At the Guardian’s Comment is Free, human rights lawyer Margaret Owendescribes the trial in Turkey of 151 Kurdish politicians, lawyers, and other leaders as “a trial that would shame any democracy.” Observers have “widely condemned” the process - evidence-gathering and courtroom procedures “breach all international and European standards on human rights and fair trials,” Owen writes, and the trial is essentially political, not legal. She mentions the closure of pro-Kurdish political parties, arrests of Kurdish political leaders, and bans against some civil society organizations. This trial, Owen concludes, “will reveal Turkey’s true status in the context of democracy, justice and the rule of law.” The judge will decide at the end of this week whether the trial will continue or whether the detainees will be released, and Owen calls on the ruling AKP to bring the trial to a close and release the accused.
At a recent policy forum luncheon held by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, three members of the Institute gave their perspectives on the current political situation in Iraq. Ahmed Ali said that Prime Minister Maliki is “known to be close with Iraqi president and leading Kurdish figure Jalal Talabani,” but that Maliki also brought Minister of Planning Ali Baban along on his recent visit to Turkey, signaling to the Turks that he was not “yielding to Kurdish demands.” Michael Knights focused on the security situation saying that “[s]ecurity metrics are degrading in quality as the U.S. military draws down […] confirm[ing] that stabilization is slowing overall and even regressing in some places.” Michael Eisenstadtreflected on the challenges facing the US and Iraq in the future. “Going forward, hopes rest on reconciliation through politics, with the formation of a broad-based governing coalition that gives elements from every community a stake in political order.”
Iraq’s Supreme Court ordered the Iraqi parliament to convene after a seven month delay on Sunday, according to a report from the BBC. While one Iraqi constitutional lawyer called the order a “formality that would do nothing to break the political deadlock,” Reidar Vissercalls the move a “small triumph for Iraqi democracy.” However, Visser points out that “what the main factions are currently doing, i.e. postponing the election of a parliament speaker until the architecture of a more comprehensive deal including prime minister and president is ready, is not in line with the constitution,” either. He goes on to describe the continued negotiations between the Kurdish parties and Maliki’s coalition, saying that “there is nothing that should prevent the Kurds from picking a winner within a week or so.”
An editorial in today’s New York Times stresses the importance of a democratic resolution to the political stalemate in Iraq. Referencing the recent spate of state visits by Nouri al-Maliki, the editorial remarks: “Iraq needs good relations with its neighbors. But more than anything it needs a legitimate government able to address its many deep problems.” Reports of backsliding by some in the Awakening is also a point of concern, as are the implications of a Shiite-run government that excludes Sunnis. “Iraq urgently needs a new government that is not mortgaged to Iran but reflects the election results with Mr. Maliki, Mr. Allawi and the Kurds playing major roles.” Ultimately, “Washington needs to press all sides, a lot harder, to make a deal.”
Marina Ottaway and Danial Kaysi write at RealClearWorld that “Sadr’s support makes it easier for Maliki to gain the numerical majority in parliament he needs to form a government, but is not sufficient to produce a politically viable alliance.” The authors argue that the the ISCI (Islamic Supreme Council) and the Kurdistan Alliance are still skeptical about the chances of a government forming in the near future. Calling the political landscape “confusing and inconclusive”, the authors describe the inherent complexity and apparent incongruities of some of the positions parties have taken: “Talks between Iraqiya and ISCI are continuing, and Abdul Mahdi himself and several Iraqiya members characterize the relationship between the two parties as one aiming to further an “advance project.” However, “[w]hile openly in talks with Iraqiya, opposing a second term for Maliki, and pushing instead the candidacy of Adel Abdul Mahdi, ISCI representatives stress that they remain part of the National Alliance between State of Law and the INA.” Ultimately, the deal between Maliki and al-Sadr has led to “much movement, but little real progress.”
While many assume that Iran stands to benefit most from the current political situation in Iraq, Ranj Alaaldinargues that the involvement of Iran has spurred the US to support the attempt by Ayad Allawi to form a coalition with the Kurds (who hold 57 seats) and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (who hold 18 seats.) “These developments mean that the Kurds have emerged as kingmakers,” because both Allawi and Maliki are actively courting the group to join their respective coalitions. “They hold the power to determine the future of Iraq’s other groupings, the future of the country itself as well as that of the US role in Iraq,” according to Alaaldin.
Reidar Visser provides a look at the demands the Kurds have made in exchange for their cooperation. “We have the ironic situation whereby two declared Iraqi nationalists (Maliki and Allawi) who are theoretically committed to working against the destruction of the Iraqi state in practice are trying to outbid each other in an attempt at satisfying Kurdish aims that are directed precisely at the dismemberment of Iraq as a recognisable and governable state.” The Kurds have released a set of “19 Points” that they wish to be fulfilled prior to their agreement to join a coalition. Visser calls into question the constitutionality of the fourth Point, which entails “the establishment of a senate within the first year of the parliament, and the extension of the veto powers of the presidency council until the senate is up and running.” The problem with this Point is that “[t]his is simply one hundred per cent unconstitutional and against the basic principles of separation of power. It is for the Iraqi parliament, not the government, to draw up the rules of the next senate, with a two-thirds majority.” Visser concludes on an ominous note: “The Kurdish negotiating document is not only a step towards the complete destruction of the Iraqi state, it is also a flagrant violation of the constitution that the Kurds themselves supported back in 2005.”
James Traubwrites in Foreign Policy that Turkey’s democracy remains “unresolved” eight years Erdogan came to power. The AKP’s commitment to the rule of law and minority rights is doubted by some secular Turks, who also fear that the country is becoming more conservative (the country’s Higher Education Board’s recent decision to stop teachers from expelling women wearing headscarves from classrooms may suggest otherwise, however). The recent constitutional referendum, moreover, is viewed by some as “a dangerous ploy by the AKP to increase its control over the state.” These ongoing debates – about national policy and about identity – illustrate that “Turkey’s democracy is not yet ‘consolidated,’” Traub writes.
The Kurdish role in Turkish politics and society is highlighted today as the trial of 151 pro-Kurdish politicians and activists begins. Reuters reports that the process could take months. The defendants are charged with joining and spreading the propaganda of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) which prosecutors say is a branch of the PKK, as well as unlawfully demonstrating.
Reidar Visserwrites that there are “three races” towards government formation in Iraq at present: The Maliki Project, the Allawi Project, and what could be called the American Project. Visser describes the Maliki Project as “the 89 SLA (State of Law) deputies, the 40 Sadrists plus Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Ahmad Chalabi […] which would bring the total number to a minimum of 131. On top of this, Maliki is obvious angling for the support of the Kurdish parties (58), which would easily bring him above the magical 163 mark required to have a majority in parliament. […] Maliki is also hoping to lure a new coalition between Unity of Iraq and Tawfuq (sic) into his coalition (10 deputies altogether with promises of more), in order to serve a symbolic ‘Sunni representation’.”
The Allawi Project would consist of “building a coalition between Iraqiyya and as many INA (Iraqi National Alliance) breakaway elements from the NA (National Alliance) as possible plus Tawafuq and Unity of Iraq; then convincing the Kurds that this kind of coalition would be favorable compared to a deal with Maliki.” Visser points out that these two options are “competitive” and that any invitation to form a coalition from State of Law or Iraqiyya to the other is “tongue in cheek.”
The American Project would require a rapprochement between all of the parties: “The Americans still seem to be hoping that all the original four big winning blocs – Iraqiyya, SLA, INA and the Kurds – will somehow eventually get together in a single coalition to form the next government, preferrably (sic) without the Sadrists in a too-dominant role. In doing so, the Americans are actually raising the threshold for government-formation…” Visser goes on to list several problems in pursuing the American path. First, it is simply more difficult to form a four party coalition than a three party coalition. Second, “almost all American proposals on the subject of government formation seems to involve simultaneous measures of constitutional reform, since redefining the powers of the presidency now appears to be an aim.” Constitutional referendums are risky and take time, Visser says, leaving the “competitive” projects as the “more realistic” options.
Adel Barwari, a top Kurdish politician, says that the Kurds will join whatever bloc responds best to their demands. So far, he adds, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition has been the most accommodating to the Kurdish agenda. Some issues, like the national census and the future of oil-rich Kirkuk, remain unresolved. The Sunni-backed Iraqiyya coalition, meanwhile, appeared “to be giving up its demand for the premiership,” according to the New York Times. Sheik Adnan al-Danbous, who is close to Ayad Allawi expressed that the bloc wants an equal share of power in parliament, adding: “We have reached a position that we don’t care anymore about posts…Posts are not as important to us as having participation in decision-making.”
The recent deal between Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Sadrist majority National Iraqi Alliance (NA) continues to provoke conversation in the Middle East policy community. Fouad Ajamiwrites in the Wall Street Journal that “Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now all but sure to form and lead the new government,” and that Iraq, in spite of the political deadlock, is now a “far cry from the ways of the Arab autocracies and despotism” that surround it. In an interview with CFR.org, Joost Hiltermann sounds a cautionary note about the nature of the compromise, calling the situation in Iraq “thoroughly confusing and confused.” When asked about the possibility of a quick resolution to the outstanding problems in forming a government, Hiltermann said, “Oh, I am not so sanguine. It will take a long time.” Reidar Visserdescribes the new-found power of the Kurds: “The recent nomination dynamics within the all-Shiite National Alliance (NA) played out in (a) way that suited the Kurds more perfectly than they could have ever dreamt of.” Visser explains that the inability of Iraqiyya to even speak to State of Law, prefering instead to pursue a coalition with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), has made the Kurds “kingmakers,” and the formation of the government dependent on a list of Kurdish demands that will end up “emasculating Baghdad.”
Ranj Alaaldin writes at TheGuardian’s Comment is Free that the deal reached to make Nouri al-Maliki the Prime Minister is one of compromises and back room deals. “This had always been the likely outcome,” Alaaldin writes, noting that the deal between Maliki’s State of Law party, the Sadrists, and the Kurds was based on “strategic bluffs and manoeuvring,” meant to force more concessions from Maliki. Alaaldin suspects that the Sadrists will receive “a total of six service ministries,” the release of many Sadrists currently in prison, and possibly one of the deputy prime minster positions. The Kurds want “disputed territories, oil and power-sharing,” and possibly the presidency. The Kurds desire to control Kirkuk is extremely controversial and “could slow the entire process down.” Alaaldin concludes that the deals necessary to form the government may doom it to ineffectiveness: “The forthcoming multi-party coalition government will ensure the politics will be paralysed and the disputes remain unresolved.”
The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) held a panel discussion today to discuss the ongoing political impasse in Iraq. The event was moderated by Michael Svetlik, the Vice President of Programs for IFES. The speakers for the event were Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy at the CATO Institute, Perry Cammack, a professional staff member for Senator John Kerry who focuses on the Middle East, and Sean Dunne, IFES Chief of Party in Iraq.
(To read full notes continue below the fold or click herefor pdf)
POMED’s recent event, “Is Turkey Becoming Less Democratic?”, received coverage from Voice of America’s (VOA) Turkish service and Istanbul-based Ihlas News Agency (IHA). The VOA report (in Turkish) emphasized panelist Daniel Brumberg’s suggestion that the real effect of the constitutional reforms will be determined by how the AKP government governs in the coming years. IHA focused (in Turkish) on panelist Gonul Tol’s comment that while the reforms represent a significant step forward, they still fail to address fundamental challenges like the resolution of minority issues.
On Monday, September 13th, POMED hosted an event entitled “Is Turkey Becoming Less Democratic?” The event was moderated by Bill Schneider, Distinguished Senior Fellow and Resident Scholar at Third Way and the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. The discussion featured three panelists: Gonul Tol, Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; Daniel Brumberg, Director of the Muslim World Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace; and W. Robert Pearson, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and President of the International Research and Exchanges Board.
POMED’s full notes continue below or read them as a pdf.
Gonul Tol, Director of Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute, wrote at Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel yesterday that the Kurdish issue in Turkey “is primarily an issue of democracy and should therefore be resolved through democratic means.” The PKK has become an actor in national politics, not solely an insurgent group – as such, matters of equality, minority rights, and rule of law must be approached through democratic channels. Tol asserts that “this requires a new constitution.” In addition, leaders must shift away from thinking about the Kurdish issue in military and security terms and acknowledge that it is really a political problem. Tol commends the broadening of the public debate in Turkey to include issues about cultural rights and education, and points out that Kurds have “come to understand that…change will come through effective use of democratic means – not violence.” She also notes that Kurdish civil society has been growing, and that the PKK has pursued political paths in the resolution of the conflict.
Tol cautions, however, that “a few cosmetic changes” will not satisfy the increasingly politically-vocal Kurdish community. “The national awareness has been rising among Kurds,” she asserts, and their faith in the democratic process remains high. As such, she argues that there is growing momentum to resolve the Kurdish issue through civilian means.
Days ahead of the Turkish constitutional referendum, Steven Kinzersuggests the vote will be a critical test of both AKP’s (Justice and Development Party) and the military’s power: “If the referendum passes, it will be taken as a sign that Turks are fed up with the military’s involvement in politics.” Should the referendum pass on Sunday, Kinzer writes, it will likely empower AKP to draft a new constitution in the coming year, which he believes is “essential if Turkey is to reach European levels of democracy” and may, in the long run, facilitate the resolution of Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds.
In a piece for Foreign Policy yesterday, Henri Barkley contended that “Turkey is slowly and inexorably moving towards a crisis point.” In his view, “tensions between the [Turkish] government and the country’s Kurdish minority are threatening to explode like never before,” and the Kurdish question “remains Turkey’s Achilles’ heel, influencing all aspects of political and cultural life, from civil-military relations to democratic reforms to foreign policy.” He describes the domestic political environment as being “thick with stories of daily humiliations, minor taunts, and discrimination in housing and employment,” conditions that have helped produce an “alienated and angry” population of young Kurds that are becoming increasingly assertive in the political arena. Mass arrests and drawn-out court cases against Kurdish activists have not deterred them from continuing to demand cultural freedoms, freedom of the press, and more autonomy from the centralized Turkish state. According to Barkley, the U.S. “has been oblivious to this brewing crisis” even though it could have repercussions for U.S. efforts to promote stability in Iraq and elsewhere.
As combat troops are withdrawn from Iraq, questions remain about how this will affect its emerging democracy. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Stephen Hadleyargues, “The six-month stalemate in forming a new government is worrying, but virtually all Iraqi leaders accept the need for a broadly inclusive government.” Mohammad Bazzi believes that Iran has been the true beneficiary of the war, which may have repercussions across the region: “…the Iraq war has unleashed a new wave of sectarian hatred and upset the Persian Gulf’s strategic balance… the brutal war between Iraq’s Shiite majority and Sunni minority unleashed sectarian hatreds that are difficult to contain. This blowback has been most keenly felt in Lebanon…”. Bazzi adds, “Far from becoming a model of freedom and religious coexistence, Iraq remains a powder keg that could ignite sectarian conflict across the Middle East.” According to former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker , “The difficulty and delays we have seen since the March elections illustrate the fundamental truth that everything in Iraq is hard…”. He goes on to list a few of the challenges facing the government once it is formed: “…it will have to wrestle with the tough issues… includ(ing) the structural and constitutional issues underlying much of the tension between Kurds and Arabs in the north — disputed internal boundaries, especially Kirkuk, and the authorities of the federal government in Baghdad vis-à-vis the Kurdish regional government in Irbil, including the control of armed forces.” Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Malikistruck a more hopeful note, “Iraq today is sovereign and independent…our relations with the United States have entered a new stage between two equal, sovereign countries.”
Writing in the Los Angeles Times, Henri Barkey argues that putting blame on the European Union for “Ankara’s movement away from the West,” as remarks from President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have suggested, is an oversimplification and shows a lack of understanding of Turkey’s internal affairs. According to Barkey, the current Turkish administration “would have acted the same way even if membership to the EU were imminent,” saying that Turkey’s movement away from the West is simply a reaction to its “over-inflated” sense of importance in the world stage. Turkey, according to Barkey, believes that its “strategic location, economic prowess, historical ties and cultural affinities with the Muslim world” can be utilized to enhance its “activist foreign policy” and “Ankara’s importance.” Its interest in the Middle East is also a commercial one, as Ankara is searching for new markets, Barkey says. Nevertheless, in regard to its potential membership in the EU, Turkey faces several challenges, including the Kurdish problem and more importantly, the fact that the government “does not embrace the rule of law.” Barkey concludes that U.S. silence on domestic concerns within Turkey relieves “Turkish leaders from the burden of reform and from being honest with their public.” If EU membership for Turkey is in fact in America’s interest, then “the U.S. must align itself with Turkish and European advocates of change and help transform Turkey into a more tolerant and democratic society. Only then is EU membership likely.”
Becky Lee Katz at the LA Times Babylon & Beyond blog reports that a 15 year-old Kurdish girl, Berivan Sayaca, who attended a demonstration while visiting her aunt, has been convicted as a terrorist and sentenced to a seven-year, nine-month jail time. Turkish authorities allege that the demonstration was held by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and they accuse Sayaca of throwing stones at the police. Supporters of Sayaca deny that she was part of the demonstrations, saying that she was only passing by a demonstration “coordinated not by the PKK but by the recently banned Kurdish political party Peace and Democracy, or BDP.”
Decorating a letter to a local human rights groups with hearts and roses, Sayaca wrote: “I’m drowning and imprisoned though I have committed no great crime,” “it is more than I can stand. I feel so much pain. I do not deserve to be here. You cannot imagine how terrible a place the prison is. Words are not enough to explain it. I’m so scared to spend the rest of my childhood in here. I want to be with my family, in my house, go to school, play with my friends. I want to be free instead of being in prison.” According to an anti-terror law passed by the Turkish government in 2006, “minors can be convicted of terrorism and sentenced to 50 years in prison,” and Sayaca is currently waiting until her 23rd birthday to be released, while her “mental health has deteriorated” during solitary confinement.
