

The Quebec City 'Democracy Summit'

Winston Churchill once famously startled a dinner host by complaining that a pudding “lacks a theme.” As the host country of the 2001 Summit of the Americas, Canada is wrestling with a number of choices on what its theme should be in April in Quebec City. These choices are informed not only by the internal logic of Canadian partisan politics and national interest, but by the collective threats and opportunities facing the nations of the Americas. A nagging concern looms that the momentum toward establishing a free-trade hemisphere has stalled and that several countries are backsliding on democracy. At the same time, major crises have been resolved through collective actions and mediation; there is a sense that the time is right for bold initiatives to revitalize both processes. Above all, Ottawa wishes to host a summit that has a substantive legacy and isn't merely a spiced-up, symbolic photo opportunity.

Summits of the Americas have so far been given an imprint according to a single designation: the 1994 Miami summit is remembered as “the Trade Summit” and the 1998 Santiago summit in a more muted way as the “Education Summit.” There will be a strong impulse to accord the 2001 summit a similar tagline. With this legacy in mind, making Quebec City the “Democracy Summit” could well be not only the most timely, but the least problematic course. A Democracy Summit would contain both substance and symbolic style. Furthermore, there is considerable sensitivity to presenting a broad target to grassroots antitrade activists. Unlike simply a symbolic summit or one ostensibly driven by trade, a Democracy Summit skirts the risk of being stigmatized as a top-down exercise.

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Location, Location, Location

To begin with, Ottawa can be expected to use the physical location of the summit to reinforce the notion of Canada's serious engagement with the hemisphere. This development is important. Surprising as it may seem, Canada has long resisted seeing itself as a nation of the Americas. Until the end of the 1980s, Canada desired its diplomatic association with these countries to be friendly rather than intimate. Closer ties were considered problematic, since they would undercut Canada's traditional multilateralism and further lock Canada into the United States' backyard. Canadians generally dismissed plans for hemispheric economic integration as "excessive regionalism."¹

Ottawa's soul-searching, as it crafts a mission for the 2001 summit, reflects a dramatic change in mindset, amounting to a "psychological relocation," and the desire to signal that a new Canada has emerged in the 1990s. From being a country that kept the Americas off its mental map, Canada has become an enthusiastic supporter of the notion of a hemispheric neighborhood founded on common norms and institutions. Ottawa can point with particular pride to Canada's entry into the Organization of American States (OAS) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Canada's engagement in the 1994 Miami and 1998 Santiago summits and its hosting of various intra-American events in recent years, including the Pan-American Games in 1999 and the OAS General Assembly in June 2000, also mark this strategic shift.

This summit will thus be laden with the symbolism of "belonging." Setting the event in Quebec City makes a strong symbolic statement about a confident federal government with a high profile in the world. If Canada is part of the Americas, so too is Quebec part of Canada's federal dynamic. From this perspective, for Canadians, the Quebec City summit thus fits into a wider strategy to bolster national unity, while giving special significance to the role of Quebec (and Quebecers) in forging the connection with the Americas.

Placing the summit in Quebec City is enormously attractive for reasons beyond the national unity question, not only because of the city's old-world charm but because of its historical connections with summitry. In August 1943 and September 1944, Quebec City hosted major conferences bringing together U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill. In March 1985, it provided the setting for the so-called "Shamrock Summit" between U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney.

Yet there are also risks. The possibility of a federal/sovereignty spat bubbling over into the summit should not be overlooked. Although former pre-

mier Lucien Bouchard of the Bloc Québécois (PQ) government has accompanied several of the Team Canada missions in relative tranquility, tension on this front has not altogether receded. On the contrary, the potential for an embarrassing incident over protocol at the summit has increased after events surrounding the inauguration of Mexican president Vicente Fox, in which Bouchard was first invited and then uninvited as a special guest with the same ranking as a head of state. Whether or not Ottawa actually intervened with the Mexicans, a lingering cloud of ill will hovers over Quebec City because of this episode. The buildup to a leadership convention by the PQ to pick a successor to Bouchard may add to the tension.

A Leavening of Trade

The item most predictably competing for the top of the agenda is of course trade. In order to sustain momentum toward implementing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, Canada is eager to demonstrate its commitment to competitiveness, the expansion of trade opportunities, deregulation, and enhanced interdependence. Canada's engagement with the region reflects this commitment. Canada has devoted considerable effort not only to the FTAA but other complementary endeavors: the various Team Canada missions launched by the Chrétien government since 1993 (including one to the Americas in January 1998), negotiation of a Canada-Chile bilateral free trade deal, and momentum toward a similar agreement between Canada and Costa Rica. Efforts to negotiate a trade and investment deal with the Mercosur countries of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay have taken place. Canada has also hosted high-profile economic forums such as the FTAA's trade ministers meeting and the Fifth Americas Business Forum in Toronto in November 1999.

The case for putting trade at the center of the summit agenda is, however, not as compelling as it appears at first glance. First, the political and economic dimensions to the logic of competitiveness are far from fully complementary. Canada has been a wary convert to an ideology based on neoliberal assumptions about competitiveness or, more specifically, to a trade agenda which tampered with the historic status quo. At least at the outset, Canada was a reluctant participant in the NAFTA project. With its own free trade deal with its dominant trading partner, the United States, safely in the bag, Ottawa was highly skeptical about letting Mexico in on the deal. NAFTA raised the specter that Canada would no longer be special and would join Mexico as just another spoke to the U.S. hub.

This ambivalent attitude to NAFTA was overcome only by the Canadian instinct to be the quintessential joiner. A regional approach, even of limited

scope, created more of an imbalance in bargaining strength than did the bilateral option. Canada's interests seemed to be protected better by taking part in the expanded negotiations rather than by remaining on the sidelines. "Being there" was deemed essential if Canada was to make its influence felt.

This clubbish bent meshed well with two other deeply embedded Canadian instincts, which in practical political terms are reflected in a rough bipartisanship.² The first involves the need to diversify Canada's trade base in

order to overcome Canada's dependency on the United States. By engaging a wider range of trading partners through NAFTA and other regional activities, Canada hopes to attenuate the gravitational force of the United States. When the Mulroney government entered the NAFTA negotiations, Canada was the only country that wanted the agreement to include an accession clause. The oft-repeated theme of the Liberal government in office since 1993 has been that "the more amigos the better." As then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated

just before Chile's widely anticipated entry into NAFTA at the time of the Miami summit, "To sleep with an elephant is dangerous, now we will be three to watch the elephant." Chrétien added, "After Chile, others will fall into line."³

The second diplomatic instinct concerns Canada's reliance on institutions such as the FTAA as a means to balance or modify unilateral U.S. trade remedy laws. As early as a 1995 White Paper, the Canadian government obliquely alluded that it counted on the FTAA "to encourage outward-looking and cooperative U.S. economic policies."⁴ In operational terms, the most tangible objectives of this approach hinge on the potential of the FTAA negotiations to provide a counterweight to antidumping and countervailing duties.

With respect to Canada's diplomatic behavior, two further characteristics should be noted. The first is its dogged commitment to the FTAA/summit agenda in the absence of fast-track authority, that is to say, absent U.S. leadership. Canada was one of the countries most eager to make trade the focus of the Miami Summit. Canada has been part of the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG) troika (with Chile and the United States) and chair of both the SIRG and the Trade Negotiations Committee of the summit/FTAA process.

Second, Canada's willingness (and ability) to mediate deadlocks in the FTAA negotiations is an issue. This role was especially visible during the agenda-setting stage between the 1994 Miami summit and the 1997 Belo

Ottawa wishes to avoid the summit being merely a symbolic photo opportunity.

Horizonte trade summit. The "NAFTA Plus" model championed by the United States was challenged by Brazil, which proposed an entirely different model of economic integration based on negotiations between North America and Mercosur. The impasse threatened to freeze discussions altogether. Canada crafted a compromise, which would allow countries at least to begin negotiations, either individually or as a group. Canada also pushed successfully for a formula for a timetable that allowed negotiations on all subject areas to start simultaneously.

A Role for Personal Chemistry

Both the symbolic and trade agendas proposed for the summit complement each other and underscore Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's centrality to foreign policy decisionmaking in Canada. Chrétien definitely wants to impress a personal stamp on the process of Canada's "psychological relocation" as a country of the Americas. His ability to do so, as well as his comfort level with the process, should be enhanced by his overwhelming electoral majority in October 2000, which consolidated his stature as the senior statesman of the region.

Chrétien has placed day-to-day management of the summit process firmly in the hands of close advisors and senior Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) officers (Ambassador Marc Lortie is the coordinator for the summit, together with the Hemisphere Summit Office in DFAIT; George Haynal is assistant deputy minister for the Americas; and Canada's ambassador to the OAS, Peter Boehm, is chair of the SIRG). Nevertheless, the prime minister's chemistry with other leaders will strike the definitive tone of the meeting.

The main point of uncertainty stems from the 14-plus new faces at the summit, including Mexico's Fox (whom Chrétien met briefly in Ottawa), Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Fernando de la Rúa of Argentina, and of course, George W. Bush of the United States. Although Chrétien has developed over the years a good personal relationship with some of the other leaders (including President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil), much of his time will have to be spent simply networking.

From an instrumental trade perspective, the Quebec City summit provides Chrétien an important forum to express his own enthusiasm for a hemispheric trade agenda. As at the Miami Summit, the keynote will be part of Canada's larger goal: to signal that the FTAA should be as inclusive as possible. Failing a breakthrough at the multilateral level, Chrétien's alternative strategy will be to seek separate bilateral deals with select countries in the hemisphere. The highly personalized style which guides this approach is

epitomized by how the Canada–Costa Rica bilateral negotiations arose. Far from being part of a well-rehearsed strategy, these talks were triggered by a meeting between Chrétien and Costa Rican president Miguel Angel Rodriguez. The Costa Rican president made a bilateral pitch and Chrétien responded favorably. Only then did the negotiating process swing into gear.⁵

The Quebec City summit will in be the first meeting between Chrétien and Bush on the Canadian prime minister's home turf. Oddly enough, these two leaders do not know each other. Chrétien was regarded as openly favoring

then-Vice President Al Gore in the U.S. election, while Bush gives the impression of a politician who looks south not north. Although this meeting may well eclipse other components of the summit, the distinctive nature of the forum will let Chrétien have the best of both worlds. Not only does it allow him the opportunity to distance himself from the role of supplicant (an image which may linger from Chrétien's rushed February 5 visit

Putting trade at the center of the agenda is not as compelling as it may first appear.

to Washington to get acquainted with Bush), but the regional orientation of the summit will relieve the meeting of the usual impediments of Canada-U.S. relations—perennial squabbling over lumber, fish, potatoes, and so forth. Chrétien should be able to use the meeting to generally support the U.S. trade approach, while differentiating some of Canada's own specific issues. It remains to be seen whether the political will for a big trade deal for the Americas picks up speed with a Bush presidency. In the meantime, Canada will continue to provide surrogate leadership on the project. On questions pertaining to the substance, negotiating style, and pace for an FTAA, Canada's strategy will run largely in tandem with the Bush administration, as it did with the Clinton administration. As in the past, the rationale for such parallelism has both a defensive and offensive component. Canada's push for the FTAA is intended to send the right signal about the need to maintain the impetus toward liberalization; it also taps into Canada's desire to keep up with the European countries' ability to conclude free-trade deals in the region.

In terms of the Canada-U.S. relationship, the watchword is “widening” rather than “deepening.” Canada is uncomfortable with any talk about a different form of relationship in North America, particularly for movement toward dollarization or a customs union as Fox has suggested.

Finally, using the summit as the cornerstone for a trade agenda entails risks from the disconcerting populist groundswell of resentment against globalization, free trade, and corporations. Nobody wants another Seattle. Ottawa has already had a taste of this discord; indeed its caution is accentuated by memories of the 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) summit in Vancouver. Populist efforts to shut down the OAS Assembly in Windsor, Ontario, in June 2000 through a campaign to “unmask” or “shut down” the meeting were defused because of the palpable disconnection between what the protestors were saying happened at the “OAS/FTAA” General Assembly and the actual agenda being discussed. The impression would be very different if the FTAA were placed at the center of the Quebec City summit.

The image of the summit faces symbolic challenges from the street, but risks are also inside the negotiating chambers. The huge gulf between the United States and Brazil indicates that the success of the summit on the trade agenda is far from assured. Moreover, Canada’s potential to serve as a mediator between the two countries on the FTAA has faded; Canada’s own relationship with Brazil has deteriorated because of an acrid dispute over aerospace subsidies. What began as a firm-to-firm conflict between the Canadian/Quebec firm of Bombardier and the Brazilian jet manufacturer Embraer has rippled through the entire bilateral relationship. Ottawa is pressing for sanctions at the World Trade Organization (WTO), while Brasilia held up the initial signing of a trade and investment facilitation agreement between Mercosur and Canada (arising from the Team Canada mission to the region in January 1998).

Additionally, structural obstacles exist to Canada taking on the FTAA agenda. Canadian trade negotiation professionals view the FTAA as a mixed blessing, particularly in light of the signals from the perceived potential shift from multilateralism to bilateralism in the Asia Pacific region. No one questions the solidity of Canada’s bureaucratic apparatus. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, its resources would be strained by the sheer practicalities of running negotiations on the FTAA if another multilateral round started under the auspices of the WTO.

The Canadian business community has similar misgivings, even though some of the most prominent leaders of Canadian business are enthusiastic proponents of the FTAA. The Fifth Americas Business Forum in Toronto, for example, included keynote speakers such as Thomas d’Aquino, president of the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI). As the premier Canadian business organization, the BCNI has kept a low profile behind the FTAA initiative, with little of the grassroots mobilization it has displayed on other economic issues, such as its recent campaign for a reduction in federal taxes. After all, the main game for Canadian business remains the United States. Canadian exports to Brazil, for instance, are approximately Can\$1 billion yearly, with imports at Can\$1.3 billion, while two-way trade between Canada and the United States is much more than Can\$1 billion a day. Not

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surprisingly, the bulk of the activity behind the FTAA has focused on facilitating business deals and achieving a more level playing field with regard to norms, including support for the inter-American convention against corruption and legal reform.

Spicing It Up: A Democracy Summit

A third choice facing Canada's policymakers is trying to take the 2001 summit beyond symbolic engagement and the instrumental trade agenda. The assumption is that, for the Quebec City meeting to matter, it must address issues that will make a substantial difference to people's lives in the hemisphere. No less importantly, the summit must also be perceived as addressing these needs. This visionary component must be more than just talk. The key to a successful summit, from this perspective, would hinge on its ability to deliver a results-oriented plan of action.

There is certainly space for Canada to create a unique leadership role in this area. The discipline imposed by the bloc logic of the Cold War is gone. Not only has the need for obeisance to received notions dissipated, the potential for building issue-oriented coalitions with "like-minded countries" has been enhanced. Ottawa's diplomats are moving into this space with energy and creativity, as seen in Canada's approaches to issues such as land mines and the International Criminal Court. Canada worked hand-in-hand on these issues with a number of countries including Mexico and Chile. A similar consensus was found on narcotics, with the Multilateral Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism.

To say that Canada was able to work closely with some other countries in the hemisphere on an *à la carte* basis, however, is not to suggest that Canada could sell a fixed menu of alternative solutions. Case in point was Canada's inability to make the concept of "human security" a central theme of the Quebec City summit, with a predominant concern for the security of individuals in the face of a kaleidoscope of transnational threats. As late as June 2000, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and DFAIT officials pushed hard for such an agenda.⁶ Though Axworthy championed this initiative with passion and persistence, it was a nonstarter since it ran afoul of well-entrenched principles of nonintervention of the inter-American system. Presented as a panacea, the concept of human security also suffered from a sense of fuzziness (or even faddishness) throughout the Americas.⁷

The departure of Axworthy from the position of foreign minister means that any chance of the human security theme being reprised in a different format is highly unlikely. Although the new foreign minister, John Manley, has made clear that he will focus a good deal of his time and energy on

hemispheric issues, he brings a very different policy orientation and personal flavor to the position. Instead of idealistic, issue-based diplomacy, Manley will concentrate on a more defined and pragmatic agenda. One early indication of this problem-solving orientation came in January, with Manley's decision to go to Vancouver to meet Cardoso when the Brazilian president stopped there during an Asian trip. Although officially called a courtesy meeting, behind the gesture was a desire to deal substantively with the aerospace issue.

Thus, almost by default, the notion of making the Quebec City summit the Democracy Summit continues to retain its appeal.⁸ The bulk of the October SIRG meeting, chaired by Peter Boehm, the Canadian ambassador to the OAS, was devoted to the democracy theme and related issues. Although "Strengthening Democracy" emerged as only one of three priority baskets of issues (the others being "Creating Prosperity" and "Realizing Human Potential"), the democracy theme appears to have intrinsic value for the summit to meet its professed aim of "putting people first." It also allows consistency across the spectrum of concerns in the design and implementation of a Summit Plan of Action.

As with the issue of human security, a number of obstacles stand in the way of the notion of democracy acting as a unifying motif for the summit. The first impediment concerns basic issues of sovereignty. As demonstrated at the OAS General Assembly debate about the question of democracy in the case of Peru, the hemisphere is sharply polarized over how far the inter-American system should promote an activist pro-democracy agenda. Strengthening democracy via collective intervention found a strong set of supporters at Windsor, including the United States, Canada, Argentina, Costa Rica, and small Caribbean island states such as Antigua and Barbados. This push for a more assertive stance, nonetheless, is still opposed by countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and even Chile, which have traditionally been reluctant to allow outside interference in internal politics.

A second cluster of obstacles surrounds the means and ends of the democracy agenda. If the focus of the summit is democracy, how far should Canada push this goal? Several representatives of civil society included in the SIRG process have pressed for a "democracy clause," linking participation in the summit to the existence of democracy in member states. Ideally, such a clause would intersect not only with constitutional and electoral dynamics but with the widening social and economic gap. In reality, however,

The Quebec City summit thus fits into a wider strategy to bolster national unity.

even if a “democracy” clause were added, the definition of democracy would probably have to be so watered down as to be meaningless.⁹ Canada, as the host country, would thus be caught between two colliding objectives: pressure from civil society for an expanded definition of democracy on the one hand, and national governments with entrenched concerns about state sovereignty on the other.

A third cluster of obstacles focuses on resources. As in other areas of hemispheric activity, the image of the inter-American system as a “talking shop” is perpetuated by the lack of resources to implement many mandates.

A fourth and final cluster of obstacles centers on issues raised by Canada’s desire to introduce additional themes, most notably gender mainstreaming and “connectivity,” or efforts to reduce the digital divide between North and South. Both have considerable substantive merit and political appeal. Gender mainstreaming is an area where Canada has shown leadership in a number of other international conferences.

The connectivity theme has enormous implications for strengthening governance and democracy in the long run. It also complements the immediate process of opening up the summit process not only to business, but also to civil society. Indeed, the SIRG meeting on the democracy basket was broadcast live over the Internet through the OAS and Summit of the Information Network Web pages. The chair also received e-mail questions in real time from a number of civil society organizations located throughout the region. The theme of connectivity, furthermore, supports Canada’s efforts to market itself as a technologically sophisticated country. Axworthy was particularly attracted to the notion of “soft power” linkage displayed through information technology; his successor, Manley, should also find connectivity appealing in light of his experience as industry minister and the clustering of Canadian high-tech companies such as Nortel in his Ottawa home base.

Inclusion of such themes would inevitably detract from the precision of the core agenda. Indeed, there has already been grumbling about agenda creep. As Peter Romero, a senior U.S. State Department official remarked during the SIRG process, it is necessary to “create a plan of action that has a more manageable number of initiatives.”¹⁰ Representatives of civil society have urged that the summit should reduce and clarify the number of mandates and deal with more concrete initiatives that are easier to implement.

Good Housekeeping

Despite the risks of setting an ambitious democracy agenda at the center of the Quebec City summit, there are strong incentives to continue on this course. From the collective standpoint of the inter-America system, the

main rationale for a Democracy Summit is to signal concern over backsliding on this issue in a number of countries of the region: Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Ecuador.

From an institutional perspective, some important housekeeping requiring attention includes the need to streamline the redundant architecture of the inter-American system. In principle, the Plan of Action of the Miami summit designated the OAS as the main organization for the defense and consolidation of democracy within the Americas. In practice, the OAS must coexist with the summit process, but the relationship between the two remains ambiguous and uneven. A Democracy Summit would create an opportunity to define a clear division of labor between the summit and the OAS based on distinctions between immediate concerns and those issues more pertinent to long-term reform.

Canada's potential to serve as a mediator on the FTAA has faded.

From a purely national perspective, a Democracy Summit would allow Canada to exploit the prestige it has won within the inter-American community for its support of democracy, specifically, its impressive diplomatic contribution on the Peru crisis. The kudos are due in large part to Canada's longstanding support for the OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, or UPD (the unit's only two chiefs have been Canadian nationals). The full significance of this activity became widely recognized only during Peru's May 2000 presidential election, in which a second round runoff and the reelection of Alberto Fujimori were condemned by the OAS's Electoral Observation Mission because of serious irregularities. Prior to this rather startlingly assertive action, the UPD's role had emerged in an incremental, low-key fashion through a variety of assistance and educational programs designed to strengthen democracy. As suggested by its financial contribution—including Can\$2 million to support the OAS Electoral Mission to Peru and donations to local groups such as *Transparencia*—Canada puts its money where its mouth is.

What stands out about the OAS initiative on Peru is the way the United States allowed Canada and the secretary general of the OAS to take center stage. Although keeping a close eye on events, the United States seemed perfectly content with an ad hoc multilateral solution. As the Quebec City summit nears, Canada will be able to exploit its success in the Peru case in a less modest fashion. This profile also allows Canada and the OAS to create new openings to a democratic paradigm. From a foreign policy perspective, therefore, the notion of a Democracy Summit helps balance the image of

other, controversial U.S. initiatives including the Helms–Burton act, drug certification, and Plan Colombia.

For Canada, a Democracy Summit would make it much easier to manage a positive spin on the country's image and the future of the FTAA, quite unlike that of the clashes of Seattle WTO and the Vancouver APEC meetings.

A successful summit hinges on its ability to deliver a results-oriented plan of action.

As noted above, although the approach of a robust democratic-oriented agenda is risky, the alternatives are far less attractive from a public relations point of view. Even taking spin out of the equation, the argument for extending the agenda of the summit to encompass democracy is convincing. As two inter-American affairs experts write, "The logic underpinning the goal of economic integration by 2005 is too narrow. ... [T]he process begun in Miami has begun a one-rail policy that is focused on trade liberalization.

... The region's democratization policies ... are crucial to the success of a long-term trade relationship."¹¹

Canada's mix of motivations in its role as host for the 2001 Summit of the Americas, coupled with the complex dynamics of regional integration, may well mean that the most likely prospect is a hybrid summit. Without a clear consensus on one overarching theme, the fallback solution has been to adorn the summit like a Christmas tree with an array of brilliant issues. These ornaments are in themselves attractive and not totally unrelated to each other. The fundamental question that remains, however, is whether the long-awaited Quebec City summit will be more than the sum of its sometimes contradictory parts. The proof, as always, will be in the pudding.

Notes

1. John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 236.
2. On these habits, see Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice, Hall, 1997).
3. Julian Beltrame, "Chile's NAFTA Entry Protection from U.S. Elephant, Chretien Says," *Ottawa Citizen*, December 12, 1994 (quoting Chrétien). See also Drew Fagan, "Chile Viewed as NAFTA Trail Blazer," *Globe and Mail*, January 21, 1995; Keith Christie, "The Four Amigos and Beyond: Towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas," Policy Staff Paper 95/10, DFAIT, October 1995.
4. Government of Canada, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: 1995), 15.
5. Robert Fife, "Costa Rican President Wins Chrétien's Ear on Trade Talks," *National Post* (Toronto), February 1, 2000.

6. Lloyd Axworthy, minister of foreign affairs, address to the Inter-American Sol Linowitz Forum, June 15, 2000, Washington, D.C.
7. See, for example, Oppenheimer Report, "'Human Security' Agenda Most Puzzling: Summit Theme May Not Excite the Americas," *Miami Herald*, February 27, 2000.
8. Summit of the Americas Center, "The Democracy Summit? Summit 2001, A Joint Newsletter on Hemispheric Summit," no. 3 (Florida International University & Canadian Foundation for the Americas, September 2000).
9. Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management, "Chairman's Summary of Suggestions and Recommendations for the Summit Implementation Review Group [SIRG]," presented at the XIX Meeting of the SIRG, October 1–3, 2000, Quebec City, Canada.
10. Peter F. Romero, acting assistant secretary, Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, Organization of American States, opening remarks at the SIRG Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 7, 2000.
11. George A. Fauriol and William Perry, "Thinking Strategically about 2005: The United States and South America," CSIS Americas Program, Washington, D.C., December 1999.