

## Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?

“This is an Anglo-Saxon Protestant conspiracy. So much for Britain’s commitment to European solidarity; its real union is with America.”<sup>1</sup> That was the complaint of Jean-Claude Martinez, a French member of the European Parliament, during a debate on electronic surveillance and commercial espionage that took place in Strasbourg in March 2000. Martinez, along with many of his fellow parliamentarians, was convinced that Great Britain was being used as a base for U.S. satellite surveillance of continental Europe. More generally, he expressed a common suspicion in Europe (and particularly France) that Great Britain’s real loyalties will always lie with the “Anglosphere” of English-speaking nations, dominated by the United States.

Martinez’s language was lurid, and his accusations about electronic surveillance not provable, but in a general sense he put his finger on the most sensitive issue in British foreign relations. Will the United Kingdom’s (UK) membership in the European Union (EU)—which has a self-proclaimed goal of “ever-closer union”—ultimately imperil its special relationship with the United States? It is a question that matters far more in London than in Washington. Yet in time, Great Britain’s future within Europe—and the consequences for its relationship with the United States—may also come to matter to Washington. Little doubt exists that there are voices within the EU who anticipate (indeed, long for) a growing foreign policy rivalry with the United States. If such a rivalry were ever to emerge, the position of Great Britain would be both ambiguous and pivotal.

Before considering the future of the special relationship, it is worth pausing to ask if it actually exists. The phrase is certainly used far more in Great

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Britain than in the United States. If prominent Americans hear the term, they might be forgiven for looking slightly blank. The United States, with global interests and a polyglot population, has “special relationships” with numerous countries around the world. Arguably, its relations with Israel, Japan, Mexico, Canada, and perhaps even Ireland are just as special as any relationship with the UK.

It is also true that the relationship—forged during the first and second world wars—used to be a lot more “special.” In the immediate aftermath of the wartime alliance, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin were “the big three,” molding the postwar order. Any pretense of British equality in shaping world affairs quickly faded, as the British Empire crumbled and Great Britain’s relative poverty and military weakness became increasingly evident. The Suez crisis of 1956—in which Great Britain was forced to abandon a joint military operation with France in the Middle East, in the face of U.S. disapproval and a consequent run on the pound—demonstrated once and for all how limited Great Britain’s capacity was for truly independent military action. The Thatcher-Reagan era resurrected a period of close UK-U.S. cooperation, brought about by shared attitudes to both the Cold War and economic reform. By this time, however, it was clear that Great Britain was the junior partner. Since then, in international economic cooperation, the actions of Japan and Germany (or the EU on trade issues) have mattered far more to the United States than do those of Great Britain—although it should be noted that in recent years Great Britain has been the largest single destination for U.S. foreign direct investment, surpassing China in 1999.

## **Aspects of Friendship**

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Despite Great Britain’s diminishing global importance in the postwar years, it remains true that the country retains a special relationship with the United States in intelligence, in nuclear affairs, in a military alliance, and more amorphously, but perhaps most importantly, in cultural and intellectual life.

As Martinez noted, Great Britain does enjoy an unusually close intelligence relationship with the United States—a legacy of World War II and the Cold War. James Woolsey, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, says, “Although no one is a complete friend in the intelligence world, with Britain and America, it is as close as it gets.”<sup>2</sup> Despite its membership in the EU—which now officially aspires to a common foreign and security policy—Great Britain continues to share intelligence with the United States and other English-speaking allies, such as Australia and Canada, that it does not share

with its European allies. As long ago as 1983, Lord Owen, a former British foreign secretary, was complaining that this disparity was an anomaly. Owen told the Franks Committee on the Falklands War that

It struck me as wrong in our new relationship with Europe that we should be tapping into the European Community and passing some of that stuff on to the United States. I wanted to have an arrangement whereby anything that dealt with negotiations within the European Community, which after all can influence the United States in trade negotiations, should not be passed on. I wanted to have a ring fence around it. There was terrific resistance to this, unbelievable resistance, from everyone.<sup>3</sup>

Little suggests that this close intelligence relationship has changed in the 17 years since Owen spoke.

The closeness of the intelligence relationship is linked to Great Britain's nuclear relationship with the United States. Along with its permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Great Britain's possession of a small nuclear deterrent is crucial to its vestigial claim to be more than just another middle-ranking power. Unlike France, which has insisted on developing its own nuclear "force de frappe," Great Britain has been happy to buy all of its Trident nuclear technology from the United States. Additionally, as two of the five "status quo" nuclear powers, Great Britain and the United States have a shared interest in working together on nuclear nonproliferation. During the Cold War, Great Britain (along with Germany) served as a vital base for U.S. cruise missiles, and, if the United States does get around to developing and deploying a defense system against nuclear missiles, satellite stations in Yorkshire in northern England will be an important part of the early-warning system. The early indications are that, despite deep reservations within the EU about Bush's missile defense, Blair will go along with the U.S. plan.

**The relationship used to be a lot more 'special.'**

Intelligence and nuclear weapons lead naturally to the third element—close military and diplomatic cooperation. Allies during the first and second world wars, Great Britain and the United States also shared a Cold War experience as occupying powers in Germany and allies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Great Britain declined to send troops to Vietnam (a source of tension at the time), but the two countries were close military allies during the Persian Gulf War. Despite considerable differences over the handling of the conflict in Bosnia—Great Britain and the United States voted against each other in the UN on the sensitive issue of lifting the arms embargo—the two countries were once again in close harness by the time of the Kosovo campaign. Great Britain can also be a useful diplomatic stalking horse for the United States. A former senior official in

the Clinton administration notes, “Sometimes when it doesn’t suit us to push an initiative directly, the British will put it forward instead.”<sup>4</sup>

The fourth element to the special relationship, which is harder to quantify but may be most important of all, is the cultural tie. Former president Bill Clinton is an Oxford alumnus, as were close advisers George Stephanopolous, Robert Reich, and Strobe Talbott. Likewise, several of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s closest advisers have studied at U.S. universities. David Miliband, the head of Blair’s Downing Street policy unit, studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as did his close colleague and theoretician, Geoff Mulgan. Both men were instrumental in promoting the “third way” seminars that both president and prime minister attended. Perhaps the most important British intellectual

**The most important and ambiguous factor is Great Britain’s relationship with Europe.**

loan from the United States during Blair’s first term came at the Treasury. Ed Balls, a highly influential economic adviser at the Treasury in London, is a former Harvard student of Larry Summers, the U.S. treasury secretary under Clinton. The intellectual influence of Balls’s time in the United States was evident in several of the most important economic reforms of Blair’s first term—in particular the introduction of the working families tax credit, a welfare benefit directly modeled on the U.S. earned income tax credit.

This kind of intellectual interchange has profound implications for foreign policy. It is striking, for example, that, despite the determination of the Blair administration to be more “European” in outlook than its Tory predecessors, key economic advisers continue to look, almost instinctively, to the United States as a model for domestic reform. That tendency, in turn, has a direct effect on British attitudes toward further European integration. If U.S. labor markets are the intellectual model the British have at the forefront of their minds, they are more likely to balk at increased EU integration in tax and social affairs, based on an alternative “European model.” More broadly, if policymakers and opinion formers know each other and know each other’s countries, they are more likely to share common approaches to problems. Sentimental as well as intellectual bonds count for something. Indeed, in an international crisis, personal friendships can matter a great deal.

### **Declining Significance?**

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Despite the existence of a special relationship of sorts between Great Britain and the United States, there is also a widespread assumption on both sides

of the Atlantic that this relationship has been declining in significance for both sides, and that this trend is likely to continue. Some of the reasons for this deterioration have already been mentioned: the global scale of U.S. interests and Great Britain's relative economic decline. Other commonly cited factors include the end of the Cold War in Europe and the tilt of the U.S. economy west and south—away from the U.S. East Coast.

The most important and ambiguous factor, however, is Great Britain's relationship with Europe. Once again, it has been conventional wisdom in policymaking circles on both sides of the Atlantic that Great Britain's integration into the EU will not undermine the special relationship. Indeed it is more usually argued that it could actually bolster Great Britain's voice in Washington by ensuring that Great Britain remains an influential voice on the world stage. Thus, Joseph Nye, a prominent Harvard academic and former Clinton administration official, recently wrote,

The role of Britain in Europe remains a unique asset to the cause of European-American comity. A Europe in which Britain continues to look both across the Channel and across the Atlantic, which emphasizes outward-looking aspects of the EU ... helps to reinforce overall U.S.-European relationships.<sup>5</sup>

Blair administration officials, desperate to bolster the pro-European case at home, have seized upon such comments to argue that Great Britain's relationship with the United

States is not an alternative to its relationship with Europe but is in fact dependent on continued close involvement with the EU. This is probably rooted in their worry that Great Britain will cease to matter to the United States if London is a fringe player in Europe. One senior British official even describes ramming home this message as "the central proposition of my working life."<sup>6</sup> Shortly after Bush's election, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook reiterated the point in the *Times* of London when he wrote, "Any loss of influence in Europe would damage our economic relations with the U.S. and our strategic relations."

Yet in Great Britain in particular, this proposition is increasingly being challenged. Voices on both the right and the left of the political debate argue that the idea that there is no choice to be made between closer integration with Europe and a special relationship with the United States is an illusion. Although they differ in their prescriptions—the Left tends to favor "choosing" Europe, the Right looks to the United States—both sides see such a choice being foisted on Great Britain.

Ideologically and culturally, the putative choice would be between U.S.-

**Is Great Britain's relationship with the U.S. an alternative to its relationship with Europe?**

style free markets and a European social model, and the selection will be forced by the increasing European tendency to “harmonize” social legislation. Politically and strategically, the choice would be between Great Britain allying itself to a joint European foreign policy, which could increasingly differ from that of the United States, or rejecting this option and adopting a policy that looked more to Washington than to Brussels. This choice—it is thought—might be required in a number of ways. Most obviously because the EU negotiates as a bloc on trade matters, Great Britain would inevitably be in the European camp if a transatlantic trade war threatened. Yet, on some important trade issues—for example, the effort to liberalize agriculture trade and combat cultural protectionism—Great Britain is intellectually more in tune with the U.S. position than the EU stance. More broadly, aspirations to develop a separate European defense capability are, in some minds, a harbinger of potential future foreign policy disputes with the United States.

The two key questions about Great Britain’s special relationship with the United States stem from this debate. The first is whether the idea that Great Britain may end up having to “choose” between the United States and Europe has any foundation. The second is whether the United States would give any encouragement to a British attempt to realign its foreign policy.

The answers to these questions will in large part depend on the future development of the EU. A fresh drive toward European integration—for example, on direct taxation or the development of common political institutions (a directly elected European president is one proposal recently floated by Germany’s foreign minister)—might well provoke a crisis in Great Britain’s relations with Europe. British acceptance of such moves would be a significant move toward a “European social model,” but might also prove politically unsustainable at home. An anti-European backlash in Great Britain would then give heart to pro-U.S. conservatives. Some possible developments within the EU might also provoke a U.S. reconsideration of its relationship with Great Britain. In particular, if the new EU defense arm develops into something close to a European army—autonomous of NATO—the initially benign U.S. attitude might change. To assess how these developments would really play, it is necessary to look at the current state of the debate in both Great Britain and the United States.

## **The British Debate**

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Great Britain’s argument over its “choice” between the United States and Europe is usually conducted in primarily economic and strategic terms. The pro-Europe lobby likes to point out that Great Britain does more than 50 percent

of its trade with the EU. It also points out that Great Britain is 20 miles from France and 3,000 miles from the United States. It surely makes more sense to form a trade bloc with your neighbors than with a group of nations an ocean away. The pro-U.S. lobby responds that Great Britain invests more in the United States than in any other country, and vice versa, because the British and U.S. way of doing business (hostile takeovers, an emphasis on shareholder value, flexible labor markets, and so on) are fundamentally more in tune with each other than the British and European models.

Although the argument over Great Britain's "choice" is conducted in primarily rational terms, it has an emotional base. Just as the right's urge to embrace the United States is underpinned by its suspicion of the EU, the "choose Europe" lobby in Great Britain is sometimes underpinned by a strain of anti-Americanism. Sir Edward Heath, Great Britain's most ardently pro-European postwar prime minister, has also often taken a rather lofty attitude to the United States. Prior to the Gulf war, Sir Edward even took it upon himself to stage a "peace mission" to Baghdad—an idea that flew in the face of U.S. diplomacy. Some on the British right and left share the traditional French dream that the EU may eventually evolve into a superpower capable of "standing up" to the United States over issues such as the Middle East. As far as Great Britain's pro-Europeans are concerned, Great Britain is much more likely to play a leading role within Europe—where it will be one of several big powers—than in a transatlantic relationship, in which Great Britain would inevitably be the junior partner. They talk derisively of the pro-U.S. camp wanting to turn Great Britain into "the fifty-first state."

This feeling, that an overweening United States can be an uncomfortable partner, got a boost in Great Britain with the U.S. intervention in the Northern Irish peace process. When then-President Clinton granted Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, a visa to visit the United States, the invitation was greeted with outrage in much of Great Britain—and indeed in the U.S. embassy in London.<sup>7</sup> A great deal of this outrage has faded because of the apparent success of the Northern Irish peace process and also perhaps because of an ingrained British deference to the United States.

Nonetheless, Great Britain also shares a much weaker version of some of the French mistrust of U.S. cultural influence. Although the British are acutely aware of the benefits to them of the U.S.-sponsored spread of the

**Great Britain invests more in the U.S. than in any other country, and vice versa.**

English language, Hollywood can antagonize the British as well as the French. Irritation has been expressed in the British press about Hollywood's tendency to use an English accent to signal villainy, and there has also been a sometimes agonized debate about the portrayal of British history. A recent film about the American Revolution, *The Patriot*, was condemned as a "blood libel" on the British by one critic—whose article achieved the unusual distinction of being reprinted in both the left-wing *Guardian* and the right-wing *Daily Telegraph*.

**Great Britain shares a much weaker version of the French mistrust of U.S. cultural influence.**

Such eruptions may seem essentially ephemeral, but Great Britain's "choice" between the U.S. and European models has a strong cultural element. Many of the partisans on both sides are likely to be motivated by where they feel "at home." Even strategic and economic questions take on a cultural tinge, because they are often framed as a question of what sort of society Great Britain aspires to be.

Thus the pro-European camp in Great Britain will use the election of George W. Bush to push the message that the United States is culturally more alien to Great Britain than continental Europe. Indeed, the Bush presidency may bring to a close an unusual period in which the British left has looked with unusual favor on the United States. In the Blair years, the traditional anti-Americanism of the British left has given way to often warm admiration. The United States was indeed often cited by British left-wingers as a model of egalitarian and radical politics.<sup>8</sup>

Bush's America will certainly not be looked upon with such favor in Blairite circles. Two weeks before the U.S. election, Hugo Young, a leading British left-of-center journalist, warned, "For Mr. Blair, and therefore for Great Britain, a Bush presidency offers alarming possibilities."<sup>9</sup> Young focused in particular on Bush's alleged ignorance of foreign affairs and on the theory that a Bush presidency would usher in a "new era of U.S.-first unilateralism." Other British left-wing commentators think a Republican presidency would emphasize those aspects of the United States that often seem most alien to the British—for example, attitudes toward gun ownership and religion. For the most ardent pro-Europeans in Great Britain, a Bush presidency would paradoxically therefore be rather welcome because, by emphasizing the "alien" aspects of U.S. culture, Great Britain would then more likely opt for a European social model.

The "choose America" lobby in Great Britain will also see opportunity in a Bush presidency. They believe that Republicans are more likely to share



their suspicions of the EU—and some hope that a Bush presidency will enable an escape route from closer European integration (or even from the EU itself) in the form of an invitation to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

It is safe to say that the idea that Great Britain should seek to join NAFTA is not one that is regarded with much favor by Great Britain's Foreign Office, or by the Blairites. They point out that the EU negotiates trade agreements as a bloc and that no single EU member can negotiate its own bilateral trade agreements. Therefore, to join NAFTA, Great Britain would have to leave the EU. Withdrawal, they argue, would clearly never be in Great Britain's economic interests because it trades so much more with the EU than with the United States. Robin Cook, Great Britain's foreign secretary, has described the idea that Great Britain should join NAFTA as "barmy." Even Great Britain's Conservative Party, which is strongly skeptical of further European integration, hesitates to push the NAFTA idea, partly because they know that it will open them to the charge that they really want Great Britain to leave the EU. The Conservatives' foreign affairs spokesman, Francis Maude, says instead that his party favors a free-trade agreement between the EU and the United States.<sup>10</sup>

Without support from mainstream political parties, the idea that Great Britain should pursue the NAFTA option has been pushed mainly in newspapers, in particular by Conrad Black, the Canadian proprietor of Great Britain's *Daily Telegraph*. Black argues,

British political institutions, which have served the country well for centuries, should not be stripped jurisdictionally to clothe Brussels and Strasbourg. ... Britain should not go back to pre-Thatcher European levels of taxation and industrial strife; and Britain should not slam the door on its relationships with the United States and Canada. These relationships (along with the geographical fact of the English channel) have been Britain's greatest strategic asset in this century.<sup>11</sup>

His solution is beguilingly simple: Great Britain should apply to join NAFTA. To critics who argue that this action will require Great Britain to leave the EU, with disastrous economic effects, Black replies that it should be possible for Great Britain to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the EU, along the lines of agreements already negotiated by countries like Norway and Israel.<sup>12</sup> This arrangement would give Great Britain the economic benefits of EU membership without the sacrifices of political sovereignty that have always made the British so uncomfortable. NAFTA, of course, has none of the EU's sovereignty-guzzling characteristics. It is, more or less, a pure free-trade agreement. Black's vision is of a Great Britain that enjoys free access to the markets of both North America and the EU, unconstrained by common EU policies in either social and economic affairs or in foreign policy.

## Is Washington Listening?

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The NAFTA argument is a strikingly original contribution to what has been a fairly sterile debate about the future of the special relationship between Great Britain and the United States, but it appears to have one clear flaw. Although the idea resonates in right-wing political circles in Great Britain, there has been little evidence of interest in Washington. The usual reaction of U.S. strategists is that the United States has a much more direct interest in maintaining good relations with the EU. One senior U.S. diplomat in London remarked in 1999, "It's striking that with all Black's resources and transatlantic connections, he's managed to make so little headway with the idea."<sup>13</sup>

That situation may be changing. In April 2000, Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) persuaded the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to hold hearings on the idea. On a subsequent visit to London, Gramm predicted that it would take just a week for the U.S. Senate to pass legislation giving the president a mandate to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Great Britain. Gramm is a noted maverick, but other voices on the right in the United States have also spoken favorably of the concept, including former House speaker Newt Gingrich and former presidential candidate Steve Forbes. In Canada, Preston Manning, the leader of the Reform Party, has also talked of British membership in NAFTA.

Gramm's argument for British membership, unlike Black's, is couched purely in economic terms. He told the ITC panel, "I am not interested in drawing Britain away from Europe," and instead presented his initiative as a way of encouraging the EU to allow its members to negotiate free-trade agreements on their own behalf and ultimately to encourage free trade between the EU and NAFTA.<sup>14</sup>

Yet it is difficult to imagine how Great Britain could join NAFTA without provoking a major row with its EU partners. It is equally difficult to see why it might be in America's interests to risk antagonizing the EU by playing *agent provocateur* in provoking a British rupture with the EU. Ultimately, preserving smooth relations with the EU is likely to be a higher priority for the United States than indulging Great Britain. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser under Jimmy Carter, writes, "I do not find the notion of a Britain outside Europe but essentially an extension of America very appealing, for implicit in it is the divorce of America and Europe."<sup>15</sup>

What if the United States began to share the Black view, however, that the EU is increasingly aiming to be a rival, not a partner, to the United States? At that stage, the United States probably would encourage the UK to take a step back from the process of European integration.

Precisely this issue was raised by the announcement in November 2000

that the EU is bringing into being a “rapid reaction force,” which Romano Prodi, the head of the European Commission, has made clear he regards as an embryonic European army. Many questions about this EU military wing remain open, in particular its relationship with NATO. Great Britain—which has offered more than 12,000 troops, an aircraft carrier, and an amphibious brigade to this nascent force—insists that NATO will continue to be Europe’s major security club and will retain its position as the main agency for military planning, even for European operations. As the *Economist* noted, however, “The language used by French officials could hardly be more different.”<sup>16</sup> They see the European force as the military arm of an independent European foreign policy.

British Euroskeptics rushed to raise the alarm that this “European army” would undermine NATO and drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. The Clinton administration at first did not appear to agree. In a joint article with Robin Cook, Great Britain’s foreign secretary, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. secretary of state, asserted plainly that

Our governments fully support Europe’s common security and defense policy and the contribution it can make to European and transatlantic security. ... Dangers to NATO and the transatlantic link are far more likely to come from European weakness than European strength. We want both a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. That is why we both back this European initiative.<sup>17</sup>

Little more than a week later, William Cohen, U.S. secretary of defense, struck a much more cautious note. In remarks in Brussels, he warned that NATO risked becoming “a relic” if the EU attempted to develop military capabilities autonomous of NATO.<sup>18</sup>

Cohen’s remarks caused visible shock among the European NATO ambassadors. The big question is whether the Bush administration will take a similarly wary view of the EU’s defense ambitions. It may therefore be significant that Cohen is a former Republican senator because clearly some senior figures associated with the Republicans do not share Albright’s sanguine view of either the European force or Great Britain’s role in it. Richard Perle, an adviser on defense to the Bush campaign, for example, wrote in November 2000,

I should have thought that the British prime minister would attach fundamental importance to the special relationship that has served both of our countries so well for so long and that he would not place it at risk by falling in behind French maneuvers aimed at sidelining the United States in Europe.<sup>19</sup>

**Bush’s America will not be looked upon with such favor in Blairite circles.**

Senator Gordon Smith (R-Ore.), chairman of the Europe subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, took a similarly wary view of talk of a European defense force in April 2000. He told a British audience, “The flagrant anti-Americanism of some continental leaders fuels the suspicion that the [EU’s] real motive is to build a European force separate from NATO in order to counter U.S. influence and to check U.S. power,” and he urged the British to “never forget the vital British role as the lynchpin in the Atlantic Alliance.”<sup>20</sup>

**It seems unlikely that the relatively stable decline of the past 20 years will be disrupted.**

In a later letter to London’s *Daily Telegraph* (owned by Black), Smith and Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reiterated their suspicion of Europe’s defense ambitions. They wrote,

It is in neither Europe nor America’s interests to undermine our proven national relationships in favor of one with a European super-state whose creation is being driven, in part, by anti-American sentiment.<sup>21</sup>

Clearly, their views do not represent the entirety of Republican, let alone U.S., opinion. Voices within both the Republican and Democratic parties have long urged Europeans to take a bigger role in policing their own continent. During the 2000 election campaign, Condoleezza Rice, now Bush’s national security adviser, spoke of a “new division of labor” in Europe in which the Europeans did more to guarantee their own security. If this view were to prevail, it might seem natural for the United States to continue to support the European defense initiative as a way of allowing the United States to scale back its own defense commitments in Europe. Robert Zoellick, the new U.S. trade representative, has also been a keen supporter of closer European integration.

At this stage, it is difficult to know which of these strains of thought within the Republican Party will prevail and therefore how Great Britain’s special relationship with the United States will evolve. It still seems unlikely that the relatively stable pattern of the past 20 years will be disrupted. If this pattern continues, expect Great Britain to continue to become more closely enmeshed in the EU, with the continuing support of the United States, and consequently a continual gradual decline in the significance of the special relationship.

The alternative scenario would be for Great Britain to make a deliberate attempt to draw away from the European orbit and closer to the United States, possibly through an application to join NAFTA. For this to come to

pass, a variety of different things would have to happen. There would have to be a fundamental change in thinking about Europe in British governing circles. This transformation might be provoked by a crisis in UK-EU relations—perhaps an irreconcilable argument over the pace of European integration or the emergence of unavoidable differences over the future of the European defense force. For this crisis to really force a change in policy, it is likely that the fundamentally pro-European New Labour Party led by Blair would have to lose power to the Euroskeptical conservatives. At the same time, it would probably require the United States to become even more wary of the European defense force. That development, in turn, means three things: the more ambitious French view of the force's future role would have prevailed, the Republicans would still be in office, and the Euroskeptical wing of the Republican Party (the Perle-Gingrich-Smith-Gramm group) would be in the ascendancy.

The likelihood of these developments vary. Perhaps the least likely is that Blair will lose the next British election, which at the time of writing was widely expected to be held in May 2001. For all of the events outlined above to happen simultaneously—thus provoking a realignment of British foreign policy and a reassertion of the special relationship—would perhaps be too great a coincidence. The idea that Great Britain has a choice to make between the United States and Europe—although overly melodramatic at the moment—may come to seem more relevant if and when the pace of European integration quickens.

## Notes

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1. *Economist*, April 29, 2000.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. Conversation with author, London, November 2000.
5. Joseph Nye Jr., *International Affairs* (January 2000).
6. Conversation with author, London, January 2000.
7. Ray Seitz, *Over Here* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998).
8. Jonathan Freedland, *Bring Home the Revolution* (London: Fourth Estate, 1999).
9. *Guardian*, October 24, 2000.
10. Interview with author, London, November 2000.
11. Conrad Black "Britain's Atlantic Option," *National Interest*, No. 55 (Spring 1999).
12. Conrad Black, *Spectator*, July 15, 2000. For a critique of Black's ideas, see Desmond Butler, "Fog over the Atlantic," Action Centre for Europe, August 2000 (pamphlet).
13. Conversation with author, London, 1999.
14. *Economist*, April 13, 2000.

15. Butler, "Fog over the Atlantic."
16. *Economist*, November 25, 2000.
17. *Observer*, November 27, 2000.
18. *Financial Times*, December 6, 2000.
19. *Daily Mail*, November 22, 2000.
20. *European Journal* (London), April 2000.
21. *Daily Telegraph*, December 28, 2000.