Daniel N. Nelson

Transatlantic Transmutations

W hy has a chasm formed across the Atlantic?
The obvious explanation seems to be that America is at war, but Europe is not. On September 12, 2001, *Le Monde* ran the headline "We Are All Americans Today." Only a few months after the attacks on the World Trade towers and the Pentagon, however, a *Die Zeit* front-page essay entitled "Amerika im Blindflug" ("America Flying Blindly") captured the gulf be‑ tween U.S. and European perceptions about what a war against terrorism means or ought to mean. Moreover, as the U.S. president presented his "axis of evil" vision and the United States considered military action against states thought to be supporting and harboring terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Europeans began to discuss the dan‑ gerous consequences of U.S. policies to a united Europe. On the eastern side of the Atlantic, an ambient concern about terrorism exists, but it is not a visceral fear and is certainly not a matter of daily urgency.

As shocking and traumatic as the events of September 11 were, however, they are not sufficient to explain the current state of transatlantic affairs. The malapropisms of President George W. Bush, his administration's unilateralism, or U.S. hubris do not explain the gap either. Moreover, Europe's military weakness and domestic politics, and the European Union's (EU) own troubled metamorphosis, provide just a small part of the story. Easy explanations for such differences in transatlantic viewpoints are ab‑ sent. One must look beyond stylistic irritants and transient disputes. Reach‑ ing deeply into U.S. and European worldviews, one can see fundamentally

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distinct understandings of at least three fundamental questions: Who are the primary international actors, how do they act, and why?

Actors

Who are the primary international actors? Who should be at the forefront of relations that span the Atlantic or the globe? The differences between prevalent U.S. and European visions on such a central issue grow with each day.

Americans and Europeans perceive and value states in very different ways. In the United States, institutions are fundamentally understood as utilitarian instruments designed to achieve ends, not bearers of normative content. People more often view transnational and subnational communities, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with suspicion in the United States and with confidence in Europe. Generalizations of such scope are perilous but provocative. Is there any reason to believe these expansive characterizations are accurate?

In broad respects, states, institutions, and communities of various kinds now occupy the international stage. This development is not new, but the mix, proportion, and balance among such players are now unlike any era before. Americans and Europeans do not describe this twenty-first century world as differently as they interpret it.

Because the United States, with its countless ethnic, religious, and local communities, has never been a single nation as most people would define such a concept, it has placed strong emphasis on an individualistic ethos coupled with a vigorous devotion to patriotism. Americans are far more inclined than most to prefer a state that intervenes little in their personal lives or finances. For example, more than twice the proportion of Americans (56.9 percent) as compared with Germans (29.9 percent), and almost three times the proportion of Norwegians (21.9 percent), prefer a state that is "libertarian."[1] Yet, Americans look to political figures and federal institutions to act, and act effectively, when the need arises. The state exists not to provide welfare or ensure well-being because these are individual responsibilities. Rather, the state's purpose is to ensure its citizens' safety, protect them from attack, and define (for an otherwise extraordinarily diverse population) "us" and "them." That the state should at once stay out of one's own life while constraining "deviant" behaviors that appear threatening suggests much about Americans' sense of state limits and responsibilities.

For the most part, publics within the EU view the state, their bureaucracies, and their militaries in much different terms. The modern European state, in its Western form, is an instrument of social welfare embedded in and expressed through supranational or community-level institutions. The

European state is less central as a guarantor of security and less critical to a definition of "otherness"; it is but one player in an array of institutions that are expected to provide socioeconomic and quality-of-life guarantees. Such conceptual differences are increasingly meaningful in transatlantic relations as a now-aged NATO and other elements of Euro-U.S. ties adjust to transnational challenges and dangers.

In the aftermath of World War II, the global stage had few actors—great powers, the United Nations (UN), newly formed Bretton Woods economic institutions, and some ideologically motivated revolutionaries supported by states. States and organizations composed of states thus defined transatlantic relations. Territoriality and sovereignty were integral. On maps of the era, blue and red colors denoting NATO and the Communist states of the Warsaw Pact, respectively, arrayed against each other as on a football game's scrimmage line. The two teams held territory, controlled populations, and fielded armies. This world of few variables was easily programmable.

> Americans and Europeans perceive and value states in very different ways.

Now, that has changed—fully, irrevocably, and rapidly. Into the equation of interactions across the Atlantic have entered actors for which the Atlantic matters not at all. Indeed, the ocean is as irrelevant as any territory.

The EU, no longer merely a creature of economic cooperation à la the European Community, is principal among these stakeholders in transatlantic relations. Washington's continuing preference for ties through NATO or bilateral contacts evinces the U.S. failure to recognize or accept the pace and comprehensiveness of the European project. U.S. representatives to the European communities and later the EU have included skilled diplomats, most notably David Bruce, Thomas Enders, George Vest, and Thomas Niles. Still, the summits of heads of state (NATO, G-7/8, and bilateral) have formed the leitmotif of U.S. engagement with Europe.

In the early twenty-first century, however, the president of the European Commission (the de facto EU head of "state") occupies a singularly important role. President Romano Prodi may not be personally powerful, but the EU institutional milieu has become all encompassing. Very little public policy in European states can be enacted or implemented without adhering, first, to the EU's *acquis communautaire*, the vast body of law and regulation that is the EU's central nervous system. Even when the large EU states have sought to protect sectors of their domestic economy, they have eventually been pressed to allow foreign competition. Compatibility with all European-wide standards (for foods, products, services, and science and technology),

indeed, is a prerequisite to closing various chapters on the long road to EU membership.

The EU is but the most wealthy and omnipresent of new actors on the global, regional, and substate levels that intersect transatlantic relations. In one sense, the growing presence of multinational corporations (MNCs), global and national NGOs, and many other players that interact beyond borders is an old story. To some extent, these elements of globalization contribute to transnational integration; in other cases, because such new actors may have narrow interests, norms, or identities, their motivations fragment.

> Europe and the U.S. dispute how states, institutions, and communities should act.

The post-Westphalian world may be an overused and ill-defined notion. Still, Internet-linked advocacy communications and NGO organizations—which, for example, generated momentum toward a global treaty banning antipersonnel land mines—have unquestionably buffeted transatlantic relations. The same can be said for environmentalist actions that led to the Kyoto treaty. In these and other cases, activities that European governments have come to acknowledge and accept were met with implacable opposition in the United States. Much of Europe, already accustomed to sovereign compromises, saw these as tests of U.S. adherence to civilized norms.

While Europe has mostly accepted the multiplicity of new actors, the United States has, to a large extent, rejected it. Those "inside the Beltway" have often seen NGO and special interest communities such as advocates for arms control, minority rights, gender as well as sexual equalities, and environmental standards as challengers, not allies, whose initiatives and movements must be intercepted, countered, or derailed. The Clinton administration's embarrassment over the Ottawa treaty, which left the United States as one of an uncomfortably few bedfellows refusing to sign a ban on antipersonnel land mines, led to a concerted effort to delay or derail parallel NGO and multilateral endeavors to limit small arms and light-weapons trafficking. By contrast, several European governments, Japan, Canada, and New Zealand worked with and funded NGO conferences, research, and communications about the manufacture and distribution of man-portable weaponry.[2]

The United States has not, of course, responded negatively to all new international actors. For perceived national interests, the United States has maintained very close ties with international private-military companies (PMCs) to perform defense planning and training projects in the Balkans,

Angola, the Middle East, and many other locations. Great Britain has had similar arrangements.

Although state leaders may utilize new PMC actors as an extension of power, data suggesting the "capture" of states by criminal syndicates is alarming. From country to country, aggregate interview data of firms doing business in particular countries allow a gauge of the proportion of firms affected by the illicit purchase of parliamentary legislation, presidential decrees, court decisions, and more. Some former Communist countries, with which the leaders and institutions of NATO and the EU must interact, are classified as "highly" captured by such corruption.[3]

Euroatlantic relations exist, then, in a very crowded universe. U.S. policymakers no longer await criticism from a handful of European foreign ministries and parliaments but rather can expect salvos from Amnesty International regarding the death penalty or incarceration of Al Qaeda and/or Taliban prisoners. The International Crisis Group scrutinizes Europeans' contributions to a lasting peace in the Balkans or reform in Serbia.

With no single focus or purpose, notwithstanding the U.S. dedication to prosecuting the war against terrorism, the transatlantic relationship becomes far more susceptible to the influences and effects of what the new actors that have proliferated since 1989 say or do. PMCs become proxies for interventions, criminal organizations capture states, and global NGOs combat such trends—the implication of less state-centric "relations" is clear. Far less clear are inferences that one might draw for long-term prognoses. As states, the United States and its allies retain powers to tax, make law, and raise armies. As supra- and substate actors assume even these fundamental aspects of state activity, defining and conducting relations in the old way will not work.

Modalities

Europe and the United States dispute how states, institutions, and communities act, or should act, internationally. The instruments and implements of global action are, from the U.S. standpoint, those of power with a bit of cooperation. To Europeans, modalities have shifted significantly to cooperation and to the discourse of European-ness, with much less attention to power.

Less than a generation ago, "Reforger" exercises were an annual rite in which U.S. and some Canadian forces would practice rushing across the Atlantic to reinforce Europe against a Soviet-led onslaught. The ability to project U.S. military power rapidly into Europe in massive numbers was es-

sential to the U.S. presence there. A U.S. nuclear umbrella gave Washington virtually unquestioned hegemony within the alliance.

In the first decade after the Cold War, the United States as the "indispensable power" became an oft-repeated phrase in the United States. Madeleine Albright may have been the first to use this phrase while UN ambassador, but it later appeared in President Bill Clinton's second inaugural address and in many other pronouncements by U.S. officials. That no major world problem can be solved without U.S. engagement and that the United States has a capacity to see "farther into the future" were Albright assertions that became axiomatic of U.S. policymaking. Former principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy Jan Lodal wrote:

> Virtually no conceivable combination of powers can challenge America's conventional military might. The economic strength of the United States touches every corner of the earth. Its veto over almost every major multilateral institution means that no concerted action can be taken without America's agreement.[4]

For U.S. foreign policy elites, and certainly for most of the U.S. public, power still tells it all. Cooperation among states via institutions is an acceptable practice when coincident interests dictate or allow it. The loudest special interest, not public consensus, can unfortunately frame such interests. U.S. power as a captive of pressure groups turns the United States into the "Mr. Big" that European and other global actors sometimes admire and often trust, but still find worrying.[5]

Today's Europe has not forgotten power—even Germany certainly understands it, for which the attribution of *zivilmacht* was given iconic status. Yet, cooperation and collaboration mark the modality of European international behavior in the early twenty-first century far more than that of the United States. Expecting multilateral action through institutions guided by collective norms describes European perspectives on the world stage much more accurately than U.S. expectations of power.

Realists of every nationality have no doubt that power remains the principal modality of international action. For transatlantic relations, however, the nature, role, and U.S. use of power has become a core divisive issue. A provocative commentary in April 2002, for example, wrote of a United States whose power had become so unrivaled that "what it doesn't do is as fateful as what it does. ... The fundamental problem is that America today has too much power for anyone's good, including its own."[6]

That the military components of U.S. power are far larger than those of other NATO members is an empirical reality. Defense expenditures tell part of the story—the United States will spend more than $1 billion daily in 2002–2003, while the European NATO allies' combined annual defense budgets fell to about $159 billion in 2001. Germany spends 1.5 percent of its

gross domestic product (GDP) on the military, and no NATO members except Turkey and Greece (for their own reasons) exceed 3 percent, roughly equal to U.S. defense expenditures.[7]

Of European NATO allies, moreover, all spend a far higher proportion of their defense dollars on personnel, with Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain allocating from 60 percent to more than 80 percent on personnel. Great Britain spends about 40 percent, while the U.S. figure is about 36 percent. These percentages may be interpreted in many ways, but they certainly suggest greater attention to procurement, research and development, and deployment in the United States.[8]

Part of the story, too, is the record of Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghan combat, which demonstrated vividly the real and growing capabilities gap.[9] European military weakness has many shortfalls in areas such as airlift capability, precision munitions, airborne and satellite intelligence, etc. Non-U.S. NATO members, and the EU generally, recognize that the capabilities problem accelerated throughout the last decade and that they should take action to narrow the gap.[10] NATO secretary general Lord George Robertson has often called for more European defense efforts and warned of Europeans becoming "pygmies" relative to U.S. capabilities.

> A sense among Europeans exists that Europe is an emerging superpower.

From the European perspective, however, waning U.S. capacities in other arenas were part of the post–Cold War uncertainties. Observations on "the loss of U.S. economic supremacy" and the awareness that the "United States does not have the same measure of authority, or capabilities, that enabled Washington to direct affairs during an earlier period" were widespread and commonly held at the start of the 1990s.[11]

The United States, however, did not hold this perception of itself. Indeed, the maxim identified by quintessential realist Kenneth Waltz in 1964—that the United States sought a Europe that could shoulder alliance burdens but not one that would share in deciding which burdens would be shared—continued to guide Washington.[12] Almost four decades later, U.S. conservatives advocated "a benign U.S. hegemony" that conjoined an assumed U.S. goodness with U.S. greatness.[13] At the same time, a leading British analyst warned that the then–new Bush presidency risked implanting a U.S. strategy defined "in terms of American leadership but [which] fails to pay for that privilege," thereby "losing the respect and support of U.S. allies."[14]

That Europe could be a worthy competitor to the United States, however, was not realistic until after 1989. The deepening of the EU, its launch of a

common currency, and its declaratory Common Security and Defense Policy, as well as its plan to create a military crisis response capability by 2003, have all contributed to a sense among Europeans of an emerging superpower. This new Europe has altered the definition of the nation-state, affects socioeconomic and political outcomes in all corners of the world, has its own transatlantic agenda, and pursues its own sense of appropriate relations with Russia, China, Japan, the Middle East, and other powers or regions. In a few years, leaders and publics across an EU with perhaps 25 members, then encompassing a market of a half-billion people, may justifiably see their power—albeit different in form from that of the United States—as warranting full equality. Such a larger presence and greater weight in nonmilitary measures will make Europe's emphasis on interaction, grounded less in raw power than cooperation, powerful in and of itself.

Europe's metamorphosis is toward international action based on its own discourse—no longer anchored in a NATO serving as a transatlantic self-portrait of the United States. The EU's narrative is becoming one of a community sharing identity, constructing a recent history deeply embedded in the lore of the *acquis*, the EU commissioners, rotating EU presidencies, Brussels bureaucracy, Intergovernmental Conferences, and the euro's exchange rates. "Talking Europe" has not yet supplanted country-specific or locale-focused concerns and may never. Still, Europe qua "NATO allies" and transatlantic partners is no longer the predominant or even prominent discourse of international or global action.

Motives

Theoretical insights from realism, idealism, and constructivism hold, respectively, that political action derives from interests, norms, and/or identity. Cost-benefit analysis, maximizing gain and minimizing loss, is fundamental to the explanatory model of realists. By contrast, idealism focuses on beliefs and values, whether religious or humanistic, as motives for political action. Constructivism sees an effort to ensure or procure individual, community, or national "self" as capable of generating violence, forbearance, and sacrifice.

Transatlantic relations suffer greatly from a reciprocal inability of Americans and Europeans to understand and accept the other's motives for international activity. Until 1989, a single and common enemy diminished the differences and rendered them a minor distinction. As memories of the Soviet threat have faded, however, and a successor generation has taken governmental and institutional reins in Europe and the United States, why the United States and Europe say and do what they do has diverged and become a matter of increasing friction.

In terms that are too simplistic but nevertheless useful as a starting point, U.S. neorealism retains a primary focus on interests shaped by unilateral normative concerns such as the value of private property or an emphasis on religious freedom. Many scholars understand that no single U.S. definition of national interests has ever been evident. Such imprecision has not stopped most U.S. politicians and foreign policy elites from talking as if national interests were clear-cut, somehow in a hierarchy with "vital" at the top. By contrast, while European leaders continue utterances about states and their interests, their policy paths of expression lie necessarily through supranational (or subnational) institutions where cooperation embodies norms.

Critical for both groups, however, is their confrontation with the politics of identity at home, across the Atlantic, and globally. Language, not power or cooperation, speaks to issues of identity—forming, disseminating, and maintaining self and agency of any actor

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from individual to nation. Europe has a new discourse of its own, with new symbols and brands; the desire to expand and make a European identity specific, although by no means universal or equally strong across the continent, is here to stay. The United States, particularly the Bush administration, has renewed emphasis on an old discourse and symbols to strengthen U.S. identity and gird for a war against terrorism.

Indeed, one might characterize the post–September 11 war as a confrontation in which eradicating the presence of the other—not their governing, control of territory, or specific policies—is the war aim. For the United States and for self-styled Islamic fundamentalists, this turns into an identity war. In an identity war, being "with us" is the only alternative to being "against us," and neither formal alliance membership nor adhering to the same faith is enough to prove oneness. During and after such a struggle, erstwhile allies may talk past each other, unable to speak about their motives for policies in ways that fit within the old frames of Euroatlantic security.

The contemporary incompatibility between U.S. and European senses of identity, however, is not solely derived from September 11. Who occupies the international stage and why they do what they do seems to have been much simpler in the Cold War era. Europe's expectations of motives, long containing nuanced distinctions from the United States, now stand in starker contrast.

The U.S. tendency to see identity in black-and-white, good-versus-bad, with-us-or-against-us dichotomies was present in prior decades but Septem-

ber 11 accentuated it sharply. During his presidential campaign, in an eerie and typically fractured rendition of what he would say after September 11, Bush foreshadowed:

> When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world, and you knew exactly who "they" were. It was we versus them, and it was clear who "them" was. Today, we are not so sure who "they" are, but we know they're there.[15]

Bush was expressing, no doubt, something he and millions of Americans felt—that an "us versus them" weltanschauung was implicit in the bipolar, superpower-dominated world of the Cold War. With the Charter of Paris in 1990, and after so many other declarations of a far more holistic notion of security and an international community, Europeans and other advanced societies no doubt expected a metamorphosis of Americans' sense of self—more inclusive, less exclusive, more multilateral, less unilateral—after the Soviet Union dissolved.

Europe is still far from the "whole and free" continent pronounced by President George Bush in 1989. Its divisions include unequal wealth, contrasting norms (from a social-democratic, ecological left to an anti-immigrant and anti-Europe right), and divided loyalties (global, supranational, national, regional, and local). It is, rather than one Europe, four Europes. As differentiated by measures of institutional ties, GDP, political values, and social behavior, an inner core, outer core, inner periphery, and outer periphery clearly emerge.[16] Still, European governments and political elites are not fond of being reminded of their diversity and divisions and would vastly prefer that their accomplishments be acknowledged and intentions recognized.

In the aftermath of September 11, however, such nuances were lost on the U.S. leadership and public. When Bush spoke to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, and said, "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists"—a reprise of his campaign rhetoric, albeit with repaired syntax—Europe recoiled, not from a sense that opposing terrorists was a mutual interest or from the idea that the actions of Osama bin Laden or others who murder thousands in single acts of terrorism are reprehensible. Instead, from the Nordic countries to the Mediterranean, the thought that Americans would no longer accept an emerging identity known as Europe generated angst. After September 11, Americans seemed to be calling not just for burden-sharing but identity subservience.

By European standards, the United States earlier had failed the test and had become a pariah vis-à-vis a normative sense of civilization. For years,

> Think of NATO and the EU as one Euroatlantic community rather than two institutions.

U.S. failure to pay its UN dues seemed to reflect to European and other critics that the organization's policy utility governed U.S. perceptions and policy. Many interpreted the long-standing U.S. reluctance to provide developmental assistance in proportions similar to wealthy West European states (often 5–10 times the proportionate U.S. contribution) as selfish or, at best, misguided.[17] By rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in relatively short succession, the United States seemed also to reject most of a European sense of how states ought to behave. In late 2001, when the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue a national missile defense system, the normative distance grew.

U.S. governments and leaders have not eschewed motivation derived from norms and principles. No one in the twentieth century was lauded or condemned more for endorsing international relations guided by ideals than President Woodrow Wilson. The United States has also played early and formative roles to promote the diffusion of global norms that condemn and fight corruption, limit WMD proliferation, and support and defend political and religious liberties. Portraying U.S. policy as unguided by normative considerations would be grossly inaccurate. Yet, a stronger European orientation toward norms derived from and invested in the continent's cooperative institutions now in part strains transatlantic relations. Such an orientation collides with a U.S. tendency to see norms only through the prism of an aggregate of personal beliefs that are reflected as the state uses power to act in consonance with interests.

Reenvisioning Europe

Since the demise of Europe's Communist states, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' dismemberment, and Germany's reunification, Europe and the United States have made strenuous efforts to preserve the vitality of transatlantic ties. Reinventing NATO was central to that effort. The venerable institutional carrier of transatlantic relations is vastly different than it was in 1989. It has, indeed, grown beyond being an alliance in a classical sense. NATO's future may be, according to some observers, "an upgraded type of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with Russian participation."[18] More charitably, the continental drift between the United States and Europe on matters of security may be institutionalized in differentiated roles, as the United States leads whenever NATO employs force while Europe provides developmental assistance and fills most peacekeeping roles.[19]

The Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan made clear to both sides of the Atlantic that NATO's political capacities to legitimate otherwise largely

unilateral action by the United States are now far more important than any military contributions likely from other members. Even after invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as NATO solemnly did immediately after September 11, military collaboration with the United States was de facto a coalition of the willing, not the action of an alliance.

Once conceived as a community sharing identity and norms in which an alliance for common defense was grounded, NATO is increasingly devolving into ad hoc coalitions. Ideally, such coalitions join the willing with the able. Nonetheless, they can easily and dangerously comprise either the willing but incapable, or unwilling but capable. The greatest peril arises when unwilling and unable join with a hegemon thinking that they have no choice. Blunt questions about NATO's survivability are unsurprising.

> The U.S. conception of Europe must enlarge beyond NATO.

These questions must be addressed by the Prague summit and after. A summit once thought to be about the alliance's enlargement now looms as a far different event. As a result of Prague, the U.S. conception of Europe must enlarge beyond NATO, and Europe's conception of the United States must enlarge beyond a caricature of hegemony.

To reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship, the two parties ought not to rely on functional and geographic expansion of NATO in concert with EU extension. States and institutions are no longer the only actors. Denoting transatlantic bonds in terms of an intersection of interests—as the United States and Europe join to fight terror, nationalist aggression, transnational crime, and other threats—will be at best a transient formula. Although those interests and norms that Americans and Europeans bring to policymaking will be necessary, they will not be sufficient to repair and bind these fundamental ties.

If NATO and the EU compete or if national security interests ignore the wider need for all to be secure, no one may have the benefit of that core collective good (that which is distributed equally to all). Some have called for a U.S. foreign policy to provide international order as a global public good (that for which an equal opportunity exists for all). Whether a collective good or a public good, these are commodities that will erode unless all have access. When such collective or public goods are consumed, however, such use "do[es] not diminish [their] availability to others."[20]

European or U.S. policies that ignore the needs of a larger Euroatlantic community are perilous. Such a community must be one that shares a common discourse and accepts the agency of Europe and the United States, as

well as the EU and NATO, on the international stage. To become grounded firmly in identity and norms, not solely in interests, and to act as a community rather than as a state or institutions of states requires an enormous political leap from the present.

How would envisioning a community, rather than two institutions, alter the transatlantic relationship? What would change?

Whether the foundations of a transatlantic community were framed as a document for signatures and ratification or as declaratory political principles, consequences—strategic, structural, and policy—would follow. At the level of strategy, the way we define security would change. One would define security as a dynamic balance between threats and capacities.[21] Obtaining and maintaining such a balance requires identifying threats and developing capacities that counter real or perceived peril. NATO's business has been enhancing military capacities as an alliance for common defense. Not until the 1990s did it hesitantly commence threat-abatement activities, such as promoting the democratic control of armed forces in post-Communist states. By contrast, the EU, without a military infrastructure of its own, formulated a nascent common foreign and security policy in the 1990s that focused on threat reduction before, during, or after conflict, for example, the Balkan Stability Pact.

> Europe's conception of the U.S. must enlarge beyond a caricature of hegemony.

Such a division of responsibility has become an accepted feature of the transatlantic relationship, but one that thus differentiates and divides European and U.S. security roles. Were community, not institutions, the leitmotif of U.S.-European relations, the alliance would be guided by the strategic recognition that security cannot be achieved unless threat-abatement efforts are pursued simultaneously with robust capacities to project power.

Joining EU and NATO efforts in both facets of security would have structural and budgetary implications and would be visible as multilateral and national policies were formulated and articulated. Jointness and collaboration within the community would make communication "across town" (Brussels) omnipresent and highly valued, from the EU commission president and NATO secretary general down to the levels of desk officer and analyst. An interinstitutional process, akin to an interagency process in most democratic systems, is implicit for a Transatlantic (or, as some may wish, Euroatlantic) Community's policy planning and formulation. Principal member states can embrace a community symbolically by appointing one ambassador in Brussels, not two (one for NATO, one for the EU).

Thinking and acting as one community, however, must be visible as policy. The community cannot respond to a crisis, whether in a European locale such as Macedonia or other regions of the world, or confront global challenges of terrorism, crime, and proliferation if two institutions arrive at often competitive and sometimes contradictory policy. The genesis of transatlantic diplomacy, not separate delegations from NATO and then from the EU, might well be the first tangible evidence that a new chapter can begin. Although EU officials (Chris Patten, Javier Solana) have, in cases such as Macedonia, occasionally joined efforts with Robertson, expected and permanent diplomatic collaboration needs to supersede ad hoc mechanisms. The same can be said for planning and implementing interventions short of war—Petersberg Tasks—that NATO and the EU could undertake as a joint NATO-EU enterprise utilizing equities and skills that both institutions have amassed.

Getting there from here, however, may be more a consequence of trauma than analyses. If EU states are affected by grievous losses to megaterrorism, NATO-related military resources might seem more necessary and European concerns about U.S. hegemony less relevant. If early U.S. successes in the war against terrorism, such as the Taliban regime's precipitous collapse in Kabul, are followed by years of costly, indecisive military and covert action around the world without clear signs of progress, Americans' belief in their own indispensability (or Europe's weakness) may ebb. That both kinds of trauma might, indeed, happen is terrible to contemplate but wholly plausible.

Thinking of NATO and the EU as one Euroatlantic community rather than two institutions is neither unprecedented nor radically disruptive, given the metamorphoses of both. Considering the present acrimony and misunderstanding between Europe and the United States and the current palpable danger and risks ahead, the transatlantic allies may push political will and bureaucratic limits aside and accelerate the process of community building. Still, the chasm that has grown across the Atlantic is formidable and deeply embedded in different conceptions of actors, means, and motives in the international arena. During Prague and beyond, NATO and EU enlargement will be secondary to the real need of reconstituting the transatlantic relationship. Without beginning and guiding such a transformation, NATO and EU enlargement will lead nowhere.

Notes

1. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, "National Community, Political Culture and Support for Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe," in *The Long-Term Applications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border*, ed. Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt (Florence: European University Institute, 2000), "Final Report of the

Reflection Group of the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission," Table 16, p. 94 (citing data from the *World Values Survey* 1995–1997).

2. See Daniel N. Nelson, "Two Worlds of Arms Control," *Monitor* 4, no. 3 (May 1998); Daniel N. Nelson, "Damage Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1999): 55–57.

3. Transparency International, *Global Corruption Report 2001* (Transparency International, 2002), p. 247.

4. Jan Lodal, *The Price of Dominance* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), p. 119.

5. Josef Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?" *National Interest* (summer 2001): 52.

6. Timothy Garton Ash, "The Peril of Too Much Power," *New York Times*, April 9, 2002, p. A25.

7. For 2000–2001 data, see Congressional Budget Office, *NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 2001).

8. Data reflect expenditures through 2002 and were collected by John Treddenick, George C. Marshall European Center for Security; Michael Mihalka, George C. Marshall European Center for Security, calculated these percentages in March 2002. For the net effect of such minimal expenditures for combat in Afghanistan in 2001–2002, see Suzanne Daley, "NATO, Though Supportive, Has Little to Offer Militarily," *New York Times*, September 20, 2001, p. B5.

9. Franklin D. Kramer, "The NATO Challenge," *Washington Times*, March 14, 2002, p. 17.

10. See EU General Affairs Council and the Ministers of Defense of the EU, "Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities," Brussels, November 19, 2000. At St. Malo in 2001, the EU issued a follow-up "Joint Declaration on European Defense" that specified improved capabilities to be developed. The North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session also issued a "Statement of the Defense Capabilities Initiative," Brussels, June 7, 2001, in which goals are reiterated.

11. Michael Brenner and Phil Williams, "The United States and European Security in the 1990s," in *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, ed. Colin McInnes (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 146–147.

12. Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93, no. 3 (fall 1964): 881–909.

13. Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Present Danger," *National Interest* (spring 2000): 58.

14. Quoting William Wallace. See also William Wallace, "Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas," http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace.htm (accessed July 2, 2002) (expansion of Wallace's thoughts after September 11 about the meaning of U.S. "liberal hegemony").

15. This quotation, of course, was never published verbatim by the Bush campaign. It was, however, published widely in media reports and never denied by Bush as a campaigner or president. See, for example, http://www.bushisms.com.

16. Daniel N. Nelson, "Four Europes," in *Security at the Peripheries*, ed. Daniel N. Nelson and Graeme Herd (London: Palgrave, forthcoming).

17. Official development assistance as a proportion of GDP in 2000 showed the United States at 0.10 percent, while large European states such as Great Britain and France provided 0.32 percent, and the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Swedengave 0.80 percent or more. "U.S. Aid Boost is Applauded and Criticized," *International Herald Tribune*, March 16–17, 2002, p. 3

(reporting data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]).

18. Dominique Moïsi, "Toward Harmonious Transatlantic Relations," *Financial Times*, February 10, 2002.

19. Gorm Rae Olsen, "The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa," *International Politics* 39, no. 3 (forthcoming) (documenting the EU's purposeful decision to focus on developmental assistance in non-European regions, initially as a way to enlarge the EU's global role); Joseph S. Nye, "The U.S. and Europe: Continental Drift," *International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (2000): 1–59 (discussing the division of roles).

20. Nye, "The U.S. and Europe" (citing Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds., *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], p. 239).

21. I have developed this definition in various articles and books. See Daniel N. Nelson, "Threats and Capacities: Great Powers and Global Insecurity," in *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, 3rd ed., ed. Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 35–58.