October 15, 2010

Obama's National Security Vision: Confronting Transnational Threats with Global Cooperation

By Matthew Levitt

The Obama administration's May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) laid out a strategic vision that draws on interagency information sharing as well as active engagement with foreign partners to secure American interests. This multilateral approach is likely to succeed in the tactical areas of counterterrorism and counterproliferation. But given the emergence of several critical national security threats -- including Iran's nuclear program and the emerging danger of "homegrown" terror -- the long-term challenge remains considerable. Will the administration's national security vision translate into strategic success?

Obama's National Security Vision: Confronting Transnational Threats with Global Cooperation, the fourth compilation in the Stein Program's lecture series by senior counterterrorism officials, tracks the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism and counterproliferation policy during the Obama administration's first two years, with particular focus on the 2010 NSS and its implementation by various government bodies. As U.S. officials strive to keep up with the ever-changing tactics of adversaries, the administration's formidable goal of reshaping the current strategic environment demands the kind of timely analysis and creative ideas compiled in this volume.

Offering their unique insights and perspectives:

* Matthew Levitt (editor), Director of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
* John T. Morton, assistant secretary of Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
* Todd M. Rosenblum, deputy undersecretary of Homeland Security
* Daniel Benjamin, coordinator for counterterrorism, State Department
* David Cohen, assistant secretary for terrorist financing, Treasury Department
* Steven Pelak, national coordinator for export enforcement, Justice Department
* David T. Johnson, assistant secretary of state, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

The complete monograph is available here.

October 11, 2010

Team Petraeus: Taliban 'Comfortable And Safe In Pakistan'

By James Gordon Meek

Where are the Taliban and their one-eyed leader Mullah Omar hiding out? Where is the Afghan Haqqani network now based?

The answer, of course, is Pakistan. It used to be a dirty little secret no one spoke about publicly. That changed in the past few years, but an apparent U.S. blunder involving an airstrike inside Pakistan that killed two of its border scouts could knock such overt criticism of our paradoxical ally off the table again.

The U.S. military once helped prop up Pakistan’s shaky regimes by refusing to publicly acknowledge its ally’s army and intelligence service had internal elements who collaborated with the enemy. After Army Gen. David Petraeus took over NATO forces in Afghanistan on July 4th, however, the diplomatic niceties eased after years of “See no evil,” and pressure mounted on Pakistan’s army to hit the Taliban like they meant it.

The Obama administration has leaned hard on Pakistan’s current government about Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries — or as hard as anyone can with a stubborn republic fretting over India’s expanding influence.

Petraeus’ staff has applied its own pressure on Pakistan in almost daily blunt public statements spotlighting the embarrassing fact that the Taliban’s base of operations and command and control are not even in their own country. The trend of calling out Pakistan has continued despite Petraeus’ near-apology on Wednesday for the Pakistani border guards’ accidental killings by a NATO chopper last month, which he said “we deeply regret.”

Click here to read my full post at the New York Daily News.

October 8, 2010

Profile of Zakir Naik: Controversial Islamic Orator With Influence in the West

By Madeleine Gruen

The NEFA Foundation has released the fourth report in its series on extremist ideologues with influence in the West. This report profiles Zakir Naik, a Muslim orator from Mumbai, India, who has millions of fans around the world, including many in the U.S., that he reaches through live lectures and through his satellite television station, Peace TV.

His enormous popularity is due to his exceptional speaking and memorization skills. He is able to quote the Koran, the Bible, the Torah, and other religious texts, chapter and verse, and impresses audiences with his ability to cite numerous examples to support such claims as, apostates should be put to death, and it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife under certain circumstances and with specific techniques. Although Naik often makes such religious pronouncements he is not a formally trained religious scholar, and has been labeled “deviant” by some orthodox clerics.

While Naik is regarded as controversial by many observers and several government agencies (he has been banned from entering Canada and the UK), he does not publicly or overtly promote violent jihad. However, he bears observation because he insinuates that violence perpetrated against Americans is acceptable, and he has made statements that suggest he is in agreement with terrorist attacks that have taken place in the past. He was a source of inspiration to Najibullah Zazi, who plotted to attack the New York City subway system, several of the attackers and planners of the 2008 Mumbai massacre, and others charged with involvement in terrorism. He also promotes the theory that the 9/11 attacks were planned and coordinated by the U.S. government in order to gain control over oil-rich countries.

The full report can be read here.

September 30, 2010

Getting a Better Handle On Terrorism Financing

By Victor Comras

On Tuesday (Sept 28th) the House Subcommittee on Financial Oversight and Investigations held hearings on Current and Evolving Trends in Terrorism Financing. The Subcommittee members were particularly interested in the effect of US efforts to combat terrorism financing. I had an opportunity to testify at these hearings and to describe some of the more serious shortcomings A copy of my testimony is contained below:

We have just passed the 9th Anniversary of the terrible 9/11 attack that confirmed for us, and for most of the international community, that international terrorism poses one of the gravest threats to international peace and security. Yet, despite this confirmation, funds continue to flow to those engaged in indoctrinating, recruiting, and training terrorists and for terrorist operations.

Some have suggested that we have, in fact, already put a real crimp on terrorist financing. But, the threat posed by the international terrorists has not diminished. And, empirical evidence demonstrates that many of these terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other groups associated with al Qaeda, continue to have access to sufficient funds to maintain their organizations and their terrorist operations. If anything, Taliban funding is expanding, not diminishing.

While the Taliban’s cash flow from Afghanistan’s poppy fields comes as no surprise, the amount of foreign donations they continue to receive is a real eye opener. According to the CIA (as reported in the Washington Post), Taliban leaders and their allies received some $106 million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan. Much of these funds are drawn from the same donors in Pakistan, the Gulf region, Southeast Asia and Europe that long supported al Qaeda. And these supporters continue to include a variety of Muslim fundamentalist organizations and charities, as well as wealthy Al Qaeda/Taliban supporters.

Hamas has also developed its own worldwide network for soliciting funds to support its activities, including terrorism-related operations. Hamas, which has close links with the Muslim Brotherhood, is also still able to use front companies and well-established banking links in much of the world to openly collect such funds from organizations, donors, and from over the internet, and to transfer these collected funds to Hamas operatives through well established channels.

There is also a growing nexus between terrorism and transnational crime. The Taliban, FARC and several other international terrorist groups draw heavily on funds generated from the illicit drug trade and other criminal activities, including petty crime and credit card fraud, and even Hamas has turned to the illicit drug trade emanating from the tri-border region in Latin America to surreptitiously acquire additional funding. West Africa and Southeast Asia are also emerging as other potential regions for this crime-terrorism convergence.1 And these nexus rely heavily on money laundering techniques to enter these funds into established financial transfer channels.

I know, Mr. Chairman, that U.S. financial institutions take the threat of international terrorism very seriously. They have come a long way since 9/11 in putting in place effective procedures to identify, report, and/or to block suspicious transactions. Extensive transaction filters have been put in place and “due diligence” and “know your customer” have become regular catchwords for compliance officers spread extensively throughout our banking and financial system. And, US Government regulatory oversight is now both intensive and vigilant.

So, what is lacking?

Well, Mr. Chairman, the fact is that US Banks are intricately networked into an international banking system that has not yet fully come to terms with halting terrorism financing. And, while we have made great strides in cutting off the flow of money for terrorism from the United States, our banks remain awkwardly vulnerable to getting caught up in handling terrorist group-related transactions that originate overseas. This is because US banks must so heavily rely on the veracity and accuracy of the transactional information provided to them by their overseas clients and associates.

Following enactment of the increased “due diligence” and “know your customers” requirements contained in the Patriot Act, US banks moved quickly to re-assess their relationships with the foreign banks with whom they maintain a correspondent relationship. They had to assure themselves that these foreign banks were also taking the steps necessary to vet their clients and that they would accurately record and pass on required transactional information, including the correct identification of the beneficial parties involved. But, the fact is that this is not always the case. And, in the fast and very competitive world of international financial transactions, these assurances are often shortchanged. Our banks must also rely heavily, therefore, on any cautionary information that our public sector regulatory agencies, such as Fincen, OFAC, and other relevant Treasury Department offices share with them. This cooperative relationship and information sharing is essential, and needs to be formalized.

Today, when US banks have doubts about the legitimacy of transactions they are required to file suspicious activity reports with FinCen. In most cases they still permit the transaction to be processed. However, when their doubts suggest the possibility of terrorism financing, they will usually place some kind of hold on the transaction.
US Depository Institutions filed some 15,500 suspicious wire transfer reports in 2009. Of these, only about 545 involved possible terrorism financing concerns. How well they are actually doing in discerning such terrorist-related risks remains any ones guess. Nevertheless, the number of suspicion-of-terrorism SARS did increase some 8 percent last year.

Considerable strides have also been made with regard to the regulation and oversight of the myriad money services businesses operating in the United States. This sector has seen exponential growth in the volume of international financial transfers. We must recognize, however, that at least one part of this sector – the informal mom and pop transfer mechanisms, such as Hawala, lack the wherewithal to closely vet the transactions they handle and they remain particularly vulnerable to being used to handle terrorism related transfers. Here too, much of the problem resides overseas. Funds transferred through Hawala like systems are very hard to trace, particularly as they are re-directed once they are received overseas. Terrorist organizations have become sufficiently sophisticated in handling such transactions to assure that the initial overseas recipient of the funds appears squeaky clean.

Let me suggest, Mr. Chairman, that it is essential that we broaden the focus of our attention, when it comes to inhibiting the financing of terrorism, to include financial institutions beyond our shores.

When I say that the locus of the terrorism financing problem is largely overseas I do so with a caveat. A number of foreign financial institutions that maintain branches and correspondent accounts in the United States have engaged in banking activities that have become of grave concern to us.

In August 2005, the New York branch of Jordan’s Arab Bank signed a consent decree, and paid a $24 million penalty, for its involvement in transferring more than $20 million to and from more than 45 suspected terrorists or terrorist groups in the Middle East. The bank acknowledged that it had dollarized many of these transactions. In April 2009, Doha Bank, New York paid a civil penalty of $5,000,000 which was assessed, in part, because of its involvement in dollarizing transactions related to terrorist groups overseas.
There have been several other cases involving US branches of foreign banks that have engaged in practices inconsistent with U.S sanctions laws and regulations. Last May a criminal information was filed against, ABN AMRO, now part of the Royal Bank of Scotland, for facilitating transactions by altering or stripping information from the transactions so that they might pass undetected through compliance filters at other U.S. financial institutions. These transactions involved more than $3.2 billion dollars moving to, from, and through AMB AMRO’s New York branch. And, in December 2009, Credit Suisse was assessed a $536 million penalty for processing thousands of transactions over a 20-year period that concealed the involvement of sanctioned parties and the routing of wire transfers and securities transactions to and through the United States.
These regulatory actions have sent a strong message to overseas financial institutions that the United States will not countenance such activities on the part of their branches in the United States.

But, an even stronger message is now being sent by victims of terrorism as they move in U.S. courts to hold such financial institutions accountable under section
2333 of the anti terrorism act for facilitating the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. I cite as examples the civil damages cases now proceeding in New York against Arab Bank, Nat West, and Credit Lyonnais for their having facilitated the transfer of funds to Hamas and other terrorist groups that have launched suicide and other terrorism attacks against innocent victims in Israel.

The real problem here is that while these terrorist related transactions are illegal in the United States, they have not been deemed illegal by many of the other countries in which these banks operate. This is in spite of the fact that almost all countries are now parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which came into force in April 2002. That convention clearly obligates all countries to criminalize the funding of groups or individuals that engage in terrorist activities.

Shortly after the 9/11 attack the Security Council also adopted resolution 1373 which obligates all countries, whether or not they have adopted the Terrorism Financing Convention, to take the steps necessary to prevent the transfer of funds to terrorist organizations or for terrorist purposes. But, the resolution failed to contain any definition or criteria as to what constitutes terrorism. It left it to each country, independently, to determine this crucial issue for itself. Without common criteria, or a definition of terrorism, each country remains free to interpret its own obligations. Each can decide which groups they consider terrorists and which they wish to hail as “freedom fighters.” Saudi Arabia uses this distinction, for example, to justify its continuing funding for Hamas while Iran and Syria use it to provide funds and support to Hezbollah.

The fact of the matter is that there is still only a very limited international consensus as to which organizations are terrorist organizations. And, for the most part, that consensus is limited to a very short list of entities and individuals identified and designated by a Committee of the Security Council, as being directly associated with al Qaeda and/or the Taliban.

At my own last count, in June 2010, that designation list includes 137 members of the Taliban, 257 members or associates of al Qaeda, and 103 entities directly related to al Qaeda. I want to be clear on this point. Beyond that list of designated individuals and entities there is no international consensus, and therefore, no clear and enforceable international obligation, which inhibits countries from allowing their financial institutions to engage in financial transactions with such undesignated individuals and entities.

Only a limited number of countries have joined with us in designating such organizations as Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. This includes, for the most part, our European friends and allies. Yet, some European countries still exempt the political and humanitarian wings of these organizations from such designation. Many other countries have not even gone that far and openly permit their financial institutions to process transactions in Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s favor.

Given US bank interaction with this larger international banking community, the vulnerabilities become stark. And, that means that very careful attention must be paid to assuring that accurate information regarding origination and the ultimate recipient of the transaction is complete and accurate.

The problem is further complicated by the emergence in numerous lesser developed countries of new under-funded and under-regulated home grown banks. These banks rely heavily on their correspondent and payable through accounts maintained in more established banking institutions. Many of these home grown banking institutions continue to lack the wherewithal to mount and maintain an effective compliance system. At the same time the national regulatory environment under which they operate is unable to provide effective oversight. And, many of these banks are located in areas quite susceptible to the recruitment of terrorists.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would also place great emphasis on the need to strengthen the international banking communities resources and commitment to halting the financing of terrorism.

I do not want to appear too pessimistic in this regard. A very substantial segment of the international banking community does take terrorism financing and money laundering issues quite seriously. The Wolfsberg group of banks, for example, has established high standards to prevent terrorist organizations from accessing their financial services, and they have pledged to assist governments in their efforts to combat terrorist financing.
There are also a number of other activities underway to upgrade international compliance capability. FATF, The Financial Action Task Force, has made great strides in providing guidance and best practices for the strengthening of international banking compliance, and in brokering assistance for jurisdictions wishing to upgrade their compliance programs. It has also spawned numerous regional organizations to facilitate cooperation and share the burden of compliance among their member banks.
FATF has also finally gotten back to holding certain countries accountable for their failings in this regard. In 2008 FATF began publishing a list of high risk and non cooperating jurisdictions whose banks have failed to adequately implement an anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing program. FATF issued a series of statements expressing concerns about the AML/CFT deficiencies in Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, São Tomé and Principe, and the northern part of Cyprus.

The FATF statements called on FATF members to pay special attention to transactions dealing with Iran and Uzbekistan and to strengthen preventive measures in response to the risks associated with these countries. In February 2009, FATF also called on its members and other jurisdictions to apply additional counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and terrorist financing risks emanating from Iran.
Ultimately, United States regulatory agencies can also make reference to the broad powers provided to them in Section 311 of the Patriot Act. As you know, Mr. Chairman, that section authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose special enhanced due diligence requirements with regard to the maintenance and operation of correspondent and payable through accounts maintained in US banks for foreign jurisdiction banks. And, in some cases this may include precluding the operation of such accounts in favor of risky banks overseas.

We all recognize that these powers must be used sparingly and prudently. At the same time they do provide us considerable leverage when it comes to influencing and correcting bad banking conduct overseas.

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September 29, 2010

High Frequency Trading as a Cyber-War Weapon

By Roderick Jones

As the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission prepares to jointly produce its long-awaited report on the “flash crash” of May 6th it is worth considering some of the security risks that are attached to the practice of High Frequency Trading.

In the past I have used the CT Blog as a forum to discuss and present ideas on future security threats, from virtual worlds to hacking commercial airliners. These ideas have been presented because technological advance has produced a paradigm shift for national security authorities to manage. The introduction of algorithmic and high frequency trading has the potential to create security risks consistent with this theme. For now the most interesting security vector is how high frequency trading can be used as a kind of Denial of Service attack against financial exchanges. This is clearly of some interest to the cyber-warfare community in terms of offense and defense. Other lesser security themes have presented themselves around this topic and a blog/white paper is available on the topic here.

September 25, 2010

In the Washington TImes on Reconsidering Aid to Pakistan

By Aaron Mannes

The Washington Times just ran a piece by my colleagues and I on reconsidering aid to Pakistan.

Black hole for foreign aid
As U.S. funds increase, so does terrorism
By V.S. Subrahmanian, Aaron Mannes and Amy Sliva -
The Washington Times7:00 p.m., Friday, September 24, 2010

As Pakistan approaches the international community for massive assistance for the third time in six years, donors face difficult choices. Three disasters, starting with the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, then the 2008 financial crisis, and now the massive flooding, were not Pakistan's fault. Nevertheless,

as violence and terrorism emanating from Pakistan increase, donors must ask if aid to Pakistan is improving international security.

According to aiddata.org, the international community (including international aid groups but excluding the United States) provided nearly $22 billion in international aid from 2004 through 2008 (nearly $2.5 billion in 2004, increasing to more than $7 billion in 2008). Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has, according to the Congressional Research Service, provided more than $18.5 billion in aid to Pakistan. Of this aid, more than $12.5 billion was military. Supposedly this aid to Pakistan is essential for counterterrorism.

But based on the numbers, it is difficult to argue that international aid to Pakistan is reducing terrorism. According to the National Counterterrorism Center's World Incidents Tracking System, which monitors noncombatant casualties of terror attacks, there was an enormous jump in terror attacks by Pakistani perpetrators from 2004 through 2008. In 2004, 110 Pakistani noncombatants were killed in terror attacks. In 2008, nearly 900 were killed. Some of this can be explained by the civil war between the Pakistani Taliban and the government. Nonetheless, the recent spate of bombings in Pakistan, which have killed at least 75 members of Pakistan's Shia minority, show that despite substantial security aid, the government remains unable to protect its citizens.

There also has been a jump in attacks by Pakistani perpetrators outside of Pakistan, including the 2006 and 2008 attacks in Mumbai. Combined, these two incidents claimed nearly 400 lives. Beyond the immediate carnage, these attacks increased the possibility of open war between the nuclear-armed rivals Pakistan and India. Further, a number of international terror plots, such as the 2006 airplanes plot and the recent Times Square car-bombing attempt, have been linked to Pakistan.

Pakistan has played important roles in counterterror efforts, particularly protecting NATO supply lines to Afghanistan and its own operations against the Pakistani Taliban, which have claimed the lives of more than 2,000 Pakistani troops since Sept. 11. However, despite these losses, Pakistan's priority is not counterterrorism - it is India.

When India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, then-Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated, "Even if we have to eat grass, we will make nuclear bombs." Despite possessing the ultimate deterrent, Pakistan continues high levels of military spending in its impossible race for parity with larger and wealthier India. This has led to persistent fiscal deficits and low spending on social services. International aid is no substitute for sound domestic policies.

Read the complete post here.

September 24, 2010

The Death of the FARC's Jorge Briceño Is a Blow to Latin American Terrorism

By Douglas Farah

The Colombian government just passed an historic milestone in its decades long fight against the FARC - a successful airstrike that killed Jorge Briceño, AKA Mono Jojoy, the group's most successful military commander ever. But he was more than that, and his death is a significant strike against terrorism in Latin America.

Briceño was the architect of the FARC's transition from Marxist insurgency to drug trafficking terrorist organization in the early 1990s as a method of survival. It was Briceño who moved his Southern Front (followed by the rest of the FARC) into kidnapping and an almost-total dependency on cocaine trafficking. He targeted Americans, along with the hundreds of Colombian hostages he plucked off. He was remorseless about the human suffering he caused, viewing it as a cost of war. He was the architect of the FARC becoming a true terrorist organization.

Briceño, who commanded great loyalty among the FARC rank and file, was born into the FARC, and has a brother, German, who is also a senior FARC commander. German, who kidnapped and murdered three Native American activists with the consent of Jorge, has been identified by Colombian authorities as one of the FARC commanders under the protection of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in Venezuelan territory.

As a commander, Briceño pioneered the use bombs made of gas canisters that were used to incinerate rural villages, as well as inflict significant damage on the military. My full blog is here.

September 22, 2010

Counter-Terrorism Offensive in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

This past weekend, Indonesia's police counter-terrorism unit, Special Detachment 88, conducted a series of dramatic raids across North Sumatra province targeting a 33-strong band of terrorists who had perpetrated a series of bank robberies since mid-year. Thus far, 20 suspects have been caught and three shot dead. Of those captured, seven were trained at a paramilitary camp discovered in Aceh Besar district, Aceh province, last February. The others were apparently trained in the jungle near Mount Sinabung, a recently-active volcano in North Sumatra.

This terrorist group, which reportedly has ties to detained firebrand cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, has proven itself to be heavily armed with assault rifles. What's more, they have shown a level of aggression and coordination not normally associated with standard criminals. According to the police, the group had targeted more banks, money changers, and show rooms for the medium-term; apparently, they appear to be focusing on fund raising through criminal activities rather than attacking Western interests.

During the early morning hours of 22 September, an estimated 10-12 well-armed persons using 6-8 motorcycles attacked the Hamperan Perak police post in Deli Serdang district, North Sumatra province. Three police officers were killed and the building was destroyed by Molotov cocktails. This attack almost certainly was conducted by the remnants of the terrorist cell mentioned above as revenge for the capture/killing of their co-conspirators. It would appear to indicate that virtually all of those still being pursued by the police were in the Deli Serdang vicinity as of yesterday. It would also underscore the fact that this cell continues to concentrate on domestic targets rather than expatriates.

September 19, 2010

Indian Mujahideen is Back to Threaten Commonwealth Games?

By Animesh Roul

Indian capital New Delhi had a major security scare on September 19, days ahead of scheduled Commonwealth Games when two bike-borne armed assailants fired indiscriminately at a bus carrying foreign tourists near the Gate No 3 of historic Jama Masjid (Mosque), located in the walled city. Two Taiwanese nationals have sustained injuries in the incident.

Hours after the incident, Indian Mujahideen terrorist group has issued a media statement threatening to sabotage the Commonwealth Games. The message however, made no direct reference to today’s firing incident. It threatened to sabotage the Games to avenge atrocity against Muslims in the country and the recent violence in Kashmir.

Excerpt of the statement (compiled from media reports):
The purported email is signed by one Al-Arbi and has been sent from the mail id al.arbi999123@gmail.com.

“Since July, the Paradise on earth, ‘Kashmir’ is being soaked with the blood of its sons. The Indian occupying forces have not spared the life of 8 years old boys to 80 years old elderly person or hapless Muslim women either. The death toll has already surpassed a hundred innocents…The Indian Mujahideen has finally decided to avenge the blood of each and every brother and sister as its topmost priority and duty towards the Ummah and Allah above all. Remember! As we bleed, so will you seep.”
“…We warn you to host the Commonwealth games if you have a grain of salt. We know that preparations for the games are at its peak; beware!! We too are preparing in full swing for a Great Surprise! The participants will be solely responsible for the outcome, as our bands of Mujahideen love death more than you love life. In Kashmir you have succeeded in usurping our Right of self-determination with all your Chanakya policies.”
“In the name of Allah we dedicate this attack of retribution to martyrs, Shaheed Atif Amin and Shaheed Muhammad Sajid.”

Both Atif Amin and Muhammad Sajid were killed during the Batla House encounter on 19 September 2008.

Meanwhile, Delhi police has indicated that firing incident was a criminal act, perhaps attempting to avoid concern over the security situation ahead of the CW games. It also downplayed the terror email sent to media houses purportedly by the IM.

Police though sounds little cautious and wants not to portray a panic picture for foreigners and visitors during the forthcoming CWGames, Sunday’s firing incident could be a handiwork of IM suspects who by attacking foreigners sent a clear message across the world that Delhi is not a safe place for them and the place is under terror radar.

In June 2010, Indian government proscribed Indian Mujahideen and all its formations and front organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. IM which is actually a shadow organization of Pakistan based Lashker-e-Taiba and Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) has perpetrated series of attacks in various urban centers of India in 2008.

The investigation is on and as usual it would take sometime for the Delhi police to unravel the case.

September 17, 2010

Murder in London - Fire in Karachi

By Aaron Mannes

A murderous stabbing in London could have profound geopolitical consequences. Yesterday, Imran Farooq, one of the senior leaders of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) was stabbed to death in London. MQM is a major Pakistani political party representing the Mohajirs (the Muslims who left India for Pakistan in the 1948 partition.) The MQM is particular strong in Karachi where the Mohajirs are a plurality of the population and the MQM dominates the city government.

Farooq, along with the MQM’s founder Altaf Hussein ran the party from a self-imposed exile in London. In 1992, in the wake of massive fighting between the Mohajirs and the Sindh the Army cracked down on the MQM and the party leaders decamped to London.

Karachi in recent times has been prone to large-scale outbreaks of violence. Now much of the fighting is between the growing Pashtun population and the Mohajirs.

Turmoil in Karachi matters – it is the great port and economic engine for Pakistan. Karachi has frequently burst into riots over the past several years. The city is clearly tense now. Turmoil in Karachi will complicate flood relief and long-term makes it difficult for Pakistan’s economy to right itself. Considering the precarious state of the entire country, this is no small matter.

Whodunnit?

Read the complete post here.

September 15, 2010

Indonesian Counter-Terrorism Forces Reorganized

By Kenneth Conboy

On 15 September, the Indonesian National Police announced that it was reorganizing its counter-terrorim forces as part of a wider restructuring effort. Effective this week, Special Detachment 88, which had previously been part of the detectives division, will now answer directly to the chief of the National Police.

Several observers immediately lauded this change, noting that it will enhance transparency associated with foreign funds (mainly from the U.S. and Australia) used to support Special Detachment 88.

It should be noted that police counter-terrorism units have been subject to much criticism in recent months. First, they were deemed too quick to kill, rather than capture, many of the top terrorist leaders over the past year.

Second, counter-terrorist units deployed at the provincial level have often been used on duties not tied to terrorism--such as arresting foreign fishermen poaching in Indonesian waters. They have also been accused of torturing separatist leaders in prison.

The reorganization involving Special Detachment 88 follows last month's creation of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (known by the initials BNPT) in Jakarta. This new agency will focus largely on "de-radicalizing" captured terrorists, which has been seen as a priority after several released extremists were found to have been repeat offenders.

September 10, 2010

ON SEPTEMBER 11 WE REMEMBER THE VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE TO COUNTER TERRORISM

By Victor Comras

September 11th has become a day of remembrance for all victims of terrorism and a poignant reminder of the constant threat posed by all those that would use terrorist tactics in the furtherance of their ambitions, their ideologies, or their political or religious goals. This day stands among a growing number of sad anniversaries that mark senseless killing and maiming in furtherance of some intolerant cause. It is also a day to take stock of the imperfect steps, and the uneven progress made, in countering this terrorism scourge.

The human, social, and economic costs of terrorism are staggering. Estimates put the world wide number of terrorist attacks since 1963 at well over 15,000, resulting in more than 25,000 casualties. Governments have spent well into the hundreds of billions of dollars to prevent, defend against, and fight terrorism; and to provide security for their interests at home and abroad. Private businesses have also expended additional billions to secure their premises and personnel from terrorist attacks, and the world’s financial community has invested billions more on regulatory compliance measures to police accounts and transactions in order to steer clear of counter terrorism and money laundering issues. There has also been a staggering impact on global economic activity and development. Yet, despite these efforts, terrorism continues to pose a worldwide threat.

Since 9/11 we have remained relatively safe within our own national borders. Yet, hardly a day passes without some roadside explosion, suicide bombing, or other terrorist attack elsewhere in the world being reported. And, we all recognize that we cannot let our own guard down even for a second. So, while we have accomplished much, so much remains to be done.

Next week the 65th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations will convene in New York, and international terrorism will again be a prominent issue on its agenda. Several will use the General Assembly platform to call for greater efforts to eliminate what they deem are “the root causes of terrorism.” They want the focus to be on the economic, social and political conditions that they believe give rise to terrorism, rather than on matters of compliance and accountability. Yet, we cannot wait for the ills of the world to be cured before confronting terrorism, and while each step addressing such ills is admirable, we can never accept that discontent ever justifies acts of terrorism. Compliance and accountability must remain the United Nations highest priority and greatest focus.

Many of the speakers will refer to the various Security Council resolutions and 16 international conventions that have outlawed terrorism and that obligate all countries to adopt measures to prevent terrorism and the financing of terrorism. But, undercutting these measures is the fact that there is still not “common ground” as to what constitutes terrorism and who the terrorists are. So far that consensus only extends to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and those groups and individuals identified and listed by a UN Sanctions Committee as associated with them. Beyond those listed there continues to be substantial disagreement that allows certain countries to continue to provide support and material assistance to groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, that use “violence to kill and damage indiscriminately to make a political or cultural point and to influence legitimate Governments or public opinion unfairly and amorally.” This lack of consensus has, in turn, severely limited the United Nations ability to monitor compliance with the counter-terrorism measures that it has adopted or to hold countries accountable for failing to implement and enforce them.

Truth be said, there are already a multitude of definitions of terrorism now being applied by one country or another. Almost every country has its own, and several countries use more than one, depending on the circumstances. This has left each country free to pick and choose who they wish to deem terrorists and who they prefer to call something else, such as “national liberators” or “freedom fighters.”

Many pundits have emphasized the likely impossibility of coming up with a universal definition of terrorism that can capture all its elements and/or satisfy all those charged with its application. But, such precision is not really required for UN purposes, and can be left for each country to more fully develop and apply on its own. However, it is critical that the counter-terrorism norms provided for the international community by the United Nations contain sufficient criteria describing the elements of terrorism to provide some standard by which to hold all countries equally accountable.

September 3, 2010

Combating Export Violations to Iran

By Matthew Levitt

Last month a senior U.S. delegation visited key world capitals to stress the risks incurred by foreign banks as they continue to do business with Iran. Indeed, Tehran -- mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- has successfully evaded sanctions by setting up a network of front companies, procurement agents, businesses, and transporters as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Of equal concern are the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Yesterday, the Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hosted Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) John T. Morton to discuss "Combating Export Violations to Iran: The Role of ICE Homeland Security Investigations." This event was part of the Institute's ongoing lecture series with senior U.S. counterterrorism officials.

Mr. Morton's prepared remarks are available here. An audio link is available here.

August 29, 2010

Updates on Abu Bakar Bashir

By Zachary Abuza

Despite an online petition drive and pressure campaign to release militant cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, both the evidence against him and the Indonesian authorities' confidence in prosecuting him are greater than the two other times he was arrested. For an analysis of the case against Bashir and what the recent investigations tell us about the state of Jemaah Islamiyah, please see my recent article "Fall of the Teflon Terrorist?" in the Australia/Israel Review.

August 27, 2010

WaPo: "Bitter religious fighting over mosque plays right into al-Qaeda's hands"

By Evan Kohlmann

The Washington Post kindly invited me to contribute a column to their "On Faith" blog regarding the latest controversy over the proposed Cordoba House Muslim community center in New York near the site of "Ground Zero." See below:

http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/08/by_evan_f_kohlmann_the.html

Bitter religious fighting over mosque plays right into al-Qaeda's hands
By Evan F. Kohlmann

The way that renowned Christian preacher Franklin Graham portrayed Muslims on a nationally-televised news broadcast last week, one would imagine that Islam is some sort of insidious cancer devouring the civilized world. Between his nauseating description of Islam as a "devilish" faith and his nonsensical discussion about the "Muslim seed" of President Obama, Graham managed to shame not only himself, but also the very democratic, pluralist ideals that we as Americans aspire to. I watched in disgust as his uninterrupted tirade continued, and it suddenly occurred to me that some viewers might not recognize that Graham speaks only for a prejudiced minority, whose numbers have been artificially inflated by the cynical recent tactics of various political candidates. To that segment of viewers, Graham instead represents the larger, ugly face of American xenophobia and prejudice--and in doing so, this self-described "man of God" has merely provided extra ammunition for al-Qaeda to use in its battle against us, our constitutional ideals, and our ethos of personal freedom...

Click to view the entire column at the Washington Post "On Faith" Blog

August 26, 2010

Arming Hizballah?: The debate about US Military Assistance to Lebanon

By David Schenker

The fatal cross-border shooting of an Israeli soldier by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in early August has sparked a debate in Washington as to the utility of providing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Lebanese military. Since 2005, the US has obligated over $700 million to the army, which has less than 50,000 troops.

The robust program was started in the immediate aftermath of the Cedar Revolution. But much has changed since then, and Congress is asking whether the policy is still appropriate. Of particular concern is the relationship of the Shiite militia Hizballah to the standing army. There is a history of collusion and cooperation, which, although not surprising, remains problematic.

Over the past week, I’ve written two articles discussing in detail US funding for the LAF. The first piece provides the history and context of US military assistance to the LAF. The second addresses the policy issues and asks what, if anything, should cause the US to downgrade its FMF program with Lebanon.

August 23, 2010

The Real Truth About Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

By James Gordon Meek

Ever since senior Obama administration advisers such as CIA Director Leon Panetta and Vice President Biden admitted that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan was minimal, with fewer than 100 operatives believed to be on the ground there, war critics have complained the President has little justification for escalating the U.S. commitment there.

But the inside-the-Beltway political debate underscores a fundamental misunderstanding of what Al Qaeda’s role in Afghanistan — which Osama Bin Laden’s minions call “Khorasan” — truly has been, according to Special Operations commanders and troops on the ground.

Today’s Washington Post makes hay of the fact that Al Qaeda is barely mentioned in the 76,000 pages of war files released last month by WikiLeaks. The story overlooks two key facts: (1) The voluminous files are mostly “sigact” - “significant action” - combat reports dispatched as incidents happened; and (2) troops who faced Arabs in battle fighting alongside Afghan “Taliban” rarely knew, even after they had killed them, that they were up against non-Afghan opponents.

Critics also fail to realize that a single Al Qaeda operative’s knowledge and experience in guerrilla and terror tactics is of incalculable value as a force multiplier to the Taliban.

Al Qaeda’s Arab operatives are considered a fearless elite. They have knowledge of Islam that makes them seem like religious scholars to many Pashtun tribesmen, who they have led into battle in the past. After Al Qaeda fled Afghanistan’s cities with their Taliban government allies in 2001-02, they reorganized and reconstituted their ranks in Pakistan. Al Qaeda returned to the fight in 2004, training, equipping and often leading or joining Haqqani fighters in battle along the eastern border.

Their presence was often suggested by the tactics used by Haqqani fighters, the cells’ skill at accurately firing AK-47s and RPGs, and gear such as armor-piercing ammo, body armor and night-vision devices.

Today, as they withstand CIA’s withering drone onslaught in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the Arabs are more low-key in their Afghan ops than they were in the past. The CIA’s targeted killing of Skeik Mustafa Abu al-Yazid after he left Mir Ali may also have impacted their activities on the other side of the AfPak.

Arabs from Al Qaeda still fund and train the Taliban, but no longer lead operations from the front, Army Col. Donald C. Bolduc, who leads the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, told me in his office at Bagram Airfield this month.

“They’re considered much too valuable to risk that,” said another U.S. official in the war zone.

During the winter, Taliban leaders ensconced in Pakistan send in Al Qaeda operatives to train their fighters in bombmaking tradecraft during the lull in fighting, sources said.

“The Pakistani madrassahs are still the big recruiting and training place. The Afghans go to a madrassah in Pakistan, where an Arab is typically like the dean, or headmaster, and learn how to fight,” the official told me. “Then the Afghan goes back home and teaches others to build bombs or fight — and gets paid handsomely for it.”

Meanwhile, as we reported in today's New York Daily News, Taliban leaders in key Afghanistan districts have been "shwacking" each other (Special Forces term) to jockey for "permanent" leadership positions after the U.S. begins to draw down forces next year.

August 22, 2010

The Militant Myth

By Farhana Qazi

On Saturday morning, I appeared on Fox News to discuss whether militants in Pakistan could recruit among the millions of flood victims. The story began with a statement made by US Senator John Kerry, the first American official to visit the flood-hit areas, “We don’t want additional jihadists (and) extremists coming out of a crisis.” The idea that the human tragedy in Pakistan is a “frightening opening for the Taliban” is not yet substantiated but certainly makes for sensational news. We should remember that the Taliban is and has never been a charitable organization. The Taliban does not have a social services institute, and instead, boasts of enforcing and providing justice and order in the form of Qazi courts (i.e., harsh interpretation of Shariah law).

While American security may be linked to Pakistan’s future, the militant myth serves Pakistan’s political elite all too well. The message of militants moving into grief-stricken areas is largely being propagated by the Pakistani Government. This past week, at a United Nations donor meeting, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureishi stated “The massive upheaval caused by the floods and the economic losses suffered by the millions of Pakistanis must be addressed urgently. We cannot allow this catastrophe to become an opportunity for the terrorists." Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari makes a similar argument. In his visit to flood-hit areas with Kerry, Zardari said at a joint press conference, “The children could be put in camps to be trained as the terrorists of tomorrow.”

There is little truth to these arguments. So why make them? In reality, Pakistan needs increased aid to rise above its latest crisis of crises. By invoking the rise of the militant mafia, Pakistan can woo America into donating millions more. Pakistan can convince the international aid community that it cannot survive without its support. But more aid to the Pakistani government is met with great skepticism and suspicion.

Many ordinary Pakistanis fear that aid will fall into the pockets of corrupt, inept politicians, and are thus expressing rage and resentment against the civilian elite. In a Pakistani blog called Chup! (Hush in Urdu), one blogger harshly states:

Dear Pakistani government, your response to the disaster in Pakistan has been atrocious. As a Pakistani citizen, one who is peddling like mad to drum up funds to send back home, I am disgusted with your political pot shots, your disinterest in your own people, and your lip service to something unfolding in front of your eyes. Everyone has pledged aid – even Afghanistan – who barely has anything right now. If every leader who defaulted on their loans or didn’t pay taxes actually dug into their pockets, maybe the rest of the world wouldn’t be calling us selfish beggars.

A DAWN newspaper opinion piece on Sunday by Ardeshir Cowasjee—who invited me into his well-guarded home in Karachi—offers his view:

Knowing that much of the aid money channeled through government agencies will be siphoned off to private pockets, international donors, foreign governments and local citizens are extremely reluctant to give to official channels. Voluntary groups like the Edhi Foundation, Citizens’ Foundation (US tax benefits for donations), Omar Asghar Khan Foundation, and many other organizations are faring better as they, along with the military, are mobilizing their networks around the country to get food and other help to the flood-affected.
Prime Minister Gilani, honestly admitting that his government is dishonest and totally untrustworthy, agreeing with Mian Nawaz Sharif, proposed a government-sponsored body to be run by non-political figures with credibility who will see that the money that trickles in goes to those it is meant for. It has not been allowed to take off. This incompetent, ill prepared, uninspiring and non-visionary leadership gifted to us through a dubious ‘deal’ is all we have — we have no option but to lump it until someone or something comes to the rescue of this miserable country.

If Islamabad is concerned with militant madness, then it should focus on improving and strengthening its civilian capacity. After all, a government deemed unable and unfit to provide basic social services to its population is considered a failed state by the Fund for Peace which manages the Failed States Index 2010.

To overcome the human disaster, ordinary Pakistanis are doing what they can to help those in need—as they did in the aftermath of the October 8, 2005 earthquake in Pakistan-held Kashmir. Then, trucks of supplies were collected for the victims trapped in the mountains. But the challenge was twofold: lack of access to victims and accusations of stolen or wasted donor money by the Pakistani government.

In recent conversations with senior Pakistani commanders, the military still considers the civilian government to be out-of-touch with reality. So why does an unpopular President continue to hold power? As one commander said to me in private, “We are waiting for the civilians to create a mess inside Pakistan so that the military will look like the better option for governance.” As Pakistan’s history has previously shown, in civilian chaos and confusion may come military might.

However, neither the military nor civilians in power have proven capable of servicing those in need. The earthquake in Kashmir is a prime example. Over the past two years, I have visited the refugee camps in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Kashmir. The same women greet me. One is now pregnant. Another still complains of wanting a blood transfusion but has no money to afford it.

The women’s greatest need is medical care. “We need a doctor,” they say. But most female doctors will not leave their hospitals and clinics in Islamabad, the capital city, to take the dangerous trek to Kashmir to offer once-a-week services to the poor. Other local Pakistani NGO’s seem stretched for resources or have other areas they operate in.

While the women of the tents do receive a stipend from the government and have access to a nearby hospital, many argue that it is not enough. “Can you feed a family of four with the money we receive? We can’t even afford a decent education for our children or the kind of medical treatment we desperately need.”

Five years after the earthquake, most women complain of living as refugees when the government promised them low-income housing. “I used to have a home,” said an older woman, “now I have this tent. How long should I live like this? It’s inhuman.”

In the current flood disaster, it will take more than five years to stabilize the country. And that is obviously not the only challenge Pakistan faces, as Aaron Manne’s piece highlights on August 17th.

The good news is that the Pakistani government acknowledges the threat by militant groups. An assessment released by the country’s intelligence agency reveals that domestic militancy poses a greater threat to the country than India.

But while the Pakistani elite remains concerned, they also applaud the efforts of religious charities, some of whom are tied to terrorist organizations. So which story are we to believe? Should we be alarmed by the freedom of mobility and safe haven that front charities enjoy in Pakistan? If so, then Pakistan needs to underline its policy against militants and those connected to it. Civilian elites need to stop using the “militant myth” to garner public sympathy and support for the flood victims. Rather, the government should focus on restoring the public’s confidence in the country’s ability to lead and deliver goods at this time of crisis.

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Keeping Tabs on Terrorists: Aaron Mannes & V.S. Subrahmanian in the "Wall Street Journal"

By Aaron Mannes

The Wall Street Journal Asia just posted an article my colleague V.S. Subrahmanian and I wrote on the ongoing game of catch-up intelligence agencies are forced to play as terrorists quickly adopt and adapt the latest communications technologies.

* OPINION INDIA * AUGUST 22, 2010

Keeping Tabs on Terrorists
India's spat with the maker of the Blackberry underlines a broader technological challenge for intelligence agencies.

By V.S. SUBRAHMANIAN AND AARON MANNES

The war on terror came closer to home this month, when the Indian government pressured Canadian company Research in Motion to hand over encryption keys for its popular Blackberry device. New Delhi claims terrorists are using the company's secure networks for covert communications. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—all of which face significant terror threats—have also expressed concern. But such moves may do more harm than good.

India's concern is clearly justified: Terrorists are using new media sources to facilitate covert communications that—directly or indirectly—have led to numerous deaths. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System, Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), perpetrator of the deadly 2008 Mumbai attacks, is responsible for over 700 fatalities in India during the last five years.

But publicly browbeating RIM into providing its encryption keys is a Pyrrhic victory. Terrorist organizations can only survive if they study the capabilities of their adversaries and adapt. Terrorist organizations backed by intelligence agencies tend to be even more sophisticated. If terrorists know that Blackberries are monitored, terrorists will not employ them—or will do so only in combination with other channels of communication in order to evade intelligence agencies. The much-publicized nature of India's threat to Blackberry thus may well have compromised potential operational gains.

LeT's Mumbai attack shows how quickly terrorists adapt to new technology.

Read the full article here.

August 20, 2010

Viktor Bout, the Merchant of Death, to Stand Trial in the United States

By Douglas Farah

Well, it is a day I had long predicted would never occur, but I have never been happier to be wrong. A Thai appeals court today ruled the Russian weapons merchant Viktor Bout could be extradited to stand trial in the United States.

Bout not only supplied the Taliban and the FARC in Colombia, both designated terrorist organizations. He also helped arm some of the most murderous regimes and groups in Africa (Charles Taylor, Mubut Sese Seko the RUF, UNITA etc.) and the genocidal regime in Sudan. These actions are detailed in my book, with Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible (Wiley 2007).

Bout should be extradited in about a week, although the Russian government has already made clear it will do what it can to slow the process even further. There is, under Thai law, no further appeal allowed of this ruling.

Bout's extradition request is based on an elaborate and successful operation by the DEA's Special Operations Division, where informants posed as representatives of the FARC seeking to buy weapons to fight in Colombia, and specifically to kill Americans. Bout took the bait and arrived in Bangkok March 2008 with a laptop full of pictures of the toys he could deliver to them, including unmanned drones, RPGs and the promise of surface-to-air missiles.

When he finished his presentation he was arrested by Thai police, having said more than sufficient to build a case. He then spent the next 2.5 years fighting extradition to the United States, where similar cases, using similar tactics, have led to quick convictions.
My full blog is here.

August 17, 2010

The End of Pakistan?

By Aaron Mannes

Although it is wracked by floods, violence, and other tragedies, this small story from rural Pakistan caught my eye recently:

SHIKARPUR: Ten people were killed in an armed clash between Magsi and Qambrani tribes in the jurisdiction of Golodaro police station on Thursday evening.

According to sources, the gunbattle followed a brawl over irrigation of paddy crops near Kuddan village.

The sources said the Qambrani tribe lost seven men while the Magsi tribe lost three.

Sanaullah Abbasi, a senior police official, told Dawn five bodies had been recovered.

A big police contingent stormed the village late in the evening and brought the situation under control.

According to a letter to Pakistan’s excellent daily The Dawn this incident was by no means exceptional.

This story encapsulates several important realities about Pakistan: declining resources, the increasing violence over the declining resources and the inability of the government to control this violence.

This is a miniature of the violence that has recently wracked Karachi – also fundamentally a conflict over land and resources. These riots are unfortunately endemic to Pakistan’s commercial capital. Just two years ago, on the weekend that the world watched as Mumbai suffered from an overflow of Pakistan’s internal disorder, Karachi was suffering its own outbreak of violence in which at least 40 people were killed, not unlike the recent fighting.

The great fear of the West is Pakistan falling under the control of radical Islamists. The great fear of Pakistan’s leadership is the state fracturing (this is probably #2 for the West – a nuclear Yugoslavia.) But the endemic low level violence suggests another possibility, the state dissolving – a nuclear Somalia.

Medium and Long-Term Dangers
Meanwhile the terrible flooding is testing the capabilities of Pakistan’s institutions and they are failing. Their record at providing immediate relief is mediocre. But the floods have destroyed Pakistan’s crops, so that the country (which is already broke) will be forced to buy or beg food abroad. It will be several years before Pakistan’s agricultural production will return to their previous levels – so food shortages will be an ongoing problem. Even without the crisis food security was a problem in Pakistan. In addition, cotton crops, essential to Pakistan’s major export industry – textiles – have also been devastated. All of this can only further weaken an already precarious economy.

Assuming the floods and their aftermath do not lead to state dissolution it certainly weakens Pakistan for facing its longer-term crises.

Read the full post here.

August 10, 2010

Latest Developments with Hizballah

By David Schenker

Last night, Hizballah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah gave a press conference (via satellite) in which he claimed that Israel was responsible for the 2005 murder of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri. The conference was held amidst rising speculation that Hizballahis will be indicted by the Special Tribunal on Lebanon for the Hariri assassination.

Nearly all of what Nasrallah laid out as “proof” that Israel was involved in the killing was circumstantial, but he did make an interesting comment suggesting that Hizballah had been able to intercept transmissions from Israeli UAVs operating over Lebanon.

Nasrallah’s gambit to implicate Israel comes amidst increasing tensions on the Lebanese-Israeli border following an incident last week in which an Israeli Lt. Colonel was killed by a Lebanese sniper—whether from the Lebanese Armed Forces or Hizballah. The attack prompted an Israeli retaliation against an LAF outpost. More details on the operation can be found here.

Yesterday, an article of mine ran in The New Republic, discussing Hizballah’s latest campaign in Dahyia to convince women to wear the veil. The campaign suggests that Hizballah’s long-ago articulated goal of transforming Lebanon into a Shiite Islamic State ala Iran is alive and well.

Status Check on the Struggle against Global Terrorism

By Matthew Levitt

The State Department's recently released Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 (CRT 2010) reveals several important trends in the evolution of global terrorism. The good news is that al-Qaeda is facing significant pressure, even as the organization and its affiliates and followers retain the intent and capability to carry out attacks. What remains to be seen is if the dispersion of the global jihadist threat from the heart of the Middle East to South Asia and Africa foreshadows organizational decline or revival for al-Qaeda itself and the radical jihadist ideology it espouses. How governments and civil society alike organize to contend with the changing threat will be central to this determination. The bad news is that governments and civil society remain woefully ineffective at reducing the spread and appeal of radical Islamist extremism.

For all the tactical counterterrorism successes documented in CRT 2010, the most significant finding of the report is the one that is missing: strategic counterterrorism success remains elusive. Al-Qaeda senior leadership has been in hiding and on the run for several years now, but despite losing safe havens and facing hard financial times, the organization and its affiliates and like-minded followers remain capable of recruiting new foot soldiers and executing attacks. Unfortunately, despite the sharp rise in terrorist plots and cases of homegrown radicalization, specific policies and programs aimed squarely at countering the radical narrative remain few and far between. It is axiomatic that the United States cannot simply capture and kill its way out of the problem; it must find a way to take on the extremist ideology directly. As concluded by the recent Washington Institute strategic report Fighting the Ideological Battle, failure to recognize the impact of radical Islamism -- an extremist political ideology separate and apart from Islam as a religion -- as a key driver framing, motivating, and justifying violent extremism hampers efforts to intervene early enough in the radicalization process to prevent individuals from becoming violent.

The full article is available here.

August 9, 2010

Militant Cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Detained, Again

By Kenneth Conboy

With the Islamic fasting month set to start at mid-week, and the country's independence day to be celebrated next week, there has been a flurry of terrorism-related arrests in Indonesia during recent days. On Saturday, five suspects were arrested at three locations across West Java province and accused of plotting a car bomb attack; one explosive device, and chemicals for further bombs, were found at one of the sites.

Although Indonesian terrorists have not succeeded at car bombing since 2004, this has not been for want of trying. Last August, the police disrupted a plot to ram a car bomb into the president's motorcade. And two months ago, further arrests halted plans to use a car bomb against the Danish embassy (located in an office tower that houses other embassies and many Western firms) as belated payback for the cartoon controversy.

The target of the latest car bomb plot has not yet been revealed, though the current crop of Indonesian terrorists appears to be splitting its wrath between both Western interests (especially those of the U.S., U.K., and Australia) and the Indonesian government.

Tied to all this, the police this morning announced that they had detained militant cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Ba'aysir had been convicted in 2005 on terrorism-related charges, but was freed a year later after his case was overturned. There have been frequent reports in the press that members of his radical Islamic organization, which goes by the initials JAT, were involved in paramilitary training in Aceh earlier this year, and were among the five arrested this past weekend.

August 5, 2010

Islamic Radicalism Rising in India’s Southern State!

By Animesh Roul

The prevalence of anti India ideology, especially in northeastern states and J&K; is not uncommon. But in States like Kerala, it is certainly worrisome for India’s internal security and integrity. Though there are such activities by the SIMI since long, recent evidence shows the organization like the Popular Front of India (PFI) calls India its enemy openly and asks for 'total Muslim empowerment' in the state.

Late last month, reports indicated that PFI is holding Taliban style (Kangaroo) courts in the state. To recollect, this same Popular Front of India activists recently attacked a college teacher for setting question paper that had some references to Prophet Mohammed that allegedly hurt Muslim sentiments. On July 04, suspected PFI activists chopped off teacher’s right hand for this. It is also established that the PFI organized Freedom Parade on every Independence Day (August 15), and the radical group has backing of some political organization as well. Police investiagtions shows that there are other like minded groups also operating in the state.

The state chief minister recently said that PFI is aiming to convert Kerala into a Muslim majority state in the next 20 years and for achieving that goal, the outfit is pumping money to attract youth and give them weapons. They also try to convert youth from other communities and persuade them to marry Muslim girls (understandably part of the so called Love Jihad campaign).”

Following the July 04 attack on the teacher, police seized maps of at least three temples and CDs of Al-Qaida and Taliban training, along with country-made bombs, swords, knives during raids on some hideouts of PFI activists.

Terrorist group is one thing, but over ground radical originations like the Popular Front of India (PFI) which has been nurturing and spreading anti national ideals is really disturbing.

July 27, 2010

Indonesia Establishes New Counter-Terrorism Agency

By Kenneth Conboy

The Indonesian president on 16 July signed a decree establishing a new National Counter-Terrorism Agency that answers only to him. It is tasked with “preventing terrorism, protecting civilians, de-radicalizing terrorists, and building national preparedness.” It will be launched later this year, though no specific date has been set. Ansyad Mbai, who heads a counter-terrorism desk under the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, will likely initially serve as its caretaker chief. The agency will have its own budget and staff, including members seconded from the police, State Intelligence Agency, and military.

The new body has been established after the Indonesian government came under criticism following the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. During this incident, several terrorist suspects were found to be repeat offenders—that is, they had been arrested once before and already underwent rehabilitation classes. Then this past February, more than a dozen terrorists released from detention joined a militant training camp in the jungles of Aceh. The new agency, therefore, will focus on ways of more effectively de-radicalizing captured terrorists. Meantime, Special Detachment 88, part of the Indonesian National Police, will continue to be the country’s primary counter-terrorism strike force.

Some rights groups have criticized the new body because of what they see as vague provisions in the presidential decree, and because they oppose the idea of military officers serving on the board.

July 26, 2010

Flashpoint Exclusive: Captive Pakistani Intel Officer Threatens to Reveal "Secret Game" Behind Afghan Conflict

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the latest embarrassing disclosures about Pakistan's unhelpful role in the Afghan conflict, Flashpoint Global Partners has obtained an unpublished video of retired Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer Colonel Imam Sultan Amir Tarar, who has been held hostage by militants in Pakistan’s tribal region since March 2010, when he arrived in the area alongside another former ISI officer Khalid Khwaja.

Tarar, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war and a reputed expert on guerilla warfare, has acknowledged a long relationship with the Afghan Taliban and its leader Mullah Mohammed Omar—but has been far more critical of the Pakistani Taliban movement. During a recent New York Times interview, Tarar admonished the TTP and its leadership as “troublemakers” who should be “neutralized.”

In his latest video-recorded message, Colonel Imam Tarar claims that he has been kidnapped by “Lashkar Jhangvi al-Alami, Abdullah Mansour” faction and insists that the Pakistani government has done nothing to facilitate his release. If the government continues to refuse negotiations for his freedom, Tarar further threatens to disclose highly sensitive information about “the weaknesses of our nation” and the secret “game being played with Afghanistan, India, Russia, and America.”

Still images and an English transcript of the video of Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar are now available via the website of Flashpoint Global Partners - http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.

The Boston Cluster and Extended Connections: Case Study on Homegrown Radicalization

By Madeleine Gruen

The NEFA Foundation has released the 26th report in the “Target: America” series; a PowerPoint presentation on a cluster of men originally from the Boston area and their associates. Members of this cluster sought to join al-Qaida forces overseas to kill Americans and also contemplated an attack in a shopping center in the United States. Several participated in jihad by circulating jihadist propaganda to other Americans.

This case study provides insight into how U.S. citizens who sympathize with terrorists make connections with like-minded people on the internet, and through school and community activities. This case also provides insight into how American citizens arrange to access terrorist training camps overseas.

The PowerPoint can be viewed here.

July 22, 2010

Hezbollah Spies via Facebook

By Aaron Mannes

In an excellent article in The Washington Times, UPI’s Shaun Waterman described a “red team” activity in which a security consultant created a false persona on Facebook that appeared to be attractive young woman who was working in cyber defense. She quickly garnered hundreds of friends in the national security community, as well as job offers and invites to conferences. In the process she gathered a great deal of sensitive materials such as inadvertently exposed passwords.

This is not a hypothetical concern – Hezbollah (long a terrorism pioneer) has already employed this strategy. According to the Israeli news site MySay:

The Hizbullah agent pretended she was an Israeli girl named “Reut Zukerman”, “Reut” succeeded during several weeks to engage more then 200 reserve and active personnel.

The Hizbullah agent gained the trust of soldiers and officers that didn’t hesitate to confirm him as a “friend” once they saw he/she is friends with several of their friends from the same unit. Most of them assumed that “Reut” was just another person who served in that elite intelligence unit.

In this way, Hizbullah collected information about the unit’s activity, names and personal details of its personnel, the unit’s slang, and visual information on its bases. This user / agent using Facebook is an example of a trend called fakebook.

The picture attached to “Reut Zukerman” was, of course, an appealing young woman (some tricks are timeless.)

Implications

The first concern regarding incidents of this nature is the raw intelligence collected. But more than the data, it creates opportunities to gather even more data.

Read the full post here.

Flashpoint Partners Exclusive: Video of Times Square Bomber with Pakistani Taliban Commander

By Evan Kohlmann

Flashpoint Global Partners has released a previously unpublished video excerpt of a meeting between confessed Times Square bomb plotter Faisal Shahzad and the leader of the Pakistani Taliban Hakimullah Mehsud. During the undated video clip, Hakimullah and Shahzad are shown shaking hands and hugging, as Shahzad speaks in an overlaid audio track: "Today, along with the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud and under the command of Amir al-Mumineen Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahid (may Allah protect him), we are planning to wage an attack on your side, inshallah."

The video excerpt can be accessed via Flashpoint’s website: http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.

July 19, 2010

The Ghazi Brigade: Lal Masjid Episode Conitinues to Haunt Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Last week I published one report on the Lal Masjid offshoot ‘Ghazi Brigade’, a relatively new comer and named after the slain radical Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The Ghazi Brigade has stepped up its Jihadi actvties recently in Pakistan primarily to enforce Islamic Shari’a in the country through the use of force and to punish those who stormed the mosque in July 2007.

"Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8 (28), July 16, 2010.

Abstract of the article:

A recent spurt in sectarian attacks in Pakistan has been blamed on a lethal but lesser known group affiliated with Taliban and al-Qaeda elements: the Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade, also known as the Ghazi Brigade or Ghazi Force (Daily Times [Lahore], July 2). What was formed as an Islamic vigilante group has now emerged as a radical jihadi organization in response to the July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in Islamabad. Over one hundred religious students were killed by Pakistani security forces during the siege, including the mosque’s deputy leader, Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Thousands of mourners pledging their commitment to jihad thronged the funeral of Abdul Ghazi, held in his native village of Basti Abdullah in Punjab (PakTribune, July 12, 2007). Indeed, his death heralded the start of a neo-Taliban movement in Pakistan, with radical students calling for jihad against Pakistan and its allies.
The events at Lal Masjid prompted al-Qaeda's Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri to call for revenge attacks in Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Aziz, the brother of Rashid Ghazi, also issued a threat of “bloody revolution” in the country (Dawn, July 10, 2009). Addressing an Islamic gathering to commemorate the Lal Masjid standoff, an unidentified cleric said, “You killed one Ghazi. Here are thousands of Ghazis ready to sacrifice in the way of Allah.” In effect, the events at the mosque have unleashed a wave of suicide attacks across Pakistan.

According to intelligence sources, the organization is led by Maulana Niaz Raheem (a.k.a. Bilal), a former student at the Red Mosque’s Jamia Faridia seminary. Pakistani agencies have arrested a Ghazi Brigade terrorist identified as Fidaullah (a.k.a. Junaid) who was allegedly involved in the attacks on the Police Special Branch and the FC checkpoint in Islamabad. Fidaullah has been identified as one of the top strategists for the Ghazi Brigade, operating from the Galjo area in Hangu, part of the North-West Frontier Province (Geo TV, June 1, 2009). Two of his accomplices also involved in the FC checkpoint attack, Khairullah and Khurram Shahzad, were arrested on earlier occasions. Ghazi Brigade terrorists adopted decapitation as a tactic to instill fear among those civilians supporting security forces in the battle zones. Fidaullah himself beheaded three people publicly in Sultanwas and Pir Baba in Swat (The News [Islamabad], June 2, 2009).

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July 16, 2010

Arab Bank Case Ruling: A Victory for Victims of Terrorism

By Victor Comras

It looks like the 6 year old Linde v Arab Bank case may finally move into its trial on the merits phase following a ruling July 12th by US District Court Judge Nina Gershon that:

"The factual allegations of the complaints sufficiently support an inference that Arab Bank and the terrorist organizations were participants in a common plan under which Arab Bank would supply necessary financial services to the organizations which would themselves perform the violent acts. Administering the death and dismemberment benefit plan further supports not only the existence of an agreement but Arab Bank's knowing and intentional participation in the agreement's illegal goals. No more is required."

The case had been locked in its discovery phase for some time pending rulings on Arab Bank’s refusal to provide documentation concerning such financial transfers. Plaintiffs maintained that such documents, if provided, would establish that Arab Bank participated knowingly in this money raising and transferring scheme. Arab Bank’s attorneys maintained that they were precluded from providing such documents because of Jordanian and other country bank secrecy laws. The ruling reflects Judge Gershon’s determination that the refusal to comply with the court's order that such documents be made available to the plaintiffs pursuant to discovery requests merits legal sanctions against Arab Bank. And, the judge's instruction to the jury that they can draw the above inference from this lack of production of such documents is the appropriate remedy. This ruling is fully in line with legal precedent in such cases of non production of court ordered documents.

The Linde case was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in July 2004 by six American families, victims of Palestinian terrorism in Israel during the Al Aqsa Intifada. They sued Jordan's Arab Bank under section 2333 of the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996 alleging that Arab Bank had encouraged such terrorism by disbursing millions of dollars in support payment for families of suicide bombers, which served as a further incentive for attacks.

Section 2333 provides that “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue {in Federal Court} … and … recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” The District Court also permitted foreign nationals to join the lawsuit via the Alien Torts Claims Act. Currently, more than 100 families and 700 individuals in the Linde case and related cases are seeking more than $1 billion in damages based on Arab Bank’s role in financially supporting terrorist activities. The foreign nationals consist mostly of Israeli citizens but also include Afghani, Argentinian, Australian, Belarusian, Canadian, French, Iranian, Iraqi, Peruvian, South African, Turkmenian, Ukranian, and Uzbeki citizens.

The payments were transferred by Arab Bank to and through several charities that allegedly serve as fronts for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These funds were originally collected by two special committees established in Saudi Arabia with the stated intention of raising funds for the families of those carrying out suicide missions at the behest of the named terrorist organizations. Some of these funds were routed through Arab Bank’s New York office in order to convert the funds into U.S. dollars. The Palestinian charities named in the suit include, inter alia, the Popular Committee for Support of the Intifada (the “Popular Committee”), the Coalition of Benevolence (the “Coalition”), the Humanitarian Relief Association (the “HRA”), the Al-Ansar Society, and the Tulkarem Charitable Committee.

The Arab Bank case will likely move forward before a jury at the same time as Canada’s Parliament takes up new legislation that would also grant victims of terrorism the right to hold those that finance terrorism liable for damages. Final Parliamentary committee hearings on this legislation were held earlier this month, and passage of the act is expected when Parliament reconvenes in October. This is due in large part to the unceasing efforts of C-CAT, the Canadian Coalition Against Terrorism, which has become the leading voice for victims of terrorism in Canada. I had an opportunity to testify in the course of these hearings. A webcast of the hearings can be found here.

July 13, 2010

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

As nonaffiliate terrorist actors begin to take center stage and al-Qaeda's core strength diminishes, it has become clear that America is at war with a larger enemy: the extremist ideology that fuels and supports Islamist violence. Unfortunately, the United States is not well equipped to fight on this ideological battleground, and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology worldwide have not kept pace with more successful military targeting of high-level al-Qaeda leaders.

In a new Washington Institute Strategic Report my co-authors and I argue that rather than avoid any mention of the religious motivation behind the terrorism of al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, the Obama administration should sharpen the distinction between the religion of Islam and the political ideology of radical Islamism to successfully defeat Islamist terrorism at its most fundamental source.

Engagement and counterterrorism are key elements of this comprehensive strategy, we argue, but the wide space between them must be addressed. Missing are the policies and programs that should suffuse the space between these two poles on the counterradicalization spectrum, including efforts to contest the extremist narrative of radicalizers, empower and network mainstream voices countering extremism, promote diversity of ideas and means of expression, and challenge extremist voices and ideas in
the public domain. Contesting the radical Islamist narrative does not mean arresting or banning despicable but protected speech; rather, it means openly contesting
extremist views by offering alternatives and fostering deeper ideological debate. The objective in either case is to strengthen the moderate center against the extremist pole and help Muslim communities become more resilient in confronting the challenge.

This report, Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, follows on the Institute's 2009 bipartisan Presidential Task Force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. It is a joint project of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Project Fikra: Defeating Extremism through the Power of Ideas.

This new report recognizes the important steps the Obama administration has taken to address violent extremism and suggests ways to address remaining gaps in U.S. homeland security and foreign policy. The report has benefited from a series of interviews with administration officials at numerous cabinet level agencies and the White House and is the product of a small study group including myself, my Washington Institute colleague J Scott Carpenter, and former White House counterterrorism officials Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

The complete report is available here.

July 10, 2010

Iran's Global Terrorist Reach

By Walid Phares

The United States became painfully aware of the threat posed by global jihadism after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Until that day, Iranian-backed terrorist networks, such as Hezbollah, were responsible for killing more American citizens than al-Qaeda. In the years since, the balance has been gradually tilting back towards Iran. In the words of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, al-Qaeda may be the 'B' team of international terrorism, but Hezbollah is the 'A' team. Indeed, Iran's Khomeinists began their war on the U.S. and other democracies years before Osama bin Laden began his jihad.

The takeover of Iran's government in 1979 by radical Islamist forces faithful to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the breakthrough after which the so-called Islamic Revolution spread throughout the Middle East and beyond. The Khomeinist revolution is ideologically rooted in a radical Islamist doctrine that stands in opposition to the more traditional "Quietist" school of thought among Shia clerics. In a sense, the Khomeinists are the Shia world's equivalent of the Salafists within the Sunni world. The Islamist Shias are also jihadists, in the sense that they call for the establishment of a future Imamate, a Shia form of Islamic Caliphate, by any means necessarily, including what they coin as "Jihad," which practically means war.

Because it cannot project much conventional military power, Iran threatens the United States, Israel and other democracies by unconventional means. Through the use of its terrorist surrogates—such as Hezbollah—Tehran's reach extends around the world.

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Iran

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Syria

Hezbollah

The formation of the Iranian-Syrian alliance in 1980 allowed Tehran to penetrate Lebanon's Shi'ite communities and build a militia that enabled it to extend its influence to the Mediterranean. Through Hezbollah, Iran controls the resources of a large religious community in Lebanon and has established itself as a dominant force inside the country. Iran is therefore able to develop networks overseas more easily and engage Israel in direct confrontation from across the border. Furthermore, the alliance has granted greater access to U.S., European, and other interests on behalf of the Khomeinist regime.

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Hezbollah zones

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Hezbollah forces

Hezbollah was an Iranian project designed to export its revolution globally and it fast became the single most dangerous terrorist network. Since the 1979 revolution, the ayatollahs have invited radical Shia clerics from Lebanon to Iran for theological training. They also recruited militants, including Imad Mughniyeh, who became the central figure in the terror nexus for decades. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran) established its first bases in the northern Bekaa valley in 1980. From there, it connected with "Islamic Amal," an offshoot of the Amal Movement, and with radical religious scholars who studied at the holy cities of Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq.

Hezbollah was born in a gradual process under the auspices of the Pasdaran and launched from the Bekaa towards South Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs. It took part in limited clashes against Lebanon's Christian enclave in early 1982, and as the Israeli invasion destroyed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) infrastructure in the South in June, Iran sent Hezbollah into the fray. Its first strikes were directed at the U.S. embassy and Marines, and French troops. Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah took U.S. and European hostages and engaged in operations against Israeli forces and their local allies in the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

In 1990, Syria invaded East Beirut, seizing the central government and conferring a mantle of state legitimacy on Hezbollah. Iran consequently gained a third ally in the region, the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Republic. After a decade of attacks, including suicide bombings, the Iranian-funded organization won another victory when Israel withdrew from the security zone in southern Lebanon and the SLA was disbanded.

In May 2000, Hezbollah was poised along the international border with the "Zionist enemy." Through Lebanon's institutions, ports of entry, and security apparatus, Iran has expanded its base inside the country, obtained additional funding, and penetrated many countries around the world, from Africa to Latin America. In 2005, the organization intimidated members of Lebanon's Cedar Revolution, using terrorism to put down a democratic uprising against Khomeinist-Baathist domination.

Connection with Hamas

In the early 1990s, Iran finally connected with Hamas through Hezbollah. The hundreds of jihadists exiled by Israel into Lebanon were absorbed by the Khomeinist organization in various training camps. The encounter between Hezbollah (a Shia Islamist organization) and Hamas (an offshoot of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood) created the first hybrid of Sunni extremists acting in alliance with Shia fundamentalists. Iranian funding further strengthened Hamas.

Gaza

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Hamas forces

The new strategic partnership gave Iran influence inside the Palestinian communities, particularly in Gaza. As a jihadist organization, Hamas rejects the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, as it does not recognize the existence of a Jewish state. Initially, its Muslim Brotherhood training and Wahhabi funding directed its efforts against the PLO negotiations with Israel, but when Hamas entered an alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, it became part of a regional axis commanded from Tehran, and thus became part of the ayatollahs' strategy to expand across the region and topple moderate Arab governments. Hamas's 2007 coup d'etat against the Palestinian Authority signaled that Hamas had become another Iranian tentacle in the region.

Iran's stooges in Iraq and Afghanistan

The Iranian plan for Iraq is nothing new. Since the first days of the 1979 revolution, Iranian intelligence fomented trouble in the Shia areas of Iraq. Its long-term goal would see the Shia majority in Iraq sympathetic to the regime in Tehran and provide a land bridge to Syria and Lebanon in the west – from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. With southern Iraq dominated by Iran, it would change the nature of the confrontation with Israel and threaten the oil-rich states of the Arabian Gulf.

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Mahdi forces

The Shia Hizb al-Dawa of Iraq had struggled to establish an Islamist state in Mesopotamia since the 1960s. During the Iraq-Iran War, Khomeini planned to seize Basra and Iraq's southern provinces and declare an Islamic Republic there. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and was routed, thousands of Shi'ites fled to Iran, where they were trained by the Pasdaran. The Badr Brigade, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and other Iraqi factions were born in exile in Iran.

With the collapse of Iraq's ruling Baath party at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition in 2003, Iran began another secret invasion of Iraq, dispatching operatives, special forces and Hezbollah trainers throughout the Shia areas of the country. Iran penetrated most political parties with Islamist (Shia) inclination, and organized a bold pro-Khomeinist force: the Mahdi Army. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah worked in unison to establish a "pro-axis" force inside Iraq.

In Afghanistan, Iran's strategists were undeterred by the presence of NATO troops after 2001. Despite the collapse of the Taliban regime that year, Tehran infiltrated Afghanistan's Shi'ite Hazara community in the center of the country and provided logistical support to the Taliban insurgency. Evidently the Iranian regime is interested in driving out the U.S.-led effort, weakening the Karzai government in Kabul, and carving out its own influence in the Central Asian country. And Tehran's reach in Afghanistan will only increase as Pakistan becomes increasingly unstable.

Infiltrating Arabia: Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

Over the past few years, Tehran has widened its subversive activities in the Arabian Peninsula, quarreling with the Gulf Arab states of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Although the UAE claims the island of Abu Musa as part of its sovereign territory, Iranian forces have occupied it, and reject calls to withdraw. Recent statements by Khomeinist clerics assert that Bahrain, too, is an Iranian possession under the name of Mishmahig Island, and it has triggered a severe diplomatic crisis with the small kingdom.

Behind these historical disputes lay greater geopolitical ambitions. Iran has been investing large amounts of oil money in the UAE with the aim of expanding its political and military influence in the Gulf. Iranian intelligence has also been expanding its cells and cadres in the large Shia community of Bahrain.

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Yemen

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Houthi forces

In the majority-Sunni Yemen, the Pasdaran's networks have hooked up with the Houthis, who are waging an armed insurrection in the northern tip of the country. Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh has accused Iran and Hezbollah of training the insurgents, who have battled government forces and attacked Saudi positions across the border. By 2009, the Khomeinists had practically established a military enclave in the southern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, threatening Saudi Arabia and its most sensitive province, the Hejaz, home to Islam's holiest shrines Mecca and Medina.

Targeting North Africa

Although North Africa has been home almost exclusively to Salafi jihadists, it has witnessed increased activity by Tehran's Shi'ite operatives. According to Moroccan authorities, Iran has funded religious institutions whose first mission is to convert Sunnis to Shia, in what is coined as "Tashyeeh." In 2009 and 2010, the Rabat government shut down a number of these entities and arrested people involved in them.

Moreover, Moroccan and Algerian opposition sources believe Iran is attempting to convince Algiers to proceed with cooperation agreements similar to the Iranian-Syrian treaties or the latest Syrian-Turkish accords. If this thrust were to bear fruit, the benefits for Tehran would be incalculable. Not only would the Khomeinists have a solid base south of the Mediterranean, but they would also gain a wide gate into the weak states of Central Africa and beyond.

Hezbollah infiltrates Egypt

Meanwhile, last year in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak's government accused Hezbollah of creating cells inside the country and planning attacks against Egyptian and Western targets. Egypt, the most populous and powerful Arab country with a Sunni majority, has been targeted significantly by Sunni Salafi terror networks. The new addition of Hezbollah cells acting on the inside dramatically raises the threat Egypt faces from jihadists.

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Hezbollah cells in Egypt

Egyptian courts have sentenced a number of Lebanese Hezbollah members as well as Egyptian citizens working with them. From Beirut, Hezbollah's secretary general sent veiled threats to President Mubarak's government, claiming that Hezbollah and the "Islamic resistance" have the right to operate from any Arab and Islamic land against their enemies, principally Israel. Hassan Nasrallah had previously threatened Cairo when he exhorted the Egyptian military to rebel against its government.

But the Iranian strategy to build terror networks along the Nile Valley by way of Hezbollah has not been limited to Egypt. Sudan, whose regime has been both Islamist and jihadist since 1989, has undergone a rapprochement with Tehran. This convergence of interests between the elites of the two rogue states has only increased since the International Criminal Court indicted Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir for the genocide in Darfur. In the weeks and months following the indictments, Hezbollah delegations followed by Iranian delegates supported Bashir against the West, and thus against the African uprisings in the south, west and east of the troubled country.

Ahmedinijad and Bashir allies

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Iran's access to Sudan also brought strategic advantages to the Pasdaran: Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence benefit from the immense land mass by building military bases and training regime militias for potential confrontations to come. By linking up with Sudan, Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors now have a host south of Egypt, where they can access the Red Sea via Port Sudan and use paths to Eritrea and Chad.

Facilities in East and West Africa

Towards the end of 2008 and 2009, intense contacts between Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's representatives and Eritrean officials culminated in the signing of an agreement granting Iran's navy facilities along the coasts of the Eritrea. This strategically significant development provided the Khomeinists with hundreds of miles of access in the Red Sea. While U.S. and allied naval forces deter Iran in the Persian Gulf, Iranian assets—though not as sophisticated as the Western forces in the region—can now operate in the Red Sea. Indeed, where the Iranian regime goes, Hezbollah follows. Israel is thus surrounded by Iranian proxies and the Horn of Africa is under the increasing risk posed by the axis of resistance.

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Ahmdinijad in Eritrea

Iran has also worked to penetrate West Africa since the 1980s. Taking advantage of the substantial size of the Lebanese communities in Senegal, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Benin, and Nigeria, Hezbollah has developed financial and intelligence networks that span the entire region. This increase of Iranian-backed activities in West Africa could have negative effects on security coordination between these countries and the West, including the U.S. and Europe.

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Hezbollah in West Africa

Iran in Europe

Since the so-called "Islamic revolution," Iran has undertaken sinister intelligence activities throughout Europe, intimidating and occasionally assassinating opposition figures and dissidents. But Tehran's most dangerous presence in Europe comes in the form of active Hezbollah cells. Since 9/11, a number of European governments have detected Hezbollah activities on their soil. Indeed, Germany has arrested and tried members of the organization who were planning illegal activities.

Iran has extended its strategic reach into European countries, penetrating them with intelligence and terrorist networks, and weakening their resolve to join forces with the U.S. in sanctions or other punitive measures against Tehran.

Stretching into the Americas

Iran's longest arm stretches into Latin America. As of the early 1990s, Hezbollah had established a presence in the tri-border area between Brazil, Argentinaand Paraguay. This lawless zone enables the Khomeinist network to develop illegal financial activities and train and plan for terrorist attacks in the region. The 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center there are prime examples of Tehran's terrorist activities and global reach.

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Iran and the Chaves regime

With the rise of the Hugo Chavez regime, Iran's Latin American presence expanded even further. The Venezuelan strongman has signed several agreements with Ahmadinejad's regime, including an April 2009 defense treaty that provides for military and intelligence cooperation. Venezuela has granted Hezbollah operatives permission to organize their presence under the protection of Iran's Pasdaran and local intelligence, and according to U.S. Department of Defense reports, the Venezuelans are providing Iranian units with Spanish language instruction with the aim of inserting them in a Latin American context. One of the most dangerous aspects of Iran's presence in Venezuela is the increasing ability to install Iranian missiles aimed at the United States and other countries in the region.

As of now, Iran's reach within the United States is principally—but not entirely—in the hands of Hezbollah's networks, which have been trying to recruit new agents since they established their own foundations in Lebanon in the 1980s. Working naturally through Lebanese communities, beginning with its bases in the home country, Hezbollah established groups and cells inside the U.S. in states such as Michigan, New York and North Carolina.

The main activities detected by U.S. law enforcement organizations have centered on smuggling, fundraising, and providing material support to the mother organization in Lebanon. But Hezbollah has gained valuable experience in penetrating Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and the countries of northern Africa, which enables Iran to do considerable damage to the U.S. in case of open conflict. American authorities have also been monitoring Iran's financial presence in the U.S., with recent discoveries showing Iranian front companies even holding assets in Manhattan.

Facilitators: Turkey's AKP and Qatar

Over the past few years, two additional Middle Eastern governments—supposedly close U.S. allies—have been aiding Iran in its attempts to emerge from international isolation. Since 2002, Turkey, led by the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), has slowly become more supportive of Iran's policies, including Tehran's nuclear program. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently endorsed Ahmadinejad's controversial reelection despite the massive democratic opposition inside Iran. Ankara's Islamists also rejected UN sanctions over Iran's nuclear program.

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Ahmedinijad and Erdogan

According to several Arab governments, Qatar, which has been funding the Al-Jazeera network since the late 1990s, has also made life easier for the Iranian regime in the region. Qatar's emir made diplomatic maneuvers to prevent the UN from implementing Security Council Resolution 1559, which provides for the disarming of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Instead, Qatar held a counter-conference in Doha in 2008 to help bring Hezbollah into the fold of the Lebanese government, at the expense of the democratic Cedar Revolution.

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Iran and Qatar

The Iranian Threat

The threat from Iran goes far beyond its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Its use of terrorist proxies and its creation of global terror networks has been one the longest-standing bones of contention with the West. Despite the current focus on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, no group has had more practice in global terrorism than Hezbollah, and no state has proved a better and more consistent patron than Iran.

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Global Threat

From a U.S. counterterrorism perspective, the threats posed by Iran, Hezbollah, and its global terrorist network are considerable. But the addition of nuclear weapons into this global network of Khomeinists may well prove as dangerous if not more so than nuclear weapons in the hands of al-Qaeda.

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Dr. Walid Phares is director of the Future of Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He teaches global strategies at the National Defense University and is author of The Confrontation: Winning the War Against Future Jihad

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"Iran's Global Terrorist Reach" was published initially in the summer 2010 edition of InFocus Periodical. The article shows the geopolitical expansion of the Iranian regime as well as its terrorist and strategic reach around the world. Iran has developed weapons, created terror networks and established a system of alliances, challenging and threatening the region and the international community.

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July 8, 2010

Update on the Insurgency in Southern Thailand

By Zachary Abuza

Last week, four bombs went off in southern Thailand, killing 10, including four soldiers and four paramilitaries. An additional four people were gunned down. Pundits decry the 88 killed in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in May, yet more than 4,100 people have been killed, and nearly 7,000 wounded since the insurgency in southern Thailand began in January 2004; 160 have been killed and over 400 wounded in 2010 alone. Yet the conflict gets little attention in this Bangkok-centric nation, obsessed with the elite’s political machinations, despite the Bt 3 billion ($91 million) a year spent on curbing it.

The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to resolve the crisis in the south when it came to power in December 2008. The south has long been the Democrat Party’s heartland, and they believed they had a softer and more nuanced approach. But the government soon became embroiled in a popular uprising over how it came to power and the south became a low priority.

Nonetheless, in the 18 months since the Abhisit administration has been in office, violence has come down. An average of 32 people a month are being killed, while 66 are wounded. In 2007, the peak of the violence, 4 people a day were being killed and 8 were being wounded. In the first half of 2010, the ratio was down to just under 24.3 people a month being killed and 67 wounded.

For the full report, please click here.

July 5, 2010

Terrorists: Nitwits or Masterminds?

By Aaron Mannes

Recently, in the Atlantic Monthly Daniel Byman and Christine Fair (two first-rate analysts) argue that the reality is that the terrorist enemies of the United States are not highly disciplined religious fanatics – but in fact are a bunch of nitwits. The article is interesting, provocative, and makes some important points. But we cannot dismiss the terrorists as nitwits quite yet – they’ve had failings in attacking the U.S. homeland directly, but they have also had some important successes.

Byman and Fair point out the many cases of terrorist incompetence such as the Times Square bomber, the UK doctors, and the Miami jihadis. In many regards, I agree with them. Terrorist groups are extremely constrained in their efforts to hit “far targets.” I’ve argued that this is a logistical issue. With intelligence agencies worldwide on high alert it is increasingly difficult to move operatives long distances. This complicates long-range terror strikes. Self-starters do not have the necessary skills and groups do not want to risk well-trained operatives on operations that will probably not succeed. The failed attacks on the West aren’t because the terrorists are stupid. What’s more they are adaptable. My argument continued that the danger was now in the realm of geopolitics – terrorists destabilizing and important country rather than carrying out direct attacks in the U.S. or the West.

Fair and Byman also state that the Taliban are similarly stupid. They frequently blow themselves up and also become intimate with livestock (this has been caught on tape by drones and other battlefield cameras). Maybe, but they are also giving the U.S. military a run for its money so discounting their capabilities seems unwise.

Read the full post here.

Two Major Middle East Terrorist Figures Die in their Safe Havens

By Michael B. Kraft

The deaths within days this weekend of two major figures behind major Middle East terrorist attacks and the possible death of a third last month should serve as a reminder of how long the terrorist threat has been with us -- and the difficulty in taking action against terrorists when they enjoy safe havens.

In Damascus, Mohammed Oudeh, better known as Abu Daoud -- the mastermind of the 1972 massacre of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics, died Friday of kidney failure at the age of 73.

In Beirut Lebanon on Sunday morning, a liver hemorrhage claimed the life of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the Shiite spiritual leader of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist organization which conducted the 1983 bombings of the barracks of the U.S. and French peacekeeping forces and the U.S. embassy. The group was also involved in the kidnappings of dozens of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980’s. He was 75.

Both deaths were announced separately by the families or associates.

In an unconfirmed report last month, the German press agency DPA reported that a drone missile strike in Pakistan on June 19 killed Mohammad Ali Hamadeh, a Lebanese Hezbollah member who was accused of killing of an American Navy diver, Robert Stethem during the hijacking of TWA 847 flight to Beirut 25 years ago in June, 1985. However State Department officials said they could not confirm the report when it came out and DOD did not respond to a query.

Both the Munich Olympics attacks and the Beirut bombings had wide ranging consequences although not necessarily those intended by the perpetrators.

In the Munich massacre, 11 Israeli Olympic team members were killed, either outright by the Palestinian Black September terrorists, or during a botched rescue operation by German security officials. In the bombings a decade later in Beirut, 241 U.S. marines were killed and 58 French paratroopers were killed by nearly simultaneous suicide truck bomb attacks in October, 1983. In the earlier suicide bombing American embassy attack in April, 60 persons were killed, including 17 Americans.

Discussing the Munich attack in an 2006 AP interview, Oudeh was quoted as saying:
”Before Munich we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about the Palestinians.”

Oudeh apparently had a short memory a very high opinion of himself, or a desire to rationalize the attack, which he claimed was intended to take hostages to swap for Palestinian prisoners, not kill the Israeli Olympic team members. It was the 1968 hijacking of four airplanes by a rival group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the spectacular blowing up of three planes at Dawson field, an old World War II air base in Jordan, that brought the Palestinians large scale publicity for their terrorist attacks..

It is a dubious proposition that the killing of athletes at the widely televised international Olympics had a positive impact on the Palestinian image or cause. Palestinian leaders nevertheless, paid tribute to Oudeh.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas sent his condolences to Oudeh’s family, the Palestinian news agency, WAFA reported.
"He wrote in his letter to his family, 'He is missed. He was one of the leading figures of Fatah and spent his life in resistance [against the occupation] and sincere work as well as physical sacrifice for his people's just causes,' " the news agency quoted Abbas as saying.

(Abbas provided funds used for the operation, although he allegedly did not know what the money was being spent for, according to Oudeh in his autobiography, From Jerusalem to Munich, published in France in 1999, and later in a written interview with Sports Illustrated, Wikipedia said in citing the book as part of its description of the attack.)

Oudeh also was praised as “a fighter of the highest order,” by Amin Maqboul, Secretary General of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. (Some high order! The terrorists killed the eight Israelis who survived the initial attack by throwing hand grenades at them and raked them with gunfire when they were tied up in helicopters to be taken to an airport as part of an ostensible deal worked out with the Germans.)

Oudeh belong to that faction of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization. In 1996, Israel allowed him to attend a PLO assembly meeting in Ramallah where he voted to remove the PLO’s charter clause calling for an “armed struggle” to destroy the Jewish state. Three years later, he was barred from returning to the West Bank from a trip to Jordan after he published his book acknowledging his role in organizing the Munich attack. He found refuge in Syria, which harbors a number of terrorist organizations.

In one unintended consequence of the Munich attack, then-President Nixon established the first U.S government unit to focus specifically on countering terrorism. He first set up a Cabinet-level committee. That turned out to be too unwieldy to deal with day-to-day activities and the State Department established an office to coordinate counterterrorism activities overseas. It is now the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the Coordinator, currently Daniel Benjamin, has ambassadorial rank and is the equivalent of an Assistant Secretary of State.

The Munich attack, and the actions by several countries that provided sanctuary to terrorists, prompted Congress to enact legislation prohibiting foreign assistance to countries that support international terrorism by granting sanctuary to terrorists.
The attack also led to the eventual development of a 1979 Export Administration Act provision that authorizes the Secretary of State to formally designate governments that repeatedly provided support to acts of international terrorism. This law, initiated by the late Rep. Millicent Fenwick
(R- New Jersey), a House Foreign Affairs Committee member for whom I was working at the time as her foreign policy legislative assistant, became known as the terrorist list. Designations trigger a variety of economic sanctions against terrorist-supporting states. In 1979 Syria was among the first countries designated and to this day it remains on the list.

Ayatollah Fadallah was a major figure in the emergence of political activism among Lebanese Shiite Muslims, the poor cousins to the more powerful and affluent Sunni community in that country of many factions. He justified the use of suicide bombings against Americans and Israelis and western intelligence services considered him to be responsible for the nearly simultaneous truck bombings of the American and French peacekeeping units and the American embassy.

As described by the London Daily Telegraph foreign editor, Con Coughlin: ,
“ … he was right up there with other infamous terror masterminds, such as Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal.

“One of Fadlallah’s last acts before he died was to issue a fatwa authorising the use of suicide bomb attacks. The mystery here is why he waited so long. For as a founder member of Hizbollah – he sat on the organisation’s ruling council – Fadlallah gave his personal approval to the massive suicide truck bomb attacks that levelled the American Embassy and Marine compound in Beirut in 1983, killing more than 300 people, including the then CIA station chief. Fadlallah gave his personal blessing to the suicide bombers before they left for their deadly mission.”

The U.S Marines were bunched up in a barracks instead of sleeping tents because the unit commanders felt that would provide better protection from the mortar attacks that had been aimed at them by Muslim militia groups who considered the U.S. to be allies of the Lebanese Government Forces in the internal Lebanese strife. Although then-President Reagan had previously vowed to keep the Marines in Lebanon, he withdrew them three months later. This action reinforced a perception among Bin Ladin and many militants that the U.S. was a “paper tiger” and had no staying power.

The attack on the embassy also led to a commission led retired admiral Bobby Inman that led to new construction and physical security requirements for US embassies to make them more resistant to terrorist attacks. The refitting of existing buildings and construction of new ones –many of them in inconvenient locations where more land was available for setbacks from the nearest road—cost billions of dollars. The attacks also led to the creation and expansion of the State Department Diplomatic Security Bureau which is charged with the protection of US government personnel and facilities overseas and implementing counterterrorism training and rewards programs.

The embassy bombing killed the CIA station chief, Bob Aimes, and some of his colleagues. There has been speculation that the terrorists knew they were holding a meeting. This aspect of the attack has been previously and widely reported.

But overlooked was the fact that the large bomb that destroyed the embassy also killed Bill McIntyre and other Agency for International Development(AI.D.) team members who were planning major foreign assistance projects for Lebanon.

In early 1983 I and several other Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers spent time with the team when we visited Lebanon to look at the possibility of stepping up the U.S. aid program in Lebanon following Israel’s withdrawal. Senators Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minnesota,) and Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland), the chairman and ranking member of the Middle East Subcommittee, wanted us to look at the proposals in preparation for legislation supporting the assistance.

Bill had been our escort officer. He and his team showed us various proposed aid projects, including infrastructure projects and others planned to provide permanent jobs, such as citrus canning plants. Most of the projects were intended for the Shiite areas in Beirut and Southern Lebanon, which had been neglected by the central Lebanese government. McIntyre was a decent, hard working career foreign assistance officer. Had the plans and the planners not been literally blown up, the Lebanese Shiites would have benefited greatly.

Whenever I hear or read complaints that the U.S, has not done enough for the Muslims, especially the Shiites, or hear about Fadlallah I think of McIntyre and his colleagues. May they rest in peace.

As for Oudeh and Fadlallah, they were lucky to survive apparent assassination attempts and to find sanctuary in Beirut and Damascus where they could hide from everything but fatal illness.

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June 29, 2010

Failed States and Terrorism: Interesting Reading

By Douglas Farah

My favorite magazine edition of the year just came out: Foreign Policy's Failed State Index.. As always it is full of interesting data points that help one understand how and why state's fail. But this year there is also a ranking of the worst leaders in the world.

What is striking, from my perspective, is that only two Latin American leaders are named: Hugo Chávez, weighing at number 17 of the 23 worst listed, and Raúl Castro at number 21. What is also striking is that their three primary allies outside of Latin America are also among the world's worst: Mahmoud Ajmadinejad of Iran at number 8; Basher al-Assad of Syria (recently jointly bashing Israel and calling for an end to the empire, meaning the United States) at number 12; and China's Hu Jintao, busying buying up all the natural resources he can, at number 10.

Sub-Saharan Africa, of course, has the most of the worst, including my personal favorite, Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang (number 14), who has hired Lanny Davis and other prominent and once respectable people as lobbyists. Obiang deposed and killed his uncle before assuming power in 1979, and was well-loved for continuing his uncle's heart-warming custom of having his political enemies beaten to death with metal bars in the main stadium while the band played "Happy Days are Here Again."

But back to Latin America: One can tell a great deal about leaders by the company they keep and the alliances they build. Chávez, rather than embracing any government with a liberal democratic form of government, has gone for the most repressive. Not coincidentally, both Syria and Iran are among the world's foremost sponsors of terrorism. Cuba, toying with modest internal reforms, remains a formidably repressive state, and has been busy helping the Bolivarian states implant state of the art internal security apparatuses that are sure to improve their respective repressive capacities.
My "a href="http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/540/failing-states-and-despots-interesting-reading.com">full blog is here.

June 25, 2010

Giving Teeth to the Iran Sanctions: Targeting Re-Export Loopholes

By Matthew Levitt

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, Undersecretary of State William Burns and Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey laid out the administration's game plan for leveraging the sanctions mandate created by UN Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted earlier this month. Central to this strategy is "vigorous" implementation, in part through a monitoring committee. The resolution, Burns noted, includes "new platforms" and "new tools," including a tough cargo inspection regime to detect and prevent Iranian smuggling efforts aimed at circumventing the sanctions. Now that these measures have been passed, he emphasized, we "need to make the maximum use of them." One key area that would benefit from greater attention and enforcement is closing the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Deceptive Trade Practices

Mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- which the Treasury Department has studiously exposed over the past few years -- procurement agents, businesses, and transporters in Iran have developed a network of front companies and willing partners as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Some of these fronts are aware of the deception, while others are not.

Resolution 1929 highlighted such conduct by both Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and IranAir's cargo division. For example, since Treasury designated IRISL in 2008, the company has sought to evade sanctions by not only establishing new front companies, but also renaming and repainting its vessels.

The just-released annual report of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) offers similar findings. In 2009, Iran used "mediating firms" in the Czech Republic to procure items that could facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction. According to the report, Iran orchestrates "complex business channels in which companies from various countries fulfill only partial tasks without knowing the whole chain of suppliers and customers." Iranian procurement agents have been active within the United States as well.

The complete article is available here.

June 24, 2010

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in America's Effort to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

Although the United States continues to successfully target high-level al-Qaeda leaders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, efforts to contest the Islamist ideology that fuels and supports violence have not kept pace. At home, incidents of domestic radicalization have increased dramatically in 2010, while abroad, the myriad, complex security challenges inspired by various violent strands of Islamist ideology have multiplied from Yemen to Pakistan. Indeed, just today several Muslim-American youth from Northern Virginia were convicted in a Pakistani court of plotting terrorist acts with militants in Pakistan they had met via the internet and sentenced to 10 years in jail each.

In the context of the recent release of the Obama administration's National Security Strategy and the one-year anniversary of the president's Cairo speech, the Washington Institute convened a special Policy Forum marking the release of recommendations from the Institute's forthcoming report on Obama administration efforts to address violent extremism -- a follow-up to the Institute's 2009 bipartisan task force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization This new report, soon to be released in full, was the product of a study group comprising J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt, Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

A rapporteur's summary of the event, which featured Mr. Carpenter, Dr. Levitt and Mr. Zarate (Coauthor Steve Simon was unable to attend due to travel conflicts), is available here. Audio of the event, which also appeared on C-SPAN, is available here.