagreb as medical support to UNPROFOR/UNCRO was withdrawn in December 1995. This was the first entire U.S. unit provided to serve under U.N. command (the MASH unit became operational in November 1992)" (Congressional Research Service, 2003). The United States could re-establish such support.

Enhanced Security. A devastating terrorist attack against the U.N. headquarters in Iraq forced the U.N. to leave the country. The U.S. could potentially provide security assistance to U.N. to protect its PKO headquarters from terrorists.

AIDS. Although the U.N. has taken some action to reduce the risks of soldiers in its operations acquiring AIDS, there is evidence for additional support to prevent AIDS amongst the troops and local populations.

Election Monitoring. The Congressional Research Service (2003) reported that "with increasing frequency, some authorities have called for the United Nations to supervise and monitor elections in various countries. In the past, the United Nations had not responded affirmatively to such requests. In fact, in June 1989 Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, when considering Nicaragua's request for U.N. participation in its electoral process, characterized U.N. acceptance of election supervision in an independent country as "unprecedented." However, recent examples exist of such U.N. election supervision, with a U.N. peacekeeping component to ensure security, authorized and established by the

U.N. Security Council. In the case of Namibia (UNTAG, 1989-1990), Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991-), and Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1994), the election is an act of self-determination, as part of an overall conflict settlement arrangement"

General Revenues

One thing that is the U.N. is always lacking is revenues that are significant enough to support existing, and potential future, PKOs. Affirmatives could provide more funding to support the operations.

Advantage Areas

Despite the potential for a very large number of affirmatives, there are a limited number of types of advantages that the affirmative can claim. Negatives that are ready to debate these advantages with either take-outs or counterplans are likely to prevail.

Regional conflicts. Affirmatives may claim that peacekeeping needs to be strengthened in a given region of the world in order to prevent conflicts from escalating. Negatives that can win the topicality argument that only action to support existing operations is topical, can research conflict take-outs to the thirteen different places the U.N. currently has PKOs. Counterplans to increase support from other nations to these particular conflicts will likely be very effective since the U.S. hardly contributes any troops now and if PKOs have "proven effective," they have done so without the presence of U.S. troops. It will be important for the negative to generate significant defense against these conflicts or the affirmative will probably be able to win that these conflicts could escalate to larger wars and outweigh the disadvantages.

Non conflict-based harms. These harms may stem from small problems that the U.N. is unable to address with its current resources. These harms may include deaths from AIDS, deaths from lack of appropriate hospital care, or deaths from terrorist attacks. Since these harms will be so specific, it will be difficult for the negative to be prepared with take-outs to every one and it will also be relatively easy for affirmatives to defeat international actor counterplans against these harms with arguments that the "U.S. is key." The strategic positive side for the negative is that these harms are quite small so they have a good chance of outweighing them with a disadvantage.

Strengthening the United Nations & multilateralism. These advantages stem from giving an overall boost to the United Nations and strengthening multilateralism vis-à-vis unilateralism. The negative needs to be well-prepared to debate this advantage with counterplans and turns because their agent counterplans will not be able to solve this advantage. Even counterplans that only consult one country may arguably be seen as a preference for bilateralism over multilateralism.

Disadvantages

There are a number of strong generic disadvantages that are available to the negative.

Politics

A decision to make a substantial commitment to United Nations Peacekeeping, and potentially multilateralize U.S. foreign policy, at least in a particular area, would be very politically controversial. Conservatives in the U.S. have always been very skeptical of the utility of the U.N. and to providing funding to international organizations.

Spending

Although the deficit is very high, negatives will be able to make a strong case that new foreign aid commitments will come out of existing foreign aid budgets and/or that support for new PKOs will trade off with support for existing PKOs.

Multilateralism Bad

One popular generic strategy will focus on the reasons that it is bad for the U.S. to reduce unilateralism in its foreign policy.

Counterplans

Although the list of affirmative cases that has been discussed is only a small sampling of the affirmatives that are likely to be run, most of the affirmatives that you confront will likely fit into one of the categories just discussed. Based on that, you should be able to prepare at least one of the following counterplans against particular types of affirmatives.

International Actor Counterplans

One popular counterplan on foreign policy topics is to have another agent, in this instance another country, do the plan. Japan, for example, is making a significant contribution to election monitoring in Afghanistan DAILY YOMIURI, January 8, 2004, www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20040107wo42.htm). In most instances on this year's topic, it will be hard for the affirmative to prove that U.S. action is essential/key to solve the harm. As previously discussed, most troops come from other countries anyhow and their money is just as good as ours if it is just a question of costs. Popular agent counterplans this year will likely include Japan, the European Union, NATO, Canada, India, Pakistan, and a host of other countries.

To defeat this counterplan, affirmative teams need to be on the look-out for evidence that discusses the importance of U.S. action when they are researching their affirmatives. Also, affirmatives can try to focus their advantages on why it is important for the U.S. to support the UN and strengthen multilateralism generally. These latter two advantages will be difficult for the counterplan to solve, so the negative needs to be well-prepared to debate these advantages.

Agent Counterplans

Often the affirmative will specify what *agent* in the US Federal Government – the Congress, the federal court(s), or the executive will do the plan. If the affirmative specifies Congress or the courts (more likely to be Congress than the courts on this year's topic), the negative could specify executive action and run a disadvantage to Congressional action. The Congressional Research Service (2003) explains that “The President has also used the authority in section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, to provide U.S. armed forces personnel to U.N. peacekeeping

operations. Under this section, such personnel may be detailed or sent to provide “technical, scientific or professional advice or service” to any international organization.”

Unilateral Action

Another strong counterplan is to just have the United States do everything the plan has the U.S. do to support the PKO (provide troops, technical assistance, etc) without actually supporting the U.N. (doing it as an independent operation). Disadvantages that could be extended as net-benefits to the counterplan include U.N. bad, multilateralism bad, and politics with a U.N. support link.

This will probably work best against affirmatives that support *non-previously existing operations* because unilateral action in an area where the U.N. is working may undermine the U.N. too much or cause substantial conflicts with the U.N. program. Nonetheless, it will be an excellent way for the negative to focus the debate back on the desirability of supporting the U.N. rather than on the desirability of specific actions in particular areas. Debaters who wish to run this counterplan should not only have specific solvency evidence which advocates unilateral U.S. action but also should be prepared to debate evidence like the following, which makes a general case for the superiority of U.N. action.

For decades, States have recognized the unique advantages of UN peacekeeping as a means of dealing with conflicts. Its universality makes it uniquely suited to a wide range of situations, and assures a legitimacy as action taken on behalf of a global organization rather than on the basis of national or regional interests. UN peacekeeping can also help focus global attention, promote coordination and burden-sharing among those seeking to advance peace from outside a conflict area (HOW PEACEKEEPING IS FINANCED, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/5.htm).

Affirmatives can check against this counterplan by having a strong multilateralism/UN good advantage in the 1AC. This counterplan will not be able to capture that advantage and that advantage evidence will actually function as a disadvantage to the counterplan.

Consultation Counterplans

As on all foreign policy topics, a popular negative strategy will be to consult other countries, such as Japan or China, on whether or not the U.S. should do the plan. These counterplans will be particularly compelling against teams that claim foreign relations advantages.

Kritiks

Many of the kritiks that were popular this year, including realism, feminist international relations, and will work well for 2004-5 as well because this topic also focuses most of the plan action in the international realm. In particular, I think there are a couple of kritiks that link particularly well and are likely to be very popular this year.

Foucault/Biopower

United Nations peacekeeping operations involve an exten-

sive amount of surveillance, population management, law enforcement, and the use of the disciplinary sciences. These are all excellent links to a Foucault position with a biopower emphasis (Debrix, 1999).

“Peace” Kritik

This kritik, which was popular on the college circuit this year, argues that it is bad to conceptually “peace” as simply the “absence” of war and that human social factors also need to be incorporated (Kim, 1987).

Conclusion

As is the case with most high school debate topics, the swath of affirmative ground is quite wide. Potential affirmative cases include troop and financial support to existing operations, pushing the U.N. to establish new operations, and relatively small forms of assistance to existing operations such as MASH units and AIDS care. Given the lack of geographical limitations in the topic, the negative will need to be prepared to debate supporting these operations anywhere in the world.

While there are a large number of potential affirmatives, there is much that the negative can do to reign in the practical effectiveness of all of the ground that the affirmative has. First, the negative can reign-in the size of the topic with a topicality argument that says the affirmative has to support existing operations. Second, the negative can prepare take-outs to conflicts in the regions that the U.S. currently has PKOs. Counterplans that work to have other countries support the PKOs will also go a long way toward solving those harms. Third, the negative can prepare general/generic disadvantages and kritiks against PKOs. Affirmatives that wish to do well during the year will need to look for affirmatives have strong answers to these generic positions. Since these generic positions go to the heart of the topic – the desirability of U.N. action – we should all look forward to a good year of debating.

Additional Topicality Evidence

I have included this additional topicality evidence to get you thinking about different affirmative ideas.

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS ARE NOT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Congressional Research Service, 2003, U.N. PEACEKEEPING: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB90103.pdf>

On February 3, 2003, the Bush Administration requested, in its FY2004 budget, \$550.2 million to pay U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping accounts in the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. The CIPA request contained \$36.851 million for the two war crimes tribunals (Yugoslavia and Rwanda) that are not peacekeeping operations

GENERAL

UN Department of Peacekeeping, Q&A, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm

Peacekeepers became part of international efforts to rebuild States damaged by conflict, and to support free and fair elections and referenda. Peacekeeping tasks involved training and restructuring local police forces, demining, conducting elections, facilitating refugee returns, monitoring human rights, supervising government structures, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants and promoting sustainable democratic institutions and economic development. At its peak in 1993, more than 70,000 military and almost 10,000 civilian personnel were deployed in UN peacekeeping missions.

PEACE MONITORING IS PEACEKEEPING

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, A NOTE ON MONITORING CEASEFIRES AND PATROLLING BUFFER ZONES, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/pkos.htm

A soldier peers through a set of binoculars from an observation post. This is the classic image of UN peacekeeping. Observing and reporting on truces or ceasefires and the maintenance of buffer zones or demilitarized areas remain important functions of peacekeepers.

CIVILIAN POLICE ELEMENTS ARE PART OF PKOS

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, A NOTE ON CIVILIAN POLICING, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/police.htm

Beginning with the UN mission in Namibia in 1988, “CivPol” elements have become an increasingly important of UN peacekeeping. By mid-2000, some 7,000 civilian police from more than 70 countries are participating in 10 UN missions. Some recently missions have been predominantly staffed by civilian police.

DEMINING IS PART OF PEACEKEEPING

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, A NOTE ON THE PEACEKEEPER AS DEMINER, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/mine.htm

Peacekeepers often carry out a range of mine clearance activities. These include mine surveys and mapping; establishment of databases; removal of mines; training for local deminers and national mine clearance institutions; and organization of mine awareness campaigns.

CIVILIAN STAFF THAT SUPPORT LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION ARE CONSIDERED PART OF PEACEKEEPING

Department of U.N. Peacekeeping, A NOTE ON CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, 2003, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/civ.htm

From the beginning days of UN peacekeeping, civilian staff, as part of the UN Field Service, have provide such field support for UN peacekeeping as vehicle maintenance, logistics and telecom-

munications. As a distinct peacekeeping component, however, civilians were first deployed in the UN's 1960-1964 Congo operation. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping, involving the strengthening of local institutions and, in some cases, responsibility for transitional administrations, requires the participation of a growing number of civilian personnel—over 12,500 local and international personnel by mid-2000.

MANY FACETS OF PEACEKEEPING

Stimson Center, *REPORT ON THE BRAHIMI REPORT*, 2003, www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf, p. xiv

Peacekeepers protect peacebuilders, the substantive civilian members of a complex operation, who help create the conditions that enable peacekeepers to go home. Among the peacebuilding tools stressed by the Brahimi Report, quick impact projects (QIPs)—designed to generate early improvement in a local population's quality of life—are now a routine feature of first-year peacekeeping mission budgets, as urged. The recommendation to also fund disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in those budgets has been partially met—funding to reintegrate demobilized fighters and help them find productive work has only recently been added to a mission budget (Liberia). Delays in voluntary funding for reintegration can increase the risk of crime and violence in the mission area, making assessed start-up funds an urgent priority for all operations with DDR responsibilities.

WAYS TO SUPPORT PKOS

Stimson Center, *REPORT ON THE BRAHIMI REPORT*, 2003, www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf, p. xviii

Emphasizing the unimplemented elements of what the Brahimi Report termed a “doctrinal shift” in the UN's approach to rule of law elements and support for peacebuilding, the United Nations and member states should:

- Review and assess the ability of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to backstop successfully the increased numbers of fact-finding missions and special political missions, and consider an outside management review for DPA comparable to that given DPKO in 2001.

- Include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration funding for excombatants in the first-year mission budgets of all peace operations with DDR responsibilities and allow unspent funds to roll over into subsequent years for missions like the peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUC) whose programs are delayed by local politics.

- Analyze the current roadblocks to UN capacity to support restoration of governance, transitional administration, civilian police (with or without executive authority), and other rule of law components in field operations. Address how best to integrate UN capacity in these areas with the capacity and programs of regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union.

- Address seriously the issue of a criminal code and code of procedures for transitional administrations to apply ad interim and for

use in training prospective mission personnel.

- Create a reserve capacity to undertake transitional administration operations, expanding UN civilian recruitment rosters to include job descriptions unique to transitional administrations.

SUPPORT U.N. INFORMATION ACCESS TO PREVENT TERRORISM

p. xxi)

In this area, the United Nations and member states should:

- Reconsider the UN's pressing need for strategic information gathering and analysis in light of 9/11, the bombing of UN offices in Iraq, and other challenges facing field personnel; improving such capacity would promote both the safety and security of field personnel and effective mission planning and implementation.

- Fund fully Secretariat plans for creative use of advanced information technology, recognizing that UN spending in this area, as a fraction of total budget, lags far behind other international organizations such as the World Bank.

Bibliography

I did not include a formal bibliography as all but a couple of the textual references include a complete citation. Those that do not are listed here. There is also an extensive collection of research links available to Planet Debate Members (membership is free) at <http://www.planetdebate.com/scripts/topic.asp?I=412>

Debrix, Francois. (1999). *Space Quest: Surveillance, Governance, and the Panoptic Eye of the United Nations*. *ALTERNATIVES*. V. 24, pp. 269-94.

Kim. (1987). *BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS*. 18(1), pp. 27-ff.

Generally Useful Journals

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH

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