Voter Education Survey

Pakistan National and Provincial Elections 2007/2008

A Report Based on a Nationwide Public Opinion Survey



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Report Abstract

Purpose: The Asia Foundation in Pakistan commissioned a survey of members of the eligible electorate—citizens over the age of 18—during March and April 2007 in order to identify the level of citizen awareness of the 2007-08 electoral process and to inform the design of voter education projects by the Foundation and its partners, including members of the civil society coalition, the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN). The primary purpose of the survey was to assess eligible voters' access to information about the political process, exposure to media, level of political awareness, participation in public affairs, knowledge of specific electoral procedures and the approaching elections, general attitudes about democracy, and expectations about the future.

Research Design: A cross-sectional, representative sample of the population over eighteen was selected using a cluster sampling with unequal probabilities (probability proportional to estimated size) (PPS) procedure, which produced a sample of 2,722 respondents.

Survey: A total of 139 teams of enumerators carried out face-to-face surveys in 145 rural and 84 urban locations lasting approximately one hour each. Interviews were carried out between March 12 and April 5, 2007. All in-person interviews were conducted by Pakistani men and women in collaboration with The Researchers, a non-partisan, non-profit Pakistani organization. After pilot-testing, master trainers and enumerator teams received two days of survey-specific training in each province. Training was carried out from March 8 to March 16, 2007.

Respondents: Of the 2,722 respondents selected for the sample, 2,488 completed the interview, representing a response rate of 91 percent. Of the interviewed respondents, 53 percent were men and 47 percent were women and 54 percent of respondents were between 18 and 35 years of age, proportions roughly equivalent to the respective population proportions. The survey's representativeness was refined subsequently through statistical weighting techniques.

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Summary of Key Findings

This report presents the key findings of The Asia Foundation (TAF) pre-election survey of the knowledge, attitudes, and political participation of the Pakistani electorate with respect to the National and Provincial Assembly elections of 2007-08. The nationally representative survey, conducted prior to the public display of a new, computerized electoral roll in June and July 2007, assessed attitudes of citizens who reached the voting age of 18 prior to January 1, 2007.

The data suggest that, as of March/April 2007, the majority of the eligible Pakistani electorate intended to vote, yet the study found significant disparities based on gender, rural/urban location, income, education, age, province, and other demographic characteristics regarding knowledge, access, and attitudes toward electoral procedures and issues. Understanding such disparities was useful for TAF and other organizations working to design and implement voter outreach and education programs, targeted at women, youth, and the poor, in particular. An internal version of this report was used for this and related purposes beginning in April 2007.

In addition, the survey measured voters' previous experience with electoral processes, including their exposure to and perceptions of electoral fraud and violence, in order to identify populations vulnerable to disenfranchisement or misrepresentation as a result of these problems. These findings highlight the prevalence of different types of irregularities that have been common in past elections for different population subgroups, which might help to inform those involved in the interpretation of electoral conduct before, during, and after election day and contribute to electoral reform efforts.

Demographic Characteristics and Implications for Voter Education (Chapter 2)

- Of the eligible voters surveyed in March/April 2007 for this study, 47% reported reading and writing at least one language (almost always Urdu). In rural areas, 40% are literate, while 60% of the urban electorate is literate. Among native Punjabi and Hindko speakers, 51% and 55%, respectively, are also literate in Urdu, while the other language groups in the sample have 35% or less Urdu literacy. For all the major language groups, literacy rates in Urdu are higher than that for literacy in the mother tongue, but substantial numbers of Pushto speakers (27%) and Sindhi speakers (42%) are literate in their mother tongue. Print materials with a large amount of text in *any* language may be less effective than illustrations and audio-visual voter education strategies in regional languages in rural areas, particularly in Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where the sample's literacy rate is particularly low (30% and 44% respectively). However, almost half of their populations *speak and understand* Urdu (44% and 48%, respectively). In Sindh and Punjab, about 60% of the population speaks Urdu.
- In all languages, more women are illiterate than men. Only 23% of percent of women and 44% of men are literate in their mother tongue. More people are literate in Urdu, with 32% of women and 53% of men reporting that they can speak and understand it.

- Reaching youth with voter education is challenging, since only 5% report being students, and about 40% of people in all age groups report having no education. In fact, educational attainment levels are about the same across generations. Young people have somewhat higher rates of literacy. Forty-three percent of 18-24 year-olds are literate in their mother tongue compared with 31% of both the 25-34 year-old and 35-49 year-old age groups, and 21% of respondents over 50. Forty-four percent of respondents in the youngest age group are literate in Urdu, 49% in the 25-34 age group, and 41% and 36% in the two oldest age groups, respectively.

Interest in Politics (Chapter 3)

- The eligible electorate is relatively disinterested in politics based on self-reporting. Only one in three respondents (32%) said they were somewhat or very interested in politics and 67% were disinterested.
- However, the behavior of the eligible voting population suggests that their interest in politics is elevated during elections and that there are more people who are *actually engaged* in politics than say they are interested in politics. One in three (32%) discusses elections with friends and family and 20% say they are likely to do so. One in four (23%) have told friends and family how to vote and 21% say they might or would be likely to do so. One in five (21%) have argued about elections and 18% might or would be likely to do so.
- Surprisingly, the survey did not provide evidence that men and women respondents differ with respect to interest in politics or likelihood of discussing politics with friends and family, trying to convince others how to vote, or arguing about elections.
- Disinterest in politics is not more characteristic of younger adults, but more young people tend to exhibit medium interest in politics (42%) than high interest (34%).
- Lower income people are also less interested in politics, with 56% of the lowest income respondents expressing no interest at all in politics compared with 36.5% of those in the highest income category. Fifty-four percent of those in the lower middle class have no interest, but of those in the middle class, the number expressing no interest at all falls to 40%. Respondents who have some or a great deal of interest in politics tend to have higher incomes; 28% in the lowest income group are somewhat or very interested in politics compared with 24% in the middle class and 29% in the upper middle class (table not shown).

Information Consumption Preferences (Chapter 3)

- Consumption of media is surprisingly low in Pakistan; 60% of eligible voters never listen to radio or read a newspaper, and 51% never or very rarely watch television.
- Young people of voting age are no more likely than other segments of the population to listen to radio or watch television. Neither are women, who one might expect to be home more often then men.
- When asked to choose two among a variety of potential media for receiving election information, such as a radio drama, a TV debate, or newspapers, a plurality (38%) indicated a preference for some form of television program. Twenty-seven percent

would prefer to hear about elections through illustrations and posters, particularly low-income (33% compared with 19% of upper middle class respondents) and rural respondents (30% compared with 23% of urban respondents).

- More respondents mention PTV (22%) and GEO (9%) as their primary source of political information than *any other single sources*, although 28% prefer sources too diverse to identify.
- If given the opportunity to attend two of several types of events to learn more about elections in their communities, 35% of respondents would decline to attend any type of election-relation program. Twenty percent would be willing to attend a private event such as a home meeting, while 17% would be interested in participating in a rally or other public event.
- The lowest income members of the electorate are less inclined than those with higher incomes to attend any kind of voter education event; over half (54%) compared with 42% of wealthier respondents would decline to attend any voter education activity. However, more (21%) of poor respondents prefer private, home-based events while 15% are willing to attend rallies and other public activities.
- Surprisingly, though one might expect younger people to be interested in going out, there is no evidence of a real difference between age groups in public-private venue preference, even when disaggregated by gender.
- Not surprisingly, more men are willing to attend public events (22%) than women (13%). However, when gender differences are examined by province, it becomes clear that the national differences are attributable to NWFP. There is no evidence that there are real differences between men and women in venue preference in the other three provinces. In NWFP, however, only 7% of women compared with 35% of men prefer public venues, while 17% of women prefer private events compared with 20% of men. Sixty-three percent of NWFP women say they would not attend any event, compared with only 34% of men (table not presented).

Election Awareness and Access (Chapter 4)

- Awareness of key 2006-2007 registration procedures was low; 42% of the electorate was unaware of any of four publicized new aspects of the process. Women were particularly uninformed; 62% were *unaware* of any of four election registration procedures compared with 30% of men.
- Women were less likely to know whether or not the national door-to-door registration process, carried out in 2006 by the ECP, had reached their homes. Sixty-two percent of men and 35% of women were aware that someone had come to their homes to register eligible voters.
- Of those who were reached by the ECP registration in 2006, 80% of women and 89% of men said they registered through this process, which results in an estimated registration rate of 28% of women and 55% of men, keeping in mind that more women may have been registered by male family members (and, possibly, vice-versa).

- Four in five (80%) respondents said they possessed either a new or old identity card required for both registering and voting, but women and younger adults were less likely to have the necessary ID. The majority (94%) of men reported having one of the necessary identity cards compared with 79% of women. One-fourth of 18-24 year olds lacked the necessary ID.
- Surprisingly, people in lower income groups are *not less likely to have* the necessary ID; about 85% of people in all economic classes reporting having at least one form of necessary identification.
- Nineteen percent of eligible voters in both NWFP and Sindh did not have ID, compared with 13% and 10% in their urban areas, respectively. Both rural and urban respondents in Balochistan lacked ID more often than respondents in the other provinces; 21% in rural and 19% in urban areas had neither the old or new ID.

Procedural Barriers to Political Participation (Chapter 4)

- More than one in three (36%) respondents said that inability to register was a very important reason for their lack of participation in previous elections.
- Twenty-nine percent of respondents said that lack of identification after reaching the polling station was a very important factor in nonvoting. Low-income and less-educated respondents reported that a lack of ID was a greater problem than did the wealthy and educated.
- For 17% of respondents, showing up at the polling station and not finding one's name on the voter list was a very important factor in not voting.
- Although difficulty getting to the polling station was an important factor in nonvoting for only 10% of respondents, the percentage for whom reaching the polling station deterred past voting was as high as 19% in NWFP and 15% in Sindh.

Perceptions of Electoral Administration and Conduct (Chapter 4)

- The Election Commission of Pakistan was regarded with a great deal of trust by only one-fourth (25%) of the electorate. Thirty-eight percent of eligible voters had some trust in the ECP and another 38% has no trust at all in the ECP.
- A significant portion of the electorate expected names to be missing from electoral lists at the polling stations in the coming election; 13% said this problem would be very likely and 26% said it would be somewhat likely.
- Better training for election officials would give 40% of eligible voters much more and 18% somewhat more confidence in the election process.
- Before knowing about the new privacy screens being used in the 2008 election, 24% of eligible voters thought it would be somewhat or very likely that authorities would know how they voted in the upcoming elections.
- Almost half (45%) of the electorate expected the upcoming election to be no more free and fair than past elections. Eighteen percent expected them to be somewhat more free and fair and 27% expected them to be much more free and fair. Only 12% expected the upcoming election to be less free and fair than those in the past.

Perceptions of Proposals to Increase Election Access and Fairness (Chapter 4)

- When asked about types of measures that might improve fairness of elections in Pakistan, 42% of eligible voters said having a procedure for ordinary citizens to complain about fraud would give them much more confidence in the election process.
- Local trained observers to monitor the entire process would give 56% of respondents somewhat or much more confidence in the election.
- More than a third (38%) of the electorate would have more confidence in the election process if local governments were dissolved during general elections—a proposal that has been contemplated in the national media--while 37% would have less under these circumstances.

Trust in Governmental and Nongovernmental Institutions (Chapter 5)

- Over two-thirds of respondents (67%) said they had no trust at all in the police, who have responsibility for election security.
- The provincial and national assemblies ranked second to last after the police among institutions with respect to citizen trust. Only 18% of respondents had a great deal of trust in the elected assemblies, while 43% had no trust at all. More people had *some* trust in the assemblies (39%) than had *some* trust in the police (23%).
- Only 20% would recommend a Member of the Provincial or National Assembly (PA/NA) to a friend or family member searching for a solution to a local problem, and one-fourth (26%) of the electorate believed the NA had no power at all.
- Over one in three (34%) of respondents in March/April 2007 had no trust in the national government, while 38% had some trust and 28% have a great deal of trust. Levels of trust in local and provincial government had a very similar distribution. Similarly, 31% had no trust in the judiciary, 37% had some trust, and 31% had a great deal. Over half (58%) of eligible voters felt it important to have friends and family in government in order to get a job.
- Many potential voters believed that corruption was a major and common problem. About the same percentage of respondents (40%) said corruption was a major problem for all three levels of government--local, provincial and national, but more people (59%) said they would be likely to recommend local Nazims and Union Councilors to solve local problems—a rate much higher than that for other levels of government.
- Social institutions had greater trust among the electorate than government and elected institutions. While only 27% of respondents would recommend religious leaders to solve a local problem, these leaders ranked higher than district officials (25%) and members of provincial and national assemblies (20%).
- The electorate, even those who are illiterate and those who rarely listen to radio, read a newspaper, or watch television, had a great deal of trust in the press. Of illiterate respondents, 64% had some or a great deal of trust in the press, compared with 78% of literate respondents, for a nationwide average of 72%.
- *Biradari,* or clan, elders are the institution most often referenced as a likely source for solving local problems, regardless of the respondents' level of educational attainment.

Seventy percent of respondents would recommend this source, while 30% would not. Rural and lower income respondent were somewhat more likely to turn to *Biradari.*

- One-fourth of the electorate (26%)—even higher percentages in rural Sindh (39%) and those with no education (38%)--said they would be likely to recommend large, influential landowners ("feudal" leaders)to solve local problems.

Corruption and Fairness in Politics (Chapter 6)

- When asked their opinions about a number of statements seeking to measure perceptions about patronage, 46% of respondents agreed strongly that government delivers or improves public services like road repair and water in their area for the purpose of influencing elections. An additional 22% agreed, while 18% disagreed. Similar percentages believed political parties and candidates reward their supporters by helping those who voted for them after elections.
- The problem of corruption in political parties was perceived to be common and major more often (51%) than for other institutions.
- Over one-third (39%) of the electorate said they thought that it would be somewhat or very likely that candidates would be prevented from competing in the upcoming election.

"Rigging" and Misconduct in Elections (Chapter 6)

- In NWFP, respondents who had abstained from voting in past elections said the fairness of the election was a somewhat or very important (30%) factor in non-voting almost three times as often as those in the other provinces (9% in Punjab, 11% in Sindh, and 10% in Balochistan, respectively).
- Asked about the likelihood that people would be able to vote more than once in the upcoming election, 21% said very likely and 20% said likely.
- Forty-eight percent said they expected cheating in counting the ballots to be somewhat or very likely, and 38% expected authorities to make changes in the count after the counting process.
- The electorate was divided in its attribution of responsibility for election-rigging in Pakistan; 26% said it is the central government that rigs elections, 32% said local politicians, and 15% said that political parties work together with the government to rig elections in Pakistan.

Undue Influence, Intimidation, and Violence (Chapter 6)

- Fourteen percent of respondents— more in NWFP (23%)--who had abstained in one or more past elections said that fear of violence and unrest was somewhat or very important in their decision not to vote.
- Twelve percent of women—and 30% in NWFP--said a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to abstain from voting in past elections was that family members had stopped them from doing so.
- While few eligible voters actually reported experiencing intimidation personally in past elections, quite a few expected different forms of malpractice to happen in the

upcoming election; 42% said it was somewhat or very likely that employers 45% said that landlords would get their employees and tenants, respectively, to vote together as a group.

- Forty-two percent of respondents said they expected the same amount of violence as in past elections, 14% expected more, and 14% expected less.
- Candidates and voters were identified as the most likely victims of electoral violence by the largest percentage of respondents (27% and 35%, respectively, said candidates and voters would be targeted).
- Thirty-eight percent of respondents believed violence and intimidation would be the most serious threat to a free and fair election, while 43% said fraud and malpractice would be more likely to undermine the results of the next election. Nineteen percent expected the election to be free and fair. It is notable that the number who believed fraud and violence might compromise elections exceeded the number who reported experiencing voter-targeted fraud and coercion directly.

Perceptions of Proposals to Reduce Election Misconduct (Chapter 6)

- Over half (56%) of respondents said having trained observers from the local area to monitor the entire process would give them somewhat or much more confidence in the election.
- A signed and enforced party code of conduct would give 64% of respondents some or much more confidence in the election process.

Perceptions of Democratic Rights and Freedoms (Chapter 7)

- Twenty-five percent of eligible voters agreed strongly with the statement, "Pakistan's citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government," while an additional 26% agreed.
- Forty-eight percent of eligible voters agreed or agreed strongly that citizens can criticize the government freely, while 39% disagreed.
- When asked if they agreed that citizens can join any party or organization they wish, 68% agreed or agreed strongly and 19% disagreed.

Beliefs about Democracy (Chapter 7)

- When asked to chose the two most important factors essential for democracy, the most common response (chosen by 37% of respondents) was the provision of basic necessities for everyone, followed by having a smaller gap between rich and poor (32%). Almost one in three (27% mentioned absence of violence as essential to democracy.
- One in three respondents (33%) mentioned *only* economic factors as essential for democracy, compared with just 10% who mentioned elections and political freedoms *alone*.

Political Participation (Chapter 8)

- One-third (33%) of respondents claimed to have voted in every election, 15% voted in many elections, 16% in 2-3 elections, and 9% in one election. Twenty-eight percent of the eligible electorate--many in the younger age group had never voted.
- One in three women (31%) reported never having voted, while one in four men (24%) had never voted.
- The percentage of those who had never voted was highest in NWFP (37%), followed by 32% in Balochistan and 26% each in Punjab and Sindh.
- Forty-five percent of respondents said they were very likely to vote in the next election and 24% said they were somewhat likely to vote. Eighteen percent were uncertain whether they would vote and 14% were unlikely to vote. Eighty percent of male respondents compared with 58% of female respondents were *somewhat or very* likely to vote, and women said they were very unlikely to vote twice as often as men (10% of women compared with 5% of men).
- The most important reason for voting in past elections mentioned by the largest percentage (74%) of respondents was a belief that voting is a duty for every citizen, followed by a belief that voting makes a difference (56%), a desire to change things in Pakistan (38%), and strong feelings about the candidates (36%).
- Almost half of respondents (49%) said voting in the 2008 election would make a big difference, while 27% thought it would make some difference. One in four (24%) thought voting would make little or no difference.
- Less than 20% of respondents said they had or would be likely to engage in each of four other forms of democratic participation—election boycotts, attending rallies, going to political party meetings, and contacting representatives.

Women's Political Participation (Chapter 8)

- While three-quarters (75%) of respondents agreed or agreed strongly with the notion that women can run for political office, one in four (24%) disagreed or disagreed strongly, and respondents of both genders believed that men are better suited for politics than women.
- Similarly, while one-third of respondents (64%) agreed that women can lead Muslim countries, one-third disagreed.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Asia Foundation (TAF) in Pakistan commissioned a survey of the members of the eligible electorate of Pakistan—citizens over the age of 18—in order to identify the level of citizen awareness of the 2007-08 electoral process, including the public display of the draft voters list during June and July 2007, in order to (a) inform the design of voter education projects by the Foundation and the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), an independent coalition of 30 civil society organizations implementing voter education and election observation projects, and other partners in Pakistan (hereafter "the partners") in preparation for national elections; (b) provide a picture of the types of electoral irregularities that voters experience most often to contribute to election observation and electoral reform efforts; and (c) generate baseline measurements of voters' past experiences with electoral coercion and fraud that can be repeated after the 2008 election and during future electoral processes for comparison over time and between different types of elections (i.e., local versus national).

The survey data was collected in March and April 2007, soon after the dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, but before the proclamation and then lifting of a state of emergency and the death of a former Prime Minister and opposition candidate.[1] The survey sheds light on the predispositions, expectations, and attitudes of ordinary men and women at that specific moment in time. Publication and dissemination of key findings from the pre-election survey may contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the 2007/2008 electoral process.

1.1 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

The primary purpose of the survey was to assess eligible voters' access to information about the electoral process, exposure to media, level of political awareness, participation in public affairs, knowledge of specific voter registration and electoral procedures and the approaching elections, general attitudes about democracy, and expectations about the future.

In an environment in which other surveys of the electorate were also being carried out, TAF sought to complement rather than duplicate the efforts of other organizations. While the survey included conventional survey questions about democracy, trust in the electoral process, and trust in government institutions as a basis for comparison, it also introduced novel questions designed to gauge the perceived quality of the electoral administration process, the levels of government that citizens perceive as most powerful, accountable, and responsive to their problems, and the way that citizens understand and experience common methods of electoral manipulation, from vote-buying to intimidation.

Democracy-promoting programs related to elections have matured, evolving from election-day observation to long-term partnerships between national nongovernmental organizations and/or governmental agencies and international organizations. Research and practice also have moved beyond simple notions of competition and the meaning of a

[1] See Proclamation of Emergency, November, 3, 2007, and Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007. (http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Nov/order.htm).

"free and fair" election. In addition, a number of experts have called for more careful measurement and assessment of the technical aspects of electoral administration,[2] including election security,[3] and how they shape voter perceptions of both the concept of democracy in general and the quality of an election in particular. The partners' aimed to take these developments into account in implementing both the survey and the full range of voter education and election observation activities.

The survey aimed to understand how ordinary men and women in Pakistan have experienced electoral processes in the past, including the devolution process launched with the 2000-01 local elections,[4] and how they perceived contemporary developments in electoral administration, such as the introduction of a new, computerized electoral roll. Analysis of citizens' experiences of previous electoral processes was used to help inform the partners' programming, including choosing media formats and designing messages to reach various target groups with voter education activities, as well as identifying themes for emphasis in election observation and advocacy efforts.

Specifically, the survey aimed to contribute to public understanding of citizen knowledge and attitudes in several key areas that influence their (a) likelihood of voting and other forms of participation and (b) confidence in Pakistani electoral processes, as well as democracy as a general concept. The survey sought to assess the sentiments of the eligible electorate with respect to:

- The types of traditional, governmental, and nongovernmental authorities that citizens trust and hold accountable;
- The types and forms of media and other sources of political information citizens use most often, and whether citizens with different religious, ethnic, and age profiles have different media preferences;
- Access to information about politics and participation in electoral processes; including voter identity cards, voter registration, and awareness of when, where, and how voting would take place;
- Concerns about security in general and anticipated unrest, violence, or intimidation surrounding the 2008 election in particular;
- Perceptions and actual experiences of general and electoral corruption; and
- The electoral experience of women and other typically disenfranchised groups.

[2] See, for example, Jorgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds. 2002. "The impact of election administration on the legitimacy of emerging democracies: a new comparative politics research agenda." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 40 (2):86-119; Elklit, Jorgen, and Andrew Reynolds. 2005. "A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality." *Democratization* 12 (2):147-62; Pastor, Robert. 1999. "The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions." *Democratization* 6 (4).

[3] Fischer, Jeff. 2002. "Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention." In *IFES White Papers*, ed. IFES. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems.

[4] See Local Government Plan 2000 http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/LG_Final_Plan_2000.pdf and Local Government Ordinance 2001 www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/SBNP_Local_Govt_Ordinance_2001.pdf.

In addition to informing the partners' assessment of the overall conduct of elections, the survey results were used with the following objectives in mind:

1. Identification of the most *appropriate audiences* and *locations* for voter education programming;
2. Design of the *form and language* of voter education programming;
3. Development of appropriate, context-specific *messages* and *content* for voter education messages; and
4. Identification of the types of issues *election observers* should emphasize.

1.2 BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

A number of Pakistan's twenty-four provincial and national elections since independence were relatively competitive and have brought comparatively civilian, democratic governments to power. (See **Chapter 8 Attachment** for a list of past elections in Pakistan.) However, Pakistan has been governed by non-civilian rule for much of its history. Despite many setbacks, the press, political parties, and civil society have sustained and periodically intensified calls for the restoration or strengthening of democratic institutions and greater transparency in the conduct of elections.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

1.31 Sample Design

The research team selected a cross-sectional, representative sample of the population over eighteen using a national probability disproportionate, stratified multistage survey design. Pakistan's four provinces, as well as the Islamabad Capital Territory and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), served as first-stage strata in the cluster sampling procedure with unequal probabilities (probability proportional to estimated size, PPES).

Villages in rural areas and census circles in urban areas, delineated from the national 1998 census by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, constituted the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), or clusters, in each province. As a result of using the PPS method, the sample of clusters contains a disproportionate number of large villages and urban circle numbers, resulting in 88 locations in Punjab with a total sample size of 1,540 respondents, 47 locations in NWFP with a sample size of 338, 60 locations with a sample size of 640 in Sindh, 44 locations with a sample size of 128 in Baluchistan, one location in Islamabad with a sample size of 19, and one location with a sample size of 57 PSUs in FATA.

Within each PSU, twelve households were selected using a systematic sampling method. Interviewers chose a central location within each PSU, from which a starting point was selected using a random start. Interviewers identified every fifth household (a sampling interval of five) from the random start, for a total of twelve households within each PSU. Within each household, interviewers enumerated the number of household members eligible to vote and used a Kish grid to select the respondent randomly from all eligible voters within the household (See Survey Questionnaire in the **Appendix** for Kish Grid). Interviewers administered the questionnaire to each sampled respondent.

1.32 Limitations of the Sample Data and Analysis

Although considerable care was given to the design of the survey and to the way in which it was presented to respondents, a number of factors suggest caution in drawing inferences about the results. First, the absence of census data based on enumeration of households and individuals at the level of the village or census-enumeration block made it impossible to create a complete sampling frame from which to draw a simple random sample and to account for the complex nature of the sampling design at the analysis stage.

Second, as in many countries with evolving democratic institutions, circumstances fluctuate more quickly than in more established democracies. The electoral context changed considerably after the survey was conducted. Responses should be viewed as a snapshot of the eligible voting population at the time of the survey, rather than as enduring predispositions and tendencies.

While the overall survey response rate for completed interviews was high by conventional standards, item non-response, in which data is missing completely for a given question, and ambiguous responses (Don't Know/Don't Remember) are common for most questions. The analysis does not seek to make statistical corrections for missing data but presents frequencies and percentages for those people who said they did not know or did not remember in response to a question. People respond in this manner for many reasons. Interviewers recorded whether respondents refused to answer the question, had no opinion, suggested another response, did not remember, or did not know. Only the "Don't Know" category is included in the analysis unless otherwise noted. The survey instrument with the total number of valid responses for each question can be found in the appendix.

Social desirability bias, in which respondents tend to tell interviewers what is socially acceptable or desirable, is a problem in any survey. This bias was likely a factor in questions about literacy, income, and social status, as well as sensitive issues such as victimization or perpetration of corrupt or illegal activities. Respondents may misrepresent their true feelings by choosing the socially desirable response or may simply say they do not know how to answer. Respondent perceptions of interviewers, the organization conducting the survey, and fears about how the survey data might be used, even when they are assured of confidentiality, can also lead them to respond in ways that they hope will please the interviewer or to avoid choosing responses that might upset or offend the interviewer. This is particularly likely for questions about support for democracy or non-governmental organizations, given that a non-governmental organization known for supporting democratic institutions conducted the survey.

In any of these situations, had more respondents' answered the question, the overall findings might have been different. It would be redundant to repeat this caveat for every finding presented in this report.

Nevertheless, given the large size of the sample, it is possible to draw some useful conclusions about the nature of elections in Pakistan, particularly how ordinary men and women seek information about elections, how they participate in the process, and their views of the election campaign process.

1.33 Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire was designed to cover several areas of interest to organizations working in the field of electoral administration strengthening: attitudes and perceptions toward current state and non-state institutions, preferred actual and potential sources of political information, access to election-specific procedures and processes designed to ensure citizen participation, and ordinary citizens' views about the state of democracy in Pakistan as well as the broader meaning of Democracy as a concept. Particular emphasis was placed on the development of questions designed to measure both perceptions and experience of corruption, electoral fraud, and electoral violence. Questionnaire development was guided by previous Asia Foundation surveys and reports,[5] program managers' and partners' knowledge of the Pakistani political landscape and electoral system, and advice on electoral fraud and violence, data management, and survey design from a researcher with experience in Pakistan.

Questions on electoral fraud and violence were informed by past election surveys, surveys on crime carried out in the United States, and the Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Program at the International Foundation for Election Systems (See end of Appendix for questionnaire design references). The initial questionnaire was also subject to a pilot test, carried out by The Researchers.

Careful attention was paid to question order, particularly with respect to questions regarding awareness of 2007/2008 electoral procedures and past voting behavior, to reduce the probability of bias. The questionnaire was written in English and translated into Urdu and Sindhi.

1.34 Data Collection

In addition to collecting substantive data about political institutions, democracy, and elections, the questionnaire included questions on other topics to provide context about the nature of the electorate. Each respondent was asked questions about their household, education, previous employment, housing tenure, mother tongue/ethnicity, and religion. This information was used in the development of voter education materials and strategies.

1.35 Interviewing and Fieldwork Procedures

In order to prepare for the interviews, *The Researchers* organized two-day survey-specific briefing and training sessions for experienced male and female local interviewers in each province. After training was complete, interviewers were deployed throughout the country to recruit a random cross-section of respondents, supervised using strict checks in the field with team managers.

Forty-three teams (one supervisor and two enumerators; one male and one female) with a total of 139 enumerators carried out face-to-face surveys, recording responses using pen and paper, in 145 rural and 84 urban locations lasting approximately one hour each. Interviews were carried out between March 12 and April 5, 2007. Female interviewers

[5] See, for example, Charney, Craig, et. al. for The Asia Foundation. 2004. "Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections." Kabul: The Asia Foundation.

conducted 1,260 interviews, and male interviewers conducted 1,223 interviews. Gender identity information for the interviewer is missing for 220 surveys.

Supervisors selected households randomly for follow-up verification that interviews were conducted.

1.36 Data Management

After interviews were complete, the questionnaires were entered from April 11–27, using a web-based system for entry of each survey. After data were checked for accuracy and any inconsistencies resolved, they were transferred to SPSS software for creation of sampling weights[6] and preliminary analysis. Stata software was used for analysis, taking aspects of the complex nature of the sampling design into account.

1.37 Weighting the Data

Several districts in the North-West Frontier Province were not included in the survey due to violence, including Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, and Kohat districts. Of the 2,722 respondents finally selected for the sample, 2,488 completed the interview. Furthermore, interviewers could make only one substitution per cluster if unsuccessful in contacting respondents. Interviewers were required to return to the household three times, unless they determined that it was not a residence. Only 88 household substitutions were made in the sample of 2,722. The response rate of 91% is well above accepted norms and was not incorporated into the weighting procedure.[7]

Data are weighted for respective proportion of the population age 18 years and above in each province, the percentage of urban and rural residents in each province, and the proportion of men and women in the population. The province-level distribution of urban and rural PSUs (villages and census enumeration blocks) in the survey sample compared with the population distribution is shown in **Table 1.37a**.

Table 1.37a

Provincial and Urban-Rural Distributions for Sampled Respondents and 1998 Pakistan Population Proportion

PROVINCE	Rural Respondents (N)	Rural % (Sample)	Rural % (Census)	Urban Respondents (N)	Urban % (Sample)	Urban % (Census)	Total PSUs	TOTAL Respondents
Punjab	671	62.9	68.7	395	37.0	31.3	88	1066
NWFP	438	81.4	83.1	100	18.6	16.9	47	538
Sindh	296	48.8	51.2	310	51.1	48.8	60	606
Balochistan	388	78.7	76.1	105	21.2	23.9	44	493
Islamabad	12	100	34.3	0	0	65.7	1	12
FATA	5	100	97.3	1	0	2.7	1	6
Total	**1810**	**66.5**	**67.5**	**911**	**33.5**	**32.5**	**229**	**2,722**

[6] In the dataset, the final sampling weight is labeled "FINALWT1".

[7] See American Association for Public Opinion Research. 2000. *Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys*. Lenexa, Kansas: AAPOR.

Slightly fewer women responded to the survey than the percentage of women in the total population. The data are weighted accordingly. **Table 1.37b** presents the number of men and women in the survey and compares the proportion of sampled women with the population proportion based on the most recent census (1998). The sample age-distribution was also weighted based on the population proportions in the census (not presented).

Table 1.37b

Proportion of Men and Women in Sample and 1998 Pakistan Population Proportions

PROVINCE	Survey Respondents			***Respondent*** Proportion Female	***Population*** Proportion Female
Name	Male (N)	Female (N)	Total (N)	%	%
Punjab	775	763	1064	58.9	58.1
NWFP	281	254	535	47.5	48.8
Sindh	326	280	606	46.2	47.1
Baluchistan	257	235	492	47.8	46.6
Islamabad	6	6	12	50.0	46.0
FATA	6	0	6	0.00	48.1
Total	**1454**	**1261**	**2,715**	**50.2**	**48.0**

After weighting, the sample is a reasonable estimate at the national and provincial level of the adult population of Pakistan as a whole in terms of gender, urban-rural, regional and age distribution compared with the population as of 1998.[8]

1.38 Data Analysis and Reporting

Clustering reflects the sampling of surveyed individuals within the PSUs (villages and urban census blocks). In the absence of clustering, the PSUs are defined to be the individuals or, equivalently, clusters each of size one. Generally, sampling by cluster implies a sample-to-sample variability of the resulting estimates that is usually greater than that obtained through sampling individually, and this variability must be accounted for when estimating standard errors or performing significance testing.

The survey module in Stata is designed to handle these features of complex surveys. The complex nature of the sampling used was taken into consideration through the second stage.[9] Complex samples have more sampling error than simple random sampling, and

[8] Public opinion research has found that a sample size of 1,000 is generally sufficient for inferences about a population of any size; beyond which further additions do not further reduce the margin of sampling error. However, making inferences about subpopulations, such as provinces and linguistic groups, requires additional sample points to ensure sufficient numbers for drawing meaningful conclusions about them. While a sample of 1000 of each subgroup (e.g., province) would best minimize sampling error at the province level, the survey's sample size provides hundreds of respondents in each province (and more than 1,000 in Punjab). While large enough for analysis, the reader should keep in mind that the margin of sampling error for any province-level finding is greater than it is for the national-level findings. For an explanation of the principles behind the general practice of selecting 1000 respondents in national surveys, see the American Association for Public Opinion Research (http://www.aapor.org/marginofsamplingerror).

[9] Analysis was carried out using Stata (A Data Analysis Package). See StataCorp. 2005. Stata Statistical Software: Release 9. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. Syntax used in the analysis can be made available upon request. The absence of district-level household population proportions makes it impossible to

statistical analysis packages usually consider data as a simple random survey. Because the number of respondents in the Islamabad Capital Territory and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are insufficiently large to include in the complex survey analysis, they are omitted from the national-level data presented in this report. This omission allows for accurate analysis of province-level data and other sub-populations. With this omission, the number of surveys was 2,703.

It is misleading to report margins of sampling error for an entire survey, particularly one that reports most information for sub-populations, such as provinces. Furthermore, sampling error does not include error due to nonresponse, interviewer bias, and other factors. Therefore, the margin of sampling error, not accounting for weighting, is offered with caution as theoretically 2.5% at a 99% level of confidence, given the population and sample size.

1.39 Notes on Conventions Used in Report Tables

- The unit of analysis is adults of voting age. Respondents are never described as voters, since they are only of voting age, except in reference to those who claimed to have voted in one or more past elections. "Likely voters" are those who said they plan to vote in the upcoming election.
- Because complex sampling design could be taken into account only partially and the household and individual-level sampling frames were unavailable, necessitating the use of a random walk pattern, standard errors and confidence intervals in any univariate or bivariate analysis are likely to be underestimated, increasing the likelihood of finding significant differences between population subgroups (e.g., men and women) when there are none. For this reason, all bivariate relationships that are reported in the narrative or tables are significant based on a conservative 99% confidence interval. There is no difference, for example, between male and female respondents in the household income they report. Data for income, therefore, are not presented disaggregated by gender.
- The margin of sampling error for each percentage (point estimate) is not presented with the data, but the possibility of sampling and other forms of error should be kept in mind. Furthermore, the margin of sampling error for provinces and subgroups is greater than that for country-level percentages. The base weighted is used to give readers a sense of the sample size associated with a particular question.
- Chi^2 figures, standard errors, confidence intervals, and p-values are not reported, unless the result only approaches significance, in order to simplify the presentation. If findings are discussed or presented, they are statistically significant at the 99% level ($p<.01$).
- All tables present univariate and bivariate data that are significant. These are measures of association or correlation and cannot be inferred as causal relationships. Multivariate analysis, which is beyond the scope of this report, would be required to

account for the complex sampling design beyond the PSU level. The commands "svyset" and "svy: tabulate" were used to calculate appropriate standard errors and tests of significance.

draw inferences about the directional relationships between variables presented in this report.

- All data in this report are weighted. Unweighted and weighted bases, or illustrative bases, are shown at the foot of each table. The unweighted base is the number of respondents who gave a valid answer to that question. Some respondents failed to answer each question. These "item non responses" have been excluded from the analysis, so tables that describe the same sub-populations (e.g., urban versus rural) may have slightly different bases. The weighted bases show the relative sizes of the various sample elements after weighting, reflecting their proportion in the Pakistani population, so that data from different columns can be combined in their correct proportions. Unweighted frequencies and percentages are presented within the survey questionnaire in the Appendix. Unless otherwise noted, all tables in the report present percentages rounded to the nearest integer to ease interpretation and to avoid confusion with weighted frequencies.
- Due to rounding, column percentages do not always sum to 100%.
- Titles of tables summarize the general meaning of each question. The tables or the narrative provide references to question numbers and specific question wording from which data categories and tables are derived. The question wording and order are presented in the Appendix.
- Some questions were multi-coded (i.e. the question allowed respondents to give more than one answer). The column percentages in these tables may sum to more than 100%.

Chapter 2: Sample Characteristics

While political institutions shape the quality of governance, degree of democracy, and attitudes of ordinary citizens, population characteristics such as ethno-linguistic differences, socio-economic stratification, and literacy also influence political behavior and the responsiveness of governments and political parties to public opinion.

Some studies suggest, for example, that a large middle class and mass literacy are necessary conditions for democracy. While it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze relationships systematically between socio-demographic background characteristics and political outcomes, which would require more complex multivariate statistical analysis, the socio-economic-linguistic context of Pakistan is important to understanding the survey data, designing voter education programs, and observing electoral processes. In societies that maintain largely oral traditions and in which education is limited, the level of literacy, class and religious differences, and other social factors can influence the interaction between interviewer and respondent and interpretation of questions. Demographic information is also important for the identification of populations most vulnerable to disenfranchisement as a result of lack of access to information, deliberate omission from voter registration processes, or undue influence in order to design voter education strategies and identify populations or areas where the presence of observers would be most effective in deterring problems during an election.

Analysts of past elections have pointed out the importance of provincial, rural-urban, sectarian, age, occupational status—particularly between employees and employers, and class divisions in political party support as well as campaign strategy.[1] Political parties and non-governmental organizations, for example, have chosen radio or local-language press to reach rural populations, while state-run television (PTV), available without cable, has been a medium of choice for lower-income and rural groups that do not have access to cable television, where private stations have grown in importance since restrictions on broadcast media were relaxed in 2002.[2]

This section presents data describing the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the sample population (adults over 18 years of age), which are used in the following sections to better understand variation in this diverse population's experience of past elections and perceptions of the 2007/2008 electoral process. In addition, since the last census was conducted almost ten years before the survey, the demographic profile provides an updated snapshot of the Pakistani electorate as of March/April 2007.

[1] For a summary of scholarly literature on past elections in Pakistan, as well as a thorough discussion of shifting bases of party support at the district and provincial levels, see Mohammad Waseem. 2006. *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

[2] The Government of Pakistan established the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) on 16 January 2002 to license privately-owned radio and TV stations. Pakistanis with subscriptions to cable or satellite services could already receive two private channels in Urdu, including Geo TV which broadcasts from Dubai and London. PTV enjoys what is called a "terrestrial monopoly" of television air waves.

2.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Like many developing countries, Pakistan's population is young. Female survey respondents were, on average, younger than male respondents. Seventy-six percent were married (**Table 2.1a**). Whereas in some countries unemployment and housing shortages have reduced marriage rates and increased the age of marriage among younger populations, income and unemployment do not appear to be barriers to marriage in Pakistan.

Table 2.1a

Age and Marriage Status, by Gender (Questions Q2, 3, 1)

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Total (%)
Age			
18-24 years	25	30	27
25-34 years	24	30	27
35-49 years	25	24	24
50 years	27	17	22
Marriage Status			
Married	77	75	76
Unmarried	23	18	20
Divorced	0	1	0
Widowed	1	6	3

a. Percentages are by Column and sum to 100

b. Age Bases Weighted, 2642; Unweighted, 2697

c. Marriage Bases Weighted, 2582; Unweighted, 2628

d. Age and Marriage Status do not differ in Urban and Rural Areas

The majority of respondents were either employed full time--46% and 28% of men and women, respectively—or working in the home (30% of men and 55% of women). Students represent five percent of respondents, and retirees three percent. Four percent reported that they were seeking work (**Table 2.1b**). Only 37% of the survey respondents were employed full time.

Table 2.1b

Employment Status, by Gender (Q10)

Status	Men (%)	Women (%)	Total (%)
Full Time	46	28	37
Part Time	5	3	4
Seeking Work	7	3	5
Retired	4	2	3
Homemaker	30	55	42
Student	5	5	5
Other	4	4	4

a. Percentages by Column

b. Bases Weighted, 2542; Weighted, 2586

c. Employment status did not differ by region or rural/ urban milieu.

Occupational status has been salient in past Pakistani elections. While land tenants often vote with landowners, employers and employees often have been on different sides of local political divisions. In areas where a high percentage of the labor force is employed in the civil and military branches of government, such as north Punjab, voter preferences

have been distinct.[3] Among both male and female respondents, the most common reported occupation was homemaker, but it is unclear whether men reported falling into this category because they were unemployed, independently-wealthy, engaged in a stigmatized economic activity or for other reasons. The unemployment rate in 2004 was 7.7 percent,[4] while the 1998 Census reported an unemployment rate of almost 20 percent.[5] Agricultural laborers and small and medium farmers made up 10 and 8% of the sample, respectively. Nine percent of respondents are self employed, while 7% each work in government and the private sector (**Table 2.1c**).

Table 2.1c

Occupation Classification, by Gender and Urban/Rural Classification (Q11)

Classification	Men (%)	Women (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Total (%)
Self-Employed	11	8	8	11	9
Government	9	5	5	9	7
Industry/Private Sector Employee	9	5	7	7	7
Agricultural Laborer	13	7	12	6	10
Small or Medium Farmer	10	5	9	5	8
Landowner	1	1	1	2	1
Professional/Managerial	1	1	1	1	1
Education/Teacher (incl. Madrasa)	3	3	3	3	3
Homemaker	33	59	46	45	46
Other	10	7	7	11	8
Total Column Percentage	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

a. Gender Bases Weighted, 2335; Unweighted, 2393

b. Urban/Rural Bases Weighted, 2337; Unweighted, 2396

Reported housing tenure rates are high, with 80% of respondents reporting that they or a relative own their current residence, a figure roughly consistent with figures from 2004 Living Standards Survey.[6] More respondents in NWFP said they live in residences owned by landlords (**Table 2.1d**), a much higher number than that of government statistics, a discrepancy that could be attributable to sampling bias. The average household size, including adults and children, was ten.

[3] Waseem, Mohammad. 2006. *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

[4] Asian Development Bank. 2005. "Asian Development Outlook 2005: South Asia." Manila: Asian Development Bank.

[5] Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics. 1998. "Pakistan National Census." Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.

[6] Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics. 2004. "Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM)." Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.

Table 2.1d

Average Household Size and Housing Tenure, by Province

Province	Average Household Size (Adults/Children) (Q6)	Owner of Respondents' Home (Q7)			
		Respondent Owns	Relative Owns	Landlord Owns	Other
Punjab	10	68	22	6	4
NWFP	9	27	23	45	4
Sindh	10	40	33	25	2
Balochistan	12	56	18	24	2
TOTAL	10	55	25	17	3

a. Percentages are by Row

b. HH Size Bases Weighted, 2204; Unweighted, 2283
c. Home Ownership Bases Weighted, 2504; Unweighted, 2553
d. Housing tenure rates do not differ significantly between urban and rural areas, except in the Punjab and Sindh. 10% of respondents in Urban Punjab live in landlord-owned dwellings as opposed to 4% in rural Punjab. In Sindh, 30 percent of Urban respondents live in landlord-owned housing as opposed to 20% of rural respondents, while 46% of rural respondents own their own housing in urban versus 33% in urban Sindh.

Income distribution for the sample differed in rural and urban areas—but not Province--with lower income people living disproportionately in rural areas (**Figure 2.1**). Economic studies consistently find higher rates of poverty in NWFP, which again points to the possibility of sampling bias in this province.

Figure 2.1



a. Income distributions did not vary significantly by gender or province. Education, language literacy, and income are strongly linked, a finding common to nearly all survey data, and are not presented.

In 2001, the Government of Pakistan announced a poverty line of 749 Pakistani rupees (Rs) per capita per month, which was about 900 Rs in 2005 prices.[7] **Table 2.1e** presents

[7] Oxford Policy Management. 2006. "Poverty and Social Impact Assessment: Pakistan Microfinance Policy." London: DFID.

the *household* income distribution of the sample population in urban and rural areas and defines five summary class categories that are used to ease subsequent analysis. Below Rs.4,000/month is considered below the poverty line for a family of four.

Table 2.1e

Percent Population per Household Income Category, in Rural and Urban Areas

Monthly Income in Rupee (Q13)	Class Designation	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Population (%)
Less than Rs 1,000	Lowest Income	5.2	2.4	4.2
Rs 1,001-2,000		11.7	6.5	9.8
Rs 2,001-3,000		16.4	12.7	15.1
Rs 3,001-4,000		12.5	10.2	11.7
Rs 4,001-5,000	Lower Middle Class	17.5	19.5	18.2
Rs 5,001-10,000	Middle Class	18.4	24.4	20.6
Rs 10,001-15,000	Upper Middle Class	6.9	10.4	8.2
More than Rs 15,001	High Income / Wealthy	9.5	11.8	10.3
Don't Know		1.9	2.0	1.9
Total Column Percentage		100	100	100

a. Base Weighted, 2488; Unweighted, 2536

b. Income did not differ significantly by province or gender

2.2 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND LANGUAGE LITERACY

Limited educational opportunities, linguistic complexity, and high rates of illiteracy present challenges to both political parties and election administrators in Pakistan. Voter education activities must be designed with these issues in mind.

The national print and electronic media in Pakistan is composed of primarily English and Urdu sources, with some local language radio, television, and print media available regionally and locally. The business of government is conducted in both Urdu and English.

Forty-two percent of respondents (38% of men and 45% of women) reported having no education. An additional 10% have a madrasa education or some primary school. Fifteen percent passed the matriculation exam and 9% have an F.A./F.Sc degree (**Table 2.2a**). Reported educational attainment rates are somewhat lower in rural areas. Because the number of respondents with bachelor's degrees or above is small, the those with the F.A./F.Sc degree and other higher degrees are combined in further analysis.[8]

[8] Education in Pakistan is divided into five levels: primary (grades one through five); middle (grades six through eight); high (grades nine and ten, culminating in what used to be known as matriculation, or matric); intermediate (grades eleven and twelve), after which a diploma is awarded upon successful completion of a test. This diploma is now called the 'Higher Secondary School Certificate' or HSSC, but people still refer to the degree as F.Sc./F.A. ("Familiar of Science"/Familiar of Art") or 'intermediate'.

Table 2.2a

Educational Attainment, by Gender and Urban-Rural Classification

Education Level Completed (Q12)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Total (%)
None	38	45	45	35	42
Madrasa	3	5	4	4	4
Some Primary School	6	5	6	5	6
Primary School	9	8	9	8	9
Middle School	9	7	8	8	8
Matric	15	15	14	16	15
F.A. / F.Sc	9	8	8	10	9
B.A. / B.Sc	7	5	5	8	6
MA or Professional Degree	4	2	2	5	3
Doctorate or Post-Graduate Degree	0	0	*0*	*0*	0
Total Column Percentage	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

a. Gender Bases Weighted, 2567; Unweighted 2620

b. Urban-Rural Bases Weighted, 2569, Unweighted, 2623

c. Educational distribution does not vary significantly by province or age.

The level of educational attainment is virtually the same across age cohorts. Youth do not possess more education, even at the primary, middle school, and matric levels, than older people (data not presented; results very close to the national averages, with no statistically significant deviations).

The number of respondents speaking each mother tongue in the four provinces is presented in **Table 2.2b**. In Punjab, 72.6% of respondents speak Punjabi, followed by 16.3% who speak Seraiki and 9.1% who speak Urdu. In NWFP, 72.9% of respondents speak Pushto, 16.1% speak Hindko, and 3.9% speak Seraiki. In Balochistan, 30.8% of respondents speak Pushto, 45.8% speak Balochi, and 3.9% speak Seraiki.[9]

Table 2.2b

Provincial Language Distributions

PROVINCE	Urdu	Punjabi	Seraiki	Hindko	Pushto	Sindhi	Balochi	Others
Punjab	9.1	72.6	16.3	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	1.1
NWFP	1.3	0.7	3.9	16.1	72.9	0.0	0.0	5.1
Sindh	24.2	6.6	3.5	1.5	1.6	57.3	4.2	1.2
Balochistan	2.1	1.2	3.9	0.3	30.8	7.7	45.8	8.2
Total Pakistan:	**11.4**	**44.4**	**11.1**	**2.6**	**11.4**	**14.1**	**3.1**	**2.0**

a. Percentages are by Row b. Base Weighted, 2501; Unweighted 2502

Table 2.2c presents data showing where mother tongue speakers are located. Almost 51% of native Urdu speakers live in Sindh, while 47.1% live in Punjab. The vast majority (96.2%) of Punjabi speakers live in Punjab. Most Seraiki speakers live in Punjab (86.4%) and Sindh (7.6%). Most Hindko speakers live in NWFP (80%, primarily north of Islamabad) and Sindh (13.6%). Almost 83% of percent of Pushto speakers live in NWFP,

[9] The survey included a question about religious affiliation. The weighted number of Shia respondents in the survey was 162.3, or about 6% of respondents. No results were found to be significantly different according to religious sect, although the small number of respondents in minority religious groups is insufficient for robust statistical analysis at the subgroup level.

with some (11.7%) living in Balochistan. Almost all (97.3%) of Sindhi speakers live in Sindh. Balochi speakers are distributed across Sindh (33.2%) and Balochistan (64.6%).

Table 2.2c

Distribution of Mother Tongue Speakers Across Provinces

	Percent Respondents Speaking Mother Tongue in Province							
PROVINCE	Urdu	Punjabi	Seraiki	Hindko	Pushto	Sindhi	Balochi	Others
Punjab	47.1	96.2	86.4	5.5	2.2	.35	2.2	33.5
NWFP	1.4	.21	4.6	80.4	82.8	0	0	33.6
Sindh	50.7	3.5	7.6	13.6	3.2	97.3	33.2	14.9
Balochistan	.8	.11	1.5	.50	11.7	2.4	64.6	18
Total Pakistan:	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

a. Percentages are by COLUMN

b. Base Weighted, 2501; Unweighted 2502

In addition to identifying their mother tongue, respondents were asked whether they read and/or write each of the major languages of Pakistan (Q9). **Table 2.2d** presents data for minimum literacy in each province, by urban and rural areas. Those who said they could read, speak, and write *at least one* language are defined as literate for the purpose of the analysis.[10] Forty-seven percent of the sample is able to read *and* write at least one language. Using this definition of literacy, the Balochistan sample has the lowest literacy rate (30%), followed by NWFP (44%). Similarly, the Ministry of Education reports that the literacy rate in Punjab is 56%; Sindh 51%; NWFP 46% and Balochistan 37%, while literacy is 72% in urban compared with 44% in rural areas.[11] About 60% of urban populations in each province are literate, compared with 40% in rural areas, but Balochistan is at a disadvantage, with only 26% of its rural population and 44% of its urban population able to read and write at least one language (**Table 2.2d**).

Figure 2.2a presents the distribution of respondents in each province who are literate in at least one language, sorted in order of the highest percentage of literacy. More Hindko speakers (70%) report that they can read and write one or more languages than any other group, followed by Urdu speakers (69%), Punjabi speakers (51%), Sindhi Speakers (45%), Pushto speakers (41%), other language categories (38%), Seraiki speakers (33%), and Balochi speakers (27%).

[10] Most people surveyed who read a language also write that language.

[11] Choudhry, Munir Ahmed. 2005. "Pakistan: Where and Who are the World's Illiterates?" In *Background papers for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2006: Literacy for Life*: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

Figure 2.2a



Table 2.2d

Single-Language Literacy, by Province and Urban-Rural Classification

	Cannot Read or Write Any Language (Q9)			Reads and Writes at least one Language		
Province	Province Total (%)	Urban (%)	Rural (%)	Province Total (%)	Urban (%)	Rural (%)
Punjab	53	40	58	47	60	42
NWFP	56	50	58	44	50	42
Sindh	46	33	60	54	67	40
Balochistan	70	56	74	30	44	26
Population Total	53	40	60	47	60	40

a. Percentages are by Row

b. Base Weighted, 2703; Unweighted, 2646

c. Measures of Association: Pearson: Uncorrected chi2(3) = 28.8
Design-based F(2.37, 548.57) = 3.6591 p=0.0198

It is important to note that the survey findings indicate that *minimum language literacy is* Urdu literacy. That is, if a person is literate in *at least one language,* that language includes Urdu, even if the speaker may speak their maternal and other languages. Fifty-three percent of respondents cannot read or write any of the languages they speak. Of the 47% who can, 42% are literate in Urdu and only 5% are literate in some other language but *not Urdu* (table not presented). Although the survey findings suggest that most people

who can read and write at all can read Urdu, TAF's civil society partners emphasized the importance of translating printed materials into Sindhi and Pushto, as well as Urdu. While literate Sindhi and Pushto speakers are also literate in Urdu, they may be more comfortable in their mother tongue. On the other hand, there is a perception that Balochi, Punjabi, and Seraiki speakers, if they can read at all, read Urdu.

The data presented in **Table 2.2e** support the assumption that citizens of Punjab, Seraiki, and Balochistan are more likely to read Urdu than their mother tongue. Twenty percent of Balochi speakers are literate in Urdu, compared with 12% who are literate in Balochi, while 51% of Punjabi speakers are literate in Urdu, compared with 30% who are literate in Punjabi. Of Seraiki speakers, 29% are literate in Urdu, only 20% in Seraiki.

Figure 2.2b displays graphically the rates of Urdu, English, and mother tongue literacy for each language group in the survey.

Figure 2.2b

Urdu, English, and Mother Tongue Literacy



The highest rate of mother-tongue literacy is among Sindhi speakers, 42% of whom can read and write Sindhi, followed by Hindko speakers, with 37% Hindko literacy. Thirty percent of Punjabi speakers read and write Punjabi, and 27% of Pushto speakers also read and write Pushto. Of those who grew up speaking Balochi, only 12% are literate in Balochi (**Table 2.2e**).

Literacy rates also differ by gender, urban and rural areas, provinces, and age group (**Table 2.2e**). Over half (56%) of urban dwellers are literate in Urdu, compared with 35% of rural respondents. In urban areas, 44% of respondents are literate in their mother tongue, compared with 27% of rural respondents. In all languages, more women than men are illiterate. In Urdu, 32% of women and 53% of men are literate. Twenty-three percent of women and 44% of men are literate in their mother tongue. Young respondents have higher rates of Urdu, English, and mother-tongue literacy than do older people. For Urdu,

44% of 18-24 year-olds and 49% of 25-34 year-olds are literate in Urdu, compared with 41% of 35-49 year olds and 36% of those over 50.

Table 2.2e

Urdu, English, and Mother Tongue Literacy; by Mother Tongue, Urban/Rural Classification, Gender, and Province

	Urdu		English		Literate in Mother Tongue	
Mother Tongue	No Urdu Skills (%)	Urdu Literacy (%)	No English Skills (%)	English Literacy (%)	Illiterate in Mother Tongue (%)	Mother Tongue Literacy (%)
Urdu	32	68	72	28	32	68
Punjabi	49	51	82	18	70	30
Seraiki	71	29	92	8	80	20
Hindko	45	55	79	21	63	37
Pushto	65	35	92	8	74	27
Sindhi	74	26	93	7	58	42
Balochi	80	20	96	4	88	12
Others	64	36	89	11	83	17
Milieu						
Urban	44	56	77	23	56	44
Rural	65	35	91	9	73	27
Gender						
Male	47	53	82	18	56	44
Female	68	32	89	11	77	23
Age Category						
18-24	56	44	84	16	57	43
25-34	51	49	86	14	69	31
35-49	59	41	87	13	69	31
50 and above	64	36	87	13	71	21
Province						
Punjab	54	46	84	16	70	30
NWFP	64	36	89	11	72	28
Sindh	60	40	86	14	51	49
Balochistan	72	28	94	6	85	15
Population TOTAL	*57*	*43*	*85*	*15*	66	34

a. Percentages are by Row
b. Mother Tongue Bases Weighted, 2501, Unweighted 2502
c. Urban/Rural Bases Weighted, 2501, Unweighted 2502
d. Province Bases Weighted, 2501, Unweighted 2502
e. Gender Bases Weighted, 2642, Unweighted 2697
f. Not surprisingly, Urdu and English literacy and literacy in general are correlated with higher income and education, as in most social surveys. This data is not presented.

Investigative news channels and radio programs dealing with elections and politics tend to be broadcast in Urdu. In order to determine the number of languages and the quantities in which to create audio-visual materials, public service announcements, and other non-printed outreach materials, the partners needed to determine the extent to which the voting age population can speak (and understand) Urdu. This information has been used to determine how much of the partners' voter education content should be created and translated in multiple languages and distributed on national Urdu media outlets or local radio and cable stations broadcasting in local languages.

Table 2.2f shows the number of people in each language group who speak Urdu, as well as the percentage of people who can speak Urdu in each province. Urdu is spoken by 82% of Hindko speakers, 62% of Punjabi speakers, 47% of Pushto speakers, 45% of Seraiki

speakers, and 41% of both Sindhi and Balochi speakers. In Sindh and Punjab, about 60% of the population speaks Urdu, while less than half of the populations of NWFP and Balochistan speak Urdu (48% and 44%, respectively).

Table 2.2f

Urdu Speakers, by Mother Tongue and Province

	Urdu Speaker?	
Mother Tongue	NO	YES
Urdu	3	97
Punjabi	38	62
Seraiki	55	45
Hindko	18	82
Pushto	53	47
Sindhi	59	41
Balochi	59	41
Others	34	66
PROVINCE		
Punjab	40	60
NWFP	52	48
Sindh	38	62
Balochistan	56	44

a. Percentages by Row

b. Base Weighted, 2646; Unweighted 2703.

These findings suggest that *written* materials in languages other than Urdu would be less effective than regional-language audio-visual or face-to-face voter education strategies, particularly in rural Sindh and Punjab and all of NWFP and Balochistan. While levels of Sindhi and Pushto literacy are high enough to reach substantial populations with translated materials in these two languages, those who speak Balochi and Punjabi are more likely to be able to read materials in Urdu than in their own languages. Specific strategies designed for those who cannot read and write fluently--including television and radio programs, public service announcements in local languages, illustrations, and posters--are necessary to reach eligible female voters and those who are native speakers of Pushto (NWFP and Balochistan), Seraiki (rural Punjab), Balochi (Balochistan), and other minority languages.

Chapter 3: Political Interest and Information

3.1 INTEREST IN POLITICS

Electoral participation declined significantly between the 1970 and 2002 general elections.[1] When asked directly about their interest in politics (Q20), 67% of respondents said they were either not at all or not very interested, while only 32% were somewhat or very interested (See **Figure 3.1a**). However, self-reported political interest, belief in democracy, and other general questions are often influenced by social desirability bias, particularly among social groups where political interest is desirable (e.g., higher income and educated groups).[2] Indeed, higher income and educated respondents were much more likely to report general interest in politics (data not presented). On the other hand, self-reported disinterest in politics among some populations might be attributable to associating politics and elections with violence, intimidation, or corruption, and wanting to stay out of the fray.

Figure 3.1a



Somewhat surprisingly, there was no evidence for a real difference in self-reported interest between male and female respondents, contradicting common wisdom that Pakistani women perceive politics as "men's work" and do not want to be involved.

[1] Waseem, Mohammad. 2006. *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

[2] See, for example, Voogt, Robert J. J., and Willem E. Saris. 2003. "To Participate or Not to Participate: The Link Between Survey Participation, Electoral Participation, and Political Interest." *Political Analysis* 11 (2):164-79.

The data also suggest that there is no real difference between urban and rural respondents with respect to political interest. It is often said that people in rural areas of Pakistan surprisingly participate in elections more than urban populations. Reasons offered include urban elite cynicism about elections and feudal "capture" (control) over rural populations, essentially forcing them to vote for particular candidates. The self-reported equality of interest in politics between urban and rural populations may contradict this analysis.

More than one in five respondents in Sindh, compared with one in 10 or less in the other provinces, reported that they were "very interested." However, in all the provinces, about one in three respondents said they were somewhat or very interested in politics. **Table 3.1a** presents provincial differences in political interest.

Table 3.1a

Self-Reported Political Interest, by Province

Province	Not at All Interested	Not Very Interested	Somewhat Interested	Very Interested	Don't Know
Punjab	52	16	21	10	0
NWFP	47	21	23	7	2
Sindh	41	22	16	20	2
Balochistan	53	17	20	8	2

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted, 2513; Unweighted 2563.

Lower income people self-reported less interested in politics, with 56% of the lowest income expressing no interest at all in politics compared with 36.5% of those who have high incomes. Fifty-four percent of those in the lower middle class have no interest, but of those in the middle class, the number expressing no interest at all falls to 40%. Respondents who have some or a great deal of interest in politics tend to have higher incomes; 28% in the lowest income group are somewhat or very interested in politics compared with 24% in the middle class and 29% in the upper middle class (table not shown).

The survey included additional questions to measure self-reported behavior during elections. To provide a more reliable measure of political involvement, these additional questions are used to create an index of political interest. Questions 21a, e, and f asked respondents to indicate whether, for a number of different political activities, they have, would be likely to, might, or would *never* engage in that activity. Those questions dealing with low-effort or spontaneous engagement, such as discussing elections with friends and family, telling people to vote for a particular candidate, or getting into an argument provide a richer picture of the sample's degree of political engagement during an election.

Figure 3.1b presents weighted percentages for the respondents' willingness to discuss elections with friends and family. Thirty-two percent—much higher than the percentage of respondents stating that they are very interested in politics—report having done so, and an additional 20% say they are likely or might discuss elections. While those interested in politics reported discussing elections more frequently, 16% claiming no

interest and 39% claiming little interest have discussed past elections with friends and family.[3]

Figure 3.1b



Twenty-three percent of respondents reported telling friends and family how to vote (**Figure 3.1c)**, 33% of whom reported little or no interest in politics more generally, and 21% have argued about elections, of whom 32% claimed they are uninterested in politics (**Figure 3.1d**).

The survey results do not provide evidence that women differ significantly from men in their likelihood of engaging in any of these activities, nor in their general political interest, with the exception of women in NWFP, where male respondents reported having *some* interest in politics twice as often as women (data not presented).

With respect to their participation in these activities, the responses for rural and urban and young and old respondents also do not differ significantly. While higher income and more educated individuals are more likely to engage in these activities, income group differences are less marked than for responses to the general question about political interest.

[3] Weighted p-value < .0001 at the 99% level of confidence. Data not presented.

Figure 3.1c



Figure 3.1d



The behavior questions are correlated with political interest and can be combined into a "political interest" index. Those engaging in two or more activities and/or reporting high interest are characterized as "high interest," for example, and those with little or no interest and/or only one reported activity are "low interest."[4] **Figure 3.1e** presents the distribution for this index, with 38% falling into the high-interest category, 35% medium, and 27% low interest, levels that suggest a higher degree of engagement than self-reported degrees of political interest.

Figure 3.1e



Some observers of Pakistani politics have expressed concern about a lack of interest among younger people of voting age. While the findings suggest that older respondents are more likely to score high on the political interest index, 42% of the 18-24 year-olds fall in the middle of the scale. Respondents between the ages of 35 and 49 are the most engaged, followed by older people. (See **Table 3.1b.**) It is important to note that lower rates of engagement among younger voters may be a function of lack of experience and opportunities to become engaged, as opposed to fundamental generational differences.[5]

[4] The Cronbach's alpha is .80 and average inter-item covariance is .73. The index ranges from 1-16, with from 80 to 533 respondents falling into each category, with 1 indicating that the respondent has said he or she has no interest in politics and would never engage in any of these three activities. Based on natural breaks in the distribution, this index is further collapsed into three categories for ease of analysis.

[5] The difficulty of determining whether age differences are due to age, or life-cycle effects, or enduring changes in attitudes across generations as a result of circumstances is well-documented in the literature on survey research on political socialization. See, for example, Alwin, Duane F., and Jon A. Krosnick. 1991.

Table 3.1b

Political Interest Index by Age, Province, Income, and Educational Attainment

	Low (%)	Medium (%)	High (%)
Age Group			
18-24 years	24	42	34
25-34 years	28	35	36
35-49 years	23	34	43
50 years or more	33	30	37
Province			
Punjab	29	32	39
NWFP	26	37	37
Sindh	21	42	36
Balochistan	31	41	28
Class			
Lowest Income	32	39	29
Lower Middle Class	25	39	36
Middle Class	22	32	46
Upper Middle Class	19	33	47
High Income	22	27	51
Educational Attainment			
None	35	39	26
Madrasa	27	35	38
Some Primary	28	41	31
Finished Primary	25	31	44
Middle School	24	28	48
Matric	23	35	42
F.A./F.Sc or above	16	33	38

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted vary. Education Base Weighted, 1972; Unweighted, 1998.

Respondents in Punjab score highest on the index, with 39% showing high interest in politics, followed by respondents in NWFP (37%) and Sindh (36%). Balochistan has the lowest number of respondents in the high interest category (28%).

Overall, women and men have similar degrees of political interest when the various forms of engagement are combined, as do respondents from both rural and urban areas.

Consistent with the findings of many surveys, the political index score is greater the higher a respondent's income and education. Around one in three low income respondents have a high interest score compared with one in two high income respondents—a difference of 20%. To the extent that this predictable pattern is repeated for voting behavior, belief in democracy, and other attitudes associated with income, further results are not presented unless the pattern is inconsistent with this general trend.

"Aging, cohorts, and the stability of sociopolitical orientations over the life span." *American Journal of Sociology* 97 (1):169-95.

For example, self-reported political interest (Q20, **Figure 3.1a**) alone increases with levels of education, but when the index including actual behavior is used (**Table 3.1b**), interest is much higher for respondents who have finished primary school (44%) compared with those who have only some primary school (31%), but is only 4% higher for those with a middle school education. Those in the high interest category with F.A./F.Sc degrees or more education are fewer (38%) than those who have only finished middle school (48%), the same percentage as high interest respondents with a madrasa education (38%). These findings suggest that self-reported interest may be subject to social desirability bias, particularly among those with more education, or people with different levels of education may have different interpretations of how interest in politics is or should be expressed. When discussing, arguing, or persuading others during elections are included as measures of interest; less educated individuals appear as engaged as those with more education.

The partners' voter education programming included specialist outreach to women. However, since the survey showed that women's self-reported interest and behavior with regard to politics is approximately equal to men's, the primary programming focus was not to convince women that they *should* be involved, as might be expected, any more so than for men. Rather, the focus was on outreach to men to convince them *to allow and enable* women to participate by facilitating the women in their households to receive voter education and candidate information and to go to the polls on Election Day.

The Foundation decided not to focus voter education in urban areas, mostly because of the impossibility of overcoming perceived urban cynicism towards the election process through simple voter education techniques and messages. Another reason was the desirability of focusing on relatively disadvantages, isolated, poor, or traditionally disenfranchised populations.

One of the Foundation's major project components was voter education for "First Time Voters," or youth of voting age for the first time during national elections. TAF voter education activities for this target group focused on providing practical opportunities for engagement in the democratic process through student debates, other competitions, and volunteerism with FAFEN NGOs engaged in voter education and election observation.

3.2 PATTERNS OF MEDIA USE AMONG ELIGIBLE VOTERS

Encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral process and to do so in an informed, independent manner is challenging in a society with high levels of illiteracy and linguistic diversity. The task is particularly challenging in Pakistan, because penetration of both the broadcast and print media are limited. People tend to rely on personal networks and word-of-mouth rather than the media. Despite the relative freedom of the Pakistani media compared with many developing countries, particularly in the Muslim world, these sources do not reach the vast majority of ordinary citizens.

According to 2002 statistics, newspaper readership is 60% in urban areas but only 35% in rural areas, figures that tend to correspond with national literacy rates. Radio audiences are much smaller in Pakistan than in other countries--only 21% of the urban population and 27% of the rural population listen to radio on a regular basis. Television access is low, with only about 10 million homes owning televisions--5 million each in urban and rural homes.[6] Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run network, is broadcast over the airways, but cable subscriptions are necessary to access independent channels that emerged after 2002. Patterns of media use reported by the survey respondents are consistent with previously-reported trends (**Figure 3.2a**).[7]

Figure 3.2a



Over 60% of respondents report that they never listen to radio or read a newspaper, while 51% watch television only once in a while or never. Men and women do not differ with respect to use of radio and television, but women are less likely to read a newspaper. Urban dwellers are more likely to watch TV and read a newspaper, but there the survey findings do not support the conclusion that there is a real difference in radio use between urban and rural settings in the Foundation survey, in contrast to the 2002 survey results.

Table 3.2a shows respondent use of media sources by province. In Punjab, 72% of respondents never listen to radio, but report greater television use than those in other

[6] Rehmat, Adnan, and Aslam Khan. 2002. "Grace Under Pressure: Pakistani Journalists Hold Their Own in Changing Media Scene." In *Press Freedom Reports*. Islamabad: Intermedia, Internews Pakistan, and Green Press Pakistan.

[7] Pie chart legend starts with largest pie and reads clockwise.

provinces (e.g., 43% report daily use compared with 32% in Balochistan). The percentage of Balochistan respondents who listen to radio daily (15%) is more than twice that in Punjab and Sindh (7% each), while 11% of NWFP respondents listen daily. Voting age populations in NWFP and Balochistan, where penetration of television may be lower, rely more heavily on radio for information. In Punjab and Sindh, 50% of respondents watch television frequently or daily compared with 40% in NWFP and 39% in Balochistan. However, the percentage of respondents who report frequent or daily radio use does not exceed a high of 24% (Balochistan) in any province. Newspaper readership never exceeds 28%.[8]

Table 3.2a

Frequency of Media Use, by PROVINCE

	Never	Once in a While	Frequently	Daily
Television				
Punjab	32	15	9	43
NWFP	41	18	13	27
Sindh	32	21	21	26
Balochistan	46	16	7	32
Radio				
Punjab	72	15	5	7
NWFP	63	18	9	11
Sindh	55	28	10	7
Balochistan	56	21	9	15
Newspapers				
Punjab	65	13	8	14
NWFP	57	15	11	17
Sindh	56	19	15	11
Balochistan	65	14	10	12

a. Percentages are by Row

b. Bases Weighted Vary. TV: Weighted, 2481; Unweighted 2515; Radio: 2462, 2491;

c. Internet use is extremely rare among the surveyed individuals. Over 92 percent report never using the internet. The number of users is insufficient for statistical analysis.

Television is the media most watched by the Pakistani electorate; 36% of respondents claimed to watch television daily, while another 12% watch television frequently. Only 14% read newspapers daily while another 10% read frequently. When asked about internet use, 92% of respondents had never used the internet, and only 3% used this source frequently or daily, despite the fact that the political parties have increased the quality of the content and amount of material about their platforms in recent years.[9] These efforts appear to reach foreign audiences and a small elite within Pakistan and should not be viewed as an influential source of political information.

These findings suggest that television is still the most common source of media used by Pakistanis, and that delivery of voter education information through channels broadcast over airways may reach the largest number of eligible voters. Tailoring messages to language groups is important. Content delivered over radio

[8] The figure of 28% for frequent or daily newspaper use in NWFP may be inflated due to sampling bias in the province (see Chapter 2).

[9] See Waseem 2006, cited previously.

in local languages is likely to be most effective in Balochistan and NWFP, but it is clear that alternatives to traditional media are necessary to reach most eligible voters in Pakistan. The partners used both mass media and face-to-face outreach in their voter education campaigns.

Not surprisingly, television use increases with age, education, and income (data not presented). Radio use, on the other hand, does not differ across income categories, but more educated groups do listen to radio more frequently. In many countries, younger voters are more likely to listen to radio due to their interest in entertainment, and thus can be targeted through this medium for voter education campaigns. The data suggest that in Pakistan, however, younger people of voting age are no more likely than older voters to listen to radio. Voter education programs limited solely to broadcast and print media are likely to reach primarily higher income and educated groups who already self-report greater interest in politics.

Media usage differs somewhat across occupational classification and language group, although television is used more frequently by all them. **Table 3.2b** presents TV and radio use by occupational category.

Table 3.2b

Use of Television and Radio, by Occupational Classification

	Never or Once in a While		Frequently or Daily	
Classification	TV	Radio	TV	Radio
Self-Employed	48	84	52	16
Government	34	65	66	35
Industry/Private Sector Employee	40	80	60	20
Agricultural Laborer	71	82	29	18
Small or Medium Farmer	68	77	32	23
Landowner	40	68	60	32
Professional/Managerial	12	91	88	9
Education/Teacher (incl. Madrasa)	32	84	68	16
Homemaker	52	93	48	7
Other	58	81	42	19

a. Percentages by Row
b. TV Bases Weighted, 2250; Unweighted 2290.
c. Radio Bases Weighted, 2233; Unweighted 2268.

Rates of both forms of media are particularly low among agricultural laborers and small and medium farmers. Only 29% of the former group report watching TV frequently or daily, compared with 88% of those in the professional/managerial category and 65% of government employees, for example. Eighteen percent of agricultural workers and 23% of farmers listen to the radio frequently or daily compared with 9% of the professional/managerial class, 20% of private sector employees, 16% of educators, 7% of homemakers, and 16% of those who are self-employed. Respondents in all of the categories listen to radio much less than government employees, 35% of whom report listening frequently or daily, and landowners (32%). The first set of occupational groups—agricultural workers, employees, homemakers, etc.—are also less interested in politics. These groups watch television more often than they listen to radio, but at rates

much lower than the other occupational categories. This data illustrates how difficult it is to reach marginal populations of potential voters through traditional media.

Similarly, language groups also have different patterns of media use, with Seraiki, Balochi, and Pushto speakers reporting the lowest rates of both television and radio use (See **Table 3.**2c). Pushto and Balochi speakers report low usage of both television and radio overall, but a relatively higher percentage of Pushto speakers listen to radio frequently or daily compared with the other language groups. Seraiki speakers report the lowest total rate of radio and television usage.

Table 3.2c

Use of Television and Radio, by Language Groups

	Never or Once in a While		Frequently or Daily	
Mother Tongue	TV	Radio	TV	Radio
Urdu	46	80	54	20
Punjabi	46	88	54	12
Seraiki	59	88	41	12
Hindko	40	85	60	15
Pushto	62	77	38	23
Sindhi	55	85	45	15
Balochi	64	83	36	17
Others	58	75	42	26

a. Percentages by Row
b. TV Bases Weighted, 2250; Unweighted 2290.
c. Radio Bases Weighted, 2233; Unweighted 2268.

3.3 PREFERRED SOURCES OF ELECTION INFORMATION

As a follow-up to questions about general media use, interviewers asked respondents to specify sources they use for *political and government information* (Q16) in particular. These open-ended responses varied widely, with 28% reporting different sources, but 41% could not list any source (See **Figure 3.3a**). Many mentioned national, state-run PTV, private cable channel GEO, or both. **Figure 3.3a** presents data for those who mention *either* PTV or GEO. Only 75 respondents mentioned national or provincial TV channels other than PTV and GEO as sources for political information (e.g., ARY).

PTV is the most prevalent single source of political information among the respondents (22% mentioning PTV but not GEO), while 9% mention only GEO. **Table 3.3a** shows the differences across provinces, urban and rural areas, language groups, and literacy rates.

Respondents in Punjab are more likely to specify at least one source for political information (89%), while 24% of Sindh respondents do not report any sources. GEO is mentioned more often in NWFP than in other provinces (16%). Urban respondents are more likely to mention GEO than rural respondents (14% and 6%, respectively); while PTV is more common as a source of political information among rural respondents (24% of rural respondents mention PTV as compared with 18% of urban respondents).

All language groups mention PTV more frequently than GEO, but Urdu, Punjabi, Hinkdo, and Sindhi speakers are two times more likely to mention GEO than other groups. More illiterate respondents (21%) mention PTV than GEO (6%) (**Figure 3.3b)**.

Variation in the number and types of sources volunteered across age or gender was negligible, but Urdu and English speakers were more likely to mention GEO and PTV specifically.

Figure 3.3a



Because PTV is the most common single source of information mentioned by eligible voters, perhaps because it has a monopoly over the airwaves and viewing all other channels requires cable TV, televised voter education messages will reach the largest audience through this medium. However, it is also possible to reach as much as 28% of eligible voters through local radio and cable TV channels broadcasting in various local languages.

The partners developed a series of eight Public Service Announcements (PSAs) and six discussion programs in local languages. These were aired on PTV, other national channels, provincial stations, local cable outlets, and radio. They were also copied on CD/DVDs for use by "social mobilizers" in small and large gatherings with potential voters.

Table 3.3a

Sources of Political Information Volunteered by Respondents, by Demographic Groups

	None	Various	Mentions PTV	Mentions GEO
Province				
Punjab	9	73	16	0
NWFP	1	1	4	16
Sindh	24	7	3	1
Balochistan	2	1	4	0
Rural Area	44	26	24	6
Urban Area	36	33	18	14
Mother Tongue				
Urdu	35	38	15	13
Punjabi	38	20	30	12
Seraiki	45	31	19	5
Hindko	25	47	17	11
Pushto	49	28	20	3
Sindhi	41	41	9	9
Balochi	50	35	13	3
Others	36	38	23	3
Illiterate	51	22	21	6
Literate in 1 Language	30	35	23	12

a. Percentages are by Row *b. Province, Literacy, and Milieu Bases Weighted, 2703; Unweighted 2646*

Figure 3.3b



3.4 PREFERRED MODES OF ELECTION INFORMATION CONSUMPTION

Even among those people who report low rates of media use and decline to report sources of political information under *ordinary* circumstances, many people may seek out media use during elections or other periods in which political events are particularly salient. When respondents were asked from which two sources they would choose to learn more about elections (Q18), 38% indicated a preference for television programs, followed by 27% who preferred posters and illustrations. The third most common response was to suggest other ideas (**Table 3.4a**).

Table 3.4a

Preferred Modes of Election Information

Q18: I'd like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to spend one hour learning more about the election, which *two types* of sources would you choose for your time? (options were read out to respondents)

	Mentioned (%)	Not Mentioned (%)
Radio Drama	6	94
TV Program	38	62
Posters/Illustrations	27	73
Newspapers	15	85
TV Debate	11	89
Other Ideas	20	80
No Opinion/DK	16	84

a. Percentages are by Row

b. Bases Weighted Vary. Drama: Weighted, 2646; Unweighted 2703.

"Reading newspapers or internet", "watching candidates or parties debates on TV", and "radio drama or comedy" were cited by 15%, 11%, and 6% of the respondents respectively. **Table 3.4b** presents statistics for the *combined* responses to help understand the degree to which voters prefer television to radio overall or a combination of both in finding out about elections. Fourteen percent declined to mention any source, while an additional 15% said they did not know which sources they would prefer.

Television (*either* debate or a program) was mentioned as both the first and second preference for 33% of respondents, followed by 19% who suggested one or more of their own ideas exclusively. Only 10% indicated a preference for the combination of television and newspapers and 2% both radio and television. Radio and newspapers were mentioned as the sole preferred source of election information by only 3% and 4% of respondents, respectively. Both urban and rural respondents mention only television as a means for obtaining election news, but rural 13% of rural respondents compared with 6% of urban respondents suggest their own ideas for obtaining election information.

Respondents in all four provinces mention television most frequently, followed by a lack of preferences. Respondents in all provinces suggest their own ideas more often than selecting combinations of sources other than television, followed by a preference for television and newspapers (about 10 or 11% for all provinces). Respondents in Balochistan were relatively more likely to mention radio as a sole source of information (7% compared with 4% or less in the other three provinces).

Table 3.4b

Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Province and Milieu

Combinations of Two Types of Media Preferred by Respondent

	TOTAL	Milieu		Province			
Combined Responses	%	Rural	Urban	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan
Declines to Mention	14	10	5	13	17	15	15
Don't Know	15	10	5	12	22	18	18
Presents Own Ideas Only	19	13	6	22	14	14	17
Newspaper Only	4	3	2	3	8	5	5
Radio Only	3	2	1	3	3	4	7
TV Only	33	18	14	35	24	32	24
Both Newspaper and TV	10	5	5	10	10	10	11
Broadcast Only (Radio + TV)	2	1	1	2	1	3	3

a. Percentages are by column

b. Bases Weighted, 2646; Unweighted 2703.

Higher income and more educated respondents were more likely to mention all sources of media, including newspapers or the internet, radio, and television. Lower income and less educated respondents were more likely to say they have no preferences. Younger respondents expressed a preference less often, and were less likely to mention all forms of media. The number of respondents suggesting their own ideas increased with age (data not presented). These results reinforce the findings that reaching younger eligible voters is a challenging task.

Voter education programming aims both to increase the information available to groups that typically do not participate, either due to low interest in politics or poor access, and to encourage them to use the information to express their own choices. Respondents with low or medium political interest mention TV more frequently than any other combination of sources for election information, but 31% of those with low interest present their own ideas, compared with only 20% and 19% of those with medium to high interest. (See **Table 3.4c.**)

Table 3.4c

Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Level of Political Interest (Index)

Combinations of Two Types of Media Preferred by Respondent

Combined Responses (Q18)	Low	Medium	High
Declines to Mention	10	12	8
Don't Know	19	8	5
Presents Own Ideas Only	31	20	19
Newspaper Only	3	5	7
Radio Only	1	6	3
TV Only	30	35	39
Both Newspaper and TV	6	11	17
Broadcast Only (Radio and TV)	1	3	2

a. Percentages are by column

b. Bases Weighted, 2646; Unweighted 2703.

Men and women have similar preferences for election information. Women declined to express a media preference or said they did not know 1-2% more frequently than men. Men were three times more likely to mention newspapers as their preferred source than

women (6% compared with 2%), but there is no evidence that there are real differences in preferences for television, radio, and broadcast preferences by gender.

While more educated, higher income, urban, and interested respondents were more likely to learn about election through watching a TV program, lower income groups and less educated voters were more likely to learn about elections through illustrations and posters in their communities. **Table 3.4d** presents preference for posters and other illustrations. Forms of illustrations common in Pakistan and implicitly included in this category are picture booklets (brochures/pamphlets) and "panaflex" banners—large, portable, and waterproof "flip-chart"-style canvas posters that can be hung separately or together between trees or other objects--used by "social mobilizers" in face-to-face meetings with small groups of people. It is important to note that illustrations were mentioned less frequently than television among all groups, but relatively more (35%) of respondents in NWFP mentioned posters compared with 28%, 20%, and 30% in Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan, respectively.

Table 3.4d

Preference for Posters/Illustrations as a Preferred Mode of Receiving Election Information, by Class, Education, and Urban/Rural Milieu

Q18: I'd like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to spend one hour learning more about the election, which *two types* of sources would you choose for your time? (options were read out to respondents)

		Not Mentioned %	Mentioned %
Province	Punjab	72	28
	NWFP	65	35
	Sindh	80	20
	Balochistan	70	30
Class	Lowest Income	67	33
	Lower Middle Class	67	33
	Middle Class	72	28
	Upper Middle Class	81	19
	High Income / Wealthy	81	19
Education	None	72	28
	Madrasa	57	43
	Some Primary School	73	27
	Primary School	73	27
	Middle School	64	36
	Matric	72	28
	F.A. / F.Sc or above	80	20
Milieu	Rural	70	30
	Urban	77	23
Political Interest	Low	78	22
	Medium	67	33
	High	64	36

a. Percentages are by Row
b. The data does not support a conclusion that women and men and younger and older voters differ in their reported preference for posters.
c. Bases Weighted vary.

Posters and other illustrated print materials in the community, while mentioned less frequently than television, are more likely to reach lower income and less educated people. Voter education posters and illustrated leaflets that can be brought into homes in local communities—especially in rural areas—are an important means of supplementing the broadcast and print media. Illustrations and posters are somewhat more likely to reach people in Balochistan and NWFP.

All of TAF's printed voter education materials – including posters, brochures, leaflets, and stickers – were light on written information and heavy on illustrations. They were designed to encourage dialogue and interpretation of the images.

Because the data showed that women are less inclined to leave the home, they would be unlikely to see posters in the community, which often remain posted for only 3-4 days. The weight of the investment in TAF's voter education strategy was on face-to-face meetings with "panaflex" canvas banners (easily transportable and water-resistant) and hand-held materials that could be brought into the home.

3.5 VOTER EDUCATION PROGRAMMING PREFERENCES

The survey's findings suggest that the utility of the broadcast and print media for reaching new voters and marginalized populations is limited. Respondents were asked to identify two alternative types of programming activities that they would be willing to attend to learn more about elections. **Table 3.5a** lists the distribution of preferences for several methods potential voters might use to obtain information about elections in their communities.

Table 3.5a

Preferred Modes of Voter Education Programming

Question 17: I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get information about elections in their communities. I'd like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to attend two events, which two would you choose?

	Mentioned (%)	Not Mentioned (%)
Live drama or comedy about elections	7	93
International NGO workshop	5	95
Meeting about elections at someone's house	30	70
Party rally or meeting	15	85
Short film or movie	7	93
Special women's meeting	11	89
Would not attend any of these	35	65
Suggests other event	5	95
No Opinion/DK	15	85

a. Percentages are by Row

b. Bases Weighted Vary.

The most common response, mentioned by slightly more than one third (35%) of respondents, was to decline to attend any type of event or activity, and 15% had no opinion. Thirty percent mentioned "A meeting about elections at someone's home" as one of the two events which they would choose to attend if the elections were held this weekend, while 11% mentioned a special women's meeting. It is surprising to note that

there is no evidence of a real difference between women and men in terms of mentioning women's meetings—13% of women compared with 9% of men mention a special meeting for women, but this finding is not statistically significant. In NWFP, however, 12% of women and 2% of men prefer a special meeting for women. For those who mention home meetings, 35% are men while 24% are women (table not presented). For men who mention a special meeting for women, they may have this preference for their wives and other women in their families, since the question was worded to ask the respondent what type of event he or she *would attend* himself or herself.

"A party rally or meeting" was mentioned by 15% of respondents. "A short film or movie", "workshop by an International NGO", and "live drama or comedy about elections" were in the top two preferences for 7%, 5%, and 7% of respondents, respectively.

Combining respondents' top two preferences amplifies these patterns. **Table 3.5b** presents the distribution for the most common combined responses by rural and urban area and province. Again, the most frequent response is to decline participation (47%), but meetings in the respondents' home—either in general or also involving women -- are favored by the largest percentage of respondents who express willingness to spend time learning about elections. In NWFP and Balochistan, 12% and 14% of respondents, respectively, mentioned home meetings, a preference that was also mentioned in conjunction with rallies.

Twenty-three percent of rural respondents mention home meetings alone or in combination with a rally compared with 16% of urban respondents (**Table 3.5b**). While conventional wisdom might lead one to expect greater involvement in politics in urban areas, these findings indicate that rural citizens may be more likely to seek community-specific information about elections. The urban population, on the other hand, is somewhat more likely to consume media information about politics--with 8% preferring a film compared with just 4% of rural respondents--but relatively less interested in face-to-face forms of political participation. Still, the findings support a strategy of direct outreach to reach potential voters in addition to traditional mediums of communication.

Table 3.5b

Most Frequent Combinations of Voter Education Delivery Methods Preferred by Respondent

Combined Responses (Q18)	Percent	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Baloch
None/Would Not Attend Any	47	48	51	50	49	51	40
Home Meeting	11	10	9	9	12	9	14
Home Meeting and Rally	11	13	7	11	14	7	10
Home and Women's Meeting	5	5	5	5	3	5	8
NGO Mentioned	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Women's Meeting Mentioned	5	6	5	6	3	5	6
Film Mentioned	5	4	8	6	2	6	5
Drama Mentioned	5	5	5	4	5	6	7
Rally	2	2	2	2	2	1	2
Proposed Other Idea	4	3	4	2	6	6	4

a. Percentages are by column *b. Bases Weighted, 2645.5; Unweighted 2702*

Voter education programming focusing on home meetings (these neighborhood gatherings are often called "corner meetings") and special meetings for women, as well as public meetings and rallies, are more likely than traditional forms of media to reach rural voters, as well as populations in NWFP and Balochistan. Pakistanis in general may be more receptive to meetings organized in familiar neighborhood environments with people they know -- an important result for conducting mobilization activities at the local level.

Education activities such as NGO information sessions, films, and dramas, are more popular among those with higher incomes, and would thus duplicate television, newspaper, or radio messages already reaching these groups, while interest in meetings and rallies is more uniform across income groups (See **Table 3.5c**).

Table 3.5c

Distribution of Voter Education Format Preferences, by Class

Most Frequent Combinations of Voter Education Delivery Methods Preferred by Respondent

Combined Responses (Q18)	Lowest Income	Lower Middle Class	Middle Class	Upper Middle Class	High Income	Total
None Mentioned/Would Not Attend Any	54	48	41	38	41	47
Home Meeting	10	9	13	10	8	10
Home Meeting and Rally	11	12	11	11	14	11
Home and Women's Meeting	6	6	5	4	2	5
NGO Mentioned	1	3	6	8	13	4
Women's Meeting Mentioned	5	8	5	7	4	5
Film Mentioned	4	3	8	10	8	6
Drama Mentioned	3	7	5	10	5	5
Rally	1	3	2	1	2	2
Proposed Other Idea	4	3	4	1	3	3

a. Percentages are by column *b. Bases Weighted, 2439; Unweighted, 2471*

The relationship between education level and election education programming preferences is more varied than that for income. **Figure 3.5a** graphs the percentage of respondents within each level of educational attainment for each type of voter education format described in Question 17, excluding the majority response—non-participation.

The most common response among madrasa-educated respondents is a combination of special meetings for women and meetings in the home (14%), a preference much less popular among all of the other educational groups. The combination of a home meeting and rally is more common among those with primary and middle school education (19% and 18%, respectively), and less common among those having passed Matric or above (See **Table 3.5d**). Those with a middle school education mention home meetings (14%) more often than other types of activities. Eight percent of both madrasa and primary school-educated respondents mention special meetings for women alone, a percentage that declines when respondents have higher levels of education.

Figure 3.5a



Table 3.5d

Distribution of Voter Education Format Preferences, by Level of Educational Attainment

Most Frequent Combinations of Voter Education Delivery Methods Preferred by Respondent

Combined Responses (Q18)	None (%)	Madrasa (%)	Some Primary (%)	Finished Primary (%)	Middle School (%)	Matric (%)	FA/FSc or More (%)
None Mentioned/Would Not Attend	59	43	50	44	42	40	35
Home Meeting	9	10	10	11	14	10	10
Home Meeting and Rally	7	9	11	19	18	13	11
Home and Women's Meeting	6	14	2	6	1	5	3
NGO Mentioned	1	1	3	1	2	6	13
Women's Meeting Mentioned	6	8	8	7	6	4	4
Film Mentioned	3	4	6	6	6	10	9
Drama Mentioned	3	4	6	3	6	7	8
Rally	1	2	2	2	3	3	3
Proposed Other Idea	5	4	1	2	2	2	5

a. Percentages are by column

b. Bases Weighted, 2568; Unweighted, 2622.

Community-level meetings in the home and gatherings targeted at women are most popular among less educated respondents. Those with little to no education are more likely to prefer home meetings, while those with primary school and middle school education are more likely to prefer rallies as well as meetings.

To facilitate the participation of women, who, according to the survey data, are as interested in politics as men but whose families do not always support them, using home and women's meetings can be used to reach not only women, but those who place social barriers to their engagement in political life.

Table 3.5e similarly indicates that those with medium to high interest in politics, according to the four-dimensional index presented in chapter 2, are more likely to mention all forms of voter education programming, which points to the challenge of reaching those voters with low interest in politics, no matter where they reside.

Table 3.5e

Distribution of Voter Education Format Preferences, by Political Interest

Most Frequent Combinations of Voter Education Delivery Methods Preferred by Respondent

Combined Responses (Q18)	Low Interest	Medium Interest	High Interest	Total
None Mentioned/Would Not Attend Any	70	42	25	43
Home Meeting	4	11	15	11
Home Meeting and Rally	2	9	23	12
Home and Women's Meeting	3	6	8	6
NGO Mentioned	1	4	7	5
Women's Meeting Mentioned	4	7	6	6
Film Mentioned	5	9	5	6
Drama Mentioned	4	7	6	6
Rally	2	1	2	2
Proposed Other Idea	4	3	3	3

a. Percentages are by column

b. Bases Weighted, 1975; Unweighted, 2001

It is notable that the results for the most common combinations of the top two preferred modes of receiving election information point to two contrasting preferences: those who are willing to attend large public events as opposed to those who prefer something small and more intimate. Home meetings and rallies are the two activities chosen most often, and yet they represent very different preferences.

While designed in part to measure the type of content of voter education messages, such as concrete information verses something with cultural and entertainment significance, the survey responses seem to indicate that the question is really measuring not differences in preferred message content or form, but rather the respondent's preferred *venue* for election-related activities. Some people indicated a clear willingness and even desire to go out to a public event, while others prefer private venues.

Based on these findings, the responses were further combined to place respondents in two categories: those who mention at least one public event, such as a drama or a rally, and those who mention home events exclusively. Including those who said they would not attend any events and those who proposed other ideas and mention NGOs or film (not

easily placed in the public-private dichotomy) produces a four-category indicator defined for the purpose of analysis as "public-private venue preference".

Half of respondents (49%) would not attend any event, while 20% prefer private events and 17% are willing to attend public events. Thirteen percent fall into the "other" category (table not shown). The analysis seeks to identify venue preference for the groups the partners are most interested in reaching: youth, women, and the poor. The lowest income group—those below the poverty line--differed in their venue preference from the other four income categories, which were otherwise similar to one another. Although less willing to attend any event (54% compared with 42% of wealthier respondents), poor respondents prefer private to public events; 15% compared with 20% of those in higher income categories (**Table 3.5f**).

Surprisingly, though one might expect younger people to be interested in going out, there is no evidence of a real difference between age groups in public-private venue preference, even when disaggregated by gender.

Table 3.5f

Public-Private Venue Preference

	None	Private	Public	Other
Poor				
Lower Middle Class or Higher	43	21	20	16
Poor	54	21	15	9
Class				
Lowest Income	54	21	15	9
Lower Middle Class	48	22	22	8
Middle Class	41	23	18	17
Upper Middle Class	38	21	22	20
High Income	41	14	20	25
Milieu				
Rural	48	21	20	11
Urban	51	19	14	16
Gender				
Male	44	21	22	13
Female	55	19	13	13
Province (Urban and Rural)				
Rural Punjab	48	20	21	10
Urban Punjab	52	20	12	16
Rural NWFP	47	20	20	13
Urban NWFP	56	12	25	7
Rural Sindh	52	20	14	14
Urban Sindh	50	18	14	18
Rural Balochistan	41	29	18	12
Urban Balochistan	38	24	23	15

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted vary, Poor, 2440; Unweighted 2472.

Rural-urban differences in willingness to go out for events are greater than provincial differences. Urban respondents may be slightly more reluctant to attend any event (51% would not attend any event compared with 48% of rural respondents). Somewhat surprisingly, urban dwellers prefer private venues (19%) to public (14%), while roughly

equal numbers of rural respondents (21% and 20%, respectively, prefer private and public venues (**Table 3.5f**).

Not surprisingly, more men are willing to attend public events (22%) than women (13%). However, when gender differences are examined by province, it becomes clear that the national differences are attributable to NWFP. There is no evidence that there are real differences between men and women in venue preference in the other three provinces. In NWFP, however, only 7% of women compared with 35% of men prefer public venues, while 17% of women prefer private events compared with 20% of men. Sixty-three percent of NWFP women say they would not attend any event, compared with only 34% of men (table not presented).

When provincial data are disaggregated by rural and urban areas, NWFP also stands out. More respondents in NWFP say they will not attend events (largely women), but public events are chosen twice as often as private events in urban NWFP (25% of urban respondents in NWFP are willing to go to public venues while just 12% prefer private venues only) (**Table 3.5f**). Equal numbers (20% each) of rural respondents in the province are interested in attending private and public events.

Conversely, in Punjab, more urban dwellers prefer private (20%) as opposed to public (12%) venues. Rural respondents in the province seem willing to attend public and private events in equal numbers (21% and 20%, respectively).

In Sindh, both urban and rural respondents indicate a similar preference for private events; 14% of both urban and rural dwellers are willing to attend public events, compared with 18% and 20%, respectively, who would prefer private events.

In rural Balochistan, 29% of respondents mention only private venues, compared with 18% who are willing to go out—a much greater difference in preferences than in the other provinces, even though about as many rural Balochistan residents are willing to go out as in the other areas. In urban Balochistan, people are evenly divided as to whether they prefer private and public venues (23% and 24%, respectively).

Informed by these findings, a national "dual strategy" that employs both public and private events in both rural and urban areas of all provinces was implemented by the partners. Those who prefer private venues would not be reached by public events, while rallies, large public forums and other activities requiring people to go out would attract a different set of individuals. This strategy did not varied by content, but rather by venue and medium, in order to increase the accessibility of information for diverse parts of the population.

NGO partners of TAF organized both public events – such as unprecedented "Meet the Candidates" public forums in every National Assembly constituency, community interactive theater, and "rallies" or "walks" in which social mobilizers parade through a community holding voter information banners—as well as more intimate events targeting religious leaders, women, and others with smaller meetings within family compounds.

The partners were surprised that there were not more differences by age group in media preferences, political interest, and other variables. In fact, regression analysis was used in some cases using raw age rather than age groups to examine the importance of age more rigorously, yet no profound differences were found. The lack of clear patterns among youth suggests that very diverse strategies are needed to find and communicate with them.

Very few respondents are students. The lack of profound generational differences in the survey may point to the fact that the political socialization process is not the same *within* this age group. It may be that there is nothing statistically significant about the views of Pakistani youth as a whole, or at least those aged 18-25. Rather, younger people in Pakistan may be more influenced by their family, cultural, or regional context than they are by their own age cohort, so that generations are more similar to each other than in some other developing country contexts.[10]

In Pakistan, education is highly localized and privatized, and most children live at home until they are married. Even then, many remain with the older generation rather than establishing a new residence. The average family size per household among respondents in the survey is 10-12, pointing to the strong influence of numerous family members on an individual's life.

These findings convinced TAF that it was not essential to develop distinct messages for youth, but that diverse *methods of outreach* would be critical. One strategy targeted madrasa- and college-students, simply because schools are venues where youth can be targeted specifically. Another strategy was to create opportunities for youth to get directly involved in election-related activities, drawing them away from home and into environments where they can learn from peers and potential mentors in action.

[10] A counter-example is Algeria, where mass education -- often requiring relocation away from family to university residences -- and urbanization, combined with key events shaping the country's history, have contributed to a divergent sets of dispositions and expectations across generations. "Political Generations in Developing Countries: Evidence and Insights from Algeria." Mark Tessler, Carrie Konold, and Megan Reif. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer 2004 (68:2): 184-216.

Chapter 4: Awareness of and Access Electoral Processes

During the summer of 2006, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) conducted a house-to-house enumeration to register voters for a new, computerized voters' list (or "electoral roll"). To vote in the 2007-08 general elections, all eligible citizens were required to register again, even if they had registered and voted in one or more past elections. In previous elections, once registered, citizens could vote even if they had registered many years before. This would be the first election in which *all* citizens of voting age would have to register.

The survey included a battery of questions to assess whether eligible voters had been enumerated in 2006 and knew about an upcoming opportunity to check or add their names to the new voters' list. A primary purpose of the survey was to identify the method and content of voter education programs to enhance voter registration, with particular interest in potential barriers to full participation, such as (a) the timing, location, and method of additional voter registration or (b) the personal identification required for both registering and voting.

A related set of questions aimed to understand procedural, logistical, and other obstacles to voting in the past in order to help determine what kind of new policies could help ensure the ability of citizens of voting age to exercise their rights.

Whereas voters could use many different forms of identification during previous elections; new election regulations initially required eligible voters to present a new computerized national identity card (CNIC), or the card for overseas Pakistanis (NICOP), to register. In response to criticism about the actual cost (about Rs. 100) and opportunity costs of the process of obtaining a CNIC through the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), the ECP announced that it also would accept the old national identity card (NIC) for registration and voting.

The election commission hired government schoolteachers as enumerators to go door-to-door to register voters in the summer of 2006, but the low number of voters registered through this process (and reports of location-specific gaps fueled speculation that the enumeration process was not conducted equally or well throughout the country. Political parties and civil society organizations argued that the house-to-house registration process, combined with the new identification requirements, had resulted in partial registration, at best, of the eligible voting population, particularly among citizens who had reached voting age since the 2002 general and 2005 local election.

Another problem was that one eligible voter in the household could register all citizens of voting age, which meant that other members of the household might not know that they were registered to vote. In addition, voters who thought they were registered in the door-to-door process would not know whether or not their names and details had been accurately recorded on the new list, and indeed whether they were registered at all.

After the 2006 enumeration process, the government permitted additional registration until the announcement of the election timetable, which turned out to be November 20, 2007. Any individual who wanted to add her or his name to the new voters' list would

need to go to the district election commission office, show their CNIC or NIC, and fill out an application form. Few people take advantage of this opportunity, especially those who do not live in district capitals.

The election commission is required by law to provide for a 21-day public display of the provisional voters' list. Given the many concerns about the new electoral roll, and with technical advice from international partners, the ECP decided to establish for the first time as many as 45,000 temporary display centers around the country. The display period would offer an opportunity for voters registered during the enumeration process to check and correct their details on the new list. Equally importantly, additional voters would be able to add their names to the new list at the more conveniently located display centers, The Asia Foundation survey was conducted in advance of a planned voter education campaign to help voters take advantage of this special display period.

4.1 AWARENESS OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND DISPLAY PERIOD

Interviewers asked survey respondents whether they had heard about the upcoming national and provincial assembly elections and whether they were aware that the elections were likely to be held between November 2007 and February 2008. About one third of respondents (35%) claimed to be aware of the upcoming election, while two-thirds (65%) were not aware that an election was due. Of those who were aware of the election, 87% identified the election period correctly, while 13% did not (**Table 4.1a**).

Table 4.1a

Awareness of Time Period for 2007/2008 Election

Q27: Have you heard when the next elections will be held?
Q28: On approximately what date do you think the election will be held?

	Yes (%)	*Weighted Count*	Correct (Between Nov 2007 - Feb 2008)	Gives Incorrect Period/Doesn't Know	*Weighted Count*
Not Aware	65	*1565*	14	86	*36*
Aware of Upcoming Election Period	35	*897.7*	87	13	*751*

a. Election Timing: Base Weighted, 2548; Unweighted, 2592

When asked to identify the location where eligible voters in the area could register, only 15% of respondents answered correctly that a voter must go to the district election commission office, while 84% said they did not know or named an incorrect registration venue (**Table 4.1b**).

Table 4.1b

Awareness of Registration Location

Q45: If someone asked you where they could register to vote, what would you tell them? (open-ended question)

	(%)	*Weighted Count*	Accuracy
District Election Commission Office (DECO)	16	*400.7*	Percent Correct: 16%
Union Council Office	34	*844.4*	
Tehsil Office	3	*70.77*	Percent incorrect: 84%
Others	2	*52.54*	
Don't Know	46	*1147*	
Total	100	*2515*	

a. Registration: Base Weighted, 2515; Unweighted, 2559

Awareness of any of the new aspects of the registration process—the re-registration requirement (Q37), display of provisional voter lists at 45,000 locations (Q39), a new opportunity to register during the display period (Q42), and the acceptance of old identity cards (Q50) (See **Table 4.1c**)—did not exceed 27% (**Figure 4.1a**).

Figure 4.1a



As with levels of political interest, responses to these four questions are related—the same respondents who report awareness of one policy change also report awareness of the other policy changes.[1] Combining these measures permits the creation of a registration procedure "awareness index" that facilitates analysis of political knowledge by location and demographic groups, as well as political interest.

Table 4.1c

Awareness of Voter Registration Policy Changes (March-April 2007)

Re-Registration Requirement		
Q36: Are you aware that all citizens must register again if they want to vote in the upcoming elections, even if they registered to vote in the past?	Yes (%)	23
	No (%)	77
Display of Provisional Voters List (June-July 2007)		
Q39: Are you aware that the provisional voters' registration list will be displayed in May and June[2] and that registered voters can check the list to see if your name is correctly listed?	Yes (%)	27
	No (%)	73
Special Registration Opportunity		
Q42: Have you heard that there will be a special *registration period in May/June for all citizens of voting age who did not register during the past 12 months?*	Yes (%)	19
	No (%)	81
ECP Policy Change to Accept Old and New Identity Cards		
Q50: Have you heard that the Election Commission of Pakistan has decided to accept the old *national identity card (NIC) for voter registration and elections?*	Yes (%)	27
	No (%)	74

Figure 4.1b illustrates the relationship between level of political interest and the number of new voter registration policies of which respondents are aware. Nine percent of respondents with high interest compared with 5% with low interest were aware of all four policy changes, and medium and high interest respondents knew about two and three policy changes twice as often as those with low interest.

[1] Cronbach's alpha = .677

[2] The question wording mentioned May and June for the display period, which was later delayed by one week, starting in June and lasting into July with the two-week extension.

Figure 4.1b

Number of New Registration Policies of Which Respondent is Aware, by Level of Political Interest (March - April 2007)



Overall awareness of the changes was low, reinforcing concerns that the house-to-house enumeration had been inadequate (re-registration requirement) and that frequent voters might not even be on the new list. The relationship between interest and awareness suggests that voter education efforts were necessary even to ensure that people most likely to participate would be registered on the new list. The need for outreach regarding voter registration would be particularly acute for people who were less likely to participate in the election process. (See also **Table 4.1d**).

Men were aware of all the new policies twice as often as women; 30% of men were unaware of any changes, compared with 62% of women; 20% of men compared with 11% of women were aware of two policy changes; 13% and 5%, respectively, were aware of three policies; and 9% compared with 5% were aware of all four (see **Table 4.2d**). These findings, combined with election commission data showing a lower than usual percentage of women registered through the house-to-house enumeration, pointed to a serious need early in the process to encourage and facilitate women to register to vote.

Awareness differed by province, with respondents in NWFP and Balochistan, surprisingly, more aware of the policy changes. (**Table 4.1d**). In Punjab and Sindh,, 45% and 46% of respondents, respectively, were unaware of any new election procedures, compared with 20% and 30% of respondents in NWFP and Balochistan. In NWFP, 16% were aware of all four procedures, and in Balochistan, 18% were aware of all four. In contrast, 6% of respondents in both Punjab and Sindh were aware of the new procedures. This may be attributable to sampling bias and smaller sample size in the two less populous

provinces, or information about new registration requirements may have been distributed more extensively in these traditionally disadvantaged provinces.

There were no significant differences in awareness of the four policies according to the respondent's age. However, when disaggregated for each question, the results suggest a slight difference in awareness of acceptance of identity cards by age. Older voters--age 50 years or more--were more likely to know that the ECP decided to accept the old NIC (data not presented).

Table 4.1d

Index of Election Awareness

	Number of Policies of Which Respondent is Aware				
	None	*One*	*Two*	*Three*	*Four*
Gender					
Male	30	28	20	13	9
Female	62	18	11	5	5
Province					
Punjab	45	25	16	9	6
NWFP	20	23	26	13	16
Sindh	46	23	15	10	6
Balochistan	30	19	19	14	18
Political Interest Index	*None*	*One*	*Two*	*Three*	*Four*
Low Interest	52	27	11	5	5
Medium Interest	42	21	18	12	7
High Interest	33	26	21	12	9
TOTAL	**42**	**24**	**17**	**10**	**7**

a. Percentages by Row

b. Gender: Base Weighted, 1158; Unweighted, 1101.

c. Province: Base Weighted, 1103; Unweighted, 1159

d. Political Interest: Base Weighted, 916; Unweighted, 872)

These findings sugggest that major efforts are necessary to ensure that adults of voting age, particularly women, are registered to vote in all four provinces. Without this critical step, even those who are aware of an election, but unable to find out about procedures necessary to register, will be unable to participate.

4.2 ACCESS TO THE 2006-2007 VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS

Questions about subjective awareness of different voter registration policy changes were followed by objective questions to assess the extent to which election commission efforts had succeeded in registering voters. **Table 4.2a** shows how many of the respondents were aware if their household had been reached by the national door-to-door registration process. Sixty-two percent of men and 35% of women respondents knew that someone had come to their home. When respondents were asked if they *had actually registered* as a result of this process, 89% of men compared with 80% of women said they registered at that time. One in ten women compared with one in 20 men reported that they were not registered *even if they knew their home was reached by the enumeration campaign* (**Table 4.2a,** Q28). There may be a number of reasons for this finding. Many men and women who were aware of the door-to-door visit may not have filled out the form themselves, even if someone in the household had registered all members. Women,

especially those living in separate women's compounds, may not have opened the door for an enumerator. Some may have been unaware if the men in the household had registered on behalf of women. In any case, certainty about final registration would require verification that one's name could be found on the registration list.

At the time of the survey, a larger percentage of urban respondents reported that they had been reached by the door-to-door process as compared with rural respondents. Urban respondents reported being enumerated in Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh, at rates of 55%, 40%, and 47%, respectively. Only in Balochistan did a larger percentage of rural respondents report door-to-door visitation at a higher rate (40% rural and 32% urban had been reached). According to the survey, the lowest overall reported door-to-door access rate was in NWFP and Balochistan (**Table 4.2a**).

Table 4.2a

Respondent Exposure to National Door-to-Door Registration Process as of March/April 2007, by Demographic Category

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Do not Know (%)
Was household reached by Door-to-Door registration (Q37)?	48	47	5
Gender			
Male	62	35	3
Female	35	60	6
Province			
Punjab – RURAL	48	48	4
- URBAN	55	41	4
NWFP – RURAL	28	65	7
- URBAN	40	59	1
Sindh - RURAL	43	53	4
- URBAN	47	40	12
Balochistan - RURAL	40	57	3
- URBAN	32	64	3
Age Group			
18-24 years	44	49	7
25-34 years	43	53	5
35-49 years	51	47	2
50 years or more	48	47	5
Follow-Up Question: (If Yes) Did a household member register at that time? (Q38)	85	7	7
Gender			
Male	89	6	5
Female	80	8	12

a. Percentages by Row
b. Reached: Bases Weighted, 2556; Unweighted, 2600. GENDER: Weighted 2555; Unweighted 2598.
c. Registered: Bases Weighted, 1331, Unweighted, 1278 (same by Province): GENDER: Weighted 1330, Unweighted 1276
d. Note: Question 37 was only asked of respondents' who reported receiving a house call to register. The estimated TOTAL registration rate by this method is 41% of the eligible voting population.
e. If a house was reached by door-to-door registration, respondents of different ages and occupations were equally likely to report registering at that time. The rural and urban subpopulations by province answering each question are insufficient to draw statistically robust conclusions about registration decisions once the household was reached.

About half of respondents in each age group were aware of an enumerator visit to the household (44-51%), but older people were slightly more likely to have been reached, with 44% and 43% of 18-24 year-olds and 25-34 year-olds, respectively, compared with 51% and 48% of 35-49 and the over-50 age group receiving door-to-door registration teams. However, any of these people may have been registered by their family, a process

that would have ultimately succeeded only if their family members had included their CNIC or NIC numbers on the registration forms. The number of people *aware* of the door-to-door process, therefore, may be lower than the actual number of households reached. Furthermore, the survey found that younger people are less likely to have the CNIC (see **Table 4.2d** in the following pages).

Respondents were asked to report their willingness to take the effort to register themselves, given their perceived distance to the district election commission office. Of those reporting living close to the election office, 65% reported that they would be somewhat or very likely to register. One third (33%) reported that they were very or somewhat unlikely to register, *even if they lived close.* Forty percent living very far were somewhat or very unlikely to register. Fifty percent who did not know the location of the office were unlikely to register (**Table 4.2b**). **Figure 4.2a** illustrates this relationship.

Table 4.2b

Likelihood of Registering Outside of Home if Travel Required, by Respondent Distance to Election Registration Office / District Returning Officer

	Likelihood of Registering if Travel to EC Required (Q47)					
EC Distance from Respondent (Q46)	Don't Know	Very Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Likely	Very Likely	Row Total
Close	2	22	11	35	30	100
Far	4	11	10	46	29	100
Very Far	3	26	14	36	22	100
Don't Know	22	40	10	19	8	100
Column Total	***28***	***10***	***20***	***42***	***21***	***100***

a. Percentages by Row
b. Base Weighted, 2428; Unweighted, 2464

It was important to assess voters' willingness to register through the normal process, in order to know whether the display period would be an essential time for additional voter registration, whether providing mere information about the location of display centers and procedures would be sufficient to ensure registration, or additional mobilization would be needed to *assist more directly in the process itself.*

The fact that 30% of all respondents who reported living close to the district election commission office would still be unwilling to make the effort to register, among other factors, convinced the partners to implement a three-part voter information and mobilization initiative. The nationwide strategy was designed to (1) inform communities about the need to register again and the procedures to do so; (2) help eligible voters obtain their CNICs; and (3) provide transportation and facilitation to help people reach display centers and complete required voter registration forms.

Figure 4.2a



Possession of identification is a critical requirement for both registration and voting under Pakistan's amended electoral law (Section 33, Representation of the People Act, 1976).[3] **Figure 4.2b** shows the numbers of people in possession of different forms of identification. Eighty-percent of respondents said they possessed either a CNIC or NIC—44% had the old card and 77% had the new card. Only 22% had a birth certificate, so many other forms of identification must have been used to obtain the national identification cards. It is important to note that the CNIC is useful for access to many government public services, so the respondent's possession of this identification does not reflect anything about his or her intention to register to vote.

[3] **Voting Procedure.**---(1) Where an elector presents himself at the polling station to vote, the Presiding Officer shall issue a ballot paper to the elector after satisfying himself about the identity of the elector and shall, for that purpose, require the elector to produce his identity card provided for in the National Registration Act, 1973 (LVI of 1973) or issued under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000).

Figure 4.2b

Possession of Identification Needed to Vote



Table 4.2c

Possession of Different Forms of Identification (Q48)

Forms of Identification	Yes (%)	No (%)
New Computerized Identity Card (CNIC)	77	23
Old National Identity Card (NIC)	44	56
National ID Card for Overseas Pakistanis	3	97
Birth Certificate	22	78
Respondent Possesses Either CNIC or NIC	**87**	**14**

a. Percentages by Row
b. Base Weighted Vary. For possession of CNIC, the Base Weighted is 2521 and Unweighted N is 2566.

Although a relatively large percentage of the total population possessed a CNIC at the time of the survey, **Table 4.2d** shows that women and younger adults were less likely to have either the CNIC or NIC.

Table 4.2d

Possession of Either CNIC or NIC (Q48)

Demographic	Neither (%)	CNIC or NIC (%)
Gender		
Men	6	94
Women	21	79
Age Group		
18-24 years	25	75
25-34 years	17	83
35-49 years	6	94
50 years or more	4	96
Province (Urban and Rural)		
Punjab - RURAL	12	88
- URBAN	12	88
NWFP - RURAL	19	81
- URBAN	13	87
Sindh - RURAL	19	81
- URBAN	10	90
Balochistan – RURAL	21	79
- URBAN	19	81
National Total	14	87

a. Percentages by Row

b. Base Weighted Vary. For Province, the Base Weighted is 2537 and Unweighted N is 2583.

Ninety-four percent of male respondents reported having the IDs compared with 79% of women (**Figure 4.2c**). The 18-24 age group reported a lack of ID most often (25%), followed by 25-34 year-olds (17%). Only 6% and 4% of 35-49 year-olds and those over 50 lacked ID (See **Figure 4.2d.)**.

Figure 4.2c



Figure 4.2d



In the Punjab, respondents reported having ID equally in rural and urban areas at a rate slightly higher than the national average (88%). The results indicate that 19% of the rural electorate of the NWFP and Balochistan did not have identification, compared with 13% and 10% of their urban electorates, respectively (**Figure 4.2e**).

Figure 4.2e



When *respondents who did not possess a CNIC* were asked why (Q49), most mentioned a variety of different reasons too varied to analyze. Eighteen percent of respondents said they did not know where or how one could obtain the CNIC, while 15% said they had not heard of the ID. Another 15% reported not wanting an ID, while 9% said the cost was too high. **Figure 4.2f** illustrates these results.

Figure 4.2f



These findings sugggest that while the CNIC is required for citizens to access a number of state services unrelated to the elections, ensuring that eligible voters have the CNIC is an important first step in enfranchising them. With 30% of respondents without the CNIC saying they had not heard of the card or did not want one, providing both education and intervention to help eligible voters obtain the card should be an important part of voter education programming.

Based on the survey results and a technical rapid appraisal process[4] confirming that women, rural, and younger people were less likely to have the CNIC, the partners requested that NADRA either (a) organize a mobile van to go to the underserved communities or (b) allow the FAFEN social mobilizers to complete all the paperwork for those without ID in those areas. In addition, the assessment found that many people had filled out all of the necessary paperwork but were still waiting for their CNIC to arrive. Social mobilizers also delivered to the villages CNICs that were ready but still sitting in the NADRA national office. Whole villages without the CNIC obtained it as a result of this process.

4.3 BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS ELECTIONS

To inform the content of the partners' voter education messages, as well as to inform the partners' advocacy of procedural and policy improvements at the national level, the

[4] For more information about the technical rapid appraisal process, TAF's unpublished donor report to the Like Minded Group (LMG) can be made available upon request.

survey asked respondents a battery of questions to better understand why they had voted (Q26) or abstained (Q25) in past elections. All sub-questions were asked of all respondents *unless* they reported having voted in *every* election or *never* voting. These questions asked respondents to indicate the level of importance of different factors in the decision to vote or abstain, with 2-3 questions each in four broad categories: (a) personal reasons, such as lack of time or interest, as well as belief in the efficacy of their vote; (b) procedural or logistical barriers, such as distance to the polling station, inability to register or to vote once inside the polling station; (c) personal exposure to non-violent forms of election fraud, such as vote-buying; and (d) exposure to election violence and intimidation.

This section presents findings for those questions addressing procedural and logistical barriers as explanations for the respondent's past voting and non-voting behavior. These questions deal with measures that are largely the responsibility of the election commission and areas in which the partners could recommend improvements in communication, logistical delivery of election materials and services, and attention to pre-election empowerment of voters. Respondents were asked to talk about their past experiences with polling-station access, accuracy of voter lists, and problems with identification requirements at polling stations.

When asked about the importance of difficulty of reaching the polling station (Q25b) in decisions to abstain in one or more past elections, 63% said this factor was not at all important, and additional 12% said not very important. Only 10% said polling station access was a somewhat or very important factor in a decision to abstain (**Figure 4.3a**).

Similarly, **Figure 4.3b** those who have not voted because they did not know where the polling stations are in the minority—only 10% said this factor was somewhat or very important in abstention. Surprisingly, difficulties finding or getting to polling stations are reported equally by respondents in urban and rural areas. Urban dwellers may be less likely to be connected to family and other community networks of information about polling station locations, as well as transportation options, especially if they are newly urbanized. Traffic, transportation, and the complexity of the urban environment may make polling stations more difficult to find and reach, suggesting that, even when polling station distance does not seem to be a major reason for abstention, other physical factors may be relevant.

For respondents in the NWFP, reaching the polling station was a somewhat more common problem than in the other provinces. Nineteen percent in NWFP compared with 5% in Punjab, 15% in Sindh, and 11% in Balochistan said difficulty of reaching the polling station was a somewhat or very important factor in abstention (table not presented). Women, the poor and younger voters were no more likely to report polling station access as a problem than other demographic groups.

Figure 4.3a



Base Weighted, 620; Unweighted, 710

Figure 4.3b



Base Weighted, 524; Unweighted, 595

In contrast, 36% of respondents claimed that inability to register was a very important factor in non-voting, while 55% said the problem was not at all or not very important (**Figure 4.3c**). The number of people reporting this explanation did not differ by province, nor were poor people or women more likely to name inability to register as a barrier to abstention. Neither education nor Urdu or minimum literacy were related to registration problems as an important factor in non-voting.

These results may seem somewhat surprising given the findings of the preceding section that show women and rural electorates somewhat less likely to be registered. However, given that previous elections did not require strict forms of identification, vested interests in the constituencies may have helped mobilize likely supporters based on clan or family ties, irrespective of demographic characteristics. Thus, to the extent to which people were excluded from previous electoral lists, this exclusion, while substantial, does not appear to have been based on particular ascribed characteristics such as race and class. This is consistent with research on turnout and registration earlier in the histories of advanced industrialized democracies, in which parties would mobilize voters irrespective of race or other characteristics if they knew or could guarantee these groups would support them. [5]

Figure 4.3c



[5] See, for example, Tracy A. Campbell, 2003. "Machine Politics, Police Corruption, and the Persistence of Vote Fraud: The Case of the Louisville, Kentucky, Election of 1905." *Journal of Policy History* 15 (3):269-300.

Almost as many respondents (29%) reported that they went to the polling station, but that they couldn't vote due to a lack of personal identification, while 42% said identification was not a factor in abstention (**Figure 4.3d**). While women and younger people did not differ significantly in the importance they attributed to having personal identification, there were significant differences among different levels of education and lower and upper classes, especially the poorest category of respondents.

As **Table 4.3a** shows, respondents in the two lowest income categories reported that lack of identification was a somewhat or very important factor in abstaining more often (42% in the lowest income category and 41% in the lower middle class category), compared with under 30% for the other income categories. Those with less education also cited identification problems more often than better educated people. Forty-eight percent of those with only a primary school education who answered the question, for example, said ID was a somewhat or very important factor, compared with 22% high income category.

Table 4.3a

Importance of Lack of Identification at Polling Station as Reason for Non-Voting, by Class and Education

	Don't Know (%)	Not at All Important (%)	Not Very Important (%)	Somewhat (%)	Very (%)
Class					
Lowest Income	14	36	8	10	32
Lower Middle Class	16	40	3	4	37
Middle Class	12	44	16	5	23
Upper Middle Class	6	51	14	3	27
High Income	13	55	11	1	21
Educational Attainment					
None	21	32	5	8	33
Madrasa	2	40	17	7	34
Some Primary	18	46	3	6	26
Finished Primary	1	41	9	9	39
Middle School	9	45	13	5	29
Matric	11	52	12	6	20
F.A./F.Sc or above	6	59	12	2	21

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted vary. Education Base Weighted, 653; Unweighted, 744.

For 24% of respondents, arriving at the polling station and not finding their name on the voter list was a somewhat or very important factor in abstention (**Figure 4.3e**), a result that does not differ significantly across demographic groups or the provinces.

These findings reinforce results presented in the previous section about awareness and access to the current election procedures, particularly with respect to ensuring that eligible voters—especially the poor and less educated—register, verify that they are on the electoral lists in their communities, and have the proper identification when they arrive at the polling station.

Figure 4.3d



Base Weighted, 655; Unweighted, 746

Figure 4.3e



Base Weighted, 626; Unweighted, 717

4.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION AND CONDUCT

At the time the survey was conducted, no voter education activities had yet taken place. Looking forward to the kinds of measures that needed to be taken to ensure a free and fair election, as well as the messages that need to be communicated to potential voters, the survey sought to assess people's general expectations about the upcoming elections as well as their views of problems in past Pakistani elections.

It is well-known that with each election in Pakistan, ordinary men and women, the parties, the media, and civil society refer to the problem of "rigging" elections. However, people have different views about what "rigging" means, when and where in the process it occurs, and who is responsible. Some observers may imagine rigging to be a centralized process involving manipulation of the count, ballot stuffing, and other election-day problems, but for ordinary people in Pakistan, free and fair elections may be compromised by less obvious problems that occur well before election-day by actors who remain largely behind the scenes.

The survey asked a battery of questions seeking to identify what types of problems most threaten free and fair elections in the perception of ordinary adults, as well as what types of administrative and procedural measures would most effectively strengthen citizen confidence in the efficacy of their participation in the electoral process.

This section addressed citizen perceptions of the types of problems that occurred in past elections and what actors and levels of government are responsible. The chapter's final section presents data about respondents' reactions to potential recommendations in election administration. The partners aimed to identify what changes in policy or procedure might address voters' past concerns in order to identify advocacy strategies for FAFEN and other stakeholders as well as to design voter education messages about any relevant changes in policy.

The survey sought to assess the perception of ordinary citizens about the role of local politicians and other actors in the quality of national and provincial elections in Pakistan. **Figure 4.4a** shows how the sample population responded when forced to choose between two statements (see Column labels in **Figure 4.4a**) designed to measure the level of government perceived as most important in ensuring a fair election (Q31). Approximately one-third (29%) agreed with the first statement—that the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election, while another one-third (36%) said they agreed with the statement that local officials corrupt the process despite efforts at the national level. An additional third (35%) said they did not know, even though they were not presented with this option (See also **Figure 4.5d** in the following section).

Figure 4.4a



a. Bases Weighted, 2194; Unweighted 2280.

As both education and income increase, the number perceiving local government influence over election processes increases; 52% in the highest income group attributed corruption to local officials, compared with 34% in the lowest income group. Those who are illiterate, live in rural areas, are less educated, younger people, and lower income respondents said they did not know in response to this question at much higher rates than urban respondents, those with more education, and higher incomes (tables not shown, see **Table 4.4a** for illustrative example). Thirty-three percent of rural respondents chose the second statement attributing problems to local officials, compared with 41% of urban respondents, while 39% of rural compared with 28% of urban respondents said they did not know how to choose between the two statements. About the same percentage of rural and urban respondents (28% and 30%, respectively) said the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps. It appears that urban respondents are somewhat more likely to attribute problems in national elections to local officials.

Women chose a statement less than half as often as men (50% of women compared with 20% of men said they did not know how to choose). When they did choose a response, 45% of men attributed election unfairness to local officials compared with 27% of women, but even fewer women (23%) compared with 34% of men said the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election (tables not shown).

The number of respondents who did not choose a statement declined with increased age. Respondents of all ages were more likely to attribute responsibility for election

corruption to local governments, but both 18-24 year olds and those over 50 were significantly more likely to attribute problems to local government than to credit national government. Thirty-six percent of 18-24 year olds and 42% of those aged 50 and over blamed local officials, compared with 24% and 27%, respectively, who attributed election quality to the national government (**Table 4.4a**).

Provincial differences suggest that eligible voters in the Punjab and Sindh are more cynical about local officials' role in the election process, while those in the NWFP and Balochistan are more likely to believe in central government steps to ensure free and fair elections. In NWFP and Balochistan, despite the fact that more respondents appear underserved by objective measures of election access and awareness, 34% and 42% of respondents said they believed the central government was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election, compared with 29% and 23% of those in Punjab and Sindh. In the latter two provinces, 39% of all respondents' confidence in central government measures was tempered by skepticism of local politicians' corruption of the process (**Table 4.4a**).

Table 4.4a

Attribution of Election (Un)Fairness to National versus Local Government, by Age, Educational Attainment, and Province

Demographic Group	Government in Islamabad is Taking Positive Steps to Ensure Free Election	It does not matter what Islamabad does, local and provincial politicians corrupt the process.	Don't Know / Cannot Choose
Age *(p=.02)*			
18-24	24	36	40
25-34	30	33	36
35-49	34	35	31
50 and above	27	42	30
Province			
Punjab	29	39	32
NWFP	34	24	42
Sindh	23	39	39
Balochistan	42	28	30
Educational Attainment			
None	25	34	41
Madrasa	23	30	47
Some Primary	23	41	36
Finished Primary	31	37	32
Middle School	30	37	33
Matric	31	43	26
F.A./F.Sc or above	37	36	27

a. Percentages by Row b. Bases weighted vary. Age Base Weighted, 2194; Unweighted, 2280.

When asked in March 2007 to compare their expectations for upcoming elections to past elections in Pakistan (Q32), 45% of respondents said they expected the level of fairness of the 2007-08 election to be about the same as past elections. Only 12% said they expected the election to be less free, while 45% said they expected the elections to be somewhat or much more free than past elections (**Figure 4.4b**). Expectations did not differ significantly by age, educational attainment, and income, but there were significant provincial, gender, and rural-urban differences in expectations of fairness (**Table 4.4b**).

Figure 4.4b



Forty-five percent of rural respondents compared with 40 percent of urban respondents said upcoming elections were likely to be somewhat or much more free and fair compared with past elections, while slightly more urban (16%) than rural (10%) respondents expected these elections to be less free and fair. Surprisingly, comparatively more respondents in the NWFP expected the elections to be more free and fair than past elections (53%), a result that may reflect their local, provincial, and national representation. Women were less likely to expect major differences between past and present elections, while more men thought elections would be less free (14% compared with 10% of women) or more free (44% compared with 42% of women (**Table 4.4b**).

Taken together, these findings suggest that voter education, election observation, and efforts at institutional strengthening need to be focused on both the local and national levels, and that citizens must be empowered to hold local politicians as well as the national government accountable for their roles in compromising the quality of elections.

Table 4.4b

Fairness of 2008 Compared with Past Elections, by Milieu, Province, and Gender

Demographic Group	Somewhat or Much Less Free and Fair	About the Same	Somewhat or Much More Free and Fair
Milieu			
Rural	10	45	45
Urban	16	44	40
Province			
Punjab	12	48	40
NWFP	13	34	53
Sindh	11	43	46
Balochistan	12	43	46
Gender			
Male	14	41	44
Female	10	48	42

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted vary. Province Base Weighted, 2370; Unweighted, 2445.

When asked about their confidence in the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) (Q33f), the same percentage of respondents (35%) said they had no trust at all or some trust, while fewer (25%) said they had a great deal of trust in the ECP, results that did not differ significantly across levels of educational attainment, province, or age group (**Figure 4.4c**). Urban respondents said they had no trust in the ECP more frequently (44%) than rural respondents (34%), while rural respondents expressed some or a great deal of trust more frequently than urban respondents. Forty percent and 27% of rural respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the ECP, while 34% of urban respondents had some trust in the ECP and 22% a great deal (**Table 4.4c**). These response patterns may reflect the relative lack of exposure of rural respondents to media and other analysis of the ECP, as well as more trust in government institutions in general among people in rural areas. These results also are consistent with the survey's previous finding that rural populations are generally less likely to have been reached by election registration efforts (See **Table 4.2c)**.

Similarly, almost half (48%) of women said they had no trust in the ECP, compared with less than one third (29%) of men. One in three men (32%) compared with less than one in five women (16%) expressed a great deal of trust in the institution (**Table 4.4c**). These data may reinforce the findings that women are less likely to know about and to be reached by election procedures or may reflect women's greater awareness that some women face serious obstacles to voting on Election Day.[6] Thirty-nine and 36% of men and women, respectively, had some trust in the ECP.

The low level of trust (16%) among women in the ECP suggests that efforts to make women aware of their rights as voters and to assist them directly in taking the steps necessary to exercise their voting rights should be a major priority, while the ECP should be encouraged to do a better job of registering women, facilitating their access to the election process, and ensuring that they express their opinions freely in the polling booth.

[6] See, for example, Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team, "Pakistan Local Bodies Elections, 19 and 25 August 2005," pages 15-16, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/commonwealth-lb-elections.pdf

Figure 4.4c



Table 4.4c

Trust in Election Commission of Pakistan, by Milieu, Class, and Gender

Demographic Group	No Trust at All	Some Trust	Great Deal of Trust
Milieu			
Rural	10	45	45
Urban	16	44	40
Class			
Lowest Income	33	39	28
Lower Middle Class	37	40	23
Middle Class	43	35	22
Upper Middle Class	46	39	15
High Income	34	35	31
Gender			
Male	29	39	32
Female	48	36	16

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted vary. Province Base Weighted, 2370; Unweighted, 2445.

Questions to assess respondents' degree of confidence in the implementation of specific electoral procedures were posed to help inform the partners' voter education messages for the coming election, to the extent that the survey showed a lack of confidence in aspects of the process that could or would be improved for this election compared with past elections. Taken together, the questions were designed to identify what measures would be most important to ensure citizen confidence in the fairness of the electoral process.

When asked about their confidence that most voting-age citizens in their communities would be registered on the electoral list in time for the election (Q43), 21% said they were very confident, 34% said they were somewhat confident and only 7% said they were not at all confident (**Figure 4.4d**). Classes and rural and urban settings did not differ significantly in their level of confidence about registration, while those with only a madrasa education stand out as much less likely to express confidence in the registration process (only 12% of madrasa-educated respondents said they were very confident that people in their communities would be registered in time, compared with 18-25% of respondents in the other educational groups). The number of respondents who do not know how confident they are in registration process decreases as the level of education increases (table not shown).

Figure 4.4d



Confidence in registration for the upcoming election differs by province, with 12% of respondents in Balochistan, 8% each in NWFP and Sindh, and 5% in Punjab saying they were not at all confident of the registration process at the time of the survey. Respondents in Sindh said they did not know (49%) more often than those in the other provinces (**Table 4.4d**). More males than females were somewhat or very confident that eligible voters in their communities would be registered (69% and 48% of men and women, respectively), with more women also saying they did not know. Women's lower confidence level may indicate that women respondents had in mind the low level of women's voter registration, whereas some men respondents may have had in mind only men as registered voters. In any case, the data are consistent with the survey's other findings pointing to the need for targeted voter registration efforts aimed at women.

Table 4.4d

Confidence that Eligible Voters in Community Will Be Registered, by Province and Gender

Demographic Group	Not at All Confident (%)	Somewhat Confident (%)	Very Confident (%)	Don't Know (%)
Province				
Punjab	5	38	22	35
NWFP	8	32	21	39
Sindh	8	25	18	49
Balochistan	12	39	14	35
Gender				
Male	7	42	27	24
Female	6	27	21	39

a. Percentages by Row

b. Bases weighted vary. Gender Base Weighted, 2535; Unweighted, 2577.

Similar percentages of respondents expressed confidence in the accuracy of electoral lists in their communities (Q44), with 22% very confident, 33% somewhat confident, and 8% not at all confident (**Figure 4.4e**).

Figure 4.4e



Levels of confidence in list accuracy differed significantly across most demographic groups except rural and urban respondents (**Table 4.4e**). A lower percentage of respondents in Sindh and Balochistan expressed high confidence in the electoral lists (16% and 14%, respectively, compared with 25% and 21% in Punjab and NWFP), although more respondents in Balochistan (40%) said they were somewhat confident—higher than in the other provinces (see **Table 4.4e**).

The percentage confident in the accuracy of the electoral lists increases steadily with respondent age, with 17% of 18-24 year-olds compared with 31% of those over 50 expressing high confidence in the electoral lists. This data is consistent with earlier findings of lower levels of voter registration among youth (see **Table 4.2a**) .

While about one-third of respondents in each income group said they were somewhat confident in electoral lists, the number saying "don't know" decreased with increased education, and the number of respondents who said they were very confident in the lists increased with income—higher income groups said they were very confident in the lists *twice as often as the lowest income group*, and at least 13% more often than the other income groups (**Table 4.4e**).

Table 4.4e

Confidence in the Accuracy of the Electoral List in Your Community

Demographic Group	Not at All	Somewhat	Very	Don't Know
Province				
Punjab	6	35	25	34
NWFP	8	31	21	40
Sindh	10	28	16	46
Balochistan	9	40	14	37
Age				
18-24	10	31	17	43
25-34	8	33	18	40
35-49	8	33	23	35
50 and above	4	34	31	31
Class				
Lowest Income	7	33	18	41
Lower Middle Class	7	34	23	36
Middle Class	9	33	21	38
Upper Middle Class	9	32	23	36
High Income	6	30	36	28
Educational Attainment				
None	7	29	19	45
Madrasa	6	40	14	39
Some Primary	5	34	21	39
Finished Primary	8	30	25	37
Middle School	7	36	27	31
Matric	9	35	29	26
F.A./F.Sc or above	9	36	22	33
Gender				
Male	8	38	28	25
Female	7	28	16	50

a. Percentages by Row; b. Bases weighted vary. Gender Base Weighted, 2535; Unweighted, 2577.

Finally, women (16%) said they were very confident in the list almost half as often as men and women were twice as likely to say they did not know about list accuracy in their communities (**Table 4.4e**). These results are consistent with findings that women have less trust in the ECP, less confidence that people in their communities are registered, and less knowledge about whether their household is registered to vote.

Equal percentages of respondents expected names to be left off of electoral lists at polling stations as expected no problems with electoral lists (39%), while 24% did not know how

likely this problem might be in the next election (**Figure 4.4f**). Despite the fact that some groups reported personally experiencing this problem in the past, demographic groups did not differ substantially when answering this question about expectations for the coming election.

Figure 4.4f



The low level of confidence in the registration process and the accuracy of electoral lists, particularly among women, the young, and the poor, suggested that targeted efforts were necessary to encourage these groups not only to register, but also to check that their names were on the draft electoral lists during the display period.

While large percentages of respondents felt that names being excluded from voter lists at polling stations would be a problem in the next election, they did not differ significantly according to different provinces and groups. The *content of the messages* of voter education with respect to registration and verification of electoral lists did not need to vary significantly by province, even while direct assistance with registration and verification should target more disenfranchised groups. A dual strategy of *broad* information distribution with a common message, paired with *targeted* direct assistance to women, the poor, and youth was adopted by the partners to engage substantial cross-sections of the electorate.

In addition, FAFEN conducted Pakistan's first statistically-sound audit of the provisional voters list during the display period in June/July 2007. Using "list-to-people" and "people-to-list" methodologies, 250 trained FAFEN personnel

checked a random selection of approximately 10,000 eligible voters nationwide. Five hundred additional FAFEN observers monitored the display period, focusing in part on issues highlighted in this voter education survey report. FAFEN findings were published in "Flawed But Fixable," which is available at www.fafen.org.

When the Supreme Court of Pakistan later heard a case related to the electoral roll, FAFEN submitted a brief to the Court,[7] and in February 2008 FAFEN conducted a follow-up audit of the resulting 2008 Final Electoral Roll.[8]

4.5 PERCEPTIONS OF PROPOSALS TO INCREASE ELECTION ACCESS AND FAIRNESS

The survey sought to identify the degree to which different kinds of measures would increase the confidence of ordinary citizens in the electoral process, in order both to help define FAFEN advocacy strategy and to inform voter education messages about existing measures of which many people were unaware, such as display of provisional voter registration lists, as well as new measures introduced for this election, such as the use of local observers in every constituency. Interviewers asked respondents the following question, followed by a list of possible measures, to which respondents indicated the effect of each measure on their level of confidence in the election process:

> Q59: "Some people are talking about different ways that the fraud and corruption could be prevented in the election process. I'll list a few of the suggestions we've been hearing and some that have already been implemented. I'd like you to tell me whether each measure would give you much more confidence, somewhat more confidence, have no effect, or give you less confidence, in the election process."

Forty-two percent of respondents said that "a procedure for ordinary citizens to complain about fraud" (Q59a) would give them much more confidence in the election process, while an additional 15% said it would give them somewhat more confidence.[9] The average percentage who said they didn't know (20%)[10] decreased the higher the respondent's income, while the higher income respondents were more likely to report higher confidence as a result of this measure (**Figure 4.5a**).

The lowest income group did not express an opinion almost twice as often as the other income groups (27% of the poorest respondents said they did not know compared with 15% of the other income groups (data not presented).

Forty-seven percent of respondents in Punjab, 39% in NWFP, and 34% each in Sindh and Balochistan said complaint procedures would increase their confidence in the process. In

[7] See FAFEN Press Releases, including "ECP Decisive Actions Needed To Increase Voter Numbers," June 22, 2007, http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=43; "Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable," August 23, 2007, http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45; and "FAFEN urged ECP to Display Voter's List at Union Councils," October 26, 2007, http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=55.

[8] See FAFEN Press Release, "Missing and Duplicate Voters on the Final Electoral Roll," February 13, 2008, http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b3114b6e197.pdf.

[9] The ECP initiated a "Complaint Management System" on its website, www.ecp.gov.pk, on December 15, 2007, with technical assistance from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

[10] This option was not read out to respondents for any question.

both Sindh and Balochistan, 12% of respondents said the measure would give them less confidence, compared with 9% and 6% in Punjab and NWFP (table not presented).

Figure 4.5a



Figure 4.5b shows respondent levels of confidence in response to the proposition that the registration process be made simpler (Q59c). International advisors to the election commission advocated that the display centers should be a "one-stop-shop" for voter registration so that potential voters would not need to go through the onerous process of appearing before a "Revising Authority" after applying to add their names to the draft list.[11] Sixty-one percent of respondents said that this measure would give them somewhat or very much more confidence in elections, a figure that did not differ substantially by gender, province, or other categories. Those with higher incomes and educational attainment expressed an opinion more frequently, and were more likely to report that these measures would increase their confidence. This may reflect a greater understanding of the registration process, or intentions to take advantage of such procedures.

[11] See Election Commission of Pakistan Press Release, "Eligible Persons Filing Claims for Inclusion of Names in the Computerized Electoral Rolls Need Not to Appear Before the Revising Authorities," June 26, 2007 (clarification of changed procedure issued midway through the display period, but implemented unevenly) following FAFEN Press Release urging this clarification, "ECP Decisive Actions Needed To Increase Voter Numbers," June 22, 2007, http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=43.

Figure 4.5b



Figure 4.5c



Respondent reactions to the proposition that every voter check the electoral lists (Q59d) during the display period follow a similar distribution, with 57% responding with greater confidence (**Figure 4.5c**).

When asked whether dissolving local governments during the election period (Q59f)—a proposal debated publicly in 2007—would increase respondent confidence in the election process (see **Section 4.4** above), 48% said that it would make them somewhat or much more confident, while 17% of respondents would be less confident under a local government dissolution (**Figure 4.5d**). Of those who had identified local politicians as responsible for compromising election quality, 45% said dissolving local government would increase their confidence in the process, compared with 42% of those who felt the national government was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election. Only 28% of those who said they did not know to the question about government measures to ensure free and fair elections said local government dissolution would give them more confidence. Twenty-five percent of respondents who felt positively toward the steps taken by the central government said dissolving local governments would have no effect on their confidence, compared with 21% of those emphasizing a local role in electoral corruption (table not presented).

Figure 4.5d



These findings suggest that both those who see the central government's role as positive and those who attribute problems to local politicians would feel more confident about elections if local governments were dissolved during the process, suggesting that local politicians are seen as a significant part of the problem of electoral corruption.

Figure 4.5e presents the distribution of respondent reactions to the proposition that election officials be better trained (Q59g). This question referred both to the need for training for Display Center Information Officers (DCIOs) in advance of the display period for the draft electoral roll and to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) mandate to support improved election commission training of polling staff.[12]

Fifty-eight percent of respondents said they would have somewhat or much more confidence were ECP officials better trained. Those with more education were more likely to say that this measure would make them much more confident, but the same percentage (about 20%) across educational groups said it would make them somewhat more confident, while less-educated people were more likely to say they do not know. A similar pattern follows for those with lower incomes (data not presented). Similarly, more women (25%) than men (19%) said they did not know, while 58% of both men and women would have somewhat or much more confidence with better ECP training. Thirteen percent of men compared with 8% of women believed ECP training would have no effect, while 9% of men and 8% of women believed the training would give them less confidence in elections (table not presented).

Figure 4.5e



Among respondents who felt that the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election, 49% said they would have much more confidence in elections with better ECP training, compared with 40% of those who believed central

[12] See Election Commission of Pakistan Press Release, "Election Commission with the Assistance of UNDP has Undertaken a Programme to Train More Than 500,000 Polling Staff," November 26, 2007.

government efforts are compromised by local corruption (data not presented). These findings suggest that those who believe electoral corruption occurs at the local level feel that better-trained ECP officials would help to improve the process.

A final policy change was not explored explicitly in the survey questionnaire, but a related question about secrecy in polling booths provides some relevant insights. The election commission announced that new cardboard privacy screens would be introduced in the next general elections.[13] Before knowing about this policy change, 24% of survey respondents said they thought it *somewhat or very* likely that authorities would know how they voted in the coming election. A majority (54%), however, felt that violation of ballot secrecy by authorities would be very or somewhat unlikely (Q54b) (**Figure 4.4f**). Surprisingly, these attitudes did not differ significantly by province, age group, gender, income, or other demographic categories.

Figure 4.5f



Responses to all questions regarding measures that could be taken by electoral administration authorities are highly correlated[14]; that is, the same respondents who express confidence in one measure also expressed confidence in the other measures. While about 60 percent or more respondents have confidence in each measure, they are approximately the same set of respondents. About 40% of respondents either do not know

[13] See Election Commission of Pakistan Press Release "Transparent Ballot Boxes and Voting Screens to be Used in the Upcoming General Elections by the Election Commission," February 9, 2007.
[14] Cronbach's Alpha = .94; correlation coefficients range from .64 to .89.

how the measures would influence their confidence; believe the measures would have no effect, or that they would provide less confidence.

Demographic analysis does not give many clues as to those individuals who are ambivalent or negative about election procedures except for women, the poor, and the less educated, which reinforces previous findings that outreach to these groups is necessary to engage them not only in voting, but in better understanding the electoral process and what makes an election free and fair.

FAFEN voter education messages were designed based, in part, on the findings of this voter education survey. Themes included:

1. The role and importance of **national election observers**
2. New **transparent ballot boxes** with **numbered, tamper-proof plastic seals**
3. New cardboard **secrecy screen** to protect the privacy of voters while marking ballots
4. The legal restriction against **"influencing voters"** within 400 yards of a polling station
5. The importance of a **"level playing field"** for all candidates to campaign
6. The importance of **women's polling stations and booths** remaining open
7. Qualities of **good leaders**
8. The importance of an **independent media** to fair and transparent elections
9. The relationships among the **three branches of government**, the media, citizens, and elections

Chapter 5: Trust in Governmental and Nongovernmental Institutions

A population's participation in elections and political processes reflects, in part, its trust in political institutions. Greater levels of trust in political institutions have been associated with higher levels of citizen engagement with political processes. Many analysts consider trust in political institutions—particularly elected institutions and their ability to regulate unelected leaders—as critical to the consolidation of democracy.[1] New research has questioned this assumption, arguing that citizens who are more skeptical of institutions do a better job of holding governments accountable, especially along with an independent judiciary and media.[2] Survey questions that measure citizen trust in a variety of institutions can shed light on the health of governance and democracy.

Furthermore, proposals for improvements in the election process, including electoral administration reform and scrutiny of elections by observers, may be irrelevant if low trust in both bureaucratic and elected institutions keeps eligible voters away from the polls. Understanding public regard for the institutional landscape helps provide a context for interpretations of the quality of the electoral process by long- and short-term election observers and civil society. Additionally, in an environment of distrust, informing citizens about the nature of reforms designed to increase their participation may be an important part of creating public demand that hastens the institutional strengthening process.

To help inform design of the content of voter education messages and select partners to deliver those messages, the survey asked respondents a series of questions about their perceptions of a variety of state and non-state institutions in Pakistan.

5.1 ELECTED ASSEMBLIES

When asked about their trust in a variety of Pakistani institutions (Q33) in March/April 2007, respondents expressed little trust in the elected national and provincial assemblies (Q33e), with 43% saying they had no trust at all in these institutions (**Figure 5.1a**). The assemblies ranked second after the police (67% distrust) with respect to level of distrust, although more people had *some* trust in the assemblies--39%--compared with just 23% who had some trust in the police.

[1] See, for example, Rose, Richard, and William Mishler. 1997. "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies " *The Journal of Politics* 59 (2):418-51.

[2] Stokes, Susan Carol, and Matthew R. Clearly. 2006. *Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico* New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation Publications.

Figure 5.1a



At the time of the survey, more respondents in rural areas said they had some or a great deal of trust (63%) in the assemblies than did urban respondents (48%). Over half (52%) of urban respondents compared with 37% of rural respondents had no trust at all in the assemblies. While it is beyond the scope of this survey to explain these differences between rural and urban electorates, closer links between rural electorates and patronage networks and family connections to representatives may explain this higher level of trust. In addition, a more diffuse and transient urban electorate may be less familiar with their representatives and their constituent activities (**Table 5.1a**).

Women expressed mistrust of the assemblies more frequently than men, with one in two women (53%) saying they had no trust at all in the assemblies compared with one in three men (35%). Sixty-five percent of men had some or a great deal of trust in the assemblies, compared with 47% of women (**Table 5.1a**).

Table 5.1a

Trust in National and Provincial Assemblies, by Milieu, Class, and Gender

Demographic Group	No Trust at All	Some Trust	Great Deal of Trust
Milieu			
Rural	37	42	21
Urban	52	34	14
Class			
Lowest Income	38	41	21
Lower Middle Class	43	41	17
Middle Class	49	37	14
Upper Middle Class	52	40	9
High Income	41	34	26
Gender			
Male	35	43	22
Female	53	33	14

a. Percentages by Row b. No differences by province, educational attainment, age, or religious sect.

c. Bases weighted vary. Class Base Weighted, 1814; Unweighted, 1890.

Respondents in the middle and upper middle class reported less trust in the assemblies than higher and lower income groups; 47% and 49% of middle and upper middle class respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the legislatures compared with 58% or more of low and high income respondents.

Interviewers asked respondents to assess the likelihood of suggesting the their Member of the National Assembly (MNA) or Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) (Q19) when asked: "Looking at the problems in your area and the way they affect families like yours, or your relatives' and friends', who would you suggest to go to in order to resolve these problems?" Fourteen percent said they would be likely to suggest the MNA or MPA to solve a problem, while 16% and 65% said they were unlikely to or would never suggest, respectively, the MNA or MPA (**Figure 5.1b**). Fewer women (17%) than men (23%) were likely to suggest the assembly members, and more women (69%) than men (59%) would never recommend the MNA or MPA to solve a problem. Eighteen percent of men and 14% of women respondents said they were unlikely to recommend these politicians (table not shown).

About one in five respondents at all educational levels said they were likely to recommend the MNA or MPA (**Table 5.1b**), with the exception of those who have a madrasa education, who said they would recommend the MNA or MPA more often (about one in three). However, the number of respondents saying they *would never* recommend an MNA or MPA decreases with higher levels of education, which may reflect a greater awareness on the part of educated respondents of the functions of the MNAs and MPAs and how they might be contacted, as well as greater knowledge about their constituencies' representatives.

Figure 5.1b



Table 5.1b

Likelihood of Recommending MNA or MPA to Resolve Local Problems, by Gender and Educational Attainment

	Would Never	Unlikely	Likely
Educational Attainment			
None	70	13	17
Madrasa	51	17	32
Some Primary	70	13	18
Finished Primary	60	15	25
Middle School	64	14	22
Matric	58	18	23
F.A./F.Sc or above	59	22	19
Gender			
Male	59	18	23
Female	69	14	17

a. Percentages by Row

b. Gender and Education Base weighted, 2041; Unweighted, 2048. P=.0015.
c. Differences across age groups, provinces, and income levels are not significant.

Perceived power of the assemblies, presented in **Figure 5.1c**, is not related to[3] the respondents' likelihood of recommending the MNA or MPA to solve local problems. This result suggests that perceptions of the individual politicians and their ability to deliver services at the local level shapes public views of MNA or MPA efficacy more than the influence of the institution itself.

[3] Regression analysis has been used in this and subsequent cases to substantiate such findings from the cross-tabulated data.

Figure 5.1c



The Pakistani electorate was divided in its opinion about the degree of power the national and provincial assemblies have to direct political development in Pakistan (Q60); 26% said that the National Assembly and Senate (Q60a) had no power at all, while 28% said it had a great deal of power (**Figure 5.1c**). The perceived power of the national assembly did not differ across provinces and demographic groups.

More respondents had an opinion about the provincial as compared with the national assembly. When asked about the Provincial Assemblies' (PA) power to direct political development in Pakistan (Q60b), 26% of respondents said the PA had some power, and about one in five respondents said it had no power, little power, or a great deal of power, respectively (**Figure 5.1d**). Forty-eight percent said the PA had some or a great deal of power, compared with 42% for the National Assembly. Not surprisingly, these findings vary somewhat by province (**Table 5.1c**). In Punjab, 52% of respondents said the PA has some or a great deal of power, compared with 44% in NWFP, 41% in Sindh, and 43% in Balochistan. In both Punjab and Balochistan, 39% of respondents said the PA had little or no power. In NWFP and Sindh, respectively, 35% and 41% perceived little or no power in the PA. Respondents in the NWFP were twice as likely to say they did not know how much power the PA has.

Figure 5.1d



Table 5.1c

Perceived Power of the Provincial Assembly, by Province

	Don't Know	None	Little Power	Some Power	A Great Deal of Power
Province					
Punjab	9	20	19	27	25
NWFP	21	16	19	26	18
Sindh	18	18	24	23	18
Balochistan	18	17	22	26	18

a. Percentages by Row

b. Base weighted, 2360; Unweighted, 2409.

c. Differences across age groups, provinces, and income levels are not significant.

National and provincial elected institutions enjoyed relatively little esteem from the Pakistani electorate; 43% of respondents—and 53% of women—had no trust at all in elected assemblies; 64% *would never* recommend a member of the provincial or national assembly to solve a local problem. Around 40% of the electorate perceived that neither the Provincial nor the National Assembly had power to shape political development. Even if elections are competitive, the perceived weakness of the country's primary elected institutions points to the limitations of voter education programming absent institutional strengthening and accountability. Furthermore, rural and less educated people may trust these institutions more than urban, middle class, and educated populations, a finding consistent with patronage patterns, rather than an informed electorate overseeing the performance of electoral institutions.

5.2 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The electorate expressed more trust in the national government compared with the elected assemblies (Q33a); 34% had no trust at all in national government, but 38% and 28% had some or a great deal of trust, respectively (**Figure 5.2a**). As with the elected assemblies, women were less likely to trust national government; 41% had no trust at all compared with 28% of men. Thirty-five percent of women and 41% of men regarded the government with some trust, and 24% and 31% of women and men, respectively, expressed a great deal of trust in the national government (table not shown). The urban electorate was also more skeptical of the central government; 70% of rural respondents had some or a great deal of trust while comparatively fewer urban respondents (60%) felt the same way. Forty percent of urban respondents had no trust at all in the government compared with 30% of rural respondents (tables not presented).

Figure 5.2a



The low levels of trust in national government correspond with a prevailing (39%) perception that corruption is both a very common and major problem in government (Q53) (**Figure 5.2b**). Those with more education as well as those with higher incomes were more likely to view corruption as a frequent and serious problem (tables not shown). Only 30% of those with low education compared with 54% with a F.A. / F.Sc degree or higher believed government corruption is a common and serious problem. Women said more frequently that they did not know about the level of corruption in government, but were otherwise similar to men.

Figure 5.2b



An additional measure of corruption—the degree to which employment depends on friends and relatives in government (Q52b)—was included to assess the potential effectiveness of voter education messages encouraging Pakistanis to make independent decisions based on evaluation of party platforms and policies, rather than on candidate personalities and personal benefit. Over one third (36%) agreed strongly with the statement "employment depends on friends and relatives in government" and an additional 22% agreed, for a total of 58% who view connections as important (**Figure 5.2c**). A minority (26%) disagreed with this statement.

In the NWFP, 76% of respondents agreed or agreed strongly that jobs depend on government connections, compared with 57% in Punjab, 51% in Sindh, and 65% in Balochistan (table not shown). Twenty-six percent of respondents in Punjab, 14% in NWFP, 29% in Sindh, and 25% in Balochistan disagreed with the proposition. Respondents in NWFP appear to believe connections are more important to employment than those in the other four provinces.

Figure 5.2c



5.3 JUDICIARY

The survey asked about the third branch of government, the judiciary, in part because of judges' major role in elections in Pakistan. District judges approve polling station schemes and appointment of polling officials, oversee candidate nomination and election observer accreditation processes, and manage the consolidation of election results.

At the time of the survey, levels of trust in the judiciary mirrored support for other institutions (Q33b). Important national events regarding the judiciary have taken place in the intervening period, such that survey findings do not reflect views about judges of the current national or local courts.[4] **Figure 5.3** shows that in March-April 2007 about one in three (31%) Pakistani adults had a great deal of trust in the judiciary; while an additional one-third (31%) had no trust at all. Thirty seven percent of respondents had some trust in the judiciary. Urban respondents expressed distrust of the judiciary more often; 37% said they had no trust while only 28% of rural respondents had no trust. On the other hand, 26% of urban and 35% of rural respondents had a great deal of trust in the judiciary. Equal percentages (37%) of both rural and urban respondents had some trust in the judiciary.

Similarly, women trust the judiciary less than men; 36% and 27% of women and men, respectively, had no trust in the judiciary. Twenty-five percent of women compared with

[4] See Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, Issued November 3, 2007, Amended November 15, 2007, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco_1_2007.html

37% of men had a great deal of trust in the institution, and 39% and 36% of women and men, respectively, had some trust (tables not presented). In Punjab, 74% of respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the judiciary, followed by 67% in Balochistan and 60% each in NWFP and Sindh (tables not presented).

Figure 5.3



5.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS

Of the institutions respondents were asked to evaluate in March-April 2007, the police (Q34c) were trusted the least. Only ten percent of respondents had a great deal of trust in the police, followed by 23% with some trust, and over two-thirds (67%) with no trust at all (**Figure 5.4**).

There were provincial differences in levels of trust for the police, and rural respondents expressed trust in the police somewhat more than urban respondents. In Sindh, more respondents (75%) distrusted the police, followed by Punjab (67%), NWFP, and Balochistan (57% each). Higher percentages of respondents in NWFP and Balochistan—42% and 43%, respectively—had some or a great deal of trust in the police, compared with 33% and 24% in Punjab and Sindh, respectively (**Table 5.4**).

Men and women did not differ with respect to trust for police, but 59% of men and 49% of women had a great deal of trust in the army (Q33d), 28% and 27%, respectively, had some trust, and 23% of women had no trust at all compared with 14% of men (table not shown).

Figure 5.4



Table 5.4

Trust in Police, by Province

	POLICE		
PROVINCE	*No Trust*	*Some*	*Great Deal*
Punjab	67	23	10
NWFP	58	30	12
Sindh	75	18	7
Balochistan	57	26	17

a. Percentages by Row. b. Base Weighted, 2100; Unweighted, 2163.

5.5 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Fewer people have a great deal of in trust provincial government (Q33g) (understood as the Chief Minister and cabinet and to a lesser extent the Governor, who is appointed by the President) (22%) than in national government (28%), but 38% of respondents have some trust in both. Forty percent said they had no trust at all in provincial government (**Figure 5.5a**). These attitudes do not differ across the provinces.

The number of respondents in urban versus rural areas who said they had no trust at all in provincial government differed by 10% (47% and 37%, respectively). Forty percent of the rural electorate expressed some trust and another 24% a great deal of trust in provincial government, while only 35% of urban respondents had some trust and 18% had a great deal (table not shown).

Gender differences in trust of provincial government are more pronounced than for national government. The percentage of women expressing a great deal of trust in

provincial government was 16%, compared with 25% of men; 42% had some trust compared with 32% of men; and 51% had no trust at all compared with just 32% of men (table not shown).

Perceptions about corruption in provincial government (Q53b) (**Figure 5.5b**) mirror those of the national government, with a similar distribution of responses, suggesting that those who believe there is a great deal of corruption in Pakistan perceive it as a problem at multiple levels of government.[5] Forty percent of respondents said the problem of provincial-level corruption is both common and serious. Eight percent said corruption is not a problem at the provincial level, while 18% said it is somewhat common and 11% said it was very common but minor. The distribution of responses in each province is the same as the national average. Respondents with higher levels of income and educational attainment view corruption as a problem more frequently than those with lower incomes and with less education (data not shown).

Figure 5.5a



[5] The correlation coefficient for these two questions is .87.

Figure 5.5b



5.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Approximately one in three respondents each have no trust (35%), some trust (36%), and a great deal of trust (29%) in the re-established local governments elected in 2001 and again in 2005[6] (Q33i) (**Figure 5.6a**), levels that correspond to those for the national and provincial government, but with no differences across rural and urban respondents or provinces. The level of perceived corruption is also similar to that for provincial and national government, with 39% of respondents saying local government corruption is a common and major problem (Q53c) (**Figure 5.6c**). Again, those who think corruption is a major problem think that it occurs at all levels of government.[7] However, a greater percentage (59%) would recommend local government to solve a problem (Q19g) (**Figure 5.6b**), a function, perhaps, of the relative proximity of local government rather than high levels of trust or expectations of low corruption.

Women were less likely to trust local as well as the other levels of government. Forty-three percent of women compared with 29% of men have no trust in local government. Women respondents report some or a great deal of trust less often (33% and 24%, respectively) than men (38% and 33%), although they said they were likely to recommend local government for solving problems as often as men.

[6] See Local Government Plan 2000 http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/LG_Final_Plan_2000.pdf and Local Government Ordinance 2001 www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/SBNP_Local_Govt_Ordinance_2001.pdf.
[7] Correlation coefficients for the three questions relating to government corruption range from .75 to .86.

Figure 5.6a



Figure 5.6b



Respondents ages 18-24 were less likely to name elected local officials as a resource for resolving local problems. While 60% or more of respondents in each of the other age groups recommended local officials, 51% of 18-24 year-olds do so, while 49% said they the would be unlikely to or would never do so, compared with about 39% of respondents in the other age groups (**Table 5.6**).

In each of the provinces with the exception of Balochistan, urban respondents recommend local government officials more often than their rural counterparts do (see **Table 5.6**). Respondents in Punjab and NWFP (64% and 60%, respectively) say they are likely to recommend elected local officials more often than those in Sindh and Balochistan (49% and 46%, respectively) (table not shown).

The percentage of respondents in the two lowest income groups surveyed who said they were likely to recommend local officials (50% and 62%, respectively), was lower than that for the other income levels (between 66% and 65%) (**Table 5.6**). Within the lowest income group, 37% would never recommend local officials, compared with 23%-31% in the other classes. As with other levels of government, this may reflect a lack of knowledge about the process, or a general feeling of powerlessness to influence government among the poor. Because income and education are related, education may be the primary explanation for low government engagement by low-income respondents. Those with no or some primary education were likely to recommend local officials less often (48% and 54%, respectively, compared with 60% or more for the other educational groups (**Table 5.6**). About 30% of respondents in each of the four highest educational levels (those who finished primary school or more) were unlikely to or would never recommend local officials, compared with about 50% of respondents with no education, madrasa, or some primary school.

Mirroring the results for perceived corruption at other levels of government, the percentage of respondents who perceive local government corruption as a common and serious problem increases with income and education (data not presented), but does not vary by province, age, gender, or urban/rural milieu.

Respondents who view local officials as corrupt recommended them less frequently as a solution to local problems. Of those who said there is *no* corruption among local officials, 68% recommend them as a solution to problems, compared with 58% of those who think that local corruption is common and serious. Thirty-five of these skeptics said they *would never* recommend local officials compared with 22-25% of those who believe corruption is a minor problem or no problem at all (data not presented). While many respondents would still consult local government for a problem, the finding suggests that perceived corruption may reduce the degree to which citizens view local government as a resource, perhaps leading them to seek alternative sources of information and assistance.

Table 5.6

Likelihood of Recommending Local Government to Solve a Problem, by Age, Provincial Milieu, Class, and Educational Attainment

	Would Never	Unlikely	Likely
Age Group			
18-24 years	40	9	51
25-34 years	28	9	62
35-49 years	28	11	60
50 years or more	29	9	62
Province (Urban and Rural)			
Rural Punjab	29	11	60
Urban Punjab	***26***	***5***	***70***
Rural NWFP	31	11	58
Urban NWFP	***21***	***9***	***69***
Rural Sindh	44	12	44
Urban Sindh	***36***	***11***	***53***
Rural Balochistan	45	9	46
Urban Balochistan	***45***	***10***	***45***
Class			
Lowest Income	37	13	50
Lower Middle Class	31	7	62
Middle Class	23	9	68
Upper Middle Class	23	12	66
High Income	30	3	67
Educational Attainment			
None	42	10	59
Madrasa	29	11	60
Some Primary	34	13	54
Finished Primary	31	8	61
Middle School	22	10	68
Matric	21	7	72
F.A./F.Sc or above	23	10	67

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary, Income, 2052; Unweighted, 2057.

People in Pakistan understand "district government" as the district bureaucracy or civil service, namely the District Coordination Officer (DCO) and subordinate Executive District Officers (EDOs). It may also include the elected District Nazim, but most people probably think of these elected representatives as part of the new "local government" structure. Respondents were, overall, unlikely to recommend district-level officials as resources in solving local problems (Q19h). Seventy-five percent said were unlikely or would never recommend this resource, and only 25% would be likely to recommend district officials to solve a local problem (**Figure 5.6d**).[8]

FAFEN implemented a long-term election observation strategy to monitor the actions of local government officials as well as the administrative preparation for the elections. See 19 FAFEN Election Updates published from November 2007 to February 2008, at www.fafen.org.

[8] For an excellent explanation and organogram on the current local, district, and provincial government structures, see Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar. 2007. *Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 264-265.

Figure 5.6c



Figure 5.6d



5.7 PRESS

Historically, the domestic press has enjoyed more respect than other Pakistani institutions. Indeed, 72% of the survey respondents have some or a great deal of trust in the press (**Figure 5.7**). Furthermore, trust in the press, surprisingly, does not vary with respondent age, education, rural or urban milieu, *frequency of use of any media*—television, radio, or newspapers – or *interest in politics* (both with self-reported and the behavioral index measures (see Chapter 3)).

Literacy in at least one language corresponds with greater trust in the press, but it is interesting that even among those who are illiterate, 64% have some or a great deal of trust in the press, compared with 78% of literate respondents. Not surprisingly, those with literacy in Urdu or English have more trust in the press. Forty-three percent of those literate in Urdu have a great deal of trust in the press, compared with 30% of those who cannot read, write, or speak Urdu. English speakers have even more trust in the press, with 48% expressing a great deal of trust compared with 34% of those without English literacy (table not shown).

Respondents in Punjab and Sindh express a great deal of trust in the press more often (38% each) than those in NWFP and Balochistan (31% and 24%, respectively), who say they have no trust more often (40% and 36% in NWFP and Balochistan, respectively) than the 25% and 26% who have no trust in Punjab and Sindh. (table not shown).

Figure 5.7



The relatively high level of confidence in the press, even in a population with low levels of media consumption, may have several implications for voter education programming.

First, the electorate, even while not highly engaged with the news on a personal level, may assume that the media is playing an important role in representing their interests or in holding other institutions accountable. Secondly, the electorate may rely on others who do consume media to share information and thus form opinions about the quality of the media based on these secondhand accounts. Finally, people may not consume the media under normal circumstances, but limited, elevated consumptions during salient events and crises may influence perceptions of a larger audience.

Further research would be required to confirm the speculation that people consume the press indirectly through educated or more engaged family and community members, but the relative level of confidence in the press may point to the importance of using the media as an important resource in voter education, despite low levels of direct consumption.

5.8 SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

In developing democracies, social institutions often wield considerable influence over people's lives as well as the political system itself. These institutions, operating at the community level, are often closer to ordinary people.

Public opinion about the influence of local figures and institutions should not be viewed as a static continuation of long-standing traditions, but rather as a snapshot of the views of ordinary people *given relatively recent changes in local governance.* In developing democracies, there is a tendency to assume that citizen ties to local institutions are remnants of primordial social interaction, but there is evidence that institutional changes are equally if not more influential.[9] A 1999 study of the Pakistani electorate, for example, found that agricultural landowners' influence on elections had diminished as of the 1997 elections,[10] but recent research suggests that the new devolution program and non-party local elections may have reversed that trend.[11]

The Foundation included questions to measure citizen attitudes toward three social institutions—religious leaders (Q19b), landowners ("feudal leaders") (Q19a), and *biradari* elders (Q19c)—in anticipation of programming that might seek to engage these local "influentials" in voter registration, voter education, and other election-related activities, or to encourage voter independence from them, depending on various factors. Specifically, respondents were asked how likely they would be to recommend each type of community member to solve a local problem. The goal of the question was to identify what leaders people think of most readily when they have a question or problem, which may be a proxy for measuring the level of engagement between citizens and those institutions.

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[9] See, for example, Richard Rose and William Mishler. 1997. "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies " *The Journal of Politics* 59 (2):418-51.

[10] Wilder, Andrew R. 1999. The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[11] Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar. 2007. *Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Almost one in three respondents (27%) would recommend religious leaders if they knew someone with a problem in the community. This places religious leaders above nongovernmental organizations, political party offices, Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, district administration officials, and feudal leaders as perceived problem solvers, even though 58% of respondents would never recommend them and 15% would be unlikely to do so (**Figure 5.8a**).

Respondents' likelihood of recommending religious leaders did not differ by province, age group, gender, or urban/rural milieu. The percentage of respondents who recommend religious leaders as a resource diminishes, to some extent, with income and education (**Table 5.8a**).

Among low-income respondents, one in three (32%) said they would be likely to recommend religious leaders, 14% would be unlikely to recommend them, and 54% would never recommend them. In comparison, 19% of the highest income group would recommend religious leaders while 82% would be unlikely to or would never do so (**Table 5.8a**). The middle class respondents recommended religious leaders slightly more frequently (26%) than did the lower middle class (23%) and the upper middle class (23%).

Not surprisingly, those with a madrasa education recommend religious leaders to solve problems two times as often (50%) than the other education groups, with the exception of those with no education and some primary school education (29% and 28%, respectively) (**Table 5.8a**). Four out of five (80%) respondents with Matriculation or an F.A. /F.Sc degree or more education said they were unlikely to or would never recommend these leaders, compared with 76% of those with a middle school education, 75% with a primary school education, and 71% of those with no education.

Table 5.8a

Likelihood of Recommending Religious Leaders to Solve a Problem, Class and Educational Attainment

	Would Never	Unlikely	Likely
Class			
Lowest Income	54	14	32
Lower Middle Class	59	17	23
Middle Class	56	18	26
Upper Middle Class	62	16	23
High Income	74	8	19
Educational Attainment			
None	56	15	29
Madrasa	33	17	50
Some Primary	55	17	28
Finished Primary	54	21	25
Middle School	67	9	24
Matric	63	23	24
F.A./F.Sc or above	64	15	21

a. Percentages by Row. b. Bases weighted vary, Income, 1996; Unweighted, 1988

Religious leaders could be a relatively important partner in reaching lower income and less educated people. Religious leaders come to mind for one in three low income respondents compared with one in four middle class respondents or one in five high-income respondents in the context of solving local problems. The partners' programming enlisted assistance and input of religious leaders in encouraging lower income and less educated citizens to participate in the process.

Figure 5.8a



Although declining, the so-called feudal system still holds sway in the social dynamics of Pakistan. Many low-income people still depend upon landowners for their livelihood and income. In the political sphere, the patron-client relationship between feudal elites and lower income groups persists in some parts of the country. For many years, observers of Pakistani politics have argued that the influence of large landowners, who often parley their "landed power" into political power, is a critical obstacle to democracy in Pakistan. That is, where landlords are influential, they dominate the electoral process.[12] These feudal leaders represent an important influence on the lives of their tenant farmers, and their political influence, often manifested in the form of provincial and national assembly seats or influence within political parties, means that understanding their role is critical to any assessment of Pakistani elections.

[12] Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar. 2007. *Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Wilder, Andrew R. 1999. *The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Percentages of respondents who would suggest feudal leaders to their relatives or friends to find solutions to their local-level problems are similar to those for religious leaders. **Figure 5.8b** illustrates that 26% of respondents said they were likely to recommend these leaders in the event of a local problem, while 62% would never do so. Twelve percent said they would be unlikely to recommend feudal leaders. Women and men recommend feudal leaders equally often, as do different age groups.

Figure 5.8b



Less than half the number of respondents in urban Punjab as in rural Punjab said they were likely to recommend feudal leaders to solve local problems (13% and 28%, respectively), and 87% were unlikely or would never recommend them, compared with 71% of those in the province's rural areas. Urban versus rural respondents in NWFP have similar responses (see **Table 5.8b**), while both urban and rural respondents in Sindh and Balochistan were more similar to each other in their willingness to suggest feudal leaders, which is, perhaps, consistent with the greater degree of influence these leaders may have overall in these two provinces in both rural and urban areas.

Differences across income and education groups are striking; the lowest income respondents suggest feudal leaders *twice* as often as *the next highest* income group (40% compared with 20% of lower middle class respondents) (**Table 5.8b**). While 61% of low-income respondents are unlikely to or would never suggest feudal leaders, 80% of lower middle class respondents would not. Similarly, about 40% of those with no education or a madrasa education are likely to recommend feudals, while 22% and 24% of those who have some or finished primary education, respectively, would suggest feudals (**Table 5.8b**).

A large percentage of the uneducated and low income electorate think of feudal leaders when asked to recommend someone to solve their problems, and existing research suggests the electoral power of these "influentials." Voter education should seek to involve these local leaders, as needed, but more often to bypass powerful locals and target those who depend on them to ensure that the latter make informed, independent choices and vote freely.

Table 5.8b

Likelihood of Recommending "Feudal Leaders" to Solve a Problem

	Would Never	Unlikely	Likely
Province (Urban and Rural)			
Rural Punjab	60	11	28
Urban Punjab	77	10	13
Rural NWFP	63	10	27
Urban NWFP	72	10	17
Rural Sindh	53	14	32
Urban Sindh	47	14	39
Rural Balochistan	61	13	25
Urban Balochistan	57	18	25
Class			
Lowest Income	52	9	39
Lower Middle Class	66	14	20
Middle Class	66	17	16
Upper Middle Class	74	11	14
High Income	83	4	13
Educational Attainment			
None	52	10	38
Madrasa	46	12	41
Some Primary	66	11	22
Finished Primary	60	17	24
Middle School	73	8	18
Matric	75	10	15
F.A./F.Sc or above	74	15	10

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary, Income, 1942; Unweighted, 1948.

An even larger percentage (70%) of the electorate is likely to turn to *biradari* elders (**Figure 5.8c**). The *biradari,* or clan, is more specifically a group of patrilineal kin who generally reside in the same village, but who often extend their influence to those who have migrated outside it. These groups of elders may help members find employment, arrange marriages, and collect and administer loans to poorer members, for example. Clan loyalty, or *biradarism,* is reportedly strong during elections, in which people often follow the recommendations of their elders as opposed to political ideology when voting.

Although *biradari* is an important informal institution to which many people turn, 30% of respondents say they would never or would be unlikely to suggest *biradari* to solve problems (**Figure 5.8c**). Of rural respondents, 75% would recommend *biradari,* while only 63% of urban respondents would do so. Urban respondents never or are unlikely to recommend *biradari* more often (37%) than those in rural areas (25%) (**Table 5.8c**).

These urban-rural differences are more pronounced by province. In rural Punjab, 79% recommend *biradari,* compared with 63% in urban areas. Respondents in NWFP are less

likely overall to recommend *biradari,* and more urban respondents (69%) than rural (51%) do so. Seventy percent and 63% of rural and urban respondents, respectively, in Sindh recommend *biradari;* while only in Balochistan does the number of urban respondents who recommend *biradari* (72%) exceed those in rural areas (66%) (**Table 5.8c**). The latter finding may be a result of sampling bias.

Figure 5.8c



Those with higher incomes are less likely to recommend *biradari* to friends and relatives to solve local problems—77% of the lowest income respondents compared with 68% of those in the upper middle class said they were likely to suggest *biradari* (**Table 5.8c**). Educational attainment does not seem to diminish respondents' willingness to turn to *biradari,* with over 70% (the national average or more) of all educational groups likely to recommend clan leaders, with the exception of those with F.A./F.Sc degrees or more education, of whom 60% recommend *biradari* (**Table 5.8c**).

The kinship system in Pakistan is important throughout the country, particularly in rural areas. Voter education programming aimed at the community level, will inevitably require working with *biradari* and engaging community elders in the process. These groups can certainly be enlisted in educating voters about the logistical aspects of participation, while messages encouraging voters to make independent decisions, such as initiating community discussion about the characteristics of good leaders and how to evaluate them, may diminish divisive clan-based voting patterns that may weaken ideological, party-, and policy-based voter decision-making.

Table 5.8c

Likelihood of Recommending Biradari Leaders to Solve a Problem

	Would Never	Unlikely	Likely
Milieu			
Rural	19	6	75
Urban	29	8	63
Province (Urban and Rural)			
Rural Punjab	16	6	79
Urban Punjab	28	9	63
Rural NWFP	25	6	69
Urban NWFP	40	9	51
Rural Sindh	22	8	70
Urban Sindh	31	6	63
Rural Balochistan	25	9	66
Urban Balochistan	19	8	72
Class			
Lowest Income	18	5	77
Lower Middle Class	23	5	72
Middle Class	24	10	65
Upper Middle Class	23	10	68
High Income	36	7	57
Educational Attainment			
None	23	5	74
Madrasa	10	6	84
Some Primary	23	12	65
Finished Primary	16	7	78
Middle School	25	5	70
Matric	23	6	71
F.A./F.Sc or above	28	12	60

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary, Income, 1942; Unweighted, 1948.

5.9 NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups have been increasing exponentially since the 1990s. A prevailing assumption is that ordinary citizens view such elite-led groups with cynicism. The partners used the survey to assess attitudes toward NGOs in order to determine whether support for local NGOs would be effective alone or should be supplemented with other outreach strategies. Another goal was to assess what aspects of NGO credibility need to be strengthened and whether and how this could be accomplished through election-related programming.

While NGOs are not among the first institutions respondents recommend to solve a problem (only 14% do so, while 86% would not recommend them) (Q19d) (**Figure 5.9a**), a majority (55%) do not know when asked to agree with one of two alternate statements, "NGOs make a positive contribution to society" or "NGOs are a waste of resources." While 29% choose the former statement, 16% choose the latter (Q34) (**Figure 5.9b**).

Similarly, 19% perceive corruption to be a common and major problem among NGOs—much lower than that for elected and non-elected government institutions—and 40% do not know (Q53d) (**Figure 5.9c**). Overall, respondents seem generally unaware, ambivalent, or somewhat positive about the role of NGOs compared with other institutions.

Figure 5.9a



Figure 5.9b



Women say they would recommend NGOs as a resource less frequently (12%) than men (16%). Eighty-eight percent of women would never or would be unlikely to recommend NGOs compared with 84% of men (table not shown). One in four women (25%) say NGOs make a positive contribution compared with one in three men (32%); 15% and 17%, respectively, see NGOs as a waste of resources, and 59% of women compared with 50% of men do not know.

Respondents in Punjab said they did not know whether NGOs' role in society is positive or negative twice as often (66%) as respondents in NWFP (30%) and Balochistan (36%). Twenty-four percent of Punjab respondents viewed NGOs positively and 10% negatively, compared with 40% and 30% in NWFP, 33% and 23% in Sindh, and 37% and 27% in Balochistan, respectively. Those with more education and income recommend NGOs more frequently and are more likely to see their contribution to society as positive (data not presented).

The electorate as a whole does not have an overwhelmingly negative view of NGOs, but most people do not perceive NGOs as effective for solving local problems and are ambivalent or unclear about their role in society. These results indicate the need for careful selection of locally based NGO partners with strong relationships and credibility in their communities. The data also point to the need for enhancing public perception of civil society groups as effective and transparent, one of the goals of the Foundation's election program.

Figure 5.9c



The findings in this chapter suggest that the Pakistani voting-age population is more likely to trust and to turn to non-elected institution outside of government, such as *biradari* elders and feudal leaders to solve problems. Some non-elected institutions have persisted over time at the local level regardless of fluctuating political loyalties and systems of government. They have had greater power to address people's grievances, if only as a function of their proximity and profile in their communities. The press and NGOs represent non-elected institutions with relatively positive, but more weakly established, images compared with elected and other government institutions.

Voter education designed to enhance both the level and quality of participation by ordinary citizens in the election process may need to emphasize institutions outside of the election system itself in order to strengthen indirectly the connection between citizens and their elected representatives as well as their ability to hold those representatives accountable. However, voter education strategies should avoid reinforcing the "capture" of the electorate by entrenched local systems of influence.

Chapter 6: Experience and Perceptions of Electoral Fraud, Coercion, and Violence

Electoral fraud and violence have occurred in the electoral histories of most countries,[1] and Pakistan is no exception. People in Pakistan often talk about "rigging," but little research has explored exactly what people have in mind when they use this term in Pakistan or elsewhere. With a wide range of methods--from ballot stuffing to vote buying to gerrymandering to various forms of intimidation—at the disposal of political and social actors, every polity experiences electoral misconduct differently. While some people think of "rigging" as a centrally managed and organized process, others see electoral manipulation as a local phenomenon, carried out by specific candidates, parties, or others in particular places. Understanding how voters define and experience electoral misconduct can help inform voter education messages, electoral advocacy themes, and the emphasis of electoral observation training and activities. In addition, some forms of election fraud and coercion impact ordinary voters more than others, particularly with their support for democracy as a system of government and their participation over time. In addition, some problems can be addressed more readily by institutional and policy reforms or by the deterrence of election observers.

The survey included a series of questions to assess the degree to which the electorate has experienced different types of electoral misconduct. This chapter presents data on non-violent electoral fraud, as well as violence and intimidation, to identify the most serious problems with various aspects of Pakistan's electoral process that influence the quality of elections. The purpose of collecting this data was to: (1) create messages for voters, (2) identify phenomena that election observers should be looking for before, during, and after the election; (3) inform an advocacy strategy; and (4) provide a baseline for measurement in future surveys. This report aims to enhance the use of public opinion surveys and election observation tools in assessing election quality and providing a context for the interpretation of measurable, objective criteria, such as the procedural accuracy of a ballot counting and consolidation process.

Respondents were asked to discuss reasons why they have voted or abstained in past elections in order to assess the degree to which they have experienced electoral malpractice personally, and the degree to which their views and actions are based on general impressions of Pakistani elections. The survey asked about many of the acts described as "electoral offenses" or "crimes" in the election laws of some countries in the world,[2] ranging from spiritual coercion (involving religious figures to influence voters), to

[1] See, for example, Jeff Fischer. 2002. "Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention." In *IFES White Papers*, ed. IFES. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems. Posada-Carbó, Eduardo. 1996. *Elections Before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America*. London: University of London. Rapoport, David C., and Leonard Weinberg. 2001. *The Democratic Experience and Political Violence*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Rapoport, David C. 2004. "Tantrums in the streets? We take peaceful elections for granted, but maybe we shouldn't." *Los Angeles Times*, October 3, 1. Reif, Megan E. (unpublished chapter drafts) (Final expected 2009. Making Democracy Safe: Institutional Causes and Consequences of Electoral Coercion and Violence. Ph.D. , Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

[2] Reif, Megan. 2008. "Electoral Laws on Election Crimes Database (ELECD)." University of Michigan.

landlord or employer intimidation of voters to candidate or party vote buying. Other questions focused on direct experience of and impressions about specific kinds of electoral fraud, such as ballot stuffing, and electoral violence. The chapter concludes with data on the possible impact of remedies designed to mitigate fraud and violence, such as a party code of conduct or election observers, on citizen confidence in the electoral process.

6.1 PERCEPTIONS OF NON-VIOLENT ELECTORAL FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT

Even when elections are relatively free and fair, governments have access to many resources that give them an electoral advantage, while parties seeking power can also promise allocation of resources according to their electoral support. In Jamaica, for example, housing and other resources are allocated based on party patronage. Similarly, the weakness of political parties and ideology- or policy-based platforms in Pakistan has been connected in part to the reportedly common practice of elected representatives promising their constituencies and supporters development funding and other public service allocations.

When asked about their opinions of a number of statements seeking to measure perceptions about patronage (Q52), 46% of respondents agreed strongly with the statement: "Public services like road repair and water are delivered, improved, or repaired in this area for the purpose of influencing elections" (Q52a). An additional 22% agreed, while 18% disagreed (**Figure 6.1a**).

Figure 6.1a



Respondents in NWFP agreed (29%) or agreed strongly (47%) that government resources are used to influence elections more frequently than those in the other provinces, followed by respondents in the Punjab, 21% of whom agreed and 36% of whom agreed strongly with the statement. In Sindh, 20% agreed and 31% agreed strongly about the use of public service delivery in elections, while 34% and 31% of respondents in Balochistan did so. In sum, 76% in NWFP viewed public service delivery as an instrument of electoral manipulation, compared to 65% in Balochistan, 57% in Punjab, and 51% in Sindh. The percentage of those who disagreed or disagreed strongly by province was 15% in NWFP, 25% in Balochistan, 15% in Punjab, and 26% in Sindh (table not shown). Respondents in Punjab and Sindh were almost twice as likely to say they did not know about the issue (17% and 20% respectively, compared to 8% and 9% in NWFP and Balochistan).

Similarly, 47% agreed strongly and 21% agreed with the proposition that political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after the election (Q52c). Seventeen percent disagreed (**Figure 6.1b**).

Figure 6.1b



Perceptions of *party use of patronage* to reward their supporters also differ by province, with 79% of NWFP respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, "Political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after elections", compared to 71% of respondents in Balochistan, 67% in Punjab, and 65% in Sindh (tables not shown).[3] The percentage saying "don't know" is similar to that for the

[3] *P=.0148* (99% level of confidence).

previous question, while the percentage disagreeing or strongly disagreeing was 12% in NWFP, 20% in Balochistan, 18% in Punjab, and 14% in Sindh.

The perceived behavior of the political parties, as the primary political actors during elections, is an important factor in both voter turnout and belief in democracy, regardless of the procedural quality of the election. Political parties in Pakistan have been associated, traditionally, with particular leaders and candidates, rather than ideological or policy positions. Political parties are also commonly said to be internally undemocratic. The survey asked about the related concept of "corruption" within the parties. Fifty-one percent of respondents said that corruption is both a common and major problem within Pakistan's political parties (Q53e), and an additional 13 percent said it is common but a minor problem. One in three (31%), however, said that corruption was only somewhat or not at all common (**Figure 6.1c**).

Figure 6.1c



A larger percentage (54%) of respondents in the Punjab said the problem was common and serious, followed by 52% in the NWFP, 46% in Sindh, and 40% in Balochistan (**Table 6.1**). Despite these differences in the perception of political party corruption across provinces, the percentage of respondents who would recommend going to a political party office to solve a local problem is the same nationwide, with only 14% saying they would tell a friend or family to seek assistance from this resource (Q19e) (**Figure 6.1d**). While the main actors in Pakistani elections are perceived as delivering services and rewarding supporters in order to enhance their electoral chances, they are not viewed as a primary community resource for solving local problems. More people recommend their MNA or MPA and NGOs than political party offices.

Table 6.1

Corruption in Political Parties (Q53e)

Province	Not at All	Somewhat	Common but Minor Problem	Common and Major Problem	Don't Know
Punjab	10	19	12	54	5
NWFP	6	20	14	52	7
Sindh	12	26	14	46	1
Balochistan	12	28	14	40	5

a. Percentages are ROW percentages

b. Base Weighted, 1765; Unweighted, 1847

Figure 6.1d



These findings suggest that a majority of the electorate views patronage, including government or political party delivery of services to communities as well as personal rewards to supporters, as important factors in the electoral process. When interpreting election results and election quality, it is important to keep in mind the social and institutional factors that may weaken citizen confidence in the electoral process and democracy more generally.

While it is difficult to encourage voters to evaluate and support parties based on the quality of the party platforms and policies rather than on expectations of short-term personal or community benefit, voter education materials can encourage citizens to think in these terms. Parties and candidates also can be called upon to engage in discussion and debate at the community level in ways that enhance citizen access to candidates and ability to judge their ideas and

credibility. The partners hosted Pakistan's first nationwide "Meet the Candidates" Public forums for this purpose.

6.2 EXPERIENCE OF TURNOUT-INFLATING AND –SUPPRESSING ELECTION FRAUD

The effect of flawed elections on citizen participation over time can undermine support for democracy as well as the effect of positive electoral reforms designed to make elections fairer. Alternatively, when participation is affected by "turnout-inflating" measures, such as vote-buying, or "turnout-suppressing" measures, such as intimidation, the quality of election administration may have little relationship with voter participation. In fact, voter turnout diminished throughout the history of advanced democracies as electoral laws limited the use of money, free alcohol, food, and other incentives to vote.

The survey aimed to identify the extent to which certain types of nonviolent and violent coercion, as opposed to objective measures of election quality, have influenced past voter participation. The purpose of these questions was to inform the content of voter education messages and whether they should focus on voters' sense of power to influence election outcomes and government performance, improvements in electoral laws and procedures to mitigate the types of electoral misconduct that suppressed participation in the past, security measures to allay fears of violence, or other aspects of the process.

Figure 6.2a



Respondents were asked how often they had voted. All those except those who said they had voted in every election were then asked, for those elections in which they abstained,

how important a variety of factors were, from a sense of civic duty to being forced to vote, in influencing their decision to vote in one or more past elections (Q25).[4]

Only a small percentage (14%) said the elections not being free and fair (Q25g) was either somewhat or very important in influencing their decision to stay away from the polls. Whether the election was free and fair was "not at all important" for 57% of respondents and "not very important" for an additional 13% (**Figure 6.2a**).

Respondents in NWFP said the fairness of the election was somewhat or very important in their abstention almost three times as often (30%) as those in the other provinces (9% in Punjab, 11% in Sindh, and 10% in Balochistan, respectively). In contrast, 81% in Punjab, 69% in Balochistan, 61% in Sindh, and 47% in NWFP said election fairness was not at all or not very important in the decision not to vote (table not shown).[5]

The percentage of non-voting respondents who abstained because of unfairness of the election is higher among those with the most education as well as madrasa-educated respondents. Fourteen percent of both those with F.A. /F.Sc and above and those with a madrasa education said fairness was a very important factor in non-voting. Nine percent of madrasa-educated respondents said fairness was somewhat important, compared to 6% of those with the highest level of education (**Table 6.2**).

Less educated respondents said they did not know more frequently, while the percentage of respondents saying fairness was not at all or not very important ranged from 62% (those with no education) to 91% (those who have finished primary school).

Table 6.2

Importance of Perceived Election Fairness in Decision to Abstain in One or More Elections, by Educational Attainment

	Don't Know (%)	Not at All Important (%)	Not Very Important (%)	Somewhat Important (%)	Very Important (%)
Educational Attainment					
None	27	50	12	4	7
Madrasa	3	55	21	9	12
Some Primary	22	61	3	8	6
Finished Primary	3	72	19	2	3
Middle School	13	59	12	7	9
Matric	12	67	12	6	3
F.A./F.Sc or above	8	60	14	6	13

a. Percentages by ROW

b. Bases weighted, 607; Unweighted 697.

The relative insignificance of the substantive differences between educational groups, compared to clear provincial differences, may suggest the degree to which abstention depends on local and individual-level factors rather than educational attainment,[6]

[4] "I'm going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past election."

[5] Base weighted, 610; Unweighted, 699.

[6] In developed democracies, surveys generally find a strong relationship between education and bases for making voting and non-voting decisions. Nevertheless, in advanced democracies, mobilization of voters and

"Turnout-inflating" measures can include legal activities, such as campaigning, as well as illegal activities, such as vote-buying. Incentives are also used to suppress turnout among certain demographic groups or in specific locations. The survey asked voters about the importance of material or other nonviolent incentives or disincentives to abstain or to vote in past elections.

Figure 6.2b[7] shows the level of importance given to financial incentives as a reason for abstention (Q25j) among those who have abstained in one or more past elections. Only 5% admitted that receiving a gift or money was a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to abstain, while 79% said this factor was not at all or not very important. Survey respondents often hesitate to answer questions about such stigmatized behavior. Some who said "don't know" may have said yes in the absence of social desirability bias.

Respondents in Sindh said financial incentives were somewhat or very important (9%) in non-voting twice as frequently as those in the other provinces (5% in Punjab, 4% in NWFP, 5% in Balochistan). Sindh also had the highest number of "don't know" responses (23%, compared to 10% in Punjab, 20% in NWFP, and 20% in Balochistan). In Punjab, 86% of respondents said financial incentives were not at all or not very important, compared to 76% in NWFP, 69% in Sindh, and 76% in Balochistan (table not shown).

Figure 6.2b



targeting of important districts has been associated with higher turnout. Aldrich, John H. 1993. "Rational Choice and Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1):246-78.

[7] Base weighted, 594; Unweighted 681.

The percentage of respondents who reported having voted in one or more elections because of material incentives is somewhat higher than the percentage saying they abstained in response to economic coercion, if one includes questions about employer influence on voting behavior. **Figure 6.2c**[8] shows the level of importance given to employer influence as a reason for voting (Q26e) among those who have voted in one or more past elections. Twelve percent of respondents admitted that employer influence was a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to vote, while 88% said this factor was not at all or not very important. The percentage saying they did not know was only one percent, which may suggest that less stigma surrounds questions that ask respondents to attribute their stigmatized action to a specific actor.

The importance of employer influence in voting varies by province, with 14% of respondents in Balochistan saying employers were somewhat or very important in their decision to vote, compared to 13% each in NWFP and Sindh and only in 8% in Punjab. In Balochistan, 22% of respondents said this factor was not very important, while 63% said it was not at all important, followed by 15% and 69%, respectively, in NWFP; 11% and 76% in Sindh; and 8% and 84% in Punjab. Based on these findings, employer influence on voters may be more common in Balochistan and the NWFP (tables not shown). It is notable that gender, age, educational attainment, class, and rural-urban milieu where not individually associated with higher or lower rates of employer influence.

Figure 6.2c



[8] Base weighted, 1675; Unweighted 1693.

Surprisingly, the importance of material incentives, such as gifts or cash (Q26g), in voting is reported even less often than that for abstention. **Figure 6.2d**[9] shows that this factor was important or somewhat important for only 3% of respondents, while 86% said it was not at all important and 5% not very important. It is widely reported that parties and candidates give cash incentives to potential voters in advance of elections in Pakistan. Survey results either indicate a very strong social stigma bias for this question or a discrediting of the widespread belief that vote buying is common.

Figure 6.2d



The influence of vote-buying in encouraging participation varied by province but not urban-rural milieu, with 4% of respondents in NWFP and Sindh, respectively, saying a gift or money was very important in their decision to vote, compared to 1% in Punjab and 2% in NWFP. An additional three percent of respondents in NWFP said receiving a gift or money was somewhat important, compared to less than one percent in the other provinces. This factor was not very important for 9% of respondents in Sindh, 8% in Balochistan, 7% in NWFP, and 3% in Punjab, and not at all important for 75% in Sindh, 85% in Balochistan, 75% in NWFP, and 93% in Punjab. Respondents in NWFP and Sindh said they did not know twice as often (11% and 12%, respectively), as those in Punjab (3%) and Balochistan (4%), which may point to higher rates of vote-buying than reported in these two provinces.

Women were more likely to say they did not know in response to this question (9% compared to 3% of men), but 3% of both men and women said material incentives were

[9] Base weighted, 1771; Unweighted 1793.

somewhat or very important in their electoral participation in one or more past elections. Four percent of women and five percent of men said this factor was very important and 84% and 89%, respectively, said it was not at all important (table not shown).

Respondents ages 50 and over said that material incentives were somewhat or very important in their voting decision more frequently (4%) than 35-49 year-olds (3%), 25-34 year-olds (2%), and 18-24 year-olds (3%). Older voters have been exposed to more opportunities for vote buying, but younger voters may have been somewhat more vulnerable to such incentives. Younger voters said they did not know in higher numbers than older voters, but the number saying this factor is not at all or not very important increases with each age category (table not shown).[10] Neither education nor class was related to reported importance of material incentives in voting behavior.

The threat of economic loss (specifically loss of job or land) (Q26k), shown in **Figure 6.2e**,[11] was a somewhat or very important factor for 6% of respondents who report voting in past elections, while 6% said this factor was not very important. Only one percent said they did not know, while 88% said economic threats were not at all important.

Figure 6.2e



[10] Cross-tabulation results had more than sufficient numbers in each cell to conclude reliably that the small differences across age groups were nonetheless real, even while responses are undoubtedly tied to the number of opportunities each age group has had to vote in their lifetimes. These data are presented because they represent one of the few instances in which age seems a relevant factor in the survey.

[11] Base weighted 1663; Unweighted 1682.

Responses differed significantly only by province, with 11% of respondents in Sindh reporting such threats as somewhat or very important, compared to 7% in NWFP, 6% in Balochistan, and 3% in Punjab. In Sindh, 10% of respondents said this factor was not very important and 79% said it was not at all important, compared to 9% and 80% in NWFP, 12% and 81% in Balochistan, and 4% and 92% in Punjab, respectively (table not shown).

6.3 PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF VARIETIES OF ELECTION FRAUD

The types of nonviolent election misconduct analyzed in the previous section are those in which the electorate is directly involved. The questions discussed in this section aimed to assess voter perceptions of the likelihood, extent, and types of party-, candidate-, and government-driven misconduct that do not involve voters. (Q54).[12] Compared to offenses that respondents report experiencing directly, problems outside of their direct control and experience appear to be more common in Pakistan or at least more readily reported.

A majority of respondents (53%) believed that levels of cheating and fraud would be the same in the upcoming election as in past elections (Q55) (**Figure 6.3a**).[13] Twenty percent expected reduced fraud, while 17% expected more fraud in the upcoming election. The percentage of respondents saying they did not know was smaller with higher incomes and education, while those with more education expected more cheating more often (data not shown).

Figure 6.3a



[12] Question 54 wording: "Now I'm going to mention some other things that can happen during elections. For each one, tell me how likely you think each will occur in the next election.

[13] Base weighted, 2412; unweighted 2485.

Ordinary people and those who follow politics closely in Pakistan refer frequently to the problem of "rigging" in elections. The Foundation included a question designed to understand better what people mean when they use this term and at what level of the process they believe that it occurs in order to determine the focus of election observation and advocacy, as well as the content of voter education.

Respondents were asked, "During elections, people talk about 'rigging'. When you hear talk about cheating or rigging in Pakistan, which of the following three statements best describes what happens, or is it something else"(Q57)? Interviewers then read the following three statements:

(1) "Rigging is something controlled by the central government."
(2) "The central government works with certain parties and officials to rig results in different places around the country."
(3) "Local politicians rig elections to benefit themselves, even if the central government tries to stop it."

Figure 6.3b



About one in three respondents (32%) chose the third statement, compared to one in four (26%) who chose the first. A substantial minority (15%) chose the second statement, while 3% proposed other descriptions of the problem (**Figure 6.3b**). These findings differ slightly by province, with respondents in NWFP saying they do not know more frequently (33% compared to 20-25% in the other provinces) and respondents in Sindh proposing something else more often (6% compared to 1-3% in the other provinces) (see **Table 6.3a**). Respondents in all four provinces attribute the problem to local politicians

most frequently, but relatively more do so in Punjab and Balochistan (35% and 33%, respectively, compared to 27% each in NWFP and Sindh).

Perceptions of rigging do not differ substantially among other demographic groups, although women, the poor, and less educated respondents are less likely to express an opinion, as with most other questions in the survey.

Table 6.3a

Statements that Best Describes Responsibility for Rigging Elections, by Province

Province	Don't Know	Central Government	Parties and Central Government	Local Politicians	Something Else Happens
Punjab	21	27	16	35	2
NWFP	33	26	13	27	1
Sindh	27	26	15	27	6
Balochistan	25	25	13	33	3

a. Percentages are ROW percentages

b. Base Weighted, 2257; Unweighted, 2331

The survey also asked about specific forms of electoral manipulation or "rigging." When asked about the likelihood of certain candidates being prevented from running for office (Q54a), 39% said the problem would be somewhat or very likely in the coming election, while 9% and 29%, respectively, thought it would be somewhat unlikely or very unlikely (**Figure 6.3c**).[14]

Figure 6.3c



[14] Base weighted, 2016; Unweighted, 2086.

The survey question did not ask voters to specify whether candidates might be physically prevented from running, in the form of violence, or whether requirements for candidacy might be used to disqualify them. Respondents might have been thinking of both procedural and physical barriers to candidacy. Under the Musharraf administration, candidates were required, for the first time, to demonstrate that they hold at least a Bachelor's degree to run for office. In addition, the survey was conducted while two former Prime Ministers remained outside the country and it was unclear whether they would be permitted to return and run for office.[15]

Respondents both with higher levels of income and educational attainment reported that they expected this problem to be likely or very likely in higher percentages than the less educated, poorer electorate, while the latter groups were more likely to say they did not know (data not shown). These findings do not differ according to province, age group, gender, or rural-urban milieu, which may suggest that respondents have central policies or national figures in mind rather than local-level efforts to eliminate candidates.

Figure 6.3d[16] presents the percentage of respondents who believed that stuffing of ballot boxes by officials or members of political parties was likely in the upcoming election (Q54e). Forty-eight percent expected ballot stuffing to be very or somewhat likely, while another 48% said it would be very or somewhat unlikely.

Figure 6.3d



[15] See, for example, Associated Press, "Former PM Bhutto to return to Pakistan Oct. 18," September 14, 2007, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20772734/

[16] Base weighted, 1666; Unweighted 1748.

In Punjab, 51% of respondents expected ballot-stuffing, while 45% did not, followed by Sindh, where 44% percent expected stuffing and 53% did not; Balochistan, where 40% expected stuffing and 54% did not; and NWFP, where 39% expected ballot-stuffing and 48% did not (table not shown).

Respondents with higher incomes and educational attainment expected ballot stuffing to be somewhat or very likely more often than the less educated and poorer electorate (data not shown). Of those with no education, for example, 35% thought ballot stuffing would be somewhat or very likely to occur in the next election, compared to 53% of those having graduated Matric. Madrasa-educated individuals were an exception to this overall linear trend, saying ballot stuffing would be somewhat or very likely at a higher rate than the other educational groups. While 30% of those with an F.A./F.Sc or more education said ballot stuffing would be likely, 38% of madrasa-educated respondents did so; 27% and 22% of F.A./F.Sc graduates and madrasa graduates, respectively, expected ballot stuffing to be somewhat likely. Expectations about ballot stuffing did not differ by gender, age, or rural/urban milieu.

A history of multiple voting,[17] often organized by local leaders and parties, has been a subject of complaints by political parties and candidates in past elections and is one of the reasons a national identity card is now required to vote.

The survey's findings indicate that much of the electorate had obtained identity cards and a little less than half thought they had registered to vote.[18] The partners sought to determine the extent to which respondents expected multiple voting to continue and whether voter education messages should emphasize those measures designed to mitigate this problem (e.g., indelible ink, checking of identification). When asked how likely multiple voting might be in the upcoming election (Q54f), 21% said very likely and 20% said likely. Thirty-six percent thought multiple voting would be somewhat or very unlikely, while one in four respondents did not know what to expect (**Figure 6.3e**).

[17]For related analysis of past Pakistan elections, see, for example, Aurat Publication and Information Service Foundation, "Unethical Electoral Practices: A Citizens' Report on the Local Government Elections 2005," p. 16; European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, "Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly Election 10 October 2002," p. 6; International Crisis Group, "Pakistan's Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule," November 22, 2005, p. 9; and Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, "Pakistan: Entire Election Process "Deeply Flawed". October 9, 2002.

[18] See, however, Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), "Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable," August 2007, www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4729d6fb5a19e.pdf. For related recommendations see FAFEN 2007 press releases, e.g. www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=44 and www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45. See also Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT) Citizens' Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), "Position Paper: Proposed Electoral Reforms," September 25, 2007, pp. 5-6, www.pildat.org/CGEP/Publications/PDF/Electoral_Reforms_2007.pdf.

Figure 6.3e



Figure 6.3f



When asked about the likelihood of counting fraud (Q54g), 48% of respondents expected the problem to be somewhat or very likely to occur in the next election, compared to 32% who said it would be somewhat or very unlikely (**Figure 6.3f**).[19] While expectations did not differ by province, urban respondents expected counting fraud to be somewhat or very likely more often than rural respondents; 50% of those in urban areas thought counting fraud would be somewhat or very likely compared to 41% of rural respondents. Thirty-four percent in rural areas thought counting fraud was somewhat or very unlikely, while 25% did not know; 38% of urban respondents thought counting fraud unlikely, and 22% did not know (table not presented).

Expectations about the likelihood of counting fraud, as with other forms of fraud, were greater among those with higher levels of educational attainment, as well as among madrasa-educated respondents (data not presented).

Figure 6.3g



Similar percentages of respondents believed that results would be changed after the counting process (Q54j) (**Figure 6.3g**).[20] Thirty-eight percent thought results manipulation would be somewhat or very likely to occur, and the same percentage thought it was unlikely, findings that do not differ by gender, province, age, or urban-rural milieu. As with perceptions of other forms of fraud, those with higher educational attainment and higher incomes were more skeptical of the process (data not presented).

[19] Base weighted, 2096; unweighted 2088.
[20] Base weighted, 2094; unweighted 2186.

Although most respondents did not admit to having received gifts or money to vote or abstain, many believed that counting fraud and ballot stuffing were likely to occur in the next elections with few expecting improvement. When asked about what political actors they think of when they hear people talk about rigging, about one third of respondents blamed local politicians, while about one fourth blamed the central government.

Together these findings suggest that about 40% of the population believed some form of nonviolent electoral fraud was likely, even if they had not experienced or been affected personally by electoral manipulation. If self-reported rates of experience of either turnout-inflating or turnout-suppressing activities, such as vote buying or intimidation, are to be believed, procedural misconduct, such as ballot-stuffing and counting fraud, appears to be more common than voter-level fraud. While personal exposure to fraud differs by province, perceptions about polling station or centralized fraud are more similar across provinces.

If perceptions of fraud are, in fact, greater than actual experience with fraud, confidence in the quality of the election is related not only to local-level election administration and quality, but also to perceptions of the nationwide quality of elections. Even if voters feel fraud in their own community is limited, they believe that it occurs elsewhere and corrupts the process overall.

6.4 EXPERIENCE OF TURNOUT-INFLATING AND -SUPPRESSING ELECTION VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION

Although the severity of election violence -- with respect to injuries, national impact, and the effect on final vote tabulation -- is often low compared to other forms of political violence and means of electoral manipulation, even minor incidents can weaken citizen trust in the process and convince losing parties to challenge results, undermining support for the system itself. No matter how localized the incidents, violence attracts disproportionate publicity, contributing to a perception that it is simply the most visible manifestation of a more systemic disease of widespread electoral irregularities that could include padded registration lists, vote buying, and ballot counting or consolidation fraud. In addition to reducing participation, violence undermines the perceived legitimacy of electoral outcomes and support for elections as the preferred method of resolving disputes and choosing leaders.[21]

The survey aimed to measure the degree to which the electorate has experienced electoral coercion and violence personally, their perceptions of the problem of violence more generally, and their expectations for the upcoming election. The survey responses were used to identify the types of violence that could be included in voter education materials, as well as the type of incidents that should be included in polling station and mobile observer forms.

[21] Reif, Megan. 2005. How Institutions Define and Have Been Defined by Electoral Conflict in Mature and Emerging Democracies (Dissertation Prospectus Draft). Paper read at Comparative Speaker Series, February, at Ann Arbor, MI.

Respondents who said they had abstained in one or more elections for which they were eligible to vote were asked to estimate the importance of a number of different factors in their decision to abstain (Q25).[22]

Only a small percentage (14%) said that fear of violence and unrest (Q25k) was either somewhat or very important. Fear was "not at all important" for 77% of respondents and "not very important" for an additional 7% (**Figure 6.4a**).[23]

Figure 6.4a



However, a disproportionate number of respondents in NWFP (15%) said that fear of violence and unrest was very important in their decision to abstain from voting, and an additional 8% of NWFP respondents said fear was a somewhat important factor.[24] In Sindh, 9% said violence was very important in non-voting and 7% said it was somewhat important, compared to 7% and 4% in Punjab and 7% and 2% in Balochistan (**Table 6.4a**).[25]

[22] "I'm going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past election."

[23] Base weighted, 525; unweighted 594.

[24] These findings are not surprising given the ongoing unrest in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), as well as parts of NWFP. See, for example, International Crisis Group, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants," December 11, 2006.

[25] See FAFEN Election Update 17, "FAFEN Introduces Election-Violence Monitoring," February 16, 2008, http://fafen.org/admin/products/p47b739cba9396.pdf.

Table 6.4a

Importance of Fear of Violence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting, by Province

Province	Don't Know	Not at All	Not Very	Somewhat	Very
Punjab	1	83	5	4	7
NWFP	7	56	14	8	15
Sindh	0	75	9	7	9
Balochistan	6	79	6	2	7

a. Percentages are ROW percentages

b. Base Weighted, 525; Unweighted, 594

Election laws in many countries prohibit involvement of religious leaders in partisan activities and elections. These laws often refer to the use of religious leaders, symbols, and teachings as spiritual coercion, which is listed alongside physical coercion in the election crimes section of election laws in many Islamic countries. Religious influence frequently takes the form of religious leaders using the opportunity of mass congregation in their venues, such as Friday prayer, to suggest to citizens how to vote.

When asked whether instructions by religious figures to respondents not to vote was important in their decisions to abstain in past elections (Q25l), only 5% said this was a somewhat or very important factor, while 8% said it was not very important. Over two-thirds (71%) said religious influence was unimportant (**Figure 6.4b**).

Again, respondents in NWFP said religious influence was somewhat or very important more than twice as often (12%) as respondents in other provinces (4% in Punjab, 7% in Sindh, and 4% in Balochistan) (**Table 6.4b**). In Sindh and NWFP respectively, 11% and 13% said religious influence was not very important, compared to 6% in each of the other two provinces. These findings suggest that, while relatively low, self-reported spiritual influence is somewhat more important in Sindh and NWFP.

Those with middle school and madrasa education were more likely to report spiritual influence in non-voting behavior. Fifteen percent of madrasa-educated individuals and 12% of middle-school educated individuals reported religious figures to be somewhat or very important in encouraging them to abstain, compared to no more than 6% (finished primary school) in the other educational categories (data not presented).

Table 6.4b

Importance of Fear of Religious Leaders' Influence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting, by Province

Province	Don't Know	Not at All	Not Very	Somewhat	Very
Punjab	10	81	6	2	2
NWFP	20	55	13	3	9
Sindh	22	60	11	3	4
Balochistan	19	71	6	2	1

a. Percentages are ROW percentages

b. Base Weighted, 597; Unweighted, 684

Figure 6.4b



Social or family pressure is rarely defined as an election crime in election law, nor do organizations involved in promoting democracy and free and fair elections measure or attempt to influence such informal aspects of the electoral process. However, the influence of culture and family is strong in Pakistan and is often viewed as a factor that militates against democracy and free elections. It is often said that women, in particular, are subject to these influence in ways that may prevent them from voting or making choices that would be in their own interest.

In the interest of designing voter education materials that address both institutional and social features of voter choice and election fairness, the survey asked respondents about the importance of family pressure in preventing voter participation.

Figure 6.4c



When asked whether being stopped from voting by family was an important influence in their reasons for not voting in past elections (Q25n), twelve percent said this factor was somewhat or very important, while 7% said it was not very important. Sixty-eight percent said it was not at all important and 14% did not know (**Figure 6.4c**).[26] Women said family pressure was somewhat or very important three times as often as men. Twelve percent of women said being stopped by their family was a very important factor, while an additional 3% said this factor was somewhat important. Six percent of women said family pressure was not very important in non-voting decisions and 64% said it was not at all important. Only 5% of male respondents said family pressure was somewhat or very important; 8% said it was not very important, and 73% said it was not at all important. Women were also more likely (15%) than men (14%) to say they did not know (table not shown).

The data provide evidence that women in NWFP experience family pressure more often than women in other parts of the country;[27] 27% of women in the province compared to 6% of men said that being stopped by family from voting was very important, while 8% of women and no men said the factor was somewhat important.

Family pressure to *encourage* voting behavior is more difficult to measure; the line between normal influences in the family environment, which are well-documented in

[26] Base weighted, 612; unweighted 702.

[27] Provincial differences were not statistically significant except when disaggregated by gender, and only in NWFP was there a gender difference bordering on conventional significance at the 99% level (p=.04).

surveys of electorates in advanced democracies, and coercion of those who would otherwise abstain or choose different candidates is not clear, particularly in societies where family ties are much stronger than in some of the world's older democracies.

When asked why they had voted in one or more past elections, 24% of respondents said that the influence of family in friends was very important, and another 15% said it was somewhat important (**Figure 6.4d**).[28] Fourteen percent said this factor was not very important, while 42% said the role of family in convincing them to vote was not at all important. It is not possible to conclude from the data whether people view family influence as unwelcome pressure, however, or part of the normal course of events.

Figure 6.4d



Neither class nor educational differences are associated with a greater degree of influence by family members in voting behavior. However, women, younger people, and rural dwellers all say family influence was a somewhat or more important factor in voting more often than the others. There are also differences by province (**Table 6.4c**).

Family influence was most important in the NWFP, where 12% of respondents said being convinced by family members was somewhat or very important, followed by Sindh, where the percentage was 7%.

Thirty-nine percent of women and 38% of men said family influence was somewhat or very important, but women said it was *very* important (27%) more often than men (20%). Only 16% of men said this factor was not very important, compared to 41% of women,

[28] Base weighted, 1805; unweighted 1829.

which may suggest that women are more likely to experience more pressure to vote, even if they ultimately decide to do so for their own reasons (**Table 6.4c**).

Rural respondents placed more importance on family influence. In rural areas, 26% compared to 18% of urban respondents said being convinced by family was very important (**Table 6.4c**).

Table 6.4c

Importance of Being Convinced by Family Members in Decision to Vote

Province	Don't Know	Not at All	Not Very	Somewhat	Very
Punjab	10	81	6	2	2
NWFP	20	55	13	3	9
Sindh	22	60	11	3	4
Balochistan	19	71	6	2	1
Gender					
Male	3	42	16	18	20
Female	9	9	41	12	27
Milieu					
Rural	7	35	15	16	26
Urban	3	52	14	13	18
Age					
18-24 years	11	49	10	11	19
25-34 years	9	42	16	13	22
35-49 years	5	42	16	14	23
50 years or more	1	36	14	21	29

a. Percentages are ROW percentages

b. Base Weighted Province, 1805; Unweighted, 1829

Compared to family, the role of political parties in pressuring or coercing people into participating in elections (Q26f) is reportedly relatively minimal. **Figure 6.4e**[29] shows the distribution of responses for party coercion. Five and six percent of respondents said that having a party supporter make them vote was somewhat or very important, respectively, and 9% said the party pressure was not very important. This factor was not at all important for 73% of respondents. Party coercion was not reported as important disproportionately by class, education, milieu, age, or gender, although both young and women respondents said they did not know more frequently than older people and men.

In Sindh and Balochistan, party influence was mentioned more frequently. Ten percent of respondents in Sindh said party coercion was very important and 5% said somewhat important, compared to 9% and 3%, respectively, in Balochistan. In Punjab, 5% of respondents said party agents making them vote was very important and 6% somewhat, compared to 6% and 6%, respectively in NWFP. Those who said party influence was *not very* important totaled 19% in Balochistan, 11% in Sindh, 13% in NWFP, and 7% in Punjab. The sum of these responses suggests that more voters in Balochistan may have actually *experienced* attempted party coercion more often than those in other provinces (41% giving *some* importance to this factor compared to 26% in both Sindh and NWFP and 18% in Punjab). Respondents in NWFP (12%) and Sindh (11%) said they did not know more than twice as often as respondents in Punjab (3%) and Balochistan (5%).

[29] Base weighted, 1783, unweighted, 1806.

Figure 6.4e



Whether external influence by others amounts to physical violence, in which people feel that they are in physical, spiritual, or serious economic danger if they choose to participate or not, is difficult to assess. Very few respondents said that feeling afraid was a somewhat (2%) or very (3%) important factor in voting, while 6% said fear was not very or not at all (83%) important (Q26h) (**Figure 6.4f**).[30]

Respondents in NWFP and Sindh reported feeling in danger if they did not vote in higher percentages; 10% of respondents in NWFP and 9% in Sindh said fear of danger was somewhat or very important, followed by Balochistan, where 5% did so. Only 2% of Punjab respondents said fear was somewhat or very important. The percentages in each province who said fearing danger was not very important in voting were: Sindh, 10%; Balochistan, 10%; NWFP, 8%; and Punjab, 4%. Twelve percent of respondents each in NWFP and Sindh said they did not know compared to 5% and 3% in Punjab and Balochistan, respectively.

These findings may indicate that family or party coercion does not necessarily rise to the level of physical intimidation or violence. Nevertheless, the fact that almost one in ten respondents in both NWFP and Sindh report that they voted because they feared that not doing so would put them in danger is an unacceptable degree of fear in an electoral process in any polity. The findings imply that at least 6% (Punjab) of the electorate in each province was *exposed* to some threat of turnout-inflating intimidation in a past

[30] Base weighted, 1778; unweighted 1800.

election process, rising to 20% in NWFP, 19% in Sindh, and 15% in Balochistan (**Table 6.4d**).

Table 6.4d

Importance of Fear of Danger in Motivation for Voting, by Province

Province	Don't Know	Not at All	Not Very	Somewhat	Very
Punjab	3	91	4	1	1
NWFP	12	71	8	5	5
Sindh	12	70	10	3	6
Balochistan	5	80	10	2	3

a. Percentages are ROW percentages

b. Base Weighted, 1778; Unweighted, 1800.

Figure 6.4f



The role of spiritual coercion in encouraging voting was reported about as frequently as it was in discouraging participation. Six percent of respondents said a religious figure's instructions to vote was somewhat or very important in their decision to participate, while 8% said it was not very important and 80% not at all important (**Figure 6.4g**).[31] As with turnout-suppressing religious influence, more respondents in NWFP (14%) reported that this factor was somewhat or very important in voting, followed by Balochistan (10%), Sindh (7%), and Punjab (3%). The percentages in each province who said religious figures' influence was *not very* important in voting were: Sindh, 12%; Balochistan, 9%; NWFP, 12%; and Punjab, 5%. Again, respondents in NWFP and Sindh said they did not know more often than in Punjab and Balochistan.

[31] Base weighted, 1774; unweighted 1799.

Figure 6.4g



Although no single form of coercion is reported with overwhelming frequency by respondents, significant minorities report that some form of coercion was significant in either discouraging or encouraging them to vote, while the evidence suggest that even larger numbers are actually exposed to coercion or external influence, even if that influence may be relatively unimportant in their overall decision to participate in elections.

None of the measures of coercion are highly correlated—that is, the respondents who report family influence as important are not the same respondents reporting religious influence as highly important; those who fear danger are not the same people reporting party pressure. This suggests that the cumulative sum of the number of respondents who have been directly exposed to and influenced by various forms of social, physical, economic, and spiritual pressure is substantial.

Voter education materials can emphasize the importance, particularly for women, of individual evaluation of candidates and platforms as well as the right to make independent decisions free of intimidation. Perhaps with the exception of Punjab, messages about election laws regulating violence and intimidation, as well as resources to prevent physical violence and/or intimidation would be appropriate in all provinces. The issue of religious influence on voting should also be considered for discussion with community and religious leaders. The partners developed voter education strategies addressing each of these ideas.

6.5 PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF VARIETIES OF ELECTORAL FRAUD, COERCION, AND VIOLENCE IN PAKISTANI ELECTIONS

Self-reported exposure to and influence by violence and intimidation may be subject to social desirability bias and stigma. Questions about general perceptions of coercion in the electoral environment complemented more direct questions about personal experience with such tactics. Media and party emphasis on specific instances of fraud and violence may also increase voter concern about these problems even if they have not experienced them directly.

When asked about the types of things that can occur in elections and whether they are likely in the upcoming election (Q54), the percentages perceiving some intimidation in elections was much higher than for self-reported experience.

Figure 6.5a



When asked how likely prevention of people from registering and voting would be in the next election (Q54d), 25% said the problem would be somewhat or very likely, while 52% said it would be somewhat or very unlikely (**Figure 6.5a**).[32] These expectations did not vary by province, but 30% of urban respondents compared to 22% of rural respondents expected this in the upcoming election, while 48% of urban and 53% of rural respondents did not. Those with higher income and education thought people would be prevented from participating in higher percentages (data not presented), while madrasa-educated individuals were more likely than those with an F.A./F.Sc or more education (37% compared to 31%) to expect this problem.

[32] Base weighted, 2103; unweighted, 2192.

Economic coercion, in the form of single individuals who wield control over groups of people who depend on them for jobs or land, is commonplace in the early phases of democratic development. Many electoral laws make such economic coercion, which involves a feeling of obligation to vote physically—at the same time and place—or ideologically, or both, with other employees or land tenants, an electoral crime.

These forms of informal electoral coercion are by far the most frequently reported by the Pakistani electorate, according to the findings of this survey. When asked about the likelihood of "employers getting employees to vote together as a group" (Q54h), 42% thought it would be somewhat or very likely to occur, while 33% thought it would be somewhat or very unlikely (**Figure 6.5b**).[33]

Figure 6.5b



An even greater percentage of respondents (45%) expect landlords to get tenants to vote together as a group (Q54i) in the next election, while 31% think it unlikely to happen (**Figure 6.5c**).[34]

Surprisingly, there are no significant urban-rural or provincial differences in responses to these questions. Additionally, although one might expect those who are poor and less educated to be victimized by such use of influence more frequently and therefore to think it more likely in the upcoming election, those who are educated and have higher incomes anticipate such events in higher percentages (data not presented). This may point to a general perception among the more privileged that the less privileged are less likely to

[33] Base weighted, 2100; unweighted, 2191.
[34] Base weighted, 2082; unweighted, 2174.

think and act for themselves, when in fact there is no reason to assume those groups are easily manipulated. Less privileged respondents also may be afraid to answer honestly and complain openly about the local social forces that operate in their lives, even when a survey interviewer reassures them of anonymity.

Figure 6.5c



In fact, when asked who they expect to be the most likely targets of intimidation and violence (Q58), the largest percentages believe candidates (27%) and voters (35%) will be targeted, compared to only six percent who say that low income people are most likely to be targeted, the same percentage who expect political party supporters to be the primary targets (**Table 6.5**). Further research designed to minimize the effects of question sensitivity on the results would be required to know in what ways respondents believe candidates and voters will be threatened .

A greater percentage of urban respondents (41%) believe voters will be targeted, compared to 32% of rural respondents. Twenty-five percent of urban respondents compared to 27% of rural respondents expect candidates to be the primary targets of violence. Six percent of women and 4% of men believe women will be the most likely targets of coercion.

When asked about their expectations of violence and unrest in the upcoming election (Q51), 42% said they expected the same amount of violence, 14% expected more, and 14% expected less (**Figure 6.5d**).[35]

[35] Base weighted, 2463; unweighted, 2528.

Table 6.5

Most Likely Targets / Victims of Electoral Intimidation and Violence

Victim Category	Percent (%)		Male (%)	Female (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)
Don't Know	6		4	8	7	4
Candidates	27		28	25	27	25
Voters	35		39	32	32	41
Female Candidates	2		2	2	3	2
Female Voters	5		4	6	6	4
Election Workers	5		6	5	5	5
NGO Workers	1		1	1	1	1
Security Officials	1		0	1	1	0
Low Income People	6		6	6	6	6
Political Party Supporters	6		5	7	6	7
No One	6		3	8	7	3
a. Percentages by Column	100	2518				

b. Overall Bases Weighted, 2517; Unweighted, 2575. Urban-Rural Milieu borders on significance at the 99% level (Design-based p-value = 0.0114)

Figure 6.5d



These results differ substantially by province. At the time of the survey, twenty-one percent of respondents in NWFP expected more violence, compared to 17% in Sindh, 14% in Balochistan, and 12% in Punjab. Greater percentages of respondents in NWFP (36%) and Sindh (37%) did not know compared to 26% and 24% in Punjab and Balochistan. In Punjab, 48% expected the same level of violence and 14% less, compared to 28% and 15%, respectively, in NWFP. In Sindh, 35% expected the same levels of

violence and 12% less; 41% expected the same levels and 22% expected less in Balochistan (table not presented)

Consistent with expectations about the disproportionately greater impact of violence on voter perceptions of election quality -- even though relatively few respondents report direct exposure to physical fear, threats, and/or danger -- 38% believe violence and intimidation will be a more serious threat to a free and fair election than will fraud, while 43% believe fraud and malpractice are more likely than violence to undermine the next election (Q56). Nineteen percent believe that the election will be generally free and fair (**Figure 6.5e**). This finding does not differ across provinces or any other demographic group mentioned in the survey.

Figure 6.5e



To gather statistically-valid information about some of the electoral fraud and violence issues discussed in this chapter during the February 18, 2008, Pakistan General Elections, almost 20,000 FAFEN election observers filled out election day checklists and collected the "Statement of the Count" from a random selection of approximately 8,000 polling stations (out of 62,000) in 256 National Assembly constituencies (out of 264). This unprecedented Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) effort resulted in the publication of three Election Results Analysis reports, based on previously-unavailable polling station data, all posted at www.fafen.org.

6.6 OPINIONS ABOUT MEASURES TO PREVENT FRAUD AND VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS

The survey asked two questions about measures that could influence actual levels of violence as well as voter expectations about violence. When asked about the additional confidence that these measures might give to eligible voters if implemented in the next election (Q59), over half (56%) said having trained observers from the local area to monitor the whole process would give them somewhat or much more confidence in the election process (Q59b). Twelve percent said observers would have no effect on their confidence while 10% said observers would decrease their confidence (**Figure 6.6a**).[36]

Figure 6.6a



Signed and enforced party codes of conduct have been shown to decrease levels of violence, as well as fraud, in other electoral contexts. When asked about this measure, 64% of the Pakistani electorate said they would have some or much more confidence in the process (**Figure 6.6b**)[37] if such a code were in place.[38]

[36] Base weighted, 2267; unweighted, 2324.

[37] Base weighted, 1783; unweighted 1833.

[38] See "Election Commission Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates for the Forthcoming General Elections, 2007-08," November 20, 2007, http://ecp.gov.pk/COCFinal.pdf. But see PILDAT CGEP, "Model Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, Government, and the Media, General Elections 2007/08," June 2007, at http://www.pildat.org/eventsdel.asp?detid=203; and later recommendations by CGEP and FAFEN, such as "FAFEN Election Update 1," November 30, 2007, at http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4750048b2fda5.pdf. Also see National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "Statement of the NDI Pre-Election Delegation to Pakistan," October 21, 2007.

These findings did not differ by province or demographic group, suggesting widespread support for such measures and the importance of not only attempting to implement them, but also publicizing them in order to reassure potential voters who fear violence and intimidation personally, as well as more generally.

Table 6.6b



Efforts to promote free and fair elections often treat violence and intimidation as epiphenomenal, at best as factors beyond the control of voter education and at worst as irrelevant to electoral results unless they disrupt the process altogether. Electoral violence is often seen as a security problem rather than a problem of electoral institutions and regulation.

Similarly, while ballot counting fraud and other forms of nonviolent manipulation can be documented in terms of the number of ballots affected, providing clear evidence to election complaints bodies that can be ruled upon, violence is rarely the source of complaints because its effect on elections is rarely concrete enough to document systematically with respect to number of votes inflated, changed, or suppressed.

The survey results show, however, that violence and intimidation, even if objectively low, are perceived by the electorate as a serious threat to democratic elections. As long as a significant portion of the electorate believes violence will compromise an election, citizens and competing candidates may not accept the election process is free and fair, regardless of the quality of procedural and administrative components of an election.

It is thus worthwhile to include messages about preventing violence in voter education. These messages can include existing electoral laws pertaining to violence that can make citizens and candidates aware of what behaviors are illegal and information about how to report such problems as formal complaints.

The partners have implemented several strategies related to violence in their programming, including development of five local-language television discussion programs on election peace and security following the violent events of December 2007. FAFEN initiated an election-violence media monitoring program and included in its election observation forms a special section for recording information about violent incidents.

Given the low level of trust in the police in Pakistan, future research should address the degree to which police are viewed as perpetrators, bystanders, or resources in dealing with electoral violence and what additional security or peace-building measures, such as pro-peace statements by community leaders or special training for election security personnel and poll workers.

Chapter 7: Perceptions of Democracy

Elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democracy. When elections are unaccompanied by other characteristics of democracy, such as the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, repeated flawed elections and subsequent weak or corrupt elected governments may, in fact, undermine support for democratic institutions.

While most respondents to surveys throughout the world say they support democracy when asked directly, most people mean different things when they use this term. The survey asked a short battery of questions aimed at assessing citizen perception of the power of democratic institutions, the status of freedoms characteristic of democracy, and the meanings that people assign to democracy. In addition to helping design content pertaining to electoral procedures, voting rights, and the electoral environment with respect to fraud and security, these questions were used to better inform broader civic education programming.

7.1 PERCEIVED STRENGTH OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

When asked in March/April 2007 about their perception of the degree of power of the national and provincial assemblies in determining the course of political development in Pakistan (Q60), 28% said the national assembly has a great deal of power and 22% said the provincial assembly has a great deal of power (**Figure 7.1a**[1] and **Figure 7.1b**[2]). Almost twice as many respondents said the provincial assemblies have some power (26%) as said the national assembly has some power (14%), so that overall, 42% believed the national assembly (NA) has some or a great deal of power, while 48% perceived some or a great deal of power at the provincial level. Forty percent and 39% believed the national and provincial assemblies (PA), respectively, have little or no power.

While there were no significant provincial differences in perceived power of the *national* assembly, 54% of respondents in Punjab believed their PA has some or a great deal of power, followed by 44% in NWFP, 41% in Sindh, and 41% in Balochistan. More than twice as many respondents in NWFP (21%), Sindh (18%), and Balochistan (18%) said they do not know how much power the PA has than in Punjab (9%). Thus, in Punjab, even though more people believed the PA has power, 49% say it has little or no power, compared with 35% in NWFP; 42% in Sindh; and 39% in Balochistan (table not presented).

Those with higher incomes and education were more likely to answer the questions, so that higher numbers of educated and wealthier respondents said both that the PA and NA have little to no power or some to a great deal of power (data not presented).

[1] Base weighted, 2406; unweighted 2459.
[2] Base weighted, 2360; unweighted 2409.

Figure 7.1a



Figure 7.1b



7.2 PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

When asked about their level of agreement with three statements about politics in Pakistan pertaining to democratic freedoms (Q61), a majority of the electorate felt that ordinary people can influence government and have basic freedoms of speech and association. Twenty-five percent strongly agreed with the statement, "Pakistan's citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government", while an additional 26% agreed (Q61a). Thirty-five percent disagreed (**Figure 7.2a**).[3]

Figure 7.2a



Respondents in NWFP and Sindh were slightly less likely to believe that citizens influence the government (46% in each province agree/agree strongly) than in Punjab and Balochistan, where 53% and 52%, respectively, were optimistic about citizen influence (data not shown).

Consistent with other survey findings, less educated and poor respondents said they did not know more frequently than others for all three questions about citizen efficacy and freedom. Although the lower and middle class respondents report a slightly higher level of agreement about citizen influence in government (56% and 55%, respectively) than the other categories of income (ranging from 46% among the lowest income respondents to 52% of highest income respondents) (**Table 7.2a**), these differences are similar for all three questions. Education and income are associated more generally with a better understanding of democratic rights and freedoms, as opposed to perceptions about different *degrees* of freedom.

[3] Base weighted, 2362; unweighted 2410.

With respect to the number agreeing that Pakistanis have power to influence the government, those with a madrasa education (62%) were more like those with middle school (60%) matric (59%) or higher degrees (54%) than those with none (46%) or only some primary school (40%) education (**Table 7.2**). The number of those who express an opinion and view citizens as influential on government jumps between those who have some primary and those who finished primary school, which may point to the effectiveness of even basic education on democratic behavior.

Table 7.2

Pakistan's Citizens have Power to Influence Government

	Don't Know (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Class					
Lowest Income	21	15	17	24	22
Lower Middle Class	11	17	17	31	25
Middle Class	8	17	21	26	29
Upper Middle Class	8	21	19	25	27
High Income	5	22	23	25	26
Educational Attainment					
None	24	15	16	24	22
Madrasa	9	10	20	37	25
Some Primary	20	20	21	20	20
Finished Primary	7	20	22	29	22
Middle School	7	17	16	28	32
Matric	4	19	19	29	30
F.A./F.Sc or above	4	20	22	26	28

a. Percentages by ROW. b. Results did not differ by gender, age, rural-urban milieu.
c. Bases weighted vary. Education Base Weighted, 2357; Unweighted, 2405. *d. p=.0000*

A larger percentage of respondents agreed with the statement, "People are free to criticize the government without fear" (Q61b) than the percentage who agreed that citizens can influence government. Forty-eight percent agreed or agreed strongly with the statement, while 39% disagreed (**Figure 7.2b**). As with opinions on citizen efficacy, NWFP, Sindh, and Balochistan respondents agreed less often with this statement (44%, 41%, and 44%, respectively) than do citizens in Punjab (52%) (table not shown).

When asked if they agreed that citizens can join any party or organization they wish (Q61c), a much smaller percentage of respondents disagreed (19%), while 68% agreed or agreed strongly (**Figure 7.2c**). More respondents in the Punjab (73%) agreed or agreed strongly about Pakistanis' freedom of association, followed by 67% in NWFP, 61% in Balochistan, and 59% in Sindh. Eight percent of respondents in Punjab and 17% (Balochistan) – 21% (NWFP) did not know, while respondents in Sindh (25%) disagreed more frequently, followed by those in Balochistan (22%). Eighteen percent disagreed that Pakistanis can join organizations without fear in Punjab and 12% disagreed in NWFP (table not shown).

Respondents in Sindh appeared to question the freedoms of association more than those in other provinces, while those in Punjab and NWFP were relatively more likely to feel that citizens can join any group or organization they want, even while those in NWFP reported a greater degree of fear in criticizing government.

Figure 7.2b



Figure 7.2c



7.3 MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

For many people in developing countries facing high unemployment, health problems, and other quality of life issues, democracy often represents different things to different people, but is particularly seen as related to economic advancement. The survey findings indicate that economic advancement is an essential part of the meaning of democracy for many Pakistanis. When asked to chose the two most important factors they felt are essential for democracy (Q62), the most common response (chosen by 37%) was the provision of basic necessities for everyone, followed by having a low gap between rich and poor (32%) (**Table 7.3a**).

The change of government through elections—a minimalist definition democracy—was chosen by 28% of respondents, and the absence of violence was mentioned by 27% of respondents.

Table 7.3a

Most Important Factors Essential for Democracy

Q62 People often differ in their views on what factors are essential for democracy. If you have to choose only one thing, what would be the most important, and what would be the second most important?

	Mentioned	Not Mentioned
Essential Factors for Democracy	%	%
1. Changing Governments Through Elections	28	72
2. Low Rich-Poor Gap	32	68
3. Freedom to Criticize Government	13	87
4. Absence of Any Violence	27	73
5. Basic Necessities for Everyone	37	63
6. No Influence of Religion in Politics	5	95
8. Other Suggestions	1	99
9. No Opinion	4	96
10. Don't Know	11	90

a. Percentages are by Row

b. Bases Weighted Vary. Columns and rows do not sum due to the multiple-response nature of the questions.

Table 7.3b shows the combined responses of the top two factors each respondent said was essential for democracy. If a respondent mentioned only one factor and said do not know for the other, they are counted only in the single-factor row category. Elections and freedom of speech are grouped and described as "political freedoms," while all economic factors are combined under "economic security" and the absence of violence is described as "physical security."

One in three respondents (33%) mentioned only economic factors as essential for democracy, compared with 10% who mentioned elections and political freedoms only and 12% who mentioned economic security in association with civic freedoms. Twelve percent mentioned only physical security, while an additional 7% mentioned it in association with economic security. Over half (54%) mentioned economic factors alone or in conjunction with another factor, while many (19%) associated democracy with peace and stability and 24% mentioned only political freedoms. Very few (4%) mentioned separation of religion and government as essential for democracy. While lower income respondents (36% of lowest income) mentioned economic security alone more often than

higher income respondents (26% of highest income), the number mentioning economic security in conjunction with political freedoms and physical security increases with income. The differences between education levels and those mentioning economic factors are not significant, while those with higher education mentioned secularism and civic freedoms more frequently (tables not shown).

Table 7.3b

Essential Features of Democracy (Response Types)

Q62 People often differ in their views on what factors are essential for democracy. If you have to choose only one thing, what would be the most important, and what would be the second most important?

	Mentioned	Not Mentioned
	%	%
DK/No Opinion	21	21
Economic Security/Equality	33	53
Economic and Institutional Factors	12	66
Economic and Physical Security	7	73
Economic Security and Secularism	2	76
Institutional Factors	10	86
Secularism and Institutional Factors	2	88
Physical Security	12	100

a. Percentages are by Row

b. Bases Weighted, 2642; Unweighted 2697.

While substantial percentages of the Pakistani electorate believed that the elected assemblies and ordinary citizens have some influence on the course of politics in the country, larger percentages were either ambivalent or see citizen and elected institutions as powerless or ineffectual. More than half of respondents believed people in Pakistan have the right to associate freely and to criticize the government without fear, but these freedoms were not viewed as particularly effective in changing policies that influence the lives or ordinary people.

For over half of the electorate, democracy requires (and perhaps promises) economic equality and well-being, while for one in five, it requires physical security. Only 10 percent say elections and freedoms are alone essential for democracy.

Voter education, then, must encourage citizens to articulate their needs and preferences through the electoral process, rather than seeing the process as an end in itself. Even if they perceive an election to be free, fair, and competitive, eligible voters in Pakistan may be unlikely to feel that democracy as a system of government will make a difference for them personally. Political parties, candidates, elected representative, and civil society groups that want to strengthen "democracy" in Pakistan should understand how citizens perceive this term in order to help ensure that Pakistani institutions live up to citizens' hope and expectations.

Chapter 8: Conclusions about Electoral and Democratic Participation

Participation in elections declined steadily in Pakistan between 1970 and 2002.[1] Low voter turnout undermines the legitimacy of elected governments as well as the extent to which elected officials represent the population. Cynicism about the efficacy of electoral institutions, the fairness of electoral processes, and the integrity of elected representatives may weaken citizen participation.

However, non-electoral participation, such as contacting a government representative or attending political party meetings, may be higher than electoral participation. In fact, those who respond to calls for electoral boycotts by abstaining from voting are engaging in a form of participation.

The survey assessed the extent, nature, and voter characteristics, such as educational attainment, that are associated with past political participation as well as expected participation in the upcoming election. The survey also asked respondents to identify *political* or *personal* motivations for participation/non-participation (in contrast to the external factors, such as procedural barriers and coercion, explored in **Chapters 4 and 6**, respectively).

As the findings from previous chapters suggest, Pakistani women are as interested in politics as men, but they report less trust in political institutions (**Chapter 5**), greater procedural barriers (**Chapter 4**), and more influence by family and other social institutions in either voting or abstaining (**Chapter 6**). Voter education should not necessarily focus on convincing women of the efficacy of their participation or reasons they should care about politics, but rather on convincing their families and other influential members of their communities to allow them the resources, time, and independence to make free choices among candidates and to vote if they so wish.

The first section of this chapter presents findings about participation in past elections, respondents' expectations about their participation in the 2007/2008 elections, and their involvement in preparations necessary to vote in 2008. The second section examines personal motivations for voting or abstaining in past elections, in order to determine to what extent the electorate is motivated by "participatory" factors, such as interest in the candidates, a desire to change policy, etc. The third section explores forms of democratic participation other than voting, and the fourth section addresses attitudes toward women's participation, in particular.

Finally, to inform the content of longer-term civic education messages and to understand what aspects of the political system, procedural and social incentives and disincentives, and beliefs about democracy are associated with electoral participation, the fifth section explores relationships between voting and interest in politics.

[1] Waseem, Mohammad. 2006. *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

8.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

When asked about their past participation in elections (Q22), 33% of respondents claimed to have voted in every election, 15% voted in many elections, 16% recalled voting in 2-3 elections, and 9% in one election. Twenty-eight percent of the eligible electorate had never voted (**Figure 8.1a**).[2]

Figure 8.1a



Not surprisingly, younger respondents said they had never voted more often than older age groups; 36% of 18-24 year-olds had never voted, compared with 30% of 25-34 year-olds, 25% of 35-49 year-olds, and 18% of people over 50. One in five (23%) of the youngest respondents said he or she had voted in every election, compared with almost one in two (46%) of people over 50 (**Table 8.1a**).

Women vote less frequently than men; 31% said they voted in every election, while 34% of men reported doing so. The percentage of women who voted in many elections (13%) was four percent less than the percentage of men (17%), and 15% of women and 18% of men voted 2-3 times. One in three women (31%) reported never having voted, while one in four men (24%) did so (**Table 8.1a**).

[2] Base weighted, 2549; unweighted 2598.

Table 8.1a

Past Electoral Participation (Number of Elections in Which Respondent has Voted)

	Never	Once	2-3 Times	Many Elections	Every Election
Age Group					
18-24 years	36	9	19	12	23
25-34 years	30	9	18	13	30
35-49 years	25	8	16	18	32
50 years or more	18	7	11	18	46
Gender					
Male	24	8	18	17	34
Female	31	9	15	13	31
Province					
Punjab	26	7	14	15	38
NWFP	37	11	14	14	23
Sindh	26	10	24	17	24
Balochistan	32	11	14	12	31
Class					
Lowest Income	29	7	16	14	34
Lower Middle Class	27	8	17	20	29
Middle Class	22	13	14	13	38
Upper Middle Class	27	11	15	18	29
High Income	28	7	18	11	37
Educational Attainment					
None	28	5	14	19	34
Madrasa	33	13	9	5	41
Some Primary	28	10	14	16	32
Finished Primary	24	7	18	11	39
Middle School	27	14	20	13	27
Matric	29	10	17	10	33
F.A./F.Sc or above	27	12	19	15	26

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary, Age weighted, 2549; Unweighted, 2598.

Rural and urban respondents did not differ significantly with respect to past voting behavior, which, consistent with findings in previous chapters, may be attributable to stronger local ties at the rural level that increase the effectiveness of "get out the vote" efforts, paired with greater cynicism about the electoral process in the urban electorate.

Voter participation differs significantly by province; 38% of respondents in Punjab claim to have voted in every election, followed by 31% in Balochistan, 24% in Sindh, and 23% in NWFP (**Table 8.1a**). The percentage of those who had never voted ("non-voters") is highest in NWFP (37%), followed by 32% in Balochistan and 26% each in Punjab and Sindh.

While the survey findings suggest that higher class and income are associated positively with levels of political interest, awareness, and many other pro-election attitudes, the data suggest that they are associated somewhat negatively—or less systematically—with actual voting behavior. This result is consistent with findings that show that the reasons for voting may include economic or physical coercion.

Those in the middle class report voting in every election more frequently than those in the other income categories; 38% of middle class respondents voted in every election,

followed by 37% in the highest class and 34% in the lowest class. The percentage of respondents voting in every election was 29% in both the lower and upper middle classes (**Table 8.1a**).

Almost one in two members of every class voted in many *or* every election—many more than the number who report high political interest, media use, or other personal political inclinations, suggesting a considerable influence of social or other external motivations for voting. While most studies of political behavior in advanced democracies find strong links between education, income, and voter turnout, the survey results for Pakistan suggest a different pattern of electoral participation.

Education is also, somewhat surprisingly, almost inversely related to voting behavior, with madrasa students (41%), who reported voting in every election, followed by 39% of those who finished primary school and 34% of those with no education (**Table 8.1a**).

Those with an F.A./F.Sc degree or more education reported voting in every election less often (26%) than all of the other educational categories. Those with these higher degrees reported never voting at a rate (27%) similar to the other groups (24% - 33%).

Interviewers also asked eligible voters about their participation in the 2002 and 2005 elections. Of those who answered the question, 49% percent said they voted in the August (18 and 25) 2005 local government elections (Q23)[3], which corresponds roughly to the 48.75% turnout rate reported officially in Phase II of that election.[4] However, perhaps because those who said they voted in *every* election were assumed by interviewers to have, in fact, voted in both 2002 and 2005, the rate of self-reported voting may be inflated compared with official turnout. There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy: (a) those who claimed to have voted remembered inaccurately, were unaware of some elections, and/or said they voted to please interviewers; (b) official turnout rates are based on different geographical units than those sampled for the survey, and those PSUs (see Chapter 1) sampled corresponded to higher-turnout areas; or (c) official turnout may not be reported accurately. Further research would be necessary to confirm or disconfirm any of these explanations.

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[3] Because this question was skipped for those who said they never voted, the distribution has been calculated adding to the number who said they did not vote the number of respondents who never voted, resulting in the adjusted percentage presented herein. Similarly, although interviewers were instructed to skip questions about voting only for those who said they NEVER voted, in practice, most also skipped the questions for those who said they voted in EVERY election, assuming both that respondents' reported their own voting behavior accurately. As a result, for those who said they voted in every election, responses to the questions about voting in 2002 (Q24) and 2005 (Q23), specifically, had missing data for those who said they voted in every election in Question 22. "Yes" responses have been coded for those claiming they voted in every election in Q22 for their corresponding missing (skipped) responses in questions 23 and 24. This decision was made to avoid omitting a large number of respondents from the analysis; while actual national turnout and sample turnout are different, the other relationships are more consistent with other answers and theoretical expectations, suggesting that this decision is the best representation of respondents' actual voting behavior—that is, the majority who claimed to have voted in every election probably did vote in both 2002 and 2005.

[4] Msosa, Justince Anastasia, Zulkefli bin Haji Kamaruzzaman, Alison Sutherland, and A.W. Mohamed Arshad. 2005. "Pakistan Local Bodies Elections, 18 and 15 August 2005: Report of the Commonwealth Observer Team." Islamabad: Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Local Government Forum.

Figure 8.1b presents the survey sample estimated to have voted in the 2005 local election; 66% turnout rate and a 35% abstention rate.[5] Respondent participation in the 2002 general election (Q34) was lower than for the 2005 local elections, with 62% reportedly participating compared with 38% abstaining (**Figure 8.1c**).[6] The ECP reported a national turnout rate of 42% in 2002.[7] Similar official data is not available for 2005.

Figure 8.1b



Percentage turnout for both the 2002 and 2005 elections within the survey population differed significantly between men and women, age groups, and provinces. A higher percentage of women (38%) abstained compared with men (31%), while 62% of women and 69% of men voted (**Table 8.1b**).

This proportion was similar in all of the provinces except for NWFP, where 69% of women abstained and only 31% voted, compared with 23% of men who abstained and 77% who voted (table not shown).

Respondents in the youngest age category reported voting in the 2002 and 2005 elections less often than older voters (**Table 8.1b**). In the 2005 and 2002 elections, respectively, 57% and 52% of 18-24 year olds reported voting, compared with 75% or more in both elections among respondents over age 50. Respondents in Punjab, followed by Sindh,

[5] Adjusted base weighted, 2544, adjusted base unweighted 2595.
[6] Base weighted, 2527; unweighted,, 2583.
[7] Dilshad, Kanwar Muhammad. 2002. "Statistical Data Prepared by Federal Secretary: Election Commission of Pakistan." Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Election Commission of Pakistan.

voted in higher percentages in both of the most recent local and national elections, while those in NWFP and Balochistan voted less often (see **Table 8.1b**).

Table 8.1b

Participation in 2005 Local and 2002 NA/PA Election

	2005		2002	
	Did Not Vote (%)	Voted (%)	Did Not Vote (%)	Voted (%)
Age Group				
18-24 years	43	57	47	52
25-34 years	36	64	42	58
35-49 years	32	68	34	66
50 years or more	25	75	24	76
Gender				
Male	31	69	33	67
Female	38	62	42	58
Province				
Punjab	32	68	34	66
NWFP	46	54	52	48
Sindh	34	66	37	63
Balochistan	40	60	44	57

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary, Age 2002 weighted, 2527; Unweighted, 2583.

Figure 8.1c



Electoral participation often increases with age; younger people who study away from home are less likely to register and vote. They are still in a process of "political socialization." In addition, the eligible voting age was lowered in 2000 from 21 to 18 years. Only respondents aged 20-24 in 2007 would have been eligible to vote in the 2005 elections, and only 23-24 year olds would have be eligible to vote in 2002. Therefore, it is likely that some survey respondents aged 18-24 falsely reported their past voting behavior. This analysis is also relevant to data presented in **Table 8.1a**.

There were no significant differences across income and educational groups with respect to voter participation in either the 2002 or 2005 election.

The percentage (70%) of respondents who said they were somewhat or very likely to vote in the upcoming general election (Q29) is roughly similar to past self-reported voting behavior for the two most recent elections. Fourteen percent of respondents said they were somewhat or very unlikely to vote (**Figure 8.1d**).[8] Eighteen percent responded by saying they did not know whether or not they were likely to vote.

Figure 8.1d



Higher percentages of older voters say they are somewhat or very likely to vote in the next elections; one in three in the youngest age group say they are very likely to vote, while two in three in the oldest age group are likely to vote (**Table 8.1c**).

[8] "How likely is it that you will vote in the next National Assembly Election?". Base weighted, 2540; unweighted 2577.

Although respondents in Sindh reported voting at higher rates than those in other provinces in the 2002 and 2005 elections, they said they were very likely to vote relatively less often compared with those in other provinces for the upcoming election. In Sindh, only 52% of respondents stated that they were somewhat or very likely to vote, compared with 61% in NWFP, 60% in Balochistan and 79% in Punjab. On the other hand, only 10% in Sindh and 4% in Punjab said they were very unlikely to vote, compared with 16% in Balochistan and 14% in NWFP (**Table 8.1c**).

Surprisingly, written literacy in Urdu or other languages was not associated with higher rates of reported past electoral participation. However, when respondents were asked about their expected participation in 2008, 75% of those who reported literacy in at least one language said they were somewhat or very likely to vote, compared with 62% of those who are illiterate (**Table 8.1c**).

Table 8.1c

Likelihood of Voting in 2008 Election

	Very Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Don't Know
Age Group					
18-24 years	11	9	24	30	26
25-34 years	8	5	26	42	18
35-49 years	7	5	25	50	14
50 years or more	3	3	21	61	12
Gender					
Male	5	6	24	56	9
Female	10	5	24	34	26
Province					
Punjab	4	4	24	55	13
NWFP	14	8	22	39	17
Sindh	10	8	24	28	30
Balochistan	16	6	31	29	19
Literacy in One Language					
Illiterate	8	6	25	37	23
Literate	7	5	23	53	12
Educational Attainment					
None	7	6	24	42	21
Madrasa	9	7	14	41	28
Some Primary	7	5	20	49	20
Finished Primary	5	4	24	47	21
Middle School	8	7	28	48	9
Matric	10	3	22	51	13
F.A./F.Sc or above	6	7	25	46	16

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary, Education base weighted, 2503; Unweighted 2546.

Education is related to expected voting behavior, but not in a perfectly linear way. Two in three (66%) of those with no education are somewhat or very likely to vote, compared with 56% of madrasa-educated respondents. Those with some primary education say they are somewhat or very likely to vote more often (69%) than those who finished primary school (61%). Among those who finished middle school, 76% are likely to vote, more than the 73% and 71% of those who have matriculated and those with higher degrees, respectively (**Table 8.1c**). Similar to findings presented earlier, finishing middle school

seems to be associated with higher levels of civic engagement. There were no significant class or rural-urban differences in expected voting behavior.

Eighty percent of male respondents compared with 58% of female respondents were somewhat or very likely to vote, and women said they were very unlikely to vote twice as often as men (10% of women compared with 5% of men) (**Table 8.1c**).

The percentage of women who voted in 2002 (58%) was four percent below the national rate of 62%; 42% of women said they did not vote, while 67% of men voted—3% above the national rate. While actual voting behavior reported for the 2002 and 2005 elections differed by gender most significantly in NWFP, *anticipated* voting differed by gender in *every* province (**Table 8.1d**).

Table 8.1d

Likelihood of Voting in 2008 Election

	Very Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Don't Know
Province and Gender					
Punjab - Men	4	4	22	65	5
Punjab - Women	5	4	25	45	21
NWFP - Men	6	6	24	28	7
NWFP - Women	22	11	20	20	26
Sindh - Men	9	10	25	35	21
Sindh - Women	12	6	23	21	38
Balochistan - Men	6	5	33	44	11
Balochistan - Women	25	7	29	14	26

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary.

In follow up to questions about respondents' awareness of the display of provisional voters' lists in June and July 2007 (Q40)[9], interviewers asked whether they were likely to take advantage of the opportunity to verify that their names and details were listed accurately. Although respondents indicated that opportunities to check voter lists would give them greater confidence in the election process, 57% said they would be very unlikely to check the lists during the display period. No one said he or she would be very likely to do so, and 28% said they would be somewhat likely to check the list (**Figure 8.1e**).[10]

The likelihood of checking the list differed in population subgroups only with respect to gender; 26% of women respondents said they were likely to check the list compared with 30% of men, but more men (60%) said they were very unlikely to check the list compared with women (54%). Six percent and 7% of men and women, respectively, said they were somewhat unlikely to check the list, while more women (13%) compared with men (4%) did not know whether they would check the list (table not shown).

[9] "How likely is it that you will check your name on the provisional voters' list?"

[10] Base weighted, 2337; unweighted 2356.

Figure 8.1e



The fact that women expressed an intention to check the list almost as frequently as men—and at rates higher than their self-reported voting histories—may be a further indication of their interest in politics and desire to participate to a greater degree than in the past. It is particularly surprising that gender differences in this stated intention to check the voter list did not differ significantly by province—that is, even in NWFP where the percentage of women voting is much lower than men, the percentage of women saying they would be somewhat likely to check the list was virtually the same as that for men.

When those who had not filled out a registration form were asked if they had made plans to register before the 2008 election (Q41)[11], 62% said they had made no plans to register, while 29% said they did plan to register (**Figure 8.1f**).[12]

[11] "If you did not fill out a form in the last 12 months, have you made plans to register to vote in order to get your name on the electoral list in your area before the next election?"
[12] Base weighted, 1610; unweighted 1679.

Figure 8.1f



Only 18% of women said they had plans to register compared with 45% of men (**Table 8.1e**), a difference that was essentially the same across the different provinces, which again suggests that women in NWFP are not necessarily different from women in other provinces with respect to interest and motivation, but rather in the social-institutional barriers they face to participation.

Respondents with literacy in at least one language reported plans to register almost twice as often (40%) than illiterate respondents (21%), even though literacy was not associated with more likely intention to check the provisional electoral list (**Table 8.1e**). Barriers to voter registration, which involves filling out a complex form, are greater for those who are illiterate than are the barriers to checking the voters' list, wince an election commission official is always present to assist with the latter process. Assisting illiterate adults in registering, then, should be a key component in voter education and mobilization programming, since, once registered, illiterate voters are as likely as any other to participate in the election. Given the new re-registration requirements for this election, there is, perhaps, a risk that illiterate voters who have voted in the past will be unable to vote if they do not have a clear understanding of the registration process.

Table 8.1e

Plans to Register for Unregistered Respondents, by Literacy, Gender, Province

	No Plans (%)	Have Plans to Register (%)	Don't Know (%)
Literacy in One Language			
Illiterate	67	21	12
Literate	55	40	5
Gender			
Male	49	45	7
Female	71	18	11
Province			
Punjab	69	24	7
NWFP	60	32	8
Sindh	48	37	14
Balochistan	63	30	7

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary.

The highest percentage of unregistered respondents with plans to register was in Sindh (37%), followed by 32% in NWFP, 30% in Balochistan, and 24% in Punjab. These figures do not reflect a higher percentage of plans to register among first-time voters; that is, those who have never voted are no more or less likely to have plans to register than those who say the voted in many or every election (data not presented). This is likely to be due to the re-registration requirement and the degree to which the national registration process had reached respondents in each province at the time of the survey.

Table 8.1f presents respondents' most recent self-reported voting behavior with their stated intention about voting in 2008. Of those who voted neither in 2002 nor 2005, 37% said they were very likely to vote in 2008, compared with 36% and 31%, respectively, of those who voted in 2002 or in 2005. Over half (52%) of respondents who voted in both of the most recent elections said they were very likely to vote again.

For further analysis, "likely voters" are defined as those who voted in one or both of the 2002 and 2005 elections *and said they would be very likely to vote in 2008*; "probable voters" are those who voted in one or both recent elections but said they were only *somewhat likely* to vote; "prospective voters" are those who did not vote in recent elections but said they were *somewhat or very likely* to vote in 2008; "lapsing voters" are those who voted in both recent elections but say they are *unlikely to vote in 2008;* and "unlikely voters" are those who did not vote or voted only once in a recent election and said they were unlikely to vote (see **Figure 8.1g**).[13]

[13] Base weighted, 2460; unweighted, 2505.

Table 8.1f

Likelihood of Voting in 2008 Election

	Very Unlikely (%)	Somewhat Unlikely (%)	Somewhat Likely (%)	Very Likely (%)	Don't Know (%)
Recent Voting Behavior					
Voted in Neither 2002 or 2005	11	6	24	37	22
Voted in 2002 General Election	10	5	21	36	29
Voted in 2005 Local Election	4	11	30	31	24
Voted in 2002 and 2005	6	5	23	52	14

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted, 2460; unweighted 2505.

Combining respondents' stated intention to vote in 2008 with past voting behavior in this way produces a profile of the electorate in which 34% were likely to vote (and had voted in the recent past), 16% had voted recently and were somewhat likely to vote (probable), 19% had not voted recently but were likely to vote; 15% had voted recently but did not intend to vote, while 16% had neither voted recently nor intended to vote (**Figure 8.1g**).

Figure 8.1g



Over half of respondents 50 years old or more could be characterized as "likely voters," a percentage that diminishes with age. While only 18% of 18-24 year olds and 30% of 25-34 year-olds were likely voters, 14% and 16%, respectively, voted in one or both recent elections and said they were somewhat likely to vote, while 22% in each age category said

they were very likely to vote even though they had not voted recently (and indeed may have never voted) (**Table 8.1g**). Working to empower these young prospective voters to register and vote was an important part of the partners' voter education strategy.

Table 8.1g

Likely Voters in 2008, by Demographic Subgroup

	Unlikely Voter (%)	Lapsing Voter (%)	Prospective Voter (%)	Probable Voter (%)	Likely Voter (%)
Age Group					
18-24 years	23	24	22	14	18
25-34 years	16	16	22	16	30
35-49 years	15	11	18	17	39
50 years or more	9	9	15	17	51
Gender					
Male	9	11	21	16	43
Female	22	20	18	16	25
Literacy in One Language					
Illiterate	19	19	17	17	29
Literate	12	11	23	15	39
Province					
Punjab	11	11	21	16	41
NWFP	29	10	18	13	30
Sindh	21	29	16	15	20
Balochistan	20	19	20	21	19

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary. Province Base Weighted, 2460; unweighted 2505.

Literacy in at least one language is associated with a greater propensity to participate in the upcoming elections; 39% of those who can read and write at least one language are likely voters, while only 29% of illiterate respondents can be put in this category. Similarly, illiterate voters are more likely to be "lapsing," having voted in both recent elections, but expressing no interest in further electoral participation. Thirty-five percent of illiterate respondents compared with 38% of literate respondents were either prospective or probable voters (**Table 8.1g**). Finding ways to reach voters who cannot read and write in an environment in which media penetration is low was one of the important challenges of the partners' programs.

The percentage of likely voters in Punjab (41%) was double that in Sindh (20%) and Balochistan (19%), and exceeded that of NWFP (30%) by 11%. The highest percentage of lapsing voters was in Sindh, followed by Balochistan, with many recent voters unlikely to vote in the 2007/2008 election (**Table 8.1g**).

Neither class nor educational attainment was associated in a systematic or significant way with the respondents' characterization as a likely or unlikely voter.

Women fell into the "likely voter" category less frequently than men, with 29% of women compared with 39% of men expressing strong intention to vote along with recent voting behavior. Twenty percent of women compared with 11% of men were "lapsing," having voted in 2002 and 2005 elections, but stating disinterest in going to the polls again in 2007/2008. More than twice the number of women (22%) than men (9%) had neither voted recently nor intended to do so (**Table 8.1g**). Finding ways to facilitate the 34% of

women who said they intended to vote (prospective and probable voters) also was an important component of the partners' programming.

Such efforts were particularly important in NWFP, Sindh, and Balochistan, where only 10%, 16%, and 11% of likely voters were women. In NWFP, 23% of women were prospective voters—saying they were very likely to vote even though they hd not voted recently—a figure higher than in the other provinces, while only 6% of female respondents in NWFP were probable voters (**Table 8.1h**).

More women voters were lapsing in Sindh (34%) and Balochistan (27%) than in Punjab (15%) and NWFP (12%). Not surprisingly, the highest number of female unlikely voters was in NWFP, where 49% of women compared with just 10% of men had neither voted recently nor intended to do so. In Balochistan, women were three times more likely (31%) than men (10%) to be in the "unlikely voter" category. Given that women have similar levels of interest in politics when behavioral factors are included, it is important to overcome the institutional—social and procedural/bureaucratic—factors/obstacles that deflate women's participation.

Table 8.1h

Likely Voters in 2008, by Province and Gender

	Unlikely Voter (%)	Lapsing Voter (%)	Prospective Voter (%)	Probable Voter (%)	Likely Voter (%)
Province and Gender					
Punjab – Men	6	6	23	15	50
Punjab – Women	15	15	19	18	33
NWFP – Men	10	8	12	20	50
NWFP – Women	49	12	23	6	10
Sindh – Men	18	23	19	16	24
Sindh – Women	24	34	12	14	16
Balochistan – Men	10	12	26	25	28
Balochistan – Women	31	27	14	18	11

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary.

While thirty-four percent of the electorate could be considered "likely voters," 15% of those who voted in the 2002 and 2005 elections did not intend to do so in 2008. Many of these "lapsing" voters were women—particularly in Sindh and Balochistan—and/or members of the 18-24 year-old age group. About one in five (19%) respondents were prospective voters who said they were very likely to vote but had not voted recently, while another 16% voted recently and were somewhat likely to vote. A multi-pronged strategy that tries to reach youth, illiterate, and female voters, particularly in the more disadvantaged provinces, was required. Programming employed (1) delivery mechanisms, such as home meetings and illustrated materials, appropriate to the target populations and their communities; (2) messages that addressed citizen concerns about election fraud and security, as well as the efficacy of voting; (3) direct enfranchisement programs working with institutions to ensure registration of voters and facilitating citizens in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities with respect to electoral participation.

8.2 PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR ABSTAINING OR VOTING

Chapter 4 addressed some of the procedural reasons why people do not vote, while Chapter 6 analyzed external incentives and disincentives for electoral participation. In reality, every individual votes or abstains for a multitude of reasons, many of which are personal as well as circumstantial. To gain a better picture of those who vote or abstain, the survey included questions designed to measure these motivations for voting that are, in many cases, beyond the influence of voter education or procedural reform. Because such reasons are highly individual, one would not expect them to differ predictably across geographic regions or ascribed characteristics such as gender, but rather to be more a function of individual circumstances, such as education and political socialization.

Of those respondents who said they had abstained from voting in at least one past election, only 12% said they intended to vote but did not do so as a result of personal circumstances on the day of the election (Q25a), while 62% said such circumstances were not at all important (**Figure 8.2a**).[14]

Figure 8.2a



Those with more education gave this explanation significantly more often (12% of degreed respondents, for example) than less educated respondents (6% of respondents with no education), as were respondents in NWFP, 13% of whom said personal circumstances were very important in abstaining almost twice as often as in the other provinces (6% in Punjab, 8% in Sindh, and 6% in Balochistan) (data not presented). There

[14] Base weighted, 632; unweighted 719.

is no evidence that percentages for whom this explanation was important differed by gender, class, rural and urban areas, literacy, or age.

One in five (21%) of non-voting respondents said that work was somewhat or very important (Q25i) (**Figure 8.2b**),[15] an explanation that differed only across educational groups, with about one in five of those with middle school, matric, or higher degrees saying work was a very important factor in abstaining, compared with only one in ten respondents with primary school education or lower, despite the fact that election day is a non-working day in Pakistan (data not presented).

Figure 8.2b



[15] Base weighted 621; unweighted 702.

The belief that one's vote makes no difference (Q25f)—a quite rational belief according to many political scientists—was a somewhat or very important factor in non-voting for 22% of past abstainers (**Figure 8.2c**).[16] Not surprisingly, those for whom this explanation is very important are more educated; 20% of those with middle school education, 12% with matric, and 15% with higher degrees, compared with 11% or less among those with less education (data not presented). This attitude did not vary significantly by age, gender, or class, but 20% of respondents in NWFP who abstained in at least one past election said this factor was very important, compared with 13% in Sindh and 9% each in Punjab and Balochistan (data not presented). These findings confirm the general provincial trends evident in previous analysis.

Figure 8.2c



Election-specific reasons for abstention, such as a lack of enthusiasm for parties and candidates, are often associated with lower turnout in older democracies and attributable to the nature of the political system and political competition. These factors are often more common among those interested in politics who have both access to information and the means to understand it.

[16] Base weighted, 628; unweighted 716.

On the other hand, it is often said in Pakistan that voters have been jaded by the country's mixed governance history and believe that all politicians are the same and say, "whoever gets elected, things won't change." However, only 16% of survey respondents who abstained at least once said that dislike of the candidates was a somewhat or very important factor (Q25h) (**Figure 8.2d**).[17]

Figure 8.2d



These findings differ across educational groups; 16% of those with higher degrees say this explanation was very important in their non-voting decisions, compared with 8% of those with matric, 6% with middle school, and 11% who finished primary school education. Of those with no education, 7% said candidate choices were very important in non-voting, compared with 10% for madrasa-educated people and 5% of those with some primary school (data not presented). Respondents in NWFP also mention candidates as a very important factor more often (15%) than those in other provinces (less than 9%) (data not presented).

Further dispelling the common wisdom about disenchantment with Pakistan's politicians, among the reasons that respondents gave for having voted in one or more elections, feeling strongly about one of the candidates or parties (Q26b) was very important for over one in three (35%) and somewhat important for one in five respondents (19%). Over half (54%) of the voting electorate said strong feelings about a candidate motivated them to vote (**Figure 8.2e**).[18] There is no evidence that these sentiments differed by gender, rural-urban area, class, or educational group, but literate voters were more likely to mention

[17] Base weighted, 608; unweighted 694.
[18] Base weighted, 1828; unweighted, 1862.

support for candidates as an important factor (41%) compared with 32% of illiterate voters. The importance given to candidate support as a reason for voting increases steadily with the respondent's age (data not presented). Finally, attachment to candidates appears to be more important in voting for respondents in Punjab and Balochistan, where 40% said support for the candidate was very important in voting, followed by 35% in NWFP and 27% in Sindh (data not presented).

Figure 8.2e



These data point to the possibility that Pakistani voters remain hopeful that their elected representatives, regardless of past mixed performance, have the potential to govern well. Other possible interpretations are that voters feel a strong connection either to prominent national party leaders (even though their local representatives may disappoint constituents) or to local politicians whom voters know (even if high profile national leaders do not live up to expectations). A final explanation for respondents' seeming optimism is that they provided answers they expected interviewers would want to hear with regard to all of the questions in this group.

Providing further evidence that the Pakistani electorate has not given up on electoral politics, over half (56%) of those who voted in at least one past election said that the belief that their vote makes a difference (Q26c) was very important in their decision to vote, while 19% said it was somewhat important (**Figure 8.2f**).[19] Men said this factor was somewhat or very important more than women (82% and 64%, respectively). The percentage giving importance to this explanation also increases with the age, literacy, and educational attainment of the respondent, contradicting the notion that experience or information about past governments leads to cynicism (data not presented). More voters in Punjab (63%) see this factor as important, compared with half of voters or fewer in the other three provinces (50% in Balochistan, 45% in NWFP, and 41% in Sindh) (data not presented).

Figure 8.2f



A desire to change things in Pakistan (Q26j) was a very important factor for 38% of voters, and somewhat so for 17% (**Figure 8.2g**).[20] A larger percentage of voters in NWFP (44%) say desire for change is a very important reason for voting, compared with 38% in Punjab, 39% in Sindh, and just 25% in Balochistan (data not presented). Desire for change as a factor in voting increases with age, but not education or class. Among literate voters, however, 48% said change was very important, compared with 29% of illiterate voters. Forty-six percent of voting men compared with 29% of voting women said desire for change was a very important motivation, while 17% of both men and women said it was somewhat important.

[19] Base weighted, 1836; unweighted, 1872.
[20] Base weighted, 1810; unweighted, 1841.

Figure 8.2g



The most common explanation for respondents who have voted was the belief that voting is a duty of every citizen (Q26a), with 74% saying duty was very important and 12% somewhat important in past electoral participation (**Figure 8.2h**).[21] It is notable that this attitude does not differ significantly across classes or educational groups, but that literacy seems to make a difference in whether a person votes based on a sense of duty. While there are no provincial differences, rural voters attribute a sense of duty to their voting behavior less often (70%) than urban voters (82%) (**Table 8.2a**). Duty is also a less important motivation for women than for men, with 66% of women and 81% of men saying duty was very important in their decision to vote (**Table 8.2a**).

It is somewhat surprising that younger voters said duty was important about as often as other age groups; 76% of 18-24 year-olds felt duty to be very important, compared with 70% of 25-34 year-olds, 77% of 35-49 year-olds, and 74% of those 50 and older. The youngest group was among the least likely to say duty was not at all important, although more said they did not know than did older respondents (**Table 8.2a**).

[21] Base weighted, 1888; unweighted 1932.

Figure 8.2h



Table 8.2a

Voting out of a Sense of Duty, by Demographic Subgroup

	Don't Know (%)	Not at all Important (%)	Not Very Important (%)	Somewhat Important (%)	Very Important (%)
Age Group					
18-24 years	10	5	2	8	76
25-34 years	9	4	4	14	70
35-49 years	3	4	3	13	77
50 years or more	1	7	6	12	74
Gender					
Male	3	2	3	11	81
Female	9	8	5	13	66
Literacy in One Language					
Illiterate	9	8	5	16	61
Literate	1	2	2	7	88
Milieu					
Rural	7	6	4	14	70
Urban	3	3	4	8	82

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary.

When asked about their perception about the difference the respondent's vote was likely to make in the 2008 election (Q30), 49% said it would make a big difference, 27% said some difference, and 24% said no or little difference (**Figure 8.2i**).[22]

Figure 8.2i



Younger respondents value their vote as a tool of change less than older respondents; nevertheless, more than two-thirds (69%) of 18-24 year-olds said voting would make some or a big difference, compared 77% of both 25-34 year-olds and 35-49 year-olds. Eighty-three percent of respondents over 50 felt their vote would make some or a big difference, once again dispelling the notion of growing cynicism with experience (**Table 8.2b**).

More men (54%) than women (44%) said their vote would make a big difference in 2008, but more women (29%) than men (25%) said it would make some difference, and equal percentages (10%) viewed voting as ineffective. More women did not know how they would answer the question (**Table 8.2b**).

Similarly, although literate respondents said their vote would make a big difference more frequently than illiterate respondents (54% and 45%, respectively), 30% of illiterate respondents compared with 23% of literate respondents thought it would make some difference. Feelings about the efficacy of individual electoral participation also differed across educational groups, but in a somewhat curvilinear fashion, with the percentage

[22] Base weighted, 2408; unweighted 2438.

saying their vote would make a big difference peaking with those who had finished middle school, and slightly higher numbers of those with little and those with more education saying their vote would make little difference (**Table 8.2b**)

Respondents in Balochistan (67%) and Sindh (63%) said voting will make some or a big difference less frequently than respondents in Punjab (73%) and NWFP (68%). Those in Sindh and NWFP who said their vote will make little difference (17% and 12%, respectively) outnumber those in Punjab (7%) and Balochistan (8%) (**Table 8.2b**).

Table 8.2b

Difference Respondent's Vote will Make in 2008, by Demographic Subgroup

	None (%)	Little Difference (%)	Some Difference (%)	A Big Difference (%)
Age Group				
18-24 years	19	13	29	40
25-34 years	14	9	30	47
35-49 years	14	9	27	50
50 years or more	9	8	20	63
Gender				
Male	12	10	25	54
Female	17	10	29	44
Literacy in One Language				
Illiterate	16	9	30	45
Literate	12	10	23	54
Province				
Punjab	10	7	24	59
NWFP	20	12	25	43
Sindh	20	17	35	28
Balochistan	25	8	27	40
Educational Attainment				
None	17	11	28	44
Madrasa	19	12	25	45
Some Primary	12	8	34	46
Finished Primary	12	6	26	56
Middle School	7	11	23	59
Matric	11	10	24	55
F.A./F.Sc or above	15	7	27	51

a. Percentages by Row.

b. Bases weighted vary.

8.3 NON-ELECTORAL DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Voting is only one and, arguably, the least costly in terms of time and effort, of many forms of political participation. In countries in which elections are not necessarily associated with democracy or political change, abstention may be, in fact, a form of political participation, especially when paired with formal electoral boycotts.

The survey sought to assess the extent to which the electorate has participated in other forms of democratic action in addition to voting, in order to assess the best forms of delivery of voter education messages, as well as to understand whether people participating in non-electoral activities are different from those who vote.

Interviewers asked respondents about a variety of activities and whether they have been involved, would be likely to, might be, or would never be involved in such an activity. When asked in March/April 2007 about participating in an election boycott (Q21b), 5% said they have participated, while 13% said they might or would be likely to participate in a boycott. Seventy-three percent would never boycott an election (**Figure 8.3a**).

The likelihood of participating in an election boycott rises steadily with income and education (data not presented), but does not differ significantly by age, gender, rural-urban milieu, or province.

Figure 8.3a



Ten percent of respondents have participated in rallies or demonstrations (Q21c), and an additional 13% said they might or are likely to do so (**Figure 8.3b**), a finding that does not significantly by age, rural-urban milieu, or province. Not surprisingly, men reported having participated in rallies more often than women (12% compared with 8%), but 5% and 4% of men and women, respectively, said they would be likely to participate in such an event. Seven percent of women and 10% of men might attend a rally, while 72% of women and 64% of men would never do so (table not presented).

Figure 8.3b



Patterns of participation in rallies and demonstrations are not linear for different levels of income and educational attainment. Those who have at least finished primary school report higher participation (12% or more) in rallies than those with no or madrasa education (6%), but 19% of those who have finished primary school say they might participate or would be likely to participate, compared with 10% of those with no education and 14% with the highest level of education (data not presented). Similarly non-linear patterns are found for class, where 12% of the lower middle class and 13% of the upper class claims to have participated in a rally. Higher percentages of those in the middle three class categories report that they are likely or might attend a rally compared with the highest class, which is also exceeded in likely demonstration behavior by the two lowest classes (data not presented).

When asked about attending a party or election-related meeting (Q21d), 14% of respondents said they had already done so, while 18% said they might or would be likely to participate. Fifty-nine percent would never participate (**Figure 8.3c**).[23] As with other forms of participation, women, less educated individuals, and illiterate voters are less likely to have attended or to be likely to attend a party or election meeting (data not presented). Class is also associated with meeting participation; 16% of lower middle class respondents have attended a party or election meeting and 19% might or would be likely to do so. Twenty-five percent in the upper class have attended such an event, while 14%

[23] Base weighted, 2127; unweighted, 2164.

might or would be likely to do so. Sixteen and 17% of middle class respondents, respectively, have done or might participate in a rally (data not presented).

Figure 8.3c



Finally, when asked about their likelihood of visiting a political representative's office (Q21g), 13% of respondents have done so, while 15% might or are likely to do so (**Figure 8.3d**).[24] Not surprisingly, education and income are associated with higher participation in this activity, and men are more likely than women to visit a representative (data not presented).

[24] Base weighted, 2236; unweighted, 2285.

Figure 8.3d



8.4 WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The survey found significant differences between women's and men's self-reported political interest, access to information, perceptions of institutions, exposure to fraud, and rates of participation. Again and again, the findings suggest that women are at a disadvantage, both in terms of the lower rates at which they are educated and literate, but also with respect to specific gender norms, particularly family influence and the relative neglect of women in voter registration efforts, the mechanisms through which parties and civil society deliver their political and civic education messages, and opportunities to engage in political action. The fact that women's behavior demonstrates a level of interest and engagement in political issues on par with that of men (see **Chapter 3**) suggests that broader social and cultural norms may make mobilization of women to participate in democratic processes difficult without engaging society as a whole.

The following section examines various attitudes of the general electorate on women's participation in electoral processes in order to identify the types of messages that might be aimed at the voting age population more broadly, not just women, to create a climate that is more conducive to their participation. Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with a series of questions about types of women's participation.[25]

[25] "Now I would like to know your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. I will read out some statements and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them—whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree."

Three-quarters of respondents agree or agree strongly with the notion that women can run for political office (Q63a), dispositions that are consistent with Pakistani constitutional and electoral law[26] and the increasing number of women participating in government at the local level.[27] However, one in four respondents (24%) disagrees or disagrees strongly with this proposition (**Figure 8.4a**).[28]

Figure 8.4a



These percentages do not differ significantly by age, urban or rural area, or religious sect. Respondents in lower levels of income and education are less likely to agree that women can be political candidates (data not presented). It is interesting to note that men and women are not substantively different in their responses to this question. While over half of women (52%) strongly agree and 45% of men strongly agree, 25% of women compared with 27% of men agree with the statement. Nine percent of women and 10% of men disagree, and 11% and 16% of men and women disagree strongly. A substantial number of women respondents (20%) do not support the idea that women should represent them in political office.

[26] Reserved seats for women were re-introduced in advance of the 2002 general elections. Women can compete for general (unreserved) seats in addition to winning reserved seats based on party allocations. There were 164 provincial and national constituencies with women competing for office in the 2008 elections. TAF supported a separate election observation project by The Researchers focusing exclusively on these constituencies and the relevance of women candidates to the electoral process.

[27] United Nations Development Programme. 2005. "Political and Legislative Participation of Women in Pakistan: Issues and Perspectives." Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme.

[28] Base weighted, 2497; unweighted, 2557.

Consistent with lower female participation rates in NWFP, respondents in this province disagree or do so strongly more frequently (32%) than those in Punjab (25%), Balochistan (23%), and Sindh (14%) (data not presented).

Although Pakistan was the first Muslim country with a female head of state, only 64% of survey respondents agree that a woman can be head of a Muslim country (Q63b), while one third disagree or disagree strongly with the idea of a Muslim female head of state (**Figure 8.4b**).[29] Respondents in NWFP disagreed more often than those in other provinces (43% compared with 37% in Punjab, 29% in Balochistan, and 19% in Sindh). Respondents in Sindh, the home province of former female Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, were more likely to agree or agree strongly; 47% agreed strongly, while 28% agreed; 41% of Balochistan respondents strongly agreed and 27% agreed; 39% of Punjab respondents strongly agreed and 23% agreed, and 28% of NWFP respondents agreed strongly and 27% agreed (table not shown).

Figure 8.4b



Although three quarters of respondents agreed that women can run for office, almost that many (72%) agreed with the proposition that men are better suited to politics than women, while 26% disagreed (**Figure 8.4c**).[30] Provincial patterns follow the previous question (data not presented), as do linear relationships between income and education and attitudes towards women's suitability to politics. There are no generational or rural-urban differences in these attitudes, nor are there differences by gender. It should be

[29] Base weighted, 2480; unweighted, 2541

[30] Base weighted, 2489; unweighted, 2550.

noted that were one to ask the same question to electorates in western democracies, it is not unlikely that, while most would agree that women *can* serve in elected office, given the relative paucity of women in office in most democracies, many might also say that men are better suited to politics.

Figure 8.4c



Similarly, the vast majority of all respondents, even women, also agree with the proposition that a university education is more important for boys than for girls (Q63d) (**Figure 8.4d**).[31]

Perhaps surprisingly, more women than men agree strongly with this statement—65% of women compared with 58% of men, while 24% of women and 29% of men agree with the statement (table not shown). This may be due to the fact that in Pakistan, women often rely on a son and his family to care for them in old age, so that a son and a daughter-in-law are more important than a daughter for women's personal livelihood in older age . As with the other findings, these attitudes about women are less frequent among those with higher incomes and educational levels (data not presented).

[31] Base weighted, 2492; unweighted 2553.

Figure 8.4d



These findings suggest that, while barriers exist and women are still thought to be less suited to politics than men, Pakistanis as a whole are receptive to an increased role for women in politics. One possible explanation could be the increased representation of women in national and provincial assemblies and local government councils,[32] as well as their increasing appearance in media talk shows, the work place, and other public venues.

However, barriers to women's participation exist in general attitudes about political roles for women among respondents of both genders. Voter education can both design messages to convince people that when women participate in politics, policy outcomes are better for society as a whole, and use delivery mechanisms, such as home meetings, more likely to reach women and those who influence their participation.

[32] See, for example, United Nations Development Programme. 2005. "Political and Legislative Participation of Women in Pakistan: Issues and Perspectives." Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme.

8.5 ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST IN POLITICS

While surveys in older democracies find consistently that those with greater interest in politics and are more likely to vote and participate in other ways, the findings of this survey suggest that the relationship between interest and electoral participation is not so clear in Pakistan. Income and education are not related to voting behavior in ways that are consistent with explanations for turnout in older democracies. However, both the respondent's self-reported level of political interest and his or her interest index (calculated in **Chapter 3**) does correspond with a higher frequency of voting. **Figure 8.5a**[33] graphs the frequency of voting and the level of self-reported political interest. Only 14% of those who report the highest interest report never voting compared with 21% who are somewhat interested and 34% who are not at all interested.

While those who said they were very interested in politics reported voting in every election somewhat (2%) more frequently than those who are not very interested, 25% of those said they have a great deal of interest voted 2-3 times compared with 16% of those who report being *not very interested* in politics. The relatively high numbers (over one-third) who said they voted in every election, *regardless* of self-reported political interest may be attributable to the role of "get out the vote" operations and family pressure among those who are uninterested, or, perhaps, a greater level of trust in institutions and less skepticism of the electoral process from one election to the next (see **Chapter 6**).

Those who report that they are somewhat or very interested in politics are more likely to say that they voted 2-3 or many times; 22% of those reporting some interest said they voted in many elections, while only 14% of those who expressed a great deal of interest in politics said they voted many times. One-fourth (25%) of the *very* interested respondents said they voted two to three times.

When political interest is measured with an index of both self-reported attitudes and actual behavior (see **Chapter 3**), the findings are similar, but there are greater differences between the low, medium, and high levels of the index with respect to voting behavior than between the lower and higher levels of self-reported interest, and the lines cross less frequently. That is, the correspondence between self-reported interest and voting is less clear than when actual engagement in politics in the form of discussing politics with family and friends or other behaviors are included in a measure of political interest.

The relationship of the behavioral index with voting behavior is stronger than the self-reported measure. This provides further support for the findings in Chapter 3 that suggest that self-reported interest may be linked to particular meanings of how interest is expressed, whereas including behavior better approximates a respondent's actual willingness to *participate* in different types of political activities. The findings show that willingness to engage in political activities may translate into a greater likelihood of voting, even when self-reported interest might be low.

[33] Base weighted, 2476; unweighted, 2516.

Figure 8.5a



Figure 8.5b[34] graphs voting frequency against the index of political interest. Forty-one percent of those categorized as high-interest voted in every election, compared with 31% with medium interest and 28% with low interest. Eighteen percent of high-interest respondents report voting many times compared with 14% and 11% of medium- and low-interest respondents, respectively. About the same percentage of those with medium and high interest (19% and 18%, respectively) report voting two to three times, compared with 15% of those with low interest.

The index of respondents' awareness of various types of electoral procedures (see **Chapter 4**) is, surprisingly, unrelated to voting behavior. Awareness of current registration, identity card, and other requirements does not appear to correspond to a respondent's past participation. This is probably due to the fact that all the registration and other procedural changes for the 2007/2008 election were new. Even if a person had voted many times in the past, he/she would be no more likely to know about the new policy changes as someone who had never voted, since there was no public education about these new procedures before the survey was conducted.

[34] Base weighted, 1980; unweighted, 1994.

Figure 8.5b



Both self-reported political interest and the behavioral interest index are associated with higher self-reported voting in both elections mentioned specifically to voters (2002, 2005). These questions are less subjective, rely less on memory than the general voting history question, and are less subject to social desirability bias. As the foregoing findings indicate, both self-reported interest and past voting behavior may be somewhat unreliable measures.

Table 8.5 presents voting participation for 2002 and 2005 with both measures of political interest. The percentage of respondents reporting having voted is, not surprisingly, higher among respondents with both self-reported and behavioral political interest. However, it is notable that over one in three of the lowest interest respondents by both measures voted in one or the other election, and 36% or more of the most interested respondents declined to vote in 2005 and/or 2002.

Table 8.5

Participation in 2002 and 2005 Elections, by Political Interest

	Voted in 2005 Local Election?		Voted in 2002 General Election?	
Self-Reported Interest	**NO**	**YES**	**NO**	**YES**
Not at All	59	41	62	38
Not Very	47	53	52	48
Somewhat	41	59	48	52
Very Interested	36	64	41	59
Don't Know	76	24	85	15
Behavioral Interest Index				
Low	65	35	68	32
Medium	49	51	54	46
High	36	64	43	57

a. Bases vary; Index Base weighted, 1292; unweighted 1348.

These findings point to several general conclusions. First, self-reported lack of interest in politics or elections does not indicate an unwillingness or disinterest in engaging in other kinds of democratic action, civic education, or community participation. Second, low voter turnout in Pakistan does not measure the extent of cynicism, or optimism, about democratic processes or the potential for greater public demand for good governance in the country. Third, there may be a "silent majority" of Pakistanis in all demographic groups who are prepared to be more involved in broader civic engagement if they had more information, opportunity, and a conducive environment to do so. All of these conclusions underlie the importance of more robust programming giving people in Pakistan the chance not just to hear about their basic civic rights and responsibilities, such as the importance of voting, but also to take action on a wider range of issues that directly affect their lives.

Attachment: List of Elections in Pakistan

Election Date (YYY/MM/DD)			Type of Election	Suffrage Level	Voting Age	Notes
1951	10	3	Provincial (Punjab)	Universal	21	The first direct elections held in the country after independence for the provincial Assembly of the Punjab (March 10-20) for 197 seats. 939 candidates from seven political parties contested 189 seats, while unopposed candidates filled the remaining seats. Seven political parties were in the race. Turnout was low—around 30 percent.
1951	8	12	Provincial (NWFP)	Universal	21	North West Frontier Province held elections for provincial legislature seats. Many who lost accused the winners of cheating and "rigging" the elections.
1953		5	Provincial (Sindh)	Universal	21	Accusations of fraud characterized elections to the provincial legislature of Sindh.
1954		4	Provincial (East Pakistan)	Universal	21	Elections for the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly, in which the Pakistan Muslim League lost, and Bengali nationalists won.
1956	5	3	Executive	Indirect	NA	
1960	14	2	Executive	Indirect	NA	
1962	28	4	National Assembly	Indirect	NA	
1965	2	1	Executive	Indirect	NA	
1965	21	3	National Assembly	Indirect	NA	
1970	7	12	National Assembly	Universal	21	Pakistan's first direct, national general election was held under the regime of Yahya Khan, which reported a turnout of almost 63 percent. Twenty-four political parties participated.
1977	10	3	National Assembly	Universal	21	Snap elections announced by Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto.

1977	7	3	Provincial Assembly	Universal	21	Official turnout rate of 63 percent.
1984	19	12	Referendum	Universal	21	1984 Referendum initiated by General Zia ul-Haq on Islamization program.
1985	25	2	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	21	
1988	16	11	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	21	
1988	12	12	Executive	Indirect	NA	
1990	24	10	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	21	
1993	6	10	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	21	
1993	13	11	Executive	Indirect	NA	
1997	3	2	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	21	
1997	31	12	Executive	Universal	21	
2002	30	4	Referendum	Universal	21	Referendum on whether current president's term should be extended by five years.
2002	10	10	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	18	Voting age changed to 18 for these elections.
2005		8	Local Government	Universal	18	
2007	09	10	Executive	Indirect	NA	
2008	18	2	National and Provincial Assemblies	Universal	18	Survey conducted prior to these elections.

The Asia Foundation

VOTER EDUCATION SURVEY:
Pakistan National Assembly and Provincial Elections 2007 / 2008

APPENDIX:
Survey Instrument with Frequency Distributions

Unweighted frequency distributions shown for respondent variables with quantitative responses. Results for interviewer characteristics available on request.

2007 PRE-ELECTION SURVEY OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS IN PAKISTAN

Survey Instrument

SECTION I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Form Number / Respondent ID	PSU Number	CCN (Census Charge No.)	Interview DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

Enumerator Name:	Supervisor Name:	Start Time of Interview (hh:mm)	End Time of Interview (hh:mm)

Province/Region Name & Code	District/Zila Name & Code	Tehsil/Taluka/Town Name Code	City Town Name & Code

Household No. in CCN	No. Eligible Respondents in Household	Respondent No. Selected	Household in sample?
			Y N

Coder Name	Coder Number	Date of Data Entry (dd/mm/yyyy)	Data Entry Name

Respondent NAME	Respondent ADDRESS

THIS PAGE TO BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM SURVEY RESPONSES.
WRITE RESPONDENT / FORM NUMBER AT THE TOP OF EACH SURVEY PAGE

A1 | | | **A1** Result of Visit: Please describe circumstances of three contact attempts below.

	Task/Action	First Visit	Second Visit	Third Visit
a	a. Interview Completed	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
b	b. Partially Completed	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
c	c. Delayed/Postponed	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
d	d. No eligible person	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
e	e. Residence closed temporarily	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
f	f. Residence closed permanently	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
g	g. Not a residence	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
h	h. Refused interview	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No	1 Yes 2 No
i	i Other (state):			

A2 **A2** Is this household in the original sample or a substitution of a new household for a sampled respondent?

1 Original 2 Substitution

A3 **A3** *(IF SUBSTITUTION)* Why was a new household selected as a substitute for the randomly selected respondent in the sampled household?

1 No one home after 3 returns 2 Refused interview
3 No eligible voter in household 4 Others interfered with interview
5 Incompatible language 666 OTHER: _____

A4 **A4** Result of Interview

1 Interview conducted 2 Interview declined
666 Other (state): _____

2007 PRE-ELECTION SURVEY OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS IN PAKISTAN

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INTERVIEWER

1. Ensure Privacy of Interview & Protect Interviewee Confidentiality
   a. Ensure that the interview is a one-on-one, face-to-face environment, without others present. If the respondent wants others present, please explain that it is very important that every interview be conducted under the same conditions to ensure comparability and confidentiality.
   b. If a private place is not available, ask the respondent if there is a neutral location in which you can conduct the interview without audience or interruptions.
   c. Each respondent should be assigned a unique code. Name and address information, *to be used for verification that the interview was conducted*, should be recorded on a separate sheet along with the unique number for each respondent to ensure that survey answers cannot be linked to respondent identities.
2. Random selection of eligible respondents in the household should include only people eligible to vote. **The sampling universe consists of all citizens of voting age.**
3. Sampling:
   If there is no one at home in the selected household on the first try, the respondent should make two call-backs later in the day. Or, if the designated respondent is not at home, the Interviewer should make an appointment to meet them later in the day. Again, call-backs will be necessary in order to find the selected respondent and to conduct the interview. It is also acceptable for the Interviewer to enquire about the whereabouts of the selected respondent (they may perhaps be at work) and, if nearby, to walk to that place to conduct the interview.

If the call-backs are unsuccessful, say because the respondent has still not returned home for the appointment, then, and only then, the Interviewer may substitute the household. If the house is still empty or the selected respondent is not at home at the time of the call-back, the Interviewer must substitute that household with the very next household in the direction of the walk pattern.

4. CODING CARDS

List of Media in Pakistan

List of Parties

5. NON-RESPONSE

a. Only one response is allowed per question unless otherwise indicated with instructions and coding boxes.

b. DO NOT read aloud non-response categories unless they are explicitly listed in the response sets. Only code them if volunteered by the respondent. Non-response categories are not shown on the show cards, to encourage respondents to try to answer the question.

c. If the respondent cannot or does not want to answer the question, use the following appropriate non-response categories.

888	Don't Know / Can’t remember
555	No Opinion
999	Refused
777	Not Applicable
666	Other (Write-in response in blank)

FOR ITEM **NON-RESPONSE, ALWAYS USE THE FOLLOWING CODES:**

888 DON'T KNOW/DON'T REMEMBER
555 NO OPINION
999 REFUSED
777 IRRELEVANT / SKIPPED
666 OTHER

Form Number / Respondent ID	PSU Number	CCN (Census Charge No.)	Interview DATE (dd/mm/yyyy)

Enumerator Name:	Supervisor Name:	Start Time of Interview	End Time of Interview

Province/Region Name & Code	District/Zila Name & Code	Tehsil/Taluka/Town Name Code	City Town Name & Code

Household No. in CCN	No. Eligible Respondents in Household	Respondent No. Selected	Household in sample?
			Y N

START OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWER SCRIPT

INTRODUCTION: *(READ VERBATIM)*: Good morning/afternoon/evening. My name is _____. I work for an NGO called Researchers, a private company that does not work with or for any government or any political party. We are interviewing thousands of Pakistanis all over the country about their concerns, experiences, and backgrounds for a national public opinion survey. The purpose of the survey is to talk to enough people to get averages and percentages that help assess the mood and concerns of the nation so we can better inform people about the upcoming election. Every household in the country has an equal chance of being included in this study; every one, yours included, has been selected by chance. Your answers will be kept confidential; no one will find out what you say. There are no right or wrong answers; we just want to find out your opinion. The findings of the interviews will be used by universities and nongovernmental civil society groups in voter education activities.

The interview is voluntary and should take about 60 minutes to complete. Other than taking up some of your time today, there are no risks to participating. Your assistance will be very much appreciated.

May we proceed with the interview?

Because we are interviewing other people in this community, we ask that you refrain from discussing the interview with other people. We want to ensure that all responses are true and not influenced by others. Is there a place where we can talk where other people will not be listening?

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

The survey instrument below includes the unweighted frequency distributions for the responses for quantitative variables. Interviewer characteristics and qualitative variables can be made available upon request. Please note that the N reported for each question is the number of respondents that responded to that item out of a total of 2,721 individuals surveyed. Each question includes the number of responses, followed by the percentage of the total responses (i.e., N, %). Responses of "don't know" and "don't remember are abbreviated with "DK".

SECTION I: RESPONDENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Member	Eligibility: Family Members **aged 18 and above** beginning with eldest	Age	Sequence Number					
			1	2	3	4	5	6
1			1	1	1	1	1	1
2			1	2	1	2	1	2
3			1	2	3	1	2	3
4			1	2	3	4	1	2
5			1	2	3	4	5	1
6			1	2	3	4	5	6
7			1	2	3	4	5	6
8			1	2	3	4	5	6
9			1	2	3	4	5	6
10 or more			1	2	3	4	5	6

Q1 ☐☐☐

Q1 Gender of Respondent (N=2715)

1 Male (1454, 53.55%) 2 Female (1261, 46.45%)

SCRIPT: First, we'd like to know little bit more about the types of people participating in the survey. I'd like to start by asking you some questions about yourself, your living situation, and your day to day habits. Is it alright with you if we get started now?

Q2 ☐☐☐

Q2 What is your marital status? (N=2647)

1 Married (1953, 73.78) 2 Unmarried/engaged (618, 23.35)

3 Divorced (7, 0.26) 4 Widowed (69, 2.61)

Q3 ☐☐☐

Q3 What is your approximate age in years? (N=2721)

(2,700 Observations; Mean: 33.52 (s.d. 13.77)

Q4 ☐☐☐

Q4 Where did you spend most of your childhood?

City _____ Region _____ Country _____

Q5 ☐☐☐
NO. OF YEARS

Q5 For how many years have you lived in your current residence?
(N=546, DK 21)
(Mean 29.1 (s.d. 24.43))

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q6 Adults / Children

Q6 What is the total number of family members living in the household?

Adults: (N=2484) Mean: 5.16 (s.d. 3.76)) Children (N=2443) Mean: 4.94 (s.d. 3.98)

Q7

Q7 Who owns your current residence? (N=2,569)

1	Respondent (1339, 52.12)	2	Close relative (594, 23.12)
3	Distant relative (11, 0.43)	4	Landlord (447, 17.40)
5	Employer (94, 3.66)	666	Other: (84, 3.27)

Q8

Q8 What language is your mother tongue? ***(DO NOT READ OUT)***

N=2520

1	Urdu (235, 9.33)	2 English	(3, 0.12)
3	Punjabi (784, 31.11)	4 Seraiki	(221, 8.77)
5	Hindko (95, 3.77)	6 Pushto	(520, 20.63)
7	Sindhi (369, 14.64)	8 Balochi	(212, 8.41)
666	OTHER:	(81, 3.21)	

Q9 9a 9b 9c

Q9 Can you speak, read, and/or write your mother tongue or any other languages? ***(DO NOT READ OUT)*** (N=2721)

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i

Language	9.1. Speak	9.2. Read	9.3. Write
a. Urdu	Y: 1539, 56.56 N: 1182, 43.44	Y: 1,285, 43.55 N: 1,536, 56.45	Y: 1141, 41.93 N: 1580, 58.07
b. English	Y: 447, 16.43 N: 2274, 83.57	Y: 631, 23.19 N: 2090, 76.81	Y: 543, 19.96 N: 2178, 80.04
c. Punjabi	Y: 930, 34.18 N: 1791, 65.82	Y: 383, 14.08 N: 2338, 85.92	Y: 347, 12.75 N: 2374, 87.25
d. Seraiki	Y: 287, 10.55 N: 2434, 89.45	Y: 114, 4.19 N: 2607, 95.81	Y: 92, 3.38 N: 2629, 96.62
e. Hindko	Y: 97, 3.56 N: 2624, 96.44	Y: 59, 2.17 N: 2662, 97.83	Y: 53, 1.95 N: 2668, 98.05
f. Pushto	Y: 580, 21.32 N: 2141, 78.68	Y: 206, 7.57 N: 2515, 92.43	Y: 173, 6.36 N: 2548, 93.64
g. Sindi	Y: 491, 18.04 N: 2230, 81.96	Y: 218, 8.01 N: 2503, 91.99	Y: 205, 7.53 N: 2516, 92.47
h. Balochi	Y: 491, 18.04 N: 2230, 81.96	Y: 55, 2.02 N: 2666, 97.98	Y: 42, 1.54 N: 2679, 98.46
i Other:	Y: 137, 5.03 N: 2584, 94.97	Y: 43, 1.58 N: 2678, 98.42	Y: 35, 1.29 N: 2686, 98.71

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q10

Q10 What is your current employment status? ***(READ OUT)*** (N= 2607)

1	Full time (972, 37.28)	2	Part-time (106, 4.07)
3	Seeking work (144, 5.52)	4	Retired (72, 2.76)
5	Homemaker (1,077, 41.31)	6	Student (137, 5.26)
666	Other (99, 3.80)		

Q11

Q11 What is your primary occupation **(or anticipated occupation if student)**?
(DO NOT READ OUT - DESCRIBE & THEN CODE) (N=2415)

	Self-employed shopkeeper		University staff or professor
51	154, 6.38	61	2, 0.08
	Self-employed business or trade (except shop keeping)		Engineer
52	53, 2.19	62	1, 0.04
	Government servant		NGO Staff
53	158, 6.54	63	2, 0.08
	Private sector employee		International Agency
54	97, 4.02	64	0, 0.00
	Industrial Manual labor		Primary/secondary teacher
55	66, 2.73	65	50, 2.07
	Farm/rural manual labor		Religious teacher / mosque
56	257, 10.64	66	16, 0.66
	Small or medium sized farmer		Army/military/security
57	199, 8.24	67	10, 0.41
	Large farmer / landowner		Housewife/domestic
58	37, 1.53	68	1,073, 44.43
	Medical professional		Other
59	18, 0.75	666	214, 8.86
	Lawyer/Judge/Legal	888	Don't Know
60	5, 0.21		3, 0.12

Q12

Q12 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? ***(READ OUT)*** (N=2642)

21	None (1116, 42.24)	22	Madrasa/Religious School (96, 3.63)
23	Some Primary (139, 5.26)	24	Finished Primary School (220, 8.33)
25	Middle School (224, 8.48)	26	Matric (381, 14.42)
27	F.A/F.Sc (228, 8.63)	28	B.A./B.Sc (152, 5.75)
	M.A or a professional degree		Doctorate or post-doctorate
29	(82, 3.10)	30	(3, 0.11)
		888	Don't Know (1, 0.04)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q13 **Q13** For statistical purposes, we would like to know which of the following income groups your household falls into, approximately: ***(READ OUT)*** (N=2553)

1	Up to Rs. 1,000 (112, 4.39)	2	Rs. 1,001 – Rs. 2,000 (259, 10.14)
3	Rs. 2,001 – Rs. 3,000 (383, 15.00)	4	Rs. 3,001 – Rs. 4,000 (295, 11.56)
5	Rs. 4,001 – Rs. 5,000 (454, 17.78)	6	Rs. 5,001 – Rs. 10,000 (529, 20.72)
7	Rs. 10,001 – Rs. 15,000 (199, 7.79)	8	Rs. 15,001 and above (258, 10.11)
		888	Don't Know (64, 2.51)

Q14 **Q14** With which religion/sect are you affiliated most closely? (READ OUT) (N=2638)

1	Sunni Islam (2,375, 90.03)	2	Shia Islam (165, 6.25)
3	Christian (23, 0.87)	4	Hinduism (25, 0.95)
666	Other: (45, 1.71)	888	Don't Know: (5, 0.19)

SECTION II: MEDIA USE & PREFERENCES

Q15 **Q15** Thinking about how often you watch television, listen to the radio, read a newspaper, and use the internet, can you tell me about how often you use each … (***READ OUT***)

a
b
c
d

	A Daily	B Frequently	C Once a week	D Once in a while	E Never
a. TV (N=2533)	869, 34.31	298, 11.76	26, 1.03	436, 17.21	904, 35.69
b. Radio (N=2509)	242, 9.65	150, 5.98	42, 1.67	500, 19.93	1575, 62.77
c. Paper (N=2485)	336, 13.52	181, 7.28	87, 3.50	373, 15.01	1508, 60.68
d. Web (N=2388)	38, 1.59	33, 1.38	19, 0.80	80, 3.35	2218, 92.88

Q16
Q17a 1
Q17b 2

Q16 Please name the two specific sources you use most often to find out information about politics and government (names of stations or newspapers)? *(RECORD ANSWER AND USE LIST OF MEDIA CODES TO COMPLETE BOXES AT LEFT)*

1 _____ 2 _____

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q17

Q17 I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get information about elections in their communities. I'd like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to attend two events, which two *would you choose*? **(READ OUT)** (N=2721)(Yes=Mentioned; No=Not Mentioned)

1	Live drama or comedy about elections (222 Yes; 2499 No)	2	Workshop by an international NGO (130 Yes; 2591 No)
3	A meeting about elections in someone's home (875 Yes; 1846 No)	4	A party rally or meeting (419 Yes, 2302 No)
5	A short film or movie (167 Yes; 2554 No)	6	Special meeting for women (294 Yes, 2427 No)
7	I would not attend any of these events (854 Yes; 1867 No)	666	Other: (150 Yes; 2570 No)
777	Irrelevant/Skipped (60 Yes, 2661 No)	888	Don't Know (230 Yes, 2491 No)
999	Refused (55 Yes, 2666 No)	555	No Opinion (173 Yes, 2548 No)

Q18

Q18 I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get information about elections from the media. I'd like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to spend one hour learning more about the election, which two types of sources *would you choose for your time*? (N=2721)

1	Radio drama or comedy about the election process (194 Yes, 2527 No)	2	Watching a TV program (978, 1743)
3	Looking at illustrations or posters in the community (770 Yes, 1951 No)	4	Reading newspapers or the internet (424 Yes, 2297 No)
5	Watching candidates or parties debate on television (273 Yes, 2448 No)	666	Other: (485 Yes, 2236 No)
555	No Opinion (141 Yes, 2580 No)	777	Irrelevant/Skipped (61 Yes, 2660 No)
888	Don't Know (314 Yes, 2407 No)	999	Refused (41 Yes, 2680 No)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

SECTION VI: POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, ENGAGEMENT, EFFICACY AND KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

Q19

Q19 Looking at the problems in your area and the way they affect families like you, for your relatives or friends, who would you suggest to go to in order to resolve these problems (District administration official like EDO, DCO, MO)?

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h

LIKELIHOOD OF SUGGESTING

	Likely to Suggest	Unlikely to Suggest	Would Never Suggest
a. Feudal leaders (N=2057)	547, 25.59	250, 12.15	1260, 61.25
b. Religious leaders (N=2102)	557, 25.5	337, 16.03	1208, 57.47
c. Biradari elders (N=2220)	1536, 691.6	158, 7.12	526, 23.69
d. NGOs (N=1898)	285, 15.02	327, 17.23	1286, 67.76
e. Political party office (N=2062)	290, 14.06	354, 17.17	1418, 68.77
f. MNA or MPA (N=2066)	401, 19.41	328, 15.88	1337, 64.71
g. Local government elected officials like Nazims and Union Councilors. (N=2179)	1229, 56.40	214, 9.82	736, 33.78
h. District administration official like EDO, DCO, MO[1] (N=2064)	496, 24.03	297, 14.39	1271, 61.58

Q20

Q20 How interested would you say you are in politics? (N=2584)

Very Interested	Somewhat Interested	Not very interested	Not at all interested
296, 11.46	538, 20.82	470, 18.19	1251, 48.41
888 Don't Know	29, 1.12		

[1] District Coordination Officer (DCO), Executive District Officer (EDO), Municipal Officer (MO)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q21

Q21 I'm going describe some political activities that people engage in. I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done each of these things, whether you are likely to do it, whether you might do it, or would never do it.[2]

	Have Done	Likely to Do	Might Do	Would Never Do
a. Discuss elections with friends/family (N=2346; DK 228, 9.72)	707, 30.14	182, 7.76	318, 13.55	911, 38.83
b. Boycott an election (N=2293; DK 229, 9.99)	121, 5.28	111, 4.84	176, 7.68	1656, 72.22
c. Attend demonstrations or rallies (N=2303; DK 229, 9.94)	227, 9.86	100, 4.34	203, 8.81	1544, 67.04
d. Attend a party or election meeting (N=2300; DK 225, 9.78)	317, 13.78	156, 6.78	274, 11.91	1,328, 57.74
e. Tell friends, family, or coworkers to vote for a particular candidate (N=2117; DK 35, 1.65)	446, 21.07	173, 8.17	289, 13.65	1174, 55.46
f. Get into an argument about election (N=2303; DK 221, 9.60)	470, 20.41	146, 6.34	288, 12.51	1178, 51.15
g. Visit a local representative's office (N=2302; DK 225, 9.77)	306, 13.29	118, 5.13	245, 10.64	1408, 61.16

Q22

Q22 Since you have been eligible to vote in elections, how often have you voted in elections? (N=2622)

1 Never (789, 30.09) 2 Once (242, 9.23)
3 Two or three times (433, 16.51) 4 Most elections (372, 14.19)
5 Every election (780, 29.75) 888 Don't Know (6, 0.23)

Q23

Q23 Did you vote in the local elections in August 2005? (N=1054)

1 Yes (858, 81.4) 2 No (187, 17.74)
888 Don't Know (9, 0.85)

Q23 RECALCULATED DISTRIBUTION TO ACCOUNT FOR SKIP PATTERN

Did you vote in the local elections in August 2005? (N=1,843)

1 Yes (858, 46.55) 2 No (976, 52.96)
888 Don't Know (9, 0.49)

Q24

Q24 Did you vote in the national assembly elections in 2002?(N=1047)

1 Yes (752, 71.82) 2 No (282, 26.93)
888 Don't Know (13, 1.24)

[2] Adapted from Kessler (2006) and Inglehart et al. (2000).

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q24 RECALCULATED DISTRIBUTION TO ACCOUNT FOR SKIP PATTERN	Did you vote in the national assembly elections in 2002? (N=1,836)			
	1	Yes (752, 40.96)	2	No (1,071, 58.33)
	888	Don't Know		(13, 0.71)

Q25 ☐☐☐

Q25 REASONS FOR NOT VOTING: I'm going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past elections.[3]

		Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not very Important	Not at all Important
a ☐	a. I intended to vote but circumstances on the day prevented me (N=723; DK 120, 16.6)	57, 7.88	35, 4.84	87, 12.03	424, 58.64
b ☐	b. The polling station is hard to reach (N=714; DK 121, 16.95)	46, 6.44	35, 4.9	94, 13.17	418, 58.54
c ☐	c. I wasn't able to register (N=649; DK 6, 0.92)	233, 35.9	62, 9.55	66, 10.17	282, 43.45
d ☐	d. I went but I didn't have ID (N=750; DK 117, 15.60)	220, 29.33	52, 6.93	67, 8.93	294, 39.20
e ☐	e. I didn't know where to go (N=599; DK 18, 3.01)	42, 7.01	35, 5.84	86, 14.36	418, 69.78
f ☐	f. My vote makes no difference (N=720; DK 122, 16.94)	87, 12.08	70, 9.72	96, 13.33	345, 47.92
g ☐	g. The elections are not free & fair (N=703; DK; 132, 18.78)	58, 8.25	42, 5.97	89, 12.66	382, 54.34
h ☐	h. I did not like the candidates (N=698; DK 124, 17.77)	64, 9.17	50, 7.16	80, 11.46	380, 54.44
i ☐	i. I was too busy with work to vote (N=706; DK 117, 16.57)	84, 11.9	47, 6.66	65, 9.21	393, 55.67
j ☐	j. I received some money or a gift (N=685; DK 115, 16.79)	23, 3.36	14, 2.04	49, 7.15	484, 70.66
k ☐	k. I was afraid of violence and unrest (N=598; DK 18, 3.01)	56, 9.36	28, 4.68	47, 7.86	449, 75.08
l ☐	l. A religious figure told me not to (N=688; DK 115, 16.72)	24, 3.49	18, 2.62	58, 8.43	473, 68.75
m ☐	m. My name was not on the voter list (N=722; DK 125, 17.31)	118, 16.34	50, 6.93	56, 7.76	373, 51.66
n ☐	n. I was stopped by my family (N=706; DK 113, 16.01)	61, 8.64	18, 2.55	55, 7.79	459, 65.01

OTHER REASONS MENTIONED: _____

[3] Aspects of this question adapted from Charney (2001, 2004) and Bratton and Lambright (2001).

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q26

Q26 **REASONS FOR VOTING:** I'm going to read you a list of reasons why people vote. For each one, please tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you voted in past elections.

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not very Important	Not at all Important
a. It is the duty of every citizen (N=1944; DK 116, 5.97)	1426, 73.35	233, 11.99	76, 3.91	93, 4.78
b. I felt strongly about a party/candidate (N=1873; DK 130, 6.94)	681, 36.36	343, 18.31	252, 13.45	467, 24.93
c. My vote makes a difference (N=1883; DK 121, 6.430	1002, 53.21	346, 18.37	148, 7.86	266, 14.13
d. My relatives & friends convinced me (N=1839; DK 121, 6.58)	406, 22.08	259, 14.08	292, 15.88	761, 41.38
e. My employer asked me to vote (N=1704; DK 18, 1.06)	127, 7.45	66, 3.87	220, 12.91	1273, 74.71
f. A political party agent made me vote (N=1817; DK 121, 6.66)	122, 6.71	86, 4.73	210, 11.56	1278, 70.34
g. I received some money or a gift (N=1804; DK 118, 6.54)	41, 2.27	16, 0.89	102, 5.65	1527, 84.65
h. I was afraid I would be in danger (N=1811; DK 122, 6.74)	56, 3.09	40, 2.21	124, 6.85	1569, 81.12
i. A religious figure told me to vote (N=1810; DK 121, 6.69)	76, 4.2	68, 3.76	154, 8.51	1391, 76.85
j. I want to change things in Pakistan (N=1852; DK 139, 7.51)	691, 37.31	311, 16.79	128, 6.91	583, 31.48
k. I was afraid of losing my job or land (N=1693; Don't' Know 17, 1.0)	68, 4.02	36, 2.13	128, 7.56	1444, 85.29

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k

OTHER REASONS MENTIONED: _____

Q27

Q27 Have you heard when the next elections will be held?

(N=2610)

1	Yes (912, 34.94)	2	No (1663, 63.72)
888	DK		35, 1.34

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q28 **Q28** Approximately what date to you think the elections will be held? (N=933)

	Gives any date from Nov 2007 to Feb 2008		Gives answer other than these dates
1	(768, 82.32)	2	(81, 8.68)
888	DK		84, 9.00

Q29 **Q29** How likely is it that you will vote in the next National Assembly election? (N=2595)

Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Somewhat unlikely	Very unlikely	Don't Know Yet
1060, 40.85	649, 25.01	167, 6.44	250, 9.63	469, 18.07

Q30 **Q30** Do you think that if you vote in the upcoming general elections that your vote will make a big difference, some difference, little difference, or no difference? (N=2455)

Big difference	Some difference	Little difference	No difference
1129, 45.99	666, 27.13	249, 10.14	411, 16.74

Q31 **Q31** For the following two statements, tell me whether you agree more with statement A or statement B. (N=2297)

A	The government in Islamabad has taken positive steps to ensure that elections are free and fair. (729, 31.74)	B	It doesn't matter what the government in Islamabad does to ensure a fair election, because the *local* and *provincial* politicians corrupt the process. (783, 34.09)

DK (785, 34.18)

Q32 **Q32** If you compare the upcoming elections with the previous elections in Pakistan, would you say that compared to earlier elections, the next elections will be much more, somewhat more, about the same, somewhat less, or much less free & fair? (N=2463)

Much more free	Somewhat more free	About the same	Somewhat less	Much less free
277, 11.25	432, 17.54	1055, 42.83	123, 4.99	178, 7.23

Don't Know
398, 16.16

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q33

Q33 Now I would like your opinion on various institutions and organizations working in Pakistan. Tell me how much trust you have in these institutions--A great deal of trust, some trust, very little trust, or no trust at all.

		Great deal of trust	Some trust	No trust at all
a.	National government (N=2149)	601, 27.97	820, 38.16	728, 33.88
b.	Judiciary (N=2117)	668, 31.55	760, 35.90	689, 32.55
c.	Police (N=2177)	236, 10.84	516, 23.7	1425, 65.46
d.	Pakistani Army (N=2168)	1109, 51.15	600, 27.68	459, 21.17
e.	National & Provincial Assembly (N=2036)	382, 18.76	808, 39.69	846, 41.55
f.	Election Commission of Pakistan (N=1980)	524, 26.46	719, 36.31	737, 37.22
g.	Provincial government (N=2045)	439, 21.47	787, 38.48	819, 40.05
h.	The Pakistani press (N=2040)	712, 34.90	724, 35.49	604, 29.61
i.	Local government elected officials like Nazims and Union Councilors. (N=2157)	622, 28.84	764, 35.42	771, 35.74

Q34

Q34 Thinking about the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have offices in your community, do you think that overall, they make a positive contribution, or are they wasting money and resources that should go somewhere else? (N=2335)

1 Positive Contribution (759, 32.51) 2 Waste of resources, (481, 20.6)

Don't Know (1095, 46.90)

Q35
35a
35b
35c
Write in at right and code NGOs later

Q35 Can you name two or three NGOs respected by you and people in your community, or do people have negative views of all of them?

35a _____

35b _____

35c _____

4 No, People have negative views of all of them (183 Mentioned, 6.73; 1538 Not Mentioned, 93.27)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q36 **Q36** Are you aware that all citizens must register *again* if they want to vote in the upcoming election, even if they already registered to vote in the past? (N=2598)

1	Yes (696, 26.79)	2	No (1724, 66.36)
888	Don't Know		178, 6.85

Q37 **Q37** Has anyone come to your home in the **past 12 months** asking you or someone in your household to fill out a form to register on a *new* voters' list? (N=2618)

1	Yes (1194, 45.6)	2	No (1313, 50.15)
	Don't Know		111, 4.24

Q38 **Q38** Did you or someone in your household register to vote by filling out the form when someone came to your home in the past 12 months? (N=1286)

1	Yes (1097, 85.30)	2	No (103, 8.01)
	Don't Know		(86, 6.69)

Q39 **Q39** Are you aware that the provisional voters' registration list will be displayed in May and June and that registered voters can check the list to see if your name is correctly listed? (N=1184)

1	Yes (369, 31.17)	2	No (726, 61.32)
888	Don't Know		(89, 7.52)

Q40 **Q40** How likely is it that you will check your name on the provisional voters' list? (N=2373)

Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Somewhat unlikely	Very unlikely	Don't Know
740, 31.18	670, 28.23	150, 6.32	620, 26.13	193, 8.13

(SKIP TO Q41)

Q41 **Q41** If you did not fill out a form in the last 12 months, have you made plans to register to vote in order to get your name on the electoral list in your area before the next election? (N=1688)

1	Yes (521, 30.86)	2	No (1022, 60.55)
	Don't Know		(145, 8.59)

Q42 **Q42** Have you heard that there will be a *special* registration period in May/June for all citizens of voting age who did not register during the past 12 months? (N=2573)

1	Yes (555, 21.57)	2	No (1809, 70.31)
	Don't Know		(209, 8.12)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q43 **Q43** Looking at that whether other eligible voters have registered in your area, how confident are you that most people in your community of voting age will be registered on the electoral list in time for the election--very confident, somewhat confident, or not at all confident? (N=2597)

LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE			
Very Confident	Somewhat confident	Not at all confident	Don't Know/Can't Say
520, 20.02	900, 34.66	193, 7.43	984, 37.89

Q44 **Q44** How confident are you that the electoral list in your area will be accurate and complete in time for the election--very confident, somewhat confident, or not at all confident? (N=2594)

LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE			
Very Confident	Somewhat confident	Not at all confident	Don't Know/Can't Say
525, 20.24	881, 33.96	216, 8.33	972, 37.47

Q45 **Q45** If someone asked you where they could register to vote, what would you tell them? _____

(DO NOT READ OUT)

(N=2577)

1 **District** Election Commission (EC) office (471, 18.28)
2 Union Council Office (UC) (822, 31.90)
3 Tehsil Office (104, 4.04)
666 Others (52, 2.02)
888 Don't Know (1128, 43.77)

Q46 **Q46** How far away is the closest election commission office from your home -- very far away, a significant distance away, or close (in your town or village)? (N=2567)

1 Very far away (1087, 42.35)
2 A significant distance away (541, 21.08)
3 Close (in your town or village) (266, 10.36)
Don't Know (673, 26.22)

Q47 **Q47** If it's necessary to go to the election commission office to register, how likely are you to go and register – very likely, likely, not very likely, very un likely? (N=2531)

1 Very likely (531, 20.98)
2 Likely (857, 33.86)
3 Somewhat unlikely (277, 10.94)
4 Very unlikely (680, 26.87)
Don't Know (186, 7.35)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q48 **Q48** Please tell me which forms of identification you have. I'll read each one, and just tell me yes if you have it, and no if you don't.

		Respondent Has ID?
a	a. *New* Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) (N=2584)	Y: 1920, 74.30 N: 664, 25.70
b	b. National ID Cards for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) or Pakistan Origin Card (POC) (N=2322)	Y: 56, 2.41 N: 2266, 97.59
c	c. *Old* National Identity Card (NIC) (N=2391)	Y: 1093, 45.71 N: 1298, 54.29
d	d. Birth Certificate (N=2354)	Y: 498, 21.16 N: 1856, 78.84
e		

Q49 **Q49** If you don't have either an *old* NIC or a *new* CNIC, why don't you have either form of identification? _____

(DO NOT READ OUT) (N=678)

1	I don't know how or where to get an ID card 127, 18.73
2	The cost to get an ID card is too high or not worth it 63, 9.29
3	I don't know anything about ID cards 100, 14.75
4	I don't want an ID card 98, 14.45
666	Other: 78, 11.5

Q50 **Q50** Have you heard that the Election Commission of Pakistan has decided to accept the *old* national identity card (NIC) for voter registration and elections? (N=2578)

1 Yes (669, 25.95) 2 No (1758, 68.19)
Don't Know 151, 5.86

SECTION VII: CORRUPTION, ELECTORAL VIOLENCE, AND FRAUD[4]

Q51 **Q51** Compare your expectations for the upcoming elections with other elections. Would you say that compared to earlier elections, there will be more, about the same, or less violence, unrest, and intimidation than in the past? (N=2,546)

More Violence/Unrest	About the same	Less Violence/Unrest	Don't Know
387, 15.2	1017, 39.95	396, 15.55	746, 29.30

[4] Questions about fraud, corruption, and election intimidation/violence adapted in part from the Lokniti Questionnaire Bank (Lokniti Programme for Comparative Democracy. 2005. "Questionnaire Bank." Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi. Available at: http://www.lokniti.org/dataunit.htm).

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q52

a
b
c

Q52 Now I will read out some opinions about how politics sometimes works in Pakistan. I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them – whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

	LEVEL OF AGREEMENT			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. Public services like road repair and water are delivered, improved, or repaired in this area for the purposes of influencing elections. (N=2371, DK 292, 12.32)	169, 7.13	265, 11.18	611, 25.77	1034, 43.61
b. Employment depends on friends and relatives in government. (N=2,367; DK 324, 13.69)	854, 36.08	601, 25.39	345, 14.58	243, 10.27
c. Political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after elections (N=2371, DK 311, 13.12)	1103, 46.52	571, 24.08	200, 8.44	186, 7.84

Q53

a
b
c
d
e
f
g

Q53 I'd like to know how you feel about corruption in the local, provincial, and national governments, as well as NGOs. For each of these, can you tell me whether you think corruption is not at all common, somewhat common, very common but not a major problem, or very common and major problem?

	PERCEIVED LEVEL OF CORRUPTION			
	Not at all common	Somewhat common	Very common, Not Problem	Very, Common, Big Problem
a. National government (N=2362; DK 546, 23.12)	236, 9.99	422, 17.87	234, 9.91	924, 39.12
b. Provincial government (N=2356: DK 552, 23.43)	192, 8.15	433, 18.38	265, 11.25	914, 38.79
c. Local government (N=2352 DK 532, 22.62)	215, 9.14	487, 20.71	273, 11.61	845, 35.93
d. NGOs (N=2275; DK 835, 36.7)	380, 16.7	410, 18.02	184, 8.09	466, 20.48
e. Political parties (N=1859; DK 82, 4.41)	188, 10.11	416, 22.38	258, 13.88	915, 49.22

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q54

Q54 Now I'm going to mention some other things that can happen during elections. For each one, tell me how likely you think each will occur in the next election.

	LIKELIHOOD OF HAPPENING			
	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Somewhat unlikely	Very unlikely
a. Certain candidates prevented from running for office (N=2230; DK 518, 23.23)	373, 16.73	493, 22.11	211, 9.46	635, 28.48
b. Authorities knowing how I voted (N=2207; DK 499, 22.61)	288, 13.05	221, 10.01	165, 7.48	1034, 46.85
c. Names not on the electoral roll at the polling station (N=2208; DK 530, 24.0)	286, 12.95	563, 15.50	278, 12.59	551, 24.95
d. People prevented from registering or voting (N=2207; DK 519, 23.52)	226, 10.24	339, 15.36	266, 12.05	857, 38.83
e. Officials or parties stuffing ballot boxes (N=1756; DK 94, 5.35)	379, 21.58	413, 23.52	224, 12.76	646, 36.79
f. People voting more than once (N=2211; DK 524, 23.7)	438, 19.81	449, 20.31	196, 8.86	604, 27.32
g. Cheating in counting the ballots (N=2203; DK 528, 23.97)	498, 22.61	450, 20.43	200, 9.08	527, 23.92
h. Employers getting employees to vote together as a group (N=2206; DK 529, 23.98)	545, 24.71	377, 17.09	176, 7.98	579, 26.25
i. Landlords getting their tenants to vote together as a group. (N=2190; DK 532, 24.29)	625, 28.54	316, 14.43	145, 6.62	572, 26.12
j. Officials changing the results after the ballots have been counted (N=2201; DK 549, 24.94)	457, 20.76	354, 16.08	198, 9.0	643, 29.21

a
b
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g
h
i
j

Q55

Q55 Based on your experience or what you've heard about past elections in Pakistan, do you think that in the upcoming elections the level of cheating and fraud will be more, about the same, or less than in the past?
(N=2502)

More cheating & fraud	About the same	Less cheating & fraud
502, 20.06	1280, 51.16	443, 17.71
DK 277, 11.07		

Q56

Q56 In your opinion, which is a more serious threat to free and fair elections in Pakistan, election violence/intimidation, election malpractices/fraud, or is the election process generally free and fair?
(N=2176)

1 Violence / intimidation (868; 39.89)

2 Malpractices / fraud (896, 41.18)

3 Process is generally free and fair (412, 18.93)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q57

Q57 During elections, people talk about "rigging". When you hear talk about cheating or rigging in Pakistan, which of the following three statements best describes what happens, or is it something else? (N=2347)

1 Rigging is something controlled by the central government (617, 26.29)

2 The central government works with certain parties and officials to rig results in different places around the country (346, 14.74)

3 Local politicians rig elections to benefit themselves, even if the central government tries to stop it. (722, 30.76)

666 Something else (73, 3.11)

888 Don't Know, Don't Remember (589, 25.10)

Q58 1st 2nd

Q58 In your opinion, which types of people are most likely to be victimized by violence or intimidation in elections in your area, or will no one be victimized? ***(READ OUT)*** (N=2593)

1 Candidates (696, 26.84)
2 Voters (865, 33.36)
3 Female candidate (69, 2.66)
4 Female Voters (136, 5.24)
5 Election workers (69, 2.66)
6 NGO Workers (26, 1.0)
7 Security Officials (16, 0.62)
8 People with low income (182, 7.02)
9 Polling Officials (76, 2.93)
10 Political party supporters (154, 5.94)
11 No one (140, 5.40)
888 Don't know (164, 6.32)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q59

a
b
c
d
e
f
g

Q59 Some people are talking about different ways that the fraud and corruption could be prevented in the election process. I'll list a few of the suggestions we've been hearing and some that have already been implemented. I'd like you to tell me whether each measure would give you much more confidence, somewhat more confidence, have no effect, or give you less confidence in the election process.

	LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE			
	Much more	Somewhat more	No Effect	Less
a. A procedure for ordinary citizens to complain about fraud (N=2363; DK 484, 20.48)	949, 40.16	369, 15.62	332, 14.05	229, 9.69
b. Trained observers from the local area to monitor the whole election process (N=2342, DK 543, 23.19)	801, 34.20	493, 21.05	275, 11.74	230, 9.82
c. A simple procedure to make voter registration easier (N=2344, DK 507, 21.63)	978, 41.72	426, 18.17	251, 10.71	182, 7.76
d. If every voter checked the voters' registration lists to make sure the lists are accurate (N=2332, DK 524, 22.47)	888, 38.08	436, 18.70	262, 11.23	222, 9.52
e. If political parties agreed to a code of conduct and the code was enforced (N=1848, DK 103, 5.57)	763, 41.29	407, 22.02	323, 17.48	252, 13.64
f. If local government was dissolved during the election period (N=2313, DK 577, 24.95)	555, 23.99	321, 13.88	469, 20.28	391, 16.90
g. If election commission officials were better trained (N=2346, DK 534, 22.76)	940, 40.07	419, 17.86	242, 10.32	211, 8.99

SECTION VIII: DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE

Q60

Q60 In your opinion, how much power does the parliament (national and provincial) have in determining the course of political development in Pakistan – a great deal of power, some power, little power, or no power at all?

	Great deal of power	Some power	Little power	No power at all
National Assembly & Senate (N=2477; DK 472, 19.06)	702, 28.34	338, 13.65	365, 14.74	600, 24.22
Provincial Assembly (N=2472; DK 473, 19.13)	498, 20.15	536, 21.68	479, 19.38	486, 19.66

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Q61

a
b
c

Q61 Now I will read out some statements about politics in Pakistan, and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them – whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it.

	LEVEL OF AGREEMENT			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. Pakistan's citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government (N=2427; DK 377, 15.53)	587, 24.19	634, 26.12	446, 18.38	383, 15.78
b. People are free to criticize the government without fear (N=2426; DK 358, 14.76)	498, 20.53	631, 26.01	489, 20.16	450, 18.55
c. People can join any political party or organization they wish (N=2431; DK 357, 14.69)	868, 35.71	736, 30.28	259, 10.65	211, 8.68

Q62 1st 2nd

Q62 People often differ in their views on what factors are essential for democracy. If you have to choose only one thing, what would be the most important, and what would be the second most important? ***(READ OUT)*** (YES=MENTIONED; NO=NOT MENTIONED) (N=2721)

1	Changing governments through elections (737 Yes; 1984 No)	2	Little difference in income between rich and poor (895 Yes, 1826 No)
3	Freedom to criticize government (362 Yes, 2359 No)	4	Absence of any violence (728 Yes, 1993 No)
5	Basic necessities like food & shelter for everyone (972 Yes, 1749 No)	6	No influence of religious ideas or leaders in politics (127 Yes, 2594 No)
666	Other: (34 Yes, 2684 No)	555	No Opinion (108 Yes, 2613 No)
777	Skipped (8 Yes, 2713 No)	999	Refused (30 Yes, 2691 No)

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

SECTION IX: GENDER

Q63

a
b
c
d
e

Q63 Now I would like to know your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. I will read out some statements and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them – whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

	LEVEL OF AGREEMENT			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. Women can run for political office (N=2575; DK 60, 2.33)	1215, 47.18	685, 26.60	263, 10.21	352, 13.67
b. A woman can be president or prime minister of a Muslim country (N=2559, DK 71, 2.77)	999, 39.04	657, 25.67	373, 14.58	459, 17.94
c. Men are more suited for politics than women (N=2568, DK 81, 3.15)	1073, 41.78	723, 28.15	423, 16.47	268, 10.44
d. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (N=2574, DK 56, 2.18)	1519, 59.01	706, 27.43	114, 4.43	179, 6.95
e. Women should dress modestly, but *chador* is not obligatory (N=2478, DK 13, 0.52)	868, 35.03	544, 21.95	527, 21.27	526, 21.23

Thank you so much for your time today. Your answers will help us understanding the mood and feelings about the Pakistani people as we approach the next national election.

INTERVIEW PORTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE ENDS HERE

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INTERVIEWER INFORMATION ON NEXT PAGE

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

SECTION XII: INFORMATION TO BE COMPLETED BY INTERVIEWER

A5 ☐☐

A5 Language in which the interview was conducted

1	Urdu	2	English
3	Punjabi	4	Seraiki
5	Hindko	6	Pushto
7	Sindhi	8	Balochi
666	OTHER:		

A6 ☐☐

A6 Interviewer's mother tongue:

1	Urdu	2	English
3	Punjabi	4	Seraiki
5	Hindko	6	Pushto
7	Sindhi	8	Balochi
666	Other:		

A7 ☐☐

A7 Gender of Interviewer

1 Male 2 Female

A8 ☐☐

A8 Interviewer age in years: _____

A9 ☐☐

A9 Where did you (interviewer) spend most of your childhood?

City _____ Region _____ Country _____

A10 ☐☐

A10 In what type of area did you grow up?

1 Rural 2 Urban

A11 ☐☐

A11 In thinking about your background compared with that of the respondent, would you say that you grew up in a family…

1 About same income bracket 2 Much lower income bracket

3 Much higher income bracket 666 Other: _____

A12 ☐☐

A12 With what religious tradition are you (the interviewer) affiliated most closely?

1	Sunni Islam	2	Shia Islam
3	Christianity	4	Hinduism
666	Other:		

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

A13

A13 Which of the following statements best describes your (interviewer's) relationship with the community in which the respondent lives?

1	I grew up in this community and never left	2	I grew up in this community but have not lived here for many years
3	I have never lived in this community but visit family here frequently	4	I speak the language of this community but am unfamiliar with the people
5	My ancestors are from this area but none of my immediate family lives here	6	I live in a similar area nearby but am unfamiliar with this particular community
7	The respondent and I share family and friends in common	666	OTHER: _____

A14

A14 What is the highest level of education that the interviewer completed?

21	None	26	Matric
22	Madrasa / Religious School	27	F.A/F.Sc
23	Some Primary	28	B.A/BSc
24	Finished Primary School	29	M.A or a professional degree
25	Middle School	30	Doctorate or post-doctorate

A15

A15 Choose the best description of the area in which the **respondent** resides.

1	Rural	2	Suburb
3	Urban single-family home	4	Urban multi-family home
5	Urban housing complex	666	Other: _____

A16

A16 What is the condition of the roads in the area **where respondent lives**?

1	Good	2	Not very good

A17

A17 Were others present during the interview?

1	No	2	Only small children
3	Yes, spouse of respondent	4	Yes, more than one other adult
666	Other (*please describe):*		

A18

A18 What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?

1	None	2	A few
3	Many	4	Most
5	Almost all		

A19

A19 How interested did the respondent seem during the interview?

1	Very interested	2	Somewhat interested
3	Not very interested	4	Hostile

QUESTIONNAIRE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

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