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Diasporas
Critical & Interdisciplinary Perspectives

Edited by

Jane Fernandez

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Diasporas:

Critical and Inter-Disciplinary Perspectives

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The Diversity and Recognition Hub
'Diasporas'

Diasporas:
Critical and Inter-Disciplinary Perspectives

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Introduction

The Conference *Diasporas: Critical Issues* at Mansfield College, Oxford from July 5th -8th 2008 provided a thinking-space for those of us invariably interested in, or who work with, issues and concepts of the diaspora/s. The conference signposted several themes which drew scholars and practitioners from a cross-section of disciplines across the globe. The wide range of topics offered a broad scope for engagement with issues pertaining to what has become one of the most contestable concepts of our times: diaspora/s.

In "The Diasporic Imaginary and the Indian Diaspora", Vijay Mishra defines "Diasporas as people who would want to explore the meaning of the hyphen, but perhaps not press the hyphen too far for fear that this would lead to massive communal schizophrenia"[1]. I want to raise the restrained hyphen here as an entry point into this discussion of diaspora. If the hyphen can be regarded as an "elliptical" sign that waits to be discovered and interpreted, it stands also, in the process of our interpreting, paradoxically empty and full. If its meaning resists definition, it is also a holding place that both marks and suppresses our anxieties, enabling our hesitation and reluctance and even inability to pursue or unpack the largely fluid spheres of engagement/ influence that we are forced to contend with, using Rey Chow's metaphor, as "passengers-in-transit".

More importantly, the hyphen in subverting its own function, i.e. its purpose (supposedly) to bring two polarised identities (debatable of course) into a meaningful whole suggests that splits and fragmentation, breaches in diasporic identities is the character of diaspora. Indeed, Sudesh Mishra reminds us that the hyphen is also a "sign of rupture."[2] Accordingly the qualification regarding the definition of diaspora is not merely a matter of semantics but a motivator/initiator/measure of diaspora.

Several trajectories of the many concepts of diasporas have emerged over the last decade and its impact, its multiple and fractious framings and its attendant issues have come to enable and influence almost every field of study. Perhaps the most significant survey of diaspora criticism to date is Sudesh Mishra's recent work, *Diaspora Criticism* (2006), a work to which I am indebted for this introduction and which is cited in Breda Gray's essay. I wish to employ aspects of Mishra's catalogue of diaspora criticism as a back-drop for this introduction. My positioning Breda Gray's essay at the close of this publication is to return us to the significant patterns in diaspora criticism as well as to highlight the future pathways Gray's essay anticipates. A good place to start would be to keep in mind that the interest in diaspora as a discipline goes back several decades. Mishra cites John Armstrong's (1976) "prototypical description of diaspora as 'any [minority] ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity."[3] He charts how this

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broad generic base for the description of diaspora was broken by the Sheffer
School of the 1980's whose emphasis on "tran-state networks" (rather than
"intra-national or policy-based approach" to the subject of ethnic minorities)
marks a significant "'break' in methodology [with] earlier studies [...]".[4]
While, the emphasis on homeland and hostland relationships underlies
Sheffer's "complex triadic networks", Mishra argues that Sheffer's focus on
" 'trans-state networks' distinguished by complex ethnic ties and solidarities
[..] " is what made diaspora criticism "visible", identifiable as a "new type of
social species", converting into what is now commonly known as "modern
diaspora."[5] The focus on what Mishra calls "territorial binarisms", reliant on
"three apparently stable entities – a homeland, a hostland and an ethnically
unified diaspora" (with varying qualifications) emerge as the focal point of
these early discussions of diasporas. If Sheffer constructs the diaspora in
terms of a "complex triadic relationship between ethnic diasporas, their host
countries and homelands", he configures these networks as essentially
"conflictual or cooperative" measured against "the capability of diasporas to
mobilise in order to promote or defend their interests or the interests of their
homelands within their host countries [...]."[6]This early criticism has provided
a basis for the continuing and vigorous critique of diaspora since. Whatever
its limitations, we cannot deny how central it has been in providing us with a
typology and a specific language for appraising, critiquing and qualifying this
"social phenomenon."[7]

      William Safran's role as a significant player in extending the
diaspora debates is well noted in diaspora studies. Critiquing the Sheffer
school, Safran attempts to tighten the early definitions of diaspora which he
regarded as "too flexible", as "lack[ing] specificity and [thus] open to
metaphoric substitution."[8] Safran's six-fold taxonomy has been cited and
worked over by scholars over the last decade or so. For Safran, the "concept
of diaspora [should be] applied to expatriate minority communities". While
the elements of dispersal, centre-periphery which underlie Safran's
definition, reconceptualise the old "territorial binarisms." Safran's significant
qualifications streamline the field to endorse diaspora largely as relational
and measuring affective ties to the homeland. In a more recent work, Safran
affirms that the Jewish diaspora

> continues to be used as a prototype because it combines
> such features as ethnicity, religion, minority status, a
> consciousness of peoplehood, a long history of migration,
> expulsion, adaptation to a variety of hostlands whose
> welcome was conditional and unreliable, and a continuing
> orientation to a homeland and to a narrative and
> ethnosymbols related to it[9].

Safran's definition assumes a significant characteristic of diaspora as the minority community's "partly-alienated" attitudes to the host-country against the back-drop of their enduring loyalties both materially and emotionally to the "ancestral homeland". Accordingly, Safran's definition identifies diaspora through the diasporic community's engagement "vicariously, to the homeland in one way or another."[10]

Safran's focus on the "diasporic entities" extricates diaspora from other "social formations" as well as marks the shift away from the managing role of the homelands to the diaspora [diasporic entities] itself. This shift "encourages the ascription of the diaspora [as] a self-nominating agency" or as endowed with a "collective will-to-self definition."[11] Mishra points out that "if the category of diaspora is internal to the consciousness of dispersed minorities [...], then it is possible to give short shrift to a whole host of extra-subjective factors, both 'here'(hostland) and 'there'(homeland)". The problem as Mishra cites is that "diasporic consciousness" emerges as "the active component framed between two relatively passive territories."[12] Further, if Safran's taxonomy tightens earlier definitions of diaspora, it falls into a new trap, that of excluding groups that lie outside of its taxonomy. Diaspora then is measured against a "conformist/non-conformist" paradigm, creating illusions of authenticity and enabling a hierarchical structure of the diaspora flouting idealist notions of the classical or ideal diaspora, in this case, based on Safran's view of the traditional Jewish model.[13]

Robin Cohen(1997), influenced by scholars such as Hall and Gilroy, shifts away from "the macro(homeland/nation-state) to the micro-local" overturns earlier attempts to "institute a discrete homeland-hostland dichotomy" and argues against Safran's "ideal" diaspora, citing the fact that the "Jewish case offers several, sometimes contradictory, forms of dispersion."[14] Mishra asserts that Cohen's own classificatory ideal, one based on "a quintet of ethnically neutral categories: victim, labour, trade, imperial and cultural" merely replace Safran's ideal. Of particular note, is Mishra's point that up to this point, the definition of diaspora has been represented as "class-neutral, gender-neutral and generational-neutral ethnic blocs that uncritically project home and host countries as homogeneous territorial entities."[15]

The next phase of diaspora criticism moves more dramatically away from the territorial binaries, collapsing "homeland-hostland dichotomies" and in the process cautions against any "homogenising tendencies" and seeks to privilege subjective, "provisional" and discursive formations[16]. This phase is one which is distinctive by its contemporary and late-modern and postmodern theorizations. The Conference *Diasporas: Critical Issues* was profiled within this paradigm. The themes of the Conference and the Call for Papers clearly outlined both the anxieties of diasporas as well as the marked gaps and shifts that could be anticipated within this seemingly complex and contentious

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project. Besides the formal presentations, the value of the dialogue and discussions that emanated as a result of the presentations was both illuminating and provocative. Almost all essays presented at the Conference expressed a wary concern for the limitations of the term diaspora and cautioned against homogenizing tendencies. Engagement with phrases like *old diaspora, new diaspora, historical diaspora, classical, transnational, transcultural, economic diaspora* were hailed as moderately efficient but limiting markers for the permutations of the many diasporas in current critical discourse and practice. Further, several presentations acknowledge directly or indirectly, or as a sub-text, the difficulties of locking the diaspora into any one part of speech which in turn reinforces the fluid notions and multiple functions of the term diaspora.

These attempts seem to articulate the rhizomic nature of diaspora. The diaspora is embedded in, as well as, generates into/through several intersecting roots. Accordingly, the interplay of concepts of diaspora with concepts of home and its critical use make up the bulk of the first two chapters of this publication. The concerns of critics regarding the interchangeability of the term "diaspora" in its functions: suggesting sometimes a process, a condition, a state, a space, a concept, an effect, a model, the interplay of dramatic and economic modes, informed many of the formal and informal discussions at the conference. These concerns highlight the real and imaginary impulses and motivations of the diaspora/s. The many references in this conference to players, performance, playing, acting, actors suggest that the diaspora functions among other things as theatre, both in its enabling performance and witnessing capacities as well as in its imaginative fabric and imaginary positioning; revealing the action and occluding the actor/acting at the same time. The implications of diaspora as a mega-drama of human mobility, whose visual/literary/theatrical capacity has implications for both artists/players and 'spectators' suggests that extending the scope for the aesthetic engagement with this field can provide much critical as well as cathartic value for this field.

Braziel and Mannur point out that the term "diaspora" "has been critiqued as being theoretically celebrated, while methodologically indistinct and ahistorical."[17] It is hoped that this volume of conference proceedings address and moderate this criticism. I have attempted to provide a reader that brings together the conference proceedings through a framework based on Derek Walcott's idea of bricolage, offering the essays here as fragments whose interplay of meanings and value will develop and change as the fragments are shifted. Indeed, Sudesh Mishra suggests that "the new sociology of diaspora will have to focus on [...] bricolage."[18] The variety of ideas in this book rest often independent of each other and yet offer subtle, if somewhat restrained associations of inter-relationships. This book is an attempt to organise the multifarious viewpoints that energized the debates

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that ranged during the Conference in a framework that may make some of the issues of the diaspora, as presented here, more easily accessible and readable. The logic of the networking of ideas here are based around the key element of the conference which was to raise critical issues with regard to the diaspora as a talking points to stimulate research as well as establish the gaps and investigate the nexus necessary between theory and practice.

It would be helpful to bear in mind that the catalogue of essays here reflects the inter-disciplinary focus of the conference. Accordingly, the specimens, ideas, theories, methodology, symbols, abstractions and language registers, to name a few characteristics, are unique to specific discipline. In terms of a dialogue with diaspora-related critical issues, the range of essays here reflects a coherent if somewhat restrained unity. I have sought to appropriate the title of the Conference to mark this publication of its proceedings so as to preserve the rationale which informed the scholarship of the Conference. A quick summary of these critical issues which emerge from the collation of essays in this volume would include the following: a) definitions of the diaspora b) the myths, politics, initiatives, collaboration, ruptures and disjunctures of homeland and hostland formations c) the reconfigurations of temporal space, national/transnational identity and citizenship and the responsibilities of governments and agencies towards displaced minorities: in particular, the role of and responsibilities to economic refugees d) the aesthetic treatment of diaspora, rewriting configurations of space and home, narrativizing diaspora, witnessing role and agency issues, eliciting and critiquing the "gaze" of the exile/migrant/diasporic/refugee/.

The section breaks in this book are marked by three divisions**. Section I:** *Diaspora/***Diaspora/Diasporas**, deals with the fluidity, the extensions and reconfigurations of the term diaspora. **Section II: Home and Heimat** deals with the limitations and conceptualizations of home. **Section III**: **Diaspora - Performances and the Imaginary** deals with the imagined worlds through which issues of the diaspora are transacted in a global context. Each of the sections is by no means conclusive. Rather the sections are meant as rhizomic frames interfacing both ways and anticipating further dialogue in multiple directions and across intersecting boundaries.

Section I: *Diaspora/*Diaspora/Diasporas

Section I attempts to frame the diaspora by unframing it. By this I mean that the diaspora can only be managed meaningfully if we understand that it is in itself an open-source and that any attempt to limit its scope or its definition transgresses the boundaries of both its conceptual and epistemological framing. Diaspora is derived from the idea of a scattering of seeds. As such the concept must be allowed to take root, transplant, cross-fertilize, rather than fossilize. The essays in this section raise the issue of the

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difficulties of treating the diaspora as a bonded term, its limitations conceptually and its necessary open-endedness. The aim of this section is to open up and leave open the scope for enquiry into the definitions of diasporas.

My preceding argument anticipates the rationale for this section in dealing with the limitations of the term. Should the diaspora return to the old frames of identity-formations, creating ghettos of the homeland in host countries, preserving romantic illusions of home and myths of return? How can the diaspora authenticate fluid notions of identity and multiple framings of the self/nation which it represents? This section problematizes neat categorizations of identity as well as de-sacralizes notions of the homeland as static or bounded. The veneration of the homeland as a sacred space is an aspect of the imaginary we carry and sustain within the diaspora. But the danger lies in our losing ourselves in our own myths and making a monument of the "ruins of [our] history". If it is necessary for us to associate with memories of our past and our histories, it is equally important to recognize that the ability/freedom to disconnect with our visages of homeland, especially in the light of the traumatic histories of some of the diasporas, is significant and necessary for a moving on to engage and establish a new sense of place and home. It is not my intention to suggest that we should not look back to recognize the historical contexts and formations of our past but rather that we can associate with the past without necessarily connecting to it. Connection implies a degree of fixated attachment which runs the risk of what Vijay Mishra calls "reactionary thinking", "fascist rememorations" and "ethnic absolutism."[19]

Further, this section meets the call for scholars to locate diaspora studies within specific historical contexts, to make it methodologically critical and relevant. The several essays in this Section qualify definitions of the diaspora through the study of diasporas from different "points of departure", namely the USSR and China. The essays presented demonstrated the specificities of diasporas and the ethno-national/ transnational particularities/ imaginaries of communities defined through their interactions and performances.

The several essays focusing on the Russian diaspora mark the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and register the unique characteristics and disjunctures of the Russian diaspora. Ferrando, Byford and Davenel trace how this epic event marks Russia's entry into the politics and anxieties of identity formations. Ferrando cites the case of Central Asia where the mere shifting of "borders across settlements" left "five million indigenous people [...] on the wrong side of the border". Given the range of minority groups within this diaspora alone, Ferrando cautions against defining the diaspora through "archetypal traits" but rather calls for a focus on the "diasporic relationship" of the stakeholders. Of special note is

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Ferrando's distinction between "several levels of 'diasporization' from mere diaspora rhetoric to pan-ethnic gatherings, bilateral agreements and eventually overt repatriation policies."

Similarly, Byford cites how the "expansion of the Russian speaking post-Soviet diaspora across the Western world" has changed the character of several European nations. Indeed, what constitutes "Russianness"? Byford argues that to different degrees, 'Russianness" can be applied to both those whose mother tongue is Russian and to those somehow involved in the administrative and business affairs of the former empire, although he warns that the "Russian language" should never be regarded as "a marker of the cultural unity of the 'diaspora'. A case in point is Wickstrom's discussion of the Russendisko, "one of the most visible and audible events run by Post-Soviet migrants in Germany". Wickstrom employs the Russendisko to "critique the homogenization" of Russians living in Germany. He argues that the "ethnic categories" such as "ethnic German and Jewish" are imaginaries imposed by the host country, "linked to" the political stakes of different institutions, but "void of meaning in the Soviet Union". Wickstrom proposes that the emphasis on "target groups" as either "Russian-speaking" or "non-Russian speaking" might ease some of these concerns.

Expanding further on the limitations of the term, Yves-Marie Davenel argues that the term "diaspora" fails as a critique of a migratory phenomenon as unique as that of the USSR. Citing Nurbulat Masanov, Davenel argues that Kazakhstan is a case in point, which fails to meet scientific definitions of the diaspora and indeed that "no one of the hundred national minorities of the country can be called a diaspora". Davenel argues that the definition of diaspora applied to a community like the Tatars of Kazakhstan is mere political economy. The "political stakes" then define and determine the "mobilization of the term" and its use and non-use, becomes a tool managed by a series of different players at a given time, in a given context. Accordingly, Byford calls for the definition of diaspora to be expanded to incorporate "networks of exchange, performances of community, and discourses of identity". More importantly, diaspora must be studied as "an effect of (inter)actions and as a tool of (political, economic and cultural) mobilisation. Of significance is Byford's observation that the value of the diaspora as a "site of cultural exchange" must qualify if/how "this interaction" strengthens "essentialising and romanticing" both homeland and hostlands.

Gabriele Tomei's qualification of transnational diaspora is significant here in his critiques of conservative methods of measuring transnational communities. Tomei argues that such measures "underestimate the more expressive, daily and informal side of the equation" and calls for particular attention to, besides "social capital", the "co-development orientation" of a community, that is "the way in which migrants act in the

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present on the basis of the future engagement for developing the community of origin."

Whereas the Russian diaspora was the result of a dramatic political upheaval which marked the collapse of the USSR, the same cannot be said of China, though both nations, together with India, emerge as gigantic points of departure for the diaspora. Whereas conflict and exile, as deep traumatic fissures, mark the former, the latter is characterized by elements of voluntariness and "alienation". Jia Gao determines that the character of the Chinese diaspora falls outside the traditional model of diaspora because it does not arise out of a historical narrative of violent expulsion or dispersion. Gao argues that "Chinese diasporas cannot be considered to be unified" and that it would be more accurate to regard Chinese diasporas as a "series of physical and geographical diasporas". Gao proposes that, in the context of the Chinese diaspora, where force is not a mover in the diaspora stakes, and where "push-pull" factors are irrelevant, that "alienation" from the homeland should "replace the element of force" in the constitution of diaspora. Further, that the term "alienation" given its broad connotations and use in several currencies needs to be qualified specifically in relation to the diaspora. If the Chinese diaspora evolved over a significant length of time and in varying degrees in response to economic pressures, voluntary migration and the "demand for labour and capital by transnational capitalism", Elaine Tay argues that the Chinese diaspora "can be said to illustrate the reconceptualisation of diaspora described by Tölölyan who argues that 'A diaspora is never merely an accident of birth [but] defined by 'being' and 'doing."

The several essays in this section contest customary notions of belonging, moving away from ethnic and national registers, and in the case of Young Ju Rhee's study of the Old and New Huaqiao Residents in South Korea challenging the "conception of citizenship" as merely "a relation between the individual and the state". The practice of a "neo-liberal view of citizenship" is evident in "the strategies and effects of professionals seeking to both circumvent and benefit from nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work and family relocation." Emerging concepts of "flexible citizenship" and "maximal rights-based residents" is changing the debates on citizenship issues. All these essays call for a re-evaluation of restrictive labels and identifications of belonging and value "multiple belongings" and "ethnically inclusive" models.

Kim Sullivan argues that all the attempts to qualify the definitions of diaspora against its classical framing and more recently in its "more neutral understanding of the word 'diaspora' fails to ask what place the diaspora holds for 'self-identifying diasporic descendants'. Sullivan uses the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne as a case in point which test the limits of the definition of diaspora in the context of "surrogate" homelands. This test-

case measures the disjuncture between "remembered" and "imagined" homelands. Arguing that the Caledonian Society "has survived intact" in Australia despite the fact that its homeland roots with Britain and Scotland are for many merely superficial, Sullivan asks if "a self-driven, and emotionally-derived claim to diasporic identity, however sincere, [is] sufficient to warrant the inclusion of the descendant within the definitional parameters of the term 'diaspora'". That is a question that anticipates future pathways for diaspora studies.

Finally, Marco Cuevas-Hewitt's essay absorbs several elements of the issues raised in the foregoing essays as well as anticipates the harrowing attempts to define "home" against the realities of transnationalism. Cuevas-Hewitt's focus on transnational social movements demonstrate the modes and role of "political activism" in reconfiguring notions of identity in response to the ideological shift from modernity to postmodernity. Citing Rocamora, Cuevas-Hewitt argues that conceptions of culture have broken the territorial and nationalistic moulds that contained them and that today the character of Filipino identity is defined extra-territorially. Cuevas-Hewitt's definition of diaspora as "a network, composed of innumerable singularities" provides a broad template for the diaspora which enables and envisions new forms of belonging which converts "outside" into "inside" so that under the umbrella of a "diasporic cosmopolitanism" multiple belongings, diasporic subjectivity and even exile may be valued.

Section II: Home and Heimat

Section II entitled Home and Heimat links the framework of the previous chapter in defining diaspora to its ancillary search for what constitutes "home". "Roots and Routes" have become conventional and archetypal pathways for the framing of home and identities in the diaspora. While the idea of home is never neat if we measured it against the history of colonization and dispossession, its resonance against the back-drop of the diaspora is complicated further by the multiple strata's of displacement and conceptualizations of home that have emerged over recent decades. Issues of race and identity complicate further the trajectories of positioning home to extricate it from mere spatial configurations. If the question of diaspora is contentious, the question of what is home has been equally slippery and paradoxical. The range of responses to the question of 'home' has left all and sundry homeless! Accordingly "homelessness" has become the somewhat celebrated space of the diaspora!

In the Beckettian sense, the diaspora embodies a continuing deferral of home. In the Girardian sense, the triadic home-host-diaspora configuration leaves us in a perpetual quandary in a triangulated play of desire that seeks not resolution but irresolution. Home, then is never enough as we measure it against the plenitude we project on the unpossessable Other! This is a danger

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that we court within our contestations and configurations of home in the diaspora. And one route we have embraced to avoid such a pitfall has been the rhizomic nature of diaspora.

Arising out of the structure of the rhizome are relevant questions about fluid identities and cultural interfacing. Simply put, we could ask, why should we not evolve through the diaspora into more fluid and integrative communities that embrace difference and disjunctures. The conundrum of host-country is its framed ascription within the semantics of hospitality. Its role, supposedly, is unrelentingly pseudo-parental! My question is, how long should we speak of the "host-country" as "host"? Are diasporas always condemned to be guests in the homes they are transplanted within? Is it possible to be at home and homeless, to be at home in multiple contexts, to think of home globally rather than locally, to choose home rather than locate home! Indeed, why should not the host-country become home.

I have chosen for this section the title "*Heimat*" inspired by Alexandra Ludewig's essay "Home Meets Heimat". Ludewig argues that whereas the German word "heimat' is often used synonymously with "home"' its use has been tentative and apologetic "outside the German speaking community, owing to its specific cultural baggage". Ludewig argues that given among other things the politicising of home and reconfigurations of diaspora, "home has experienced a semantic shift, which aligns it more closely with *heimat*, a term imbued with the ambivalence of home and homeland intertwined."[20] Given the shift in current scholarship with regard concepts of "home", from "idyllic sphere of belonging " to "attachment to that of a threatened space", the "geographical understanding of home is increasingly taking second place to an emotional imaginary [...]."[21]. My purpose in introducing this chapter under such a heading is to reinforce this concept of home not just as an imagined and mythical space of belonging but also as a relationship with a "threatened space".

Citing the film *Casablanc*a, Vijay Mishra argues that "hidden from the film's diegesis, is that diasporas have a progressivist as well as a reactionary streak in them. Both forms of this "streak" centre on the idea of one's "homeland" as very real spaces from which alone a certain level of redemption is possible".

For Vijay Mishra, the articulation of diaspora involves the surplus value that is attached to the homeland: "Homeland is the *desh* (in Hindi) against which all the other lands are foreign or *videsh"*.

> When not presented in this "real" sense, homeland exists as
> an absence that acquires surplus meaning by the fact of
> diaspora so that Sikhs in Vancouver and Sri Lankan Tamils
> in Toronto clamour for a homeland (Khalistan, Tamil
> Eelam) or, in some quarters, Muslims seek a pan-Islamic

utopia in the European heartland."[22]This constitution of the "desh" carries also hidden sub-texts which fall into the gaps of the hyphenated identities and of the resistance to "videsh" and the so-called foreign worlds.

One of these sub-texts in the Indian contexts involves the fear of pollution, characterized through traditional notions of caste. Identity formations within the diaspora have to contend then not only with the romantic notions of a homeland whose value is exaggerated by its loss or absence but also carry, manage, translate, circumvent or convert the "social baggage" of the homeland. Related to caste are other fears of contamination, characterized through religious prejudices and taboos against migration. Both Shyam and Zahoor raise the point about the cultural taboos, of crossing the Kala Pani (black water/sea) in the case of India and confronting "muhajir" (migration) issues in the case of Muslims in Pakistan. Both essays demonstrate how the imaginaries of the homeland cut across the diaspora. Shyam's essay deals with the mobility of ideas of caste from India to the West Indies, their subversion and reconstitution and measures the difference between the more dynamic changes in India and the less conservative changes in the West Indies in the light of "post-Independent India" which has seen "lower castes [...] [emerge] as important actors in Indian electoral politics". Shyam questions the extent to which the homeland can enable a "flow on" of this positive shift to the West Indies.

A point of interest that extends from Zahoor's essay involves the question of where the diaspora starts and the homeland stops in the case of Pakistan-Indian relations. To what extent is Partition still an artificial line to people on both sides of the divide? What pockets of resistance continue to baulk at the legacies of Partition and the semantics of diaspora in relation to a homeland that constitutes also a diaspora? If psychologically, for some, the division is artificial, it makes obsolete any attempt to assert a hierarchical relationship between India/Pakistan or homeland/homeland-diaspora. This is further complicated in the case of Pakistan with the "imaginary divide" of Partition which rather than resolve, complicates our definitions of the diaspora, which in this case for some, is diaspora-homeland. Further the deep and unresolved trauma of dispossession in the Indian context is registered through the imaginaries of "pure" cultures which some communities seek to maintain through ostracism. A case in point is the example of Punjab. Zahoor argues that the semantics of diaspora has become a template for exclusion and division in Punjab where inter-marriages are frowned upon not on the traditional basis of religion and ethnicity but on the identification with *muhajir* or migration. The fear of migratory in-flows into the community suggests that the politics of *muhajir* conceal deep-seated rivalries locking with fantasies that must be named.

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Against this background, Theodore Wright's essay provides some useful discriminators. Wright's essay fills a noticeable gap in diaspora studies in the neglect of the nature and impact of diasporas "whose emigrations have been reversed by return to its claimed homeland." Wright cites, as examples, the case of Zionist Jews to Palestine since 1882 and the more recent *Muhajirin* to Pakistan. Whereas scholars have generally regarded the "return" of diaspora as a myth, since return has been generally regarded as symbolic (i.e. if measured through remittances and nostalgia), Wright examines, through a comparison of Zionist Jews and Indian Muslims, the role of religious factors determining the push-pull motivated return of these groups to their homelands.

Picking up on Wright's theme of the "return", I wish to note at this juncture Wesam Al-Assadi critique of the recent shift in the literature of the Palestinian Diaspora, namely the significance of Palestinian-American Anglophone literature and its themes of "identity and return". Of particular value is Al-Assadi's critique of "return". Citing Lisa Majaj who argues that return "is not simply going back; it is also to go forward; to create a new future from the fragments of a reclaimed past" Al-Assadi explores the work of several writers, notably, Said's *Out of Place* which endorses the notion of identity as a "cluster of flowing currents"; "requir[ing] no reconciling and no harmonizing. They are [...] out of place, but [...] always in motion." Al-Assadi explores how the "unrealized" nation-state of Palestine acts as a "cipher" and how through this "imaginary" ideal, concepts of identity are negotiated. Al-Assadi concludes that through the diaspora, Palestine is "in constant transit".

Accordingly, these examples invite us to consider some of the ways in which the splitting of home is negotiated and transcribed. The scope for psychoanalytical readings of home and diaspora would serve well in this instance especially in the light of Kleinan understandings of "phantasy" as opposed to fantasy. Given that "mothers play a central role to symbolic formation," we could well ask, what implications this has on "(o)ur attachment to the nation" or homeland. "For if the mother produces and characterizes the nation, then all that is embodied in her phantasmatic role must also belong to the nation."[23]

Home then is the interfacing of historical and mental spaces with our emotional and psychological needs and fantasies as well as phantasies in the Kleinan sense. In this regard, home is the desire to retrieve sacralised space and underlying this is the fear of polluted and contaminated spaces. It is this tension between the desire for "sacred" space and the fear of pollution and contamination that home is negotiated within and through the diaspora. Another element of this is recent interest in studies of race and ethnicity. John Solomos writes:

From a historical perspective it is clear that part of the power of racism lies in the way in which racist ideologies operate by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries between racially constituted, or racialized categories. [...] A principal means of accomplishing this is to perceive the self as carried in the genes rather than as transmitted via culture, as distilled through what appears to us most 'natural' and immediate: the body. Corporeal properties, and most fetishistically, skin colour, thus come to furnish an 'epidermal schema' not only for anchoring difference but for distinguishing the pure from the impure, the included from the excluded. [...] Racial and ethnic groups, like nations, are imagined communities.[24]

It is against this notion of nations as "imagined communities" that I present Urusula Troche's essay which calls for a renewed European-African dialogue. This essay is a response to recent scholarship which calls for a critique of concepts of race and identity as "intrinsically political resources". I cite Troche's essay, with an eye to David Carter's assertion that "[p]erceptions of land and nature" are never innocent. They "depend upon deeply encoded but historically variable cultural frameworks. We do not simply 'see' what is before us. Our seeing depends upon processes of organising, selecting, focusing and interpreting the physical forms we perceive. In this sense, we 'create' the landscape we observe, through the frameworks and concepts of our culture."[25] The anxieties of dominant groups are drawn largely from notions of "fixed" and "static" notions of being. Underlying these notions of identity is the Eurocentric fear of contamination by black or non-European, or indigenous, and the resistance to migrant and refugee spills into a nation's space.

A classic example of this is Australia's "White Australia Policy". As Warwick Anderson argues, "the white Australia policy, a tenet upon which the nation was founded" was driven in part by medical scientists in Townsville who conducted research to prove that "white Australia" "would not only prove feasible in the northern tropics, but was in fact a medical necessity, especially in the tropics."[26] Out of this emerged conceptions of "whiteness" cultivated through the politics of science. Anderson argues that "[u]ntil the 1880s, [...],being British implied a lineage, after that, whiteness became a type, mobile and standardised;".

[l]ater still, in the 1930s, whiteness dissolved into variations across a population. Whiteness might suggest a typical bodily constitution or temperament; a cultural legacy and thought style; a virility or femininity; a head

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circumference and brain capacity; a predisposition or
resistance to certain diseases; a blood group; a lamentable
inability to sweat off tropical moisture – and so on. [...]
Whiteness was merely a signpost pointing to a true racial
type, the essence of whiteness, which continued to resists
efforts to decipher it.[27]

The "writing over" of nations then involved a "white-washing" of a
nation to produce and normalize an "assemblage of whiteness", to make it
appear so "commonplace" and logical. Given that this "repertoire has become
so commonplace," Anderson argues "that we may fail to recognize the work
it took to put it together, to make it look normal."[28] Of particular interest to
positioning Troche's essay is Anderson's question: "What would it take to
repopulate [a nation's] history with specifically white bodies, to make them
visible again and ultimately to make them as strange as any other body?"[29]
Troche's discussion of the African diaspora in the context of the United
Kingdom is a response to such a query! For Troche, diaspora is "a revolution
developing from the earlier theorization 'matrix' of race, gender and class"
which "made possible a broader view of the world". Troche argues that
"blackness is in practice positioned outside the nation while whiteness is
characteristically placed within the womb of the nation". Whiteness then
becomes a self-sufficient sign, a determinant of all values collapsed into a
silent sign of adequacy, plenitude and normalcy, "irrespective of the [white
person's] origins". It says all that a nation needs to know about itself from
"inside". As Hall asserts, "[w]here Africa was the case of the unspoken,
Europe was a case of that which is endlessly speaking – and endlessly
speaking us."[30] On the contrary, "black" is the sign of rupture, of
delinquency, the aborted child of the nations of Europe, in this case, the
United Kingdom. In this sense, black people born in UK must necessarily be
outsiders while white immigrants must unquestionably be insiders.

It is in this context that Troche argues that assumptions about
diasporas are based on skin colour: on an "epidermal schema". Black people
are regarded as belonging to the African diaspora irrespective of where they
are born while white immigrants are never assumed to be "foreigners" except
as and when they choose to state otherwise. Further Troche argues that given
that "America is the country of the 'first-nation peoples'", all Americans
excepting the native Americans should be regarded as belonging to the
diaspora on the basis applied to Africans who were forcibly brought to
America. Troche's argument here can be applied to several other nations,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, to name a few where the entire
collective of these nations, except for the indigenous people, belong to a
diaspora. Troche conceptualises a "three-fold scheme for the African
diaspora" in Britain. Of these, the controversial idea she introduces stems

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from the "Out of Africa" theory by which Troche argues that "every continent outside of Africa is an 'African diaspora'" and by that logic, "Europe" she argues "is a child of Africa". On this basis, Troche appeals for a renewed African-European dialogue.

To what extent are homelands merely symbolic? This question is raised and treated through the case of the Armenian diaspora, a case argued by Evgenia Gulyaeva. Gulyaeva argues that given that the Armenian diaspora is made up of western Armenians for whom "eastern Armenia was never home", Armenia as it stands, is a "symbolic rather than real homeland". Gulyaeva investigates why "stereotypes" of the "western Armenian diaspora" persist in the Republic of Armenia, which maintains that the "cuisine" of the diaspora has "preserved its culinary [old-pan-Armenian]" traditions "better than the eastern Armenian diaspora" and the Armenian homeland. A significant point that can be drawn out of this discussion is how food plays an import role as a product of cultural exchange "between previously divided groups" as well as how the homeland is inscribed and transcribed through the domestic sphere.

I have placed Naki Osutei's essay at the end of this section as its "open source" model resolves many of the concerns raised in this section and showcases Canada as a model for the diaspora. Osutei argues that the obvious benefits of enabling the "open source" of cultural symbols qualified against the real and imaginary fears of the communities that share/receive the cultural symbols, in this case, the red, gold, and green bindi, can be harnessed through "trading essential renderings of culture," embracing a more enlightened understanding of cultural ownership and abandoning "quests for authenticity." Osutei cites Bhabha in concluding that the "preservation of [our] histories should not be confused with the preservation of culture. The Canadian "open source" model could well be a positive template for other nations.

Section III: Diaspora: Performances and the Imaginary

One of the difficulties of putting together these conference proceedings was the diverse range and scope provided in the essays delivered. It reflected the complexity of the diaspora as a phenomena that has to contend with plural and multiple positioning, institutions, capital movement, migratory flows, language currencies and transnational pressures. The current shift in diaspora studies has been to move "beyond theorizing how diaspora identities are constructed and consolidated" to "how [...] these diasporic identities" are practiced, lived and experienced."[31] Accordingly, the collection of essays in this section helps us focus on the modes of agency and strategic performance/s of the diaspora.

Indeed, against Marxist theories and more recently, Appadurai's "theory of disjuncture", no cultural product/strategy exists in isolation from

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economics and politics. However, Mishra argues that Appaduria's chaotic
and random disjunctures are not to be confused with the "classical Marxist
notion of the internal contradictions sustaining capitalist relations [...]."[32]
Appadurai favours what Mishra describes as "a form of extreme
discontinuity" through which he "imagines a system of contingent global
flows, or loops, where none of the segments link up except along random,
eccentric and lateral pathways" in the "way of the rhizome as imagined by
Deleuze and Guattari."[33] While acknowledging the value of Apapdurai's
engagement with "socio-economic aspects of globalisation", Mishra argues
that "the issue of effectivity and determination" central to Appadurai's thesis,
"is much more complex and clandestine than suggested by Appadurai."[34]

        I am aware that in profiling the essays in this section against
Appadurai's imaginaries, that I am using his theory rather mechanically and
superficially, if not selectively. But my purpose is to highlight the key idea
emerging from this theory and that is the way in which the imagination is a
real player in global politics. It is with this qualification that I employ
Appadurai's "-scape" register "to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of [the]
landscapes" of the imagined worlds that Appadurai cites. Extending Benedict
Anderson's notion of "imagined communities," Arjun Appadurai's argues
that five significant "landscapes" : ethnoscape, technoscape, financescapes,
mediascapes and ideoscapes, are building blocks of the imagined worlds, (the
multiple worlds which are constituted by the historically situated
imaginations of persons and groups around the globe which interface,
intersect "contest and sometimes even subvert the imagined worlds of the
official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them."[35] In
this regard, Appadurai speaks of that "something critical and new in global
processes", the something that cannot be ignored, the way in which "the
imagination" must be regarded as "a social practice". For Appadurai, this is
neither "no longer mere fantasy" nor "simple escape" nor "elite pastime, nor
"mere contemplations" but rather how the imagination "has become an
organized field of social practices." Appadurai argues that the imagination
has indeed become "a form of work" and "a form of negotiation between
sites of agency ("individuals") and globally defined fields of possibility."[36]
Appadurai's estimation of the imagination and its reconfiguration as a key
player in the politics of the diaspora is relevant to our purpose.

        In profiling the final chapter in this collection in the light of what
Appadurai calls the "work" of the imagination, it will be useful to keep in
mind that the "disjunctures between economy, culture and politics" are as
real as they are inestimable. If the imagination is a "key component of the
new global order" it follows that this component must be extricated as a
subject qualifying and acting upon diasporic formations and transactions.
Whatever the limitations of Appadurai's theory, we cannot ignore the several
"disjunctures" between economy, culture and politics."[37] It is the practice and

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"work" of these imaginaries aligned with and against these disjunctures that this final collection of essays anticipates further and ongoing dialogue

It is in the context of Appadurai's ethnoscapes, i.e. "landscapes of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live [...] and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree" that I wish to reflect on Julie Fletcher's essay[38]. Fletcher's essay demonstrates how the politics in Tibet is impacted by players outside of Tibet, and more significantly by those who are not necessarily Tibetan either. The far-reaching influence of the "testimonial practices" and their interfacing with other "landscapes" such as finance and media has the potential to determine quite randomly the "embedded politics of the homeland". Through the creative engagement of "border-crossing witnesses", the Tibetan diasporas "complement and counterpart [...] the 'embodied politics' occurring within Tibet"; and shift through a series of roles/strategies, which in turn creates the imagined world through which homeland and hostland politics and ideologies of exile are negotiated. If the particular appeal of this diaspora is its collaborative practices of encountering and engaging "others" through the "culture of telling" towards its cause, a significant consideration emerging from this discussion could also involve how the "culture of telling" extends the context and implications of the imagined world.

Avila and Medina's focus on the role that Unions can play in meeting the moral and economic challenges "posed by forced economic emigration" emphasize the particularities and needs of this economically-driven/generated diaspora. Indeed, this paper is significant for its sympathetic engagement with the issue of economic refugees and its investment in justice and human rights issues. Given that by 2050, Avila and Medina estimate that thirty percent of the total Mexican population of 130 million (i.e. 39 million) Mexicans or their direct descendants will reside in the US, their concerns have both urgent and significant implications. By evoking Appadurai's imaginary worlds, at this juncture, we could reflect on the question of the imaginaries that are constructed in the process of this "shift[ing] of international capital" as well as the disjunctures that emerge even as "nation-states shift their policies on refugee populations."[39]

Further, the interfacing of ideoscapes, involving in this instance, the imaginative landscapes of the Unions and that of the ethnoscapes represented by the shifting needs and fears of the refugees, clearly complicate the process, strategies and resolutions sought. Of interest also to the debate about immigration and citizenship is Orsolya Reich's discussion of Global Luck Egalitarianism, while acknowledging that immigration acts as a means "corrective measures for global misallocation" of resources calls for a moderation of open-border policies" so that the aims of Global Luck Egalitarianism are not subverted by its practice.

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My purpose in including Yasmin Fulder-Heyd's study of Jewish women living in the UK in this section is to invite further reflection on how gender anxieties and homeland trauma deepen further the disjuncture between the cultural, economic and political spheres. Fulder-Heyd's study is significant in exploring the role of alienation, fear, "shame and guilt" as factors that drive attachments to the homeland as well as complicate responses to the host country. Fulder-Heyd concludes that Israeli immigrant women live "in a constant state of temporariness and transition". Again, in the light of the role of the imagination, we could well consider how this "temporariness" reflects also how the motivations shift and will shift within a range of temporary states and accordingly change imaginaries to create different imagined worlds.

Byford and Schull's study of Muslim immigrant populations in the US measures the benefits of using education as a tool of integration. Arguing that "education is the most effective path towards integration", they call for updating curriculums to meet the "demographic challenges of today". Citing the rise in global tension around the world in relation to Muslim extremists and sectarian violence, Byford and Schull call for a two-way curriculum that informs and clarifies the two respective communities to the other. Their study is especially significant to increase mutual understanding between mainstream and marginalised communities. These worthwhile objectives would be best achieved through negotiating both the material and the imaginative landscapes of the parties involved. Further, the potential for collaborative work between Byford and Schull's study and Birgit Breninger and Thomas Kaltenbacher's work is worth noting. Breninger and Kaltenbacher's interest involves the "phenomenon of cultural 'gaze switching'". Their enquiry is directed to the probability of a similar process to "code switching" (normally associated to language learners) happening "within a critical period of cultural learning" among diasporics. Their test based on the use of an eye-tracker anticipates further development and would benefit from inter-disciplinary collaborations. .

A key player in the politics of culture is the artistic and aesthetic framings of the "shared spaces of diasporas". Sanjay Chaturvedi defines these "shared spaces of diasporas" as "a truly cosmopolitan place where diasporic cultures are celebrated not only for their fusion of differences across different orders but also for coming together to create distinctive syncretic cultures."[40] But the "innocence" of cosmopolitan spaces need to be moderated against the media and marketing strategies and imaginaries which engage with the politics of territoriality/deterriorialization. In the final group or essays, I turn to this. Appadurai asserts that "[d]eterritorialization, in general, is one of the central forces of the modern world, since it brings labouring populations into the lower-class sectors and spaces of relatively wealthy societies, while sometimes creating exaggerated and intensified

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senses of criticism or attachment to politics in the home state". Appadurai argues that "deterritorialization creates new markets for film companies, art impresarios, and travel agencies, who thrive on the need of the deterritorialized population for contact with its homeland."[41] Robert Crawford and Manuel Mourino's essays can be read against this "imagined" landscape of deterritorialization. If deterritorialization can be negotiated through imagined worlds /landscapes, it would be worthwhile to consider, how deterritorialization and/or reterritorialization is managed through the mediascape of the imaginary Antipodes in Crawford's essay? Similarly, how is it cinematically-managed through the "ghost-station" in Baer's work and the "magic step" trigger in the Galica documentary?

Crawford's focus on market strategies, its concerns and constraints and their impact on the diaspora raise also other questions for consideration. How do consumer and economic considerations manipulate and shape perceptions of the diaspora? Crawford contends that the expansion of the use of the term "Antipodean" to include the South African diaspora in London has been primarily driven by commercial interests. Comparing and contrasting Australian, and New Zealand to South African diasporas resident in London (20 years), this essay also explores the distinct identities cultivated for and, indeed, by these diasporas as well attempts to assesses the degree to which diasporas might actually accept or conform to projected images of themselves, in this case as part of a collective Antipodean identity, created by media brokers. The incongruent application of the term Antipodean in its conventional application of the collective identity of Australians and New Zealanders (in relation to the UK) is struck by the rather dramatic attempt by the media to include the South African diaspora into this configuration. The image of Antipodean-ness, besides losing its distinctive application, becomes a pawn in the hands of media brokers. What are the effects of attempting to conflate relatively distinct and historically dissimilar groups of people into an imaginary cluster? What imaginaries are deliberately being constructed? Who are the stakeholders, the power-brokers, in this economy of crafting and disseminating perceptions of identity and community?

Nicholas Baer's study of *Walk on Water* critiques "fixed conceptions of Germanness and alterity". The film's attempt to complicate "national and corporal boundaries" is suggested through its triplicating visuals of Istanbul, Jerusalem and Berlin, cities marked "by division" to raise and transgress repressed memories of historical spaces so as to open up these spaces for rewriting and renegotiating identity. Of particular interest is Baer's discussion of Fox's use of U8 track: "a line that moves between East and West Berlin" and the surreal and suggestive implications of its "ghost-station". Baer explores the significance of this "overdetermined site of division", and how its treatment in the film enables the crossing and obscuring of previously determined boundaries.

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Mourino's study of the "Documentary for Galician Emigrants" examines how through film, images of home conveyed through a series of "moving postcards" mediates between the exile and the myth of return. The spectator transforms the frame through the "emotive" power of the "gaze", through which the resolution of home is made plausible cinematically and deferred simultaneously. "The status of uncertainty that the cinematographic filter applies to the image of home habitually places the latter out of reach of any kind of full experience, but (and at the same time) offers it as being accessible, chimerically accessible". The "magic step" or "return home" involves the mental slide to the memory of home. Mourino concludes that "[i]n so far as he has belonged to his experience in an emotive way, the spectator has transformed the frame itself, the proposal of a misty image of home, to live it like a bridge or threshold of return in which an any-space-whatever – which stealthily captivates him – has effectively sublimated any need to return".

Both Mangala and Ryazantev's essays highlight the significant role that remittances play in the relationship between homeland and hostland. The movement of capital as Appadurai has pointed out has far reaching implications which is complicated further by the gaps and secrecy that represents some of these transactions, a point that is pertinent to Ryazantev's argument. Ryazantsev's study of labour migration in CIS-countries explores its benefits for the countries. Ryazantsev argues that the effect of the flow of remittances estimated at 15 billion dollars is not to be underestimated, notwithstanding, transparency issues. This labour force has contributed to significant development in such areas as trade, construction, transport and agriculture. Not to be overlooked is the tough working conditions that guest workers tolerate. By filling jobs that constitute "niches of no prestige", they take on roles that local residents resist. In this light, labour migration incurs social collateral in relation to ethnic enclaves and inter-ethnic tensions which cannot be ignored.

On a different note, Mangala's essay demonstrates the disjunctures between homeland and diaspora contingencies and how the perversion of economy plays a central role in the politics of the homeland/African diaspora. Mangala argues that the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland should be reconstituted so that the contribution of the diaspora is valued not only for its monetary "remittances" to the homeland but for the ways in which the diaspora can enable the development of the social and economic infrastructure of the homeland. Of note, is how the government in Africa and the African Union have formalised the ties with the African diaspora by constituting it as the sixth 'region" of the African Union. A pathway for the African diaspora is anticipated in Gray's citation of Boyle and Kitchin's "Towards an Irish Diaspora Strategy" through which she surmises that "the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland [should be] characterised

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as more than the state seeking to capitalise on the financial, human and social capital of the diaspora. It is also about redeeming a debt owed to the diaspora [...] and about constructing a more inclusive community of affinity [...]".

Breda Gray's paper closes this study by qualifying the framework of criticism that has shaped diaspora studies. Gray argues that given that diaspora is being "re-enchanted" in recent times, and mobilised by global institutions such as the UN and UNESCO, it would be most productive to "examine the discourses and practices by which diaspora is brought into existence in any particular time/space". Of note is Gray's critique of diaspora as 'a way of thinking about populations and producing them as a governmental category [...] constitutive of new geographies and economics of globalisation". Poignant still is her constitution of gender as a significant player in diaspora politics. Gray argues that diaspora brings "gender, and women in particular, into focus because women are seen as biologically and culturally reproducing diasporas [...] , thus a normative heterosexuality tends to underpin concerns with the survival of diasporas". Finally, Gray's point that the "struggles over diasporic boundary-making frequently focus on women's bodies and behaviour" alerts us to a significant trajectory that could be developed within diaspora studies in relation to the "gendered dynamics of migration".

Notes

[1] V Mishra, "The Diasporic Imaginary and the Indian Diaspora", *Asian Studies Institute*, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007, viewed on December 5th 2008,
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/asian   studies/publications/ocassional/020cc-Diaspora.pdf.
[2] S Mishra, *Diaspora Criticism*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006, p. 134
[3] cited in S Mishra, ibid., p. 26.
[4] S Mishra, ibid., p. 25.
[5] S Mishra, ibid., p. 25.
[6] Sheffer, 1986:9-10 cited in S Mishra, *Diaspora Criticism*, p. 27.
[7] S Mishra, op.cit., p. 26.
[8] S Mishra, *Diaspora Criticism* , p. 37.

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[9] W Safran, "The Jewish Diaspora in a comparative and theoretical perspective", *Israel Studies* 10.1, Spring 2005, viewed on 10 February 2008, <http://find.galegroup.com/itx/start.do?prodid=ITOF>

[10] ibid.

[11] S Mishra, op.cit., p.38.

[12] ibid., p. 38.

[13] ibid., p. 39-41.

[14] ibid., p. 45.

[15] ibid., p. 48.

[16] ibid., *p.* 71.

[17] J. E. Braziel & Anita Mannur. (eds), *Theorizing Diaspora,* Blackwell, Malden and Oxford, 2003, p.6.

[18] S Mishra, op.cit., p. 67.

[19] V Mishra, op.cit, p.10.

[20] A Ludewig, "Home Meets Heimat" *M/C Journal* 10.4, 2007, viewed on 28 February 2009, http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/12-ludewig.php.

[21] A Ludewig, ibid.

[22] Vijay Mishra, op.cit.

[23] D Georgis, 'Mother nations and the persistence of 'Not Here'", in *Canadian Woman Studies*, 20.2, Summer 2000:27(8). Viewed on 2 Feb 2009, http://find.galegroup.com/itx/start.do?prodid=ITOF.

[24] J Solomos, "Race, Multi-Culturalism and Difference", in *Culture and Citizenship*, N Stevenson (ed), Sage, London & Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 199.

[25] D Carter, *Dispossession, dreams &* diversity: issues in Australian Studies, Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, Sydney, NSW, 2005, p. 134-135.

[26] W Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic, 2002, p.5

[27] ibid., p.2

[28] ibid., pp. 2-3

[29] ibid., p. 3

[30] S Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora" in *Theorizing Diaspora,* J. E. Braziel & Anita Mannur (eds), Blackwell, Malden and Oxford, 2003, p. 242.

[31] J. E. Braziel & Anita Mannur, (eds),op.cit., p. 8-9.

[32] S. Mishra, op.cit., p. 158.

[33] S Mishra, op.cit., p. 158-159.

[34] S Mishra, ibid., p. 161.

[35]Cited in A, Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy" in *Theorizing Diaspora,* J. E. Braziel & Anita Mannur (eds), Blackwell, Malden and Oxford, 2003, p. 31.

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[36] A, Appadurai, ibid.
[37] A, Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy" in *Theorizing Diaspora,* J. E. Braziel & Anita Mannur (eds), Blackwell, Malden and Oxford, 2003, p. 31.
[38] A, Appadurai, ibid., p. 32.
[39] A, Appadurai, ibid., p. 32.
[40] S Chaturvedi, "Diaspora in India's geopolitical visions:[…]" in *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 32.2, Fall 2005, viewed 18th December 2008. http://find.galegroup.com/itx/start.do?prodid=ITOF.
[4141] A, Appadurai, op.cit., p. 36.

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http://www.victoria.ac.nz/asian   studies/publications/ocassional/020cc-Diaspora.pdf.

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Section I

Diaspora/Diaspora/Diasporas

Framing the Diaspora:
The Politics of Identity and Belonging

Jane Fernandez

Abstract

The concept of Diaspora is complicated by the fact that the slipperiness of identity is an unassailable fact. Ideas of the "local" or "cultural" cannot be sustained any longer by notions of pre-determined authority or coded systems of thought and practice. Identity and belonging then are concepts that are interminably in a crisis. If identity is elusive, "belonging" can only be managed in a position of "media-res", somewhere in-between. We choose to belong through our poetic faith in certain stakes or stake-holders. In this sense, "belonging" implies an acceptance of what is and what is not. When we speak of belonging, we speak of a certain kind of denial: of a shortfall or lack, of exclusion, of a gap between wholeness and meaning. In this sense, "belonging" is managed within a complex space that is pregnant with desire, frustration, pain, hope and arguably, disconnectedness.

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Over the last several decades, the term "diaspora" has been complicated by issues of global mobility, multiple dislocations, technological advancements, and postmodern consciousness. Terms such as classic diaspora, modern diaspora, voluntary diaspora, post-diaspora, transnational diaspora, and metropolitan diaspora suggest a certain degree of anxiety with the limitations of a term that has become critical usage for concepts regarding dispersion, dislocation, exile, migrancy, and such like. In attempting to grapple with the concept of diaspora, we find ourselves interfacing with several strata of displacement. The scaffolding of these strata manages but fails to contain the superfluous meanings the term seems to aggregate around itself. The several definitions of diaspora: whether involving the dispersion of a classical group/people, or forced dislocation from the homeland, or voluntary migration, or indicating an attachment to multiple nations/histories, has one thing in common.[1] In all these varying categories, the underlying premise that girds the issues of diaspora involve concepts of identity and belonging. It is in the mutuality of these inherently related concepts and their significance to "home" and "self" that my interest lies. Indeed, as Radhakrishnan points out, "home" and "not home" and "coming" and "going" are neither literal nor figurative, but rather, issues within the politics

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of "imaginary geographies."[2] Zhang states that "modern diaspora disrupts the apparent closure of home"; it also signals how "the earlier conceptualisations of home based on a singular location are no longer adequate to describe the new dimensions and transformations of home, which has been re-versed in diaspora not as a "felicitous space" of living, but rather as a process of (be-)coming."[3] Rey Chow's metaphor of the migrant as the "involuntary passenger-in-transit between cultures, for whom homelessness is the only "state" is pertinent.[4] Indeed, home has become a "veiled body" like the purdah which as Mintum argues "renders [the object] more mysterious and therefore more attractive and more vulnerable."[5]

To contend with the diaspora is to meditate on and mediate through its mystique: its search through/for its core paradigm: home and its related fixations of identity and belonging in their many resonating and conflicting configurations. Like mirrors that reflect mirrors in a fluid symphony of fleeting reflections the watery subject slides in and slips out of multiple rupturing rhizomes of unqualified meaning and deferred non-meaning. The deterritorialisation of borders and boundaries and their resident transnational challenges involve a re-thinking of questions of identity and belonging. Who am I? Where is home? Where do I belong? What/Where is in-between? These questions frame for us our ontological concerns, all that drives our passion for knowing, being, locating, connecting with home both literally and figuratively. The question "who am I?" reflects a need to know our place in the world, an appeal to name ourselves but such a project carries a sinister threat.[6] That threat lies like a cipher defying decryption: the cipher of difference. If as Solomos cites: "[a]t the basic level, […] identity is about belonging, about what we have in common with some people and what differentiates us from others"[7] it follows that difference becomes "a source of persecution."[8]

At the centre of issues of belonging lies the unconscious nature of the economy that belonging demands of us. What does belonging demand? Who demands it? What sacrifices does it entail? What rewards does it give? If to belong is to choose a certain privilege, we choose in the same context our wounding and with it the power to wound. Belonging is a series of contesting stories someone else writes for us till we choose to write our own. But the tools at our service are contaminated with demands embedded deep in the collective unconscious and the master narratives of our communities. Belonging, then, is negotiated in what I choose to call the space between biography and autobiography. We are born like written texts dependent on other texts, searching for a way to write us: the inscriptions of our home and environment tattooed into our unconscious flesh; we belong in ways we cannot always choose. In this context, belonging is negotiated in a space that is already pregnant with meaning, a space that shifts us towards some formations and displaces us from other, a palimpsest of slippery meanings,

determined by our interdependence, pregnant with inscriptions that are both inherited and created through the implications of our several historical and sociological formations; a space that shifts and changes and eludes us while it waits, conspires and facilitates our inscribing and re-inscribing.

We belong always within a wound that never heals: a space pregnant with fears, hopes, desire, fantasies. The "mutat[ion]" of identity under the demands of "mechanical solidarity, seriality and hypersimilarity" rise out of the over-extension of the processes of belonging, a point which recent examples of 20th century violence demonstrate.[9] The metatheatricality of the Rwandan genocide, for instance is unlike Fanon's "epidermal schema", a case of, actors attacking the fourth wall. It indicates the critical and acute crisis notions of belonging have reached. Given that "race and ethnicity are "intrinsically political resources, used by both dominant and subordinate groups for the purposes of legitimising and furthering their own social identities and social interests," the diaspora itself must confront and contends with these challenges.[10]

It is in this context that I turn to the figure of Moses in appraising a critique of belonging. For Moses is emblematic of the deep angst of diaspora, its promise as well as its double-binds. My interest in Moses here is not theological, but poetical. I wish only to employ Moses as a literary figure in his role as the father of classic diaspora to critique our suppositions of identity/belonging. While we regard Moses, as father of the Exodus, we cannot forget that he was also a son of the Nile, an Egyptian "prince". His Egyptian legacy, for all intents and purposes from the Old Testament perspective, lies like a cipher, a secret, evasive, closed to Moses like amnesia; and to unearth the secret is to also recognise the fantasy formations Moses was bound by. Where did Moses belong? Egypt/the desert/Mount Sinai/The Promised Land/Israel. To choose one space is to recognise that belonging is constructed, tutored, managed through a series of rituals, propositions and taboos to maintain the illusions of purity, originality, and community. For Moses acting as an Israelite was also Moses acting and not acting the Egyptian. As guardian of the Law, he was also its transgressor. If to keep the whole Law is what it means to be an Israelite, Moses was Egyptian. The weight of these double-binds is suppressed in the biblical text which forces the narrative of the exodus to collapses into itself, like a tomb that resists exhumation. And the result is a neatly manicured history, with all traces of difference silenced.

Belonging is a closed world in an open wound. Moses stands through time to remind us that we are homeless at home: Other in the Self, Other to the Self; the violence we wage on ourselves and each other is tied to the myth of roots. For Moses, running from one home into the illusion of another is a trail of blood[11] that charts his hyphenated identity. As Radhakrishna points out "The hyphenation of identity […] points up the

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reality that [nations] are not unchanging ontological conditions, but
politically necessary and accountable inventions."[12] From this perspective,
the Jewish nation, the Promised Land is for Moses "politically necessary and
accountable inventions". Moses' ambivalence, his hybrid-status is a
suppressed text that is interned in the body politic of Israel's nation-building.
Moses never enters the Promised Land because he can never belong. I want
to suggest that Moses' hyphenated identity is a significant sign through which
both sides of the many diasporas in crisis can negotiate a way beyond
imaginary geographies. And it is to language/literature that I turn for such a
route.

I turn to poetry and the image of two mothers around the cradle of
the baby Moses. Azriel Yakov's poem "Lullaby for Moses" brings together
the voices of the Hebrew/Egyptian mothers not as distinct nationalist or
ethnic voices, but rather as maternal presences, human mothers, rich in their
maternal resonance, each anticipating for Moses safety, emotional and
physical well-being.[13] Both mothers position Moses outside his native space
and this movement out of and later back into his nation space helps us
understand what Stuart Hall terms the "positionality" of belonging.[14] In a
sense, the Nile, with its fluid motions, its shifting rhythms, becomes the
metaphor for Moses' routing and re-routing to Otherness.

In the Egyptian mother's assurance to Moses that "No butcher, no
angel of death will snatch [him]" we recognise also the contrapuntal play of
two narratives raised through this assurance. Moses is raised here both as
victim of and double to the "angel of death". The spectre of violence, its
"divinity", is raised and satirised through the yoking of two images of the
loss of innocence. Moses' own escape from the Egyptian butchery of the
Hebrew first born becomes a double to the exercise of "vengeance" by
Moses' Hebrew god against the Egyptian first-born. The implied guilt of both
nations raised through the connotations of the "angel of death" erases the
difference between the two nations and renders each a mirror of its Other and
subverts the connotations of innocence and nurture suggested both in the
text's appeal to historicity and canonical framing. The Hebrew overtones of
the Egyptian mother's song blur and complicate the boundaries of ethnicity
and nationalism through the poet's appeal to motherhood, which in turn
demystifies the fantasies of difference.

In the final analysis, the poet's sympathy lies with the complex
interplay of conscious and unconscious feelings/indebtedness that both
mothers experience. What the poem achieves is to erase the distinctions
between Egypt and Israel, through mounting for us the portrait of Moses in
whom the love of two mothers of warring nations meet. Moses, then,
becomes the centre that ruptures the imagined differences through which the
contestation for space, faith and language are embodied. What the poem
highlights through the tension between the two nations is a drama of

belonging. Yocheved understands how her son's life can be preserved through her choosing to invest her faith, drive a stake, however painfully, into what is Other. In doing so, she gives her son away so that she can keep him.

In Derrida's terms, her gift to the princess is "impossible".[15] Her giving is a play on the "economy of the gift", the indebtedness it will exact. Moses' Egyptian identity is strategised maternally, politically and poetically by his Hebrew mother who positions herself and her son outside of the contained spaces of ethnic or religious identity. Moses belongs inside and outside both worlds not by choice, but by ascription. Where does Moses belong? Can he belong? This morning I want to suggest that belonging like "gift" is impossible. If Moses teaches us about nationhood, he also carved for us the space upon which we would inscribe our dispossession.[16] The double-bind of community is its structure, institutions and its inherent rivalries. Indeed, Moses' angel of death has been busy since. Paradoxically and appropriately perhaps, "For Moses, the land of Israel becomes the unattainable. Judged unworthy to enter the land, Moses dies and bequeaths to us, an enduring consciousness of exile." Something of Edward Said's "mind of winter", the mind between exile and promise.

For Moses, who imagined home as the Promised Land, home became only a process of discipline, a projected plenitude, an articulation of a painfully deferring destiny. Spiritual father of a nation who leads his people out of Egypt, he becomes the double for the bonded Israelite who never escapes Egypt, the dispossessed child of his own nation space. Unable to set foot on the Promised Land, for Moses, home, belonging is a fantasy. He is displaced from the nation he built, the labour he invested, the meaning he sought. He is a diaspora within/separate and distinct from the Jewish diaspora he initiated. In this sense, Moses is the artist who learns that the earth belongs to itself, that home is a route beyond itself, that exile is the memory of the past in the return of the future. The quest of nationalism, ethnicity and tribalism lies in the ignorant search to qualify, indemnify roots and the secret it occludes is the impossibility and implausibility of the venture. Like the misunderstanding of sacralised violence, it appears we barter on the misunderstanding of belonging.

Rousseau reminds us that belonging is a burden rooted in the desire to stake a claim in what is essentially unpossessable: land and property rights, which, must essentially be relinquished at death. Belonging is embedded in a territorial angst as deep as our fear of death and our search for sacred space. We stake a claim into the ground like an oedipal wound to displace our own wounding articulated at birth, in each infant's first cry, an exultant protest of unconscious belonging to, and dispossession by, father and mother, and life itself. Like the movement of life from individual to community, the birth of a community/self marks an entry-point into, to use a Girardian concept, metaphysical longing, an interplay of desire that has less to do with the object

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of desire and more to do with the subject of plenitude upon whom we project all our anxieties and fears. How do we belong when our stakes are political? We belong through a degree of deception, through being ransomed to the idea of sameness, through choosing amnesia. Identity and belonging then are concepts that are interminably in a crisis. If 'identity' is elusive, 'belonging' can only be managed in a position of 'media-res', somewhere in-between, a journey that defies closure or completion. We choose to 'belong' through our poetic faith in certain stakes or stake-holders. In this sense, 'belonging' implies an acceptance of what is and what is not. When we speak of 'belonging', we speak also of a certain kind of denial: of a shortfall or lack, of exclusion, of a gap between wholeness and meaning. In this sense, 'belonging' is managed within a complex space that is pregnant with desire, frustration, pain, hope and arguably disconnectedness. What implications does this have for the diaspora?

According to Fleming Christiansen "belonging implies that individuals identify with a certain type of community and, conversely, that communities see and construct themselves as containers for individual belonging". Belonging "embodies individual psychosocial agonies […] and the political construction of collective symbols for identification" with all its implications of "competition" and torn loyalties."[17] Hedetoft argues that "belonging must be situated to a) sources of belonging b) feelings of belonging c) ascriptions and constructions of belonging d) fluidities of belonging".[18] These key measurements cancel out any innocence we attach to belonging and moderate issues of agency in this regard. The language of belonging then carries connotations of violent formations. The metaphor of "containers" imply a closed world, competition implies rivalries, ascription carry implications of loss of agency and the potential for wounding, "fluidities" and "feelings" carry powerful emotive energies with the potential for surplus and over-reaching agency. Belonging then is schooled and developed through an arsenal of rites, rituals, prohibitions and taboos, which initiate our immersion into and sustains our entrenchment within a social unit. In this sense, the danger, as Gilroy suggests, is that every social group could be regulated as an army and its members relegated to "citizen soldiers."[19] In this context, if we think of belonging as the innocent product of a connectedness between and within a particular group of people based on natural categories of cultural, racial and national fraternities, we must accept also that we are marshalling within our identities /communities a progeny of violence.

The seeds that germinate into ideas of exclusivity, purity, privileged status and ultimately prejudice are framed and institutionalised into a Magna Carta of the self are bequeathed to succeeding generations through the politics of belonging. We practice, exert and act upon each other through our material and cultural artefacts. Through this process we create an archaeology

of community that reflects to us illusions of sameness, solidarity and 'false plenitude' of being. This is the site also of our wounding, the self- wounding of sameness, the projected wounding of Otherness/difference. The search for the Other then is not as celebration but as sites of resistance through which we will mediate our deepest anxieties. The Other then exists simply as theatre, an object for our gaze: unreal, artificial, a site to be acted upon, an agency whose existence is merely a functional cathartic medium for displacing the terrors we cannot quell: the terror of difference, the terror of choosing aloneness. In psychoanalytic terms, it is a narcissistic retreat in which everything is made "same."[20]

And yet, to use Gomez Pena's illustration, we live "in the fissure between […] worlds, in the infected wound: […]." In our "fractured reality cohabit histories, languages, cosmologies, artistic traditions, and political systems which are drastically counterposed."[21] How do we belong within these counterposed systems? What implications does this have for the diaspora, an already fractured concept? I wish to argue that we can only belong impossibly. Belonging demands unbelonging, in that sense it involves our right to cancel out attachments and moderate our formations. While this may seem like an exercise in word play, or even some form of nihilism, I am suggesting quite the opposite. I am suggesting that freedom from the indebtedness that underwrites our belonging to any community is a step towards peace and a movement away from a violent return to roots and their associated obligations.

In the context of the diaspora, it appears that the some moderation to concepts of belonging would be significant. It would seem that rather than exist as a by-product of globalisation, immigration and decolonisation, diaspora in its many different formations, slippery, contentious, connected, disconnected, confused, as we may be, should lead the way in shaking loose the underpinnings of race, colour, past histories, geographies and grievances that recirculate in what Derek Walcott refers to as the "ruins of history" within the diaspora. Further, whereas we had India, China, Australia, Ireland etc we now have an Indian diaspora, Chinese diaspora! It appears that through the diaspora we return to the same model of "containers" and enforced ascription of identities in relation to roots/history. The tags that contain and catalogue us in serial imitations of the past suggest that we are trapped in a truth/untruth of myth/history rather than the truth/untruth of art/revelation. There is indeed no secret destiny in melanin, in ethnicity, in nationality or even in transnationality, not even in diaspora. Radhakrishnan's concept of home as "imaginary geographies," Zhang's as "process of be- coming, Rey Chow's "homelessness" as the only home, K. S. Maniam's "chameleon outlook" calls for a more telescopic or aerial view of "home", and so taking our cue from the virtual self, we should, as Agger suggests, "compose" the self, arrive and depart moment by moment.[22] To shed the

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replicated models of isolation, break out of epidermal contexts and adopt a more aerial view of belonging is to refresh our interdependent formations beyond the scope of the local, something akin to Stuart Hall's positionality. The fundamental question remains, why in the diaspora are we fixated on the language, motifs of belonging/ be/longing (longing to be)/ when diaspora means dispersion. Like seeds we carry the promise of new growth in that moment of dispersal to our new centres and that newness as it gains momentum changes also the associated connotations of the past. We remain open and fluid like a river that retains its essence even as it changes: flowing, connecting and refreshing.

That is the energy, the fullness of diaspora, rupturing the skins of our containment, valuing, measuring, the spaces between our fingers while still feeling connected to the hand/body. Through these spaces we breathe our differences knowing, anticipating and celebrating the awareness that change/transition is our right, not a grief, not a wound. If the diaspora is not the resolution of a shipwreck, it is also not the heart of intersecting shipwrecks we carry from and into multiple locations. The frontiers we reach are always inhabited, full of both promise and contamination and our attitude to belonging both to the past and in the present determines the outcome of our new formations.

How can we choose and unchoose amnesia without resorting to a hunger for mimicry? How can we choose a different story from the ritual violence of community building and preservation, another biography from that which has been inscribed into our skins and our wounds? If, as Caribbean writers remind us, our heritage lies in "sand", then our heritage is always shifting/becoming. Indeed the significant legacy of the diaspora is the courage and privilege we have found in choosing to "die where we [were] not born."[23] This is no tragedy. This is the promise of life/peace. Finally, Stuart Hall reminds us that the "diaspora has a line through it". Indeed, it appears that the diaspora is and cannot be. As Hall and Gilroy tell us with globalisation, we are all now diasporic. Hence, for Emile Ollivier Haiti/home is as much in Montreal, Chicago, or New York.[24] If we are the embodiment of our "lands" in all the spaces that we inhabit, we cancel out as the world pours itself into us. Diapora is not our destiny, neither is Home; ultimately peace is our destiny. And therein lies Home.

Notes

[1] S Mishra, *Diaspora Criticism*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006.
[2] R Radhakrishnan, *Diasporic Mediations: Between Home and Locations*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis &London, 1997.

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[3] B Zhang, "The Politics of Re-homing: Asian Diaspora Poetry in Canada" in *College Literature*, 31(1), 2004, p103-125 viewed on May 24 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=572158181&Fmt=4&clientld=38858&RQT=309&Vname=PQD

[4] Cited in Zhang, ibid.

[5] Cited in D Grace,"Women's Space: Inside the Haveli" in *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 4.2 April 2003 viewed on 19 May 2008, <http://find.galegroup.com/itx/start.do?prodld=ITOF>.

[6] J Rutherford, *After Identity*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 2007

[7] J Solomos, "Race. Multi-culturalism and Difference" in *Culture & Citizenship*, in N Stevenson, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks,

[8] Rutherford, op.cit.

[9] P Gilroy, *Between Camps: Between Camps : Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race*. 2nd ed. London: New York: Routledge, 2004, p.104

[10] Solomos, op.cit., p.201

[11] Blood becomes a symbolic reminder of his inside/outside Egyptian status. Ironically, the image of blood is invoked again, this time as a sign of ssprotection and election of divine favour when the angel of death visits the first-born Egyptian sons.

[12] Radhakrishna, op.cit., pp. xxv

[13] A Yakov, "Lullaby for Moses", *Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies and Gender Issues* 8 (Fall 2004): 248 .2. General OneFile viewed on May 14 2008. http://find.galegroup.com/start.do?prodid=ITOF.

[14] S Hall, Interview, P Osbourne & Lynne Segal, London, June 1997, in R.D. Torres et al, op.cit.

[15] J Derrida, 'Given Time: The Time of the King.' Peggy Kamuf. Trans. *Critical Inquiry* 18/2.Winter (1992) University of Chicago Press: 161-187.

[16] Rousseau locates the transformation of a human being from a subject into the body politic of a group, a nation, in Mosaic Law. In "Considerations on the government of Poland" Rousseau describes how Moses "conceived and executed the astonishing project of creating a nation out of a swarm of wretched fugitives, […]. Out of their wandering and servile horde Moses had the audacity to create a body politic … gave them customs … over-burdened them with peculiar rites and ceremonies; he inconvenienced them in a thousand ways in order to keep them constantly alert and to make them forever strangers among other men." cited in Gilroy, op.cit., pp. 99-100.

[17] F Christiansen, & Ulf Hedetoft. *The Politics of Multiple Belonging: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and East Asia.* Ashgate Publishing Limited, London, 2004, p. 2-3.

[18] ibid.

[19] Gilroy, op.cit., p.55

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[20] S Frosh, "Psychoanalysis, Identity & Citizenship", in *Culture and Citizenship*, N Stevenson (ed) Sage Publications, London, 2001, p.72.
[21] Cited in W Mignolo, "Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse: Cultural Critique or Academic Colonialism?" *Latin American Research Review* 28.3, p.128.
[22] Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p xiv, intro. Cited in Zhang, op-cit., p. 103-105; K S Maniam, "The New Diaspora", in Donald H McMillen (ed), *Globalisation and Regional Communities: Geoeconomic, Sociocultural and Security Implications for Australia,* University of Southern Queensland Press, Queensland, *1997 p. 18-23;* B Agger, *Virtual Self: A Contemporary Sociology.* Blackwell, Malden & Oxford, 2004, p. 144.
[23] M Munro. "Unfinished Journeys: Exile, Africanity and Intertextuality in Emile Ollivier's Passages." *Journal of Modern Literature* 29.2, Winter 2006. B Agger, op. cit., p.144.
[24] Cited in Munro, ibid.

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Politics of 'Diasporisation' in Post-Soviet Central Asia

Olivier Ferrando

Abstract

In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union turned former internal boundaries into international frontiers and left millions of people stranded on the wrong side of the border. This paper explores this intertwined population issue in Central Asia and particularly the triadic nexus between the kin-states, their kin-minorities abroad and the host-states where they reside. I argue here that the concept of diaspora should not be approached in substantialist terms as a static bounded entity exhibiting a range of archetypical diasporic traits. It should rather qualify the dynamic interaction between the stakeholders of this triadic nexus and the way kin-states of Central Asia do or do not 'diasporise' their kin-minorities abroad. The paper distinguishes several levels of 'diasporisation' from mere diaspora rhetoric to pan-ethnic gatherings, bilateral agreements and eventually overt repatriation policies.

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In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union turned former internal boundaries into international frontiers between newly sovereign states. The stranding of millions of Russians outside their homeland received a significant scholar attention.[1] In Central Asia, the indigenous population[2] experienced a more anonymous dispersal, not by past migrations, but by the movement of borders across settlements. Over five million indigenous people remained on the wrong side of the border. Rather than being part of their kin-state, they became kin-minorities hosted by neighbouring states. As multiethnic states pay a specific attention to the relationship between political boundaries, national identities, and their constituent ethnic communities, the position of outside groups who share cultural and linguistic traits with the titular ethnic group is of crucial importance.

This paper proposes to explore this intertwined population issue in Central Asia and particularly the triadic nexus between the kin-states, their kin-minorities abroad and the host-states where they reside, through the concept of 'diaspora' which is approached here as an analytical framework. The aim is not to provide a catalogue of diaspora issues within and between those countries, but rather to illustrate the diversity of situations and outcomes in the diaspora politics of a region often improperly presented as a whole, and to underline the malleability of the diaspora label for kin-

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minorities, kin-states, and host-states. The paper focuses on post-Soviet Central Asia, and more specifically on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[3] These independent states can be considered, in this sense, as emerging diasporic states,[4] but the degree of awareness and development of diaspora politics and policies highly differs for each country.

This research is based on published material on diaspora politics in Central Asia, including official data from Statistical Committees and Migration Agencies. It is also grounded on several field visits to the region between 1999 and 2007, where interviews were conducted with state policy-makers, local authorities and ethnic minority leaders.

1.   Background: the Formation of Kin-Minorities in Central Asia
A.   The Historical Dispersal of Central Asian Indigenous Peoples

In pre-colonial times, Central Asia was a large borderless region stretching from eastern China to Persia and from Russia to the British India without national cleavages. Various forces led to the dispersal of its population and the shaping of ethnic identities. A first force was the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the nineteenth century. The establishment of interstate borders with China, Afghanistan and Iran created a separation between those living under the Russian empire and their fellows stranded beyond the border. It was the case of numerous Tajiks and Uzbeks who remained in or fled to Afghanistan as well as Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in China.

A second force was the extension of the Soviet power to Central Asia after 1917 through the collectivisation and forced sedentarisation of nomadic tribes. Some two million people, totalling 42 percent of the ethnic Kazakh population, reportedly died in the early years of the Soviet regime.[5] One third of the remaining Kazakhs fled abroad, mainly to China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. In administrative terms, the Soviet ethnic policy promoted five native peoples - the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks, the Kyrgyz, the Turkmens, and the Tajiks - to the rank of 'nationalities' (ethnic groups in the Soviet terminology) and granted them national republics.[6] But the intertwined settlement of these five newly created ethnic groups and the mass arrival of non-natives who settled in the region either voluntarily (most of the Slavs, Jews, and Uralian Tatars) or by force (Germans, Koreans, Caucasians, etc.) made the initial plan of five ethnically homogeneous republics clearly not attainable. As a result, each Central Asian republic comprised a large part of the nationality it was named for, but also significant shares of the four other native groups, as well as a myriad of non-native nationalities. In 1989, on the eve of independence, out of 49 million inhabitants, 16 million were not native of Central Asia. Among the 33 million natives, one in six (5,5 million) lived outside the borders of their eponym republic (see Appendix 1).

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B.   **From Kin-Minorities to Diasporas: Factors of 'diasporisation'**

In Soviet Central Asia, all citizens used to enjoy the same legal rights regardless of their 'nationality' (alleged ethnicity) and their country of residence. Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the emergence of international borders between former sister republics left sizeable shares of native nationalities stranded across the borders of their eponymous kin-state. Each republic became a sovereign nation-state with a multiethnic population comprising a titular nation and hosting not less than a hundred other nationalities, reduced then to the status of ethnic minorities, including kin-minorities from bordering states. This geopolitical upheaval challenged the population of the region to reformulate basic notions of 'home' and 'abroad'.

The concept of 'kin-state' should be addressed as a putative homeland, not in the sense of a symbolic ancestral territory formed around a teleology of origin[7] but merely as the nominal entity of an eponym ethnic group, with no presumed common origin. Therefore my understanding of the diasporic fact in Central Asia does not aim to design people across borders in substantialist terms as static bounded entities exhibiting a range of archetypical diasporic features - those of the Jewish or Armenian ideal type.[8] It rather qualifies the dynamic interaction between three stakeholders: the kin-state, in the way it engages in the construction of diasporic policies towards its co-ethnics abroad (top-to-down process); the kin-minority, in how it influences state policies (bottom-up process); and the host-state, in the way it allows or limits the expression of diasporic identities within its citizenry.

The paper proposes to explore the way kin-states of Central Asia do or do not 'diasporise' their kin-minorities abroad. This process of 'diasporisation' actually depends on various factors such as the size and degree of organisation of the kin-minority, domestic and foreign politics of both the kin-state and the host-state, as well as economic resources made available by the kin-state to support its co-ethnics.[9] In Central Asia we can distinguish several levels of such diasporisation: diaspora rhetoric, pan-ethnic gatherings, bilateral agreements and overt repatriation policies.

2.   **From Diaspora Rhetoric to Worldwide Pan-Ethnic Congresses**

In their attempt to define their newly sovereign nations, Central Asian nationalists often encouraged a diasporic narrative encompassing all co-ethnics regardless of their country of residence. Tajikistan is a meaningful example of such diaspora rhetoric. After independence, the government faced the paradoxical situation of on the one hand managing the Soviet legacy, with Tajikistan being the alleged homeland of the Tajiks, and on the other hand developing a new national narrative based on the existence of a pre-colonial 'Tajik' state founded in the tenth century, that covered a much larger territory than modern Tajikistan. Such a discourse can be qualified of diasporic, in that it promoted a Tajik identity rooted in a mythical history transcending the

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state borders and including all co-ethnics abroad. But the objective of this diaspora rhetoric was primarily domestic, as it developed to strengthen a national consciousness. It actually did not develop into an overt foreign policy from the Tajik state toward countries hosting Tajik minorities abroad.

In Kazakhstan the diaspora discourse arose under Gorbachev's perestroika, when Kazakh associations placed ethnic regeneration on the political agenda and regarded co-ethnics from outside the U.S.S.R. as suitable subjects to achieve it since they were spared the experience of russification. Thus the diaspora discourse focused on those distant Kazakhs, viewed as living repositories of Kazakh national identity and whose repatriation would help inculcating traditions long lost by Soviet Kazakhs in the homeland.[10]

Beside diaspora rhetoric, most Central Asian republics developed pan-ethnic gatherings that intended to embrace all co-ethnics residing outside their putative homeland. In 1992 the first World Congress of Kazakhs was organised under government sponsor to regroup Kazakh representatives from around the world and encourage exchange experiences of language and culture. Kyrgyzstan followed this initiative and organised its World Congress of Kyrgyz with the same objective. In 1996 all Tajik communities abroad took part to the first World Congress of Tajiks and Persian Speakers (WCTPS).

The Tajik initiative differs from the previous ones on three points. First the WCTPS is the only Central Asian pan-ethnic gathering with a permanent executive committee, a yearly magazine Payvand (Liaison), and headed by the president of the kin-state himself. Second unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the WCTPS did not develop simultaneously with its kin-minorities associations. The latter were actually founded in host-states in 1989-1992 much before the creation of the World Congress. The WCTPS seems to have then taken over the ownership of existing kin-minorities' associations abroad afterwards in order to serve its diaspora rhetoric. Tajik associations have to manage the primary task of representing the Tajiks within their host-state. At the same time, they are part of the diaspora politics of their kin-state. Last but not least, the name of the organisation can lead to confusion in that its identity is defined in terms of both ethnicity (Tajiks) and language (Persian speakers), the latter being a much larger identity feature than the former. As a result, the WCTPS comprises leaders of Central Asian Tajik minorities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, as well as representatives from Iran, India, and further countries, which are not hosting historical Tajik communities (USA, Canada, France, Germany). Interestingly, these latter representatives are mostly of Iranian origin.[11]

It should be noted that Uzbekistan did not promote such worldwide organisation. As Fumagalli shows, authorities have focused on state-building and territoriality rather than strengthening their ties with co-ethnics abroad.[12]

3.   Bilateral Agreements: Mutual Support of Kin-Minorities

Despite their symbolic existence, pan-ethnic gatherings remain weak tools of diaspora politics since host-states keep controlling cross-border activities, in particular when kin-states and kin-minorities are contiguous. For this reason, bilateral negotiations between a kin-state and the host-state where resides its kin-minority may prove to be a more effective tool of diaspora politics. Negotiations can aim at securing better education conditions, as between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2006, 0,8 percent of Tajikistan's children (13,272) were educated in Kyrgyz, and 0,3 percent of Kyrgyzstan's children (2,938) were educated in Tajik language. In order to improve the education of their respective kin-minority, the two states have signed an intergovernmental agreement securing the mutual provision of textbooks and teachers' training, as well as the access of kin-minority students to their kin-state universities with easier registration procedures.

Bilateral agreements can secure as well the freedom of movement between kin- and host-states. In 1999 Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian country to impose a visa regime to its neighbours. Millions of ethnic Uzbeks residing in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan needed then a visa to enter Uzbekistan and visit their relatives across the border. In return, these neighbouring countries started to develop similar visa regimes toward Uzbekistan's citizens, regardless of their ethnicity. In 2006, after long negotiations, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a mutual agreement providing citizens with a visa-free 60-day stay in the neighbouring country.[13]

Such agreements can also secure dual citizenship. In Soviet times, all Central Asians enjoyed the same Soviet citizenship regardless of their ethnicity or place of residence. After independence, Central Asian authorities denied the principal of dual citizenship, regarded as a threat to the new state identity and consequently to its legitimacy in such a multiethnic environment. Any individual willing to get the citizenship of its kin-state should first abandon the citizenship of its host-state. The Kyrgyz government initiated bilateral negotiations to simplify the relinquishing procedure and facilitate the shifting of citizenship. A first agreement was signed with Tajikistan in May 2004 and since then 6,000 ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan were reportedly granted Kyrgyz citizenship in a simplified procedure.[14] The lack of such an agreement with Uzbekistan made it uneasy for ethnic Kyrgyz to abandon their Uzbek citizenship. In the new Constitution of 2008, the Kyrgyz government decided to simply remove the banning of dual citizenship,[15] a first in the region's legal framework. Dual citizenship appears to be a key provision in the triadic nexus between kin-minorities, kin-states, and host-states since it authorises minorities to keep the citizenship of their host-state with related rights and duties, and granting simultaneously the citizenship of their kin-state as a symbolic attachment to their putative homeland.[16]

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4.   Overt Repatriation Policies

A further step in the diasporisation process is the adoption and effective implementation of repatriation policies. To date only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have developed such policies. Initially repatriation was couched in terms of domestic imperatives, as both states tried to overcome the disadvantageous demographic position of their titular nation. On the eve of independence, Kazakhs represented only 39,7% of Kazakhstan's population and Kyrgyz a limited 52,4% of Kyrgyzstan's population.

A.   The Recipients of Repatriation Policies

In multiethnic societies repatriates could be defined either ethnically, respectively as ethnic Kazakhs or ethnic Kyrgyz, or on a territorial basis and would therefore comprise all groups having their homeland in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, including large Uzbek and Uyghur local communities, regardless of their ethnicity. In other words, a territorial definition of the repatriate would consider autochthony as the prime criteria to claim a right to return. However both countries failed to capture the multiethnic essence of their indigenous population. Indeed the 1993 bilateral agreement that Kazakhstan signed with Iran on the repatriation of Iranian Kazakhs defined repatriates as 'co-ethnics.'[17] In Kyrgyzstan, the legislation referred to 'ethnic Kyrgyz returning to their father land'[18] but ignored that most Kyrgyz residing abroad had never lived within the boundaries of present-day Kyrgyzstan. The 'return' was thus purely teleological. Repatriation is a prime example of the tension between two conceptions of the nation. On one hand, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan convey internally the image of a civic nation, where all citizens have the same rights regardless of their ethnic background. But on the other hand, repatriation policies promote an ethnic conception of the nation since they encourage the return of families selected on ethnic criteria.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did not treat equally kin-minorities abroad. After 1991 most co-ethnics residing outside the former U.S.S.R. - in Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey - experienced an 'unprecedented porosity of borders'[19] and received particular attention from their kin-state. For instance Kazakhstan supported the early repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs from Iran (1993) and Mongolia (1994) and adopted in 1995 a Decree on the Implementation of Presidential Directives on Repatriation. On the flip side kin-minorities residing within the former Soviet republics were not subject to such diasporisation. Although Russia and Uzbekistan - and to a same extent China - were hosting sizeable Kazakh and Kyrgyz minorities, their kin-states bewared of overt claims not to be viewed as interfering in the domestic affairs of host-states and encourage them to take, in return, a more active interest in their own co-ethnics across the border. In post-Soviet Central Asia, the realistic nation-state logic often prevailed over transnationalism. The only exception to this regional status quo is the repatriation since 1992 of

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thousands of ethnic Kyrgyz fleeing the Tajik civil war. In this tragic context, the Kyrgyz government supported the resettlement of co-ethnics from southern Tajikistan to their putative homeland. However, these families were not treated as repatriates but as war refugees, as defined by international law.

B.   Special Statuses Granted to 'Ethnic Repatriates'
        In Kazakhstan the inconsistency of national legislation led the parliament to adopt in December 1997 a Law on Migration of Population, which introduced the legal status of Oralman ('returnee' in Kazakh language) and provided a legal framework to implement repatriation policies. The law defined the Oralman on exclusive ethnic ground as 'any foreigner or stateless person with Kazakh ethnicity, who resided outside the boundaries of Kazakhstan on the day of independence and entered Kazakhstan to settle there on a permanent basis.' In Kyrgyzstan, the exiles from Tajikistan were granted the status of Refugee and supported by the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But Kyrgyz returnees from other countries did not enjoy such benefits. In 2007, 22,800 ethnic Kyrgyz from Uzbekistan were reportedly facing difficulties to get Kyrgyz citizenship. The lot of these co-ethnics, largely disclosed by the media, led the Kyrgyz authorities to address this gap in the law and develop a special status for its repatriates on the Oralman model. The Law on State Guarantees to Ethnic Kyrgyz Returning to their Historical Homeland, adopted in October 2007, introduced the intermediary status of Kayrylman ('returnee' in Kyrgyz language) granted to all 'ethnic Kyrgyz migrants and stateless people of Kyrgyz ethnicity.'[20]

        In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan repatriation programmes aim at completing the legislation to implement effective repatriation policies, fixing annual quotas of repatriates, and implementing rights granted by the status of Oralman/Kayrylman (temporary shelter, provision of land plots, free medical care, access to personal and real estate, citizenship). Various law enforcement agencies are assigned to support repatriation: the Ministry of Labour organises quotas, supervises housing, employment and training programmes; the Ministry for Foreign Affairs oversees departure procedures from host-states; the Ministry of Transport and Communications provides logistical support and a smooth passage to the repatriates and their belongings; the Ministry of Interior processes residency and passport documents.

C.   Limits and Shortcomings of the Repatriation Policies
        Despite the kin-state's willingness to attract co-ethnics from abroad and the development of overt repatriation policies, the diaspora politics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remained largely ineffective. Out of an estimated population of 3,1 million Kazakhs living outside their putative homeland, only 430,000 co-ethnics actually moved to Kazakhstan in 1991-2005.[21] As for Kyrgyzstan, out of a potential of 500,000 co-ethnics abroad, a limited

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20,000 individuals took the decision to join Kyrgyzstan in the same period, including a majority of forced Kyrgyz exiles from Tajikistan. This shortcoming can be explained by the fact that both kin-states did not enforce repatriation in those countries hosting the largest co-ethnic communities – Russia, Uzbekistan, and China - for obvious realpolitik concerns.

In addition the treatment of co-ethnic repatriates lacks equity. The status of Oralman/Kayrylman is granted in the limit of annual quotas. Migrants entering their kin-state outside the quota system are not labelled as such and therefore not eligible for the benefits related to this status.

Finally despite an active diaspora rhetoric pretending that repatriates would foster the ethnic regeneration of the titular group and thus consolidate the kin-state's identity, the arrival of outsiders - albeit co-ethnic - often led to cultural incompatibilities and misunderstanding. The Kazakhs experienced a cleavage between urban and largely russified 'mestnye' (locals) and the repatriates, who were nicknamed 'iz-za rubezha' (from abroad) and perceived as anachronistic Kazakh-speaking Muslims.[22] Conversely in Kyrgyzstan, the local population lived in remote mountainous areas and was the one regarded as traditionalist, while repatriates from Tajikistan, who used to live in multiethnic kolkhozes, were viewed as fake Kyrgyz and called 'the Tajiks.'[23]

5.   **Conclusion**

In post-Soviet Central Asia, the perception of co-ethnic communities abroad and the politics of diasporisation pursued in relation to them follow various patterns. Uzbekistan downplays the significance of its kin-minorities abroad and refuses to diasporise them in order not to challenge its internal stability. Conversely Tajikistan endeavours to promote a diaspora identity through the creation of the WCTPS. But this organisation remains weak in terms of self-definition (language or ethnic boundaries?) as well as of lack of funds to go beyond the mere promotion of cultural ties. As for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, they overtly encourage the return of their co-ethnics to the homeland through comprehensive diaspora politics grounded on special legal provisions and institutions dedicated to their repatriates. However the success of repatriation is seriously challenged by the unequal enforcement of kin-state policies in each host-state and the unfair treatment of repatriates.

It appears clear that the diaspora label should not be determined by the degree to which a community possesses a prescribed list of archetypal diasporic traits, but by the degree to which the stakeholders of the triadic nexus kin-minority/kin-state/host-state develop a diasporic relationship. Since 1991, the emergence of diaspora politics in Central Asia has illustrated the point that the very term 'diasporisation' can become part of a kin-state policy project targeting kin-minorities abroad to strengthen post-Soviet nation- and state-building processes.

Notes

[1] P Kolsto, 'The New Russian Diaspora - An Identity of its Own? Possible Identity Trajectories for the Russians in the Former Soviet Republics'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* vol. 19(3), 1996, P. 609-639; G Smith, 'Transnational Politics and the Politics of the Russian Diaspora'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* vol. 22(3), 1999, pp. 500-523; N Kosmarskaya, '"Russian Diasporas" in the Light of Identity: Conceptualising Position of the Russian Speakers in the Post-Soviet State", in L Anteby-Yemini, W Berthomière and G. Sheffer (eds), *Les Diasporas. 2000 Ans d'Histoire*, PUR, Rennes, 2005, pp. 335-345.

[2] By 'indigenous' I mean those peoples who lived in Central Asia before the Russian colonization and the mass arrival of non-natives.

[3] Turkmenistan, the fifth Central Asian republic, remains out of the scope of this paper because the author did not manage to conduct field research there.

[4] C King, 'Nationalism, Transnationalism and Postcommunism', in C King and NJ Melvin, *Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union*, Westview, Oxford, 1999, pp. 1-25

[5] S N Cummings, 'The Kazakhs: Demographics, Diasporas and 'Return'', in C King and N J Melvin, *Nations Abroad. Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union*, Westview, Oxford, 1999, pp. 135-136.

[6] A Haugen, *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia.* Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003.

[7] J Clifford, 'Diasporas'. *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 9(3), 1994, p. 306.

[8] In his definition of diasporas, Safran suggested six such features (W Safran, 'Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return'. *Diaspora*, vol. 1(1), p. 83-99) while Cohen identified nine elements (R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas: an Introduction.* University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997).

[9] N J Melvin, 'The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire', in C King and N J Melvin, *Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union*, Westview, Oxford, 1999, pp. 27-57.

[10] Cummings, pp. 140-143.

[11] Interview with Masud Mirshahi, a French citizen of Iranian origin, leading the Association of Tajiks and Persian Speakers in France, May 2008.

[12] M Fumagalli, 'Ethnicity, State-Formation and Foreign Policy: Uzbekistan and 'Uzbeks abroad''. *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 26(1), 2007, pp. 105-122.

[13] Ferghana.ru Information Agency, 'Uzbekistan: the President validated the agreement with Kyrgyzstan on visa-free regime for citizens (*in Russian*),' January 10, 2007, [http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=4708].

[14] Ferghana.ru Information Agency, 'Kyrgyz from Tajikistan register their citizenship through a simplified procedure (*in Russian*),' October 19, 2007, [http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=5413].

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[15] Article 20 (4): 'Kyrgyz residing abroad have the right to get the citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic with a simplified procedure, regardless of the existence of another state's citizenship'

[16] AC Diener, 'Kazakhstan's Kin-State Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the *Oralman* Dilemma', *Europe Asia Studies*, vol. 57(2), 2005, pp. 327-348

[17] Presidential decree on *Immigration Quotas and the Organization of Immigration of Co-Ethnics from Iran and Other States*, April 15, 1993.

[18] Presidential decree on *Support to ethnic Kyrgyz returning to their father land*, August 29, 2001.

[19] G Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 22

[20] Ferghana.ru Information Agency, 'Kyrgyzstan: legal guarantees to ethnic Kyrgyz returning to their historical homeland (*in Russian*),' November 28, 2007, [http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=7792].

[21] Diener, p. 339

[22] Cummings, pp. 143-147.

[23] Author's personal observations in Batken, Kyrgyzstan, October 1999.

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Appendix 1: Ethnic Breakdown of the Population of Central Asia (1989)

Ethnic groups (,000)	Kazakhs	Kyrgyz	Uzbeks	Tajiks	Others	Total
Kazakhstan	6,534	14	332	26	9,554	16,464
Kyrgyzstan	37	2,230	550	34	1,406	4,258
Uzbekistan	808	175	14,142	934	3,629	19,810
Tajikistan	11	64	1,198	3,172	627	5,093
Turkmenistan	88	1	317	3	577	3,523
Other USSR	656	46	158	47	n.a.	n.a.
Total co-ethnics Within the USSR	*1,601*	*299*	*2,555*	*1,043*	n.a.	n.a.
China	1,000	160	15	45	n.a.	n.a.
Mongolia	177	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Afghanistan	3-21	2	1,200	5,000	n.a.	n.a.
Total co-ethnics outside the USSR	*1,500*	*200*	*1,300*	*5,000*	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Soviet Population Census of 1989. Statistical Department, Moscow, 1991-93

'The Last Soviet Generation' in Britain

Andy Byford

Abstract

The past couple of decades have seen a remarkable expansion of the Russian-speaking post-Soviet diaspora across the Western world, including Britain. In the UK, this migrant body has in the past few years been prompted to engage in more active institutional self-organisation and identity reinventions in an attempt to make the most of its steady growth, as well as to deal with its socio-economic stratifications and its invariably ambiguous relationship to 'home' (its past, present and future). This paper stresses the generational specificity of this migrant group, which is made up of people born in the former Soviet Union and then uprooted by the upheavals and opportunities of post-socialist 'transition'. It discusses if and how this migrant body can be viewed in diasporic terms and what sort of symbolic work Russian-speaking post-Soviet migrants to the UK invest in reconstructing their national and migrant identities. In this context, the paper deconstructs representations of this diaspora as a diaspora of 'Russian-speakers'. The paper proposes three principal levels of analysing a diaspora (networks of exchange, performances of community, and discourses of identity), and it emphasises the importance of studying diaspora as an effect of (inter)actions and as a tool of (political, economic and cultural) mobilisation.

Keywords: Diaspora, migration, post-Soviet, Russia, Russian-speaker, Soviet Union, United Kingdom.

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This is one of several papers at this conference dealing with diasporas which have crystallised since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both through the redrawing of the state boundaries of the former USSR and through the multi-directional migration that followed and that is still going on.[1] In studying post-Soviet diasporas one must take into account that their identity remains to a considerable degree embedded in the history of the Soviet Union as a multiethnic empire and in the numerous problems and solutions that the former Soviet state created in dealing with its 'nationalities question'. This includes the ambiguous role that it forged for the dominant Russian nationality by identifying it closely with the supra-national Soviet state, as well as the systematic engineering of minority nationalities through the institutionalisation of ethnically-defined administrative territories, passport identities, staff quotas, cultural industries, and so forth. The formation of post-Soviet diasporas also builds on, but is not straightforwardly

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continuous with, the longer history of migration both within the former Russian Empire / Soviet Union and out of it, especially in the three principal emigration waves earlier in the twentieth century: post-1917, post-World War Two, and the ethnically-framed (predominantly Jewish) emigration of the late Soviet era. At the same time, post-Soviet diasporas invariably reflect recent efforts at national reinvention, characteristic of all post-Soviet succession states, including the Russian Federation, and this reinvention typically includes a prominent discourse on new, state-promoted, national diasporas.

Despite their diversity in terms of ethnic, territorial and historical background, post-Soviet diasporas can perhaps be seen as part of one complex, historically specific, diasporic field - a kind of 'fallout' from the collapse and reconfiguration of the former Soviet multi-national state in the contemporary global context. However, it is clear that at ground level, analysis must make clear distinctions between concrete diasporic situations in which different groups have found themselves since 1989-91. This paper concerns the case of one Western-based post-Soviet 'diaspora' - namely, the current population of 'Russians' in Great Britain. Both the 'Russianness' of this diaspora and the extent to which this migrant body can be understood in diasporic terms need to be understood as open; these are precisely the issues to be tackled in the analysis that follows.

The relevance of the UK as a potential diasporic site for Russians has emerged only recently. In contrast to countries such as France, Germany, the United States and Israel, Britain did not attract large numbers of Russians in previous emigration waves. However, since the mid-1990s, Britain has become a popular destination for Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet space and their numbers have risen exponentially in the past ten years, exceeding, by some estimates, the quarter-million mark.[2] This has had to do both with vastly increased opportunities for migration from the former Soviet states, and with the fact that Britain, and London in particular, has become, in precisely this period, arguably the most dynamic focus of migration in Western Europe more generally. However, the relative prominence of 'Russians' in Britain today, and the interest that both Britain and Russia are taking in this emergent 'diaspora' (as a potentially useful site of political and economic interaction), has arguably less to do with the sheer number of Russian migrants to the UK (which, in comparative terms, is still not massive), and more with the large amounts of capital (primarily economic, but also intellectual and social) that is crossing the borders with at least some of them.

The exact path of the 'diasporisation' of the post-Soviet Russian migrant population in Britain remains uncertain. One important difficulty is that the diasporisation of this migrant body can by no means be straightforwardly based either on a Russian ethnos, or a Russian state, or a Russian national culture, or, as I shall argue, the Russian language. This

migrant population is defined by something much broader and vaguer - a historically-specific socio-cultural background shared by the generation of people born in the former USSR roughly between the deaths of Stalin in 1953 and Brezhnev in 1982, whose formative identifications are therefore rooted, somewhat peculiarly, in a state and society that are no more, and whose life-worlds span the distinctive juncture between late socialism and post-socialism.[3]

The last few years have seen an intensification of efforts by variously motivated 'diasporic entrepreneurs' to mobilise a more coherently defined and organised 'Russian-speaking diaspora' on UK soil, often seeking the help and support of the Russian Federation (despite the fact that many of those who are meant to be mobilised into this diaspora do not necessarily have strong links with this state and that many who do are somewhat wary of its political motivations). However, this process of 'diasporisation' is so far proving to be slow and awkward, fraught by mutual rivalries among key diasporic activists, by a general lack of common purpose, and, most importantly, by an absence of legitimacy on the part of those hoping to represent this 'diaspora'.

Particularly problematic is the formation of representative associations that could successfully lobby Russian institutions, British local authorities, various interested businesses or other sponsors for more substantial funding on behalf of the 'diaspora' as a whole. The establishment of relatively small-scale cultural organisations (Russian-language Saturday schools, music, dance or art workshops, various 'community' clubs, circles and societies) has, by contrast, been more successful, but these, on the whole, remain local in scope, quite fragmented, and, as a rule, financially very vulnerable. The Orthodox Church is no doubt an important focus of 'community' for some migrants, but it is by no means capable of acting as a pillar of this 'diaspora' as a whole. The establishment of a more stably-funded, formally independent, Russian cultural centre (Pushkin House on Bloomsbury Square in London) is so far proving to be a success, but it is often perceived as somewhat elitist, while its size cannot compare with the state-funded cultural centres of other developed nations. At least four London-based Russian-language weekly newspapers (two of which are free) are also thriving, acting as important vehicles of commercial, social and cultural interaction within this migrant group.[4] However, although they are arguably the most effective way of displaying a 'diasporic community' and of advertising its more prominent activists and organisations, these newspapers are run mostly as commercially-motivated media organisations, rather than community organs. This also applies to large public events, such as the Russian Winter Festival which takes place in mid-January in London's Trafalgar Square. This now-annual event is undoubtedly the most exhibitionist display of a 'Russian community' in the UK, but its organiser is

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no 'diaspora' as such, but a commercial events-organising company. Of course, one must not forget various lively Internet forums, live journals and Facebook-style networking groups which specifically bring together Russian-speakers based in the UK; however, these too are inevitably rather random in scope and purpose.

As regards the future of this 'diaspora', it is still unclear, for example, if and to what extent the children of the current migrants will be meaningfully incorporated into the process of 'diasporisation'. In the short to medium term, efforts at 'diasporising' Russians in the UK are more likely to rely on continued steady in-migration from the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states, which means that the making of a 'Russian-speaking diaspora' on British soil will continue to depend on a fairly mobile and rather unstable migrant population that tends to retain consistent links with life 'back home' (wherever that is).

Before going any further, it is important to outline in more detail my general approach to studying 'diasporas'. In my research I treat 'diaspora' as a frame of reference rather than a distinct object of analysis and definition. I focus on three analytically distinct, but mutually juxtaposed and closely intertwined dimensions of 'diaspora': 1. networks of exchange; 2. performances of community; and 3. discourses of identity. These three analytical levels are designed to move away from viewing 'diaspora' as either a structure, or a culture, or a consciousness, all of which I see as notions much too susceptible to reification.

It goes without saying that a shared socio-cultural background and a definable repertoire of common cultural markers are an essential pre-condition for mutual identification and social solidarity within a diaspora, especially as it emerges in the midst of and against 'the other' of the host environment. However, this shared socio-cultural background is really only a kind of 'starting block', while the assumption of common identity and social solidarity that supposedly emanates from it is only a latent virtuality (and often a tenuous one at that). In their own right, these are not sufficient to make or define a diaspora. To have any significance at all, they require actualisation - actualisation through very concrete enactment and interaction.

In other words, 'diaspora' is only an effect of concrete actions. Put somewhat differently, 'diaspora' resides not in more or less durable and reproducible forms of social solidarity, cultural identity and senses of belonging, but in moments of diasporic en-act-ment and inter-action. Diaspora should not be identified with a network, a community or an identity, but with specific patterns of exchange, of performance and of rhetoric as they are actualised in concrete and hence potentially highly variable and unpredictable, even mutually contradictory, situations of interaction - interaction with fellow migrants, interaction with representatives or

institutions of the host society, and interaction with fellow nationals 'back home' or with institutions of the nation state(s) of origin.

The effect of all these different types of action and interaction is mobilisation - political, economic and cultural at the same time and in an intertwined way. 'Diaspora' therefore emerges as a particular form or tool of mobilisation, rather than as its end-product. In fact, 'diasporisation' is only one of many possible tools of mobilisation, inextricably tied to national and ethnic mobilisation more generally, but suitable only in certain, very specific historical and geo-political circumstances. Even here, 'diasporisation' invariably competes with other forms of social mobilisation and is not necessarily the most successful one. 'Diaspora' can prove to be an extremely effective route of mobilisation, or else it can be a complete dead-end; in particular historical and political circumstances 'diaspora' can remain a viable mobiliser for a very long time, often adapting and modifying its role and strategies to fit new socio-historical or geo-political circumstances; in other situations it can ossify and become marginal and irrelevant.

The effectiveness or viability of 'diaspora' as a tool of mobilisation does not depend only on the objective historical context, but also on very concrete political, economic and cultural agency. 'Diasporisation' is the product of concerted (although not necessarily either conscious or coherent) mobilising action by very concrete agents of 'diasporisation'. These can include states, churches, political, commercial or cultural organisations, diasporic entrepreneurs, and finally, the very individuals who are being mobilised in this way.

It is vital, of course, to study diasporic mobilisation in terms of diasporic institution-formation and in terms of the production of a (both political and cultural) discourse of the 'diaspora'. In this context, it is fascinating to examine closely both the macro- and micro-politics of diasporic mobilisation (at both the institutional and the discursive levels). However, it is also important not to analytically identify a 'diaspora' either with its explicit institutional structures, or with its own discourse, or with the specific claims made on its behalf by diasporic entrepreneurs. It also goes without saying that 'diaspora' cannot be analytically identified with the diasporically mobilised people themselves, even when these identify themselves, quite unequivocally, as part of some 'diaspora'. Diasporic institutions, discourses and individual or collective self-identifications are merely particular means of constructing a 'diaspora', rather than the 'diaspora' itself. As already suggested, the concrete (inter)actions by means of which a diaspora is constructed are those of exchange, performance and rhetoric, and it is in terms of these that one can analyse the processes of diasporisation or diasporic mobilisation without falling into the trap of reifying what is ultimately a social and discursive construct.

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In the past ten years the post-Soviet migrant population in the UK has reached a certain critical mass, enabling the formation of what can be seen as quite a lively post-Soviet 'marketplace' on UK soil. This 'marketplace' should be understood in a broad way to include both material and symbolic forms of exchange: so not just the exchange of money, labour, products and services, but even more importantly, the simultaneous exchange of information, favours and contacts - in other words, all forms of exchange involved in social networking.

As already suggested, the 'diaspora' in question should not be identified (structurally) with this exchange network as such, but should be seen as emanating from the dynamics of exchange taking place within it. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, insofar as this network exists only through exchange, its boundaries are necessarily fluid, meaning that transactions within this 'market' are not confined to post-Soviet Russian-speaking migrants alone, but strategically extend to representatives and institutions of the host British society and those of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states; they also regularly spread to other migrant groups. Secondly, it is obvious that this network is internally highly fragmented into a multiplicity of vaguely interconnected, but ultimately distinct niches, which have crystallised specifically on the basis of a very uneven distribution of different forms of capital (economic, social, cultural, ethnic, etc.) within the network. And thirdly, it is clear that individual migrants vary considerably in terms of how much they rely on these exchange networks, of precisely how they use them, and of how much access they have to which part of the network.

Speaking metaphorically, the virtual outlines of this 'marketplace' can be seen as corresponding roughly to the former Soviet space in a deterritorialised way, meaning that this exchange network can by no means be easily delimited in ethnic or national terms. Instead, it reflects the ethno-national melange and the supra-national (one could even say imperial) ambiguity of the former USSR. This, of course, does not mean that non-Russians - for example, Lithuanians, Georgians or Uzbeks, to name just a few - do not have their own independent exchange networks that merely overlap, to different degrees, with this wider, 'former Soviet' one. It also does not mean that there are no ethnic tensions and animosities or refusals to get involved in certain types of exchanges on ethnic or political grounds. However, since, as a 'marketplace', this exchange network needs to be kept as expansive and flexible as possible, it also tends to be governed by the imperative of provisional inclusiveness, rather than strict ethnic factionalisation.

The Russian language is most often highlighted as something of a distinguishing feature of this 'marketplace' - its lingua franca perhaps - in the same way as it operated in the former Soviet Union. Consequently, the

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Russian language is regularly foregrounded as the unifying cultural marker which seemingly both naturally and neutrally circumscribes this exchange network. Thus, in the discourse of the migrants themselves, the most popular way of labelling their 'diaspora' is precisely as a diaspora of 'Russian-speakers'.[5] Yet simply to accept this identification at face value can be potentially misleading. In the rest of this paper I shall try to explain why, by deconstructing the 'Russophonism' of this diaspora at the levels of exchange, rhetoric and performance.

Within the confines of the post-Soviet migrant 'marketplace', native ability in Russian can appear to have the effect of transforming the Russian-speaking migrant from 'outsider' to 'insider', while doing the opposite to non-Russian-speakers, namely to the British hosts or to members of other migrant groups. In other words, being a Russian-speaker would here imply a key form of empowerment within this particular exchange network. However, it is important to see that, at the analytical level of exchange, being a Russian speaker is not a cultural marker of identity that supposedly creates some sort of culturally-defined boundary of this 'marketplace'. At the level of exchange, no such cultural boundary of the 'marketplace' actually exists. Native ability in Russian is simply the embodiment of a particular linguistic capital. Important as this capital might be within this migrant 'marketplace', it is only one component, one 'currency' in a much more complex pattern of exchanges taking place here, involving a whole range of different forms of capital, from economic and social to cultural and ethnic. The exact value of the fact that one is a native Russian speaker, will vary from transaction to transaction, and will certainly not be the only or even the most important factor in structuring power-relations within this marketplace (for example, in many situations, different levels of ability in English might be just as, if not more, relevant).

At the analytical level of rhetoric, the term 'Russian-speaking' is neither natural nor neutral, but emerges rather as a politically correct euphemism. The rhetorical effect of this euphemism is to rework the formerly political boundaries of the USSR (as reflected in this 'marketplace') into the boundaries of the former USSR's lingua franca, which emerges as supposedly apolitical, because, in the post-Soviet era and in the context of migrant displacement, the Russian language is said to embody connections that are merely 'cultural' and/or 'pragmatic' rather than imperial and colonial. In other words, rhetorically, the term 'Russian-speaking' is designed both to imply and to conceal the political and cultural ambiguity of this diaspora. This rhetorical and, of course, also political, ambiguity of 'Russophonism' only increases in everyday usage, where the rather awkward term 'Russian-speaking' extremely easily slips into 'Russian' tout court. Indeed, in the discourse of this diaspora, the meaning of the term 'Russian' remains very uncertain and fluid. It can serve as shorthand for a

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deterritorialised and stateless 'Russian-speaking' 'former Soviet' diaspora, while simultaneously pointing specifically to the new conception of Russian nationhood as embodied by the Russian Federation (however vague this conception itself might still be).

At the analytical level of performance, the Russian language is, of course, a key part of the display of a particular diasporic identity. However, in this context again, strictly linguistic performance is only one feature of a much more complex performance of diasporic identity and community that draws not just on language but also on all sorts of other cultural markers, often in a highly variable and inconsistent way. If one analyses the different 'performances of community' of this diaspora, i.e. its various festivals, concerts, church services, school performances, song and dance competitions, newspapers, Internet forums, house parties etc., one is faced with a remarkable cultural hodgepodge, to which different members of this migrant population are likely to subscribe to very different degrees and many of them not at all. These can range from community folk dancing (of by no means always clear regional origins) to the nostalgic revisiting of old Soviet rock numbers, from pious performances of Orthodox Christianity to ironic displays of Soviet military paraphernalia, from mock-tsarist balls for the jet-set to the obligatory 8th May Women's Day celebrations, from the vodka-themed hard partying of the overworked City yuppies to children's enactments of traditional folk fairytales at Russian-language Saturday school matinees.

What is more, these ritual performances by the diasporic community are most often done simultaneously for two distinct audiences - the diaspora itself and 'the other', essentially the host British society in which this diaspora is embedded. This means that these performances of a 'diasporic community' are not just about self-identification, but also about marketing oneself to 'the other'. Put somewhat differently, constructing a diasporic identity in such performances becomes, often quite confusingly, both about performing supposedly intimate 'insider' ties and solidarities, and about 'dressing up' into simplified cultural stereotypes designed to appeal to the British other's craving for exoticism and cultural difference, as emblematic of 'multicultural Britain'. In many cases the 'community' that is being performed at these events is strategically designed not to be narrowly 'Russian', but 'Anglo-Russian' - in other words, to embody some sort of marriage of 'the best' of these two cultures, and to perform a 'community' that is consciously promoted as a site of cultural exchange and intersection, although this interaction usually leads only to a stronger essentialising and romanticising of both the Russian and the British/English culture.

In the confusing hodgepodge of cultural markers in these performances, overflowing with cultural stereotypes targeting 'the other', the Russian language does, in fact, emerge as arguably the only cultural marker

with which all members of this potential 'diaspora' are likely to identify willingly and unambiguously. This is another key reason why the Russian language appears as this diaspora's supposedly most 'natural' mobiliser and as the favoured cultural marker in its diasporic self-representation. However, this common identification through a language only applies if the Russian language is conceptualised (by the migrants themselves) in a fairly abstract and idealised way, as some sort of culturally valuable object in its own right (for example, when it is imagined as 'the great language' embodied in the revered canon of Russian classical literature).

In performative practice, however, the supposedly common Russian language is never unambiguously a marker of the cultural unity of this 'diaspora'. Just as often, the language actually functions as a performative marker of this migrant population's disunity, of its internal divisions and splits - divisions based, for instance, on differently valued regional accents, on different levels of education as expressed through language, on different degrees to which certain migrants are forgetting their native language (usually implying different degrees of assimilation into British society); and finally, language is, of course, the marker of arguably the most painful socio-cultural split within this diaspora - the split between parents and children, which is displayed first and foremost through 'dislocated' linguistic performance.

The post-Soviet Russian diaspora in the UK is a good example of a nascent diaspora whose outlines, solidarities, loyalties and identities are very difficult to grasp and express in unambiguous terms. Of course, the complexity of this diaspora and the ambiguities of its self-organisation and self-representation emanate not just from its relative 'youthfulness', but also from the specific historical context from which it has emerged. This paper has sought to show that these potentially confusing complexities and ambiguities can, however, be grasped and understood, by focusing on the analytical levels of exchange, rhetoric and performance, and by not reifying this diaspora in terms of its supposed structure, culture or diasporic consciousness.

Notes

the formal as well as informal sessions. Since this paper does not directly cite any secondary or primary sources, all supporting references and background bibliography have been excluded in the interest of the economy of space.

[2] There are no reliable statistics on how many 'Russians' currently live and work in the UK, despite a considerable interest in this question on the part of diaspora activists, various businesses, as well the Russian and British authorities. 250,000 is the most commonly cited rough estimate, made up by journalists on the basis of widely divergent claims, ranging from 70,000 (the going estimate for migrants from the Russian Federation only, including illegal ones) to well above 300,000 (to include all Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet space). It is by no means clear precisely who is or should be counted in this 'diaspora' (e.g. 'Russians' or 'Russian-speakers' and how exactly one defines these) and also whether the figure should include only those who have moved to the UK more or less long-term or also migrants who have come in on student visas or on the basis of temporary work contracts, yet who are very likely significantly to prolong their stay in the UK.

[3] One can perhaps distinguish two main generations of post-Soviet migrants living in the UK - the 'last Soviet generation' proper, essentially those born in the 1950s-60s, and the 'generation of transition', i.e. those born in the 1970s-80s. However, there are clear overlaps between these two generations, with many from the 1970s nostalgically identifying with some childhood aspects of the Soviet past. A different worldview is much more noticeable among those born at the beginning of the 1980s, although even here there is a certain echo of the Soviet cultural past, caused by the unavoidable 'lag' of socio-cultural reproduction.

[4] There are several other publications as well, such as glossy magazines, targeting narrower audiences, mostly the wealthy, especially women and/or business people. Also, it is worth noting that some other (mostly advert-based) newspapers, which target primarily Baltic-states migrants, are published in different languages (e.g. one version in Lithuanian and another in Russian).

[5] In legislation and policy documents related to 'diasporas', the Russian Federation uses the term 'compatriots' (*sootechestvenniki*) to refer to those who live outside its borders and do not have Russian citizenship (so mostly citizens of other former Soviet republics or those who emigrated in earlier, Soviet times), yet who tend to define themselves as either ethnically or culturally 'Russian', however vague and unpredictable this self-identification might be, including cases where it is to some degree one of convenience. The Russian Embassy in London accordingly sees itself as working first and foremost with citizens of the Russian Federation, and secondly, with the

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category 'compatriots' (although in this latter domain it confines itself mostly to the cultural sphere). In other words, the Embassy necessarily conceptualises this 'diaspora' as a *national* one, in accordance with Russia's existing juridical definitions. However, the term 'compatriot' is rarely used by UK-based Russians and Russian-speakers themselves when defining their own 'diaspora'. Indeed, the term *sootechestvennik* implies the key role of *otechestvo* - the fatherland, i.e. the Russian Federation itself, *as a state*. In fact, a 'compatriot' is *defined by* the (fatherland) state, in the sense that this term is ultimately *a function of the state's own (juridical) self-definition*. Yet, clearly, the UK-based 'Russian-speaking diaspora' does not define itself *strictly or straightforwardly* in relation to the Russian Federation as a state and prefers the much vaguer formulation - 'Russian-speaking diaspora'.

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The Russendisko and Music
from and of the Post-Soviet Diaspora

David-Emil Wickström

Abstract
The fortnightly event 'Russendisko' has become one of the most visible and audible events run by Post-Soviet migrants in Germany. The musical selection criteria at the event is geography - the former states of the Soviet Union - also including music by emigrants from those states. This creates a multileveled sonic texture of music from and of diasporas as well as from the DJ's "home". However, the music played at the Russendisko which is audible to the majority (non-migrant) audience draws on persisting clichés of (primarily) Russia and only reflects a fragment of the migrants' music production. This paper offers a critique of the term diaspora within a German context as a homogenising element since the Post-Soviet migrant community is ethnically and religiously diverse. In terms of music consumption, however, the lines run along a language barrier: while the most audible music (heard e.g. at the Russendisko) caters to a non-Russian speaking (and non-migrant) audience, the Russian-speaking audience (primarily migrants) have their own institutions and listen to other types of Post-Soviet popular music.

Keywords: Berlin, Germany, Post-Soviet migration**,** Post-Soviet popular music, Russendisko, Russian-language community, Russkaja, target groups.

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1. Introduction

When asked about the musical concept of the Russendisko Yuriy Gurzhy, one of the two Russendisko DJs, answered:

> Geographically it is the 15 former republics [of the Soviet
> Union] or people who come from these republics, because I
> try to pay attention to so called emigrant music.[1]

Describing the music's geographical origin, Yuriy Gurzhy stressed that the music played at the Russendisko is from the former Soviet Union. However, due to Gurzhy's emigrant focus, the Soviet Union is here more an imagined community than a fixed geographically bounded entity. Russendisko, the name of this fortnightly event located in Berlin, normally implies a discotheque for Russians. This particular event, however, is primarily aimed at Germans and now also tourists. Run by two emigrants

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from the former Soviet Union, Wladimir Kaminer (from Russia) and Yuriy Gurzhy (from the Ukraine), the Russendisko is part of a growing cultural phenomenon in Germany and Austria. Fuelled by Post-Soviet migration, stereotypes of the East and a history of Russian images in German (and European) popular music, the event shows one aspect of the complexities surrounding the Post-Soviet emigrant community in Germany.

This community's music is, however, not limited to the Russendisko. There are numerous popular music groups, events and even a national popular music organisation, Pi-Rock, with strong ties to the community active in Germany.

2.   A Russian Diaspora?

One way to group this community commonly referred to as "Die Russen" (the Russians) is through the term transmigrants.[2] The term stresses a strong tie between host and home-land. Transmigrant, however, does not really include the transnational network beyond the home and host country which is an important component of this group.

The concept of diaspora seems more suitable to grasp the emigrants in Germany. Living in a host country they have a common origin, the former Soviet Union. They also have common points of reference like language (Russian), socialisation and official Soviet popular culture. Furthermore, they not only maintain transnational contacts with friends and family back in the former Soviet Union, but also with people dispersed across the world.

Diasporas also challenge national boundaries, something that Gurzhy's opening quote demonstrates: the music promoted at the Russendisko comes from a transnational network of residents in and emigrants from the former Soviet Union.

At first glance the concept of diaspora seems apt to grasp this network of (primarily) Russian-speaking inhabitants. The term, especially when applied from outside the community, hides the fact that this group is not homogenous. It consists of different ethnicities as well as different religions.

Tölölyan argues that the notion of diasporas only emerging from homogenous groups

> emphasises the preservation and/or non-discontinuous evolution of a single, previously available identity, and tends to overlook the possibility that quite loosely related populations possessed of many different, locally circumscribed identities in their homelands, but regarded as 'one' in the hostland, can be turned into a diaspora by the gaze of that hostland.[3]

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This previous homogenising identity is Russen used both by the emigrants as well as by people living in Germany:

> Schum is a radio show about 'Russian' music […]. 'Russian' in quotation marks since for most Germans (and often for the Russians themselves) all russophone people are 'the Russians'. And so we also play Ukrainian, Moldavian, Belorussian, Jewish music and collect them under the term 'Russian'.[4]

This quote is taken from the website of the monthly radio show Schum based in Halle. It reflects the overarching use of the term "Russian" to designate the russophone immigrant community.

The quote also points out that the group of emigrants from the former Soviet Union is not homogenous. It can be split into three groups, making Germany special in terms of Post-Soviet migration:[5]

A) Ethnic Germans who are predominantly Protestant.[6] They come from Kazakhstan, Russia, Kirgistan and other central Asian states. In German they are referred to as Spätaussiedler, Russlanddeutsche and Wolgadeutsche. Their return is guaranteed in the German constitution and in the Federal Expellees Act and with their repatriation certificate these immigrants receive the German citizenship. In the period 1991 to 2005 1 931 083 ethnic Germans moved to Germany.[7]

B) Jews who primarily come from the urban centres in the European part of the former USSR. They were accepted through the Quota Refugee Act, originally established 1980 to admit refuges from South-East Asia as humanitarian refuges (e.g. Vietnamese boat people). They can apply for citizenship once they become eligible (normally after 8 years of residence in Germany). By December 31st, 2005, 205,645 Jews from the former Soviet Union had emigrated.[8]

C) Ethnic Russians (Ukrainians, etc.) who are primarily Russian Orthodox. These consist of asylum seekers, professionals, students and marriage migrants. About 187,500 Russian (2006), 129,000 Ukrainian (2006) and 18,037 Belorussian citizens (2005), to name a few Post-Soviet nationalities, were residing in Germany 2005/2006. The problem with these numbers is that they include Jewish emigrants, since they as mentioned do not automatically receive the German citizenship on arrival.[9]

Thus, based on these numbers and a conservative estimation there are at least 2.6 million Russian speaking migrants in Germany at the moment. Of those at least 70,000 are currently living in Berlin.[10] Putting this into context, there were 6,751,002 registered foreign citizens residing in Germany 2006 which is about 8.2% of Germany's total population of 82,348,399.[11]

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According to both Germans and emigrants to whom I spoke, the community in Berlin where I conducted my research, is fractured. The migrants frequent different cultural institutions and to some extent also live in different regions of the city.[12]

At the first glance this segregation seems logical based on the emigrants' ethnic backgrounds. The European ethnologist Darieva argues, however, that the categories 'ethnic German' and 'Jewish' are primarily imposed by the host country, Germany.[13] These ethnic categories which in Germany are linked to different expectations and institutions (Jewish community, organisations for ethnic Germans) were almost void of meaning in the Soviet Union. Thus Darieva argues that the German state creates an artificial split, which she labels Re-tribalisations.

3.   Target Groups

Framing the group as a Russian-language community, however, could be a way to overcome the artificial segregation while avoiding homogenising the group. Darieva argues that the language Russian is used as a super-ethnic collective identity category in Russian-language print media in Berlin and London.[14] While this is primarily seen from the print media's perspective and not that of the individuals, a language-based approach can be used here as well.

The local discotheques and youth clubs catering to ethnic Germans and Jews focus on Russian-language popular music like Russian pop/estrada and house. On the other hand, the Russendisko caters primarily to a German speaking audience. Thus, a more useful distinction when discussing the musical production of the Post-Soviet community is target groups: a Russian-speaking and a non-Russian-speaking audience. Here a clear difference can be heard in the music played.

A.   Russian-speaking Audience

One organisation catering towards the Russian-speaking audience is the organisation Pi-Rok. Providing a platform for promoting music, the organisation targets migrants singing in Russian. The music hosted on the organisations website ranges from what is perceived as Pop to Rock reflecting current trends in popular music. Furthermore, the organisation regularly hosts festivals and has ties to a recording studio.

Apart from the language (primarily sung in Russian), the music does not really differ from popular music produced by their non-migrant peers. The above mentioned clubs catering to Jews and ethnic Germans also mirror this, playing Russian language popular music.

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B.   German-speaking Audience
        My main research focus has been the German-speaking target group. Here the Russendisko and other similar concepts which have appeared afterwards are interesting in two ways.
        First, the music played is linked to a transnational Post-Soviet imagined community illustrated through the groups presented at the event. While the majority are from the territory of the former Soviet Union, the DJs make a point in selecting emigrant groups as well (as mentioned in the beginning). However, the event is not fixed to one location. Hosting guest Russendiskos in other cities, the DJs tour Europe and Israel. Furthermore, similar events have appeared in cities like Halle, Vienna, Graz and Freiburg.
        This reflects a general flow of Post-Soviet popular music - at least through the German-speaking countries. Bands both linked to the emigrant community in Austria and Germany as well as from the former Soviet Union regularly tour the European club circuit and play not only for emigrant audiences. This is enabled through the popularity of the Russendisko which has made the music known and available. Other important factors are personal contacts within the dispersed Post-Soviet community, clubs, record labels focused on Eastern European music and hard work.
        Returning to the music played at the Russendisko a closer examination of the first Russendisko sampler reveals a tendency towards shared stylistic traits:[15] lyrics in Russian (and some Ukrainian / Belorussian) with music influenced by Ska / Ska-punk, the use of a horn section and to some extent influences of traditional music and/or instruments.
        Yuriy Gurzhy acknowledged in an interview that his colleague Wladimir Kaminer and he play music that they like.[16] The criteria he stressed was that the music has to be danceable. Thus the DJs filter the music according to their taste and present only a small selection of popular music from e.g. Russia. In addition, a lot of the music they play can only be heard at the local club circuit in the originating countries and not on media with a national reach.
        The second aspect which makes the Russendisko interesting is its target group consisting primarily of Germans and now increasingly more tourists. The attendance of Post-Soviet migrants according to people I talked to is between 15 and 20% of the local community.
        One reason for its popularity with Germans might be a European reception history of imagined Russian music especially from the 1960s and onward. I call this the Russian folklore lineage. This reception focused on Russian folklore both performed by Russians in exile like Serge Jaroff and his Don Cossack Chorus, ethnic Germans like Alexandra or pseudo-Russians like the German Iwan Rebroff (a.k.a. Hans-Rolf Rippert).
        The song "Casatschok" refers to a Cossack folk dance in 2/4. It provides a good example of folklore mixed with (popular) music production

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in the 1960s and how this music spread to other European countries and local languages; the Bulgarian singer Boris Rubaschkin made an arrangement in 1967 which by 1969 had been licensed and covered in Denmark, Sweden, France, Spain and Germany.[17]

Russian folklore also had a minor impact on popular music, especially the disco styles, of the 1970s; remains like Boney M's "Rasputin" (1978), Dschinghis Khan's "Moskau" and "Dschinghis Kahn" (both 1979) are regularly played at the Russendisko.

Besides promoting folklore this reception also helped maintain stereotypes of Russians as an exoticised Other. These are recycled at the Russendisko through the use of Russian and Soviet kitsch elements and stereotypes; TV-screens above the dance floor show Soviet cartoons, Vodka is served at the bar and the promotion posters used for the event are slightly altered Soviet and Tsarist Russia (propaganda) posters. Even the compilation CDs draw on this, e.g. Radio Russendisko produced by Yuriy Gurzhy and Wladimir Kaminer.[18] The CD includes a cover of Boney M's "Rasputin" (played by Berlin-based Dr Bajan) as well as Alexandra's "Schwarze Balalaika" (originally from 1968). Furthermore, Wladimir Kaminer's books also play with these stereotypes. His success as an author is a contributing factor to the Russendisko's popularity.

Musically, the Russian folklore lineage is also kept alive through German and Austrian groups like Apparatschik, Cosmonautix and Russkaja. While some of the musicians have ties to the Russian community, they at the same time draw on the aforementioned persisting European clichés. The Viennese-based group Russkaja provides a good example of the general music style played at the Russendisko while at the same time using the folklore elements as an additional kitsch factor. At a concert featured on the CD/DVD "Kasatchok Superstar" the vocalist starts with a Russian folk song (The Volga Boatmen's song) before transitioning to Russkaja's song "Barabany" ("Drums").[19] Not only the choice of material is important here, but also the performance style: Russkaja's vocalist clearly adheres to the style of Ivan Rebroff and the cliché of deep-Russian operatic basses. He uses full chest voice and starts in the low-range. The shift to the song Barabany is both audible (the final note in the Volga Boatmen's song is extended into a scream) and visualised with the vocalist breaking his static pose through dancing. "Barabany" fits well into the Russendisko-style, using a horn section over a Ska-punk beat. The name of the album, Kasatchok Superstar as well as the CD's graphic layout also clearly allude to this lineage.

4.   Conclusion

Whereas Post-Soviet migration to other countries is very restricted, by providing a generous legal framework for accepting ethnic Germans and Jews, Germany occupies a special position. However, this is covered up in

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the media and in the public perception by applying the term "Russians" and diaspora.

The aim of my paper has been to critique the homogenisation of migrant groups based on national (or in this case supra-national) origin, especially the concept of diaspora, which is often uncritically applied to these groups. While the Post-Soviet emigrants living in Germany have a common point of origin and are embedded in a transnational network, the concept of diaspora hides the fact that this group is diverse - both ethnically and religiously. Due to the recent emigration it is also too early to determine if a diasporic consciousness will sustain itself through the generations. Instead of diaspora the supra-ethnic term "Russian-language community" might be more appropriate. This also opens for non-migrants who through their knowledge of Russian are active within the network.

Together with Wladimir Kaminer's books, the Russendisko is often used as an example for how multicultural Berlin is and how migrants (in this case Post-Soviet) contribute to cultural life. However, this only shows one side of the cultural production - that aimed at a German speaking target group. In other words, not only the group, but also its music production is diverse. The music aimed at a Russian-speaking audience is primarily invisible for the majority of Germans. Thus the Russendisko and groups close to the event create a distorted picture of Post-Soviet popular music. This in spite the fact that the Russendisko-network relies strongly on a transnational Russian language community to obtain, distribute and perform the music.

Notes

[1] Y Gurzhy, Berlin, 05.10.2005.

[2] N G Schiller, L Basch, & C S Blanc, "From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration", *Anthropological Quarterly,* vol. 68, no. 1, 1995, pp. 48-63.

[3] K Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", *Diaspora,* vol. 5, no. 1, 1996, p. 13.

[4] http://www.newchance.de/schum/index.php?menue=radio, 06.02.2008.

[5] Cf. B Dietz, "German and Jewish migration from the Former Soviet Union to Germany: Background, Trends and Implications", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* vol. 26, no. 4, October 2000, p. 642ff.

[6] The ethnic Germans are descendants of Germans who emigrated to inter alia Russia, Rumania, Hungary and the Ukraine in the 18th and 19th century. The term also refers to those displaced from what is now Western Poland due to the second World War. The repatriation is based both on the imagined blood-lineage with today's Germany as well as the persecution of ethnic Germans in former Eastern Europe.

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[7] A Kiss & H Lederer, *Migration, Asyl und Integration in Zahlen*, 14 edn., Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Referat 124 - Geschäftsstatistik, Nürnberg, 2006, p. 65.

[8] The numbers are based on Kiss and Lederer, p. 68. which covers 1993 through 2005. This number also includes 8,535 Jews who immigrated to Germany before November 10, 1991 - before the procedures of the *Quota Refugee Act* were adopted. Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Immigration Law and Policy*, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, 2005, p. 58.

[9] Statistisches Bundesamt, *Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit - Ausländische Bevölkerung - Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2005*, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, 2006, p. 39. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, September 2007, p. 48.

[10] With regard to Berlin it is harder to detail the numbers. As of June 30th, 2006 there were 24,206 citizens of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine residing in Berlin. (http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/statistik/demografie/einwohner_staatsangeho erigkeit.html, 30.05.2008, based on material from the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2006) Furthermore, between 1993-2004 about 42,000 ethnic Germans moved to Berlin. This is a rough estimate based on R Ohliger & U Raiser, *Integration und Migration in Berlin. Zahlen - Daten - Fakten*, Der Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration, Berlin, 2005, p. 21.

[11] Kiss & Lederer, op. cit., p. 82.

[12] I was told that the Jews tend to live in Charlottenburg while the ethnic Germans live in Lichtenberg, Marzahn and Spandau. The third group which was labelled the *alternatives* (maybe *Russian-speaking bohème* is more fitting) is centred around Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg. This overlaps with Darieva who writes that the preferred settlement areas are Charlottenburg, Wilmersdorf and Schöneberg. One group of ethnic Germans coming from Siberia and Kazakhstan have settled in the outer boroughs Marzahn, Hohenschönhausen and Lichtenberg (partially due to the states´ settlement policy). T Darieva, *Russkij Berlin - Migranten und Medien in Berlin und London*, Lit Verlag, Münster, 2004, p. 127f. Dietz discusses this as well, pointing out that the Jewish migrants centre themselves around the Jewish communities while the ethnic Germans remain within a community of other ethnic Germans. Dietz, *German and Jewish migration from the former Soviet Union to Germany: background, trends and implications.*

[13] T Darieva, *Russkij Berlin - Migranten und Medien in Berlin und London*, p. 77ff.

[14] ibid., p. 262ff.

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[15] Various Artists, *Russendisko-Hits*, Trikont US-0308, 2003.

[16] Gurzhy, op.cit.

[17] http://www.coverinfo.de, 04.06.2008. The artists were Birthe Kjær (DK), Dimitri Dourakine, Rika Zaraï (FR), Georgie Dann (ES), Towa Carson (SE) and Dalida / Yolanda Christina Gigliotti (DE).

[18] Various Artists, *Radio Russendisko*, Russendisko Records RD 002, 2005.

[19] Russkaja, *Kasatchok Superstar*, Chat Chapeau CCR015-2, 2007.

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Are National Minorities of the Former USSR Becoming New Diasporas?
The Case of the Tatars of Kazakhstan

Yves-Marie Davenel

Abstract
Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Kazak State has developed a pragmatic approach on the issue of nationality policy by promoting ethnonational diversity. At the same time, the term diaspora has become widespread in the former USSR and in contemporary Kazakhstan to refer to the former national minorities. The use of this term questions the relationship between the titular nation and the national minorities in introducing a differentiation between "we" and "they". Thanks to fieldwork materials, this paper shows how a former soviet national minority, the Tatars, who lived in Kazakhstan for more than two centuries, are facing these new questions about their own identity. Besides, it shows how the Kazak and Tatar States play a role in the building of a Tatar diaspora. Then, this paper analyses what kind of discourses about their identity the Tatars living in Kazakhstan produce today. I argue here that in the specific context of multiethnic Kazakhstan the use of the term diaspora to analyse the situation of ethnic minorities is problematic. Indeed, it is used in different contexts by different actors with diverse intentions.

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The French scholar, Gérard Lenclud, in another context spoke of 'tool-word' and 'word-problem' to express the difficulties researchers encounter when using the word tradition. The same is true with the term diaspora. Everybody has a vague idea what diaspora refers to: it means people from one country disseminated in another one. It becomes a 'word-problem' when scholars attempt to give a clear-cut definition or to make typologies.

Its emergence in the scientific circle dates back to the 1970's in the Anglo-Saxon world, and to the 1980's in France. But the term really entered the media in the following decade. It is almost at the same time that the word diaspora became widespread in the new independent States. During the Soviet period, its use was limited to foreign countries and employed in

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scientific circle. Moreover, the study of this phenomenon was not very common among Soviet scholars.

According to the Russian scholar Natalya Kosmarskaya, the diffusion of the term diaspora in the Russian Federation is linked to the will of some Russian publicists, journalists and factions of political opposition, especially those of nationalistic and patriotic orientation, to play a role in the life of the Russians in the 'near abroad'. That is a 'diasporisation' of the 'compatriots' to maintain previous links in the new independent States.[1]

Even after 1991, the term has received few scientific interpretations.[2] In Russia, some scholars have discussed the concept. In 2000, V.A. Tichkov wrote a very innovative article in the scientific journal *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie* where he challenged the classical approach of the term. He insists on a dynamic approach and points out that a diaspora is:

> a political project, a feeling and situation without defined membership and exclusive identity. More often, it is a national choice or an outside inducement to be diaspora.[3]

While the thesis of Tichkov provoked some critics, the paper was favourably received by Russian scholars. Yet debates over this issue are still limited to scientific circles.

In Kazakhstan, the word diaspora appeared in public speeches during the first years of independence. It is used as a synonym of ethnic groups or national minorities, without scientific definition. According to the Kazak ethnologist Nurbulat Masanov, diasporas as such don't exist in Kazakhstan if we refer to a scientific approach. From his viewpoint, considering that a diaspora is a population made of people from outside who don't feel integrated in the host country it resides in, and who claims cultural and political peculiarities, no one of the hundred national minorities of the country can be called a diaspora.

Yet the term exists and its use needs explanation. When and in which context is the term used? What does that mean concretely to be designated as a diaspora for a national minority? These are some questions I would like to explore in this paper through the example of the Tatars residing in Kazakhstan

1.   Does a Tatar Community Exist?

The very use of a common Tatar name is problematic, since it refers to different peoples disseminated all over the CIS and in other parts of the world. Though this ethnonym is used with an epithet (usually referring to a location[4]) to distinguish different groups, the problem is complicated today by the claims of, at least, two parties. On the one hand, the authorities of the newly independent republic of Tatarstan call to a wide Tatar nation who

would include all the Tatar groups on the basis of a so-called 'community of culture and language'. This supranational view aims at reinforcing the Tatar nation. On the other hand, since the collapse of the USSR, some Tatar groups, like the Tatars of Siberia, the Tatars of Astrakhan or the Krjashen (orthodox Tatars) seek the recognition of their specificities as separate ethnic groups. This confrontation between these opposite positions reached its culmination at the time of the 2002 census in the Russian Federation when Tatars of Siberia, Tatars of Astrakhan, and Krjashen were counted separately. Though very few members of these groups decided to register themselves as Tatars of Siberia or Krjashen (about 34 thousand out of a population of 5.5 million of Tatars), this fact stresses the division existing inside a nation called Tatar.

Tatars who today live in Kazakhstan are for the most part originating from the Volga-Ural region. They arrived in today Kazakhstan by successive waves: the first one started in the 19th century and the last one ended up in the 1960's. Besides the Russians and the Cossacks, they contributed to the urbanisation and the economic development of the Steppe thanks to their commercial and industrial activities. In the 18th century, they also constituted the main part of mullahs in the Kazak steppes and they kept control over religious and laic teaching at least until the end of the 19th century.[5] Thus, their establishment dates back before the existence of modern Kazak and Tatar official entities and was often based on family networks that would be described today as trans-state.

The introduction of the Soviet regime and the creation of the Kazak soviet socialist republic and the Tatar autonomous soviet socialist republic have contributed to a disintegration of the bonds between Tatars, even if personal bonds remained throughout this period. In addition to this, there was a russification and a sovietisation process of the people in the two republics which led to a loss of consciousness of the Tatar culture in the Volga-Ural area as well as in Kazakhstan. Long-established Tatars developed, if not an identity, at least their own way of life, largely influenced by local Russian populations in the cities, Kazak in villages. Only the people having emigrated from Tatarstan towards Kazakhstan during the 1960's massively returned after the creation of a Tatar sovereign entity.

Tatars are today disseminated all over the country. Though they consider themselves part of a Tatar national minority, differences between groups according to their origin exist. Yet in Kazakhstan these linguistic and/or cultural features don't play a differentiating role like in the republic of Tatarstan.

Since the end of the 1980's, national minorities in the USSR and in Kazakhstan have demanded and obtained some cultural rights. Thanks to 'cultural entrepreneurs', these minorities have become to exist as entities. Thus, Tatars now possess their own cultural centres where they carry on

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national language and culture. The official face of Tatars is cultural organisations. Of course, those are not the reflection of the totality of the people declaring themselves as Tatars. Indeed, most part of them ignores the activities and the claims of these associations. Yet these cultural organisations constitute the only official interlocutor of the Tatar community's interests; a community which is, in itself, difficult to define.

This fact raises the question of the definition of a Tatar community. Since the Tatar associations do not reflect the 'community' as a whole, can we consider the entire group as a diaspora or just some sub-groups inside it? Here I would like to mention the analysis made by the French sociologist Stéphane Dufoix.[6] According to this scholar, the classical definition of the concept diaspora suffers three illusions. Here, I point out only two that seem to me very useful for our understanding of the question. The first one is what he calls the 'illusion of the community': from this point of view a diaspora is not a social product. It is a sum of people that can be counted. The fact of counting people of the same assigned nationality makes the diaspora, i.e. the national group, become real. The second one is the 'illusion of the continuity': the existence of a group is considered natural in an essentialist approach. The processes and the evolutions of one group are not taken into account.

In practice, these two points are today widely used to make diaspora exist. Indeed, they are the basis for the construction and the production of delimited group by States.

2.   The Construction of a Tatar Diaspora: Influences of Tatar and Kazak States

In everyday life, the word diaspora competes with other terms such as nationality, ethnic group and national minority in the official speeches of the Kazakhstani authorities, as well as in the discourses of the leaders of the minorities. It does not have any negative connotation. As we will see below, this conception change according to the different contexts it is used.

During the Soviet period, Tatars were just one nationality among other nationalities. They were primarily defined thanks to statistics and a folklorised culture. They had very often forgotten a Tatar identity in favour of a supranational, Soviet identity. With the collapse of the USSR and the establishment of independent countries, Tatars became members of separated States. Yet, they didn't consider themselves as emissaries and diaspora representatives of a new state, Tatarstan, overnight. The bonds with Tatarstan were thin, if not non-existent, for the great majority of them. The low rate of emigration of Tatars to Tatarstan after 1991 is an illustration of it. This fact is partly due to economic and political reasons (political situation of Tatarstan within the Russian Federation, absence of a true supplementary program for the installation of immigrants in the 1990's).

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Nevertheless, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the Tatar State convoked an assembly (kurultaj) of the Tatar people in Kazan. This assembly brought together Tatars from the whole world. This event marked the beginning of a vast movement of exchanges between Kazan and the 'compatriots from abroad'. Tatarstan was then defined and recognised by the participants as the historical centre of Tatars and the 'tatarness'.

Since then, Tatarstan has been developing an active policy of support for its compatriots from abroad by means of the World Congress of Tatars and of special subcommittees within various ministries. Created in 1992, the World Congress of Tatars is an NGO financed by the Tatar state whose aim is to get data about Tatars of the world, to coordinate and support their actions, in particular in the cultural and linguistic spheres. This policy essentially takes on a cultural and linguistic appearance through the involvement of Tatar artists or the sending of teaching equipment to 'Sunday schools'.[7]

In 2002 an amendment of the Constitution was adopted, recognising the duties of Tatarstan towards the compatriots from abroad. Article 14 stipulates that:

> Tatarstan ensures its support for the development of the national culture, of the language, for the safeguarding of the characteristics of Tatars living outside the borders of the Republic of Tatarstan.[8]

If the text doesn't use the term, in this way the authorities of Tatarstan take part in the construction and the reconnaissance of a Tatar diaspora.

The true 'rediscovery' of Tatars of Kazakhstan took place in 1996 at the time of the first official visit of the president of Tatarstan during which he met his Kazakhstani counterpart. It contributes to an improvement of the conditions of cultural existence of the Tatars: neither the Kazakhstani authorities, nor Tatarstan can ignore their claims anymore.

Besides cultural bonds, Tatarstan is also developing important economic bonds with Kazakhstan. These bonds are partly based on local businesses called 'Torgovyj dom Tatarstan' (Commercial firms Tatarstan). Although the trades between the two countries are treated on an official level, it is partly based on Tatars entrepreneurs well acquainted with the local markets and their operating modes. These economic relations do not imply interference from Tatarstan in the relationship between the Tatar minority and the Kazakhstani state. Yet if need be, the Tatar minority can call upon Tatarstan to plead its cause to the Kazakhstani authorities.

Thus, by the recognition of the existence of compatriots outside its boundaries and the support provide to them, the republic of Tatarstan made a Tatar diaspora a reality.

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In the other hand, the Kazak authorities play a role in this process too. By promoting the Kazak culture, the Kazak president establishes a clear distinction between an indigenous culture and those of national minorities. Kazak traditions are considered to be rooted into the Steppe territory. Those of the minorities are viewed like outside elements, even if they are recognised. The recognition of the richness of these foreign elements allows the authorities to distinguish between ethnic groups. By promoting these external contributions, these speeches point out the otherness of national minorities.

In his books, the president of Kazakhstan uses the term diaspora to make a clear distinction between 'Us-the titular nation' from 'Others-the national minorities'. Although national minorities enjoy important cultural rights and limited political rights since May 2007, the purpose of this speech, and then the use of the word diaspora, is to make clear to them the primacy of the Kazak culture. At the same time, the purpose of the president is to create a civic nation, a Kazakhstani nation in which diasporas could play the role of intermediaries between their countries of origin and Kazakhstan. Thus, by delimiting boundaries in a multinational State, the Kazak authorities participate in the creation of a feeling of belonging to a diaspora. Moreover, the members of diasporas have to respect some rules. In his book, *V Potoke Istorii (In the Flow of History)*, Nazarbaev underlines the absence of political claims of Kazaks in the countries in which they live and thus means the place the national minorities must hold.[9]

The creation of the Tatar diaspora in Kazakhstan is thus based on two parallel factors. The recognition of compatriots from abroad by the Tatar authorities gives it an official existence. At the same time, it allows the Kazak authorities to consider them as non indigenous on the territory of the newly independent State. The question now is: how does the Tatar minority react to this new situation?

3.   The Mobilising Power of Diaspora? Some Elements of Response

One of the difficulties we meet when using the term diaspora is the reality it covers. If any diaspora can potentially be defined as an ethnic/national minority, the opposite is not true. All national minorities cannot be a diaspora.

Two ways of being a member of a diaspora (as well as an ethnic group) must be taken into account: the belonging and the affiliation. If the first one results directly from a state of birth and is given by the others, that is the non members, the second is the expression of personal feelings.

This issue is very problematic in Kazakhstan since the rediscovery of a Tatar identity and, then the mobilisation of it, is a recent fact. Although the reflection about a Tatar identity dates back to the 1960s in the then Tatar ASSR, in Kazakhstan this national identity was not a factor of cultural

mobilisation until the 1990s. It is only after the law on language edited in 1989 than the first cultural centres were founded. Their first aims were and are still today a 're-birth' of Tatar language, culture and traditions.

Tatar cultural centres exist in every administrative region (*oblast*) of Kazakhstan. Most of them are members of the Tatar and Tatar-Bachkir Sociocultural Centres Association.

Although cultural centres are the only official voice of Tatars, they have a limited power since a lot of Tatar people living in Kazakhstan don't take part in their activities. Other forms of socialisation exist, principally based on kinship. These two points are not mutually exclusive, but the second one is more important than the first.

Parallel to the Association, an official diplomatic representation of the Tatar republic in the Kazak republic has been opened to improve commercial links between the two countries and to ensure help to local Tatars. While not an embassy, it represents the official face of Tatarstan in this country.

From the Kazak State point of view, as well as from the point of view of the Tatar authorities, however, the Tatar diaspora exists as a sum of people with the same nationality. This approach does not take into account the real involvements of a person into his/her nationality. This relationship depends on several factors including age, sex, region and date of settlement. Fieldwork surveys reveal that people don't have the same behaviour vis-à-vis his/her ethnic group of belonging according to age. The younger and elder generations tend to be more inclined to ethnic/national feelings than middle aged people. They actively participate in the activities of Tatar cultural centres. Yet this does not mean that they identify themselves with Tatarstan or that they wish to emigrate. They are conscious of belonging to a wide Tatar nation, but at the same time feel themselves to be one hundred percents citizens of the Kazakstani nation. The middle-age group is more cosmopolite and exogamic marriages are a common fact.

Besides, a number of Tatar regard Kazakhstan as their 'fatherland' (*rodina*) for several reasons: they are attached to the places of memory such as the burials of their ancestors, but also to the streets of a Tatarka (Tatar suburb in the cities founded at the tsarist time) and to their friendly relationships with members of other nationalities. Thus, Kazakhstan is distinguished from Tatarstan, which is considered as a 'historical fatherland'. The relation to the territory varies according to interviewed people, and a North-South cleavage takes shape, a cleavage related to the period of settlement of the Tatar families in the Kazak territory. Then, the more we go southward, the more the bonds with the territory are recent. The speeches on the autochthony follow this line. Indeed, it is not rare that the inhabitants of Almaty regard themselves more as ''guests in the country of the Kazaks''[10] than as natives. This way of thinking is less common in the North and in the

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East of the country where the prevailing feeling is that of the autochthony. Yet, the claim of autochthony is not linked to political demands. It is based on 'historical' background according to which Tatars have been living in these areas for eight or nine generations.

In this context, the use of the term diaspora by the representatives of Tatar cultural centres must be understood in two opposite ways. As long as the term is used as a synonym for national minority, the word is actualised as the expression of a community rooted in Kazakhstan which has thin bonds with Tatarstan. However, during interviews when I asked whether or not the term refers to exogenous group, the same persons categorically rejected the word diaspora, or to be more precise, this definition of the term. Yet, this kind of discourses is quite rare since ordinary people utilise words without any scientific or elaborated definition.

Hence, in this context, the common use of the term diaspora is not very helpful to understand the different aspects of an ethnic origin mobilisation.

To understand the way the nationality factor functions we have to take into consideration another factor: the migrations. Since the collapse of the USSR, many members of national minorities living at this time in Kazakhstan have emigrated (Russian, German, Ingouche, Ukrainian, and so on). Tatars did not. Those who emigrated did so for economic reasons but not necessarily to Tatarstan (usually they left for Russia). Some others emigrated to Tatarstan for political and/or emotional reasons: they wanted to live in the country of their forefathers and build a 'new post-Soviet country'.

However, most of the Tatars living in Kazakhstan for many generations have chosen to stay. We can note different attitudes in the relation to the so-called 'fatherland' (*rodina*):

1) Ignorance and/or indifference. This is the most common attitude.

2) The will to establish cultural bonds with Tatarstan but without project of emigration. This attitude is supported by the Tatar State.

3) The will to emigrate.

This category of people can be divided in two subgroups: those who want to leave because they don't trust in the future of the country, and those who choose to emigrate because of language shift and the future of their children. These latter feel well integrated in the country but choose to take advantage of the migration policy launched in June 2006 by the Russian Federation authorities ("State program to aid voluntary migration of compatriots from abroad"). As a member of the Russian Federation, the republic of Tatarstan participates in this program. It has to provide housing, job opportunities and

social care to 700 families). They are not looking for the opportunity to live in a Tatar environment and generally consider the Russian rather than the Tatar language as their natural tongue.

Moreover, they don't use the network of national cultural centres but rather address their requests for help directly to the republic of Tatarstan. We can explain that by the fact that representatives of the cultural centre do not have the possibility to provide help to migrate. The migration policy for the Russian Federation is the responsibility of the Russia embassy. But even if the representatives of the cultural centres could provide help, they would not necessarily do so. Indeed, they consider it would be counterproductive for their own situation since the Kazak authorities would interpret this fact as an act of mistrust vis-à-vis the political and interethnic situation in the country.

The mobilisation of the belonging to a diaspora is thus used by some Kazakhstani Tatars in a specific way. This way corresponds to what the Russian scholar Tichkov points out, i.e. the diaspora must be defined as a situational and contextual experiment in a particular moment.

4.   Conclusion

The example of the Tatars of Kazakhstan shows that the use of a term is not neutral. It has to be analysed in the context of utilisation. While the Tatar State uses it as a means of consolidating the Tatar ethnos, the Kazak State uses it to make a distinction between indogenic and exogenic groups. Tatars themselves mobilise the term in order to benefit some material advantages or reject it when diaspora is used as a synonym of allochtony. While national feelings of affiliation cannot be reduced only to utilitarianism, the use of the term diaspora expresses political stakes.

Describing the contemporary situation of national minorities in post-Soviet countries with such term as diaspora without a study of its use by the different actors in presence is problematic as well. That is why we cannot answer the question raised in the title without considering all the aspects of the issue. The answer is open, depending on the viewpoint.

Yet in the context of contemporary Kazakhstan, the use of diaspora would not be helpful in the overall comprehension since its use would dissimulate different aspects of reality. Indeed, what do Korean, German, Russian, and Tatar diasporas have in common? Except the fact that they are all former sovietised national minorities, their relationships to so-called 'homeland' and relationships to the country they live in vary widely.

Since I would not deny that the term corresponds to a certain reality, or a political project, as in the case of the Tatar State and then has to be used to analyse the relationship centre would like to develop with what it consider to be its periphery, the contrary is more problematic. Indeed, speaking of a Tatar diaspora as a homogeneous entity or as a political/cultural community is a non-sense.

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Hence, in this particular case the use of the term diaspora as an analytical concept could be misleading. We need to analyse it as a 'word-problem' and to elaborate new terms or concepts to describe this specific situation.

Notes

[1] N Kosmarskaya, "Russian Diasporas in the Light of Identity : Conceptualising Position of the Russian-speakers in the Post-Soviet States", in *Les Diasporas. 2000 ans d'histoire*. L Antelby-Yemini, W Berthomière, G Sheffer (eds), PUR, Rennes, 2005, pp. 335-336.

[2] Some Russian scientific journals like *Etničeskoe obozrenie* and *Diaspory* have dedicated articles to these issues.

[3] V A Tichkov, "Istoritcheskij fenomen diaspory" (Diaspora as an Historical Phenomenon), *Etničeskoe obozrenie*, N°2, 2000.

[4] For example Tatars of Siberia, Tatars of Astrakhan, Tatars of Kazan.

[5] A J Frank, "Tatars Mullahs among the Kazaks and the Kyrgyzs at the XVIII-XIXth Centuries", in *Kul'tura, iskusstvo tatarskogo naroda : istoki, tradicii, vzaimosvâzi*, Kazan, 1993, p. 129

[6] S Dufoix, *Les diasporas*, PUF, Paris, 2003, pp. 63-65

[7] Most of the national cultural centres have opened lessons of language for their own community. Generally, these lessons take place on Sunday. These "national schools" are supported by the state as teachers are paid by the government.

[8] Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan n°1130 'O vnesenii izmenenij i dopolnenij v Konstitutsiu Respuliki Tatarstan', April 19th 2002.

[9] Nazarbaev writes: "The Kazak diasporas have admirably assimilated the culture, the language and the habits of the countries in which they live since decades. They practically do not know a political movement based on national factors. During the period covering all the post-war period, there is not any example of protests of the Kazak population against the representatives of the titular nation for ethnic or confessional causes. That must be used as a model to all the diasporas residing in Kazakhstan'. N Nazarbaev, *V potoke istorii (In the Flow of History)*, Atamura, Almaty, 1999, p. 136

[10] Interview with the director of the Tatar public centre of the town of Almaty

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Measuring Diasporic Identities: A Survey on Foreign Students Attending the University of Pisa

Gabriele Tomei

Abstract:
Despite its growing spread and success, the concept of diaspora suffers an evident lack of systematic definition, not only from a theoretical but also from an empirical point of view. This paper discusses the main results of an on-line survey of young foreigners attending the University of Pisa with the aim of contributing to a bottom-up definition of the concept of diaspora through the analysis of a wide set of instrumental but also expressive and cultural indicators. In fact, if strength of ties, amplitude and frequency of contacts with other natives (living at home and/or abroad) are generally considered the main proxy indicators of a possible diasporic structuration of migrant groups, the paper argues that there are at least other three cultural and sociological conditions that makes these outcomes possible or not: (i) whether or not the migrant group members belong to a wider transnational network, (ii) a shared sense of community with its members, (iii) participating in a common project that involves the whole community.

Keywords: Co-development, cultural identification, diaspora, sense of community, social capital, transnational networks.

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1.   Introduction

One of the main characteristics of the global era is the expansion of the field of definition of personal identity, of social relations, and even of institutions that are beyond the limits of the co-presence and contemporaneity of the actors involved.[1] Since the early 1990s, the reflection on dislocated social relations has had the theoretical and applied research support provided by a new generation of studies on the translocal and transnational character of migratory processes. The analyses and reflections that have derived from this new approach have become more and more important in many areas of applied research and in particular in the studies of the socio-economic development of nations and communities. These studies go beyond the original approaches that concentrated exclusively on recruiting processes (brain drain), on remittances and on returns, by investigating more deeply the increasingly multidimensional and multidirectional character of the phenomenon. The recent spread of the idea that between the countries of

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origin and destination of migrants there could be circular processes of co-development based on the transnational practices of migrants has meant that these studies could be extended to the perception of migrants as collective agents of social change.[2]

Recently the concept of diaspora provided scholars with a new instrument to categorise the transnational phenomena that involve clusters of migrants living in different countries in the world and sharing a strong sense of belonging to the same community.[3] Despite its importance in distinguishing special types of transnational networks from the other, this new category brings up several critics both from theoretical and empirical point of view.[4]

On the one hand, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the methodological specification of the concept of a diaspora by proposing an operating definition based on the use of indicators that can identify both the instrumental and expressive components of the transnational links between members of the same community. On the other hand, the objective is to use a case study to highlight the links between the diasporic structure of a migratory network and the propensity of the members to support the development processes of their own community.

2.   Aims, Subject and Methodology of the Research

Migrants have a high propensity to develop transnational ties with their community of origin, both with the one consisting of compatriots who live in the home country and with the one made up of compatriots abroad. This is particularly evident for well-integrated migrants who have resources, and cultural and technical/professional skills and competences. [5]

The strength of the ties that characterise a transnational community has generally been measured by the consistency and heterogeneity of the practices found in the context of economic, political and socio-cultural exchanges with other members of the network.[6] These elements accentuate the instrumental character of transnational communities, but underestimate the more expressive, daily and informal side of the equation, such as the sense of belonging to a community, [7] identification with members of this community,[8] and the potential for help and prestige that members have which derive from belonging and being recognised as belonging to a community (social capital).

In this paper I define diaspora a transnational community within which members have a high level of exchanges - both instrumental and expressive - but also demonstrate a high and shared level of belonging, a strong sense of identification, and a high level of support and reciprocal help. In addition, I hypothesise that co-development orientation (the way in which migrants act in the present on the basis of the future engagement for

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developing the community of origin) constitutes one of the most important elements in defining the diasporic structure of transnational relations.

This paper analyses data from the initial results of an online survey conducted in June 2008 on 182 foreign students doing degree or post-degree courses at the University of Pisa (Italy) between 2000 and 2007.[9]

Foreign students are a particular category of migrants both in terms of personal characteristics and in terms of the specific nature of the institutional contexts with which they have relations during their migratory experience. They are migrants with a high level of education and have considerable resources and skills, in terms of communication and relations, but frequently also in financial terms. With regard to institutional contexts, they are migrants that have left their home country to develop cultural and technical/professional competencies, and thus have become part of academic and professional networks (university, research centre, enterprises, staff, etc.) which will constitute in an increasingly distinct way their opportunities for a future career.

The aim of our research is to find answers to some basic questions regarding the transnational dislocation of foreign university students at the University Pisa. To what extent do foreign students in Pisa maintain instrumental, symbolic and normative ties with their community of origin, and on the other hand, to what extent do they seem to re-orient themselves towards the society and culture of the host country? In what cases do such students take part in transnational communities? In what cases does a transnational community come to life, is it seen by them as a diaspora, and what factors facilitate this process? What connects the diasporic structure of the transnational ties of these students and their propensity to support development processes in their home country?

In order to analyse the results, we first categorised the respondents into geographical groups.[10] This led to a set of three typologies within which we analysed and compared data on the interviewees' ties with (i) the host community (the Italians in Pisa), (ii) the community of compatriots that live in Italy, (iii) the community of compatriots that live in the home country, and (iv) the community of compatriots that live abroad but not in Italy.

3.   Analytical Categories: Definitions and Operationalisations

As mentioned when we were outlining our hypotheses, in our research on foreign students we used five distinct analytical categories. The first category (transnational activity) was used to verify the existence and to study the form of ties between the various groups of students interviewed and the community of their compatriots who reside in the home country or abroad. Three other categories were used to measure the different weight of reciprocal ties (social capital) and the symbolic and value attachment (sense of community and identification) that the groups of respondents maintained

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both with the community of origin (compatriots in the home country and abroad) and with the host community (compatriots in Italy, and Italian residents). The fifth analytical category (orientation to co-development) was introduced to measure the disposition of the students to invest in the future of their community of origin.

A.   Transnational activities

A recent theoretical and methodological review of the main research works on transnationalism, proposed the use of a critical threshold with which to be able to distinguish (in terms of intensity and frequency) a transnational phenomenon from a phenomenon that cannot be defined as such. This threshold was seen as a preliminary means in order to deal with the empirical translation of any transnational theory and if necessary with how it could be measured.[11] The author admits that there are still only a few studies that have tried to establish the base criteria on which to define and measure when and above all to what extent a social phenomenon can be considered as transnational.

The most recent works have established the level of social ties at a distance by measuring the activities regarding the community of belonging that the migrants develop in the economic sector (consumption of ethnic products, money transfers, sending presents, investments in enterprises etc), socio-cultural (visits, participation in public events in the home country, membership of ethnic associations etc), and political (interest in the problems of compatriots in the home country, affiliation to political parties in the home country, political activism, etc.) .[12]

In our research on foreign students this measurement is particular important because it means that it is possible to identify and select those groups of interviewees who maintain stable, and in some way "institutionalised" relations with their community of origin (compatriots in the home country or abroad) and thus find more than the others the need to develop 'bifocal' attitudes and orientations.

B.   Social Capital

For several years the concept of social capital has been one of the key themes in social research, applied thanks to the initial thematisation by Bourdieau. The concept was then deepened by its application of the theory of exchange to the social networks made by Granovetter, Coleman and Lin, and was exploited as a guiding concept for macro-geographical surveys.

Although this notion primarily refers to the instrumental functions of exchange between members of a social network, some recent contributions[13] have also underlined its expressive meaning - they suggest that social capital could be considered as an indicator of community aggregates. This then is the meaning that we have given to social capital in our study of foreign students.

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In order to evaluate it we used a sensitive indicator - a resource generator - which sheds light not only on the instrumental value but also the expressive value of the resources that a member of a network can activate[14]

C.   Sense of Community

The availability of resources that can be mobilised by a member of a social network due to that member's belonging to the network represents an initial and important indicator of the cohesion of that network and the extent to which it can qualify as a community. However, the contents of belonging to a community are not just based on the availability of social capital, since they are by nature symbolic, emotional and motivational.

So that we could understand and measure the expressive dimensions of the experience of members of a transnational community (belonging, identification, attachment etc) we referred to the synthetic indicator of sense of community,[15] which is described as a feeling that the members have of belonging and being important for each other and a shared trust that the needs of the members will be satisfied by their commitment to being together.

D.   Identification

In a recent study on the transnational involvement of migrants resident in the Netherlands, the authors measured the respondents' ethnic identification, or rather the extent to which migrants living un the Netherlands identify with (1) native Dutch people, (2) compatriots living in the Netherland, (3) compatriots living in the country of origin and (4) compatriots in third countries. The authors state:

> These social identities indicate how people define themselves in relation to their social environment. It is not about what distinguishes one individual from the other, but about what is shared with the others. The social identity of a person refers to the two basic questions in life: (1) to whom I do belong? and (2) how should I behave? These two key questions relate to the group dimension and the normative dimension of social identity respectively.[16]

Using the same logic and schema as the Dutch research, we asked our respondents to express their level of agreement regarding some statements. On the basis of our respondents' answer to the statements we constructed three indicators representing: (1) group dimension (statements about to whom they feel close, are proud of, are occasionally ashamed of), (2) normative dimension (statements about whose norms and values are taken into account, with whom they agree on the 'important things in life') and (3)

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project dimension (statements about which community they feel will be theirs in the future and the future of their children) of identification.

E.   Orientation to Co-development
          Orientation to co-development is a personal attitude, an emotional and intellectual disposition that is difficult to measure, and even more so to synthesise into one or more indicators. However, it is a crucial parameter for understanding not only the type of transnational ties of the migrants but also the possibility that some of these ties (particularly those with compatriots in the home country and abroad) can be structured as diasporas: transnational ties that are very close knit and at the same time able to catalyse and orient in favour of the home country the future projects of the members, whatever the country where they reside.
          In our research we examined two parameters of the orientation to co-development: (1) the interest of the interviewees in using in their home country the scientific and professional competence that they have acquired abroad, and (2) the participation of the migrants in cooperation development projects that are directed to supporting the home country.

4.   Data Analysis
          A total of 182 foreign students enrolled at the University of Pisa responded to our survey, of whom 106 female (58.2%) and 76 male (41.8%). 37.9% were aged between 25 and 29, and only 27.5% were younger than 25. Students from developed countries represented 33.5% (most from EU countries), 31.3% from Eastern Europe (mostly Albania), and 31.9% from other countries. 45.7% were from scientific faculties and 54.3% from humanistic faculties.
          Overall, the level of socio-economic integration was good. 70.3% were living in a flat or house, mostly rented, which 90.7% deemed as very adequate for their needs. 41.8% maintained themselves by working (with a regular contract in 68.9% of cases). Those not working were able to maintain themselves with a grant (44.1%) or with the help of family members living in the home country (19.9%) or in Italy (20.5%).
          The levels of relational integration were also positive. 30% were married or living together, and of these 58.6% with an Italian partner. Just over half (53.6%) spent their free time above all with Italians, whereas 24.2% spent it with family members (of whom 42.3% live in Italy).

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Table 1 - Overview of Transnational Activities per Migrant Group (in percentage of the group total)

	Developed countries (N=61)	Eastern Europe (N=57)	Other Countries (N=58)
Everyday economic activities			
Transfers money to family	11,86	25,49	35,29
Sends goods to country of origin	22,03	35,29	25,49
Contributions to charities in country of origin	3,39	11,76	19,61
Average value	**12,43**	**24,18**	**26,80**
Invests in companies in country of origin	0,00	3,92	5,88
Conducts trade with country of origin	5,08	5,88	5,88
Average value	**2,54**	**4,90**	**5,88**
Reads newspapers from country of origin	59,32	78,43	62,75
Keeps in touch with politics in country of origin	54,24	49,02	58,82
Member of political party in country of origin	0,00	1,96	3,92
Participates in demonstrations related to country of origin	5,08	7,84	13,73
Average value	**29,66**	**34,31**	**34,80**
Sociocultural activities in country of origin			
Visits family/friends in country of origin	71,19	68,63	41,18
Frequent contacts with family in country of origin	89,83	80,39	88,24
Member/supporter of social and/or cultural organisation in country of origin	6,78	15,69	15,69
Participates in cultural/religious/sport events in country of origin	11,86	15,69	15,69
Average value	**44,92**	**45,10**	**40,20**

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Data analysis reveals different attitudes between the groups of students considered in the survey. Students coming from developed countries (EU most of all) have an high sense of belonging and identification with their home community, but they seem to have few transnational ties with it. Transnational practices are poor and the social capital indicators referred to compatriots living in home country are weaker than in other groups. On the contrary, they present a higher level of expressive relations with compatriots living in home country or abroad. Sense of community and other identification indicators are both higher than in other groups. In general they do not present any significant co-development orientation.

A completely different situation is apparent for students coming from developing countries. They declare high levels both in expressive and in instrumental ties with home community. In fact they have a strong identification with compatriots living at home but also support and maintain it by a high level of transnational practices. They demonstrate the higher level of co-development orientation.

Eastern European students reveal a truly mixed attitude. They maintain high levels of group identification with their compatriots at home, but at the same they demonstrate a higher sense of belonging and normative identification with the host community. In general they have a moderate co-development orientation.

Table 2 - Indicators of Belonging Attitudes per Migrant Group

		Host community	Home community
Developed countries (N=61)	Social capital	0,60	0,59
	Sense of community	0,51	0,63
	Identification	0,54	0,65
Eastern Europe (N=57)	Social capital	0,52	0,48
	Sense of community	0,56	0,55
	Identification	0,57	0,61
Other countries (N=58)	Social capital	0,54	0,54
	Sense of community	0,52	0,54
	Identification	0,51	0,65

5.   Conclusions

Our research on foreign students enrolled at the University of Pisa has highlighted on an empirical level the different structure of transnational ties and sense of belonging amongst the various groups taken into consideration. In summary, students from developed countries are true

passing foreigners, those from Eastern Europe are Italians born abroad and those from other countries are a solidal community. At the same time, and still on an empirical level, our research has furthered our knowledge of the quality of those transnational ties and senses of belonging that more than any other factor are associated with co-development and which, as we have just mentioned, are those expressed by the solidal communities.

On a theoretical level, the research has enabled us to clarify some hypotheses and to respond to some of the questions that we asked ourselves at the outset - clearly these are only preliminary for the moment until we have made further investigations:

1. Not all the students who answered the questionnaire, even though with the same status and a good level of integration, claimed they had developed transnational ties. The size and intensity of transnational ties with the community of origin seems to have an inverse relation to the level of development of the home country, so we could thus define as being members of transnational communities only those students from Eastern Europe and developing countries.

2. The availability of social capital, of a strong indentification and sense of community towards the community of origin are important factors for distinguishing the orientation of members of transnational communities. Where this is present and recognised by the members, the transnational community tends to transform itself into a diaspora. Where this is not present, or is in any case weak, the instrumental and symbolic resources of the host community will gradually replace and mix with those of the community of origin, thus generating hybrid transnational communities, in which the members will have interiorised the point of view of the host society.

3. Diasporas are transnational communities that are dense, close-knit, rich both in social capital and in symbolic and identity resources; but above all represent the type of transnational community which more than the others promotes the sense of responsibility of its members towards the community of origin and induces its actors to co-development.

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Notes

[1] A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990.

[2] S Nair, "La politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires", in *Hommes & Migrations*, n.1214, 1998

[3] R Cohen, *Global Diasporas. An Introduction*, Routledge, Oxford 1997; R Cohen and S Vertovec, *Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Southampton, 1999.

[4] T Faist, "Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus", in *Population, Space and Place*, n.14, 2007

[5] E Snel, G Engbersen, A Leerkes, "Transnational Involvement and Social Integration", in *Global Networks*, n.6 (3), 2006

[6] ibid.

[7] D McMillan and D Chavis, "Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory", in *Journal of Community Psychology*, n.14, 1986

[8] Snel et al., op. cit.

[9] There were a total of 2057 students with a foreign citizenship enrolled in degree, masters and PhD courses at the University of Pisa between 2000 and 2007. Our research was based only on 900 of these students who gave their email addresses to the administrative offices of the university. 182 students had completed the questionnaires by 13 June 2008, which was the day on which the first extraction of data took place on the basis of which the analysis was conducted.

[10] The three geographical groups are: (1) Advanced countries (EU, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia); (2) Eastern Europe (outside the EU); (3) Other countries

[11] P Boccagni, "Come si 'misura' il transnazionalismo degli immigrati? Dalle teorie alla traduzione empirica: una rassegna metodologica", in *Mondi Migranti*, 2, 2007

[12] Snel et al., op. cit.

[13] A Pizzorno, "Perché si paga il benzinaio. Nota per una teoria del capitale sociale", in *Stato e Mercato*, 3, 1999

[14] M Van Der Gaag and T A B Snijders, *The Resource Generator: Social Capital quantification with Concrete Items*, Free University Amsterdam, University of Groningen, 2004

[15] McMillan and Chavis, op. cit.

[16] Snel et al., op. cit., p.290

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The Diasporisation of Contemporary Overseas Chinese: From Alienation to an Alternative Way of Life

Jia Gao[1]

Abstract

This article is based on an analysis of the empirical data from some research on contemporary overseas Chinese communities, and examines the apparent differences between the key elements of the traditional concept of diaspora and the complexities of more recent worldwide migrations of Chinese people. The article will begin with a review of the recent efforts to use the concept in analysing various forms of new Chinese migrants, and examine in what ways the term diaspora has been utilised in this context. The discussion will then focus on why and how so many Chinese were motivated to leave their places of origins, and how and why their new diasporic communities were formed. The simplicity of the idea of dispersal carried by the conventional concept of diaspora will then be discussed. This article will continue with an in-depth look at the data concerning diasporic lives of new overseas Chinese. Special attention will be given to the findings relied upon by the present researcher in forming the idea of "dual-track demarginalisation" in an earlier study, which will be utilised to address the one-sidedness of the notion of separation or isolation in the long-established concept of diaspora.

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1.   Introduction

There has been a growing trend among scholars of overseas Chinese to make use of the term diaspora as a concept in their studies since it was first used in the mid 1970s.[2] As has occurred to research into other diasporas, the proliferation of the term diaspora in the field of overseas Chinese studies is because many old theoretical concepts become ineffective in analysing the complexities of global migrations of Chinese people, and it is hoped that the diaspora concept could be used to look at issues beyond the causes and consequences and the place-based qualities of their worldwide movements to include social behaviours, economic activities and flexible identities.[3] Yet as has also occurred elsewhere, the real meaning and nature of the concept have been considered by some to be ambiguous and inadequate, and the utilisation of the diaspora concept becomes even more problematic when it is applied to the analysis of more recent international movements of Chinese people. This article is based on an analysis of the empirical data from some research on

contemporary overseas Chinese communities, including one carried out by the present researcher,[4] and looks at the apparent differences between the focal characteristics, or key elements, of the traditional diaspora concept and the complexities of more recent global migrations of Chinese people.

The term diasporisation used in this article refers to two processes relating to contemporary overseas Chinese. It is first concerned with the new trend of utilising the concept of diaspora in overseas Chinese studies, and the ways in which it has been utilised. The second process, as to be elaborated, is about more vital changes that have taken place in the past few decades to not only the attitude of Chinese people towards international migration, but also to the ways in which Chinese migrants have opted to migrate from China to other countries, living a diasporic life as an alternative way of life, if not a choice of life. Although overseas Chinese communities across the world were sizable before the early 1980s, when China again became a migrant sending country, earlier Chinese migrants were largely from Guangdong and Fujian, two previously poor agricultural provinces. In the past two to three decades, overseas Chinese communities globally have not only expanded rapidly and continuously, but have also changed their compositions to include those who are from a wide range of regions in China and choose to live a diasporic life. The second meaning of the term diasporisation in this article refers to the key characteristics associated with the above changes in Chinese diasporas.

In the broad field of diaspora studies, theoretical analyses conducted by Safran, Cohen and some other researchers have been regarded as the new classical work that has outlined a framework for further exploring the concept diaspora.[5] In his article, Safran identifies the following features of a typical diaspora: (1) dispersal to two or more locations; (2) a collective mythology of homeland; (3) alienation from the host society; (4) idealisation of return to homeland; (5) an ongoing relationship with the homeland; and (6) group consciousness.[6]

In addition to the above six-point synopsis, there are also three- or four-point summaries of common features of a diaspora.[7] Among those key points mentioned in different summaries, two elements appear to be more essential than other features in characterising diaspora, and are included in every possible summary. The first of these two basic features is dispersion or dispersal from a homeland to two or more locations, and the second is isolation or alienation from the host society. In a more recent effort, Reis suggests to consider the term diaspora in three historical phases, calling attention to the differences between classical, modern and contemporary or late-modern Diasporas. While she recognises that contemporary diaspora are complex and coeval with globalisation, Reis also believes that contemporary diaspora is characterised by dislocation and fragmentation.[8]

As mentioned, there has been a growing trend among researchers of overseas Chinese to use the concept Diaspora in their studies since it was first

used in the mid 1970s, and such a diasporic approach has been widespread since the 1990s, as the approach is believed to have a number of benefits. For example, Ma argues that new analytical frameworks such as diaspora theory are better equipped than traditional conceptions of international migration to explain "the complex nature of new migrant geographies, social behaviours, economic activities and shifting cultural identities."[9] Among many scholars regarding diasporic scholarship as a global approach that "cuts across cultural and national boundaries,"[10] Chew and Liu believe that diasporic scholarship improves upon conventional theories of global migration by recognising that migrant communities often develop a unique blend of culture and economics that "sets them apart from the populations at both their places of origin and their places of destination."[11] From their perspective, although some regard the word diaspora as a term interchangeable with the phrase "overseas Chinese communities",[12] this diasporic approach considers migration and migrant lives from two-ways (not asymmetric), taking the emphasis off assimilation, and recognising the importance of culture (not just economics).

Although the entirety of the use of the diaspora concept in overseas Chinese studies is beyond the scope of this article, a literature review at least shows that enormous scholarly efforts to use the concept diaspora in overseas Chinese studies have been made, adding a new theoretical dimension to the analysis of overseas Chinese and their diasporic life. At the same time when the concept is utilised in the field, there are also a number of gaps appearing between the literature on the utilisation of the concept diaspora and the actual changes in Chinese diasporas. Such gaps are so large that some scholars even believe that Chinese diaspora or the possibility of multiple Chinese diasporas is the concept which defies the traditional diaspora concept. The challenges aside, which will be discussed next, one of such problems is that both the old Chinese diaspora and the new diaspora have not been differentiated to reflect the changes that have taken place in the past two or three decades. It becomes even problematic when research findings based on one type of such diasporas are used to explain various issues related to other groups.

The commonality between multiple contemporary Chinese diasporas has indicated that they are different from old Chinese migrants or sojourner groups, especially in terms of the reasons why they have chosen to migrate and the belief that they would never be fully accepted by the host society, and therefore develop their own collective culture. That is, new Chinese diasporas might still preserve a collective memory about China, the belief that the ancestral homeland is their true home, and that they should be committed to its success; as well as that they should maintain their collective awareness, but they have not only opted to migrate because of reasons different from earlier groups, but also adopted different attitudes to their diasporic lives. These have become distinct characteristics of new Chinese diasporas according to a large amount of literature that has lately appeared. While

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being caution against uncritical use of the concept to any and all contexts of global migration,[13] this article examines these two features of new Chinese diasporas with aims of exploring their key differences from old Chinese migrants and contributing to theoretical debates about the diaspora concept.

2.   Alienation vs. Forced Dispersion

This section looks at why and how so many Chinese migrants have been motivated to leave their places of origins since the 1980s, and how and why their diasporic communities were then formed. This is the first key feature or fundamental characteristic of contemporary Chinese diasporas, which not only defies the traditional diaspora concept according to some scholars, but also makes a distinction between the old Chinese migrant groups and the new Chinese diasporas. The key to this discussion is to challenge the simplicities of the idea of dispersal carried by the conventional concept of diaspora and the concept of forced departure from home that is contained in not only the old idea of dispersal, but also in the lately-formed and widely-used push-pull model of migration. To further challenge those ideas, this article argues for adopting the concept of alienation to conceptualise the factors that push or motivate people to move, especially in the context of contemporary migration.

Studies of the history of Chinese migration have long demonstrated how trends in diasporisation have evolved to the extent at which the diaspora characteristics of the 20th century are different from those in the 19th century. Stephen Chan once put forward one of the strongest arguments supporting such a theoretical challenge, contending that the Chinese "diaspora" is unlike those of others: "no loss of country; no mass enslavement and transportation; no sustained persecutions, even within the Manchu dynasty; and no mass exoduses even in times of civil war, except by the Kuomintang to Taiwan in 1949."[14] Some of his remarks are unquestionably debatable, for example, the Taiping Rebellion of the mid 19th century has commonly been regarded as a major push factor responsible for the massive emigration of Chinese people at the time. However, he believes that there have been few instances of forced exile of Chinese groups or communities. As an alternative, Chan stresses the role of people's desire for economic betterment, or their anxiety about wealth and their freedoms in their migration decision-making process. Of course, he also notes economic reform in China under Deng Xiaoping, but he offers no explanation why many still want to leave the country where they can fulfil their desire for economic betterment. Obviously Chan has mixed up both the "push" and "pull" factors affecting migration process, although his arguments imply a unique diasporisation process of Chinese people, almost pointing out the second meaning of the diasporisation that this article is going to examine, which is about that Chinese people have opted to migrate from China to other countries, living a diasporic life as an alternative way of life.

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Of course, his comments were more about pull factors, if they can be defined using this term, mentioning no internal factors in China that drive people to move.

The argument put forward by Stephen Chan and some others seems to want to point out several key points concerning Chinese diasporas. First, China is not a country or place where a single large scale socio-historical or socio-political event, including civil war or invasion, could make its entire population, or even a proportion of them, displaced, and its population size has since its ancient time made it impossible to have a large proportion of them displaced and exiled. Second, migration decisions made by Chinese migrants often do not have direct connections with significant events taking place in China. Although not many have elaborated their arguments clearly, some appear to have argued for that not many Chinese migrants were forced to leave their homeland as obvious and direct as in the case of what has been defined as classical diasporas. This is in fact a debate about whether any form of direct force existed in the formation of Chinese diasporas, and to challenge the potentially passive nature of the definition of diaspora. These debates also indirectly suggest that the element of force in the concept diaspora should be replaced by a term that could better explain why some people decide to leave their homeland. The term alienation appears to be the one that explains the relationship between those decided to migrate and their place of origin.

Such a broadly defined factor of alienation becomes more evident in the context of contemporary Chinese diasporas, although there are almost no studies that focused directly on alienation as a particular cause of emigration from China. The concept did arise in passing or as minor points in a number of articles. For example, in their survey of 1,220 Asian immigrants living in Australia, Ip, Inglis and Wu found, *inter alia*, that immigrants from Hong Kong and China cited political security and freedom far more frequently than other Asian immigrants as a motivation for obtaining Australian citizenship.[15] Peter Li specifically emphasises the role of the Tiananmen incident and its aftermath, not the imminent return of Hong Kong to China, in the rising volume of emigration from Hong Kong in the early 1990s.[16] While big events such as Tiananmen Square are relatively easy to understand, as the cases often result from various types of political alienation and result in a situation where more people become alienated politically, sometimes it is hidden and difficult to see whether people in fact are alienated. In addition to what Ip, Inglis and Wu have recorded in their study, Kuah-Pearce also makes it known that some Chinese migrate "in order to attain a certain level of self-expression and self-actualisation."[17] That is, it motivates people to leave when they feel unable to fulfil their potential in their homeland. The feeling of being alienated from society or other people could be expressed by people in a number of different ways. In their interviews of Hong Kong migrants, Li

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and others note that some cited "discrimination at home" as a reason for emigrating.[18]

Many scholars have also continued to argue that Chinese diasporas cannot be considered to be unified, and that they are not one kind of diaspora, rather a series of physical and geographical diasporas, but these Chinese share some similar experiences in home country, which drive them to relocate themselves outside their home country. According to a similar logic, although there is no unifying sense of persecution or exile amongst Chinese diasporas as argued by some scholars including Stephen Chan, there is never a lack of different forms of alienation playing its role in motivating people to migrate. As early as in 1912, Ling had already pointed out that many Chinese peasants emigrating at the time were doing so partially because of social prejudice experienced at home.[19] In fact, there are numerous cases of individual Chinese communities being marginalised by either adverse political agenda or unfavourable socio-economic conditions in home country. Yong Chen argues that even in the mid-19th century emigration from Canton to California was not prompted by of "a desperate flight" from poverty as many scholars have portrayed, but rather a measured choice by merchants and labourers to achieve upward social mobility in the context of longstanding trans-Pacific connections.[20] When Thuno and Pieke explain that villagers in Fujian migrate "because it is in their nature and they have always done so,"[21] they forget that like Canton some decades ago, Fujian is far from the traditional heartland of Chinese culture and politics, very much a marginalised place in national life.

Because of the broad meaning of the concept alienation, more socio-political and socio-economic circumstances, both complex and simple, could be included in the study of not only Chinese diasporas, but also other forms of diaspora and diaspora-related issues. A large amount of evidence or data supporting the use of the concept alienation has appeared in print and Internet publications, Chinese language films, and television programs. Even in academic publications, more facts and specifics could be found and used to confirm that there is a wide range of circumstances that motivate people to migrate and can also be defined as alienation from homeland. For example, while socio-economic changes in China have taken place rapidly in recent years, many rural people are losing out in China's development, and as a result feel disempowered and disenchanted. Using data from several Chinese surveys, Liang and Morooka note a marked shift during the early 1990s in the socio-economic composition of emigrants away from urbanites towards rural peasants.[22] Such change may be a result of urban reform, which made life for city dwellers more comfortable, reducing the incentive to emigrate. Of course, the use of the concept "alienation" in diaspora studies will be challenged by its similarities to and differences with various push factors of a push-pull model of migration. As already mentioned, however, the concept of

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the diaspora implies complex connections of those who are geographically scattered to their home country and culture, which could not be found in the meaning of push factors. Regardless of whether the diaspora concept has three or six common features or elements, it also carries the meaning of collective identity and the unity of those sharing the same cultural background. In comparison, the push factor is a far simpler explanation than the alienation concept.

3.   Dual-Track Demarginalisation vs. Isolation

         This discussion examines the data concerning diasporic lives, or the diasporic practices of everyday life, of new overseas Chinese, and addresses the one-sidedness of the notion of separation or isolation carried by the long-established concept of diaspora. This is the second fundamental characteristic or key feature of the diasporisation of contemporary overseas Chinese, which plays a central role similar to the feature discussed in the previous section in distinguishing attitudes of contemporary overseas Chinese toward their lives in newly adopted homelands and various practices from old overseas Chinese communities. That is, this analysis should be read in conjunction with what was discussed in the previous section. These two changes have formed the basis of making new overseas Chinese increasingly diasporised, ending their tradition of perceiving and treating themselves as sojourners. For a long time, the characteristics of overseas Chinese communities have been considered consistent with the traditional diaspora concept, never being fully accepted by the host society, but rather developing their own community culture and needs. Such attitudes and practices have changed over time as more Chinese have adopted living in a diasporic community as an alternative way of life.

         Of course, it is widely acknowledged that some scholars have never considered overseas Chinese to be a community exactly like in the way that the concept diaspora has been defined. However, evidence produced by some empirical studies to argue for the uniqueness of overseas Chinese has simply proven that there was a great level of political participation in local politics while some formed unique or flexible identities predominantly because of the interaction of both local and transnational factors. Diasporic trends have shown that as early as during the 19th and early 20th century, a greater level of political participation by overseas Chinese already took place in local national politics, which led to their greater devotion to their host countries.[23] For example, when Singapore first gained independence, the passionate participation of local Chinese almost demolished the idea that overseas Chinese were apolitical. Although this case has been regarded as evidence showing overseas Chinese being part of nation-building in their host societies, their small numbers and the discouragement under various discriminatory policies have simply confined them to the issues, such as immigration policy, the right to provide Chinese education, and the rights to

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control their community media and organisations. Among studies of identity, the Chinese in Southeast Asia have been found to adopt a range of strategies to deal with their identity, and the principle that they decided on their identities mostly depends on the balance between them as an ethnic group and the socio-political climate in their host societies.[24] In a more recent study, Nonini and Ong argue that identities of overseas Chinese are unstable formations constituted within webs of power relations. Based on this, they believe that overseas Chinese living in Thailand have their own "third culture" which is neither purely Chinese nor essentially Thai, but mobile.[25]

Despite the aforementioned key changes in their diasporic practices, overseas Chinese have been considered to have effectively maintained their strong Chinese identity, and therefore largely separated from the mainstream of their host societies. Apart from what was mentioned above, the mid 20th century marked an era in which overseas Chinese consciously stopped being sojourners and started adopting migrant identities by settling in host countries and taking up citizenship. Since the mid 1970s, the effects of the introduction of multiculturalism in leading immigration countries created an environment in which anti-discrimination had gained international acceptance, which has also gradually formed a perspective to look at diasporic practices themselves. Even in some studies of the early Chinese migrants, more attention is paid to the uniqueness of their diasporic life. As mentioned, Chew and Liu find out that there was a unique blend of culture and economics that situated Chinese migrants apart from the populations at both their home country and their host country. That is, living a diasporic life could be an alternative way of life.

However, also since then, more changes have occurred to diasporic practices of Chinese diasporic communities than to both the theoretical and the empirical findings about them. Some new studies have then also emerged looking at those changes and providing more evidence for further theorisation, while some researchers realised that too much attention is paid to the role of the homeland, its culture and global forces at the expense of local forces. For example, Louie argues that although Chinese Americans enjoy the privilege of mobility, "their identities are strongly shaped by the nation-states in which they reside."[26] Callahan also reveals that the identity formation of Sino-Thai communities takes place in various local economic cultures, "not just for the most obvious case of national identity, but in relations of exclusion in local and transnational contexts as well."[27] Based on a small-scale study in Canada, Chen believes that overseas Chinese live in "triadic relations" that they have developed between their homeland, Canadian society, and co-ethnic groups, forming diversified, interactive and changeable networks. Despite his idea that diasporic thinking should be replaced by "grounded cosmopolitanism," Jacobsen has also provided evidence proving that living outside homeland is a way of life. First, he reveals that Chinese diasporas are socially integrated groups, not a

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diasporised ethnic group, and their flexible identity includes negotiated local elements. Second, their longing for homeland is no longer widespread, as daily lives are far more pressing than others.[28]

Contrary to the belief that Chinese migrants are normally isolated in their host countries, a study conducted by the present researcher has revealed that that there are continuing efforts made by Chinese migrants in countering marginalisation and maintaining their relevance to both China and their host country, or Australia in the context of this study. These two types of ongoing efforts become so evident and constant that a temporal pattern is formed. Such two types of ongoing efforts and the temporal pattern are then named "dual-track demarginalisation". To a large extent, this study is based on an idea similar to the one put forward by Butler, which believes that rather than being viewed as an ethnicity, diaspora may be considered as a framework for the study of a specific process of community formation.[29] Apart from this static picture of their lives, characterised by dual-track demarginalisation, diasporic lives of that group of Chinese migrants studied then are also found to have been typified by a train of changes that switched from one dual-track option to another. If examined as a dynamic process, such changes form and show a pattern, in which their efforts appear to oscillate between their place of origin and their new host country, between their original culture and their adopted culture. For that reason, there appears to be a continuous zigzag or switching back and forth pattern in this dual-track demarginalisation process.

To the casual observer, these dual-track efforts to counter the danger of being marginalised on either side of their transnational lives were nothing more than a testimony to Li Minghuan's claim that overseas Chinese "need two worlds."[30] In effect, these two types of ongoing efforts and its temporal pattern have shown a unique way of life, which is not only characterised by the correlation between the transnationality of diasporic communities and its evolving nature, but also confirms that contemporary overseas Chinese are no longer isolated in their host society nor separated from others living in their newly adopted country. Otherwise, it would be never possible to explain and understand a range of facts about their diasporic lives, such as their success in climbing the social ladder in diasporic communities as small as India,[31] and the Chinese dominance in some Southeast Asian economies.

4.   Conclusion: Towards an Alternative Way of Life

The new attitudes and practices accepted by contemporary overseas Chinese towards living in a diaspora have shown significant differences from earlier Chinese sojourners or immigrants of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Among the changes are two fundamental characteristics of the conventional diaspora concept, which are dispersion from a homeland, and isolation in the hostland, or dislocation and fragmentation in the words of Reis. Based on an analysis of the empirical data from some research on contemporary overseas

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Chinese, this discussion has not only challenged the idea of dispersal carried by the diaspora concept and argued for adopting the concept of alienation to conceptualise the factors that drive people to move, but has also reviewed the notion of isolation or separation in the old diaspora concept and considered living in a diaspora to be an alternative way of life in the context of Chinese diasporic lives. Because of the importance of these two characteristics in the concept, and the size of contemporary overseas Chinese communities, this analysis of changes to contemporary overseas Chinese might be helpful in examining the contemporary diasporic condition and exploring the changing meaning of the diaspora concept.

The key to this discussion is to put forward the idea that to live in a diaspora in a contemporary context is an alternative way of life. This is what this article called the diasporisation of contemporary overseas Chinese, which not only takes into consideration profound changes to the attitudes of Chinese people towards international migration and the ways in which Chinese migrants have lived in a diaspora, but also recognises the positive and continuing connection between China as their home country and their places of work and settlement. To further recognise that contemporary diaspora is an alternative way of life, if not a choice of life, and make the concept of diaspora relevant to contemporary diasporic lives, a number of fundamental characteristics or key elements of the traditional diaspora concept, especially two of them discussed in this articles, have to be modified and updated.

Notes

[1] The author would like to acknowledge research funding from the Faculty of Arts, the University of Melbourne, and assistance from Mr Rowan A. Minson.

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[4] J Gao, 'Migrant transnationality and its evolving nature', *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, vol. 2(2), 2006, pp. 193-219.

[5] W Safran, 'Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return'. *Diaspora*, vol. 1(1), 1991, pp. 83-99. See also R Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, University College London Press, London, 1997.

[6] This list is based on R. Tsagarousianou, 'Rethinking the concept of diaspora'. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, vol. 1(1),

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2004, p. 54, and J Stratton, *Coming out Jewish: Constructing Ambivalent Identities*, Routledge, New York, 2000, p. 142.

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[9] Ma, 'Space, place, and transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora', p. 4.

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[11] K S Y Chew and J M Liu, 'Hidden in plain sight: Global labour force exchange in the Chinese American population, 1880–1940', *Population and Development Review,* vol. 30(1), 2004, pp. 57, 58.

[12] An example can be found in W. L. Lai's article, 'Chinese Diasporas: An overview'. *The Caribbean Quarterly*, vol. 50(2), 2004, p.1.

[13] J E Braziel and A Mannur, 'Nation, migration, globalization', in *Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader*, Jana E. Braziel and Anita Mannur (eds), Blackwell, Malden, Massachusetts, 2003, pp. 1-22.

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Diversity within Chinese Diaspora:
Old and New Huaqiao Residents in South Korea

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Abstract:

This paper explores the distinctions between the old huaqiao and new huaqiao residents in South Korea, and how their presence and diversity challenges the conception of South Korean citizenship and sense of belonging. The old huaqiao are primarily 2 or 3rd generation overseas Chinese who originate from the Shandong region of mainland China. They have historically experienced discrimination due to ethnically-based notions of membership in South Korean society at both the policy and general public levels. Their origin and differing dialect, Taiwanese citizenship, and overall economic weakness, has set the old huaqiao residents of South Korea apart from the rest of the Chinese diaspora in Asia and around the world. The new huaqiao on the other hand are PRC citizens with ethnic Chinese origin, and range from 3D labour migrants to young professionals who are able to take advantage of South Korea's developed economy and immigration policy reforms since 1997.The comparative study of the old and new huaqiao residents in South Korea and the evolving policies toward this diaspora group well represent the changing understanding of national belonging in South Korea and how the conception of citizenship as a relation between the individual and the state is being contested.

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1.   Introduction

In this paper I explore the distinctions between the old huaqiao[1] and new huaqiao residents in South Korea, and how their presence challenges the conception of South Korean citizenship. This comparative study of 'denizens' and the evolving policies toward them well represent the changing understanding of national belonging in South Korea and contribute to the field of diasporic citizenship. While distinctions between the two groups are made based on origin, citizenship, and economic status, this study finds that their differences are diminishing as South Korea's immigration policy becomes more lenient and its society more globalised. Also, many in both groups hold the increasingly common neo-liberal view of citizenship based

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on the material advantages it confers rather than see it as an exclusive relationship between the individual and the state. Increasingly, they seek to be maximal rights-based residents rather than full-fledged citizens. In this sense, neo-liberalism has had profound effects on the patterning of ethno-racial differences, and on material, social and symbolic dimensions of citizenship (Shafir 2004:55). Also explored in this paper is the meaning and exercise of diasporic citizenship defined based on the geo-political relations between South Korea, China and Taiwan that have created the differences between the new and old huaqiao, constructs of "Chineseness," and ideas of inclusion and exclusion in their homeland and host-state. Stuart Hall (1990)'s observations on diasporic identities showing both similarities and differences are particularly applicable to the study of the old and new huaqiao. Traces of Chineseness across the diaspora reflect a shared history while local or national differences reveal the process of dispersion and emplacement (Siu 2005:12).

2.   **South Korea and its Huaqiao Policy**

In order to explore the huaqiao residents in South Korea, it is important to establish an understanding of its host-state, which has had a tumultuous modern history of colonisation, civil war, military regimes, and dramatic growth into a developed economy. Since South Korea's economic recovery after the Korean War (1950-1953), there have been significant changes to the Korean population of close to 50 million. South Korea has always been a country of emigration, and has had a long tradition of exporting workers. Between 1989 and 1997, per capita GNP of South Korea doubled from $5,000 to approximately $10,000, and the wage of production workers also more than doubled. With this rapid economic development, along with an aging population, a serious labour shortage developed, especially in the dangerous, dirty, and difficult industries, commonly known as the "3-D" sectors. As a result, many Korean manufacturing companies began utilising foreign labour.[2] Ethnic Koreans from China (chosunjok), Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Indonesians are among the largest groups of migrant workers residing in South Korea and those who seek permanent residency.[3] The Korean population has also steadily diversified, with 632,490 persons (1.28%) of registered foreigners with non-Korean citizenship in 2006.[4] South Korea continues to be referred to as an ethnically highly homogeneous population, with 98% being ethnically Han Korean. Much of the ethnically-based citizenship policies have been based on this notion of ethnic and territory-based understanding of nationality.

Still, it is undeniable that significant legal reforms have been made in favour of the improved status and life of huaqiao in South Korea. The legislative reforms since 1997 aptly describe the changes the state has made, necessitated by the realities of South Korea's diversifying population and the

state's economic motives. The Foreigners' Property Ownership Act (1998) and Domicile Notification Act (2002) both came about as a result of the Kim Dae-jung administration efforts to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Amendments in 1997 and 2005 to the South Korean Nationality Law have made naturalisation easier, as well as brought about greater political and social rights for resident aliens. Nevertheless, the huaqiao emigration from South Korea shows that the huaqiao continue to have a difficult time adjusting to South Korea as 'inner citizens' even if they were to naturalise into Korean citizens. The challenge remains for policymakers who are beginning to recognise that improving the welfare of its ethnic minority groups could have long-term benefits to South Korea rather than serve just its short-term economic goals.

3.   **Old Huaqiao**

There are approximately 50 million overseas Chinese worldwide, half of them residing in Southeast Asia, with an estimated earning net worth close to 600 million in U.S. dollars (Park and Park 2003:33). Known for their extensive 'bamboo network'[5] based on guanxi[6], many overseas Chinese have identified more strongly with their ethnic group than with their host state, creating tensions even in multicultural societies such as Indonesia and Malaysia. It is interesting to note that the old huaqiao in South Korea are the exception to having the economic power that other overseas Chinese have been able to amass around the world. In this sense, not only are there differences between the old and new huaqiao, the old huaqiao of South Korea are in many ways alienated from the rest of the overseas Chinese community throughout Asia. This is primarily due to the fact that amongst the 21,806 registered huaqiao (0.04% of total population) in South Korea, majority originate from the Shandong region (90%), followed by Jiangsu and Zhejian regions. Shandong is in the Northern region of China and they speak a very different dialect from the southern region (Guangdong region among others) where the predominant number of huaqiao originate from, and are closely networked in Asia as well as throughout the world[7] (Jeong 2002:11).

The old huaqiao who arrived in Korea at the turn of the twentieth century represent the single largest ethnic minority group. "Invisible minority" is often the label used to refer to the huaqiao because of their small population, and the relatively indistinguishable physical characteristics with the host population. These aspects blend the huaqiao into the host society more easily if they choose to, compared to other racially different groups (Choi 2001: 2). Historically, not only due to the ethnically based citizenship policies but discrimination against the huaqiao was particularly evident during the military regimes. Restrictions currency exchange and ownership of property, and control on price of jajangmyeon (Chinese noodles) are some examples of discriminating laws and policies toward the huaqiao.

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Table 1: Demographic change of 'old' Huaqiao in South Korea

Source: Annual Yearbook of Immigration Office, Ministry of Justice of Republic of Korea (1985-1994), (1995-2005).

4.   Demography

The huaqiao population is a small and declining population, primarily due to intermarriages and emigration abroad**.** As with any minority group, the population change of huaqiao shows that they were susceptible to the changing economic and political circumstances of the Korean peninsula. The turbulent Korean history can be noted through, for instance, the dramatic fall of huaqiao population between 1940 and 1945, from 63,976 to 12,648 when the economic hardships during the Japanese colonisation and clashes with Korean people were particularly difficult for the huaqiao community and many migrated. Since many huaqiao from North Korea migrated to South Korea in 1953 just before the division of the Korean peninsula, the numbers increased slightly but decreased again during the beginning of the Rhee Syngman administration (1948-1960) due to its marginalising policies against this population (Park & Park, 2003:19). It is estimated that there were as many as 82,661 in 1942, however this population has steadily declined, resulting in a decrease of more than fifty percent from the 1940s to 1970s. Reflecting the decrease in population, interviews conducted for this study show the difficulty huaqiao continue to have in rooting their lives in South Korea.

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3rd generation huaqiao male (70s) retired from restaurant business.
My father owned a Chinese restaurant where I also worked at most of my adult life, and I used to have inspectors come from the Ministry of Health all the time, making trouble out of nothing. My uncle and I tried to expand our restaurant business but due to regulations that limited us from owning more than one business property real estate, we tried to partner with a Korean but this turned out sour and resulted in legal dispute. At the end of the day, we were always treated as 'jjang-ge.[8]'

Korean female (30) married to huaqiao male:
I was working for a language academy when I met my husband. I changed my citizenship to Taiwan after our marriage because it seemed like the obvious thing to do, to follow the husband's citizenship, although we were living in Korea. I didn't feel much discrimination until my son began school and I became a parent, because he is seen as huaqiao before a Korean. Everything from getting a driver's license to getting documents issued is more expensive and bureaucratic. The alien resident registration card does not validate, we can't even use on-line banking with that. I feel that just by having married a 'foreign' man, I have to re-gain membership in my own country.

Chiang, a male (16) student attending hangsung school says:
"In a country like South Korea that emphasises networks made in schools and educational achievement, attending a school that doesn't even have an accredited curriculum makes me feel like a delinquent student, much less a member of any society."

It is also interesting to note that this minority huaqiao population decreased despite the overall prosperity that came about during the period of the 1970s and 1980s. This is likely due to the increasing migration trend of huaqiao from South Korea to Western states or Taiwan. Beginning the 1970s, during a time when the U.S.'s immigration policy became more lenient, a notable exodus of huaqiao to the U.S. began to occur, particularly amongst the wealthy huaqiao residents in South Korea. Between 1970 and 1980, an estimated 30,000 emigrated in total from South Korea to abroad. Approximately 15,000 moved to the U.S. and 10,000 moved to Taiwan. Also, during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, without proper social safety nets, numerous huaqiao left Korea due to failing businesses in sectors such as Chinese restaurants, oriental medicine, travel agency and small convenient stores that were particularly sensitive to the difficult market. Although there have been exceptional periods, the overview of the historical roots shows that the South Korean huaqiao, similar to other immigrant groups, were vulnerable to the interface of the local economy, its ethnic Chinese sector,

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and the transnational Chinese labour market (Pieke 2004:25). Even in recent years after South Korea began to adopt more lenient immigration laws and its population diversified, according to a 2003 Korean Human Rights Commission report, 79% of the 700 huaqiao interviewed felt discrimination when purchasing or registering on-line, 77% when job interviewing, and 58% at banking and other commercial services. Of the huaqiao who have immigrated to the U.S. over the years,[9] many have settled in large immigrant cities such as Los Angeles that have a concentrated group of huaqiao from South Korea. Interestingly, the Korean huaqiao living in the U.S. have integrated their lives within the Korean rather than to the Chinese diaspora communities. Aside from the fact that they were once 'rooted' in South Korea, this is due to the fact that often times, the 2nd or 3rd generation of the huaqiao are children of inter-marriages (usually Chinese father and Korean mother), and therefore have ties to Korea as much as to their Chinese heritage (Yang and Lee 2004). Moreover, although 21,806 huaqiao were registered as legal aliens in 2005, the immigration office predicted that only 18,000 live in South Korea, and the rest are either studying or living in Taiwan or elsewhere and are thought to be a 'floating population.'

5.   Geo-political Relations

Before exploring the new huaqiao, it is important to discuss the dynamics between South Korea, Taiwan and the PRC (People's Republic of China), particularly beginning the early 1990s. In essence, the homeland-diaspora relations are complicated by the fact that there are two states that claim to represent the Chinese nation, the PRC and Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan. The Cold War ideological difference between democracy and communism played a major role in keeping the huaqiao in South Korea connected to Taiwan, their 'imagined homeland.' Taiwan and South Korea relations date back to 4 January 1949, four months after the formal establishment of the South Korean government, when the Republic of China set up an embassy in Seoul's Myeongdong district. However, with the downfall of communism and changing political climate, and as PRC has transformed itself from a hermetic communist state to a prominent player in international affairs (Pieke 2004:193), South Korea continues to be heavily influenced by the geo-political as well as economic significance of mainland China. On 23 August 1992, Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with South Korea in advance of South Korea's announcement of formal recognition of the PRC. PRC continues to view the old huaqiao with Taiwanese citizenship as Chinese citizens of the PRC since Taiwan is seen as an extension of mainland China.[10] As long as the PRC-Taiwan conflict continues, so will their struggle for diasporic Chinese allegiance and affinity (Siu 2005:23).

With the changes in diplomatic relations, the ideological force that tied the old huaqiao of South Korea exclusively to Taiwan has diminished.

Some scholars have observed that the old huaqiao have been able to rediscover and reaffirm their Chinese identity with support of PRC's growing economy and international power (Jeong Yongrok 2002). Hence, although 98% of the huaqiao in South Korea have Taiwanese passports, due to the political circumstances of the Taiwan-PRC relations, increasing numbers of old huaqiao are reclaiming their Chinese identity by re-establishing their roots with mainland China. Business partnerships and education in various parts of mainland China and most recently, trends of retirement in the Yantai region are examples of this. Yantai region has become a destination for retirement homes to increasing numbers of old huaqiao from South Korea, given the cheaper cost of living and cultural affinity. To some extent although not as effectively as Chinatowns in other countries, the old huaqiao Chinatowns in South Korea have also become the networking stage for incoming new huaqiao, including students, labour migrants, and business professionals from the PRC.

6.   New huaqiao

Table 2: Demography of Chinese Diaspora in South Korea based on Citizenship[11]

Country of Origin	Total Population		Male		Female	
	2002	2006	2002	2006	2002	2006
'old' huaqiao (Taiwan citizenship)	22,699	22,118	12,244	11,878	10,456	10,240
'new' huaqiao (PRC citizenship)	36,297	90,298	17,680	46,970	18,617	43,328
Ethnic Korean-Chinese	48,293	221,525	21,166	103,837	27,127	117,688
Hong Kong	152	300	86	147	66	153
Singapore	186	210	93	103	93	107
Former Soviet Union	59,514	3,731	30,283	1,333	29,231	2,398

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration Office (Immigration Yearbook 2002, 2006).

The new huaqiao are PRC citizens, estimated at 400,000, and originate from different regions, ranging from 3-D labour migrants to young professionals who as a migrant population are becoming increasingly integrated into South Korea's globalising economy and society. The new

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huaqiao are therefore over five times the number of old huaqiao population. Including the ethnic-Koreans (chosunjok), the numbers exceed 500,000. The above figures show the significant increase in the new huaqiao, and particularly that of the ethnic Koreans from China. Even more the case than the old huaqiao, the new huaqiao in South Korea tend to be 'long term sojourners' with multiple belongings in both China and South Korea, and even in third countries. Even for those who establish themselves in South Korea, there is little incentive for the new huaqiao to give up their Chinese citizenship and naturalise into South Korean citizens, given that residency rights have become more lenient and advantageous toward the huaqiao and other migrant groups (Yang Pil-seung, in www.ichosun.com 11-16-2007). This is indicative of the changing conceptions of citizenship and the practice of multiple belongings, where numerous huaqiao are ironically choosing to remain as 'denizens,' particularly as some desire not to naturalise into Korean citizens because of the advantages conferred with partial membership. In this sense, the new huaqiao represents a new breed of diaspora, where many choose to forgo identification with a rights-oriented and state-centred citizenship. Interviews below are representative of this growing trend.

Investment Banker Ping, Male, 34
I am successful and happy in South Korea, and I have lived here for the past 7 years…but I do not necessarily see myself as a permanent resident here and will go where my job or lifestyle will take me. Wherever we (my family) go, there is always a Chinese community where we will feel comfortable.

Student Woo, Male, 28
I may stay in South Korea indefinitely given that the laws are more lenient now… I may or may not seek permanent residency but likely not change my citizenship (to South Korean). There is a growing international community of business, academic and other professional elites in South Korea, and I want to build my global network with them.

Although this paper cannot elaborate due to limited space, one reason to the continued marginalised status of huaqiao and other non-ethnic Korean residents is due to the fact that actual citizenship reforms are primarily driven by neo-liberal policies rather than intended to address the culturally-rooted problems of marginalised ethnic minorities. For instance, the South Korean government has initiated projects to take advantage of the economic opportunities this population and the 'China boom' presents. Projects include the Annual Overseas Chinese Trade Association Conference held in 2005 in Seoul[12], the new Chinatown projects in South Korea including that in Ilsan (i-chinatown in Northern part of South Korea), and efforts to revive the old Chinatown in Incheon (port city in western part of

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South Korea).[13] While such initiatives have brought about some career opportunities for old huaqiao in South Korea, they still remain the 'middlemen' rather than true agents of these projects. In the case of the 2005 conference, the lack of media coverage of old huaqiao residents in South Korea and their small presence in the conference itself showed that the overseas Chinese from abroad were seen as potential investors, while the old huaqiao living in South Korea, were essentially seen as separate categories of people.

A male (49) overseas Chinese investor from Singapore says:
"I don't have any friends amongst the huaqiao in South Korea, so doing business here will have to be from scratch. The huaqiao in Korea have always been out of the loop (of the overseas Chinese networks)."

Another difference to take note of is that while the old huaqiao primarily engaged in small family businesses and are of a similar socio-economic class due to historical marginalisation as an ethnic minority group, the new huaqiao have a diverse range of jobs with various socio-economic statuses. Professional elites who are highly educated are more readily able to take advantage of citizenship in countries of their origin or current residency to their benefit. On the other hand, the struggles of 3-D migrant workers who are vulnerable to the global economy are perpetuated by their illegal status. For migrants such as these, the opportunities available through migration are counterbalanced by the loss of rights and citizenship (Shafir 2004:131).

7.   Multiple Belongings
The changing characteristics of the huaqiao diaspora in South Korea show that not only are the origins of the Chinese diaspora diverse, so too are their itineraries and destinations which are far from final. Despite their differences, old and new huaqiao show similar practice of citizenship. As described above, emigration pattern shows moving abroad is not the only option in that there is a growing number of old and new huaqiao from South Korea who separate time between Taiwan, China or US and South Korea, going back and forth, maintaining businesses, lifestyles and belongings in both (or more) countries. Aiwha Ong defines this as the practice of 'flexible citizenship' (Ong 1999) in which based on her study of the Chinese diaspora, she describes the complex relationships between homeland and host societies and asserts that the traditional idea of national citizenship has become insufficient. Ong refers to the strategies and effects of professionals seeking to both circumvent and benefit from nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work and family relocation (Ong 1999:112). Increasing number of old and new huaqiao seek to be maximal rights-based residents rather than full-fledged citizens, or seek dual citizenship when

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possible. This neo-liberal view of citizenship has become particularly prevalent amongst diaspora groups in a host-state such as South Korea where its economy has recently developed and its immigration and citizenship policy still in formation. This view reflects the harsh economic realities that drive why certain citizenship, usually that of western liberal democratic states, privilege while others undermine toward better life opportunities. This further widens the citizenship gap[14], even amongst those in the same diaspora group. Hence, globalisation re-inscribes not only gender, race, and class divisions, but also the social boundaries of citizenship (Shafir 2004:143). In this sense, Ong's among other studies support the idea that in today's world, it is economic forces that present the greatest challenge to the qualitative meaning of citizenship (Delanty 2000:127).

8.   Conclusion

The study of the old and new huaqiao residents in South Korea and the evolving policies toward this diaspora group well represent the changing understanding of national belonging in South Korea and how the conception of citizenship as a relation between the individual and the state is being contested. While their origin and citizenship show distinctions, similarities between the old and new huaqiao can be found in their neo-liberal understanding of citizenship. The practice of diasporic citizenship and multiple belongings is represented through the increasing number of those who seek to be maximal rights-based residents rather than full-fledged citizens in their host-states. Given that the current generation of old huaqiao are born to intermarriages of Chinese and Korean parents, and the growing presence of new huaqiao, citizenship reforms in South Korea will need to be translated into that which is ethnically inclusive, and integrates citizens and denizens with multiple belongings into its society. Until then, there will continue to be a disjuncture between citizenship as an ideal as conceived in law or status and how it is practiced by its state, citizens, and non-citizens.

Notes

[1] Although the Romanised version is *hwagyo* in Korean, or described as *hanhwa* as some scholars, I will refer to the overseas Chinese under the anglicized version *huaqiao*.

[2] These '3-D job' workers have grown in numbers, nearly forty times more between 1987 and 1997, from 6,409 to 266,301(Choe 2006:104).

[3] For more details on migrant workers, refer to Jeanyoung Lee (2007) '*Ethnic Korean Migration into South Korea: Reasons, Effects, and Responses,*' in Global Migration and the Household in East Asia conference papers(in English), Seol Dong-hoon & John Skentny (2001) *International Norms and*

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Domestic Politics: A Comparison of Migrant Worker and Women's Rights in South Korea, Timothy Lim (2006) *"Foreign Migrant Workers in South Korea" in Global Turbulence: Global Activist and State.*

[4]Ministry of Justice, Statistical Yearbook of Departures and Arrivals Control 2006.

[5] While scholars often refer to 'bamboo network' (Weidenbaum & Hughes 1996, Jeong 2002) as family-run businesses that have grown to large conglomerates, 'ungrounded empire' defined as "the new deterritorialized and protean structures of domination that span the Asia Pacific and within which diaspora Chinese act" (Ong and Nonini 1997:20) also describes these transnational spaces and identities practiced by overseas Chinese.

[6] *Guanxi* describes the basic dynamic in personalized networks of influence, and is a central concept in Chinese society. It describes a personal connection between two people in which one is able to prevail upon another to perform a favor or service, or be prevailed upon. *Guanxi* can also be used to describe a network of contacts, which an individual can call upon when something needs to be done, and through which he or she can exert influence on behalf of another.

[7] Although it is difficult to categorize the overseas Chinese population, there are primarily five groups based on place of origin, dialect or trade. Cantonese (Guangdong Province), Hokkien (Fujian Province), Hakka (Guangdong and Fujian Coastal areas then moved to other countries), Hainanese (Hainan Island), Teochiu (Guangdong Province but with sub dialect), and Yunnanese (Jade Trade, near Burmese border).

[8] *Jjang-ge* refers to a derogatory term based on *jajangmyon,* a Chinese noodle dish. This word is used by Koreans to refer to *huaqiao*. This also connotes being cheap and dirty.

[9] There are about 200,000 *huaqiao* from South Korea in the U.S., many with professional skills. (www.kcci.or.kr 2006-09-24 newsletter)

[10] The 1996 missile launched onto the Taiwan strait by the PRC to reiterate its territorial claim over Taiwan is representative of this 'One China' policy.

[11] It should be noted that while the data is from a government website, even legally documented migrant populations are difficult to calculate. It is estimated that there is up to 10% discrepancy in the numbers due to its illegal population.

[12] During the first fieldwork trip to Korea (August-October 2005), I conducted interviews with various attendees of the Overseas Chinese Business Association Conference held in COEX, Seoul, October 2005.

[13] During the second fieldwork trip to Korea (May-June 2006), I visited *Incheon* and *Ilsan* several times to meet with government officials in the city planning divisions and overseas Chinese organizations.

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[14] Citizenship gap between migrants and citizens in terms of the political, civil, and social rights they can claim has widened due to globalization and its inequalities.

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A Diaspora of Descendants?
Contemporary Caledonian Society Members in Melbourne, Australia – A Case Study

Kim Sullivan

Abstract

Paul Basu has recently reminded us of the centrality of the homeland to the concept of diaspora. As such, nineteenth-century Scots exemplified diasporic consciousness, by establishing hundreds of Caledonian Societies as 'surrogate' Scottish homelands across the British colonial world. A remarkable number of those Caledonian Societies have endured into the twenty-first century, despite the evolution of their host countries well beyond their settler origins. One of those to do so, the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne (1858), presents an opportunity to explore current understandings of diasporic identity within a 'Scottish' institution whose members are no longer exclusively Scottish. Current members range from the recent Scottish immigrant to the fifth-generation Australian, yet the sense of identification with a distant Scottish 'homeland' appears as legitimate for those members whose connection is purely ancestral, as it does for members actually born and raised in Scotland. The Caledonian Society of Melbourne therefore encapsulates, in microcosm, one of the key tensions presently underscoring the term 'diaspora' - namely whether its definitional scope incorporates that growing global phenomenon of roots-conscious descendants, who have no firsthand knowledge of life in the 'homeland', or the experience of leaving it - the traditional qualifiers for a diasporic claim. Engaging directly with the Society's current members, this paper observes the relationship between the imagined 'homeland' of the descendant and the remembered 'homeland' of the émigré, asking whether the two experiences can ever be reconciled under the single designation 'diasporic' - a question at the heart of the present debate.

Keywords: Australians, Caledonian Society, descendant, Diaspora, ethnicity and homeland, immigrant, Scots.

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> **diaspora**, n. (the diaspora)
> the dispersion of the Jews beyond Israel
> Jews living outside Israel

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> the dispersion or spread of any people from their original
> homeland people who have spread or been dispersed from
> their homeland[1]

Trying to define a 'diaspora' in the twenty-first century is no straightforward exercise. The Oxford English Dictionary, like most of its counterparts, gives precedence to a meaning rooted in the traumatic expulsion of the Jews from their Biblical homeland - an event of such epic and far-reaching consequences that its very association with the word 'diaspora' has seen the original meaning, as a human dispersal of any kind, relegated to second place. Lately, however, this definitional status quo has begun to shift. As the global movement of people becomes increasingly commonplace, and the motives and outcomes more complex and varied, it is that second, more neutral understanding of the word 'diaspora' which is most frequently pressed into service today to articulate a vast array of emerging immigrant identities, traumatic and peaceful, expulsive and voluntary, assimilative and segregated.[2]

But it is not only real-time immigrants, in all of their rich variety, who are currently pushing the boundaries of the term 'diaspora' beyond its traditionally understood meaning. Another group testing the semantic limits of the term, even in its broadest sense, are those citizens of 'new world', or ex-British colonial countries, who, as the descendants, by varying degrees, of immigrant/settler forebears, are turning increasingly to their ancestral ethnic roots to signify and enhance their own sense of self. Anthropologist Paul Basu has described this phenomenon as "the 'new white ethnic movement': the desire of white, suburban, middle-class, assimilated citizens to effectively dissimilate themselves and recover a more distinctive, particular ethnic identity."[3]

These individuals are not included in any formal definition of what a diaspora is, or who it refers to, yet they typically frame their own identities as the descendants of immigrants, in overtly diasporic terms, referring to the places that their forebears came from as the 'homeland' for example, even if they, personally, have never been to, or lived in, the place concerned. This paper takes up the case of these 'diasporic descendants' and asks whether there is scope for the definitional inclusion of this group, who appear to fall outside the traditional parameters of a 'diaspora', yet relate to the concept, personally and emotionally, nonetheless.

The testing ground for this enquiry is the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne, a voluntary institution founded by, and for Scottish immigrants in Melbourne, Australia in 1858, with the aim of providing a kind of surrogate Scottish 'homeland' for its members in the absence of the real thing.[4] The Society's principal objects were to encourage social intercourse among the city's Scots, to provide charitable relief to those among them

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found to be in need, and to cultivate an ongoing appreciation of Scottish culture through the celebration of the country's literature, poetry and music, and the practice of its traditional games and pastimes.[5] As such, the Caledonian Society was, at its foundation, a truly 'diasporic' institution, representing, literally, hundreds of Scots who had "spread or been dispersed from their homeland", in this case, to the Australian region of Victoria.[6]

What makes this Caledonian Society an ideal basis for investigating contemporary understandings of diaspora is that it has survived intact to the present day, in a country that has evolved well beyond its British/Scottish settler origins. Consequently, in the twenty-first century, the Society's membership no longer consists solely of direct Scottish immigrants, but is increasingly dominated by Australians of varying degrees of Scottish descent. But having never deviated from its original function as a sphere of Scottish diasporic consciousness, the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne currently presents something of an anomaly, attracting both individuals who have themselves lived in, and left Scotland (the traditional qualifiers for a diasporic claim), as well as a growing contingent who have no immediate relationship with Scotland beyond their own decision to identify personally with the diasporic acts of their often-distant Scottish ancestors.

Is it possible then, intellectually, for the incontestable Scottish identity of the immigrant member, and the largely self-determined Scottish identity of the descendant member, to be reconciled within this Caledonian Society under the single designation 'diasporic'? In order to test this quandary, a random sample of current members was canvassed via questionnaire in 2007, with a view to pitting the Society's diasporic credentials against a number of potentially problematic factors emanating from within the membership itself, regarding their diverse range of personal relationships to Scotland and therefore their diverse perceptions of Scotland, as brought to bear on the Society.

In regard to group dynamics, not only do the current members of the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne represent a broad sliding scale of proximity to their Scottish roots, but they are also, as individuals, quite ethnically diverse. Within the sample group canvassed for this study, members ranged from the recent Scottish immigrant all the way to the fifth-generation Australian of Scottish great-great-great-grand parentage. And, over and above that variance, they also embodied a wide assortment of ethnic backgrounds, besides their mutual Scottish heritage. As such, the individual paths by which each of the current members has arrived at his or her Scottish ethnic claim are incongruent to say the least.

As far as those Scottish connections were concerned, the sample group of Caledonian Society members represented a clear one-third-two-thirds split between Scottish-born immigrants and Australian-born descendants. That the Society continues to sustain such a high percentage of

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directly Scottish members may seem surprising, given the length of time that Australia has been an independent and largely self-populating nation. Certainly, the Caledonian Society of Otago in New Zealand, which is of comparable vintage and history, currently contains no Scottish-born members at all.[7] But Australia continued to attract large numbers of British, and therefore Scottish, immigrants in a relatively steady flow throughout the twentieth century, and so the many Scots among the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne's current membership are products of this process.[8] As such, their presence helps to enhance and reinforce the Society's literal status as a 'diasporic' entity.

However, the remaining two-thirds of Australian-born members represented a very broad range of personal Scottish connections, as the table below indicates. It is reasonable to assume that those members who were either one or two generations removed from their nearest Scottish forebear could at least feasibly claim to have had a meaningful personal relationship with that forebear, whether as their child or grandchild. But those members whose Scottish connection stretched to a great-grandparent (three generations removed) or beyond were arguably too far removed, in generational terms, to have directly been influenced or affected by the Scottish ancestor from whom they now drew their sense of Scottish diasporic identity. Just over seventy percent of the Society's Australian-born members, and therefore the majority of all members canvassed, fell into this latter category, so was there any correlation between proximity to, and strength of feeling for, one's Scottish connection which, given the generational distance of so many of the members, might potentially undermine the Society's diasporic credentials?

Table 1. Generational Proximity to Nearest Scottish Relative of the Caledonian Society's Australian-born Members

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
      To determine this, each of the members was also asked to describe what it was that had motivated them to join a Caledonian Society in the first instance, in order to gauge the extent to which its Scottish aspect in particular was instrumental, rather than, for example, its broader social or charitable functions. The overwhelming majority cited a 'strong personal sense of Scottish identity', right across the board from the most direct Scottish immigrant to the farthest descended Australian, suggesting that it was indeed the Society's Scottish cultural emphasis specifically which drew Scots and Australians alike to participate in the life of the Society. Clearly, then, there was no incremental relationship between degree of 'being' Scottish and degree of 'feeling' Scottish. It did not matter whether a member was descended directly from two Scottish parents, or distantly from one Scottish great-great-great-grandparent - it was the fact of the descent, and the members' personal sensitivity to it, which informed the decision to join the Society. From the individual, emotional perspectives of the membership, therefore, the Society's standing as a legitimate site of Scottish diasporic identity was not in any doubt.

      But another factor potentially threatening to undermine the Society's diasporic status from within was the presence, among the Australian-born members, of other ethnicities in their family backgrounds besides Scottish. According to a study by sociologist Mary Waters, individuals of multi-ethnic descent, for whom there is no obvious outward physical sign of their belonging to any particular one, often develop an ad hoc, and fluctuating relationship with those ethnicities which raises questions about sincerity of attachment.[9] Following the introduction of an ethnicity question into the United States census in 1986, Waters tracked and analysed the responses of a sample group of white Americans of predominantly European descent across subsequent census years. Waters found that many of her subjects unwittingly gave different ethnicity answers from one return to the next, and while the variations were typically subtle, they nevertheless indicated, as Waters ultimately concluded, that, "ethnicity has become a subjective identity, invoked at will by the individual."[10]

      Waters followed up these findings by interviewing her subjects in order to tease out the causes behind their oscillating ethnic self-perceptions. She discovered a plethora of external factors at work, among which were the ageing process, the birth of children, the death of a particular relative, and even prevailing societal attitudes towards certain ethnic groups, shaped by the media and popular culture.[11] The most telling illustration in the latter case was the high proportion of study participants with a marginal Italian family connection, who nevertheless gave 'Italian' an increasingly prominent ranking among their personal ethnic self-identifiers. When pressed to justify this claim, many admitted that they simply found the idea of Italian culture

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appealing because it enjoyed a reputation for being family-oriented, at a time when American family values were widely perceived to be in decline.[12]

Essentially, the Australian-born members of the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne inhabit that same realm of choice as the Americans studied by Waters. As multi-ethnic, but otherwise 'white' citizens of a country that similarly espouses equality and freedom of personal choice, these members are likewise at liberty to construct their own identities from the ethnic threads of their diverse family backgrounds. But the manner in which Waters' Americans appeared to impulsively adopt and discard their personal ethnic identifiers, suggested that their attachment to them was characteristically fleeting and conditional, rather than emotionally derived or especially meaningful. Was the same true, then, of the Caledonian Society's Australian-born members in regard to their own multiple ethnic backgrounds, and if so, could this be seen to undermine the authenticity of their Scottish ethnic claims in particular?

Certainly, most of the Australian-born Caledonian Society members did indeed indicate that they were of mixed ethnic backgrounds, with most citing at least one other ethnic connection besides Scottish. The other ethnicities most commonly reported by the Society's Australian members were, perhaps unsurprisingly, English, Irish and Welsh, considering Australia's predominantly British settler history, although some other European ethnicities were also mentioned, including Swiss and Scandinavian. Crucially though, there appeared to be no hesitation in offering up these far-flung connections, and yet none of the respondents cited 'Australian' among their personal ethnic identifiers, suggesting, much as Waters proposed, that 'ethnicity' was, to them, entirely a matter of personal choice, and not in any way limited to, or even necessarily inclusive of, one's actual place of origin.

But when asked whether they personally related to any of their other ethnic connections as they evidently did their Scottish ethnicity (hence their membership of a Caledonian Society), the response was a strong and collective 'no'. For example, one respondent, who otherwise cited Irish heritage, stated:

> […] although I have Irish ancestors I do not feel Irish at all
> […] there are plenty of opportunities [to express my Irish ethnicity] but I do not wish to avail myself of them.[13]

When pressed for a reason, he simply responded, "Apathy!"[14] Another respondent, citing English ethnicity but claiming not to relate to it personally, suggested that there simply were no English ethnic associations in her local area to join. When asked why this might be, she implied that England's strong regional variations meant that no overriding sense of

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'English' culture had ever existed from which one could derive a singular sense of English ethnic identity.[15]

A third respondent, also citing English ethnicity but no particular sense of connection to it, offered an alternative reason for what he, too, perceived as the general lack of ethnic empathy among English-descended Australians:

> You could say the whole of the Australian 'establishment'
> is a manifestation of Englishness … perhaps this is why
> there is not really a 'society' - it already is ours."[16]

Here, then, was a group of multi-ethnic Australians who not only chose to openly associate with their Scottish ethnic roots by participating in a Caledonian Society, but who also actively and wilfully chose not to associate with any of the other ethnicities in their collective family backgrounds, even in cases where the Scottish connection was technically the weakest, as was true for at least one such member.[17]

Evidently, there was a strong element of exclusivity and permanence to the Scottish ethnic claims being made by the Caledonian Society's Australian-born members which distinguished them from Waters' American group, for whom ethnicity appeared to be a more flexible concern. Perhaps it might be argued that the very presence of the Caledonian Society itself is what anchors these otherwise multi-ethnic Australians exclusively to their Scottish roots (Waters' subjects did not appear to have similar involvement in ethnic associations). But of course, a voluntary body such as the Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne is only as good as its members, and arguably it continues to endure precisely because sufficient Australians do appear to feel so strongly about their Scottish roots.

Whatever the reason, though, it is evident that factors such as generational remoteness from one's Scottish immigrant ancestors, and the presence of other ethnicities in one's background, do not undermine to any degree the personal sense of belonging to a putative Scottish homeland for any of the Caledonian Society's Australian-born members. There is no question in the minds of these individuals that they are a tangible part of the 'Scottish diaspora', even though the very term itself would appear to exclude them from it in the literal sense. But is a self-determined, and emotionally-derived claim to diasporic identity, however sincere, sufficient to warrant the inclusion of the descendant within the definitional parameters of the term 'diaspora'?

Perhaps the final, critical test is whether the perceptions of the Scottish homeland with which the Society's Australian-born members claim to identify, are compatible with those of their Scottish-born counterparts, whose relationship with Scotland is at least based on the experience of having

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originally 'come from' there. Given that none of the Australian respondents had ever actually lived in Scotland, or experienced the sensation of leaving it, would the gap between the 'remembered' Scotland of the Society's direct immigrants, and the 'imagined' Scotland of its Australian-born members, ultimately prove too wide for both perspectives to be theoretically acceptable as 'diasporic'?

Paul Basu found, during the course of a recent study, that a fundamental tension did indeed exist between what we might, for argument's sake, term 'real' Scots, namely those individuals who were born and raised in Scotland, and 'descendant' Scots, namely those citizens of other countries who choose to identify themselves as ethnically Scottish on account of a Scottish immigrant ancestor.[18] While observing interactions between 'real' and 'descendant' Scots on a genealogy web forum, Basu encountered several displays of animosity emanating from the former toward the latter, particularly over the latter's tendency to conceptualise Scotland in romanticised and anachronistic terms. This appeared to offend and frustrate Basu's 'real' Scots, one of whom even resorted to accusing a Scottish-descended American he was corresponding with of "tartan tomfoolery".[19]

In order to assess whether this same fundamental tension existed between the 'Scotlands' represented by the Caledonian Society's 'real' and 'descendant' members, their various personal perceptions of Scotland were drawn out via a number of indirect questions scattered throughout the questionnaire, designed to elicit honest and unaffected responses. Their answers were, once again, surprising, and appeared upon first reading to contradict Basu's findings entirely. Overwhelmingly, the Caledonian Society's members, both Australian-born and Scottish-born, tended to frame their ideas of Scotland around the romantic imagery of clans, bagpipes, tartan, haggis, and a rural idyll - all of the stereotypical clichés which are frequently associated with Scotland by those who are not from there.

Most prevalent among those perceptions was the idea of Scotland as a clan-based society, whose hallmarks of a simple rustic lifestyle and an abiding loyalty to one's kin permeated the responses given by both the Australian and Scottish members. This notion is, of course, both conflated and anachronistic - only in the Highland regions of Scotland did a feudal-style clan system ever function, and it effectively disintegrated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, under pressure to assimilate into the emerging British capitalist economy. Partly on account of the often-tragic process by which traditional Highland society collapsed, punctuated as it was by famine, clearance and mass emigration, the clan, along with its accompanying symbols of bagpipes, tartan, and a primitive, rural way of life entered into romantic folklore as a kind of lost ideal - the Scotland that never was. In Basu's study, this skewed and whimsical interpretation of Scotland as

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a whole signalled a fundamental point of divergence between those 'real' and 'descendant' Scots he observed in the genealogy chat rooms.

Yet, among the 'real' and 'descendant' Scots of the Caledonian Society, this particular stereotype seemed to represent the exact opposite - a point of convergence - out of which the Society's own collective representation of Scotland was drawn. It was, in fact, one of the Society's Scottish-born members who offered the most roundly outmoded and sepia-tinged depiction of Scotland, portraying it as a place of small, close-knit rural communities, happily cut off from the harsh modern world, through a combination of poor weather, geographical remoteness and the lack of availability of modern communication systems.[20] By contrast, only one of the 'real' Scots surveyed expressed any explicit awareness of, or frustration at, such distorted interpretations of Scotland, stating that, "in recent years we have not done enough to off-set the haggis, bagpipes and och-aye the noo …"[21] It appears, then, that the strong presence of 'real' Scots among the membership has done little to induce the Caledonian Society's representation of Scotland away from the stereotypes that one might expect of a group made up only of descendants, and towards something more reflective of the contemporary realities of Scottish life. Despite the tangible connection with modern-day Scotland enjoyed by the Society's direct Scottish immigrants, their post-immigration perceptions appeared to be equally clouded by romance and nostalgia.

So what, then, was the difference between the Caledonian Society's 'real' Scots, and those observed by Basu? The answer lies perhaps in the fact that Basu's 'real' Scots were actually resident in Scotland: it was 'home' to them. For the Caledonian Society's 'real' Scots, having left to live elsewhere, Scotland was no longer 'home' but 'homeland' - and the distinction is crucial. It seems that somewhere in the process of leaving one's place of origin, it is transformed in the mind from 'home' - the location of one's everyday reality, to 'homeland' - a place naturally relegated to the imagination by virtue of one's separation from it. In this sense, the Caledonian Society's Scottish immigrant members are no less at the mercy of their imaginations than their Australian-born counterparts, when it comes to the matter of conceptualising Scotland from elsewhere, and it is this mutual reliance upon the imagination which appears to give the Society's otherwise mixed membership a cohesion that ultimately overrides the complex ethnic and generational differences which otherwise exist between them.

And there is essentially nothing new about this unconscious inclination among immigrants to convert their authentic memories of 'home' into the idealised imaginings of 'homeland' during the process of removal. In 1928, a prominent church minister from Edinburgh noted, with good-humoured embarrassment, that even when he visited other countries on a temporary basis, he was inclined, just as much as the permanent Scottish

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émigrés he encountered on his travels, to resort to a romantic view of Scotland, while away from it. Describing his attendance as a guest at an overseas Scottish society dinner, the minister observed:

> Man after man gets up (and if you are like me you are one of them), and pictures an ideal Scotland that never existed outside of fairy books … Oh yes! We are indeed the sentimental humbugs of the world![22]

The minister's assertion of 'sentimental humbuggery' may have been a little harsh, but he nicely captured the essence of that transformative process through which an individual's perception of 'place of origin' passes, when he or she becomes physically dislocated from it. As such, it would appear as though two Scots can have fundamentally different internal perceptions of the place they both come from, simply because one has moved away while the other remains. But by the same token, it seems that a Scot and an Australian, both living in Australia, can share a remarkably similar perception of the place that only the Scot actually comes from, because both are equally compelled to 'imagine' it from afar.

In conclusion, the present-day Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne, like the majority of its counterpart overseas Scottish ethnic associations, seems to serve two simultaneous, and yet largely compatible purposes: on one hand, it continues to operate, as it always has done since its foundation in 1858, as a sphere in which the homesick and nostalgic Scottish immigrant can comfortably reassert (and reinvent) his old identity in a strange new environment. On the other hand, the Society has grown increasingly into an additional role as a sphere in which Australians, as citizens of a young and ethnically mixed nation, can otherwise distinguish themselves through an alternative, self-ascribed identity drawn from their ancestral heritage.

The motivating factors behind these two impulses may be fundamentally different, but as we have seen, the expression they ultimately take within the Caledonian Society is effectively the same. For recent immigrant and distant descendant alike, fulfilment of a personal sense of Scottishness is achieved through the selective cultivation of a romanticised, and past-oriented conception of the homeland. Neither the degree of proximity to, nor the concentration of, one's personal Scottish ethnic claim appears to have any bearing on this phenomenon - it is equally potent among those members who have actually lived in, and then left, Scotland as it is among those who have never lived there at all.

The Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne, with its highly diverse membership, therefore, is living proof that diasporic identity does not necessarily begin and end with the immigrant who actually undertakes the act

of leaving the homeland, as even the broadest of our dictionary definitions would imply. Rather, it has the capacity to transcend generations and to re-emerge in the self-perception of even the most distant descendant. Yet at a time when the very concept of diaspora is being challenged and stretched far beyond its longstanding traditional meaning, the issue of the self-identifying 'diasporic descendant', and whether his or her experience can legitimately be articulated within the conceptual parameters of this thorny term, remains unresolved.

What is certain is that roots-consciousness among the descendants of immigrants is a growing global phenomenon, and if the implications of this development are to be fully understood, it is crucial to determine precisely where, if anywhere, within the broader diaspora debate, the descendant actually fits.

Notes

[1] *Oxford English Dictionary,* 2nd ed., s.v. 'Diaspora.'

[2] R Cohen, 'Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 72, July 1996, pp. 514.

[3] P Basu, *Highland Homecomings: Genealogy and Heritage Tourism in the Scottish Diaspora*, Routledge, Oxon, 2007, p. 198.

[4] 'Caledonia' was the name that Roman invaders gave to that part of northern Britain which remained beyond their control, namely modern-day Scotland. The word has survived as a romantic term for Scotland which conjures up notions of defiance and pride.

[5] *Rules of the Caledonian Society of Melbourne*, Fergusson & Mitchell, Melbourne, 1884.

[6] *Oxford English Dictionary*, ibid.

[7] The same questionnaire was issued to a sample group of members from the Caledonian Society of Otago, New Zealand, in 2006.

[8] A J Hammerton and Alistair Thomson, *Ten Pound Poms—Australia's Invisible Migrants: a Life History of British Postwar Emigration to Australia*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005.

[9] M C Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990.

[10] ibid., 7.

[11] ibid., 81.

[12] ibid.

[13] Respondent no. 1, Royal Caledonian Society of Melbourne, interviewed via questionnaire, 2007.

[14] ibid.

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[15] Respondent no. 5, ibid.
[16] Respondent no. 21, ibid.
[17] Respondent no. 21, for example, confirmed that his family background was, in fact, more ethnically 'English' than 'Scottish'.
[18] Basu, 110.
[19] ibid.
[20] Respondent no. 15, ibid.
[21] Respondent no. 3, ibid.
[22] Rev. James Black, DD., 'The Scot Abroad—Sentimental Fraud', *The Scotsman,* August 23, 1928.

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From Pan-Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism: Epistemological Tensions in Diasporic Filipino Activism

Marco Cuevas-Hewitt

Abstract

Although listed under the common rubric of globalisation, diasporas and transnational social movements have mostly been treated as mutually exclusive phenomena. This paper seeks to remedy this oversight in its examination of transnational social movements within the Filipino diaspora. As early as the 1890s, diasporic Filipinos were organising in Spain for the Philippine nationalist revolution. Again, in the 1970s, Filipinos in the diaspora played no small part in the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. In the 1990s, the central issue to emerge was that of holding the US military accountable for the toxic waste it left behind after the closure of its Philippine bases. This paper will seek, in particular, to examine the various epistemological underpinnings evident in different modes of diasporic political activism, and to evaluate the ways in which these epistemologies are being reconfigured through, and in response to, the paradigm-shift from modernity (characterised, most importantly for this paper, by the pre-dominance of the nation-state system) to postmodernity (characterised by new supranational, or post-national, forms of sovereignty). These shifts entail a whole complex of processes, often referred to in the shorthand as 'globalisation.' Drawing from ethnographic research that I conducted amongst Filipino American activists in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2007, I will endeavour to bring to light some of the epistemological tensions that I observed at play during my time there, elucidating, in particular, tensions between Third Worldist revolutionary nationalism (which persists today despite globalisation, albeit morphing into a kind of diasporic 'pan-nationalism'), and newly-emergent post-nationalist or cosmopolitan tendencies. This tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism could in fact be considered one of the most crucial questions of our time, being symptomatic as it is, of the epochal watershed that we currently find ourselves in.

Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, diasporas, difference, global citizenship, globalisation, pan-nationalism, postmodernity, transnational social movements.

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The re-shuffling of people through global migration is taking place today on a scale unprecedented in human history. As migrants circulate across the Earth, they are creating new emotional geographies, weaving new webs of affect, and contributing to the emergence of new global imaginaries. This, along with the intensification of transnational connections being enabled through new communications technologies, is engendering innumerable recombinations and cross-fertilisations of cultural and political subjectivities in ways which are leading to possibilities for belonging beyond the nation-state.[1] In my work, I take a particular interest in diasporic social movements – sites where the cultural becomes political; that is, where the complex cultural identities that emerge out of the diasporic experience come to inform activist epistemologies and modes of political engagement in the world. If, as Gaston Bachelard suggests, the cultural is the matrix of pre-reflexive, taken-for-granted mores within which we live and act, then the emergence of the political out of the cultural marks the crossing of a threshold; that of the pre-reflexive into the reflexive.[2] Therefore, if diasporans are already, in themselves, powerful agents of globalisation and postmodernisation, then I would contend that diasporic activists, as self-conscious world-making agents, are all the more so.

This paper seeks to examine the various epistemological underpinnings evident in different modes of diasporic political activism, and to evaluate the ways in which these epistemologies are being reconfigured through, and in response to, the paradigm-shift from modernity to postmodernity and the concomitant reconfigurations of power. These shifts entail a whole complex of processes, often referred to in the shorthand as 'globalisation.' Drawing from ethnographic research that I conducted amongst Filipino American activists in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2007, I will endeavour to bring to light some of the epistemological tensions that I observed at play during my time there, elucidating, in particular, tensions between Third Worldist revolutionary nationalism (which persists today despite globalisation, albeit morphing into a kind of diasporic 'pan-nationalism'), and newly-emergent post-nationalist or cosmopolitan tendencies. This tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism could in fact be considered one of the most crucial questions of our time, being symptomatic as it is, of the epochal watershed that we currently find ourselves in.

2.   Diasporic Pan-Nationalism

The tradition of Philippine revolutionary nationalism is old as the Philippine nation-state itself, becoming as it did a galvanising force in the struggle for independence against Spanish rule. As Eduardo Gonzalez writes, 'the nationalist agenda has provided Filipinos of various social classes and ethnic backgrounds with a positive sense of collective identity and

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belonging.'[3] The revolutionary nationalist mythology that arose out of, and in resistance to, the historical experiences of colonialism, was again called upon by Filipino activists in the postcolonial period; most notably during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army, were guided by a distinctly Marxist-Leninist-Maoist brand of revolutionary nationalism, and together, became the backbone of the popular struggle against the Marcos regime.

Overseas Filipinos played no small part in this struggle, with San Francisco emerging as one of the most important nodes in the diaspora. During my research stint there in 2007, I met many Filipino American veterans of the struggle, some of whom had ended up in the United States (US) as political exiles and others of whom were born and raised in the US but who became drawn into the struggle through an emotional connection with what they considered to be their homeland. The most significant organisation to emerge was the KDP (Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino, or, Union of Democratic Filipinos), which began life as the US-wing of the CPP. Although revolutionary nationalist in character, their location in the diaspora rendered their politics a curious form of 'transnational nationalism' or what Tyner and Kuhlke refer to as 'pan-nationalism'.[4]

Inevitably, contradictions began to emerge in the ranks of the KDP as its pan-nationalist epistemology was increasingly unable to account for its members own lived experiences. Initially, the KDP was singularly dedicated to being a support organisation for the CPP's struggle against the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. Over time, however, Filipino American activists within the organisation began to take up issues of relevance to their own subject positions as marginalised diasporic people within the United States, in line with the insurgent cultural nationalisms which surrounded them, such as those associated with the Black Power Movement and the Chicano Movement. A fissure had emerged between KDP activists' lived reality and the activist epistemology within which they operated. No longer content with mere 'support work' for the struggle in the homeland, the KDP attempted to adjust its epistemology to more adequately address their own concerns within the US, in addition to their concern with toppling the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Eventually, the KDP came to adopt what it called a 'dual line' program, which expressed a dual allegiance to the Philippine nationalist revolution and the US working class revolution. This became unacceptable to the CPP, however, who sent representatives to meet with the KDP in the US, demanding that they choose between one or the other. This was back when the phenomenon of 'globalisation' was as yet unnamed and concepts like 'transnationalism' were virtually unknown, with people still only able to think in terms of the nation-state framework. The KDP insisted

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on maintaining its dual line approach, and as a consequence, was expelled from the CPP. This moment was surely indicative of the new challenges posed to revolutionary politics by the shifting global context.

It is important to note that, while the KDP demanded the right to multiple allegiances, they nevertheless left the modernist global imaginary unchallenged, which saw the world only in terms of discrete nation-states and which accepted the nation-state as the final and ideal form of human organisation. The rise and rise of globalisation, however, has since rendered this idea of the world increasingly anachronistic, and has called into question the very tenability of the revolutionary nationalist project. The disconnect between reality and traditional Leftist epistemology that the KDP was forced to grapple with, has only intensified with globalisation, prompting Filipino nationalist scholars like Gonzalez to ask the tough questions: 'In the wake of the seemingly unstoppable advance of globalization, is the nationalist project dead? Is Filipino nationalism in a tailspin, going into a deep intellectual slump?'[5] While pan-nationalist politics remains a potent force amongst many activists in the Filipino diaspora, there are new epistemologies emerging which go well beyond modernist commitments to the nation.

3.   Diasporic Cosmopolitanism

As Woodward et al. remind us, while 'globalisation alone does not guarantee the uptake or expression of cosmopolitan dispositions', it does provide 'much of the raw material for its possibility.'[6] Hence, while globalisation has elicited in some Philippine activist groups a fundamentalist response (the CPP, for example, continues to affirm its classical ideology in the face of new constellations of power, insisting that nothing has changed), it has prompted other groups to seriously grapple with the changing world-historical context, leading to the adoption of a more cosmopolitan, post-nationalist politics. The Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (FACES) is one such group, whose slogan, 'Building environmental justice across borders', renders its post-nationalist orientation plainly clear.[7] Indeed, nature has always been global and as such, it perhaps only makes sense for an environmentalist organisation to refuse to limit its allegiances to any given national terrain.

Several senior members of FACES were once active within the movement against the Marcos dictatorship, including in the KDP. As such, the historical experience of the KDP and the debates around the dual line have come to directly inform FACES's own epistemology. The lexicon around globalisation is today taken-for-granted, but in the days of the KDP, such a lexicon was as yet uninvented, given that neo-liberal globalisation was still only in its incipient phases. Where the CPP fail to acknowledge that globalisation is anything new, thereby absolving them of the necessity to update their ideology to more effectively challenge power, FACES has

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actively grappled with the implications of the changing world-historical context, recognising, for example, the new supranational character of contemporary capitalism.

FACES are also cognizant of their own ambiguous positionality as Filipino Americans, refusing nationalistic reductions of their complex, hybrid subjectivities (which, in the manner of the CPP, would posit them simply as Filipinos in exile from their 'true' homeland, even if they were born and raised in the US). Furthermore, FACES seek to use their hybrid subjectivities to their advantage, such as is the case with their campaign against Chevron, a multinational oil corporation with its headquarters located in the San Francisco Bay Area, but whom also happen to be committing environmental and social injustices in the community of Pandacan in the Philippines. As such, FACES – as a Filipino American organisation based in the San Francisco Bay Area albeit with emotional links to the Philippines – has seen an opportunity for itself to work in solidarity with local community groups fighting Chevron in Pandacan, as well as to simultaneously mobilise against Chevron in the Bay Area. The struggle at each end is local, but together, FACES and its allies in the Philippines are collaborating transnationally around an issue and a corporation that is equally transnational. As Christine Cordero, a FACES Board Member, has articulated:

> Our families live here and there. Chevron is a US-based company and we, as US citizens, have the opportunity and obligation to hold them accountable to their actions. The health problems and issues affect all of our families and communities. The movement must be transnational because Chevron Corporation is transnational.[8]

Here, and this is my crucial point, the hyper-extension of social solidarities through the diasporic experience (and the mobilisation of these solidarities through transnational activism) becomes the means with which to challenge the hyper-extension and transnationalisation of capital. This kind of diasporic cosmopolitanism is in stark contrast to the diasporic pan-nationalism that I described earlier. Whereas the latter sees its task as one of retreating into and reclaiming the national as a means of defence against the onslaught of global capital, the former deems that the struggle must be as global as capitalism itself if it is to be at all effective.

4.   The Figure of the Fil-Whatever
In August 2007, as a part of my fieldwork, I participated in a two-week solidarity tour of the Philippines that FACES runs annually as a way of reconnecting with its partner organisations, and to facilitate cultural exchange and the strengthening of political solidarities between Filipino and Filipino

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American activists in their common struggles, despite being from opposite sides of the Pacific. On the first day of the solidarity tour, we were addressed by Joel Rocamora, a prominent leftist intellectual in the Philippines and veteran of the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. He argued that we need to begin to think about ways to redefine Filipino nationality outside of territoriality; about how to conceive of culture across national borders and how to accommodate diverse expressions of being Filipino. 'Filipino-ness' is not just produced by Filipinos in the Philippines anymore, he contended, but is also being produced in the diaspora by Fil-Ams[9], Fil-Canadians, Fil-Australians, Fil-Italians, 'Fil-Whatevers'.

Although only used by Rocamora as a kind of throwaway turn-of-phrase, I believe there is much more to the idea of the 'Fil-Whatever' than meets the eye; in particular, when we connect it to Giorgio Agamben's use of the notion of 'whatever' as a philosophical concept.[10] In order to explain this concept and its relevance for the discussion here, I will firstly need to explicate the new theory of difference that Agamben seeks to outline in The Coming Community. Key to his argument is that we must reject the universal-particular binary of modernist thinking in favour of a new couplet of commonality-singularity. Whereas the former presupposes a structuralist ontology of discrete entities compartmentalised into wholes and parts of wholes, the latter rests instead on a poststructuralist ontological schema of expansive, distributed networks. These networks are comprised of singularities whose commonality, by virtue of being entangled in a common web, does not efface each singularity's irreducible difference. Commonality is achieved across difference, rather than at the expense of it. Here we can see how Agamben's ideas depart from the modernist binary between the universal and the particular, which are always deemed to be antithetical.

As early as 1924, Andre Breton in the Surrealist Manifesto already intimated towards the kind of ideas that Agamben wrote about in The Coming Community, such as when he wrote:

> If in a cluster of grapes there are no two alike, why do you want me to describe this grape by the other, by all the others, why do you want me to make a palatable grape? Our brains are dulled by the incurable mania of wanting to make the unknown known, classifiable.[11]

Where Breton gives the example of grapes, Agamben gives the example of the human face: Each is irreducibly singular and unique, yet each is also recognisably human. Thus, we are always at once simultaneously singular and common, and it is precisely this which Agamben theorises as the ontology of 'whatever'. In Agamben's words: 'Common and proper, genus

and individual are only the two slopes dropping down from either side of the watershed of whatever'.[12]

This then allows us to re-cast Rocamora's throwaway usage of the term 'Fil-whatever' in an entirely new light. Let us imagine, for example, the Filipino diaspora as a network, composed of innumerable singularities. Each individual within the diaspora represents a singularity; a 'difference-in-itself' not reducible to any kind of averaged out, essentialised, genericised whole.[13] Each Filipino, Fil-Australian and Fil-Am, for example, can all be said to be irreducible singularities. What is crucial is that their singularity does not preclude their commonality, and conversely, their commonality does not efface their heterogeneity. In modernist thinking, as discussed earlier, difference is perceived of in terms of the particular, which is always deemed to be at odds with the universal. As a consequence, modernist politics always does violence to difference, in always seeking to departicularise the particular and striving towards the universal. Nationalism, for example, destroys internal difference by enforcing homogeneity to a transcendental ideal of what it means to be an authentic member of the national community. Diasporic pan-nationalism, of the sort I have discussed in this paper, operates in precisely this manner, constantly seeking to flatten out diasporic differences in order to reinscribe diasporic Filipinos back into a transcendental ideal of Filipino-ness.

Where diasporic pan-nationalism rests on a homogenous notion of nation-ness, diasporic cosmopolitanism, in contrast, allows for and embraces heterogeneity. It recognises that commonality can be built between singularities in ways which do not efface difference. Take my participation in the FACES solidarity tour, for example. I was a Fil-Australian amongst Fil-Americans interfacing with Filipinos; all of us simultaneously singular and common – singular albeit not at the expense of our commonality and common albeit not at the expense of our singularity. We were all able to work together as Fil-Whatevers, through our heterogeneity, rather than despite it or at the expense of it; that is, we did not have to conform to a transcendental ideal of homogenised Filipino-ness as a pre-requisite for common action.

5.   Conclusion

'Transcendent value', writes Felix Guattari, 'presents itself as immovable, always already there and thus always going to stay there. From its perspective, subjectivity remains in perpetual lack, guilty a priori'.[14] Thus, to the nationalist, hybridised diasporic subjectivity remains in lack. Nationalists thus prescribe that Filipino Americans and other diasporans must overcome their confusion with their hybrid identities and get in touch with their 'true' identities as Filipinos. Too many diasporans internalise this kind of logic and become anxious about their perpetual condition of lack. Shifting

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from a nationalist to a cosmopolitan frame, as FACES has done, is thus a key manoeuvre, as it allows diasporans to reconceive themselves not as lacking, but as over determined; uncontainable within existing categories of belonging, and thus always spilling over into newness.

As such, diasporic cosmopolitanism is allowing for new forms of belonging not based on essences. It allows diasporans to locate 'home' not just in the homeland, but also in the diaspora, given that it reaffirms diasporic subjectivity, rather than devalorising it through a perception of its perpetual lack by virtue of it being estranged from the territorial homeland. Where diasporans are rendered marginal in modernist forms of politics, they re-emerge as central in postmodernity. Removed from the 'inside' of homeland space, diasporans might be seen as constituting a vast swarm of outsiders, who, through their riotous mobility, are in fact weaving a new inside; that of the world as a whole. No longer mere exile, the diasporan thus becomes reconstituted as global citizen.

Notes

[1] A Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996.

[2] G Bachelard, *Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter*, The Pegasus Foundation, Dallas, 1999, p. 17.

[3] E Gonzalez, *Is Globalization a Threat to the Nationalist Imagination in the Philippines?* Institute for Popular Democracy, Quezon City, 2000, p. 1.

[4] J Tyner & O Kuhlke, 'Pan-national identities: representations of the Philippine diaspora on the world wide web' *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2000, pp. 231-252.

[5] Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 2.

[6] I Woodward, G Kendall, et al., 'Cosmopolitanism, Technology and the Nation' *Nexus: Newsletter of the Australian Sociological Association, Inc.*, vol. 19, no. 3, 2007, p. 9.

[7] F Carlos & T Tilos, *Face2Face Exchange Trip 2006 Summary Report*, Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity, Berkeley, 2007.

[8] Cited in FACES, *International Human Rights Day Media Release: 'The Philippines and Richmond: Residents Voice Outrage Against Chevron's Environmental Health Impacts,* Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity, Berkeley, 2006.

[9] Colloquial term for 'Filipino Americans'.

[10] G Agamben, *The Coming Community*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993.

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[11] A Breton, 'Manifesto of Surrealism (1924)' in A Breton (ed), *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1972, p. 9.
[12] Agamben, op. cit., p. 20.
[13] Deleuze, G., *Difference and Repetition*. Athlone Press, London, 1994.
[14] F Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995, p. 103.

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Section II

Home and Heimat

Identity, Social Roots and Empowerment:
A Study of the Low Castes Diaspora in the West Indies

Ghan Shyam

Abstract
Studies on the migration of Indians to the West Indies as indentured labourers have often focused on the formation of a collective, unifying identity regardless of their original social or religious status in India. Thus, it appears that many of these labourers tended to see their original homeland as a way to affirm their identity, and as a source of inspiration and empowerment. Nonetheless, an analysis of the social composition of all Indian migrant labourers to various British colonies in the West Indies during the period between 1838 and 1917 reveals that the majority of them belonged to lower castes and most of them came from North India; a region well known for its age-old rigid social hierarchy. Therefore, these migrants carried their social baggage along with them in the various West Indian colonies which played a very important role in their identity formation in the new land. The process of Sanskritisation which was instrumental behind upward mobility among lower castes was more successful in colonies than their original home land. However, in the West Indian colonies, studies have shown that descendants of lower castes still have relatively less advantages in comparison to upper caste descendants of North India. In the post-independent India, lower castes have emerged as important actors in Indian electoral politics, having greater bargaining power because of their numerical strength. This is very clearly visible in North India States, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where members of lower castes have been holding power for more than one decade. Thus, if caste has historically determined identity in the diasporic community, the larger question which emerges today is whether the gradual empowerment of lower castes in North India will lead to a similar sense of empowerment among the descendents of these communities in the West Indian diaspora.

Keywords: Caste, diaspora, empowerment, identity, indentured labour, North India, Sanskritisation, social baggage, social roots, West Indies.

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Policies concerning migration during the colonial period were largely designed, developed and driven by the need to achieve certain goals which would satisfy the economic greed and religious zeal of certain individuals, groups and countries of that time. These policies have affected

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human civilisations in myriad ways. As far as Indian migration during the colonial period is concerned, it was started by British colonial government to replace ex-slaves of its various colonies with Indian indentured labourers. It is estimated that during the colonial period, starting from 1834 to 1917, approximately over one million Indians migrated to various destinations as indentured labourers. In the case of each foreign colony, the migration of Indian labourers was governed by similar modes of contract and recruitment policies set up by the British colonial Government in India.[1]

One often wonders under what circumstances such a large scale migration took place in a country where there was a religious taboo on crossing the ocean; especially among the upper castes, crossing the Kala Pani (black water/sea) meant caste defilement and severe social ostracism.[2] Indian migration as indentured labourers started in the year 1834 with recruitment of Hill coolies of Chota Nagpur, and gradually shifted towards other parts of India. In the subsequent period, the majority of the labourers were recruited mainly from what is today known as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The migrants were recruited from all the religions as well as all the major castes residing in the areas mentioned above. Therefore it becomes essential to give a brief survey of the causes which must have affected the people from all walks of life and led to mass migration.

During the 19th and early 20th centuries a combination of factors created a favourable situation for mass migration. Out of these, famines are considered to be the most crucial ones which affected millions of people all over India.[3] The pressure of the population on the land increased, especially in the Gangetic plains and Bengal where many more people opted for agriculture after losing their traditional occupation, which was destroyed due to penetration of European manufactured goods into Indian villages. The hand-made products simply could not compete with factory-made manufactured goods. Consequently, patterns of trade and commerce were greatly transformed and relocated.

The factor which affected the rural economy directly and transformed the landlord-tenant relationship was imposition of British policies for the collection of land revenue.[4] Earlier, peasants paid a share from their yearly yield as land revenue to the local landlords who were regarded as representatives of local nobility. Introduction of the new law, which ensured a fixed income to the government, had hit the peasants very hard. Now, they were forced to pay a fixed amount in cash as land revenue irrespective of the land's production in any year. Many had to change their crop patterns of cultivation to grow cash crops and often they were forced to sell their crops at low prices simply to obtain rent money. Over the year land revenue rates kept going up as revenue collection was auctioned for a year to the highest bidder and those who could not pay their rent were evicted.[5] In

addition to the above mentioned factors, there were certain non-economic reasons for migration, such as frustration with oppressive policies of the government in the aftermath of the Mutiny of 1857, criminal proceedings, social rigidity, caste prejudice, domestic violence and simply 'the desire for adventure'.[6]

As it is mentioned above, Indians labourers were recruited to serve in the plantations where earlier African slaves used to work. Out of over one million Indians who migrated as indentured labourers, more than half a million of them went to work in sugar plantations of various colonies in the West Indies.[7] The statistical data shows that among English speaking colonies of the West Indies, British Guyana received the maximum indentured labourers and their total number was 239,909; Trinidad 143,939; Jamaica 36,412; St. Lucia 4,354; Grenada 3,003; St. Vincent 2,472 and St. Kitts 337. Among non-English speaking colonies, the French colonies of Martinique received 25,509, Guadeloupe 45,844 and French Guiana 19,276. Surinam, which was under Dutch colonial rule, imported 35,501 immigrants from India. While emigrants came from practically every province of India, the bulk of them (approx. 80%) were drawn from the Gangetic plains of North India; especially from two provinces of British India, namely United Province and Bihar. Of these, again the majority came from eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh (modern name of United Provinces) and western districts of Bihar which are culturally and linguistically known as Bhojpuri and Awadh regions. A small but significant number of emigrants came from Madras (modern day Tamilnadu).

As far as religion and caste composition of the immigrants in West Indian colonies is concerned, the majority of them were Hindus. However, almost every religion, caste and community had its representation in the West Indian diaspora.[8] Among Hindus, who consisted 85 per cent of the total immigrant population, about 12-13 percent were upper castes (Brahmans, Kshtriya etc.); 35 percent agricultural castes (Koiri, Kurmi, etc); 6 percent artisans and 32 percent low castes (Dalits and other menial castes). The followers of Islam and other minority religions such as Christians and Sikhs constituted approximately 15 percent of the total immigrant population. Interestingly, the above mentioned religious, castes and community composition just reflects the perfect cross section of North Indian society from which they emigrated.[9] Despite all these similarities with the mother country, there was a severe discrepancy in the age and gender composition of the immigrants. The majority of the immigrants were single, male and in the prime age group of 20-35. The women constituted little less than 30 percent of the total immigrant population; about 70 percent of them were listed as single. It appears that family migration was not the norm, as only 15 percent married couples and a very small number of children were listed in the records.[10]

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Out of slightly more than half a million Indian indentured labourers who migrated to various colonies in the West Indies, more than 2/3 of them went to work in the sugar plantations of British Guyana and Trinidad, as mentioned above. Thus, this paper will focus mainly on these two territories, where the Indian origin population has been substantial and has played an important role in all aspects of life.

The divergent theories of "cultural persistence" and "creolisation" have been mostly used to study the identities of all the diasporic communities that settled in the West Indies, including the Indian one.[11] The theorists of cultural persistence stress that cultural identity is central to the process of distinctive community and ethnic formation in the diaspora, and it is this cultural identity that is transmitted largely through deeply embedded cultural symbols and value systems. In the case of the Indian diaspora in the West Indies, it is argued that wherever an Indian community was found in large numbers, like British Guyana and Trinidad, deeply embedded institutional patterns such as caste, religion and family values, which are often defined as cultural baggage, were carried by the migrants to their new home land. These cultural values were transplanted in new surroundings to create a similar identity away from the mother land; at the same time, they also worked as a resistance against the modernising forces of the host society. It is further argued that persistence of cultural values of the home land in the diaspora shaped the distinct ethnic identity of the diasporic community and prevented their assimilation into the prevailing cultural norms of the new societies.

In contrast, the proponents of "creolisation" theory argue that instead of cultural persistence, the migrant communities become more adaptive towards the local culture and thus their original cultural values go through a process of transformation. In the case of the Indian diaspora, socio-cultural Institutions such as caste and family traditions gradually got diluted through the experiences of migration and adaptation to new working and social conditions. In this new environment, caste was no longer the determining factor for one's occupation and position in the society.

Nonetheless, neither of these theories could fully explain the identity formation of Indian immigrants in the West Indies, as the Indian community has not shown any set pattern. Starting from the early days until now, the Indian diaspora does not represent a single unified identity. Indian diasporic identity is multi-faceted and it can be understood only by analysing the historical processes through which it has passed. Here, an attempt is being made to historically examine the identity of the Indian diaspora in the West Indies, mostly in British Guyana and Trinidad, through its social roots.

The massive Indian population which emigrated as indentured labourers to various West Indian colonies reflects a perfect cross-section of North Indian society, as mentioned above. The new identity formation of the

emigrants would begin at the depot itself, where they had to wait at least seven days to several weeks due to various reasons.[12] During this period, the only segregation that took place was between single men and single women. There was no other separation on account of caste and community for those, especially Brahmins and upper castes, who might have wished to observe caste rules which forbid them to live and dine with lower castes. In fact it was a sort of conditioning camp before they embarked on the ship for a long voyage. Peggy Mohan in her book "Jahajin" gives a detailed description of the activities of such people at Calcutta depot, who were recruited from different religions and castes of North India.[13]

The depot played a great level playing field on Indian soil. Before embarking the ship, each emigrant was dressed up in a particular fashion which suited a month's long voyage to an unknown land; men were given woollen trousers, woollen jackets, red woollen caps, and shoes, whereas women were given two flanked jackets, a woollen petticoat, worsted stockings, shoes and a sari. The dilution of religious, caste and family identities also started at the depot itself. A few depot marriages were held without ceremonies and contrary to the dictates of caste requirements. Sometimes, these depot marriages were held even across religious lines.[14]However, it is wrong to presume that religious and caste identities were no longer relevant to the emigrants once they boarded the ship. In fact, the social baggage which emigrants carried with them remained visible in the West Indian diaspora in the form of rituals, prejudices and community life, although in a much more diluted and modified form. I will discuss this aspect later in this paper.

Once they boarded the ship there was a mixed feeling among emigrants as far as their identity is concerned. For some of them, crossing the Kala Pani (black water), was supposed to have changed them forever, as the sea had turned them into an outcaste[15]; some of them thought they would never come back. On the other hand, for lower caste emigrants, probably it was the first time in their life when they were treated at par with upper castes and others who were superior to them in the caste social hierarchy. One such example is cited by Dale Bisnauth in his book where, in response to a Brahmin's chiding, a lower caste Pariah said "I have taken off my caste and left it with the port officer. I won't put it on again till I come back".[16] Life on the crowded ship was the same for everyone, irrespective of their caste and religious identity. The upper castes such as Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Rajputs ate and mingled with the lower castes such as Chamars, Dhobis and Doms. In some cases, they even had to obey a lower caste Sirdar who was appointed by the Surgeon Superintendent for maintaining discipline among fellow emigrants. Under ordinary circumstances in India, these upper castes would not have come into physical contact with lower castes, who were considered untouchable in the contemporary social hierarchy[17].

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A long sea journey did create a sense of belonging among fellow voyagers. Some of them became lifelong friends as they use to call each other jehaji-bhai (ship-brother) and jehaji-behan (ship-sister) and many of them maintained this relationship throughout their life for all practical purposes. Thus, new experiences on a long voyage did help them to prepare for the conditions under which they would work and live in the plantations of the colonies.

The Indian diaspora under indentureship created a complex mix of multiple identities. For the planters, Indian immigrants were simply the coolies who came to work in the sugar plantations as a replacement for the ex-slaves. The condition of Indian indentured labourers in the sugar estates was not much better than that of the ex-slaves whom they replaced. They were forced to adopt almost similar conditions under which former slaves worked and lived, as many features of plantation slavery still existed.[18] In principle, the indenture contract was agreed upon for five years, but it often prolonged as immigrants were entitled for free passage to return to India only after completion of ten years of the essential residential period in the sugar estates. Since very few immigrants returned to India, small settlements or villages of ex-indentured labourers grew around the estates; these immigrants worked in the sugar plantations, as well as taking up several other occupations.

In the initial phases of Indian settlements, the identity formation of the immigrants can be understood in the context of their nature of work and new social setup, which was totally different from the experiences of the mother land. They presented a unified Indian labour identity against the plantation regimes, and this identity was asserted by groups as well as individuals. One of such occasions was the public display of Moharram festival, when a large number of Indians, Hindus and Muslims participated in the processions in Trinidad and British Guyana. Through collective performances, the Indian community showed its solidarity and sense of belonging.[19] Another example of unified identity was shown by individuals like Bechu from Guyana who became the champion of indentured labourers' rights. He wrote letters to the editors of several news papers, brilliantly dissecting and exposing the facade of legality and claims to public good by planters and the colonial state.[20]

Although with regard to plantation regimes, the Indian immigrant community often appeared united around a common identity, at the same time differences in individual social roots created several identities within the indentured community itself. For instance, the gender imbalance led to inter-caste and inter-community marriages, and caste was no longer relevant for all practical purposes. Nonetheless, certain high caste individuals were unwilling to work under lower caste Sirdars[21] and they also felt a loss in their social

status.[22]On the other hand, despite all hardship, many emigrants, especially lower castes, did feel some improvement over their condition in India, given their experiences back home where they were permanently consigned to the fringes of rural Indian society as untouchable, tenants-at-will, and landless labourers with little hope of betterment in life.[23]

Indian identities became stronger in the later phase of their settlement, as now they started living as a community in the villages. The Indian settlements were largely based in isolated areas, often a few miles away from the nearest town. Fictive kin ties based on the Jahaji relationship often played a role in determining post indenture settlements. Imams and Pandits were the leading figures within the communities, and under rural farming conditions the social structure of the villages was similar to India.[24]In these villages certain types of informal social institutions also existed in order to solemnise marriages, coordinate religious ceremonies and celebrations.[25]Similar to Indian villages, there were Panchayats (village councils) to settle local disputes. The members of these Panchayats were affluent villagers who were chosen on the basis of their caste, intelligence, education and even being a son of a wealthy family.[26]

In the post indenture period, Indian immigrants in colonies where their population was very thin, like Jamaica, settled sporadically within African dominated areas, as there was little land available for them. Other colonies like Trinidad and Guyana, with high percentages of Indian population, became the major centres of Indian social, political and economic activities in the years to follow. The bulk of the immigrant population remained in the villages where they had settled after expiry of their indenture period. However, in both these countries, quite a few Indians had already made a fortune through paddy and sugar cultivation in their privately owned lands. Now they were upwardly mobile, migrating to nearby towns and, some of them, converting themselves and their families into Christianity, as it gave them access of better education for their children and a place for themselves among local elites.

Upon their free settlement in the post-indenture period, Indian identity remained complex. On one hand, Indian immigrants, being ex-coolies, were at the bottom of the ladder in the social hierarchy of the host society and they now wanted equal treatment. On the other hand, they wished to remain part of the social cultural body of India, as they still maintained various religious, social and caste practices which they inherited.[27]

As a result of the Indian National movement in the mother country, Indian diasporic identity tilted towards Hindu nationalist identity as many prominent Hindu leaders visited these colonies and preached basic precepts of Hindu religion. The effort of Hindu revivalism in West Indian colonies was not new. In fact, attempts were made to establish Hindu orthodoxy in the early days of the settlement and organisations such as Sanatan Dharm Sabha

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preached the principles of Hindu orthodoxy, especially in Guyana and Trinidad, since the late nineteenth century itself. However, in those early days, they could not succeed, as the Hindu immigrant population was not homogenous. It was predominantly rural and worshiped many different deities which they had inherited from their ancestral villages in India. Like their counterparts in India, they also became the followers of various sects and cults. It is observed that there were four major sects, namely, Ramanandi, Kabirpanthi, Shivnaraini and Aghori, which were popular among immigrants since the early days of their settlement. All these sects were quite popular among lower caste settlers, as their philosophy promoted egalitarianism, inter-caste fraternity and social harmony. In addition to this, they also worshiped Kali Mai, Dih Baba and Parmeshwarie[28]. These localised deities were worshiped at the village level; Dih Baba was considered a protector of the village from diseases and calamities and Pameshwarie was worshiped mainly by lower caste Chamars.

However, in the post indenture period, a new wave of Hindu revivalism, through various Hindu organisations, tried to create a single Hindu identity. This mechanism can be understood in colonies such as Guyana and Trinidad, where the large Indian immigrant population was seen as a viable political force. In this whole process, Brahmins played a significant role in standardising common beliefs and practices. The performance of Pujas, Yagnas and holding of Kathas gradually became an integral part of Hindu domestic life, especially among those who could afford them.[29] Thus, in the diasporic community, along with sanskritisation, a new form of social hierarchy was established, where Brahmins retained their top position in the society and hegemonic power, as their role was institutionalised. Other middle castes, such as Kurmis, Ahirs, etc., felt socially uplifted through the sanskritisation process, but what remained static was mainly the position of lower castes such as Chamars.

Prejudices and discrimination against lower castes still exist to some extent in the West Indian diasporic community. As one well-known West Indian scholar, Moses Seenarine puts it, "growing up in the predominantly caste Hindu Guyanese society during the 60s and 70s, from an early age I was made to feel inferior, and lower caste, because of my family's Christian beliefs, dark skin colour, and lower class status."[30] Again, he mentions in a newsletter that "growing up as a child in Guyana, I was aware of casteism against Dalit groups such as Chamars, Bhangis and Christian Dalits."[31] Similar examples can be sought from Trinidad and other Caribbean countries where lower castes still feel some sort of discrimination in their day to day life.

Max Weber and M.N. Sriniwas both defined caste as the fundamental institution of Hinduism, hence it is impossible to detach

Hinduism from the caste system.[32] Nonetheless, the ways in which the caste system operates within Hinduism differ according to the historical evolution of each society. Thus, in the West Indian diasporic community, Indian identity has travelled through several stages, beginning with the dilution of caste identity in the indentured period, and transforming into a singular Hindu identity in the post-indenture period, where the hierarchically highest and lowest caste extremes, namely Brahmins and Chamars, continued to bear important status value. The former retains the highest respect among the diasporic community whereas the latter are often regarded with some degree of dejection and disdain.[33] This new form of Hinduism is neither based on the principle of purity and pollution, on the basis of which the caste system was originally practiced, nor is it similar to the current form of social hierarchy in post-independent India, where lower castes are gradually moving upward through attaining political power, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

As far as lower castes are concerned, in the diasporic community as well as in their original homeland, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, from where the maximum number of migrants went to various colonies in the West Indies, they remain socially and economically at the bottom of the ladder. In both places, they still face similar kinds of disdain, deprivation and social neglect by caste Hindus. However, in North Indian society, the sanskritisation process was not as successful as it was in the diasporic community. Thus, middle castes (also known as "backward castes") still retain a separate identity from the upper castes, and constitute the majority in North Indian society. The anti-Brahminical movement created a sense of pride among non-Brahminical communities, who gained greater social consciousness. This newly gained social consciousness among lower and middle castes made them politically conscious at the same time. In the post-independent, democratic society, lower and middle castes have emerged as important actors in Indian electoral politics, having greater bargaining power because of their numerical strength. This is very clearly visible in the case of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where members of lower and middle castes have been holding power for more than one decade.

The Indian diaspora in the West Indies, which consists of a large number of descendents of lower and middle caste migrants from this region, can now easily associate themselves with new emerging power centres in India where lower and middle castes are at the helm. The empowerment of these castes in the home country has direct implications for the diasporic community, as it has inherited the same social roots. Thus, if caste has historically determined identity in the diasporic community, the larger question which emerges today is whether the gradual empowerment of lower and middle castes in North India will lead to a similar sense of empowerment among the descendents of these communities in the West Indian diaspora.

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[4] Vertovec, op.cit., p.8.

[5] G S Arora, *Indian Emigration*, Puja Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, pp.33-35.

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[7] T C Mangar, 'The Arrival of Indians in Guyana'. *Horizons,* 2006/2007, p. 9.

[8] Arora,, op.cit., p.48.

[9] P P Mahapatra, 'The Politics of Representation in the Indian Labour Diaspora :West Indies, 1880-1920'. *V.V.Giri National Labour Institute Research Series Study,* no. 48, 2003, p.3.

[10] Arora, op. cit., pp. 96-100.

[11] Mahapatra,, op.cit., pp.1-2.

[12] Bisnauth, op. cit., p. 51.

[13] P Mohan, *Jahajin,* Harper Collins, New Delhi, 2007, pp.23-32.

[14] Bisnauth, op. cit., p.52.

[15] Mohan, op. cit., p.33.

[16] Quoted by Bisnauth, op. cit., p.53.

[17] Bisnauth, op. cit., p. 53.

[18] Mangru, op. cit., p. 139.

[19] Mahapatra, op. cit., p. 7.

[20] ibid., p.13.

[21] Vertovec, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[22] Mahapatra, op. cit., p. 12.

[23] B V Lal, *On the other side of Midnight: A Fijian Journey,* National Book Trust, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 9-10.

[24] N S Ramnarine, 'The Panchayat System as an Early Form of Conflict Resolution in Trinidad' in Brinsley Samaroo and Ann Marie Bissessar (eds), *The Construction of an Indo-Caribbean Diaspora,* The University of the West Indies School of Continuing Studies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago, 2004, pp. 222-223.

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[26] Ramnarine, op. cit., pp. 224-227.

[27] Vertovec, op. cit., p. 21.

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[32] Vertovec, op. cit., p.50.

[33] ibid, p.36.

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Migration, Settlement and Identity:
A Cultural Theme of the Muslim Diaspora
after the Partition of India

Muhammad Abrar Zahoor

Abstract

India experienced one of world's largest population displacement and Diaspora in 1947 at the time of partition of British India. The policy makers and administrators of the time neither anticipated the magnitude and repercussions of calamity nor could they pre-empt it through their will. On the other hand people cut-across on religious lines became so antagonistic to each other that they did not spare themselves from ethnic cleansing. Moreover, partition of India bore a distinct characteristic because whole provinces were included in one country or the other in addition to two provincial partitions. It was characterised by a slow-moving, selective and voluntary process of migration from different parts of India two the provinces of Sindh and the Punjab. However, the nature of assimilation in both the aforementioned provinces was different to each other. Diaspora population was congenially assimilated in the Punjab (with some cultural retention of identity) while it aroused differences of socio-political nature in Sindh. Despite the fact that migration has got religious sanctity in Islam - the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) migrated from Mecca to Madina for the purpose of preaching religion to the people of Madina who showed more receptivity to the new religion - the Muslims of Pakistan use the term Muhajir (one who undertakes migration) in derogatory sense. This cultural theme can sufficiently be corroborated from the fact that the local population in Sindh, as well as in the Punjab, does not like to marry with Muhajirs. More so, people in the Punjab, in order to show themselves sons of the soil, speak like: Mein koi muhajir haan? (Am I a muhajir), tu muhajir tan nahin? (Are you a muhajir). These symbolic manifestations of chauvinism deepen the differences between the communities and it hurts the diaspora population psychologically.

Keywords: Diaspora, India, Muhajir, Pakistan, Punjab.

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On the other hand people cut-across on religious lines became so antagonistic to each other that they did not spare themselves from ethnic cleansing. Near about ten million people faced dilemma of displacement and one million were massacred. Moreover, partition of India bore a distinct characteristic because whole provinces were included in one country or the other in addition to two provincial partitions. It was characterised by a slow-moving, selective and voluntary process of migration from different parts of India to the provinces of Sindh and the Punjab. However, the nature of assimilation in both the aforementioned provinces was different to each other. Diaspora population was congenially assimilated in the Punjab (with some cultural retention of identity) while it aroused differences of socio-political nature in Sindh.

In spite of massive dislocation on both sides of the border, it is one of the tragic ironies of partition that the birth of the Muslim state of Pakistan brought about a division of the Muslim community of the sub-continent. Such was gravity of the situation that:

> there were areas in UP, Bihar and Bengal which were the Muslim League strongholds and where large segments of the Muslim population had spearheaded the movement … who were left in midstream …for the new nation simply provided a homeland for Muslims living in majority areas but not elsewhere.[1]

At the time of partition, about thirty five million Muslims, almost one third of its pre-partition population, remained in India either by choice or circumstances. The migration of significant number of Muslims from India as well as the influx of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan complicated the demographic makeup of India in such a way that Muslims, who had been one third of undivided India, were reduced to insignificant minority. In the same vein, Hindus and Sikhs were also reduced to insignificance in Pakistan. Thus the situation for all these communities became more vulnerable.

Despite the fact that migration has got religious sanctity in Islam - the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) migrated from Mecca to Madina for the purpose of preaching religion to the people of Madina who showed more receptivity to the new religion - the Muslims of Pakistan use the term Muhajir (one who undertakes migration) in derogatory sense. This cultural theme can sufficiently be corroborated from the fact that the local population in Sindh, as well as in the Punjab, does not like to marry with Muhajirs. More so, people in the Punjab, in order to show themselves sons of the soil, speak like: Mein koi muhajir haan? (Am I a muhajir), tu muhajir tan nahin? (Are you a muhajir). These symbolic manifestations of chauvinism deepen the differences between the communities and it hurts Diaspora population

psychologically. So, cultural and economic factors played more part in the settlement of diaspora community although the migration was driven largely on religious basis.

Historiography on partition has not yet focused the cultural and psychological impact of the migration and diaspora. However, novel and fiction writing has contributed its part in highlighting consequences of partition. Thus the human dimension of partition needs to be explored through physical and psychological impact of the experiences of violence, abduction, migration and settlement. There are, nevertheless, some biographical accounts that are very relevant and important in unfolding this human drama.

While some writers have denoted economic interests as an important factor which constituted the causes of partition, many opinion makers believe that the history of Pakistan is history of the ongoing struggle and competition on economic interests between the migrants and those of indigenous inhabitants. Shahid Javed Burki, a notable Pakistani economist and a prolific writer of history, elaborates his thesis in his celebrated book Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood.[2] He opines that since partition power struggle has been between the migrants and local people. Migrant community associated itself with trade and commerce because majority of them did not have land for cultivation, even for those who had been cultivators in India before partition. On the other hand local people remained wedded to their land. Economic policy making, as it was in the hands of bureaucracy in Pakistan's initial years, favoured trade and commercial activity. Resultantly, Pakistan's economy and economic hubs are presently in control of migrants and this fact is resisted by the indigenous community: dominance of migrant community in Karachi, Hyderabad, Faisalabad and Lahore is a corroborative case in point.

Partition left an indelible imprint on peoples, places and institutions not only within south Asia but beyond it also. The massive demographic upheaval that it generated uprooted an estimated eighteen million people. Most of the refugees came from the North Western Frontier Province, Punjab and Sindh in Pakistan and parts of northern India. Although most of the demographic displacement occurred during 1947-48, refugees continued to move across the India- Pakistan borders throughout the 1950s. For instance, the two countries reported movement of over a million people across the borders between 1951 and 1957.[3]

There is plenty of evidence that this uprooting led to a chain of migrations, as individuals and families looked for safety, shelter and livelihood. Families moved here and there in search of meaningful opportunities regarding their rehabilitation. This resulted in a large scale diffusion of refugees across large parts of India and Pakistan and beyond subcontinent even. Different communities that were uprooted by this

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upheaval responded to this phenomenon in a variety of ways. Some were able to rehabilitate themselves with remarkable success: an example of this is farming groups that settled down in East Punjab. Others such as Namsudra agriculturists from East Pakistan could never meaningfully settle down in West Bengal.[4]

Two communities which showed an extraordinary propensity of increasingly becoming diasporic, particularly after 1947, were the Sikhs and Sindhis. Having been classified as a 'martial race' in the nineteenth century by the British, the Sikh community had developed a tradition of migration. They had been recruited in colonial army in large numbers and deployed contiguously in military service on the far flung frontiers of sub-continent. They had also been transported to other colonies like Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong and even parts of Africa, mainly for ward and watch service. The Sikhs as community were among the worst victims of partition.[5] They in large numbers fled the districts of West Punjab to seek safety and shelter all over northern India. Arriving with hardly any possessions except personal belongings, they were welcomed and supported by their co-religionists in East Punjab where they took initial refuge. Yet it took years of struggle for these families to re-establish levels of well-being they had been accustomed to.

Like Sikhs, Sindhis are also known as diasporic South Asian community. Although they are dispersed widespread yet they are connected closely through extensive business network which operates on the basis of kinship and trust. Among Sindhis, Karachites are particularly cosmopolitan culturally because linked by trading networks; they had developed close contacts with major Asian port cities such as Singapore, Shangai, Hong Kong, Jakarta and Manila. Moreover, partition came as a turning point in the fortunes of Sindhis.[6] Unlike Punjab which witnessed unprecedented violence in the second half of 1947, Sindh remained relatively calm as its premier city Karachi became the capital of new born country. Nevertheless, as Muslim refugees started pouring in from different parts of India into the province, the Hindu Sindhi community felt increasingly insecure as their properties and lives came under attack.

In Pakistan, the two cases of Punjab and Sindh represent the two models of assimilation and non-assimilation as far as the settlement of migrant communities is concerned. The Punjab accommodated 5.3 million refugees which makes 25.6 per cent of its total population.[7] Thus every fourth person in West Punjab was a refugee from across the border. Refugees got settled in a large number of villages, towns and cities so they profoundly influenced the local population in terms of a heightened insecurity vis-a vis India the relatively enhanced consciousness about Islam. This process of acculturation was more facilitated by shared linguistic and cultural traditions of locals and migrants. Another crucial factor in the successful integration of

migrants with locals in West Punjab was the relative balance of power between the two segments of society. Migrant community from East Punjab had an edge in education and jobs in selective fields over the 'locals' who dominated electoral politics, commercial agriculture in the canal colonies as well as the army. This situation indirectly paved the way for smooth settlement and assimilation in identity as no clash of interests developed along sectoral, class, professional or institutional lines.

The scene of settlement of refugees in Sindh presented altogether different picture. Unlike West Punjab where the bulk of refugees came from East Punjab, refugees came from all over India speaking different languages and representing different cultural outlook of life and on life. Almost all refugees in Punjab were Punjabi speaking while no refugees in Sindh were Sindhi speaking. Hamza Alvi, a perceptive scholar and linguist, claims that

> Forty years ago the Punjabi ruling oligarchy ensured that refugees from East Punjab (and only those) were settled in West Punjab so that Punjab in Pakistan remained ethnically homogeneous. All other refugees, mainly Urdu speaking refugees from Northern and Central India, were settled in Sindh. They were kept out of Punjab although Punjab is a much larger province and had a greater capacity to absorb the refugees.[8]

Another factor of their less assimilation was that they did not come en masse. They came sporadically spread over a long time. Moreover, unlike Punjab where administrative machinery handling the rehabilitation process was being manned by officers originating from East Punjab facilitating their brethren, migrants in Sindh were on the mercy of alien administration and two sides had mutual mistrust as well.

Cultural theme in Muslim diaspora is particularly represented by literature produced on this theme which is termed as ''Human Drama of the partition 1947' by Ian Talbot.[9] The contributions in English of Khushwant Singh and Chaman Nahal, of Kartar Singh Duggal in Punjabi, of Bhisham Sahni in Hindi, and Saadat Hasan Minto, Rajinder Singh Bedi and Intizar Hussain in Urdu are literary outbursts which reflect all the hardships born by partition diaspora. The themes which emerge out of this literary treasure house are: the searing reality of the agony of partition massacres and migration at large scale; conflicting human emotions evoked by partition, national pride and religious fulfilment with be bewilderment and sense of loss; strong and lasting sense of the displacement brought by migration on both sides of the border.

Cultural contours have been transformed by displacement of population after 1947. Culture of those cities which received, accepted and

assimilated diaspora population was changed and it carries imprint of cultural traits they brought with them. For instance, accent of Urdu in Lahore is altogether different from accent of Urdu speaking community in Karachi. The differences which were cropped up by migrants and the locals against each other were due to competition on resources. This competition has recently been manifested in the shape of more electoral seats won by the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)—previously Muahjir Qaumi Movement. Since early 80s, MQM has become a formidable political force in Sindh province. It shares governance not only in their province but also in national assembly. This fact is most often resented by the local Sindhis and both the communities have developed many a proverbs against each other. Moreover, culture of Sindhis is perceived by people of other provinces as Hindu culture due to common cultural traits of Hindus and Muslims in Sindh. An example of this is holy which is equally celebrated by all the religious communities in Sindh.

Differences in communities are not as much real as they are perceived. This realisation has been sharpened more by ad hoc and self-serving policies of successive authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes have done irreparable damage to the social fabric of Pakistani society. They have been playing upon these differences on two counts. First, driven by the self-serving objectives e.g. perpetuation of rule. Second, authoritarian regimes, due to their legitimacy crisis at home, have been playing in the hands of imperialistic designs of super power. Pakistanis are already paying heavy price of the damage done so far and it may add to the existing because policy planners have continuously turned deaf ear to this critical issue.

Sindh government though it was sympathetic to the local population, felt obliged to accommodate incoming Muslims refugees also. This led to inconsistent official policies hitting commercial interests of Hindu community and they got unnerved. More so, as the political leadership manifested itself to be unable to control incidence of violence, especially serious riots which erupted in Hyderabad and Karachi, the Sindhis were forced to think of their unsafe future in Pakistan and they decided to leave their homes. Their migration from Sindh was a planned evacuation using the safer sea route. Their destination became business hub of Bombay but their loss in overall terms was no less. With Sindh's inclusion in Pakistan Sindhis lost their 'homeland' to the new Muslim state and they were reduced to refugee status with no territory which they could call their own or to which they could identify in cultural terms.

Notes

[1] M Hasan, 'Adjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims after Partition', in N Panikkar (ed), *Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture,* K. New Delhi, 1991, p. 61.

[2] S J Burki, *Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood,* Pak Book Corporation, Lahore, 1999, p. 55.

[3] *Ministry of Rehabilitation (India): Report, 1957-58.*

[4] T Y Tan and G Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia,* Routledge, New York, 2000, p. 231.

[5] Ibid.

[6] They used Bombay, the business capital of India, as their base and many were remarkably successful in establishing themselves where they were able to fit into the new environment. Many of them looked for opportunities abroad and through their kinsmen who were already abroad, they got impetus for further migration and facilitated their settlement and acculturation in the countries to which they migrated.

[7] M Waseem, "Partition, Migration and Assimilation: A Comparative Study of Pakistani Punjab" in *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent,* Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (eds.), Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000, p. 211.

[8] H Alvi and H John (eds), *Sociology of Developing Societies,* Macmillan Education Ltd., London, p. 271.

[9] I Talbot, 'Literature and the Human Drama of the 1947 Partition', in I Talbot and G Singh (eds), *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent,* Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000, p. 228.

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The Return of the Diaspora to the Homeland: Israel and Pakistan Compared

Theodore P. Wright, Jr.

Abstract

The study of diaspora has neglected the type whose emigration has been reversed by return to its claimed homeland, most notably the return of Zionist Jews to Palestine since 1882 after an absence of almost two thousand years. This case is seldom compared in its causes and consequences with the migration of Indian Muslims (Muhajirin) to Pakistan in 1947. The two cases are the only religiously defined nation states to emerge in the twentieth century, although the movements which produced them were largely secular. Some of the orthodox religious authorities in both Judaism and Islam therefore initially rejected the new states as impious. The outcomes for the two new states have been quite opposite. Israel, with huge help from world Jewry and the United States, is a functioning democracy with a developed economy, a well integrated Jewish majority and a record of success in war with both its Arab neighbours and in suppressing Palestinian uprisings (intifadeh), whereas Pakistan has suffered from poverty, recurrent military dictatorships and lost wars with India including the secession of the eastern wing of the country, now Bangladesh. Reasons for the contrast are found in the smaller percentage of the Muhajirin in the total population, the much lower percentage of literacy in Pakistan compared to Israel and the earlier displacement of the immigrant leadership by a less developed indigenous elite.

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The call for papers to this conference lists every conceivable category of analysis except the reversal of migration by the diaspora and its return to its claimed homeland. One can think of a few historical cases, depending on whether the definition includes a religious element or encompasses all ethnic dispersals, as in this conference.[1] The return of some "moors" and Sephardic Jews, expelled in 1492, to Spain after 1974; the reversal of the medieval "drang nach osten" of Ostdeutsch to Germany in 1945; the repatriation of Japanese colonials from Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria, also in 1945; in some sense the plantation of Scots in Northern Ireland in the 17th century from which their ancestors had emigrated a

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thousand years before to Pictland; and the return of some Calvinists from New England to Old England in 1649-1660 and their remigration after the restoration of King Charles II.

But the outstanding, even eponymous, case is the return (aliyah) of European, Ashkenazi Jews to Palestine under the impulse of Zionism in response to European, Christian anti-Semitism and the Nazi holocaust during World War II, there followed the evacuation of endangered "oriental" Jews (Mizrachim) to the newly founded Israel in 1948, and the return in the 1970s of many highly secularised Soviet Jews.[2] The return of so many diasporic Jews to their historic home in Palestine and the creation for the first time in two thousand years of a Jewish majority state, was only made possible by the flight/expulsion of much of the pre-existing Arab population of Palestine, Muslim and Christian, to the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan and the Gulf states.[3] Less well known was the flight of a million or so Indian Muslims (the Muhajirin, i.e. refugees) to Pakistan during the partition of British India in 1947-1950, balanced by an equal migration in the opposite direction to India of most of the Hindu and Sikh population of what became Pakistan and the slaughter of huge numbers on both sides.[4]

The two mass migrations and their justificatory ideologies, Zionism and the Pakistan movement, produced the only two religiously defined states of the twentieth century.[5] There have been very few comparisons of Israel and Pakistan because of the repugnance of both Jewish and Muslim scholars to being compared with "the enemy". A notable exception is the article by a Hindu scholar, P. R. Kumaraswamy in 1997 while a research fellow of the Harry S. Truman Institute of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.[6] He lists a few shared characteristics besides their religious self definition: that they emerged amidst massive violence in the aftermath of the Second World War; as a result of modern ideological rather than religious movements; attracted a large return of diasporic immigrant populations pushed from their previous residences and met with initial rejection by orthodox religious authorities in the two faiths who regarded the foundation of a modern nation-state by human agency as impious.

But the outcomes for the two new states have been quite opposite. Israel is a functioning democracy with a developed economy and a well integrated (80%) Jewish majority despite internal religious differences between the Sephardim (Eastern origin) and Ashkenazim (Western origin) Jews.[7] It has been able to win all its wars with its Arab neighbours (1948, 1955, 1967 and 1973) and suppress two rebellions (Intifadeh) of the Arab minority.

Pakistan, to the contrary, has suffered from recurrent military dictatorships (1958-71, 1977-88, 1999-2007), continued mass poverty despite spurts of gross economic growth, and a rising tide of domestic ethnic and sectarian violence. It has been unsuccessful in its four wars with archenemy

India (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999) over Kashmir and, worst of all, has undergone a second partition of the country with the secession of the eastern half, which became Bangladesh in 1971.[8] The contrasting outcomes can be explained in terms of other differences between the two cases.

First and foremost, the Pakistani Muhajiin, while initially dominant like the Ashkenazim in Israel because of their historic role in the founding of the Muslim League[9] never constituted more than about ten percent of the population until 1971 and thereafter twenty percent of the remainder,[10] whereas European Jews were a 77% majority of the Jewish population of Israel at independence and almost all of the Jews in Israel have immigrated since 1882.[11]

Furthermore, there is an issue whether the ancestors of the bulk of the Muhajirin, except perhaps for the Ashraf elite, ever lived in what is now Pakistan. It is generally agreed that the ordinary (Ajlaf) Indian Muslims are descended from low caste Hindu converts.[12] The ideology of the Pakistan movement, however, treated all Muslims as one umma (people) and, indeed, Muslims in India tended to identify with the invading Turkish rulers. The point of contrast is that the indigenous Muslims of North India are what I call a "former ruling elite minority"[13] whereas Jews of the diaspora have been persecuted in varying degrees for 2,000 years and have been the archetypical "middleman minority".[14] Muslims had ruled North India and what is now Pakistan for seven hundred years (1191-1857) before the British raj. The Muslims of what became Pakistan in 1947 (Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Bengalis) joined the Muslim League only very late (1946) and soon supplanted the immigrant leadership after the deaths of Mohammedali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. The transfer of power in Israel occurred only after the victory of the Likud coalition in 1977.[15] It should be remembered that just as the Muslim League did not win over most Muslims until just before partition, Zionism did not triumph over socialism among European Jews until the holocaust.[16] In both cases the "push" of violence loomed larger in diasporic motivation to return to the homeland than the "pull" of ideology.[17]

A correlate of the sharply differing percentages of the total population which the returning diaspora made up, was the "modernity" of the two new nations. By 1991, the median amount of education for adults was twelve years for Western and Israeli born Jews in Israel; only 1% of Ashkenazim and 16% of Sephardim had never attended school and were presumably illiterate. On the other hand in Pakistan while 50% of the Muhajirin, the cream of the community in India, were literate, only 8% of the indigenous Muslim Sindhis were.[18] (18) In fact, many of the most educated and urban people in the provinces that became Pakistan were Hindus and Sikhs who emigrated en masse to India in 1947-48. Literacy in Pakistan (54%), especially of women (41%), is still far below Israeli levels (97.1%).[19] (19) While Urdu (Hindustani) is the lingua franca and official language of

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Pakistan as Hebrew is in Israel, this has been much more controversial in the former than the latter, especially in East Pakistan (Bengal) until 1971 and Sindh since then.[20]

Pakistan nevertheless, does have an advantage in the small percentage of remaining minorities after 1948 unless one counts the Shia, Ahmadi and Ismaili as minorities.[21] Israel has a considerable twenty percent of Christian and Muslim Arab minorities even within its pre-1967 borders and if one adds in the population of the occupied territories and Gaza and factors in the higher Arab than Jewish (Theodore Wright 3) birth rate, the country faces a potential loss of its Jewish majority which in turn poses an existential threat for a religiously defined state.[22] Since Orthodox Judaism is not basically a religion of conversion, this deficit cannot be made up in that way.

Both Israel and Pakistan have an inherent contradiction between their religious raison d'etre and the ideals of their founders: the socialism of the European Zionists and the liberal, democratic goals of Jinnah.[23] Some orthodox elements in both indeed opposed the founding of the new nation states by irreligious secularists.[24] This anomaly manifested itself in difficulties in framing the basic constitutions.[25] Israel has had to eschew a constitution altogether because of the controversy the process would provoke. Pakistan for its part took eight years to draft its first constitution with the Muslim League hectored every step of the way by the orthodox Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the revivalist Jama'at-i-Islami.[26] The second, more secular constitution imposed by President Ayub Khan, did not endure beyond his regime, and the third constitution framed under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after the secession of Bangladesh has been repeatedly amended first by the dictator, Ziaul Haq and then by succeeding regimes including that of Pervez Musharruf, himself a Muhajir.

Because of the very high percentage of Jewish returned diaspora in the population of Israel within its pre-1967 borders, party structure and voting is not distinctively split along returnee vs. indigenous lines, but rather between European and "Oriental" immigrants. Palestinians who do have the right to vote in Israel proper, tend to be represented by the Communist parties which are not as committed to Zionism and have even accepted proposals for a bi-national state.[27] But parties are divided sharply along socialist vs religious lines with the former, such as Mapai gaining more of the Ashkenazi votes and the latter the Sephardic ones. As the latter grew in numbers because of higher birth rate and later immigration, the pendulum swung in favour of the conservative Likud coalition in 1977.[28]

In Pakistan, to the contrary, the Muhajrin, amounting to only a small minority except in Karachi, suffered diminished representation once the founding fathers departed the scene, though continuing to be found disproportionately in the civil service and army officer corps. In the early

years, they supported the Muslim League until it was eclipsed in East Bengal by the Bengali-led Awami League in 1954 and by the Punjabi-led Republican party in the West. Ayub Khan split the party by creating his own Convention Muslim League. It is said that in their stronghold of Karachi where most of the Urdu speaking refugees had settled, many voted for the Jama'at-i-Islami of Maulana Maudoodi who hailed from Hyderabad, Deccan because his movement preached a non-regional, pan Islamic political program.[29] Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, which ruled the rump Pakistan in 1971-77 after the loss of East Pakistan, was, like its founder, Sindhi-based but with a significant Punjabi following. It instituted Sindhi language policies in Sindh which alienated the Muhajirin.[30] So, young Muhajirs, facing a bleak employment future, established in 1984 the "M.Q.M" (Muhajir Qaumi Movement) to defend their interests.[31] This party has dominated the politics of Pakistan's biggest metropolis ever since despite bloody confrontations with Sindhis Pathans and Punjabis and periodic military suppression. It has sought not very successfully to hold the balance of power between the P.P.P. and the Muslim League like the religious parties do in Israel.

One of the conflicts with Sindhi leaders has been over the proposal to allow the Urdu-speaking "Biharis" of the then "East Pakistan" who had defended Pakistan in the 1971 Bengali war of secession to emigrate from their squalid refugee camps in Bangladesh to Pakistan. But since this would tip the demographic balance in Sindh Province against the indigenous Sindhis, they have successfully resisted it. Some Muhajirin have proposed the separation of Karachi from Sindh into "Muhajiristan"[32], but Sindhis are loath to give up the country's largest city and see their otherwise backward province diminished. Comparable "numbers game" resistance in Israel is not to further Jewish immigration, be it from Ethiopia, India or Russia in face of the huge disproportion of the neighbouring Arab states' populations, but rather that all Israeli parties have stoutly rejected the return of any Palestinian refugees but a token few.[33] Thus the "reference group" differs in the two cases: all other non-refugee "Indigenous" Muslims in Pakistan; and all Arabs whether in Israel, occupied territory or neighbours in the case of Israel.

The displaced populations, be they Palestinians from Israel or Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan provide some of the bitterest and most unrelenting foes in the refugee camps of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to the government of the countries from which they fled or were expelled in 1948. They too provide recruits for terrorism, including suicide bombings. In conclusion, the two cases of returning diaspora exhibit a combination of push and pull motivations, but probably significantly more of the latter than most mass, economically motivated migrations because of the religious element in their ideologies. Otherwise why the insistence on return to these particular locations? Zionists spurned Birobidjan and Uganda in the interwar period. The Muslim League rejected confederation within India. That Israel has been

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so much more successful than Pakistan is due to the different degrees of modernisation of the migrant and indigenous population before 1947, the percentage of the population of the returning diaspora in the resulting nation-states and the massive financial and military support of American Jewry and the U.S. Government since 1967. Indian Muslims are in no position economically to aid Pakistan and if they did try to, their loyalty would be questioned by other Indians.[34]

Notes

[1] Webster's 7th *New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1970, after three definitions restricted to the Jewish historical phenomenon, gives "any dispersion abroad".

[2] B Morris, *Righteous Victims; a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-1999*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999.

[3] Arthur Koestler in *The Thirteenth Tribe* presents the theory that many East European Jews were descendants of Khazar converts in South Russia in the 7th century who therefore had no ancestors who lived in Palestine.

[4] N D Palmer, *The Indian Political System*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2d ed. 1971, p. 93.

[5] Belgium, 1830, might be considered a third in that both Flemings and Walloons are Catholic.

[6] P R Kumaraswamy, "The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan", *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1997.

[7] D Peretz and G Doron, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, Boulder: Westview Press, 3rd ed., 1997, pp. 50-54, "Ethnic Composition"

[8] C Baxter, Y K Malik, C H Kennedy, and R C Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 245

[9] K B Sayeed, *Pakistan, the Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, pp. 208, 223 for domination of the Muslim League by U.P. Politicians.

[10] T P Wright, Jr., "Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan", *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, XII, 2 (July 1974), pp. 189-205

[11] S Smooha, "Class, Ethnic and National Cleavages and Democracy in Israel", in *Israeli Democracy under Stress*, E Springzak and L Diamond, (eds), Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 318.

[12] G Ansari, "Muslim Caste in UP.", *Eastern Anthropologist*, XIII, 2 (1960), pp. 1-83

[13] T P Wright, Jr., "Identity Problems of Former Elite Minorities", *Journal of Asian Affairs*, 2,(Fall1976),pp. 58-63

[14] W P Zenner, *Minorities in the Middle,* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991

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[15] Peretz and Doron, op.cit., p6.

[16] B Johnpoll, *The Politics of Futility, The General Jewish Workers Bund in Poland, 1917-43,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968.

[17] Peretz and Doron, opcit., p. 49 ;Theodore Wright 5

[18] T P Wright, Jr., "Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs and Punjabis," *Comparative Politics,* XXIII,3 (April 1991), pp. 299-312.

[19] *Pakistan Times*, July 15, 2004; CIA, World Fact Book.

[20] R Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972

[21] The status of the Ahmadis or Qadianis as Muslims is the most controversial because of their belief in a new revelation. Baxter et al, op.cit, p. 176. In Israel, "the relationship between the Falasha (from Ethiopia) and Judaism was questioned by some Orthodox rabbis[...]", Peretz and Doron, op.cit p. 49.

[22] "Since 1948 their (Palestinian) number has increased as a result of one of the world's highest birth rates[...].with these rates, and assuming a zero rate of Jewish immigration to Israel in the future, the number or Jews and Arabs would become equal around the year 2015; [...]the political consequences for maintaining Israel as a Jewish state are unclear." Peretz and Doron, op.cit, pp. 55-56

[23] Kumaraswamy, op.cit

[24] Indeed, some of the most orthodox Muslim leaders, like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Zakir Husain, remained staunch Indian Nationalists and were trusted enough to hold high political office in independent India.

[25] A Lijphart, "Israeli Democracy and Democratic Reform in Comparative Perspective" in *Israeli Democracy under Stress*, Ehud Sprinzak and Larry Diamond, eds., Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, Chapter 6.

[26] L Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. 27. Peretz and Doron, op.cit., Ch.3, "Political Parties and Ideologies", pp. 88, 95-97.

[27] Peretz and Doron, op.cit., Ch.3, "Political Parties and Ideologies", pp. 88, 95-97.

[28] However, the influx of more secular Jews from the Soviet Union in the 1970s may restore the balance in favor of the non-religious parties in the future.

[29] T P Wright, Jr., op.cit (1974)

[30] T P Wright, Jr., op.cit (1991).

[31] O Verkaaik, *Migrants and Militants; Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan,* New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005.

[32] ibid. p. 158.

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[33] At least one rightwing cabinet member and a member of the Knesset have recently advocated ethnic cleansing ("voluntary emigration") of the Arab population of Israel in order to assure a permanent Jewish majority. (MK Uri Ariel in *Haaretz*, April 28, 2008).

[34] Verkaaik, op.cit., (p. 180) argues that the Muslim self identification as a diaspora began in British North India in the late nineteenth century, but that the *Muhajirin* in Pakistan despite their mass migration there, did not conceive of themselves as a "nation in search of a homeland" until the 1990s along with a growing pessimism about the possibilities of positive change for them in contemporary Pakistan. Nichola Khan in "Mobilisation and Political Violence in the Muhajir Community of Karachi", *Economic and Political Weekly* (June 23, 2007, pp. 2435-2443, offers a more psychoanalytic explanation but without reference to the diasporic character of the community.

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Palestinian Diaspora Goes Global through American-Palestinian Prose

Wesam Al-Assadi

Abstract

Although Diasporic literatures are common in today's world, the phenomenon is generally more manifest among Palestinians, not only because their Diaspora was largely involuntary and remains extensive, but also because of a continual emphasis on the motherland. The Palestinian experience in the Diaspora and the narrative of their present actuality in Said's words "stem directly from the story of their existence in and displacement form Palestine." Part of the struggle for self-determination by Palestinians has been to tell the truth about their experience as Palestinians across geographical barriers.

For decades, the literature of the Palestinian Diaspora has been too political, too academic and too elitist to attract the non-involved Western and American reader. They lack the imaginative essence that can tempt the readers' souls and capture their minds, one that portrays Palestinians not as victims, but as normal human beings with a personal history, faces and names, and are more than the United Nations' endless statistics that signify the Palestinian cause. This paper examines the shifting location of the modern Palestinian literature written in English by Americans of Palestinian origin, rooted in Diasporic countries but focused in theme and content on Palestine. The paper explores how these themes and settings function in a selection of Palestinian-American novels and memoirs and highlights ways in which contemporary Palestinian literature embodies the reality of today's Palestinian Diaspora.

Keywords: Al-ghurba, Anglo-Palestinian fiction, communal trauma, diaspora, displacement, exile, memoir, Palestinian-American literature, thresholds.

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1. Introduction

The year 1948 marks the beginning of al-ghurba (exile or Diaspora) and al-nakba (disaster or calamity), words intensely resonant in the Palestinian lexicon. After this decisive date, one can affix "pre-" or "post-" as markers of an apocalyptic moment. In this cultural and political orbit, a new spatial world took shape. In 1948, through a combination of expulsion and flight, around 750,000 Palestinians became refugees in neighbouring Arab countries. About 100,000 Palestinians remained in their homeland. And since then,

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To be Palestinian is, in part by upbringing, in part by sensibility, to be a wanderer, an exile, a touch moon mad, always a little different from others. Our name, which we acquired after 1948, was not so much a national title – we had had no nation – as an existential term.[1]

For decades, the Palestinian experience in the Diaspora and "the narrative of their present actuality"- in Edward Said's words- "which stems directly from the story of their existence in and displacement form Palestine, later Israel- that narrative is not [there]."[2] Nonetheless, part of the struggle for self-determination by Palestinians has been to tell the truth about their experience as Palestinians across geographical barriers. Lisa Majaj, argues that return "is not simply going back: it is also to go forward; to create a new future from the fragments of a reclaimed past"[3]

Edward Said's, and the other Palestinian intellectual figures' seminal scholarly publications, formal public lectures, classroom teaching and political discourse have played a pivotal role in changing the way in which the Americans and others all over the world perceive the people of Palestine and the Palestinian Israeli conflict. However their publications in politics, history and economy of Palestine have influenced on the American political, intellectual and cultural elite.

The typical American doesn't get the opportunity to read the non-political story of the Palestinians and the Arab World, because it is rare and difficult to find. Arab American discourse usually comes in one packaged form: dry, statistically correct, dissertations on Politics that any career academic would love to read.

In order to steer the involvement of the American public and the new generation of the Arab Americans, it is necessary to narrate the collective past of the Palestinians using literary writing in which the Palestinian trauma is given a human face and sensibility.

2.   Beyond National Thresholds

Said's memoir *Out of Place*, Shaw Dallal's autobiographical novel *Scattered Like Seeds* and Ibrahim Fawal's novel *On the Hills of God*, among other memoirs and works of fiction give the Palestinians in the Diaspora, and in the United Sates in particular (the concern of this paper) the freedom to go beyond the confining thresholds of national torpor; The freedom to remember, to dream of a different reality, to deliver themselves into history's keeping. They are emblematic of a recent trend in Palestinian literature: writing rooted in Diasporic countries but focused in theme and content on Palestine.

By exploring the themes of identity and return, they highlight ways in which contemporary Palestinian literature embodies the reality of today's Palestinian Diaspora. They typify the relationship of Palestinian exiles and their descendants with their Diasporic countries (in this case the United

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States) and with Palestine. These relationships are crucial to the realities of the Palestinian Americans face in the twenty-first century; rendering the physical, or political, estrangement a personal "exile," or alternatively, expressing the communal trauma in the terms of an individual's internal existential conflict. Since Palestine as a nation-state is as yet unrealised, the name becomes a "cipher for existential ruminations on the nature of both physical exile, and a more characteristically modernist personal "exile" in the world."[4] This is part of a more general trend, in the years following on from another devastating Israeli military victory in 1967, to personalise the political, and clothe it in metaphor. Salaita argues that: Strong affinities emerge between the fragmented individual typical of the Palestinian Diaspora, and literary modernism, an aesthetic that, as a result, often becomes the preferred form for Palestinian writing about land and belonging.[5]

3.   Identity and Cultural Schism in Diasporic Fiction

Said's memoir *Out of Place* masterfully captures the heart and the soul of the Palestinian tragedy. It portrays the Palestinians not as victims, but as normal human beings who had and have lives, personal history and faces and names. *Out of Place* is a memoir of youth, an intimate autobiography of life, family and friends from Said's birthplace in Jerusalem, schools in Cairo, and summers in the mountains above Beirut, to boarding school and college in the United States, revealing an unimaginable world of rich, colourful characters and exotic eastern landscapes. Underscoring all is the confusion of identity the young Said experienced as he came to terms with the dissonance of being an American citizen, a Christian and a Palestinian, and, ultimately, an outsider. Said has lived in a multi-cultural, multilingual environment since he was born. He doesn't remember which language he spoke first, English or Arabic. He says that "the two [languages] have always been together in my life, one resonating in the other sometimes ironically, sometimes nostalgically, most often each correcting, and commenting on, the other."[6] Expressing his feeling towards his out of placeness, Said articulates:

> I occasionally experience myself as a cluster of flowing currents. I prefer this to the idea of a solid self [...] These currents [...] at their best; they require no reconciling, no harmonising. They are "off" and may be out of place, but at least they are always in motion.[7]

In reading Said's memoir, one finds the presence of political crises provoked by international events. He connects personal experience with geopolitics and a critical attitude toward American foreign policy. *Scattered like Seeds* is again an autobiographical novel. It explores the identity complexity of the

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Palestinians in the Diaspora by telling the story of Thafer Allam, a Palestinian American lawyer and nuclear physicist returning to the Middle East. He is married to the Irish American Mary Pat, and a father of four children. Thafer's assimilation to the American society is called into question after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, when he must re-confront his identity as a Palestinian.

At the Allenby Bridge (the crossing borders between the occupied territories of the West bank and Jordan), Thafer is strip-searched and denied entry to the West Bank to visit his aged mother. This trip is conforms a turning point in Thafer's ideological transformation. He is gradually made to alter his philosophy to better suit the realities of the Arab world. Thafer resisted this politicisation before finally capitulating to his new position as a Palestinian nationalist

> What happened at the [Allenby] bridge changed you, and you know it[...]. It all began in Beirut, at the refugee camp[...]. Then those encounters with Suhaila, your countrywoman, awakened that slumbering passion hidden within you. But it was the humiliation at the bridge and your inability to see your mother that changed you forever.[8]

He remains confused, however, about both his identity and his role in the struggle. His children's struggles, on the other hand, are more emblematic of Palestinian American life than anything Thafer experiences. Consequently, their role in the novel indicates how the Diaspora has transfigured Palestinians. It is not surprising that Colleen and Andrew, both in college prefer to return to the United States while Katherine and Sean, still teenagers, seek further fulfilment in the Middle East. They do not yet have enough invested in the United States to consider it a living necessity. More crucially, their actions signal a cultural schism between Palestinian immigrants to the United States and American-born Palestinians.

4.   Land in the Palestinian Fiction

In *Scattered like Seeds*, and *On the Hills of God*, Land, as in all Palestinian literature, becomes central. Dallal infuses Palestine into the figure of Suhaila, thus representing her with a metaphorical presence. Thafer's renewed dedication to Palestine is codified by his relationship with Suhaila, a Palestinian working for OAPEC. The following scene illustrates how this awareness becomes actualised: [Thafer] can't go to sleep. It is as though he is embracing his homeland. Hearing [Suhaila] breathe, he feels comforted and protected by her presence. Her breasts remind him of the gentle hills of his homeland, her smooth soft skin of its plants, and her long, light brown hair of

the rays of it sun.[9] The symbolic merger of the body with the landscape has long been a technique of male Palestinian authors. Women's bodies have often been invoked by writers to represent the land from which the Palestinians are exiled assuming a forbidden quality that only increases their desire to return; and the land which encapsulates the pride and honour of Palestinians, who must suffer from afar while it is penetrated by a foreign entity.[10] Fawal, with more subtlety, does the same with Salwa in his novel *On the Hills of God*. Yousif has been in love with her since he was a child, but the strictures of Arab society do not allow them to pursue a romantic relationship. Once the pursuit of Salwa becomes taboo, she is immediately transformed into a symbolic icon of the statehood struggle. When her father accepts an engagement offer from hotel manager Adel Farhat, Salwa becomes even more taboo and unattainable, prompting Yousif to pursue her with increased vigour.

Fawal's choice of metaphor here is complex. If Salwa represents the threatened land for which the Palestinians yearn, then Adel Farhat is the alien presence intruding on the physical object of their love. Yousif fights furiously to break the engagement, ultimately succeeding and marrying Salwa near the close of the novel. The emotional attachment of Palestinians with their land is thus crystallised. The marriage indicates that Palestine and its people will always be symbolically united. Fawal's novel takes us to Palestine during the final year of the British Mandate, which Fawal call "Palestine's last summer of happiness."[11]

Unlike Dallal's *Scattered like Seeds*, Fawal avoids explicit engagement with Arab American themes by fashioning an historical novel focused solely on Palestinians. As a result, *On the Hills of God* complements *Scattered like Seeds* in a critical framework; both cover different but equally important issues while remaining confined to the same point of departure, Palestine. The 1948 War provides *On the Hills of God* with its primary theme. Much of the early plot follows the endeavours of Yousif, a Christian, and his two best friends, Isaac Sha'lan, a Jew, and Amin, a Muslim. Fawal employs this tripartite religious dynamic in order to mirror the demographics of Mandatory Palestine and, more importantly, to depict a community that at the time privileged national culture over religious lines. In *On the Hills of God*, Zionism is not an alien Jewish force that disrupted and then destroyed the lives of Palestinians; rather, it is an alien European force that disrupted and then destroyed the lives of Middle Easterners, Palestinian Jews included. The Safis, Sha'lans, and other residents of Ardallah may be the actors in the text, but Zionism is the story.[12]

The novel ends with the dispersal of the residents of Ardallah. Yousif and his mother, evicted from their year-old house, join the human caravan into Transjordan. On the way, he and Salwa are separated. He vows to find her, and in so doing, it is implied, return to Palestine. Isaac appears

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later as a Zionist spy and land surveyor. His contingent is captured in Ardallah by armed fighters and he is murdered. Yousif, watching the death of his best friend, reinforces his dedication to diplomacy over warfare. Countering this ethic is his cousin, Basim who believes in the armed struggle for liberation and retention of identity. Fawal never manages to find a resolution to these opposed philosophies. Instead, he allows the story to conclude with both Basim and Yousif clinging to their different styles of resistance. The conflict between nonviolent action and armed struggle is perhaps the most pronounced development in the text.

The Hills of God's setting, as a novel which setting is limited to the land and history of Palestine, coupled with American publication and, presumably American readership indicate the cultural dynamics of the Palestinians. Fawal's novel setting, and its publication in America for American readership, denotes that the cultural dynamics of the Palestinian society have taken its root in the Diaspora.

5.   Conclusion

For the last sixty years, since the date of al-nakba, the Palestinian question lost the common understanding of the average American and denied the human face of the agonies of the Palestinians inside the Palestinian occupied territories and in the Diaspora due to the fact that the Palestinian question was constantly addressed in a rigid, dry and detached political discourse and elitist academic research.

Recently, a number of Anglophone and Palestinian American writers have recognised the pivotal role of memoirs and novels in giving the Palestinian political question a soul and spirit. The American Palestinian writers have utilised the tools and aesthetics of literature to narrate directly the experience of displacement Palestinians in the Diaspora share across geographical borders and linguistic barriers. A recurrent theme among all these works shows how the Diasporic communities share the same identity as Palestinians despite the lapse of sixty years and the different geographical landscape.

Palestinians in the Diaspora identify and collectively remember in their narratives the lost home. Looking at their artistic production, one major element that categorises their works is the symbols used to address their collective identity as Palestinians.

The retention of a Palestinian identity in the United States is a marker of the Diaspora; the literature produced under its guise, then, embodies the ambivalent modern Palestinian condition. Diasporic writing adopts American poetics and explores the complexities of America's cultural landscape, but Palestine simultaneously remains the pivotal source of inspiration. Such textual evolution is the typical outcome of displacement. The emphasis on Palestine, though, is a result of revived political awareness.

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Palestine is therefore in constant transit, and has been carried to all areas of the world where its people have taken up residence.

Notes

[1] F Turki, *Exiles Return: The Making of a Palestinian American*, The Free Press, New York, 1994, p 272

[2] E Said, *The Politics of disposition – The Struggle for Palestinian Self – determination*, Vintage books, New York, 1995, p. 90

[3] L Majaj, 'On Writing and Return: Feminism Race and Transnationalism', *Meridians*, vol. 2 No. 2, 2001, pp. 99 - 103

[4] S Salaita, 'Scattered Like Seeds: Palestinian prose goes global', *Studies in the Humanities*, vol. 30, issue: 1-2, June, 2003, p. 46

[5] ibid

[6] E Said, *Out of Place*, Knof, New York, 1999, p. 4

[7] E Said, *The Politics of disposition – The Struggle for Palestinian Self – determination*, p. 251

[8] S Dallal, *Scattered like Seeds*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1999, p. 213

[9] ibid, p. 190

[10] J Harcourt, 'Foreword', *Scattered like Seeds*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1999,

[11] I Fawal, *On the Hills of God*, the Black Belt, Montgomery, 1998, p. 9

[12] S Salaita, op. ct., p48

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Diasporas, Difference and Dialogue:
The Case of Africans and Europeans in London

Ursula Troche

Abstract
In this paper, I am concerned with African-European (intercultural) dialogue, and how our understanding of diaspora is confusing and obstructing this dialogue. Further, in this dialogue, we are dealing with a double-issue, which is, in part, inseparable: on the one hand there is what Gordon calls the 'black-white duality', and, on the other hand, the diversity of diasporas that can be involved in this encounter. The 'Diaspora Enquiry' has come out of the field of race relations, and 'race' and diaspora are mostly being dealt with in tandem. In the British context, for example, Africans / black people are assumed to have come from 'outside' and whites assumed to be English. I, the researcher, am breaking this assumption by being a white person but a foreigner. My presence brings up questions around where I belong, a question that has usually been an issue for black people. Fryer shows that black people came to Britain before the English, therefore questioning who belongs to Britain and who is of the diaspora and, consequently, what belongs to whom - and further, who is who? These questions influence African-European dialogue, as I shall show below.

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1.   **Introduction: The Diaspora Revolution**
        The topic of Diaspora has been theorised increasingly in recent decades, so much so that many of us have become familiar with some of the concepts and notions developed within the Diaspora Enquiry. These would include 'dislocation', 'displacement', transculturality, 'belonging'. Dislocation and displacement suggests the effect of rupture that living in diaspora causes, transculturality refers to the mix of cultures that living in diaspora causes. Finally, belonging refers to the attempt to feel at home in diaspora and the difficulties involved in declaring diaspora as home.
        Feelings of displacement and the difficulties involved in declaring Diaspora as home have dominated the lives of people from the Jewish diaspora – which is where the word originates from, as we know. However, the theorization of diaspora has been taken on most vigorously by academics of the African diaspora. This may be explained by the situation that people

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from the African diaspora find themselves in, which, of all peoples in diaspora, is arguably most severely marked by racism. In fact, the diaspora enquiry is closely related to fields of study around migration, 'race', racism and race relations.

Because they highlight racism and migration as determinants of our existence in and experience of society, these are important additions and challenges to our repertoire in social theory. Due to their novel and critical nature, they had to develop in disciplines that are equally novel and critical nature, such as postcolonial studies and women's studies, for which the diaspora enquiry, especially for the postcolonial studies field, has become a central pillar.

The new discourse was aided by the earlier 'academic revolution' across the social sciences, namely the ⯑heorization of 'race', gender and class as always being intersected with each other in the analysis of our situation in society as well as our experiences. The intersections of 'race', gender and class came to be known as the 'triplet', or the 'matrix'. In fact, the discourse around diaspora is, to a large extent, a development from this earlier revolution.

2.   The Inclusion of 'Original Space'

Why I am describing this as a revolution here is because the theorisation of diaspora made space for a broader view of the wider view of the world. The thought that came to enter the canon of social theory has been predominantly the thought by male academics of the western world. Theorising diaspora brought in space from the 'outside' for discussion.

The space from the 'outside' is in fact the original space for academics living in a diaspora. In the narrow sense of the word, this is physically a different space, a different country but in the wider sense this can be a marginalised and ignored space within that what is known. Such spaces can have different belongings, different histories and 'different people' in the perception of those who live in the main space without awareness of the 'other space' - indeed, without awareness of the 'other'. 'Black spaces', i.e. the African diaspora, are such spaces, which differ from 'white spaces' because of their immediate links with Africa and their creation largely through slavery. Such spaces have been explained to the wider world through literature, i.e. Toni Morrison and through social theory, i.e. W.E.B. Du Bois. In his 'The Souls of Black Folk' Du Bois describes the difference and distance between black and white, and how these spaces are separated and segregated by the 'colour line'.

There have been other 'other' spaces, all of which are marked by marginalisation. These spaces are diasporas, though the marginalisation of women, too, represents an internal 'other' space which is not a diaspora. However, 'race' and country/regional origin - especially in their respective

diasporas - have always played the strongest roles in the labelling and identification of people.

3.   The 'Double Issue': Diaspora and the Colour Line

Considering the African diaspora, we are exposed most clearly with the fact that we are dealing not just with being diaspora here but also with being black. So there is diaspora and colour at work here, not just diaspora. That this is, in fact, a double issue becomes clearer when we consider the white section of the population in relation to the black section of the population. Not all the whites are natives: hence they also live in a diaspora. In this sense, we have a situation of a multitude of coexisting diasporas. Of those, some people are black and some people are white. Hence the line of division is primarily not drawn according to whether one belongs to a diaspora or not, but it is drawn according to one's skin colour.

This may sound like a contradiction: to be black anywhere outside of Africa means to be part of the (visible) African diaspora. However, there are many ways of understanding diaspora: diaspora, as mentioned earlier, may mean relocation in one's lifetime. If we go by that and consider the American example, we find that many African Americans have been born in America for generations, whereas some white people have only migrated to America within their lifetime. In this sense you have 'black natives' and 'white foreigners'.

The presence of 'Black natives' and 'white foreigners' does not mean that African Americans do not share in the African diaspora, however, this does not mean that white people do not belong to a Diaspora - a Diaspora which may be younger than the African Diaspora and which might, in individual cases, have occurred in one's lifetime. In the American case, in particular, white people are as much from diasporas as black people are, because unlike in Europe, whites do not 'belong' to America in the same sense. America is the country of their 'first nation peoples' (see, e.g. Laduke, 2003), the native Americans; the difference between black and white diasporas here being that white people migrated to America of their own accord whereas black people were forced there as slaves (though there were some cases of Africans having sailed to America on their own accord as well: see Van Sertima. In addition, once black people (Africans) had arrived in America, they continued to be brutalised by white people. The power relations between black and white people in America were therefore unequal from the time of their arrival and though both groups were diaspora communities, black people's diaspora status became more visible because they were actively made to feel marginalised and displaced, their culture was being questioned (as opposed to the culture of the white people, who, 'established themselves' (literally) as the questioners). Informing, developing and reinforcing this unequal power relationship was racism. As much as

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racism obscures the ordinary relationship between people, it also obscures the recognition on who is diaspora and who is not.

The case of Britain is different from the case of America but the same applies in different ways. On the one hand there are black people who were born in Britain and on the other hand there are white people who migrated to Britain in their lifetime. The author of this article is one of the latter.

Both these notions may militate against the generally held view - endorsed by not only the outspoken racists but also by the general media and public understanding that white people 'belong' to Britain, whereas black people 'have joined' this island at some later stage. However, the existence of British born black people as well as people like myself, i.e. foreign-born whites show most clearly that this is a distorted view.

The view is distorted because 'white' is being equated with 'native'. Hence we have an obscure situation here: although 'natives' has been a description for black or dark peoples who live in traditional ways, at the same time whites, too, seem to want to occupy the position of 'native' - at least in Europe, America and Western Asia.

In Britain, in the discussion on race relations, those people named as 'whites' are in fact English, whereas whites from a diaspora community are not described as 'white' but rather by their country of origin (i.e. Irish, Cypriot, East European). Such inconsistent 'practices of description' has a confusing effect on who and what is (perceived to be) Diaspora.

Part of the answer is that some groups are subject to racialisation whereas others are not. In fact, the only group that does not seem to be subject to racialisation is the group that has claimed, in any given area, belonging and 'native status' - and has therefore rejected the notion of Diaspora for itself. In the case of London these are the English.

However, this conception ignores the question of origins. The English, in England, assume that they are the 'original people', and there the enquiry ends. This assumption takes white as a skin-colour for granted as much as Englishness. This does not mean that 'Englishness' is clearly defined, however, it is taken for granted that an Irish, German, Polish, French, Mexican, or so, is not English - therefore English must be 'something else' than anybody from all of these other countries. There is hence a colour-bar and a country-bar to Englishness, whilst questions on the origins of 'the English' are not asked.

In relation to the African diaspora - and in relation to Europe, as we shall see – I would like to advance three different ways of understanding.

4. A Three-fold African Diaspora

I have conceptualised this three-fold scheme of looking at what is the African diaspora in relation to Britain - though the same would be true for other European countries.

In my conception of three ways of understanding the African diaspora, the third will be most familiar to us, the second will be less familiar, and first will be the most consistently forgotten way of conceptualising the African diaspora. Since the ways of understanding diaspora are getting easier 'towards the end' of my categorisation, I will start with what in my scheme is the 'third African diaspora'.

In my categorisation of waves of the African diaspora then, the 'third diaspora' is the labour- and forced migrations of the post-war period: Africans, at first mainly from the Caribbean, coming to live in Britain mainly because Britain needed workers. That diaspora is on-going until the present day. Within this third diaspora, there are changing dynamics: in the immediate post-war period, mainly African Caribbeans would be literally asked to come to Britain whereas today the migration of mainly Africans from the continent represents a migrations of a different kind, namely that of economic and political 'refugees', the former being 'refugees from globalisation', to some extent. What this diaspora has in common is that these are the black people that we are most aware of and indeed, many black people today trace themselves to the post-war diaspora. Though the post-war period starts 1945, a common starting point of the African (Caribbean) diaspora in Britain is 1948, which marked the arrival of the famous SS Empire Windrush.

If the third diaspora starts after the war, the second diaspora 'ends' in the war-period, with those often forgotten 'war veterans' from the Caribbean and Africa, who fought for the British. Before this time the 'second diaspora' goes back to the beginnings of Empire, the beginnings of the slave trade and even before that. For many centuries, black people mainly arrived in Britain due to the slave trade. Ron Ramdin and Peter Fryer are some of the people that have traced the black presence in Britain at this time. Fryer also goes further back than that and mentions the black presence in Britain at the time of the Roman Empire. Van Sertima has also done groundbreaking work in this area.

Van Sertima, at the same time, goes as far back as the first African diaspora. The first African diaspora in Britain, indeed in Europe at large, is, perhaps ironically, Europe itself. This is true of course only if we look beyond history itself and move into prehistory. Archaeological evidence has proven that mankind as such originated from Africa. Therefore other continents, such as Europe, do not have a separate human origin. This inevitably means that every continent outside of Africa is an 'African diaspora'. Though this is indeed going back a long time, our genes still show

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clearly that we have more in common then what separates us from one another. There are different theories how what was to be become a 'European', took on a different skin colour and slightly different features, which are too numerous to go into here in detail. However, I make mention of Europe as belonging to the first African diaspora, so as to show the first possible meaning of diaspora as well as the interconnections between Africa and Europe by way of diaspora. In this sense, too, Europe is a 'child of Africa'.

Of all the 'three waves of African diaspora in Britain, the third is the easiest to trace. The second one is more difficult as the further back we go, the more likely it is that this diaspora has been absorbed into the white population through intermarriage. To the first diaspora the question of tracing does not apply because we are, in that meaning of diaspora, all of the African diaspora of Europe. However, if identified as 'European', our skin colour is white – a circumstance where 'black' and 'African' no longer coincides.

5.   Dialogue

The dialogue that takes place between Africans and Europeans has little to do with the first African diaspora - only in the sense that Africans of the second and third diaspora may sometimes get irritated if Europeans deny their African origins. The African origins of Europe, indeed, are part of what is usually referred to as 'black history'. The perceived relatively widespread failure among white people to acknowledge 'black history' usually presents one of the obstacles to dialogue between Africans and Europeans.

History, thus, is a contentious issue. Often more prominently than this early common history, it is the divisive history since the transatlantic slave trade that is viewed as an obstacle to dialogue. The transatlantic slave trade has created a situation of inequality between Africa and Europe - and due to its far-reaching nature and consequences, between Africans and Europeans as individuals as well - that has created a deep rift between what came now to be perceived as 'different' people: black and white people. This system of exploitation was continued by other means in the form of colonialism.

However, the way black people have suffered from this - and continue to suffer - is often not seen and/or not acknowledged by white people. Not surprisingly, this creates tensions and thus definite obstacles to dialogue.

In my interviews on their assessment of African European dialogue, black people usually refer to the duality that this situation has created. White people, on the other hand, usually do not refer to this duality. However, this is more likely to be due to a lack of awareness of it rather than an absence of it. Hence one of the greatest obstacles to African European dialogue has been the issue of lack of awareness. Much of it, in fact, has to do with knowledge:

black people have their social world of which they have knowledge and white people have their social world of which they have knowledge. However, in addition to this, black people are made to live in and around (global) power structures that have been put in place by some white people since the transatlantic slave trade - therefore black people do not only know their own social world but also the social world of the system in which they have to live, i.e. the 'white system', also referred to as 'white supremacy'.

The racial demarcation here is somewhat broken down by other indicators of division, such as gender and class. However, race has persistently proved to be the most pervasive division. This can be seen, once again, from history: history, i.e. slave trade and colonialism - 'twins' that are often equated with history as such, especially by those who have been 'on the receiving end' of both of these 'twins' - has developed different realities for black and white people. History, in this sense, has also developed the African diaspora in the Caribbean, the Americas, whilst it has underdeveloped those same areas and people economically.

Again this may be a matter of perception, however, my research shows this to be so as well as the conditions for dialogue in themselves: without an acknowledgement of the impact that the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism on the present for both black and white people, dialogue will always be subject to tensions - or perhaps not even take place, for fear of misunderstanding and lack of willingness to validate what has frequently been labelled a 'black perspective'. Book titles such as Richards' 'The Way we see it' may suggest a so-called black perspective, though in fact the book aims to speak to white people about the situation black people find themselves in, so that dialogue and understanding can begin.

In everyday communication, history is often not discussed - however, it plays a role by implication. On the face of it, however, what is of greater relevance is the question around diaspora and belonging, with black people in Britain (and Europe, and/or the West in general) assumed to not belong. However, diaspora – in this case any 'wave' of the African diaspora – presents the connecting link between history and belonging here: the second and third diaspora shows that black people's contribution to Britain whereas the first diaspora shows that white people 'were once black'.

6.   Conclusion

The analysis of diaspora has come into social theory through the race relations field. This also meant that 'race' and diaspora have often been treated as being the same. However, these are two sets of divisions, which are also at work in African European dialogue: one is the black-white set, the other one is the 'native-non-native set. These sets overlap but they also contradict one another, depending on how diaspora is being interpreted: whether we are talking about an African diaspora or whether we are also

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considering internal European diasporas and thus further challenges to perceptions around belonging - all of these play a role when dialogue takes place. All of these can also create tensions, especially when there is a lack of awareness of what diaspora means for black people and its influence on history and belonging - and further, on marginalisation and inequality. My research shows that an awareness of the significance, the means of and reasons for the creation of African diasporas and their functions is essential for successful African European dialogue.

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The Formation of Stereotypes about the Cuisine of the Armenian Diaspora among Armenians who Live in Armenia

Evgenia Guliaeva

Abstract

Today's Armenia is only a small part of historical Armenia, a territory which is usually divided into east and west as a result of the incorporation of these two parts into the territories of various states over the centuries. This political division has been deepened further by ethnographic differences between the eastern and western Armenians. After the genocide of 1915-1916, the western Armenians lost their homeland and a major part of the Diaspora was formed. It might thus be suggested that for many of today's western Armenians, eastern Armenia is the symbolic rather than real homeland of their ancestors. As a consequence, the differences between eastern and western Armenians are projected onto the relations between the Diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. This presentation is concerned with the stereotype existing among Armenians who live in Armenia, which holds that the western Armenian diaspora has preserved its culinary traditions better than the eastern Armenian diaspora and even those living in the country itself. It also suggests that features of the cuisine of the western Armenian diaspora have been associated by Armenians who live in Armenia with the old pan-Armenian traditions now forgotten by the easterners. The following discussion attempts to address the question of why this stereotype has developed.

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1.   Introduction

In August 2007, I carried out fieldwork in Armenia, which involved conducting interviews on the subject of culinary skills and Armenian identity.[1] I was interested to know what my informants had to say about Armenian cuisine. I hoped that an 'insider's' view of Armenian culture would help me to understand its diversity, and would allow me to encounter a range of regional traditions. It turned out that the Armenians of Armenia were eager to talk not only about the variations of their local culinary traditions, but also about the cuisine of the Diaspora. In this report I shall try to generalise my impressions of that field trip and to answer two questions:

> 1.) How do the Armenians of Armenia ('Hayastants'i') relate to the cuisine of the Diaspora?
>
> 2) What are the reasons for these relations?[2]

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My discussion is made up of three parts; the first focuses on how the Armenian diaspora is imagined by Armenia-based Armenians; the second reviews the existing stereotypes; and the third advances some explanations of how were these stereotypes formed. In conclusion, I will attempt to present the specific features of culinary culture. It should nevertheless be noted that the conclusions forwarded by this paper are of preliminary nature and require further research.

2.   The Armenian Diaspora

The term Diaspora, strictly speaking, refers to all Armenians who live outside of Armenia. Yet today's Armenia is only a small part of the historical territory, that is, traditionally divided into the west and the east as a result of its incorporation into the states of Turkey and Russia respectively, over the centuries.[3] Besides the political division there were also differences of an ethnographic character between the Armenians of the west and the east, plus two distinct literary languages.[4]

The main part of the Diaspora was created following the genocide of 1915-1916, as a result of which most western Armenians were killed and the survivors ended up scattered around the countries of the Near East, western Europe and America (the third and fourth generations are still living there today); this part of the Diaspora is known as spyurk (Armenian colonies overseas), whereas the rest of the Diaspora is known as gaght'avayr/ gałt'avayr (colony/ exile).[5] It can be suggested that, for the people of spyurk, today's Armenia (the eastern part of the historical territory[6]) constitutes more of a symbolic motherland than the actual homeland of their ancestors.[7]

Eastern Armenians migrated mainly within the territory of the Soviet Union, so it can be said that they were, at first, domestic migrants. They became a Diaspora only with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have strong ties with their homeland; there was never an iron curtain to separate them from their relatives. Over the last 20 years, which have witnessed the 1988 earthquake in Armenia, the events in Karabakh, and the economic blockade of Armenia by Azerbaizhan and Turkey, the number of Armenians in the countries of the CIS has increased significantly.[8]

The number of eastern Armenians in western countries is relatively insignificant and there is limited contact between eastern and western Armenians within the diaspora.[9] That said, between 1946 and 1948 around 100,000 western Armenians of the Diaspora returned to Armenia, followed by another 26,000 in 1962-1973. Most of these returnees settled in Yerevan (many in fact returned to America and Europe at a later date).[10] The repatriates to Armenia from different countries – the original western Armenians – formed a sub-ethnic group called akhpar (from akhper, a colloquial term for eghbair, or brother).[11]

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The Armenians living in Georgia cannot be strictly referred to as Diaspora, since Tbilisi has always been a cultural centre for eastern Armenians and Georgia is geographically very close to Armenia and there has been continuous settlement of Armenians across the region. The same can be said about the Armenians of Karabakh – historically Karabakh was once a part of Armenia, and today it is de-facto part of the country. All this shows that the Armenian diaspora is far from homogenous, and that it can be divided into two distinct groups: the western Armenians and the eastern Armenians.[12]

The following discussion is based on the interviews I carried out with Armenians from the Armenia (15), as well as the Armenians of the Russian (5), Lebanese (1), and American (1) diasporas. My key informants also introduced me to more informants. Of the total 22 interviews, 8 of the interviews were individual, and the others were conducted in a group. This report is an attempt to interpret the data I collected from the interviews.

3.   Diaspora Cuisine Stereotypes

During my interviews, the informants constantly compared the recipes of the western Armenia, including those brought back by repatriates, to those of eastern Armenians. In addition to this, my informants said that the Diaspora (the western Armenians) have preserved their traditions, including the culinary ones, much better.

> They [the spyurk] have preserved their cuisine, and I can tell you they generally preserved all Armenian traditions much better. Here [in Armenia] people live on, you see [...] Look, they don't mix, just Armenians with Armenians, they do everything traditionally, the old way, not like us, who have a lot changed here, you know[...][13]

It is interesting, on the one hand, that, in terms of national identity, that the culinary tradition in modern Armenia is prospering. Toomre writes that although the official Soviet policy was opposed to "normal" expressions of "Armenianness", the culinary sphere remained a stronghold of national traditions despite outside influences.[14]

On the other hand, researchers have suggested that the traditions of Diasporas, who exist side-by-side with other ethnicities, are strongly influenced by them (unless the Diaspora settles in complete isolation). There is usually a substantial loss of authenticity to the cuisine, especially among third and fourth generations growing up away from their homeland.[15]

Nonetheless, my informants maintain that the cuisine of the western Armenians of the Diaspora has been preserved better than theirs. They also add that the modern day eastern Armenians living in Russia and the CIS are

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rapidly losing their culinary traditions, and that, in fact, today's Russian Armenians are the 'least real' Armenians.[16] This claim contradicts the fact that about 50 percent of the Armenians living in Russia today is made up of recent migrants and that, according to the information I have collected from Armenians born in Armenia and living in Russia for the past 10-30 years, their culinary traditions are quite stable and play an important role in defining their ethnicity.[17]

The culinary traditions of the western and eastern Armenian diasporas are, in fact, perceived quite differently.[18] The following is an attempt to address the question of why the stereotype has been formed that the western Armenians have preserved their traditions whilst the eastern Armenians are losing theirs and that Armenians of Armenia are somewhere in between.

4.   The Formation of Stereotypes about the Cuisine of the Diaspora

The interaction between the Armenians of Armenia and the Diaspora has led to the formation of the idea that one of the sides is losing their culinary culture whilst the other has preserved it. Eastern Armenians have always maintained contact with members of the Diaspora living in Russia and the CIS, in most cases first or second generation arrivals, who have maintained the same culinary traditions as the Armenians of mainland Armenia today. Yet, the western Armenian diaspora were removed from their homeland as a result of the genocide, and they were also separated from eastern Armenia as by the Iron Curtain. Thus, as the repatriates started arriving in Armenia after the Second World War, an opportunity emerged to compare the various local culinary traditions.[19] It should be pointed out here that the repatriates brought with them recipes that never existed in eastern Armenia, but that nonetheless spread quickly among the local population, resulting in the locals considering them as part of their Armenian tradition.[20]

It can therefore be suggested that the local traditions of the Diaspora, who found itself a part of modern-day Armenian culture were seen as old traditions that, for some reason, had been forgotten by the easterners. In other words, there is an apparent trend to consider everything the western Diaspora has brought back with it an archaic "real thing" or a pan-Armenian tradition. Following the largest wave of repatriates after the Second World War, another wave of ethnic Armenians were repatriated after Armenia became independent from Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. This resulted in an analogous phenomenon; the features of the cuisine of these new arrivals supported the stereotype about the conservativeness of the culinary culture of the Diaspora. My informants repeatedly mentioned that the most conservative traditions are to be found among the Armenians from the Muslim countries, where the majority of Armenians are western, except in Iran.[21]

This idea is also supported by the Diasporas themselves. On one of my trips to Armenia I met a high-ranking member of the clergy, an Armenian from the US, who told me that there was no traditional cuisine in modern day Armenia. Among spyurks this opinion about the loss of local traditions would appear to be widespread.[22] It may be suggested that, having come across a local tradition, the spyurks have assumed that it simply hasn't been preserved properly.

Besides, the Diaspora is very conservative when it comes to changes and innovations, as, for them, cuisine is something static and fixed in the past (members of Diaspora always try to completely preserve culinary practices). Naturally, all changes to culinary traditions are seen to be a result of the Soviet influence, something which is considered to be totally alien to Armenian culture.[23] The opinion of western Armenians can be expressed as follows: 'the Armenians of the spyurk have preserved the traditional Armenian cuisine'. Such an opinion can be understood in the context of the importance, for the Diaspora, of supporting its own identity through the image of themselves as keepers of tradition.[24]

But the local factor is just one explanation for why this stereotype has formed. Among Armenians, there is also the idea of a certain internal hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy are located the western Armenians of the Diaspora, since they suffered from the genocide; the genocide is central to the Armenian self-identity, resulting in its direct victims being located at the top of the hierarchy. Other reasons for such a conclusion are that during the Soviet period, everything western was assumed to be prestigious, and westerners today are financially supporting Armenia, which increases their status in relation to the Armenians of Armenia.

The Armenians of Armenia nevertheless appear to play a secondary role. Their only 'advantage' is that they have permanently inhabited the historic fatherland, a fact which might explain why the role of culinary traditions in their self-identification is less important. When some attributes of ethnicity are lost (like the fatherland in the case of western Armenians) other factors become more important for the expression of ethnic identity; food may thus have become the last bastion of Armenianess, when the Armenians of the Diaspora have forgotten their mother tongue and do not attend the Armenian Apostolic Church etc.[25]

5.   Conclusion

In conclusion I would like to point out that, although it is the stereotype about the preservation of culinary traditions that have distinguished Armenians of the west from those of the east, Armenians living in Armenia have nonetheless included western Armenian meals in their diet along their own "old Armenian" ones, thus making them part of the Armenian identity. Culinary traditions thus appear an interesting area of

study since ideas are being realised by everyday practices, and, in this way, cuisine is different from, say, the attitude to the languages of western and eastern Armenian literature. It turns out that the easterners, despite praising the western Armenian language for being beautiful and closer to ancient Armenian, have not started to use it.[26] And this is true in spite of the fact that the reformation of eastern Armenian spelling for the purposes of drawing it closer to that of western Armenian has been actively discussed in Armenia since the 1980s.[27] This is also indicated by the fact that western Armenians from the Diaspora now hold key positions in the Armenian internal hierarchy.

   In conclusion, I would like to underline that studying the mutual stereotypes of the Diaspora and the 'homeland' allows us understand the relations between these two in the context of problems of identity.

Notes

[1] The collection of data was possible thanks to grants received from the European University at St. Petersburg.

[2] There are many articles devoted to the cuisine of the Diaspora, but there is only one that I know of that has examined the problem of the correlation of the cuisines of the homeland and that of the Diaspora (Y.R. Oum, 'Authenticity and representation: cuisine and identities in Korean-American Diaspora'. *Postcolonial Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, pp. 109 – 125.). This article is about differences in the imagination / construction of national Korean cuisine.

[3] It is common to associate Historical Armenia with the territory of Greater Armenia – the state which once existed on the territory of the Armenian plateau (Eastern Turkey) in II century BC – IV AD. At its peak this territory stretched from the Caspian Sea up to the river Jordan and the Mediterranean coast.

[4] G G Sarkisyan, *Population of Eastern Armenia in XIX – beginning of XX century*, Yerevan, 2002, p. 17 – 19.

[5] L Abrahamian, 'Armenian Diaspora'*, Diaspora*, N 1 / 2, 2000, pp. 60 – 61.

[6] Western Armenians are those who were born or whose ancestors have been born on the territory of Western Armenia.

[7] L Abrahamian, *Armenian Identity in a Changing World* (manuscript). With the exception of those western Armenians whose ancestors have resettled directly on the territory of Eastern Armenia in 19th – beginning of 20th century. The latter were never considered a Diaspora. For more details see: Sarkisyan G.G., *Population of Eastern Armenia in XIX – beginning of XX century*, p. 243.

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[8] In Russia the numbers grew from 532,000 to 1,130,000 between 1989 and 2002, according to Armenians, *Faces of Russia*, information agency 'Rosbalt', viewed on 1 June 2008, http://www.rusnations.ru/etnos/armayn.

[9] The situation has been changing since the collapse of Soviet Union.

[10] A E Ter-Sarkisyants, *Armenians: history, ethnocultural traditions*, Russian Academy of Science, Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1998, p. 34.

[11] L Abrahamian, 'Armenian Diaspora', p. 68.

[12] Unfortunately, the statistics concerning the number of Armenians in the world are rather variable (from 6 to 12 million), but, in any case, the number of Armenians living in Diaspora is greater than the number of Armenians living in Armenia (3 million). The numbers of the western and the eastern Armenian Diasporas are almost identical.

[13] Armenia2007_D_053, see also ArmPetersburg2007_D_001, Armenia2007_D_104, Armenia2007_N_11, 55, 59.

[14] J Toomre, 'Food and National Identity in Soviet Armenia' in *Food in Russian history and culture, M Glants, J. Toomre (eds), Indiana University Press, Bloomington*, Indianapolis, 1997, p. 206.

[15] Y R Oum, 'Authenticity and representation: cuisine and identities in Korean-American Diaspora'. 2005, pp. 109 – 125; Bakalian A., 'Armenian Cuisine' in Bakalian A. *Armenian- Americans: From Being to feeling Armenian,* Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 1993, p. 365.

[16] Armenia2007_D_053

[17] ArmPetersburg_D.

[18] Terms such as Armenian, western Armenian or eastern Armenian cuisines are abstract; they are the result of an outsider's view of the culture, which ignores its internal diversity. This is the way that Armenians living in Armenia see the Diaspora, and vice-versa.

[19] L Abrahamian, *Armenian Identity in a Changing World* (manuscript).

[20] For instance lomadjo, basturma, sudjuk, imam baldy etc.

[21] Armenia2007_N_11, Armenia2007_D_028, 053, 074, 100.

[22] Among my informants there where only two people from the western Armenian Diaspora, but their point of view was shared by other informants with whom I have worked.

[23] There is a parallel here with the cultures of music and dance. Levone Abrahamian, in his unpublished work devoted to Armenian identity, writes that western Armenians have preserved 'classical' dances (which are now taught in special schools), whereas in Armenia an improvisational music style called R'abiz appeared. For more details see: Abrahamian L., *Armenian Identity in a Changing World* (manuscript).

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[24] It is notable that for Diaspora it is common to speak about cuisine in terms of authenticity and cultural and historical continuity (see for instance Holtzman J., 'Food and Memory'. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* № 35, 2006, pp. 361 – 378. Oum Y.R., 'Authenticity and representation: cuisine and identities in Korean-American Diaspora', pp. 109 – 125. Avakian A. V., 'Shish Kebab Armenians?: Food and the Construction and Maintaince of Ethnic and Gender Identities among Armenian American Feminists', in *From Betty Crocker to Feminist Food Studies: Critical Perspectives on Women and Food*, A. V. Avakian, B. Haber (eds.), University of Massachusetts Press, Amberst, Boston, 2005, pp. 257 – 280.). For this reason, it is possible to suggest that the discourse about "real", "authentic" Armenian culture has arrived to Armenia from the Diaspora.

[25] A V Avakian, 'Shish Kebab Armenians?: Food and the Construction and Maintaince of Ethnic and Gender Identities among Armenian American Feminists', pp. 278 - 279.

[26] Armenia2007_N_K

[27] L Abrahamian, *Armenian Identity in a Changing World* (manuscript).

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My Red, Gold and Green Bindi:
The Semiotics of Identity, Authenticity and Ownership in Multicultural Canada

Naki Osutei

Abstract
The title of this paper refers to the hybridisation of symbols traditionally associated with Jamaican (red, green and gold) and Indian (bindi) cultures respectively, an act often construed as a consequence or celebration of multiculturalism. However, the political pre-text that lends itself to this interpretation is, at times, in conflict with the lived experience of multiculturalism. How then can notions of sharing and preserving culture, as suggested in Canada's Multiculturalism policies, be reconciled? Employing cultural and semiotic theories, and highlighting Toronto-based exemplars of this phenomenon, an argument is made for the disengagement of essentialist modes of culture, particularly those which construe skin as a determinant of cultural membership or ownership. The author proceeds to consider how the physical and social relocation of peoples affect how "authentically" culture can be re-produced and re-presented. An understanding of these challenges will figure greatly into negotiations of sharing and preserving cultural symbols. Thus, not only is this study an important contribution to the multiculturalism discourse, it is critical to furthering our understanding of social cohesion and the Canadian identity.

Keywords: Belonging, Canada, cultural hybrids, cultural membership, cultural ownership, cultural preservation, diasporas, multiculturalism, semiotics, Toronto.

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1. Introduction

After almost half a century since Canada re-imagined itself as 'raceless'[1] many of us no longer look at foreign foods with apprehension; instead we now explore opportunities to fuse the myriad available cuisines. Where we once shied away from participating in unfamiliar cultural rituals, many of us seek opportunities to mix and match cultural rites, fulfilling the post-modernist's dream. Yet, amidst this sharing of culture, we maintain ideas of belonging that relate to phenotype. Certain skins are deemed more Canadian, Indian or Jamaican than others. At the same time, rather schizophrenically, our multiculturalism policy pushes us to abandon these essentialist notions and engage in the unknown.

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With an influx of immigrants whose skin is not white, whose religion is not Christianity, we are faced with questions relative to the limits of cultural sharing. Is the Canadian multiculturalism policy a license to borrow cultural symbols at will or is it a legislative device for depicting cultural symbols as sacred for use only by those deemed "members" capable of reproducing culture authentically? How are cultural owners and members identified? Who is responsible for labelling a cultural reproduction authentic? As Canada's biography is shaped, who becomes the "we" in the grand narrative? How does the struggle to both share and preserve culture challenge ideas of belonging?

The title of this paper (which is excerpted from a longer, more comprehensive study) refer to two interrelated aspects of the study: 1) The sharing of cultures that often results in new hybridised re-presentations of cultural symbols; and 2) The case studies used to frame a discussion around the challenges associated with the lived experience of multiculturalism.

The red, gold and green colour combination is found on the flags of many African countries and is usually interpreted as red - the blood of the people, gold - economic wealth and green - lush lands. The link between this colour combination and Jamaica began with Bob Marley's popularisation of Rastafarianism, a religion/philosophy that adopted, among other symbols of traditions, the Haile Selaisse Ethiopian flag and its colours. Marley often performed in, or was otherwise seen wearing these colours. Subsequently, as he grew in popularity and as a symbol of Jamaican-ness, the colours became part of the island's iconography. Likewise, the holy dot or bindi is literally a red dot of make-up typically worn by Hindu girls and women on their foreheads. The term is derived from bindu, the Sanskrit word for a dot or a point. Considered a blessed symbol, a bindi can signify female energy and is believed to protect women and their husbands.[2]

This paper will provide brief overviews of three models of cultural membership, position the skin as an imprecise measure of cultural membership, ownership and authenticity, and using two case studies, examine how these models impact the manner in which we read reproductions of culture outside of the "authentic" space. I will conclude with a summary of how these ideas affect notions of Canadian-ness.

2.   Models of Culture
A.   Culture as Embedded in Ethnicity

Theorists such as Michael Ignatieff and Anthony D. Smith proffer an essentialised view of culture, insisting that cultural symbols and traditions are inextricably linked to a particular ethnicity and a distinct homeland. These symbols and traditions mark the boundaries for non-members and serve to unite members, structuring their relations and activities.[3] Ignatieff, whose writings deal primarily with the Anglo-Franco Canadian question,

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insists these structures (consequences of accidents of birth) are deeply embedded in one's cultural and national identity.[4] Under the essentialised model, only recognised (often through the soma) members of say, the Indian nation, should have access to and can speak for the culture.

B.   Culture as a Way of Life

In *Imagined Communities*, Anderson provides an alternative to culture as ethnically exclusive. He argues, "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined."[5] Membership into a cultural group is based on agreed upon mores and a common imagination, which results in active participation in the community. This collective participation produces a way of life imagined as, for example, Canadian. This model relies heavily on what Margalit and Raz describe as informal acknowledgment of belonging by others generally, and by other members specifically.

C.   Culture as a Disposable Way of Life

Theorist Will Kymlicka describes an ideal society where everyone would be free to choose the life he or she thinks best from a rich array of possibilities offered by the cultural landscape.[6] Kymlicka cites Schwartz who argues that cultural structures provide people with a context of choice but does not believe that people are bound, in a constitutive way, to any particular culture. Cultural membership, much like in the preceding model, is based on participation in a particular landscape, however, social constructionists, like Kymlicka and Foster, take it one step further in situating culture as disposable, with no static membership to speak of; one may participate in one landscape for a moment then discard it and adopt another culture. In this argument, there are no real Others.

3.   Case Studies

Case Study 1: Bollywood Cowboy

Bollywood Cowboy was the 2005 theme for the annual AIDS fundraising gala organised by Fashion Cares and the AIDS Committee of Toronto (ACT). The organisers described it as "Eastern magic meets Western bravado…two colourful cultures collide for one great cause". The promotional materials featured, among several other characters, a woman of fair-hue, nude except for strategically placed crystals. She appeared to be an interpretation of the Hindu god Lakshmi as she sits cross-legged, her four arms moving rhythmically. For all intents and purposes, these characters were symbols and signs read in various ways by event attendees and passersby who may have taken in the adverts. A review of the media coverage revealed several themes related to cultural membership, ownership and authenticity.

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B.   Who Owns Bollywood?

        Critics of Bollywood Cowboy's promotional materials questioned the right of non-Indians to reproduce Indian culture. Opponents alleged that despite the Bollywood theme "South Asians were largely absent from the show…"[7] Tushar Unadkat, owner of a Toronto advertising agency informed the Toronto Star that he was "horrified to see…white models dressed as Krishna and Radha, handing out postcards of Hindu gods and goddesses."[8] Further examination of his grievance reveals that Unadkat maintained an essential imagining of South Asian Hindu-ness wherein skin is a determinant of belonging. In fact, none of the articles reviewed provided an example of a critic who drew the membership line in at a different point.

        The Indian film industry, now known as Bollywood, has been in existence since the dawn of the 20th century. The lack of verbal dialogue was advantageous for some of the industry's earliest big stars including renowned Sulochna. An actress who by all accounts appeared to be an Indian woman, Sulochna was born Ruby Myers to Jewish parents. Heralded the "queen of the silents and the early talkies" she grew to share in and participate in the culture of the Indian people around her; Sulochna identified and was recognised by others as Indian.[9]

        Jews who discover their connection to Bollywood may decide to lay claim on the film genre as a constituent of their culture since one of their own was central to its early development. Upon discovering their roots, the "Indian" offspring of the Jewish actresses (there were many aside from Sulochna), may act on that knowledge and reclaim their Jewish-ness. In this tangled web of culture, where does one's Jewish-ness end and another's Indian-ness begin? Skin is not a fail-proof method of discerning membership and will become even less so in Canada as more people follow Sulochna's example and become active participants in cultures to which they have no blood lineal connection.

        Perhaps Unadkat and others did not rule out the possibility of a white-skinned Hindu, their comments intimate that representation of brown-skinned Indians is important. Their concerns are exacerbated by the threat of cultural co-opting wherein culture is reproduced and those who consider themselves owners are shut out of its presentation.

        The Bollywood Cowboy organisers seem to be employing the third model of culture to very negative consequences. The South Asian communities with whom they are hoping to share cultural symbols are employing what appears to be a rather essential form of culture. However, in their request for further consultation, the South Asian community groups seem willing to accept the fact that once culture enters the public sphere, its symbols become part of the Canadian landscape; however they maintain specific rules couched in syntagmatic (the possible ways signs can be

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combined) and paradigmatic (the narrative, the fiction, the ideology) semiotics.

Barthes' famous example employs fashion to illustrate this difference. Syntagmatic relations were those between different elements of dress that could be worn together, for example, jeans-shirt-jacket, while paradigmatic relations existed between those elements which could not, such as hat-veil-hood.[10] Perhaps the South Asian communities opposed to the campaign would have been content to simply have these relationships adhered to. An understanding of these relations would require participation in the cultural landscape as theorised by Anderson. That said, this line of reasoning maintains the assumption of a particular cultural owner.

C.   On Cultural Ownership

In *Contemporary Political Philosophy* Will Kymlicka offers a position on self-ownership that builds on the property ownership theory offered by Nozick. Nozick argues that property ownership can only come from either legal rights or rights originating from the creation of an object using personal talent. Assuming that the only thing a person can truly own is him or herself, only the creator of that culture can own it.[11] This begs the question: can culture exist in the hands of one person? Eagleton's view of culture suggests " [...]culture is a network of shared meaning…common culture involves the collaborative making of such meanings."[12] The second person, by virtue of their participation, their interpretation of the culture, contributes to its creation. Thus, an individual cannot create culture much less own it. A collective may own culture provided one ascribes to a model of culture that contains a notion of distinguishable membership. This distinction will be vital to the analysis of our cases, especially our review of the Roots Canada campaign.

D.   Case Study 2: Roots Rock Reggae

In April, while the Bollywood Cowboy campaign was experiencing its early backlash, Roots Canada's newest campaign, Roots Rock Reggae, was being presented as a tribute to an over 30-year relationship between "Canada's most famous brand" and the Caribbean's largest English-speaking island. According to their website, Roots founders Don Green and Michael Budman have always been inspired by the island, its culture and "vibe". The campaign featured a collection of outerwear, jackets, sweatshirts and t-shirts, sporting the Jamaican flag and the Jamaican-associated, red, gold and green colour scheme. My Roots Rock Reggae media review presented several themes, however I will focus on those related to readings of the Roots Canada brand.

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E.   Designing Authenticity

Roots Canada went to great lengths to present their brand as authentic and utilised the cultural participation model as a measure. The articles related to the campaign consistently referred to the relationship Roots founders have held with Jamaica and its celebrity contingent. Roots Canada also employed a second tactic to demonstrate their authenticity. Unlike the Bollywood Cowboy campaign, the advertisements for the Roots Rock Reggae line feature a full-frame shot of a woman who could be identified as Black. Supporting the new line were a series of fashion shows and parties where models who could be identified as Black strolled up and down the catwalk wearing t-shirts with "Jamaica" emblazoned on the front and "Roots" on the back, and a replica of the Jamaican flag and on the breastplate. At the official launch of the line, Roots Canada enlisted the assistance of Toronto-based Ritz Caribbean restaurant, reggae DJs and recording artists and invited Jamaican Consul General Vivian Betton and members of the Jamaican Tourism Board. It may be argued that Roots wanted to ensure that people attending or reading about that event would view it as authentic because they would read the black bodies as authentically Jamaican and thus transfer that authenticity to the Roots Rock Reggae campaign. Yet, like the Sulochna, the skin is not the final determinant of cultural membership, as the story of Chris Blackwell will tell.

A blonde haired, blue-eyed boy born to an English father and a Sephardic Jewish Jamaican mother in Jamaica spends his formative years "finding himself" through odd jobs. Upon meeting his mother's friend Ian Fleming (creator of the James Bond series) stationed in Jamaica while filming the 1962 Bond film Dr. No, the young man considers a career in the entertainment industry. In 1964, now a music producer, he has his first bona fide hit with a sixteen year-old Millicent Small who became internationally renowned with the song "My Boy Lollipop" produced by his Island Records label. The gentleman in question is Chris Blackwell who went on to sign Bob Marley, the Maytals and the Skatalites to his label.[13] Chris Blackwell with his fair-skin, straight hair and light-coloured eyes does not fit the some essential definitions of a Jamaican but would, at least at that point in his life, self-identify as Jamaican. Blackwell's story is not an anomaly yet knowledge of Jamaica's full spectrum of phenotypes does not assuage the Jamaicans-as-black-skinned-people theories. In fact Roots Canada employs this to assure their campaign is read as authentic.

F.   Reading Roots Rock Reggae

Roots Canada appeared to be aware of the struggle to share and preserve culture and walked the line between the various models of culture. In ensuring the presence of Black bodies in the campaign and subsequent promotional events, they were recognising that people still read Jamaican-

ness as Black skin. However, in sharing in the Jamaican culture for over thirty years, they demonstrated a sustained participation that could, using Anderson's theory, identify the founders as members. Lastly if we present Roots Canada as a Canadian institution, as representing itself with the image of a Black woman with the Jamaican flag as an emblem on her clothes, we may be attempting to demonstrate that within the Roots-imagination of Canada, anyone can be Canadian. The question then begs, does that imagination go beyond Roots Canada and into general Canadian consciousness; can anyone truly be read as Canadian?

4.   Institutions as Purveyors of Culture

Claiming that all sense of nationhood is narrativised, Bhabha argues that institutions, including those that produce and maintain a specific narrative, are critical to manufacturing and preserving a culture across generations. He refers to such "authenticating cultural canons" or national objects of knowledge – "Tradition, People, the Reason of State, High Culture" - as the means by which a nation is scripted and perpetuates its own image.[14] Institutions such Roots Canada and the ACT play a similar role. Recognising that opposition to said institutions exists, Bhabha reminds us of the recesses of national culture from which alternative constituencies emerge and create their own meanings. These recesses are the sites of tension, the in-between spaces "through which the meanings of cultural and political authority are negotiated."[15]

If the ACT, a long-standing Canadian organisation (founded in 1983), can be viewed as an institution, the press conference held by the Alliance for South Asian AIDS Prevention is one such recess. The attendees of the press conference used that venue to investigate their role in perpetuating what they would consider authentic representations of their culture. However, would their Alliance be considered an institution associated with national life and culture? There are a few ways of responding to this question. First, we can relegate the Alliance to the private sphere and suggest that their quest for justice, related to their representation, is in vain. ACT's role is to bolster a national image and perhaps that image is one that fuses cultural symbols into a new imagining of Canada. The members of the Alliance and other opponents of Bollywood Cowboy may need to be content with the opportunity to create private institutions that will be responsible for perpetuating the kinds of images they deem authentic.

Another response to the above question is to suggest that the Alliance is part of a national narrative and that promoting an accurate representation of Bollywood and South Asian cultures broadly speaking, is the responsibility of all institutions. However, if one accepts this response, it follows that we would have to find an authentic rendering of South Asian

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culture that all who identify as such could agree upon. As we have seen, this does not appear to be possible.

The case studies themselves fall into what Bhabha refers to as the in-between spaces as they resulted in new struggles for understanding. Over time, these struggles for ownership, membership and the quest for authenticity may become non-issues as people resign the notion of ownership and create new forms of measuring authenticity; forms that reflect their presence in a new "inauthentic" land.

5.   Conclusion

Canadian multiculturalism proposes that Canada is a place where one may chose who he or she wishes to be rather than be imprisoned by the soma. The lived experience however, illustrates a post-modern thought caged within a modernist script. If we believe we are a nation of minorities who desire to live in a land where all peoples are recognised and included, this means bringing our whole selves (our cultures and symbols) into the public sphere at one point or another. In course of doing so, these symbols become open source to institutions attempting to include newer cultures and enjoy economic gains by employing newly marketable symbols. Though the joy of having one's culture recognised as part of the Canadian landscape is undeniable yet so too is the pain of seeing one's culture represented in a manner that one might conceive of as degrading. This threat leaves some retreating to the safety of cultural enclaves, providing ammunition to multiculturalism opponents who argue it encourages self- segregation. Hence we return to the paradox: the very things required to share culture inhibit its preservation.

So then how can we move forward? At the time of writing, CBC Television, a national public broadcaster, has premiered a new television program, *Little Mosque on the Prairie*. The show revolves around a small Muslim community in the fictional prairie town Mercy, their wary non-Muslim neighbours and the comedic conflict between orthodox and moderate Muslims. Like the Bollywood Cowboy and Roots Rock Reggae examples, the show presents a new Canadian imagining and while some Muslims have already expressed distaste with the program's portrayal, we cannot disregard the importance of efforts like this to the narration of this nation. All of these symbols, the bindi, the red, gold, green colour combination, and the mosque must become part of the Canadian landscape and should be available to all people, with one caveat: new "users" should make an effort to understand the systems of connotation traditionally linked to these symbols. New "users" may not necessarily adhere to them but an understanding of the systems historically linked to them will assist and prepare them for reactions from the recognised "membership".

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This paper has explored the primary arguments for the conditions required for sharing, hybridising and preserving culture, both long-established and recently introduced. To borrow a Marxian term, Canada can be a site of "cultural liberty"[16] if, as Nozick argues, we abandon the notion that cultures can be owned by one particular person and agree to make cultural symbols, regardless of their assumed origin, available to all peoples. Second, trading essential renderings of culture for a model of culture where membership can be established vis à vis participation in the imagined community is vital. This is important for cultural communities who may find it difficult to recognise members who do not meet skin colour requirements; this challenge is presented to "new" and "old" Canadians alike. Third, quests for authenticity that harken back to the "homeland" must be abandoned for the environment and institutions mandated to support and perpetuate these "authentic" presentations of culture, may not be available in Canada's public sphere. Furthermore, the case studies and anecdotes illustrate how futile the search for authenticity can be due to the degree of variation within cultural communities and the fact that supposedly reliable mechanisms such as the soma, do not tell the full story of culture.

Finally, to answer the question of whether cultures can be both shared and preserved, I will take a cue from Bhabha. Cultures themselves cannot be preserved as they are constantly edited by participants, however, we can preserve histories. If we are able to preserve the histories of all peoples, both in our personal locations of knowledge and in our national narratives, we begin to fulfil the promise of multiculturalism and again I refer to Foster who optimistically writes …"in the end, all members of society will be sharing Canada's culture of sharing. This will be their main identity."[17]

Notes

[1] This discussion can be found in C Foster, *Where Race Does Not Matter,* Penguin Canada, Toronto, 2005 pp. 1-56.

[2] K Kamat, 'Great Indian Forehead Decoration' in Kamat's Potpourri, viewed on October 25, 2005 <http://www.kamat.com/kalranga/women/bindi.htm.>.

[3] A Smith, 'The Rise of Nations', In *Nationalism*, J Hutchinson and A D Smith (eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 168.

[4] M Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, BBC Books, London, 1993.

[5] B Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, New York, 1991, p.6.

[6] For a fulsome discussion see W Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy.* Oxford University Press., New York, 2002.

[7] P Yelaja, 'For Hindus, it's fashion careless'. *Toronto Star*, June 9, 2005, p. B2.

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[8] P Yelaja, 'Hindu community cites 'callous disregard'', *Toronto Star*, July 1, 2005, B7.

[9] D Raheja and J Kothari, *Indian Cinema: The Bollywood Saga*, Roli Books, New Dehli, 2004, p. 12.

[10] R Barthes, *The Semiotic Challenge*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1988, p. 211.

[11] Even the idea of culture is problematic for Nozick for culture involves a joint ownership and as a libertarian, Nozick privileges only individual orientations.

[12] T Eagleton, *The Idea of Culture*, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts, 2000 p. 119.

[13] T Pryor, 'Guest DJ: Chris Blackwell. The man who discovered Bob Marley' in *National Geographic World Music*, viewed on October 14, 2005 <http://worldmusic.nationalgeographic.com>.

[14] This discussion can be found in H Bhabha, 'Introduction: narrating the nation'. In *Nation and Narration*, H Bhabha (ed), Routeledge, New York, 1990.

[15] ibid.

[16] This discussion can be found at K Marx, 'The Jewish Question'. In *Identities: Race, Class, Gender and Nationality*, L M Alcoff and E Mendieta (eds), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Oxford, 2003, pp.17-28.

[17] Foster, *Where Race Does Not Matter,* p. 173.

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Section III

Diaspora - Performances and the Imaginary

Border-crossing Witnesses:
Life Narrative as Testimony in the Tibetan Diaspora

Julie Fletcher

Abstract

The Tibetan diaspora consists of the approximately 130,000 Tibetans who have fled, and continue to flee, their homeland since its occupation in the 1950s by Chinese forces. Since the beginning of the Tibetan diaspora in 1959, English language life narratives - ranging from personal oral accounts to full-length autobiographical texts - have emerged as a central form of literary, cultural, and political practice. In this development, personal stories have become increasingly gathered, translated, produced, published and disseminated transnationally, frequently as part of the political and rights-based activities of the Tibetan independence movement. The post-World War Two period has been described as the age of testimony, where, according to Felman and Laub, testimony has become the literary mode par excellence.[1] This same period has been characterised as the "third age" of human rights, with institutional frameworks emerging for the hearing of the rights claims of individuals and peoples against state actors.[2] At the same time, in recent years, an increasing number of scholars have begun to examine the "conjunctions" between the telling of (life) stories, and global human rights movements and claims.[3] This paper examines the emergence of modern Tibetan testimonial literature and practices, considering the ways in which the Tibetan experience of diaspora, occurring during this Post-War period, has given rise to the development of Tibetan testimony. In and through diaspora, Tibetan refugees have been exposed to modern rights-based political concepts and practices. The liminal spaces of exile have produced contact zones for the formation of important relationships of collaboration between Tibetans and non-Tibetans, and given rise to key acts of border-crossing witnessing and testimony central to the emergence of this form of literary, cultural, political and juridical practice within Tibetan refugee communities.

Keywords: Diaspora, political action, refugees, social movement, testimony, Tibet, witnessing.

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1.   Difficult crossings

In April 1959, following an unsuccessful popular uprising in March in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, the young Dalai Lama crossed the Indo-

Tibetan border to seek asylum in India. He was followed soon after by 80,000 Tibetan refugees. This iconic border-crossing stands as a key symbol and marker of the beginning of the Tibetan diaspora, and a refugee flow that continues to the present. Forty-eight years later, in September 2006, a group of international mountain climbers witnessed, filmed and photographed Chinese border troops open fire upon a line of Tibetan refugees attempting to escape across the Nangpa-La Pass into Nepal, killing two Tibetans. Those killed, Kalsang Namtso, a seventeen year old nun, and Kunsang Namgyal, a twenty year old man, were among a group of young Tibetans, including a number of children, escaping across the glaciated high Himalayan pass that marks the border between Tibet and Nepal.[4] The route the Tibetans take across Nangpa La passes near the advanced base camp of Cho Oyu, a significant Himalayan mountaineering destination. While international mountaineers frequently encounter groups of Tibetans crossing the border, it is rare for them to witness Tibetan refugees being gunned down by border patrols. Within days, first-person witness accounts and photographs of this "dangerous crossing", sent out from Cho Oyu advanced base camp via satellite mobile phone technology, were circulating in world media. Witnessing in this way is a difficult act. The mountaineers involved were "interviewed" by the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu; many did not speak out until they had left the region; those who did attempted to maintain their anonymity to protect others still in the Himalaya, and preserve their chances of being granted future climbing permits.[5]

This border crossing speaks of a number of key things about the contemporary Tibetan situation. Firstly, it highlights the reality that Tibetans are still crossing the border at a rate of a few thousand a year to seek lives as refugees in the diaspora, a simple fact that challenges the legitimacy of Chinese rule in and "ownership" of Tibet each time it occurs. It also speaks of the state-sanctioned and justified use of lethal violence against innocents. Importantly in terms of this paper, the Nangpa-la incident highlights the significance of human rights-based witnessing across borders, and the role of the foreign witness, in the modern Tibetan situation. In the face of multiple and powerful forms of silencing employed by the Chinese state, Tibetans in the diaspora have successfully developed transnational testimonial narrative practices that are able to evade this silencing and breach China's political taboos surrounding the issue of Tibet.

One of the circulated photographic images of the Nangpa-la incident shows an expanse of snow across the glacier, a deep track through that snow, and two dark shapes in the snow, some distance apart. The larger of these is the body of the young teenage nun; the other is her small bag of belongings. This image of the maroon-robed body in the snow evokes an important form of what Robert Barnett calls "embodied politics" emerging in Tibet since the late 1980s, that has strong links with testimonial and witnessing practices in

the diaspora.[6] In the last few decades, Tibetan nuns have become central figures of resistance in Tibet, through their engagement in non-violent political protests in Lhasa. This political action has only become known to the world through a range of border-crossing accounts: smuggled stories and tapes, the witness accounts of foreign travellers, and the testimonies of refugees who have escaped into India. In significant ways, border-crossing testimony has become the complement, and diasporic counterpart, of this embodied politics within Tibet.

2.   Life Narrative in the Diaspora

The Tibetan diaspora consists of the approximately 130,000 Tibetans who have fled, and continue to flee, their homeland since its occupation in the 1950s by Chinese forces. While a small number of Tibetan refugees have been resettled in the West, most remain in South Asian camps and settlements primarily in the Himalayan regions of India and Nepal, and in the south of India. These settlements are administered by the Central Tibetan Administration or "government in exile", based in Dharamsala, a small former British hill station in the remote northern Indian Himalayan state of Himachal Pradesh. For the government in exile, beyond providing for the immediate and longer term needs of the community, the primary goals have been the preservation of Tibetan culture, and an ultimate return to a self-determined Tibet.

Since the beginning of the diaspora, English language life narratives - ranging from personal oral accounts to full-length autobiographical texts - have emerged as an important form of cultural, literary, and political practice. In this development, personal stories have become increasingly gathered, translated, produced, published and disseminated transnationally, often as part of the political and rights-based activities of the Tibetan independence movement. These various "narratives of marginal experience" have become a central means by which Tibetan refugees speak to outsiders of the situation within Tibet.[7]

The Tibetan literary corpus includes a well developed auto/biographical tradition. While sharing some continuity with the traditional practice, life story telling in exile has taken a very different, testimonial and contestatory turn. These narrative practices breach the multiple forms of silencing imposed by the Chinese occupation, to reclaim Tibetan voice, narrate the collective and national experience, and make human rights and political claims internationally and transnationally. For political philosopher Hannah Arendt, political power (as opposed to force, might, or violence) arises between people acting in concert, in public. In what follows I will outline the ways in which members of the very small Tibetan diasporic community have "acted in concert" in the formation of various government in exile and non government institutions engaged in the

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production and circulation of testimonial narrative accounts, in the small
Himalayan settlement that has become the symbolic capital of the diaspora,
known as "little Lhasa in exile". These developments have enabled a small
community of refugees to utilise what Jan Magnusson refers to as the
culturally-based "soft power resources" of the Tibetan community, to counter
the might of the PRC in a discursive "contestation of representations".[8]
Increasingly, the human rights paradigm has offered possibilities for this
narration as well as an interpretive framework within which this can be
understood.

3.   Testimony and Human Rights
Testimonial narrative is a particular kind of life-story telling: a
collective and politicised form that presents "narratives of marginal
experience" across cultural (or other) boundaries, with the implicit or explicit
aim of generating recognition of rights violations, political injustices,
atrocities and suffering, and in the hope of achieving rights-based,
normatively grounded political outcomes.[9] This form of narrative practice has
drawn increasing academic attention in recent years, primarily within literary
and cultural studies, but also increasingly within the social sciences.

The post-World War Two period has been described Felman and
Laub as "the age of testimony".[10] This same period has been characterised by
Geoffrey Robertson as the "third age" of human rights, where institutional
frameworks have emerged for the hearing of the rights claims of individuals
and peoples against state actors.[11] At the same time, in recent years, scholars
have begun to examine what Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith refer to as the
"conjunctions" between the telling of (life) stories, and global human rights
movements and claims.[12] These scholars examine the ways that diverse life
narratives are deployed in a range of formal and informal venues, making
rights claims that call forth an "ethics of recognition" and a politics of
response. At the same time, while the human rights system remains an
incomplete project of modernity, testimonial practices can be seen to emerge
in the gap – the disjunctions – between established political norms of right
and justice, and the actual lived experiences of people in diverse national and
international situations. In this, testimonial accounts, as both evidentiary and
contestatory, are mobilised to speak not only against atrocities and violations,
but also speak to the normative system of laws and rights "in the world".

4.   Tibetan Testimonial Practices
In the Tibetan diaspora, the decades of exile have given rise to the
development of a wide range of testimonial texts and practices, including
first-person performed testimony in formal and informal settings, brief
published testimony in pamphlets, newspapers and other small publications,
as well as larger collections of testimony, oral history projects, museum

display, photographic archives, film and documentary, electronic web-based testimonial forms, and full length auto/biographical texts. These practices have emerged in situations of contact, and frequently collaboration, with foreigners. In the diaspora, encounters with "others" have produced the need for a means by which the Tibetan community can translate their experiences across linguistic, cultural, experiential and geographical boundaries, in order to "tell the world" of their situation. Further, these encounters have increasingly engaged foreigners in relationships and networks of witnessing that speak, in contestatory and evidentiary ways, to those aspects of the modern Tibetan situation that are hidden, erased, silenced or contested. The following discussion briefly traces the development of what Schaffer and Smith refer to as the "networks and meshworks" of action and advocacy engaged in rights-based "fact finding in the field" relating to the production and circulation of brief forms of testimony in the Tibetan diaspora.[13] These practices have become central to modern forms of political action in the Tibetan diaspora. While they have gained increasing prominence since the 1980s, these practices emerged at the outset of the diaspora.

The gathering, translation, publication and dissemination of Tibetan refugee testimonies began in the early camps of 1959 and 1960. As refugees were still arriving into the tent camps along the Indo-Tibetan border, members of the Tibetan community became engaged in human rights "fact-finding in the field" gathering the first-person accounts of the experiences of recently arrived refugees.[14] These accounts were translated, collated and provided to the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), to form the basis of this organisation's 1959 and 1960 reports on the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet.

Following the publication of the ICJ reports, the Tibetan "government-in-exile" continued these practices. Offices of Tibet were established in Geneva and New York, and the Information and Publicity Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama was created in Dharamsala. An important function of this office was to continue the "fact-finding in the field" activities, gathering the first-person accounts of newly arrived refugees, translating, publishing, and circulating them, via the Offices of Tibet, to the UN, world media, political leaders, and interested members of the international legal community.[15]

In subsequent decades, this government activity has been supplemented by the testimonial work of emerging Tibetan NGOs. The first of these, the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), emerged in the 1970s as a radicalised (but loyally oppositional) political force within the refugee community. Influenced by secular educations received in exile, Indian political traditions, and the global youth and political culture of the 1960s and 1970s encountered in the Indian Himalaya through friendships with foreign travellers, the young Tibetan members of TYC became engaged in the

publishing of Tibetan refugee narratives for dissemination within the transnational public realm in a "new social movement" style of activity. The Tibetan Women's Association (TWA) was formed soon after, and like the Youth Congress, also became involved in the production of testimonial publications. These publications, often produced with the collaborative assistance of young foreign volunteers, include collections of testimony, pamphlets, and human rights reports based upon first person testimony.

In the late 1980s, a second wave of major Tibetan resistance occurred in Lhasa, centred upon the protests of monks from the major monasteries, and the non-violent public protests of nuns (as mentioned above). These were followed by brutal crackdown and a wave of arrests, imprisonments and tortures. Significantly however, both the initial protests and the state response were witnessed by a number of independent foreign travellers who, caught up in the crisis, spontaneously organised a network for the gathering and dissemination of evidentiary material from within Tibet.[16]

The second uprising, and its paradigmatic witnessing, had a marked impact on testimonial production in the diaspora. Following this, a particular focus of TWA's testimonial activity became the protest activities, political imprisonments, torture and human rights abuses of nuns and laywomen in Tibet. By the 1990s, two more NGOs: Gu-Chu-Sum Organisation of Former Political Prisoners, and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), had emerged and become engaged in the testimonial production in Dharamsala. Gu-Chu-Sum produces some publications, but most importantly arranges speaking events for former political prisoners. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) is engaged in professionalised full time human rights fact-finding, publication and advocacy, utilising formal UN avenues for appeal wherever possible, replacing the former Human Rights Desk of the "Government" Department of Information and International Relations.

This same period saw the spread of "Tibet Support Groups", international advocacy organisations operating on "new social movement" lines. These groups serve as global outlets for the transnational circulation of Dharamsala publications, as well as sponsoring and organising activities such as speaking tours of former political prisoners. At the same time, the Tibet Information Network (TIN) was formed by some of the foreign travellers who had witnessed the 1987 protests. Until recently this organisation engaged in highly professionalised gathering, verification, compilation and publication of witness, testimonial, and documentary material relating to the situation in Tibet. TIN produced its own reports and publications, in print and electronic form, as well as providing the Tibetan NGOs with testimonial and other evidentiary material.

From the mid 1990s onward, there has been an exponential growth in life narrative practices in Dharamsala and the diaspora, from first-person

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"post-torture" performed testimony (in formal and informal settings), publications, museum display, film and documentary, electronic web-based testimonial forms, and full length auto/biographical texts. At the same time, an informal "culture of telling" has developed on the streets of Dharamsala. Tibetans met on the streets or in tea shops will tell their own, or the collective story, to foreigners. For young Tibetans in the diaspora, "telling the true story of Tibet" to outsiders is seen as a form of patriotic - political - activity that they can engage in within the constraints of exile.[17]

5.   Witnessing Across Borders

In the diaspora, encountering "others" has set in motion the need to find a form within which Tibetan experiences and claims can be communicated internationally and transnationally; within which Tibetans can speak not to Nangpa - insiders, "one of us" – but to outsiders. Increasingly, the human rights paradigm has provided opportunities and forms for this narration. In and through diaspora, Tibetan refugees have been exposed to, and become skilled at utilising, modern rights-based political concepts and practices. Encountering others has also given rise to relationships of collaboration with those able to serve as intermediaries between cultural, experiential and linguistic worlds, and produce texts capable of crossing multiple borders.

Testimony is a "border crossing" genre that attempts to convey, however partially, provisionally, and imperfectly, the experiences of those inside a situation, to those outside. In the Tibetan diaspora, testimonial practices have emerged as central forms of political action that can be seen as the complement and counterpart of the "embodied politics" occurring within Tibet. Transnationally circulated testimony is a form able to evade and breach the silencing that can occur at national and international levels, in order to engage "others" in relationships of witnessing. As the Nangpa-la incident shows, the role of the foreign witness, whether in the first-person or through the considerable textual archive, remains a significant one in the transnational Tibetan struggle.

Notes

[1] S Felman and D Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, Routledge, New York, 1992.
[2] G Robertson QC, QC. *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice,* Penguin, London, 2002, p.xxxiii.
[3] K Schaffer and S Smith, *Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004.

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[4] T Choephel, "Nangpa La Shooting – first mountaineers reporter's eye witness account", Phayul – Tibet News, 2006. Retrieved 17th June 2008, <http://www.phayul.com/news/tools/print.aspx?id=14227&t=1>

[5] Ibid.

[6] R Barnett, "Women and Politics in Contemporary Tibet" in Gyatso, J., and H. Havnevik (eds) *Women In Tibet*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, pp285-366.

[7] S Stone-Mediatore, *Reading Across Borders: Storytelling and Knowledges of Resistance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.

[8] J Magnusson, "A Myth of Tibet: Reverse Orientalism and Soft Power" in P. Christiaan Klieger, (ed) *Tibet, Self, and the Tibetan Diaspora: Voices of Difference*, PIATS 2000: Tibetan Studies: proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000. Brill, Leiden, 2002, pp. 195-212.

[9] Stone-Mediatore op cit.

[10] S Felman and D Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, Routledge, New York, 1992.

[11] G Robertson, op. cit., p.xxxiii.

[12] K Schaffer and S. Smith, op. cit.

[13] ibid

[14] ibid

[15] For an example see Information and Publicity Office, 1976.

[16] These were a group of young professionals of various nationalities, including a journalist, a doctor, and a social scientist, with some background in human rights work. Aware of the constraints of human rights fact-finding, they were careful from the outset to maintain independence and objectivity.

[17] P. C. Klieger, "Engendering Tibet: Power, Self and Change in the Diaspora," in P. Christiaan Klieger (ed) *Tibet, Self and the Tibetan Diaspora: Voices of Difference*, PIATS 2000 Tibetan Studies Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000. Brill, Leiden, 2002, pp.139-154.

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Securing Justice for Economic Refugees Through Unionisation

Mitch Avila and Edgar M. Medina

Abstract

In this paper we argue that unions are a pragmatic and practical response to moral and economic problems posed by forced economic emigration and the resulting diaspora. From the point of view of justice, undocumented international migrant labour is unjust because of routine human rights violations, the absence of effective means of legal representation, the prevalence of dangerous and exploitive working conditions, and the absence of democratic participation. In short, while reasonable citizens extend fair terms of cooperation to all members of society, undocumented workers are normally excluded from institutional structures that secure reciprocity and fairness. From the point of view of economic efficiency, undocumented labour externalises costs (such as job safety, health care, retirement, family support, and social safety nets) onto competing host country firms and onto the home country's social network. We demonstrate that these concerns can be addressed in a morally defensible and economically efficient manner by (a) legally authorising union membership for any persons, foreign or national, independent of citizenship in host country, and by (b) legally authorising employment of any union member regardless of citizenship. Essentially, we are proposing replacing 'labour contractors' and 'guest worker programs' with 'international unions'. Unions would provide a practical and pragmatic means of redressing the most serious problems of undocumented labour, acting as a democratic representative, providing legal protection, and securing just compensation, health care, and retirement. Union interests are also advanced insofar as membership will grow and unions prosper when they pursue social justice broadly defined (as opposed to merely the membership's financial interests). While argued for in the context of the vast Central American diaspora in the United States and the corresponding undocumented labour market, we propose this as a useful strategy for any host country seeking to treat forced economic refugees justly.

Keywords: Economic refugees, Mexico, political liberalism, unauthorised immigration, undocumented workers, unions.

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1.   Introduction

What do peoples who value reciprocity, fairness, and equality owe to economic refugees? In this paper, we address this problem from two standpoints: from the standpoint of normative political theory and from the standpoint of offering a practical and pragmatic response to the immense Central American diaspora in the United States, specifically in Southern California. As a project in normative theory, we advocate for the superiority of Political Liberalism as a theory of international justice over the competing views including human rights positivism and 'cosmopolitanism'.[1] As a project in applied political theory, we argue that unions are a pragmatic and practical response to moral and economic problems posed by forced economic emigration.

2.   Normative Framework

Refugees, whether political or economic, pose a special problem for theories of global justice because by definition refugees lack traditional rights associated with citizenship and yet their status clearly results from injustice and thus falls within the scope of normative political theory. While time limits our ability to explain in detail why we believe it to be the case, we advocate for what is called 'political liberalism' as a fully-adequate, normative theory of global justice. Rawls is the leading representative of political liberalism, although we mean any theory of political justice that values fairness and reciprocity in a context of personal liberty. Unlike human rights and cosmopolitan approaches to global justice, which typically characterise justice as a relation between individual persons, political liberalism conceptualises global justice as a matter between 'peoples', which is an honorific term referring to minimally just societies, one that is meant to avoid the historical connotations of the terms 'nation' and 'state'. Rawls distinguished between two kinds of peoples, liberal and decent peoples, a distinction that is relevant to our normative framework. Essentially, both liberal and decent peoples (1) do not have aggressive aims and respect the independence of other peoples and (2) have a developed sense of domestic justice, although only liberal peoples have a fully developed conception of justice.[2] A so-called 'reasonable liberal people' values reciprocity and extends fair terms of cooperation to all citizens and thus, on the one hand, secures basic rights and liberties, including the fair equality of political liberties, for all, while, on the other hand, structuring its background institutions to guarantee fair equality of opportunity while maximising the status of the least advantaged members of society.

Reframing our primary question, we now ask, 'What do liberal peoples, who value reciprocity and fairness, owe to economic and political refugees within their borders?'[3] Our response depends on what we call the Principle of Minimal Reciprocity:

> In situations that fall outside the scope of ideal theory, liberal peoples are obligated to act both domestically and internationally according to the minimum standards they otherwise expect of decent peoples.

In short, we begin by asking what a liberal people can reasonably and minimally expect of non-liberal, but decent, peoples, and then hold ourselves to that standard. This provides us a principled way of determining minimal political obligations. In general, this includes at the very least what Rawls called a 'decent scheme of political and social cooperation'[4] comprised of: (1) an independent legal system guided by a common good idea of justice, that is, one that takes the fundamental interests of all members of society; (2) respect for basic liberties, which includes freedom from serfdom and slavery and the right to personal property; and (3) institutional structures that insure representation through consultative procedures.[5] (We have argued for this elsewhere and won't repeat that argument in this context.)

3.   The Central American Diaspora

So what do liberal peoples owe economic refugees? To bring the argument down from the realms of abstraction, we consider this question within the context of the vast Central American diaspora now residing in the United States. The size and scope of this diaspora community is truly stunning. As of March 2007, there were approximately 11.3 million undocumented immigrants living in the US, an increase of at least four million since 2000.[6] Of this population, approximately 57% are from Mexico and another 11% from other Central American countries, constituting 6.4 million and 1.2 million persons respectively. (The rest of Latin American contributes ~1.3 million or a total Latin American diaspora in the US of 8.9 million). Overall, close to 80% of all unauthorised immigrants in the US are Mexican or Latin American.[7] California alone has 2.8 million undocumented immigrants and one third of those reside in Los Angeles County, where approximately one in every ten inhabitants and one in seven members of the workforce are an undocumented immigrants. Each year since 2000, ~575,000 Mexico immigrants have entered the US and of these, ~485,000 (85%) are undocumented. As a result, approximately one of every eleven Mexicans[8] now resides in the US, half of them without documentation. By 2050, estimates are that 39 million Mexicans or their direct-descendents will reside in the US, 30% of the total Mexican population of 130 million (or 1 in every 3.3 Mexicans).[9]

3A.   Employment Characteristics

Not surprisingly, undocumented workers tend to be over-represented in fields that do not require advanced training or education. These include

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construction, manufacturing, and leisure and hospitality. In some sectors, the numbers are staggering. Of the total US population, 27% of all drywall installers, 25% of butchers, 22% of cement masons; 23% of agricultural workers, 24% of dishwashers, 22% of maids, and 26% of gardeners are undocumented. Because so much of the undocumented population is centred in a few states and localities, such as Southern California, the percentages in these regions are substantially higher.[10]

4.   Justice for Economic Refugees

In the popular mind, economic refugees from Central America are both 'illegal' and 'alien'. We reject this view and ask instead 'What does justice require for economic refugees?'

From the point of view of political liberalism and a liberal people, economic refugees from Central America in the US raise the following considerations. First, there is the absence of democratic representation or even the minimum, consultative institutions capable of representing their interests. Second, although these workers participate in the social pattern of cooperation that produces wealth, their wages and working conditions fall below minimally acceptable standards.[11] This is especially true for unauthorised women; for example, in Los Angeles County, unauthorised women workers earn a per capita income of about $7,630, only 46% earned by their male counterparts,[12] although they do benefit from some public goods, such as policing, the transportation infrastructure, and so forth.[13] Third, these individuals have only an extra-legal, informal status as moral persons. This can be seen from their inability to use such basic services as banking (including checking accounts and credit accounts), difficulty in obtaining government issued identification (including social security numbers and drivers licenses), and inability to file tax returns.[14] In short, they have insufficient legal standing, failing to reach the minimum liberal peoples expect of decent societies. Fourth, they encounter inordinate difficulty in exercising autonomy and freedom in their personal lives. It is difficult to freely structure their family lives according to their own interests and there are many obstacles to personal property ownership. Fifth, labour performed by undocumented workers is below market wages precisely because many of the associated costs are externalised. For example the cost of health care is born by the general public, the costs of education by the host country, and so forth. Not only is this economically inefficient (failing to create a market where wages are reflective of actual cost), it is violates a liberal peoples commitment to fairness since it allows some persons—those willing to purchase labour from the informal labour market—to benefit at the expense of others.[15]

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4A.   Possible Responses

        Before presenting our proposed solution, we want to reject two
alternative solutions. First, economic refugees in the US, especially in
Southern California, cannot be simply returned to their home country. Not
only are the costs exorbitant, but it is also unlikely to prove effective in the
long term since control of the US-Mexico border has thus far proved
extremely difficult. Such a policy would also be socially divisive, especially
given the number of undocumented workers in the US who are from mixed
families. Moreover, a liberal people recognises the duty of assistance and
hospitality, and if it is fair to characterise the Central American diaspora as
economic refugees, then it is simply unconscionable to return them. Second,
nor is it reasonable to simply give legal status to all undocumented workers
(i.e., give them work visas). This would neither stem the flow of future
economic refugees nor automatically improve working conditions. The
greatest advantage of this policy is that it would give these workers legal
status, allowing them access to banking and the legal system for example.
But the social costs would be high, as would the economic costs. Moreover,
past attempts to do this, including the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act, 'did not change long-term patterns of undocumented immigration from
Mexico.'[16]

4B.   A Reasonably Just Response

        We believe that unions provide a practical and morally defensible
means of fairly treating economic refugees. In the particular case at hand, we
propose the following policy.

        1) Unions in the countries who host or are likely to host
        economic refugees should be given the legal authority to
        include in their membership citizens of any country that is
        economically burdened and whose citizens are or likely to
        become economic refugees in the host country.

        2) Legal authority should be given to hire any union
        member regardless of that member's citizenship or visa
        status and when employed these individuals should be free
        of the threat of deportation.

We imagine, in the particular case at hand, unions in the US recruiting
undocumented workers in the US, but also in Mexico and Central America.
One of the primary reasons we believe this would be an effective policy is
that most undocumented workers in the US are employed in fields that are
already unionised, such as construction, janitorial and maintenance,
agriculture, and manufacturing. (Since we have personal experience with

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brick and stonemasons, we estimate that about 80% of the block and stone work in Southern California is done by undocumented workers from Mexico and Central America. In general, even experienced stonemasons who are undocumented have hourly wages that are 75% below union wages and without benefits.) Notice that the sectors in which undocumented workers are over-represented are precisely those sectors that have experienced declining union membership over the last several decades.

5.   A Fair and Just Policy

Most importantly, we believe this proposal would result in just and fair treatment of these workers while providing broad social benefits.[17] Consider the following five reasonably expected results. First, unions could provide a ready-made structure providing effective consultative representation. Unions have in place effective means of representing their workers to management and could easily adapt to provide representation at other levels including local and regional governments. Moreover, unions are at least nominally committed to democratic processes and egalitarian values (although they often fall short of these ideals in practice). In short, unions could provide an effective legal means of representation and an effective public advocacy group.

Second, unions are well equipped to insure that working conditions meet minimal standards. This includes not simply wages, but important benefits such as retirement and health care. Unions can also insure worker safety by insuring that workplace safety rules are implemented. We know from firsthand experience that many undocumented workers are exposed to a wide array of unsafe conditions, including exposure to carcinogens and dangerous equipment. While it is already illegal for any worker, unauthorised or not, to work in such conditions, these laws are rarely enforced. Unions could and would insure that these laws are enforced.

Third, we believe this structure could begin to provide greater personal autonomy for undocumented workers both in terms of personal property and family life. For example, wages could be paid directly to bank accounts in the host country, as could benefits. If given greater flexibility to travel, unauthorised workers would be more likely to maintain family relationships in their host country. Those with mixed families would benefit from improved working conditions and lessened threat of immediate deportation.

Fourth, economic refugees that are union members would be given legal standing and recognition. Although it would be less than that afforded to citizens or immigrants with work visas, it would, in our view, meet the standard of being minimally decent. Again, while current laws do afford undocumented immigrants a wide range of legal protections and legal standing, without some modicum of insurance that they will not be deported,

such laws are in practice of little value, especially in those states where courts have ruled that an unauthorised immigrants have committed fraudulent or abusive acts or that the employment contract was not enforceable.[18]

Fifth, our proposed policy would result in fairer economic exchanges because it would sharply reduce cost externalisation, that is, the price of unauthorised labour would more closely reflect its true costs as opposed to the current situation where the costs are externalised onto other sectors of the host and home countries.

5A.   Additional Benefits

For these reasons, we believe such a policy would help a liberal people fulfil its obligation to act in a morally decent way to all persons, in this case to economic refugees. In addition, beyond insuring minimal fairness and justice, there are other positive benefits. One benefit would be the growth of union power, precisely in those sectors of the economy where union membership has been weakening.[19] In addition, it would contribute to the internationalisation of unions. It could only be a positive benefit, we believe, if unions in Mexico gained strength. This would indirectly benefit US workers by increased wages and greater coordination and cooperation while workers in Mexico would benefit directly and indirectly from increased unionisation. Unions, in the construction trades, provide members a great deal of basic education in fundamental skills, along with continuing education. These skills are transferable and again would indirectly aid the economy of the host country. Overall, it is not difficult to imagine a wide range of benefits for both the host country and for the broader diaspora community, including host-country citizens and authorised immigrants.

5B.   Initial Objections

To further support our view, we want to consider three objections. The first objection is that such a policy would be unacceptable to current union members who are either citizens or legally authorised to work, since their numbers would be diluted and their earning power lessened. This objection ignores, we think, the fact that union members have an incentive to expand their membership and to increase the share of the labour they perform. Unions are weak precisely because they compete with unauthorised workers. The only effective remedy is to expand worksites and membership.[20] Moreover, we imagine unions with mixed voting membership, that is, with members from both host and home countries, and we think that there are various mechanisms that could be utilised to insure that the valid interests of citizens and authorised workers are protected.

A second objection is that our proposal is economically unfeasible because it would increase costs of goods and services. Here we have several responses. We agree that while our proposal would redistribute costs, raising

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costs in certain sectors (such as construction), it would lower costs in other areas. If it is correct, as many conservatives argue, that unauthorised immigration is a net drain on the economy, then by mitigating the externalisation of costs, our policy would promote greater economic efficiency. On the other hand, if the objection is to unions themselves and to the power of unions to demand wages beyond what the market would otherwise bear, we believe that this misrepresents the power of unions at the bargaining table. Open union-contractor negotiations can be reasonably supposed to result in weakly Pareto optimal outcomes, especially when employers have alternative labour pools and if all externalities are accounted for. Unions are well aware of the added value their employees bring to the jobsite, but at the same time cannot reasonably demand wages that undercut their ability to secure employment for their members.

Finally, it might be objected that our proposal will result in economic apartheid with one class of persons occupying a second-class social status, harkening back to the days of Jim Crow. Why is this something other than mere legalised serfdom? If this were true, it would be a serious objection. In response, we note the following. First, economic and social segregation is already the norm in US, especially in border states, and most especially in Southern California. We must take action to address the economic apartheid that already exists.[21] Second, we reject the claim that all persons residing within a nation's borders are due the same treatment and should be afforded the same civil and economic liberties. Political Liberalism rejects the cosmopolitan view that no distinction between persons can be made in these matters and that citizenship is irrelevant. On the other hand, Political Liberalism affirms a minimal standard of treatment due all persons and we believe our proposal meets that minimal standard. But third, at some point, those who participate in what political liberalism calls the 'shared pattern of social cooperation' acquire the right to be afforded full rights of citizenship. We do not know when this line is crossed and when one stops being an economic refugee and begins being a fully cooperating member. We have intended our analysis to be appropriate only to economic refugees, although we certainly recognise that when that label is no longer appropriate, another set of more robust obligations become binding on liberal peoples.

6.   Conclusion: The Power of Unions

Most importantly, however, what is central to our proposal is precisely that unions - and not labour contractors - are the ones who hire and represent unauthorised workers. Labour contractors are committed to profits first, but to worker well-being only insofar as it is cost-efficient to do so. With a virtually unlimited labour pool to draw from, labour contractors in such fields as construction, agriculture, and maintenance have little incentive to advance worker welfare. Indeed, exorbitant profits can be achieved by

externalising the costs of worker welfare, usually onto the home country. Past attempts to give workers from Mexico temporary worker visas, the so-called Bracero Program, failed precisely because it put profits before employee welfare. Unions, in contrast, have a long and proud history of advancing worker welfare. One of the most successful examples was the Service Employees International Union 'Justice for Janitors' campaign in Los Angeles County, which successfully organised over 8000 immigrant workers, many of whom were women and unauthorised.[22] It is precisely the added value that unionisation brings—the increased wages, improved working conditions, job training, worksite safety, and effective representation—that corrects the injustices and unfairness of unauthorised workers in the US.[23]

Notes

[1] By 'human rights regime' we mean any approach which takes international human rights standards as in practice secure and known. This view is often held by NGOs who emphasise that in practice human rights standards have wide agreement. Representative cosmopolitan theorists include Beitz, Nussbaum, Singer, Pogge, and Caney, among others.

[2] C Beitz, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples,' *Ethics,* vol. 110, 2000, p. 674.

[3] Note discussing the problem of immigration from Rawls' point of view and how his ideal theory doesn't seem to actually address these problems on transitional justice. See J Rawls, *The Law of Peoples,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, pp. 8-9.

[4] Rawls, p. 65.

[5] These basic concepts are from Rawls, pp. 59-78. See also M Avila, 'Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples,' *The Journal of Ethics*, 11:1, 2007.

[6] S Camarota, 'Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of America's Foreign-Born Population,' Centre for Immigration Studies, November 2007, viewed on May 1, 2008, www.cis.org, pp. 3-4. When put into global perspective the total Central American diaspora population in the United States is more than the population of 196 countries, including Australia, Canada, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, North Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. Moreover, it is growing rapidly. The Hispanic immigrant population living in the US will double in less than 42 years and current projections are Hispanic immigrants will comprise 50.1 percent of the total population growth in the United States by the year 2050, at which time they will comprise 24 percent of the total US population.

[7] Camarota, p. 4; J Passel, 'Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics,' Pew Hispanic Centre, June 14, 2005, viewed on May 1, 2008, www.pehhispanic.org, p. 4.

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[8] 'Mexican' is defined as 'born in Mexico.'

[9] Passell, pp. 36-40.

[10] Passell, p. 27. California has three of the top six counties with Mexican immigrants in the country including Los Angeles County, Orange County, and San Diego County. Put into perspective, there are more Hispanics living in the County of Los Angeles (~4.5 million) than in any other county or city in the world except for Mexico City (~18 million).

[11] This is a well-established conclusion. For one egregious example, see 'VII. Immigrant Workers in the Meat and Poultry Industry,' Human Rights Watch, 2005, viewed May 2008, www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usa0105/7.htm. Undocumented workers play an important part in many sectors of the US economy. In Los Angeles County, an astounding 14% of the workforce is comprised of undocumented immigrants (nearly one in every 7 persons); in California as a whole, ~10%; in Arizona, 12%. In states with a high percentage of undocumented workers, per capita income is generally only 1/3 of the native population. For example, in Colorado, undocumented workers earn $8,232 per year or 26% of that non-immigrant population; in LA county, the figure is ~37% ($12,799 vs. $34,009). Some of this wage discrepancy can be accounted for by the fact that undocumented workers are overwhelmingly less educated than their US-born counterparts, although they may be better educated than their host-country counterparts. Regardless, approximately 1 in 5 undocumented immigrants lives in poverty and in nearly every state, the majority of undocumented workers live in or near poverty: 69% in Arizona and Colorado; 58% in California. (These statistics are difficult to interpret because as percentage of the total population of impoverished persons, undocumented workers represent only a small fraction and legal immigrants are also in or near poverty. The addition of US born children, citizens by definition, complicates this picture.)

In terms of economic contribution, undocumented workers from Mexico collectively earn approximately $124 billion annually, of which they send less than 2% back to Mexico as remittances. They contribute ~$16 billion in taxes each years, including $7 billion in social security payments (that they will never receive). Some estimates put the net contribution to government as about ~$5 billion. Other sources, suggest that the net cost to the federal government (excluding state and regional governments) is actually $10.4 billion. (Taken in context, these are relatively small figures.)

For supporting evidence, see Camarota, 'Immigrants in the United States,' pp. 31-32; A Barnard, 'Myths and Realities of Illegal Immigration,' *Points of Migration,* June 25 2007, Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University, Princeton, pp. 1-3; S Camarota, 'The High Costs of Cheap Labor:

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Illegal Immigration and the Federal Budget,' Centre for Immigration Studies, August 2004, viewed on May 1, 2008, www.cis.org, pp. 27–32.

[12] R Vogel, 'Harder Times: Undocumented Workers and the US Informal Economy,' *Monthly Review,* July 2006, viewed May 2008, www.monthlyreview.org, pp. 7–8.

[13] Passell, 26-30; Camarota, pp. 31–38; S Camarota, 'The High Costs of Cheap Labour,' pp. 27–32.

[14] F Lipman, 'The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation,' *Harvard Latino Law Review,* vol. 9, Spring 2006, pp. 1–58.

[15] Many argue that externalised costs are born by the US federal government; see Camarota, 'The High Costs of Cheap Labour,' pp. 27-32. Others argue that immigrant workers are a net tax gain for the federal government, especially for the social security program. See A Barnard, pp. 1-3; D Bacon, 'Employer Sanctions—the Political Economy of Undocumented Immigration in the US,' LaborNet News, May 2001, viewed May 2008, www.labornet.org/viewpoints/dbacon/sanctions.html, p. 2.

[16] P Orrenius and M Zavodny, 'Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA,' *Demography,* Vol. 40, no. 3, August 2003, p. 437.

This issue is further complicated by the historical relationship between the United States and immigrant labour from Mexico. From early exclusion policies to later inclusion policies, Congress often geographically targeted specific people to fill labour vacuums in the United States. The Immigration Act of 1917, however, created an 'Asiatic Border' by excluding most of Asia and the Pacific (as well as the mentally ill and the 'slow to assimilate'). In a controversial decision in response to mounting pressure from agribusiness, the federal government waived entry requirements for Mexicans, resulting in an influx of Hispanics. In 1942, World War II created additional strains on the labour market. The unemployment rate was less than 1%. In part because of a high number of 'extreme cases of intolerable racial discrimination' in Texas, the United States Congress adopted the 'Good Neighbour Policy' with Mexico, an appeal to Mexico to help out the war effort in exchange for classifying Mexicans as 'white' (Lopez, 188). At the same time Congress, under pressure from agribusiness, created the Federal Braceros Program which legalised the hiring of Mexican migrant workers with temporary work visas. Unfortunately 'braceros were the perfect exploitable underclass, willing to work for low wages and in deplorable conditions. 'The Bracero program (1942 through 1964) allowed Mexican nationals to take temporary agricultural work in the United States. Over the program's 22-year life, more than 4.5 million Mexican nationals were legally contracted for work in the

United States (some individuals returned several times on different contracts). Mexican peasants, desperate for cash work, were willing to take jobs at wages scorned by most Americans.' The Bracero program had a lasting effect on US agriculture and at the same time essentially institutionalised circular migration patterns from Mexico to the US (See Lopez; and Garcia, 119).

[17] While our proposal would bring US law into line with the UN's *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,* which protects the rights of migrant workers to organise and bargain collectively, that is not the motivating reason for proposing it. Rather, we regard this as a reasonable and just policy that implements core commitments of liberal peoples and political liberalism. While international conventions are useful mechanisms for monitoring state compliance, they are not in and of themselves morally or politically sufficient reasons.

[18] T Lee and D Lloyd, 'Review of Workers Compensation Coverage of Illegal Workers,' *Journal of the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions,* 2007, viewed May 11, 2008 from workingimmigrants.com, pp. 1-2. Regulations vary from state to state. Many states with the highest unauthorised workforce, such as California, have workplace safety laws designed to protect such undocumented worker rights as minimum wage, overtime, health and safety. See 'Undocumented worker rights,' www.dir.ca.gov/QAundoc.html. On the federal level, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v NLRB, a case where an unauthorised worker was fired for participating in union organising, the US Supreme Court held that undocumented immigrant workers do not have the right to receive back pay if illegally fired.

[19] Unions in the US have changed their position on unauthorised immigration several times. For example, in 1986 the AFL-CIO pushed for employer sanctions; in 2000, it called for the repeal of sanctions and for a legalisation program. See Bacon, p. 4.

[20] L Duncan, 'The Role of Immigrant Labor in a Changing Economy,' pp.16-18.

[21] For an overview of the increasingly severe restrictions on immigration of Mexican-nationals since 1965 and the practical effects of creating Mexican-identity as 'illegal', see N De Genova, 'The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality',' *Latino Studies,* vol. 2, 2004, pp. 160-185.

[22] Duncan, pp.16-17; S Nazario, 'For this Union, It's War,' *The Los Angeles Times,* August 1993, available at SEIU.org, viewed May 2008.

[23] For a comparison of guest worker or 'contract labour schemes' and official AFL-CIO positions, see Bacon, pp. 5-6.

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Justice and Immigration:
Are Constraints Unjustifiable?
A Global Luck Egalitarian Account*

Orsolya Reich

Abstract

Despite the fact that by now virtually no European country recruits immigrants, immigration is emerging as a key issue across the continent. In this paper I investigate the question whether a commitment to global luck egalitarianism, a global version of a currently central strand of distributive justice theories, would involve a call for an immediate abolition of restrictions on immigration. Global luck egalitarianism holds that morally arbitrary facts should not play a role in the individuals' life prospects. Since the place of birth currently plays a decisive role in one's chance to live a good life, it might seem that global luck egalitarians should hold that no restriction on free movement is allowed. I argue that this would be a rather hasty conclusion. Even though affluent nation-states have, from the point of view of global luck egalitarianism, comprehensive duties toward those in need regardless of their country of origin they nonetheless can be morally justified in rejecting outsiders.

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1. Introduction

Luck egalitarianism is a strand of egalitarian thought which currently plays a central role in debates about distributive justice. According to the luck egalitarian core intuition, inequalities deriving from unchosen features of people's circumstances − including, for instance, the wealth of the family into which one is born and natural factors like one's native abilities and talents − are unjust and should be compensated for. Those inequalities, however, which emerge as a result of people's choices are held fully legitimate and are not considered to be flattened by any institution. In other words, luck egalitarians hold what Brian Barry calls 'the principle of responsibility,' by which Barry means 'the principle that unequal outcomes are just if they arise from factors for which individuals can properly be held responsible, and are otherwise unjust.'[1] Although luck egalitarians commonly restrict the scope of their theories to the nation state, their core intuition,

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associated with an impartialist commitment, is equally applicable on a global scale.

My concern in this lecture is to show that not even such a radically impartialist theory as global luck egalitarianism involves a call for immediate abolition of all restrictions on immigration. The luck egalitarian and impartialist perspective is compatible with the moral permissibility of restraints, albeit this compatibility is cautious and qualified.

My lecture will consist in four parts. First (Section 2), I will shortly introduce the basic intuition of the theory I investigate, as applied to the domestic scale. Second (Section 3), I will show how the main idea of this theory can be applied on the global scale. Third (Section 4), I will explore what this 'extended' theory would require in terms of immigration policies. Finally (Section 5), I will conclude.

2.   Luck Egalitarianism

Luck egalitarianism is a relatively newborn approach to distributive justice which aims at neutralising luck; it is in fact a view inimical to luck concerning the way how resources are to be divided, in accordance with the principle of showing equal concern and respect for all citizens. The representatives of this theory (following Ronald Dworkin's idea) usually distinguish two kinds of luck: brute luck and option luck. On the one hand, brute luck covers those circumstances in our life for which we cannot be held properly responsible. For example, we cannot be held responsible for what kind of family we born into, for this was not our choice. Option luck, on the other hand, comes as a result of our choices. We might choose to gamble and either we lose or we win. Luck egalitarians aim at eliminating brute luck effects on our life, but they regard option luck effects as fully legitimate.[2]

The luck egalitarian doctrine, as Samuel Scheffler has pointed out, partly overlaps with, and partly diverges from, the prevailing political morality in most liberal societies, both with respect to the unacceptability of inequalities emerging as a result of unchosen circumstances and with respect to the acceptability of inequalities deriving from people's choices. On the one hand, luck egalitarians insist that no unchosen circumstances could be basis for legitimate inequalities. The prevailing morality agrees to a certain extent – it holds that discrimination and the consecutive inequality based on certain unchosen circumstances (e.g., class, race, sex) are unjust. However, the very same morality is prepared to tolerate inequalities based, for instance, on talents, which also classify as unchosen circumstances or brute luck. On the other hand, while luck egalitarians believe that it is wrong to interfere with those inequalities that result from people's voluntary choices, the prevailing political morality finds nothing morally reprehensible in taxating e.g., gambling. Thus, luck egalitarianism is at the same time more egalitarian and less egalitarian than the prevailing political morality. What is unique to the

doctrine is the exceptionally strong emphasis it places on luck and responsibility.[3]

Although luck egalitarians commonly restrict the scope of the theory to the nation state, their core intuition, associated with an impartialist commitment, is equally applicable to the global scale.[4] After all, the doctrine's core intuition is that it is unfair if some people are worse off than others due to factors outside of their control. As Thomas Nagel puts the idea,

> [...] the accident of being born in a poor rather than a rich country is as arbitrary a determinant of one's fate as the accident of being born into a poor rather than a rich family in the same country.[5]

Now, if we do think that every person's interests should be given the same consideration, regardless of the special ties we have with them (that is, if we are impartialists), then we cannot say that we should compensate our compatriots for their bad brute luck, but should not to do the same to foreigners.[6]

3.   Global Luck Egalitarianism and Institutions

As it was established previously, the luck egalitarian theory is relatively newborn. Even the domestic versions can be regarded as works in progress – and until this point nobody has proposed a full-fledged account of its global extension. I myself know of only one article that applies the core intuition to the global scale and investigates some of its implications. This article is written by Christian Schemmel, and he argues there (among other things) that the global luck egalitarian principle would rule out the legitimacy of substantial democratic decision making on a sub-global level, that is, it would call for global government.[7]

If it were true, then my question, the question of justifiability of different immigration policies, would be beside the point. In a global state there would only be one kind of membership, the membership in humankind. The gist of immigration – changing membership – would just be impossible. Nevertheless, I think, at this point Schemmel is mistaken. Global luck egalitarianism does not automatically rule out sub-global authorities. If the global administration of the principle of responsibility turns out to be more efficient with a nation-state system than without, or if global government turns out to be simply not feasible, global luck egalitarianism does not have a ground to reject the existence of states. The doctrine fits perfectly with the instrumentalist justification of the nation-state system, according to which the nation-state system (where polities have special responsibilities toward their own citizens) is justifiable, insofar states serve as, with Robert Goodin's words, 'devices whereby the moral community's general duties get assigned

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to particular agents,' and such an assignment of special responsibility is the most efficient way to discharge general duties globally.[8]

It cannot escape notice, however, that in the present world, where deep global inequalities are characteristic, the general duties to ensure for the entirety of humankind that brute luck effects will not influence one's lot in life are clearly not best discharged in a way where rich nation states equalise these effects among their citizens and the poor do the same. Even if all governments do their best in achieving the condition where brute luck effects are equalised, there will obviously be a huge inequality between those people who were born in an impoverished state and those who were born in an industrialised one. For this reason, it seems that global luck egalitarianism calls for a roughly equitable allocation of resources (between states) first, taking into account the number of persons within each state. When the misallocation among the national resources is folded up, it is the states' special responsibility to take care about the equalisation of domestic brute bad luck. One of the possible means of achieving the morally appropriate allocation is immigration from states that are, taking into consideration the proportional availability of natural resources relatively overpopulated to those that are relatively under populated.[9]

4.   Global Luck Egalitarianism and Immigration

It might be concluded now that a global luck egalitarian commitment requires one to argue that since nation states are legitimate and desirable so long as they are more efficient in administering justice than a global state, but for that a right allocation of resources is needed - affluent states should now open their borders (completely). After a certain period of time the just allocation of goods per capita will be achieved, but until the allocation is unjust, no restriction of immigration can be justified. This, however, and this is my central claim, is a rather hasty conclusion.

Let me investigate first a pessimistic scenario. Some professionals claim that if affluent countries were to open their borders abruptly, the consequent level of immigration would be many orders beyond the current level. Immigration would not stop automatically at a healthy equilibrium. As a consequence, open borders introduced immediately would result in the breakdown of the public spheres, the institutional systems and economies of wealthy states. If this really happened, the formerly wealthy liberal states would become incapable of administering justice. On this ground, I think, global luck egalitarians can oppose open border policies, or, in other words, the doctrine can regard certain (provisional) restrictions to be justified.

Consider now a different, more optimistic scenario. Suppose that as a consequence of open border policies introduced, poor people in high numbers would enter into wealthy countries. Further, suppose that the collapse of the respective economies would not happen, and equal allocation

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of resources (per capita) among states would occur after a certain period. I do think that the aptness of this second (optimistic) forecast does not compel global luck egalitarians to the immediate introduction of open border policies, either.

Here is why. It seems reasonable to claim that resource is the currency of egalitarian justice, which should be strived for equalising on the long run.[10] According to the doctrine, in an ideal world each and every person has the equal amount of the resources available initially, for which family or state they were born into was not up to them, thus they do not deserve more or less.

Yet, I believe, the call for the manifestation of this ideal in the real world could be plausible only if it were not in clash with the core intuition of the luck egalitarian doctrine. In the real, non-ideal world some people were born with serious disabilities. Their life can be terrible if they are not given a bigger share of the resources than others. Now, in my understanding, if the disabled, out of their brute bad luck, would suffer under a resource luck egalitarian scheme, the whole doctrine would lose its intuitive appeal. Hence, luck egalitarianism should take into account those differential efficiencies in turning resources into welfare that came about by brute luck.

As one is not responsible for having higher needs as a disabled person, one might not be genuinely responsible for having higher needs for other reasons. In the actual world, characterised by deep inequalities, people are born with an access to bigger or lesser amounts of resources. They develop a taste in their early childhood that is influenced by their respective accessible goods. Later, they elaborate life-plans based on that taste. It is painful and burdensome for them if those conditions that were the basis of their life-plans were eliminated. While it can be plausibly argued that it is not legitimate to demand a bigger share of the resources on the basis of expensive tastes and people who were born to a relatively wealthy background should just change their tastes, it should be recognised that (a) this change is burdensome for the agent, and (b) it has a natural limit.

Consequently, the equal amount of resources per capita achieved as an outcome of open border policies might result in a considerable difference in welfare between the newcomers and the original members. Therefore, I believe, luck egalitarianism, understood correctly, implies that borders should be opened only gradually (not immediately), allowing people (maybe consecutive generations) enough time to adapt their expectations and tastes to be in accordance with the rightful allocation of resources.[11]

5.   Conclusion

My purpose in this lecture was to provide some reflections on the implications of a currently central strand of distributive justice theories to the issue of immigration. First, I have argued that global luck egalitarianism

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would not call for a global government, if there is reason to think that relatively local authorities have a better chance to administer justice. I acknowledged, however, that in the present world, where the allocation of resources per capita between states is not equal globally, luck egalitarianism first of all calls for a better allocation. Immigration can be seen as one of the corrective measures for global misallocation. I investigated whether this point implies a call for open border policies from the side of global luck egalitarians. I argued that the doctrine does not involve the unjustifiability of all restraints on immigration. That is, if by the number of entering immigrants a country's capability of administering justice would be eliminated, luck egalitarianism would allow for temporary restrictions. If luck egalitarianism allows for welfare considerations, there is an additional way to justify restraints. If the global resource equality achieved too quickly would result in a significant difference in welfare between the new and original inhabitants of formerly wealthy countries, this would justify not introducing open border policies immediately. In sum, under the global luck egalitarian doctrine in certain cases states may have the moral right to impose numerical limits on immigration.

Notes

[1] B Barry, 'Does Responsibility Undermine Equality?' paper presented to the Workshop in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory, University of California, Berkeley, 20 March 2003, viewed on 05 May 2008, <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/kadish/BBary%20doc.pdf>
[2] The luck egalitarian era was triggered by the publication of Ronald Dworkin's 'What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare' (*Philosophy and Public Affairs,* vol. 10, Summer 1981, pp. 185-246.) and 'What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources' (*Philosophy and Public Affairs,* vol. 10, Autumn 1981, pp. 283-345.) in 1981. It was Elisabeth Anderson who introduced the phrase 'luck egalitarianism' in her 'What is the Point of Equality?' (*Ethics,* vol. 109, January 1999, pp. 287-337.) Among the political philosophers Anderson dubs as luck egalitarians are Richard Arneson, Gerald A. Cohen, Eric Rakowski, John Roemer and Ronald Dworkin.
[3] S Scheffler, 'What is Egalitarianism?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* vol. 31, Winter 2003, pp. 5-39.
[4] According to ethical partialism, one is to give preferential treatment toward a determined set of persons (or in other words, one should give a preferential consideration to the interests of some as against others), those with whom one

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has a special relationship. The special relationship may mean family relationship or friendship, belonging to the same social group or to the same nation. According to ethical impartialism, on the contrary, all persons (including ourselves) should count as equals, they ought to be treated with equal and impartial consideration for their respective goods or interests. It is important to note, impartialism is a very counter-intuitive approach and I do not want to argue for it. What I will argue for is that not even such a radical standpoint associated with the core intuition of luck egalitarianism implies the moral impermissibility of not completely open borders.

[5] T Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* vol. 33, Spring 2005, pp. 119. It is important to note here, Nagel does not want to extend the scope of justice to the global scale.

[6] I have to admit, this point needs some further refinement. Even impartialists can restrict the scope of their theory of justice based on their view on the relations between individuals and 'their' societies. In this presentation, however, I cannot elaborate on this issue.

[7] Ch Schemmel, 'On The Usefulness Of Luck Egalitarian Arguments For Global Justice', *Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric,* vol. 1, 2007.

[8] R Goodin, 'What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?', *Ethics,* vol. 98, July 1988, p. 678.

[9] Cf. S Perry, 'Immigration, justice and culture', in *Justice in immigration,* W. F. Schwartz (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 98.

[10] There is a very firm debate in the global luck egalitarian literature on what should count as the right currency of egalitarian justice. The scope of this lecture does not allow me to go into details here, thus I only state my standpoint.

[11] In my view, something along the same line of reasoning can be argued by a luck egalitarian with regard to culture as well.

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Returning to the Diaspora:
Israeli Women Living in the UK -
Challenges to Identity and Psychological Implications

Yasmin Fulder-Heyd

Abstract

A major personal challenge that often accompanies exile or immigration is the management of particular identities. There may be a sense of lack of belonging to either country of origin or host country – which can significantly affect the adjustment process and daily life of immigrants. In this qualitative study, the experience of Israeli women immigrants in the UK was investigated, focusing on the impact this experience had on their multiple identities of Israeli and woman. The various psychological implications were explored. Very little research has been previously carried out on this unique population of Israelis choosing to live outside of Israel. In this population, in which the concept of Diaspora is intertwined in society and culture, there is a strong sense of Israel as the primary home, and at the same time the ambivalence associated with choosing to live outside of a conflict-ridden country. The study presented here interviewed 9 participants, from a variety of age groups and backgrounds. Data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews and analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. This paper will present key themes, which emerged from the women's accounts, illustrating them with interview quotes. The paper will explore the psychological impact of these woman's unique experiences, as well as the consequences of keeping the question of belonging open and unresolved. From the participants' experience it emerges that the question of home and belonging reflects trans-generational experiences of Diaspora, as well as their cultural background as Jews and Israelis.

Keywords: Identity threats, immigration to the UK, interpretative phenomenological analysis, Jewish Diaspora, Jewish Israeli women, lack of belonging, qualitative research.

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1.   Introduction

The recent rapid growth of immigration and mobility has elicited a wide discussion in the current psychological literature.[1] Such situations often involve threats to identity,[2] and raise some basic questions: what are the important dimensions of our identity which we attempt to preserve, and what dimensions are we willing to let go of, or adjust and change? When faced

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with a radical shift in location and culture, how do we manage our basic
sense of self and others, and what are the experiences which impact or
challenge the process of identification and belonging?

This paper will explore the experiences of a particular group of
immigrants - a unique Diaspora - that of the Jewish Israeli woman living in
the UK. In order to understand her experience, first one has to look at the
various challenges that she faces, and the identity processes which are at
play.[3]

A much longer account is required to discuss the Jewish Israeli
identity.[4] It will suffice to say here that the concept of Diaspora is woven
deep into the consciousness of Israeli society and its individuals. Most people
in Israel are either immigrants themselves to Israel, or second or third
generation to immigrants. This implies that mobility is an essential part of the
history and culture of each family. And of course, the Jewish Diaspora with
its centuries of displacement can be seen as an important cultural and
historical narrative, promoting a sense of rootlessness.

Yet at the same time, Israel is perceived as the ultimate homeland, a
place of refuge for all Diaspora Jews around the world.

This tension between the transitional and the 'grounded' home is an
integral part of the experience of Jewish Israelis. But what happens to those
that decide to leave Israel and live abroad? The challenges here are
numerous. Firstly, Israelis living abroad are described as being in a state of
constant confusion and contradiction[5] For example, when considering the
relationship between the Jewish and the Israeli components of their identity,
it seems that for some the national Israeli identity is more pertinent than the
Jewish.[6] On the other hand, as mentioned by Steve Gold, their commitment to
the state stands in contradiction to their voluntary choice of being out of the
country.[7] In addition, since religious Jews sometimes consider leaving Israel
as against the Jewish law, Israelis leaving the country can face criticism both
by religious people in Israel, and by Jews abroad.[8] Furthermore, because of
the political insecurity, there is a highly ambivalent approach in Israel
towards people who decide to emigrate, since they are seen as 'defecting' or
'running away'.[9] This can cause a sense of rejection by their families and
friends back in Israel, and feelings of shame and guilt. In general, the
environment of continuous conflict there can clearly have an impact on
feelings of belonging to Israel as a home when abroad.

For Israeli women living outside of Israel, the management of
gender identity is an additional struggle which can impact on their attempts at
building a positive sense of self.[10] The Israeli Woman is described in the
literature as facing somewhat contradictory influences: on the one hand she is
seen as 'equal' to the man, fighting alongside him in the army for example.
On the other hand, Israel being a very family-oriented society, the woman is
perceived as a somewhat 'passive' homemaker.[11] Using direct quotes, I

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would like to show how these numerous challenges impact on the identity and the well being of Israeli woman living in the UK.

2.   Method

The research described here is part of my doctoral research project. This is a qualitative project using interview material as the main data source.

Sampling and Participants

Nine Israeli women were recruited from various backgrounds, ages (Mean=40.5 STD=13.26) and socio-economic statuses. They were recruited by a number of methods, including the snowball technique, through fliers, through Israeli companies, on flights and by ads in newspapers.

Procedure

The main method of collecting data was a semi-structured interview conducted separately with each of the participants, lasting about 45 minutes.

Analytic strategy

The data collected from the interviews was analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This method intends to draw out the personal world view of the participant, looking at the phenomenology of their experience, and adopting an 'insider's perspective'.[12] Smith, Flowers and Osborn describe the method as attempting "to tap into a natural propensity for self reflection on the part of the participants."[13] The researcher and the participant engage in self-reflection and the analysis attempts to draw on that endeavour, so that the themes which emerge are the result of the combined effort on the part of the participant (expressing their genuine thoughts and feelings) and the researcher (reflexively interpreting the data).[14] In this way the participants are encouraged to explain their own story in their own words.

Since the questions raised here focused on the subjective experience of the women - how they perceived and tried to make sense of their experience - this analytic strategy seemed most appropriate.

3.   Analysis / Results

I would like to start describing the participant's experience from the wider context of culture, both in terms of their experience of the host culture as well as their feelings towards their country of origin. This will lead to a consideration of the 'closer' surroundings of interpersonal relationships. Finally I will consider the psychological processes of the self concept and identity.

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A.   Culture
         Looking at the wider cultural context, two main areas will be looked
at. One is attitudes and experiences of the UK, in terms of cultural
differences, language barriers, and lack of belonging. The other is attitudes
and feelings towards Israel.

B.   Experiences in the UK
Ayelet[15] describes feeling misunderstood because of cultural differences:

> They're not part of my culture and it takes more time to
> explain many things to them because you just need the
> background, the culture, the home.

Ofra asserts this cultural difference, claiming it causes her to feel she doesn't
belong:

> I just don't feel I belong, eh [][16] maybe, em … not
> celebrating what the English are celebrating, I just … I
> can't connect to it.

Liat describes the way this cultural barrier is affecting her relationship with
her husband's family who are British Jewish:

> His family is different from my family. [] they're not a
> close family, they're not warm. [] I don't have anything in
> common with them [] … they're cold people.

Another experience shared by many of the participants was a sense that their
language difficulties create an unbridgeable gap between them and English
people. As claimed by Edna:

> The main thing is the language – it's always like I feel I
> have a fog in my mind here. [] you don't have the feel of
> the language.

Tali agrees, adding how this affects her sense of belonging:

> I really feel like one sense in which I don't completely feel
> at home in Britain is because the language I speak here is
> not my native language.

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C.   Feelings about Israel

Feeling a sense of lack of belonging in the UK is coupled with very ambivalent feelings towards Israel. On one hand there is a strong sense of attachment to Israel and at the same time a sense of distance.

Ayelet describes her level of connection to Israel:

> I keep in touch with what's going on at home. I think I read about 4 times a day [] I feel really involved and I really get angry with things …that happen there… the whole range of feelings that are involved in it, which I don't here [] it doesn't touch me … it's not mine.

Rachel talks about how much she misses Israel, and expresses her Zionist ideology:

> You miss Israel. You miss the Israelis. []… it makes you think that, yeah, we've got a piece of land and it's … and it's a better land and it's better people and it's better everything … everything … even if its shit there… it's better than … than here.

Many of the participants described a sense of feeling guilty for leaving Israel. Tali explains how this sense of guilt connects for her to being Zionist:

> It was considered to be a terrible betrayal to go and [] … something of that … still rubs in, I think. [] I bought into a lot of this ideology and was sort of quite committed to it …and that sort of makes it hard in a way… [] some sort of …Zionist passion … [] that's a little bit in the background of why I feel uncomfortable leaving.

Edna stresses this point further, talking about her sense of betrayal to her country:

> It's to betray my country more than anything else. To betray country. There's so much blood, you know, we got to belong there because it's a special … it's a special country, it's not a normal country. [] It's very important. [] They [other foreigners] don't have the guilt feeling. It's haunting you. (LAUGHS)

Tali explains the background of this from her point of view:

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> My parents feel like sort of … their parents left everything they had and left Europe [] they moved to Israel in the sort of beginning of the 30s [] most of their families then told them not to go, and it turned out to be the sort of crazy move that saved their lives [] they had a really difficult time and were very poor and my parents sort of built up a very successful life in this new country [] that is what their … you know, their parents did this for. I really feel like there's a sort of feeling that this is kind of cutting … [] this endeavour, yeah.

Rachel describes the persecutions experienced by her parents leading them to flee Russia:

> I never had … an idea, a wish, willing … [] to leave Israel. I mean, I come from … very Zionist family that came from Russia in the 70s and struggled to go out of Russia. So for me, Israel … it's more than a home. [] I might cry a little bit. [crying] [] I know that it hurts to them. [] I was always raised as I should be thankful to my parents who brought me to Israel because [] we were suffered anti Semitic and my father was in jail [] I should be thankful to say that … to be Jews … between Jews … among Jews, you know. [] But, yeah, then I left … (LAUGHS) []… to go out completely of the country is something that is unforgivable [] … yes, so for them to be in Israel, it's a mission. It's what they were raised for and what they fulfilled. [] It's part of my … bad feeling or how do you say? The guilt. [] What keeps me is like I'm not doing that, I'm not really out of the country, I'm just a couple of years here.

One can see that Rachel's sense of temporariness helps her manage her feelings of guilt for leaving, separating herself from those who 'permanently' leave Israel.

At the same time as talking about their loyalty to Israel, the Participants also describe a growing sense of lack of belonging and distance from Israel, which stands in contradiction to their attachment described above.

Liat describes this as a sense of being a visitor:

> I'm like a visitor here and a visitor there. Where am I belong to? I don't belong anywhere suddenly …

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Ayelet talks about how feeling an outsider in Israel, interestingly expressed as a loss of connection to social change, was a very awkward feeling for her:

> I felt an outsider. [] Which was very weird [] because the years that I was away … many things have changed in Israel. [] it just felt as if I wasn't there for something that was very constitutive of what being an Israeli today in Israeli is …

This uncomfortable feeling is echoed in Sara's account:

> I felt like my house was empty, was hollow… you know. It was a very, very strange, eh … feeling there.

C.   Interpersonal relationships

Moving to consider the relationships in the participant's life, the participants firstly describe a strong sense of loneliness and isolation, a sense of feeling alienated and without support. Ofra reflects:

> Loneliness. Very, very lonely, em … (PAUSE) … I suppose I don't have any family in England [] so I think very, very, very lonely. Very alone. Not being able to, you know, share feelings … (PAUSE - Crying)

For Ofra this loneliness is a result of social encounters that failed, causing her to give up trying:

> If I meet with English people, I … I stay very quiet … very, very quiet. Not … not who I am [] I feel … like no energy, no confidence, em … and to be honest lately I don't even do it because I'm not enjoying it any more.

Since many of the participants came to the UK (or stayed here) following their husband, this occasionally created a strain on the relationship, as described by Tamar:

> Sometimes I feel very angry with my husband, you know, why did you bring us here?

Rachel adds an important dimension, when saying that her husband does not represent home for her any longer:

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> I am very happy with my husband, but … it used to be that wherever he is that is Home. But it is not like that any more … there is nothing to do about it … I even told him, I don't care if you want to be in your work etc, that's fine, just bring me back home.

D.   Psychological Implications

Focussing on how the experiences affected the participants' psychological well being, many of the participants described feeling very depressed, tearful, and lacking in self confidence. For example, Ofra:

> Em … at the moment, I feel very depressed. Very … I can't make any decision by myself for myself or for the family[] because I've lost my confidence and I … I believe I lost my confidence because I don't … I don't feel at home here. I don't feel good enough with myself at the moment or with the life here …

Likewise, Rachel explains

> Sometimes when I'm really, really depressed, which happens quite a lot of time … like sit, closing the phone and crying, crying, crying …

The feelings described above are accompanied by a sense of life being on hold and a painful lack of sense of control, for example by not actively choosing to come to the UK. Tamar and Rachel describe this:

> I realised that I don't … I … I've got nothing here to look for. I've finished all my business here but my husband still wanted to stay. (Tamar)

> I'm not there and I want to be there []you want to go home but [] your partner say, let's wait more. So you feel like you're trapped. You want to go home now but you cannot … (Rachel)

One of the consequences of this is a sense of loss of self and identity, as described by Ofra and Tamar:

> I feel like, em … I've lost my [] Identity. Yes. I really feel like I've lost it [...] (Ofra)

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> I came with a very strong identity, em … what I want to do
> in life. I was very sure of myself. And this sureness, eh …
> fades away a little bit. [] I don't know who I am. I'm no
> longer Israeli and I'm still not British. (Tamar)

The emerging conflict in the participants' inner world is accompanied by a puzzling resistance to resolve it, not wanting to fully settle, fearing the loss or compromise that will entail. The quotes below describe this resistance:

> So this is not home and it's not mine and I don't want it to
> become mine. I really … I actually have very strong
> feelings that I don't want it to ever become really home …
> (Ayelet)

> I always resent it. I don't want to belong here. I feel I'm
> betraying myself. I don't let it go. (Edna)

> It's like you don't want to make changes that will leave you
> here or … or consciously say that you're living … that's it,
> this is your life. [] part of me doesn't want to be … a whole
> person … part of me wants to keep it fizzy, you know []
> Maybe I'm a little bit afraid [] if I'll be a whole person, that
> means I'm not going back and I'm happy here and I'm
> settled here … (Rachel)

4.   Conclusion

This research shows the Israeli immigrant women to be in a constant state of temporariness and transition, in which a number of core concepts of themselves are questioned. They never fully leave and never fully arrive. However, it seems that there is also a resistance to resolving this sense of the 'carpet being pulled under their feet', a dependence on the painful transitoriness. It would be worth considering how this tension between attachment and identification with the homeland for Diasporic communities influences their ability to make the host country into a real home. It also raises the question of how these processes influence the multiple facets of identity, for people living in the Diaspora - not only their national identity, but also their identity as woman, mothers, and wives.

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Notes

[1] For a thorough examination of the psychological implications of immigration see J W Berry, 'A Psychology of Immigration', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 57, 2001, pp. 615-631.

[2] See G M Breakwell, *Coping with Threatened Identities*, Methuen, London, 1986, P. 192.

[3] Identity in this context is approached from a social constructionist perspective, seeing it as a fluid and changing structure influenced by the social context. See K.J. Gergen, 'Toward Self as Relationship', in *Self and Identity: Psychological Perspectives*, K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds), Wiley, Chichester, 1987.

[4] For a review of the psychological literature on the Jewish Israeli identity see M. Tur-kaspa Shimoni, D. Pereg and M. Mikulicer, *Psychological Aspects of Identity Formation and Their Implication for Understanding the Concept of Jewish Identity: A Review of the Scientific Literature.* Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, 2004. [Hebrew]

[5] S J Gold, *The Israeli Diaspora*, Routledge, London, 2002.

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[7] Gold, *Israeli Diaspora*.

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[9] Ibid.

[10] S D Walsh, & G. Horenczyk, 'Gendered Patterns of Experience in Social and Cultural Transition: The Case of English-speaking Immigrants in Israel'. *Sex Roles*, vol. 45, 2001, pp.501-528.

[11] L Hazelton, *Israeli Women: The Reality behind the Myth*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1977.

[12] J A Smith, P. Flowers, and M. Osborn, 'Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the psychology of health and illness', in *Material Discourses of Health and Illness*, L. Yardley (ed), Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 68-91.

[13] Ibid, p. 68.

[14] Ibid.

[15] All names and identifying details have been changed to protect anonymity.

[16] [ ] Indicates missing data; … indicate a short pause in speech.

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Integration through Education:
Muslims of the United States of America

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Abstract

This paper explores the challenges faced by states today dealing with large Muslim immigrant populations and the benefits of using education as a means to integrate these communities into a 'host' country's society. The authors argue that education is the most effective path towards integration. Therefore, they propose to use an education curriculum targeting high school students adapted from the Social Studies Curriculum Movement of the 1960s United States. This movement originated out of the turmoil of the Civil Rights Era. It significantly aided the better integration of African-Americans into mainstream U.S. society by extending education benefits to this community, and by educating mainstream America regarding the experiences of African-Americans and their histories. This curriculum, however, has not been updated for the demographic challenges of today, namely Muslim immigrants. This project's educational curriculum focuses on educating mainstream America regarding the history, culture, and development of the Islamic world. At the same time Muslim communities must also be studied to ascertain the unique experiences of immigrant populations. Both parts are incorporated into the curriculum in order to educate simultaneously mainstream society and the Muslim immigrant populations, therefore, benefitting both groups as mutual understanding is increased. In turn, this facilitates the integration of immigrant populations while respecting their traditions and cultures.

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Arguably one of the greatest challenges facing the Western world today is the integration of Muslim minority communities into mainstream Western societies.[1] With continuing attacks by Muslim extremists around the world, the sectarian violence erupting in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia, the threat of terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and especially the unrest among Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, the Western World has a desperate need to understand and integrate better its Muslim citizens.

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        In the United States alone there are between seven and ten million
Muslims whose population is extremely diverse. In fact it has been described
by some scholars as the most diverse Muslim population in the world. The
American Muslim population consists of immigrants from every 'Muslim'
nation in the world including those located in South-eastern Europe; North,
East, and West Africa; South, Southeast, East, and West Asia; not to mention
from the island nations rimming the Indian Ocean, such as Malaysia and
Indonesia. Furthermore, thirty percent of the United States Muslim
population consists of indigenous African-Americans. The U.S. Muslim
community practices all forms of Islam, from orthodox to heterodox and
from Sunni to Shi'i. Additionally there is also a great deal of economic
stratification within the community, and Muslims are found in every level of
the American society from the very wealthy to the poorest. This enormous
diversity among a minority religious community creates a great deal of
cultural and religious hybridisation and acts as both a strength and a
weakness as rival interests and cross national tensions cause fractioning
within the community.[2] This very diversity presents important and unique
theoretical challenges to the concept of a unified 'Diaspora' and how to
approach the integration of such a dynamic community. This paper, however,
does not focus on these specific theoretical issues, even though they are
important to our overall project. The focus of this paper is on the practical
issue of developing a secondary educational social studies curriculum
supplement aimed at educating the mainstream U.S. population regarding
Islamic history and Muslim culture.
        It is our assumption that education is the most effective path to the
full integration of minority and immigrant populations. There is a great need
for social studies curriculum development on the topic of minority integration
at the high school level, however, the last major emphasis placed on this type
of curriculum development in the United States, called the New Social
Studies Movement, was during the 1960s and 70s. This emphasis came as a
direct result of the Civil Rights movement associated with the social
turbulence of the 1960s in the United States.[3] Social studies curriculum for
the integration of minority and immigrant populations desperately needs to be
updated in accordance with the demographic and social characteristics of
present day America. We, therefore, propose an educational model and
curriculum for the integration of Muslims into America society aimed at
educating mainstream America on issues related to Islamic culture and
history and aimed at assisting Muslim Americans to embrace Western values,
such as civil liberties and democratic practices, thus enabling them to take
advantage of the opportunities available in the States. This model and
curriculum development is based on a four pronged interrelated approach.
        The first prong entails conducting research and collecting
information on the historical background and development of Islam and

Muslim societies in order to ascertain an understanding of the cultural, social, economic, religious, and political context from which most Muslims immigrate to the United States. This information will then be synthesised and abbreviated for high school student consumption. The second prong consists of collecting information and conducting research on a specific Muslim community in the United States, namely in the Memphis metropolitan area where roughly 10-15 thousand Muslims live. Through a series of oral interviews and the collection of statistical data we will ascertain the demographic, religious, socio-economic, and educational make-up of this community, including their experiences in post 9/11 America. We are employing and training a total of four undergraduate and graduate research assistants (two female and two male) from the University of Memphis Muslim Students' Association to conduct demographic surveys and oral interviews. The collection of this information will eventually result in the completion of a monograph on the history of the Muslim population in Memphis and the Mid-south, United States. Third, we are conducting surveys and interviewing high school educators in the Memphis area regarding how they deal with and teach issues related to diversity, Islam, the Middle East, and conflict resolution in the classroom. The fourth prong entails combining what is learned from prongs one through three and developing a curriculum supplement to help educate Memphis high school students regarding the Middle East, Islam, and the Memphis Muslim community thereby linking global issues with the students' local communities. This curriculum will then be tested in select schools in the greater Memphis area and further implemented through teacher training workshops.

The goal of our project is to provide a framework and model for better cultural understanding of Muslims not only in Memphis, but in mainstream America and thus promote and facilitate the integration of this community into American society. The potential problems of failed integration are readily evident in Europe. There are large immigrant Muslim communities throughout Western Europe, particularly in the Netherlands, Holland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Several European countries have struggled to integrate effectively their Muslim populations into mainstream society. In some cases, Muslim populations have been purposely excluded and/or excluded themselves from education, healthcare, and other social services. Often these communities possess limited civil rights, live in isolated and insular slums, and the children of these immigrants have poor future economic prospects. As studies and news reports on these incidents have demonstrated this violence is perpetrated mainly by Muslim youth and young adults whom society has left behind and not integrated.[4] Our program hopes to help prevent this disillusionment and violence in the United States and has the encouraging potential to be adopted and adapted by other countries in order to fit their particular educational agendas.

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Education is a key to the integration of minority and immigrant populations, because it provides the most effective mechanism for socialisation, language and culture acquisition, and the attainment of skills necessary to take advantage of opportunities and become contributing members of a particular society. Not only should a child's education teach the core necessary curriculum of reading, writing, and arithmetic, but it should also help the mainstream population understand an immigrant population's history and culture thus facilitating the incorporation of that population into mainstream society through understanding and acceptance. This program will also facilitate the education of mainstream America on critical issues related to the Middle East and other Muslim societies and thus help prepare future leaders earlier in life for public and private service in our increasingly interconnected world.

Based on this assumption that education is one of the best means of integration, Doctors Byford and Schull are basing this social studies education curriculum off of the 1960s curriculum movement, known as the 'New Social Studies Movement.' This movement illustrates not only American society's push for curriculum change in education, but also some of the most innovative and controversial teaching practices to ever be developed. Pursued with vigour during the late 1950s, curriculum reformers, politicians, and average citizens pushed for change within what was perceived as failed social studies curriculum. Through a series of national events, curriculum failures and fear of communist technological superiority, the Office of Education, along with the newly founded National Science Foundation and private donors, began to fund a variety of content specific projects from 1960 to the early 1970s to reform social studies curriculum. In the end, more than fifty projects attempted to reenergise a perceived dying curriculum.

The 1950s have been known in the United States as a time of immense change. The Civil Rights movement and advances in medicine, technology and entertainment are only a few examples of success, however, with this success also came controversy. Despite the social studies often obscure and limited presence after World War II, the social studies would be a focal point of both public frustration and change from 1950 to 1960. The fire for this re-examination was due to many events in both society and government. However, five events served as the main catalyst for curriculum reform: a) American Korean War prisoners lack of knowledge of loyalty, democracy, and the basic system of American government; b) so called "closed areas" (e.g. homosexuality, teen pregnancy, school violence, racial tension) in society that were often ignored in education; c) the Purdue public opinion poll in 1957, which exposed students lack of basic knowledge of democracy; d) the launching of Sputnik, and the fear of Soviet technological

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superiority; and e) the growing Civil Rights movement which challenged the nation's segregated school system and society.

In an effort to promote curriculum change, both the National Science Foundation and the National Defence Education Act (NDEA) were established with the intent to upgrade curriculum and encourage teachers to take the academic content of their work more seriously. As a result, an intense and extensive reassessment and reorganisation of the entire American educational system was undertaken. The results of this reorganisation and development of new materials would be known as "the new social studies." Scattered throughout the nation at different curriculum centres, new social studies programs were extremely critical of the failed mishmash of errors and programs prevalent in the 1950s. The end results were independent discipline projects (see Table I) that shared three common traits: a) an increase focus on inquiry; b) an increased focus on values; and c) an increase focus on games and simulations. Edwin Fenton suggested that the advances in the curriculum reform movement reached the social studies when the following transpired: 1) when society and the educational community realised the social studies had failed to keep pace with curriculum reform in both science and mathematics; 2) new knowledge about the way students learned required new teaching techniques and 3) monies from private foundations such as the Ford and Carnegie became readily available to support research.[5]

Table I: Sample of New Social Studies Projects Developed in the 1960s and 70s[6]

Topic	Projects
Anthropology	1. University of Georgia, Anthropology Curriculum Project 2. American Anthropological Association, Anthropology Curriculum Study Project
Economics	1. University of Colorado, Our Working World 2. University of Ohio, Manpower Development Project 3. University of Chicago, Elementary School Economics Project 4. Ohio State University, The Development of Economics Curricular Materials for Secondary Schools 5. San Jose State University, Econ 12 Project 6. Joint Council on Economic Education, Developmental Economic Program
Geography	1. The University of Georgia, The Geography Curriculum Project

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	2. American Association of Geographers, High School Geography Project
History	1. Amherst College, Basic Concepts in History and the Social Studies
	2. University of Chicago, Social Studies Project
	3. Amherst College, Committee on the Study of History
	4. Carnegie-Mellon University, The Education Systems Research Project
	5. Illinois State University, Black History Project
	6. Northwestern University, World History Project
	7. Vallejo Unified School District, Human Dignity through American History Project
Political Science	1. University of Indiana, High School Curriculum Centre in Government
	2. Hartford Board of Education, American Liberties Project
	3. University of California, Los Angeles, Committee on Civic Education
	4. Word Law Fund, High School Program
	5. Law in American Society
Social Psychology	1. University of Michigan, Michigan Social Science Education Project
	2. Sociological Resources for the Social Studies

The legacy of the new social studies movement is mixed. One of the goals for the development of new social studies materials was to increase curriculum success in the classroom through effective practice. Research completed on this curriculum's success indicated that a considerable amount of the curriculum projects designed could be improved if the following actions were taken: a) reorganising curriculum according to higher level skills and concepts; b) having students engage in problem-finding and problem-solving activities; and c) provide students with opportunities to make connections within and across the curriculum with emphasis placed on issues, themes and ideas. While these and other project goals were achievable, most projects had limited and mixed success.[7] Table II illustrates recorded strengths and weaknesses of new social studies projects.

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Table II: Strength / Weaknesses of New Social Studies Projects (1960-1974)[8]

Perceived Strengths	Perceived Weaknesses
Development / creativity of new materials	Often limited to "pilot schools" with curriculum materials often too expensive to purchase
Documentation of children's learning ability regardless of grade level	Backlash to hidden curriculum (e.g. discussion of controversial issues such as Civil Rights, Vietnam War, Women's Rights)
Increase use of discussion / problem solving to confront social / political issues	Training or lack thereof on new teaching strategies / materials
Firmly established the social sciences (e.g. anthropology, political science, history, geography, sociology, psychology, economics) with their own unique materials for the K-12 setting	Advance curriculum written by professors and not teachers often illustrated differences in content knowledge.
Provided classroom structure within the lessons	Amount of time to develop curriculum often was outpaced by events in society (assassination of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King, civil rights marches, etc.)

Yet through the criticism, successes and possible failures, important lessons were learned about students and effective pedagogy. First, projects suggested that children are curious and perceptive. They want facts about how people, society, and animals function. Second, students transform information. Students learn best when they have the opportunity to use new information in many different forms to include direct observations, data gathering, reading, role-playing, constructing projects, and watching films. Third, students accept diversity. Students, in general, have a tolerance for diversity. When asked to do so, students often approach their study of human behaviour with an openness that goes beyond the typical moralistic approaches to social studies education.[9]

With this in mind, we have developed a series of supplemental materials based on the strengths and weaknesses of over 15 new social studies projects. One of our major goals of the supplemental social studies curriculum is to attempt to foster the discussion of what could be perceived as closed areas in today's society (e.g. the war on terror, international conflict, immigration, religion in general and Islam specifically, stereotypes

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and perceptions of difference, and instability in the Middle East). In a recent survey of Memphis City and Shelby county social studies teachers (all within the state of Tennessee), a majority indicated that current social studies text books do not thoroughly explain or provide information regarding Muslims living in the United States. Furthermore, most teachers believe that the main reasons for the stereotyping of Muslims are a result of a lack of knowledge. This material is sought to be a beginning effort to open discussion between teachers and students regarding Muslim Americans. The purpose of Understanding Islam, the Middle East and Muslims in Memphis has been not merely the creation of curriculum, but also the improved training of teachers through clinical training, planning, and the use of differentiated instruction to increase content knowledge. Understanding Islam, the Middle East and Muslims in Memphis is directed toward teaching high school students of average ability in grades nine through twelve to analyse, discuss, justify, and clarify issues and dilemmas related to social and public policy towards Muslims, the Middle East, and Islam.

In conclusion, our project is aimed at developing an educational curriculum for Memphis and Tennessee for the integration of Muslims into mainstream society while respecting their traditions and cultures through developing an understanding of their unique backgrounds and history. Our project also aims at creating a detailed study of an increasingly important minority community in Memphis. The potential of this project and its ramifications are far reaching. What we develop for Memphis can act as a model for other Tennessee communities, the United States and other countries attempting to integrate Muslims into their societies and to assist in preventing future violence and social strife. In other words, this project has the potential to assist in solving one of the most troubling and dangerous issues facing not only our countries, but the world at large, namely disgruntled Muslim youth from turning towards radical fundamentalist Islam.

Notes

[1] By selecting the term 'integration' the authors mean the ability for a community or group to learn about and benefit from the broad social, political, economic, educational, and cultural opportunities presented in the broader society. The authors are not implying 'assimilation' into the dominant culture and society through the abandonment and loss of a community's own cultural and social identity.
[2] A McCloud, *Transnational Muslims in American Society*, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 2006, pp. 1-26; I. Ba-Yunus and K. Kone, *Muslims in the United States*. Greenwood Press, Westport, 2006, pp. 27-44.

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[3] D W Oliver and F.M. Newmann, *Cases and Controversy: Guide to Teaching the Public Issues Series / Harvard Social Studies Project,* Xerox Publishing Corporation, Middleton, CT., 1971.

[4] Y Haddad, ed., *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2002; Y. Haddad and J. Smith, eds., *Muslim Communities in North America*. SUNY Press, New York, 1994; Y. Haddad and J. Smith, eds., *Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible*. Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2002; J. Cesari, *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*. Palgrave Macmillan Press, New York, 2004; G. Abdo, *Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America after 9/11*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2006; T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Zapata-Barrero, eds., *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*. Routledge, London, UK, 2006.

[5] E Fenton, *The New Social Studies,* Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., New York, 1967.

[6] M Knight, *An Annotated List of New Social Studies Projects*, Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, Bloomington, IN., 1970.

[7] J VanTassel-Baska, J Feldhusen, K Seeley, G Wheatley, L Silverman, and W Foster, *Comprehensive Curriculum for Gifted Learners,* Allyn & Bacon Press, Needham Heights, MA, 1988.

[8] M Knight, op. cit.

[9] P Dow, 'MACOS: Social Studies in Crisis', *Educational Leadership,* vol. 43(1), 1979, pp. 35-39.

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Tracking the Diasporic Gaze

Birgit Breninger and Thomas Kaltenbacher

Abstract
Particularly in regard to national identity, diasporic gazes are believed to posit a challenge to what has been termed a more 'traditional gaze', sometimes defined as an "apparatus of investigation, verification, surveillance and cognition, which has served to sustain the traditions of Western post-Enlightenment scientificity and early modern technologies". In the context of the nation, the disruptiveness of the diasporic gazes also calls for a thorough investigation of what seems to constitute and set apart a 'traditional national' gaze and in what ways the 'diasporic gazes' can be revealed to differ, and as the case may be supplement seeing. Talking about the construction and perpetuation of national identities, we consider it necessary to accept a certain double-bind between images and viewers: images create viewers and viewers create images which then enter the logic of everyday 'ordinary' seeing and tend to nourish the idea of 'natural' or 'universal' seeing. Since a general cultural knowledge is needed to decipher an image, a close look is taken at the palimpsest of images that seem to make up 'national identity'. This process of polarisation, however, can only ever lead to an oversimplified categorisation of 'us' and 'them', das Heimelige (the homely) and das Unheimliche (the uncanny), 'self' and 'other'. Regarding the cultural dynamics of the nation, the diasporic gazes seem to promise to offer us 'other' viewpoints due to 'the genealogy of the mixed times and spaces'. These multiple ways of looking might as well hold the key to the modern dilemma of rigid national identity conceptions. Diaspora has become 'a' fashionable subject position but how can we show 'national seeing' in the context of cultural/national literacy and what can this process of 'showing different seeing' unveil. Is the double negative 'neither the one, nor the other' also appropriate in terms of the visual and if yes, does it perhaps hold out new ways for inculturation as dialogue or even new approaches to the well-masticated field of national identity?

Keywords: Diaspora**,** diasporic gaze, eye-tracker, inculturation.

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Did I mention my first sight of the African coast?
Something struck in me, in my soul, Celie, like a large bell,
and I just vibrated.
Alice Walker
The Color Purple

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1.   Introduction

        For some time now diasporic visual studies have been concerned
with the multiple viewpoints that move beyond the 'single-perspective' of
Western rationalism in order to bring out as well as to create alternative or
different ways of looking and spaces from which to look and be seen.[1]
Researchers with various disciplinary backgrounds have begun wondering
what the codes are by which some do look whilst others don't, what the
biological/genetical capacities of what can and what cannot be seen are and -
most important in this context here - what are the cultural constructions of
vision and how, on the other hand, does the visual construct the cultural.

        According to W.J.T. Mitchell one of the major problems hereby is
how to show seeing - of how to make the invisible visible.[2] In our pilot study
we investigate the culturally acquired acts of looking from which we view
and by which we inform what we see in relation to the sustenance of what has
been termed 'national identity' with the help of an eye-tracker. Particularly in
regard to national identity, diasporic gazes are believed to posit a challenge to
what has been termed a more 'traditional gaze', sometimes defined as an
"apparatus of investigation, verification, surveillance and cognition, which
has served to sustain the traditions of Western post-Enlightenment
scientificity and early modern technologies".[3] In the context of the nation, the
disruptiveness of the diasporic gazes also calls for a thorough investigation of
what seems to constitute and set apart a 'traditional national' gaze and in
what ways the 'diasporic gazes' can be revealed to differ, and as the case may
be supplement seeing. Talking about national identities, their construction as
well as their perpetuation, we consider it necessary to accept a certain double-
bind between images and viewers: images create viewers and viewers create
images which then enter the logic of everyday 'ordinary' seeing and tend to
nourish the idea of 'natural' or 'universal' seeing. Since a general cultural
knowledge is needed to decipher an image, it is particularly rewarding to
have a closer look at the palimpsest of images that seem to make up 'national
identity', and hence work to define and demarcate a nation. This process of
polarisation, however, can only ever lead to an oversimplified categorisation
of 'us' and 'them', das Heimelige (the homely) and das Unheimliche (the
uncanny), 'self' and 'other'. Regarding the cultural dynamics of the nation,
the diasporic gazes seem to promise to offer us 'other' viewpoints due to 'the
genealogy of the mixed times and spaces'.[4] These multiple ways of looking
might as well hold the key to the modern dilemma of rigid national identity
conceptions. Diaspora has become 'a' fashionable subject position but how
can we show 'national seeing' in the context of cultural/national literacy and
what can this process of 'showing different seeing' unveil. Is the double
negative 'neither the one, nor the other' also appropriate in terms of the
visual and if yes, does it perhaps hold out new ways for inculturation as

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dialogue or even new approaches to the well-masticated field of national identity?

The nation is a shifting terrain concerning images whose subjects often tend to translate differences into markers of information that are sometimes literally invisible, thereby most often creating 'a national/cultural capital' instead of generating 'global cultures'. The visual regime of the Austrian nation at the beginning of the twenty-first century with its carefully defined borders of identity is of special interest to this study. The images that nourish and sustain the nation's 'cultural capitals' from which some subjects try to educate immigrants how to see things 'the Austrian way', are of concern here.

Due to Austria's geographical position and her constant flow of immigrants, one might assume that the Austrians and Austria's political parties regard their country and the people as welcoming and open to immigration (Einwanderungsland), which seems not to be the case according to a recent study financed by Austria's Home Office.[5] Generally speaking, a rather hostile legal and political environment can be said to await immigrants in Austria. Only in the 1990s was the Gastarbeitersystem, by which people are 'imported' to work in Austria and expected to leave again after a certain time, replaced by a so called Quotensystem, which yearly regulates anew the number of rights of establishments (Niederlassungsbewilligung), and at the same time reduces immigration to Austria.[6] As Circo et al. point out in relation to non-EU member countries: "Austria is implementing a highly restrictive policy in the area of labour migration, also when it comes to different permits that one can be granted and to the conditions to be fulfilled for the granting thereof".[7] All in all it can be said that immigrants are not yet considered to represent well-appreciated part of Austrian culture/society but are often forced to live a life on the fringes of society on the uphill task to Austrian citizenship.

Against this national background it is of utmost importance to make visible the differences in gazes between national subjects and the various diasporas by tracking their gazes in order to foster and encourage an effective future dialogue between them.

2.   Study Design and Research Questions

This intentionally small pilot study was carried out to check whether the eyetracking technology can be effectively applied to this particular field of cultural studies, and to show whether eyetracking data is reliable and revealing in combination with various theoretical approaches in this field. Our research question was: Due to the 'multiple viewpoints' of diasporic people, do we get hybrid, or better, palimpsest gazes which comprise at least two 'national' gazes, or do we face cultural transfer and cultural fossilisation in diasporic subjects' viewing processes?[8] And secondly, might there even be

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a 'critical period' for cultural learning, as seen, for example, in second language (L2) learners? We assumed that a process similar to code switching in language learners happens in 'cultural gazes' - a phenomenon we referred to as cultural 'gaze switching', meaning, that if, a diasporic subject from Nigeria looks at a 'Nigerian stimulus' they know its meaning and if s/he looks at an Austrian stimulus, s/he switches gaze and is also able to read its cultural meaning. The ability to switch between 'cultural codes' was suspected to correlate with the duration of stay and personal interest.

3.   Material and Method
3.1   Subjects
          Nigerian subjects who consider themselves to be amongst the new diaspora in Austria were recruited among the Igbo/Nigerian community in Salzburg and Linz. Among the criteria for inclusion in the study were: literacy, moderate command of German and a minimum stay in Austria of one year. We were able to recruit 10 Nigerian/ Igbo subjects, two of whom were female and eight male. The average age of subjects was 36.2 years, with 25 being the youngest and 48 being the oldest. The average stay in Austria was 6.2 years, ranging from one year to thirteen years of stay in Austria. Our initial idea, to divide the Nigerian subjects into 'first' and 'second' generations, was dismissed due to the fact,\ that the so-called second generation is still too young (between one and ten years old). Five subjects considered their command of German 'intermediate', two 'moderate' and three regarded it as 'very good'. The educational degree of the Nigerian subjects was equivalent to GSCE level or higher (university education) in all ten subjects. For their participation in the study subjects were given 10 Euros, which were donated to the Igbo community/local church. As 'national' subjects, Austrian subjects/controls (without migrational background for at least three generations) equivalent to the Nigerian subjects in sex, age and education were recruited from volunteers in Salzburg and Linz.[9]

3.2   Stimuli and Paradigm
          The stimulus set comprised 25 images, from which the first five were used as trial items to explain the paradigm and the types of stimuli to the subjects. The stimuli were chosen by Austrian and Nigerian researchers and categorised into the following six groups:

          1. Tradition
          2. Politics
          3. Lifestyle and mentality
          4. International stereotypes and 'cultural fakes'
          5. Latest developments in politics and popular culture
          6. Nigerian home culture

Stimuli included two short texts (one English, one German) which should allow to compare subjects' reading abilities in the two languages and guide us against the mistake to construct a grand binary model of literacy and visuality, Austrian advertisements (modified to test the cultural literacy), webpage screenshots (from which relevant hidden vectors were eradicated) , drawings from a much-loved Austrian children's book as well as a cartoon and various photographic images (including two film stills).[10]

Eight of the twenty target items had been modified to test cultural literacy in the Austrian culture. Six of the twenty stimuli depicted everyday situations and festivities in Nigeria. The twenty target stimuli were presented in a randomised order, so that no two stimuli of the same category appeared in immediate succession. With every target item presented on the display monitor, subjects were asked a question to ensure that the image was viewed and evaluated carefully. An eyelink data file (.edf) was recorded for every subject, and subjects' pseudonyms were used to name the files.

3.3   Procedure

Before the recording session all subjects were asked to provide some personal data: name, age, occupation, education, mother tongue(s), nationality, duration of stay in Austria and command of German. All subjects were reassured that any information given would be treated confidentially. Thereafter all subjects were informed about the test design, which meant that - at the beginning - the eyetracking device was explained in detail, followed by a brief outline of the experiment. Subjects were provided with the background information that this cultural research is based on tracking the gaze and revealing the differences between what is and what is not seen. They were told that various images shown to them depict Austrian and Nigerian cultural events/situations, chosen by Austrian and Nigerian researchers. Subjects were informed that - while they were looking at the images - their eye movements would be tracked. The stimuli were presented onto a 17" Belinea monitor at a distance to the subjects' faces of approximately 60cm. The eyetracker's camera setup was set to 500 Hz, monocular 'pupil only' tracking. The experiment was carried out with a portable Eyelink 2 system (mobile eyetracker), which allowed us to travel to Linz, Upper Austria for two sessions. These sessions were conducted in the parochial house of St. Albans church, where the Igbo community of Linz holds their regular meetings. During these meetings, 10 subjects were tested. All other participants of the study were tested at the psycholinguistics lab at the department of linguistics, University of Salzburg. In order for subjects to view rather than scan the images, subjects were told that a question would be asked about the situation depicted in the image. Participants were given a game controlling device, with which they could control the duration of the stimulus presentation by pressing a button to let the image disappear from the

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display monitor. All answers were taken down by the experimenter and, in addition, we recorded them on minidisk in order to double-check subjects' answers. The average duration of a session was approximately 20 minutes.

3.4   Eyetracking: Method and Apparatus
          Eye-tracking is a state of the art empirical method for exploring how recipients of any kind of text (written, visual, plastic) read or view such a text. Eye-trackers have been put to ample use in the disciplines psychology, advertising, usability research (such as web design), medicine (diagnosis of visual impairment or dyslexia research), and mainstream psycho- and sociolinguistics.[11] Most recent issues addressed with the help of this methodology include scanpaths and saliency in scene perception, cross linguistic perspectives on eye-movements in reading, the 'cultural' gaze, semantic text - object relations. Eyetracking systems record eye movements and fixations at sampling rates of up to 2000Hz i.e. one picture per millisecond of the left and of the right eye. Through an algorithm eyetracking hardware is able to distinguish between smooth pursuit, vergence, optokinetic nystagm and other eye movements. Eye movements are measured by degrees and the data is transcribed into a coordinate system (e.g. from a screen or otherwise defined area), which allows accurate, virtually noise free evaluation of the data. The duration of an eyetracking experiment depends on the research questions method and - of course - the subject's patience.

Insight into cognitive processes such as image processing may be gained from the analysis of saccades and regressions - the ballistic eye movements that occur up to 3 - 4 times per second. These saccades show how an image or text is perceived and -most important for the present study - whether subjects identify the semantic relations that give meaning to the image. In reading, progressive and regressive saccades show whether a text is reader friendly or not but also whether a reader is able to parse the syntactic structures of a language. For reading eye movements, the duration of all fixations (= gaze duration) on a word may show whether subjects are familiar with a word and whether it is unknown, uncommon or not frequently used. For images, similar insight might be gained, showing whether a subject is familiar with an image or not. In tracking subjects' eye movements during viewing images a scanpath may be drawn from subjects eye movements patterns, revealing a gaze pattern or "viewing strategy" or - in this case - a "cultural/national gaze". The frequencies of fixations on certain aspects of an image may be interpreted similarly. Eye movements are arbitrary or involuntary i.e. directed and intentional. In this study the focus was on directed eye movements - when subjects' eyes followed the structure of the image, governed by cultural relations, the eye movements were considered directed eye movements. For this purpose great care is needed to avoid any form of hidden vectors that might suggest a scanpath.[12] In this study subjects'

eye movements were recorded at a sampling rate of 500 Hz i.e. one picture every 2 milliseconds. We used an Eyelink II head based eyetracker that is placed on subjects head -a "bearable" and very precise technology as it allows slight head movements of subjects without messing up the data.

4.   Preliminary Tendencies from Results

From a first screening of the acquired data one can conclude that the majority of our Nigerian subjects did not process the semantic relations hidden in the 'Austrian' stimuli. None of the subjects was able to decipher all cultural codes. The eye movement data of the experimental group of the culturally manipulated stimuli shows no evidence for a uniform scanpath which can only be obtained by cultural literacy. Whereas the Austrian control group shows a uniform scanpath of correct semantic relations paired with correct answers to all questions, the experiment group shows scanpaths that suggest arbitrary scanning of images without directed saccades to related objects. With the exception of one subject in one 'Austrian' stimulus, none of the Nigerian subjects showed 'Austrian' scanpaths. One stimulus, which is closely linked to a widely broadcast recent sports event (the UEFA Euro 2008) and was interpreted correctly by all Austrian controls, had not been interpreted in the 'Austrian way' by any Nigerian subject, showing a significant deviation in the scanpath from controls and subjects. On the other hand, controls did vary in their scanpaths in a way that suggests different ways of achieving a correct answer to the culturally coded stimuli. Only two of the eight target items showed a similar scanpath (also pointing to the plurality of the 'diasporic gazes') similar, however, for all controls and two out of ten subjects.

5.   Discussion and Outlook

Due to the hybridity of this approach, which opened up a 'third space' between empiricism and theory, it soon became obvious that we will not be able to translate complex cultural phenomena into rigid data. That is why we have chosen to discuss only two stimuli here in order to visualise the various interdependent tendencies in our study.

5.1 Stimulus: The May-tree
Stimulus 12: May-tree (photograph)

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This Austrian stimulus (no.12) of the category 'tradition' was shown to all participants, who where then asked: "Why are they firing guns?" The cultural background here is that it is a local custom to erect a barked tree decorated with Pretzels, ribbons and sausages on 1st May in every village and town district. Over the last couple of years this custom has been transformed into a highly popular social event, where people come together not only to break out the ale, but also to network and enjoy the spectacle (some people try to climb the tree and retrieve a Pretzel). All Austrian subjects came up with the 'correct' answer whereas only 1 out of 10 diasporic subjects was able to establish the visual link between the Maytree and the festival guns. In this case the values for 'gaze duration' (i.e. the average cumulative fixation duration of relevant objects) were particularly interesting, ranging from 15.343 seconds in Austrian subjects to 30.475 seconds in the Nigerian diasporic subjects. After approximately 8 seconds Austrian subjects fixated the Maytree, whereas the diasporic subjects who did fixate the Maytree (thereby establishing the semantic relations) did so after 20 seconds. This finding might also suggest that the time spent in Austria may not matter since the one diasporic subject who was able to read the cultural code had only spent 4 years in Austria.

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5.2 The Cordoba-Bleu

This Austrian stimulus relates to the recent UEFA Euro 2008, which was launched by McDonalds, creating a special burger for the event, named "Chicken Cordoba Bleu" - an allusion to an all time favourite Austrian dish called "Cordon Bleu" (a kind of cheese- and ham-filled Schnitzel). The name "Cordoba" refers to the one football event that every Austrian knows - Austria's victory over Germany (3:2) in Cordoba in 1978 / world cup. The stimulus was shown to all participants, who where then asked: "What is a Cordoba Bleu?" All Austrian subjects came up with a scanpath which enabled them to put forward the 'correct' answer since the connection between the word "Cordoba" and the result "3:2" was made. None of the Nigerian subjects was able to make this connection, yielding no football-related answers.

5.3   Outlook
        The method of eye-tracking has proven highly applicable for this area of research, yielding reliable and accurate results. Hence with more subjects yet to be tested and more stimuli to be included in future studies, we hope to obtain valid data to 10 be used in intercultural trainings and in the field of cultural studies. The results from this pilot study, however, show a tendency towards the existence of cultural fossilisation but not of a diasporic gaze (1st generation) which can readily switch between home and 'host' culture and is equally culturally literate - an actual 'sitting in between two

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stools'. Further research will be needed in order to compare and interpret the 'otherness' and read the multiplicity of hybrid gazes and its possible potential, which could neither have been proven nor made visible in this study. We will examine this in more detail by carrying out a large scale study with a larger set of stimuli.

Notes

[1] Cf Nicholas Mirzoeff, 'The Multiple Viewpoint: Diasporic Visual Cultures' in Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), *Diaspora and Visual Culture: Representing Africans and Jews*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.118.

[2] W J T Mitchell 'Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture' in Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), *The Visual Culture Reader*, 2nd ed., Routledge, London, 2007, p.86.

[3] I Rogoff 'Studying Visual Culture' in *The Visual Culture Reader*, p.31.

[4] Cf Nicholas Mirzoeff, op. cit., pp.162-3.

[5] Cf 'Der Einfluss von Immigration auf die Österreichische Gesellschaft: Österreichischer Beitrag im Rahmen der europaweiten Pilotstudie' ('The Impact of Immigration on Europe's Societies', IOM Wien, 2003: http:www.auslaender.atdownloadimmigration.oesterreich-studie.pdf, June, 2008, p.3.

[6] Ibid., p.4.

[7] I Circo, G Vilics, I Ilieva, T Kamenova and V Tsankov, *Migration Legislation: Austrian, Bulgarian, EU*, Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Sofia Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 2003, p.16.

[8] With palimpsest gazes we refer to 'overwritten' cultural gazes on which earlier cultural narratives are still 'visible' underneath newer ones and can be readily accessed.

[9] A follow-up study will unveil the 'recent diversity' in Austrian national gazes due to 'other/different' Austrian gazes, reflected by the new national gazes which represent and comprise the hybridity of various cultural backgrounds (second and third generations).

[10] G Kress and T van Leeuwen, , *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* Routledge, London, 2006. See also: Kress and van Leeuwen, 2001 and Kress and van Leeuwen, 2002.

[11] For an overview and recent literature see K Rayner, 'Eye movements' in *Psychological Bulletin: Reading and Information Processing 20 Years of Research.* 124, 3, pp. 372-422.

[12] For an overview see G Kress and Th van Leeuwen, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*, Routledge, London, 2006.

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A Commercial Identity?
The Antipodean Image in London

Robert Crawford

Abstract

This paper examines the construction and representation of the 'Antipodean' image in London during the 1990s and the 2000s. Prior to this period, the term had been limited to Australians and New Zealanders living in the UK. However, over the course of the 1990s the definition of an 'Antipodean' was extended to include the growing number of South Africans moving to London. This paper contends that this expansion of the term Antipodean has been primarily driven by commercial interests. By comparing and contrasting the experiences of Australian, New Zealand, and South African diasporas resident in London over the past twenty years, this paper also explores the distinct identities cultivated for and, indeed, by these diasporas as well as the degree to which they might actually share a common sense of being Antipodean.

Keywords: Antipodean, Australians, London, media, migration, New Zealanders, South Africans.

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Upon arrival in the UK, many Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans are often surprised to hear themselves described as Antipodean. While Australians and New Zealanders have long identified with one another when in the UK, South Africans appear to be particularly bemused by their inclusion. Many seem to think that their links with Australians and New Zealanders are tenuous at best:

> Britons recognise South Africans by their love for lager, biltong, rugby, cricket and their distinctive accent … This apparently places them in the same broad category as their southern hemispheric cousins, the Australians and New Zealanders.[1]

This paper explores the use of the term Antipodean in the UK and contends that commercial interests have been pivotal in its maintenance. Beginning with a survey of the flow of Australian, New Zealand, and South African migrants to London, the study will explore their respective

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similarities and differences. This will then provide a context for understanding the experiences of these diasporas and the ways that they connect to one another. Moreover, it will contextualise the important role played by the media outlets that serve them. By briefly examining such press outlets as In London and TNT Magazine as well as the different websites that also cater for London's antipodean diasporas, this paper will explore the role played by the media in the formation of identity for diasporic groups. While commercial interests have been the primary drivers of the contemporary use of Antipodean, the use of the term in these media outlets has nevertheless succeeded in creating something of a collective sense of identity amongst the Australian, New Zealand, and South African diasporas in London.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines Antipodes as 'Of or pertaining to the opposite side of the world; esp Australasian'.[2] Significantly, South Africans are excluded from this definition, an indication that they are not antipodean in the strictest sense of the term. Their omission additionally highlights their status as newcomers to the category, which also helps to account for the surprise they express when labelled Antipodean. The description of Australians, New Zealanders, and now South Africans as Antipodeans also reflects the historical relationship between these countries, whereby colonials arriving in the UK were viewed by their hosts as backward and uncultured cousins. Being labelled an Antipodean therefore places the recipient on the other side of the world – both physically and metaphorically. However, the historical differences between Australians and New Zealanders on the one hand and South Africans on the other establish an important framework for understanding the subsequent use and development of the term Antipodean.

The movement from the colonies to Britain has a long and well documented history. However, the contemporary relationship between Antipodeans and their British 'home' stems from the trends and developments that took place in the 1960s. In 'Beyond "Kangaroo Valley"' Stephen Alomes sketches the experience of a new generation of young Australians arriving in London: 'In the 1960s numbers peaked as the baby boomers came to adulthood, affluence facilitated travel, working rights were still generous, and the city of Sixties popular culture called'.[3] For Britons, this generation of Australians stands out for their 'colonisation' of Earls Court (better known as Kangaroo Valley) and, indeed, the individuals in their ranks that would go on to become household names – Germaine Greer, Clive James, and Barry Humphries. The popular image of the Australian abroad was caricaturised by the 1971 film The Adventures of Barry McKenzie. In his inimical style, Humphries used the film to satirise both Australians and their hosts. However, some 35 years later, Australian compatriots living in London are still identified this boorish, hedonistic image (by Britons and fellow Australians alike).

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Wrongly or rightly, this Australian image has also been applied to New Zealanders. Nigel Carter's characterisation of the New Zealand pattern of migration during the 1960s and 1970s is therefore a familiar one:

> At first most travellers went to London. They headed for the Overseas Club in Earls Court (Kangaroo Valley) or to New Zealand House in Haymarket. At both places there were bulletin boards advertising jobs and flats'.[4]

For these Australians and New Zealanders, the move to the UK was motivated by a perceived lack of opportunities with their homeland as well as a desire to see the world. Moving to London was soon identified as a rite of passage, particularly in New Zealand where this 'overseas experience' would become popularly known as 'doing the OE'.[5]

South African frustrations with their homeland were particularly pressing and inherently political. The country's decision to leave the Commonwealth in 1961 directly affected the flow of South Africans to the UK. With their Commonwealth privileges revoked, they now entered the UK as 'foreign nationals'. Apartheid also affected the type of immigrant arriving in the UK. Although they were overwhelmingly white, the presence of black, coloured, and Indian South Africans meant that they were more diverse than the Australian and New Zealand diasporas. For the exiles, Britain provided an asylum from which they could continue their struggle against the Apartheid system. As Mark Israel notes, politics provided a collective identification among the disparate South Africans, bringing 'together the most sizeable numbers in recognisably South African activities'.[6] It seems that 'the rite of passage' enjoyed by Australians and New Zealanders scarcely characterised of the experiences of these South Africans.

The pattern of migration from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to the UK that was established during the 1960s continued through to the 1990s. While the outlined social push and pull factors continued to motivate emigration from each country, the speed and the declining cost of air travel meant that a larger number could now uproot their lives to London. The impact of this democratisation of international travel can be glimpsed in The Adventures of Barry McKenzie. Noting that Barry's ever-present airways bag was 'even then … a sign of mental retardation', Tom O'Regan reveals how the film both recognised and satirised the new generation of non-middle class immigrants arriving in London.[7]

The increasing numbers of Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans in the UK did little to alter their popular image. However, by the late 1980s some were grumbling that such images failed to reflect the contemporary trends. TNT Magazine, for example, took particular exception at the popular image of an Australian in London:

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> [T]here appears to be a growing undercurrent of resentment about our image as a nation of ockers. We are no longer comfortable to use the tag. Bazza McKenzie was a disgrace. Paul Hogan was fun but he is not us … Yes, we **do** have a national character but it has very little to do with the one portrayed in the Castlemaine XXXX ads … As the major Australian magazine, we believe we have a duty to bury the ocker myth. To put the Bazza McKenzie image down where it belongs.[8]

In the magazine's following edition, the editorial revealed that the issue had 'stirred up a hornet's nest, at least from some quarters who believe that rather than trying to improve the Ocker image of Australasians in London, TNT should be catering to it'.[9] The magazine clearly sought to reflect and, indeed, inform readers' sense of identity.

The extension of TNT Magazine's 'ocker' discussion from Australians to Australasians is quite revealing. Established in 1983 with the express aim of serving London's Australians, TNT Magazine combined news from home, updates on events in London, and tips for travel. It was not long before reader base was expanded to include New Zealanders. For a free publication, this addition of some 30,000 potential readers made good commercial sense. However, as the excerpts above demonstrate, TNT Magazine prioritised its Australian readers and Australasians only came in second.

TNT Magazine was not the first publication to cater for Australians and New Zealanders in the UK. From 1887 to 1969, the British Australasian (in its various guises) had served a similar function whilst the New Zealand News was published for an exclusively New Zealand readership since 1927. Yet TNT Magazine's format clearly spoke to its target audience and it quickly succeeded in establishing itself as the pre-eminent publication for young Australians and New Zealanders in London. While the numbers of South Africans living in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s were only marginally fewer than the number of Australians, neither TNT Magazine nor its predecessors had regarded them as potential readers. Clearly, the editors of these publications recognised that the South African diaspora was substantially different to the Australian and/or New Zealand equivalents. South Africans were served by South Africa (1888-1961), Southern Africa (1961-1970) and then South African News (1983-2005).

In 1994 South Africa held its first free elections. The victory of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress saw South Africa welcomed back into the Commonwealth. While membership of the Commonwealth in the 1990s no longer offered the same levels accessibility to the UK, it nevertheless provided new opportunities to South Africans – particularly those who were not entirely sure about Rainbow Nation's future. Emigration

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levels immediately increased. While political emigration continued, the exiles were now fleeing a black government. South Africa's spiralling crime rate and crumbling infrastructure quickly displaced political concerns as the primary motivators for leaving the country. The weakening of the Rand and the government's affirmative action measures similarly encouraged many South Africans to pack their bags. An estimated 814,000 white South Africans emigrated abroad between 1995 and 2005 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States being the leading destinations.[10] However, the most accessible and therefore the most popular destination for South African emigrants has been the United Kingdom. Census data reveals that the number of South-African born people in the UK more than doubled over the course of the 1990s.[11]

The UK Government's Entry Clearance statistics for the period spanning 1994 and 2006 reveal that 217,216 South Africans entered the UK on temporary visas and a further 18,238 arriving on permanent visas.[12] Between 2001/2 and 2005/6 almost two-thirds of the temporary visas issued were under the working holiday maker programme. Such visas provided an opportunity for people under 27 (later expanded to 30) to live and work in the UK for two years. This rapid influx of South Africans arriving on working holiday maker visas not only altered the demography of the South African diaspora in the UK, it also had a marked impact on its public perception. In The Expat Confessions, Ted Botha and Jenni Baxter describe them as 'expatniks' (rather than 'real' expatriates) whose raison d'etre for being in London was to have fun:

> Expatniks try to live as cheaply as possible, often in communes, sleeping as many as five to a room. They work through temp agencies and take on accounting, secretarial and catering jobs, something that can be paid by the hour. Their focus is on earning as many pounds as possible so that they can a) party, b) travel cheaply, c) party some more and d) save enough to go home and buy a car or even put a down payment on a house.[13]

While few of the earlier generations of South Africans living in London would have identified with this image, there were others in the British capital that certainly did.

Australians and New Zealanders had long been arriving in the UK on working holiday maker visas and it is therefore little surprise that the image outlined by Botha and Baxter has historically been applied to them. The institutions and firms that have served these working holiday makers also recognised the commercial opportunities to be derived from this rapidly expanding number of South African 'expatniks'. Significantly, we can see

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that the Antipodean label begins to be applied to South Africans just as their experiences mirror those of their Australasian counterparts. This expansion is captured by a 1997 report from The Telegraph describing the Australasian institution established in 1979 – the Church:

> Every Sunday morning more than 1,000 Antipodeans get out of bed … and head towards a warehouse in north London. Their destination is an unadvertised event called the Church. … "We stick to the same running order each week," says head security man Herman … "1pm Unfurl the flags of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (old and new versions). 1.30pm Filthy comedian comes on. 2pm Stripper. 2.30pm Drinking Games. 3.30pm everybody out".[14]

Ten years later, Dylan Nichols observes that little had changed - although he did note 'the music isn't purely old Australian pop hits but is now diverse enough to accommodate South African, New Zealand and even English ears'.[15]

The Walkabout chain of pubs that emerged across the UK in the mid-1990s similarly celebrated the hedonistic Antipodean image. However, unlike the Church, its image of Antipodean was for general consumption. As Brad West observes, this chain of pubs identified British drinkers as its key demographic market although the presence of Australian and New Zealand consumers also helped produce an authentic feeling.[16] While the Walkabouts currently carry the slogan 'the awesome spirit of the Southern hemisphere' in order to include South Africans, the emergence of bars with a distinctly African theme (such as Zulus Bar) suggest that the Walkabouts' antipodean-ness is primarily envisaged in terms of Australia and New Zealand.

The Walkabout and the Church were not the first commercial institutions to extend their conceptualisation of antipodean to include the new generation of South Africans. In 1995 TNT Magazine re-branded itself as the magazine for Antipodeans in London. This decision displayed remarkable foresight as the South African and Australasian experiences of the UK were still markedly different. However, TNT Magazine anticipated that the South Africans who would increasingly arrive in the UK via the working-holiday visa scheme would begin to share the outlooks, desires, and experiences of its established audience. This prediction would prove correct; the number of South Africans arriving on temporary visas grew from 3,050 in 1994 to 32,631 in 2004/5.[17] Overwhelmingly young, relatively affluent, and white, these South Africans were hardly representative of their country but their demographics certainly mirrored TNT Magazine's established market. While the magazine could not have predicted the push factors driving South

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Africans from their home (crime, economics, affirmative action), it would have been well aware of the pull factors attracting them to the UK and specifically London. A 2007 survey of South Africans abroad reveals that those living in London were primarily motivated by work prospects and the opportunity to travel - motives that are mirrored by Australians and New Zealanders.[18] As TNT Magazine's major advertisers were in the tourism and employment industries, the extension of Antipodean to include South Africans appears to have been a logical and, more importantly, a profitable decision.

TNT Magazine's success in reaching out to the lucrative Antipodean market has prompted others to do likewise. Blue Sky Publications' chain of newspapers, for example, reaches out to all three nationalities yet it does not publicly refer them as Antipodeans. Rather than producing a single publication, it publishes three separate newspapers: the Australian Times, the New Zealand Times, and the South African. However, with the exception of their news from home and sporting results, these publications contain the same feature articles and, generally, the same advertisers (particularly in the case of the Australian Times and the New Zealand Times). Antipodean in all but name, such publications indicate that the commercial organisations (whether they are publishers selling their readers or advertisers seeking access to them) have an active interest in identifying a single market rather than three small and separate markets.

In addition to informing and entertaining the Australian, New Zealand and South African markets, the community media has also been instrumental in forging a sense of community amongst its readers. Speaking to three transient diasporas, these media outlets uniquely constitute a consistent institution that also performs an active role in organising communal events. TNT Magazine, for example, has long been an active organiser of social events for its readers. While some are nation-specific (such as Australia Day and Waitangi Day), others are aimed at the broader Antipodean community. The magazine's recent 'Four Nations Challenge 2008' (which included an English team) attracted a crowd of 300 spectators. [19] In London's 2004 Sports Awards similarly hit two birds with the one stone: the event not only united the magazine, advertisers, and the Antipodean audience it also provided photographic material for the next edition.[20]

Significantly, the number of participants involved in these media organised events suggest that there something of a shared sense of community is in fact emerging among London's Antipodeans. This identity can also be discerned in other commercial endeavours. As its title suggests, www.antipodate.co.uk is a match-making website aimed at Antipodeans in the UK. For the uninitiated, the website's function and title are explained:

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> Maybe you're an Aussie, Saffa, Kiwi, Zimbo or other expat
> in the UK … looking for a friend, date, travel partner or
> serious relationship or maybe you'd just like to meet one of
> these people - it's for anyone. The Antipodean term that is
> the basis of our name is often used - particularly in the UK
> - to refer to Aussies and Kiwis or more loosely to all this
> group from the Southern Hemisphere.[21]

Significantly, Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans only form 49% of the site's clients.[22] Like the Walkabout pubs, it seems that this commercial venture also caters for Britons who, ahem, hope gain an Antipodean experience. Commercial interests might be active in generating an Antipodean identity but the audience's positive response to these initiatives and events indicates that they are far from passive recipients.

In South Africa's Cape Times newspaper, Gerald Shaw observed that London provided 'young South Africans an intensified experience of their South African-ness. Whatever they are, they clearly are not British, even if Ozzies and Kiwis are a kind of soul-mate'.[23] While the latter comment certainly alludes to an Antipodean identity, it seems that this notion nevertheless remains weak. As the Zimbabwean-born editor of In London noted: 'we cater for Aussies, Kiwis and Saffas and we all have things in common, like: good weather, great work ethic and a goodly thirst, but sometimes it feels like we are oceans apart'.[24] The first respondents to a survey that I am currently conducting on South Africans in London confirm these observations. Asked whether they viewed themselves as South Africans, South African Britons, Britons, or Antipodeans, only one of the 75 respondents identified themselves as being Antipodean. 43% of respondents included South Africans in their definition of Antipodean whilst 17% limited it to Australians and New Zealanders. The notion that South Africans are Antipodeans appears to gaining ground.

In conclusion, it seems that Antipodean-ness has been and continues to be used by commercial interests as well as Antipodeans themselves as a means of establishing a sense of commonality in an alien place. By situating Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans in relation to their host country and, indeed, their hemispheric neighbours, the Antipodean discourse enables individuals to identify with others who share the same experiences and outlooks. Commercial interests in turn play an active role in harnessing and reinforcing these sentiments for commercial gain. For many Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans, it seems that the concept of Antipodean is an increasingly accepted label but not one that is wholeheartedly embraced. As one respondent to my survey noted: 'I think that is a British or maybe Australian concept. don't like the term'.

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Notes

[1] J Van Rooyen, *The New Great Trek: The Story of South Africa's White Exodus* , University of South Africa, Pretoria,2000, p. 162.

[2] *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, http://oed.com: accessed 7 January 2008.

[3] S Alomes, 'Beyond "Kangaroo Valley": The Rituals of Australian London', *Australian Studies*, 17:1, Summer 2002, p. 7.

[4] N C Carter, *The Big OE: Tales from New Zealand Travelers*, Tandem Press, Auckland, 2001, p.11.

[5] C Bell, 'The Big "OE": Young New Zealand Travellers as Secular Pilgrims', *Tourist Studies*, 2:2, 2002, pp.144-5.

[6] M Israel, *South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom* , Macmillan, London, 1999, p.3.

[7] T O'Regan, 'Cinema Oz: The Ocker Films' in Albert Moran & Tom O'Regan (eds), *The Australian Screen* , Penguin, Melbourne,1989, p. 83.

[8] 'TNT Comment - The Ocker Myth', *TNT Magazine*, 209, 31 August 1987, p.4.

[9] 'TNT Comment - A Pleasant Sunday', *TNT Magazine*, 210, 7 September 1987, p.4.

[10] F Cronje, 'More Jobs Less Work' , *Fast Facts*, 8-9, August-September 2006,p.1.

[11] Population Census of Great Britain, UK Office for National Statistics, 1971-2001

[12] Entry Clearance Statistics, 1994 – 2005/6 (UK Visas)

[13] T Botha & J Baxter, *The Expat Confessions: South Africans Abroad Speak Out!,* Jented Publishing ,New York & Australia, 2005, p.8.

[14] 'A Real Larynx Wobbler', *Daily Telegraph* (9 August 1997).

[15] D Nichols, *What are You doing Here? The Question of Australians in London*, Pen Press Publishers, Brighton, 2007, p. 149.

[16] B West, 'Consuming National Themed Environments Abroad: Australian Working Holidaymakers and Symbolic National Identity in "Aussie" Theme Pubs', 6:2, 2006, p.142.

[17] Entry Clearance Statistics, 1994 – 2005/6 (UK Visas)

[18] Homecoming Revolution Dataset (Homecoming Revolution 2007)

[19] Correspondence with Krysten Booth, editor *TNT Magazine*, 16 June 2008.

[20] 'London Cam', *In London*, 11, November 2004, pp.40-1.

[21] 'Who's It For?' WhatsItAllAbout.aspx, accessed 1 June 2008. , http://www.antipodate.co.uk/

[22] Personal Correspondence with Adam Fowler, creator of www.antipodate.com (7 July 2008).

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[23] G Shaw, 'English South Africans discover a Sense of Identity in "Alien" London', *Cape Times*, 16 January 2002, p. 9.
[24] 'Editor's Letter', *In London*, 27, April 2006, p.4.

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Points of Entanglement:
The Overdetermination of German Space and Identity in *Walk on Water*

Nicholas Baer

Abstract

In this essay, I consider how films have engaged with the politics of German space and identity in the context of the country's National Socialist past - and, more specifically, in the context of relations between and among Germans, Turks, and Jews. I analyse a scene from Israeli director Eytan Fox's *Walk on Water* (2004) that evokes Berührung between and among these groups through its use of a space in Berlin that bears weighty historical and ideological connotations. Of key interest for me is the function of queerness and drag in the scene, as well as the manner in which the scene serves not only as a contestation over space, but also as an opportunity for the (re)articulation of the German body politic.

Keywords: Alexanderplatz, Berlin, body politics, drag queens, Eytan Fox, Jews, neo-Nazis, Turks, *Walk on Water*, Zionism.

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In recent years, writers and scholars have begun to address the issue of how Turkish-Germans, who comprise the largest national minority group in contemporary German society, can engage with Germany's past. Zafer Şenocak has noted the exclusivity of German memorial culture and has posed the question, "Can immigrants participate in shaping the German future without having access to a shared history with the native population?"[1] Likewise, in a series of texts, Leslie Adelson has observed the omission of Turkish-Germans from the "interpretive landscape" of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, as well as from the larger "narrative of post-war German history".[2] Criticizing the tendency to imagine a Turkish-German encounter as one "between German culture and something outside it" rather than "between the German past and the German present", Adelson has developed a critical grammar in order to reconceptualise the manner in which cultural contact between Germans and Turkish-Germans is represented.[3] Finally, Andreas Huyssen has considered the relationship between diasporic and national memory by focusing on the question of whether Turkish-Germans can and should "migrate" into the German past. Huyssen has concluded that such a temporal migration will remain impossible so long as Germany's public

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memory discourse "remains fundamentally and persistently national, focused on German perpetrators and Jewish victims."[4]

It bears noting that this growing body of work has remained centred on the medium of literature; indeed, texts by Şenocak and other Turkish-German authors have been the foci of Adelson and Huyssen's analyses. Film scholars including Rob Burns, Deniz Göktürk, Barbara Mennel, and Hamid Naficy have written informative and illuminating texts on Turkish-German cinema and its spatial tropes; they have largely concentrated on the tropes of enclosure, claustrophobia, and imprisonment, and they have noted a general move from a "sub-national" cinema that reinforces notions of cultural homogeneity and authenticity to a "transnational" cinema of circulation and hybridity.[5] However, no one has presented a sustained analysis of how films have engaged with the politics of German space and identity in the context of the country's National Socialist past - and, more specifically, in the context of relations between and among Germans, Turks, and Jews. In this essay, I will analyse a scene from Israeli director Eytan Fox's *Walk on Water* (2004) that evokes Berührung between and among these groups through its use of a space in Berlin that bears weighty historical and ideological connotations.[6]

For films using spaces as a means of evoking Germany's past in the minds of viewers, the city of Berlin serves as "fertile symbolic terrain."[7] Andreas Huyssen writes, "There is perhaps no other major Western city that bears the marks of twentieth-century history as intensely and self-consciously as Berlin. This city-text has been written, erased, and rewritten throughout this violent century, and its legibility relies as much on visible markers of built space as on images and memories repressed and ruptured by traumatic events."[8] In the following examination of a scene from *Walk on Water*, I will consider not only how such spaces, images, and memories are evoked, but also how they are made legible in new ways, such that German space and identity become renegotiated. I will analyse a scene of neo-Nazi violence that Fox stages in the Alexanderplatz U-Bahn station of Berlin - a scene that has been inexplicably overlooked, or given mere cursory treatment, in the existing literature on the film.[9] Of key interest for me will be the function of queerness and drag in the scene, as well as the manner in which the scene serves not only as a contestation over space, but also as an opportunity for the (re)articulation of the German body politic. Indeed, if, as scholars such as Uli Linke have argued, the space of the German nation continues to be conceptualised as a body in contemporary discourses around German identity (much as it was during the country's National Socialist era), then the spatial politics of this scene becomes inextricably linked to the politics of race, nationality, gender, and sexuality.

In Eytan Fox's film, the hyper-masculine Eyal is a recently widowed Mossad agent who guides Axel, a gay German man, around Israel during a trip to visit his sister, Pia. Axel works for an organization in Berlin that

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assists the children of immigrants from countries such as Turkey, and Pia lives in a kibbutz in Israel. Axel and Pia's grandfather, Alfred Himmelman, is a Nazi war criminal who has lived in Argentina since the end of World War II, but who has recently disappeared. Since Pia is seeking a tour guide for Axel during his visit, and since Eyal is fluent in German (unbeknownst to Axel and Pia), Eyal is assigned to pose as the guide in order to gather information on the whereabouts of their grandfather. Eyal eventually develops a certain rapport with Axel - a rapport that is nonetheless ruined when Axel reveals his homosexuality to Eyal and has an affair with a Palestinian man. Despite the ensuing tension between the two men, Axel tells Eyal to contact him if ever in Germany; Eyal responds, "I've never been to Germany and I don't think I'll ever want to go." However, after learning that Alfred may be returning to Germany for the 70th birthday celebration of Axel's father, Eyal flies to Berlin and surprises Axel.

        In the scene that I will analyse, Eyal and Axel enter the Alexanderplatz U-Bahn station, where they pass by three neo-Nazis and then encounter four drag queens whom Axel knows. After conversing with the drag queens, Eyal and Axel begin to descend a staircase to the U8 track. However, when they hear a scream from above, Eyal and Axel run up the staircase and find that the neo-Nazis are attacking the drag queens. Just as it seems that Eyal has successfully wielded off the neo-Nazis, one of the three begins to run towards Eyal with a broken beer bottle in his hand. Eyal pulls out a gun, directs it at the neo-Nazi, and says, "Verpiss dich, du Arschloch, oder ich blas dir das Hirn raus!" [Fuck off, asshole, or I'll blow your brains out!]. The three neo-Nazis subsequently leave the station. In the following scene, after riding the U-Bahn in silence to Potsdamer Platz, Axel asks Eyal about his fluency in German and his reasons for bringing a gun to Berlin, and he invites Eyal to attend his father's forthcoming birthday celebration in Wannsee.[10]

        This scene of neo-Nazi violence forms clear links between the National Socialist era and contemporary Germany. Eyal, for whom Germany continues to be overdetermined by the policies and actions of the Third Reich, associates the neo-Nazis' attack on the drag queens with Nazi violence against Jews. The scene contains many indications of his feeling of discomfort in the space of Berlin; for example, after passing the neo-Nazis at the entrance to the train station, he immediately looks back upon hearing the sound of a bottle breaking. Later in the scene, while pulling out the gun and directing it at the neo-Nazi, Eyal reveals his German-language fluency - a mark of his family's ties to Germany. When Axel prods Eyal about his German fluency in the following scene, Eyal responds, "My parents spoke German. My mother was born in Berlin. She lived there until they had to move and hide. That's how I grew up - no German products in the house, no travel to Germany, no talking about it." Axel then asks if this motivated

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Eyal's decision to bring a gun with him to Berlin, and Eyal explains, "Just before I left for the airport, I got scared. I didn't really think it over; I just took it."[11] Eyal's account of his mother's forced exile from Berlin and his family's frayed relationship to Germany become both a temporal referent for the scene's spatial politics and an explanation for Eyal's strong reaction to the neo-Nazi attack.[12]

Since both the drag queens and the neo-Nazis remain unnamed and undeveloped, and since they never reappear in the film, one might wonder why they are introduced in this scene. I would argue that their presence must be seen in the context of the film's engagement with national boundaries and body politics. Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, Judith Butler has written, "If the body is synecdochal for the social system per se or a site in which open systems converge, then any kind of unregulated permeability constitutes a site of pollution and endangerment."[13] According to Butler, male homosexual practice, which "establishes certain kinds of bodily permeabilities unsanctioned by the hegemonic order", thus becomes a "site of danger and pollution";[14] furthermore, drag serves to destabilize and even denaturalise the bodily boundaries along which the social order is articulated.[15] It bears noting that this scene at the Alexanderplatz station is immediately preceded by a scene in which Axel takes Eyal to a gay bar. In this scene, Eyal shows a heretofore-unprecedented openness to the topic of gay sexual practices; he displays curiosity about the dynamics of anal sex, and he expresses particular interest in the degree to which gay men are "easygoing" in terms of crossing boundaries of nationality. When Eyal and Axel encounter the drag queens in the following scene, they ask Axel about the bar - thereby linking them to this conversation about national and corporal boundaries.

Apart from being associated with the crossing and confounding of boundaries, the drag queens function to convey what Marjorie Garber has called "category crisis". In her study of the role of transvestism in cultural forms and representations, Garber writes, "One of the most consistent and effective functions of the transvestite in culture is to indicate the place of what I call 'category crisis,' disrupting and calling attention to cultural, social, or aesthetic dissonances."[16] In Garber's words, "category crisis" is "a failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable, that permits of border crossings from one (apparently distinct) category to another" - e.g. male/female, black/white, Jew/Christian.[17] According to Garber, the figure of the transvestite thus "function[s] as a sign of overdetermination - a mechanism of displacement from one blurred boundary to another".[18] The drag queens in this scene of Fox's film are indeed seemingly indeterminable in terms of their race, gender, and sexuality (the three identified actors who play them - Hubertus Regout, Biggi van Blond, and Paysley Dalton - are Belgian, German, and African-American,

respectively); they alternate between German and English, and immediately disregard norms of propriety as they flirt with Eyal. When Axel introduces Eyal to them as "ein Freund von mir aus Israel" [a friend of mine from Israel], one of the drag queens even reverts to Hebrew while asking Eyal, "Ma nishma?" [How are you?].[19] After parting ways with the drag queens, Axel tells Eyal, "Don't get upset; they're really okay", and Eyal responds, "Don't patronize. Remember: we invented Dana International" - a reference to the transsexual Israeli singer, originally named Yaron Cohen, who won the 1998 Eurovision Song Contest.

Here, the drag queens become signs of overdetermination not only because they blur a range of social boundaries, but also because of their implicit connection to another group that has signified boundary-crossing and "category crisis": Jews. Indeed, as Garber has written, both the transvestite and the Jew can function as "a sign of the category crisis of the immigrant, between nations, forced out of one role that no longer fits […] and into another role, that of a stranger in a strange land".[20] During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Jews were both associated with a sense of statelessness and linked to women and homosexuals.[21] For example, in Chapter Thirteen ("Das Judentum") of Sex and Character (1903), Otto Weininger characterizes the Jew as having "keine Wurzeln" [no roots, 431] and being "von jeher staatfremd" [from time immemorial foreign to the State, 411].[22] Weininger writes of "der schnell sich verwandelnde Jude" [the quickly transforming Jew, 412] as a "Grenzenverwischer" [obscurer of borders, 417] with qualities of "Formlosigkeit" [formlessness, 417], "Beweglichkeit" [mobility, 429], and an "unendliche Veränderungsfähigkeit" [unending potential for change, 429], as well as with a "Mangel an irgend welcher Bodenständigkeit" [lack of any type of rootedness, 431]. Weininger finds numerous points of "Kongruenz zwischen Judentum und Weiblichkeit" [congruence between Jewry and femininity, 429], and he asserts that "unsere Zeit" is "nicht nur die jüdischeste, sondern auch die weiblicheste aller Zeiten" - a "Zeit ohne Sinn für Staat und Recht" [our time is not only the most Jewish, but also the most feminine of all times - a time without sense for State and Law, 441]. Jews were thus both coded as non-normative in terms of gender and sexuality, and associated with the Verwischung of traditional cultural and national boundaries - stereotypes to which the Zionist movement directly responded.

In the context of the scene, Eyal's act of successfully defending the drag queens against the neo-Nazis' physical attack would seem to serve as a validation and reinscription of his Zionist masculine identity. However, the scene is filled with indications of a transformation in Eyal's identity and of his increasing disinvestment from the Zionist project. As aforementioned, Eyal shows an unexpected and unprecedented openness to the subjects of homosexuality and transvestism, which are here associated with the crossing

and obscuration of national boundaries. Furthermore, Eyal's allusion to Dana International is a curious one, given that Eyal and Dana International would seem to represent two opposing types of Israeli masculinity: while Eyal is associated with "the masculinising and heterosexualising project of Herzlian Zionism", Dana International marks a challenge to "the prime national ideals of heterosexual masculinity": [23]

> If European Jews went to Palestine to become "normalised" as men, Dana International reversed the process. She went from Israel to Europe to become a woman (her 1993 genital surgery, described repeatedly and in detail in the Israeli press after the Eurovision contest, took place in Britain) and then she sashayed her queer femininity across the Eurovision stage. […] Dana's symbolic rejection of the fundaments of Zionism goes even further. She turned in a priestly, Israeli name for the moniker of a rootless cosmopolitan. What kind of Zionist calls herself International - and sings in Arabic as well as in Hebrew (and in French and English, as well)? "We don't need borders," Dana proclaimed exultantly the day after her Eurovision victory, in the ultimate rebuke to the ideal of the nation-state. [24]

By alluding to, associating with, and defending figures of non-normative gender and sexual identity in this scene, Eyal forms an unexpected coalitional politics around past and present targets of (neo-)Nazi violence. [25] However, rather than viewing Eyal in "the role of protector, firmly on the side of Axel and the attacked drag queens", [26] I would draw attention to the ways in which Eyal's own Zionist masculinity becomes loosened through the evocation of the two terms against which it is defined: queerness and Nazi violence. [27] Indeed, within this scene, Eyal marks himself as a member of the German-Jewish diaspora by revealing his linguistic and affective ties to Germany. If, in the words of Daniel Boyarin, "Diaspora is essentially queer," then Eyal's self-positioning as a diasporic subject in this scene represents a transformation - and even queering - of his identity. [28]

While Jews, queers, and drag queens are here linked by association with the transgression and obscuration of boundaries of gender and nationality, the neo-Nazis' assault on the drag queens becomes an occasion for the negotiation and articulation of the German body politic. Uli Linke has noted a point of discursive continuity between the Freikorps men and the German politicians who reacted against the "influx" of refugees and immigrants in the post-war era: both wished to hold the imagined national body "together as an entity, a distinct body with fixed boundaries". [29] Given

this point of continuity, it is no surprise both that the neo-Nazis direct their attack against the drag queens, and that the beginning of the attack (marked by the scream of one of the drag queens) interrupts Axel's performance of Dana International's song "Diva" - a performance which itself crosses lines of nationality and gender.[30] Later in the scene, Eyal and Axel's verbal accounts of the neo-Nazis become articulations of who should be driven raus from German space, here imagined as a collective body. Eyal tells a neo-Nazi, "Verpiss dich, du Arschloch, oder ich blas dir das Hirn raus!" [Fuck off, asshole, or I'll blow your brains out!], and Axel later tells Eyal, "It's too bad you didn't kill him, dieses Stück Scheiße [this piece of shit]. These people pollute the world. They turn everything into shit." Both statements rely on what Linke has called a "rhetoric of expulsion", whereby "the denial of membership and the expulsion of people are linguistically conceptualised as processes of excorporation".[31] In using words such as "Arschloch" and "Scheiße" to label the neo-Nazis, Eyal and Axel associate the neo-Nazis with abject, contaminous elements of the collective national body. Since Jews were once subjected to this "rhetoric of expulsion",[32] Eyal's statement - already notable for its indication of his fluency in German - becomes a means of reclaiming German space and even rearticulating German identity.

Like the drag queens, the very space in which the scene plays out serves as a "sign of overdetermination".[33] As Hamid Naficy notes in his study of "accented cinema", borders, tunnels, and trains often serve within exilic and diasporic films as "important transitional and transnational places and spaces", as well as "privileged sites […] of journeys of and struggles over identity".[34] The Alexanderplatz station, which is known as one of Berlin's major Verkehrsknotenpunkte [transportation hubs], serves as a Knotenpunkt [nodal point] for the various aspects of Eyal's history and identity that converge in this scene. Not only does Eyal clearly associate the neo-Nazis with the Nazis who drove his family out of Germany; his fight with the neo-Nazis also leads him to reveal his fluency in German and his family's ties to the country. Furthermore, a neighbouring architectural structure becomes an overdetermined symbol of German-Jewish relations within the film's diegesis. When Eyal bugs Pia's apartment in Israel in an earlier scene of the film, he installs a microphone in a model-sized Fernsehturm [TV Tower] – a structure adjacent to Berlin's Alexanderplatz. Later in the film, when the plot moves to Berlin, Fox juxtaposes Pia's model-sized Fernsehturm against the "real" one, which Eyal sees from the window of his hotel room. In a film that contrasts Eyal's preformed assumptions about Germany to his later experiences within the country, the Fernsehturm becomes a dynamic symbol of the space's resonances and connotations for Eyal, as well of as the shifting dynamics of Eyal's relationships with Pia and Axel.

Beyond representing a transformation in both Eyal's identity and his relationship to Germany, the Alexanderplatz station complements the scene's

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thematic of national and corporal boundaries, as well as its interest in unexpected linkages between and among various minority groups. As Eyal and Axel walk down the staircase of the Alexanderplatz station in this scene, they approach the track for the U8, a line that moves between East and West Berlin. During the years of Berlin's division, the U8 track was separated from the rest of the Alexanderplatz station, and its access points were walled off; it thereby became one of Berlin's so-called "Geisterbahnhöfe" [ghost stations]. Fox's use of this overdetermined site of division thus becomes an ideal backdrop for a scene in which national and corporal boundaries are crossed and obscured. Furthermore, it bears noting that Berlin becomes the third city depicted in the film that is marked by a history of division; the film begins in Istanbul (identified in the film as the "border between Asia and Europe"), continues in Jerusalem (with its literal and figurative divisions between Israelis and Palestinians), and then moves to Berlin - a city known for, and still marked by, its walled division between 1961 and 1989.

Just as Turkey becomes a part of this triangulation with Germany and Israel, Turkish-Germans become a part of the constellation of minority subjects evoked within this scene. Indeed, after initially parting ways with the drag queens, Axel tells Eyal that many of the drag queens volunteer at his organization - an organization that assists Turkish children in Berlin. It is at this point in the scene that Eyal both orders Axel not to "patronize" him and reminds Axel, "We invented Dana International." Queers and drag queens thus serve as the links between Jews and Turks within this scene of Fox's film. As Jeffrey Peck notes in his comparative study of Jews and Turks as "minorities in Germany after the Holocaust", both groups serve as "constant reminders of history and its import for contemporary identities that are intertwined and constantly shifting";[35] furthermore, both groups' mere presence within the overdetermined German cultural terrain "unsettles the established notion of what it means to be German".[36] While the ghosts of history haunt characters and viewers alike throughout this scene in one of Berlin's former Geisterbahnhöfe, Fox himself challenges fixed conceptions of Germanness and alterity by evoking illicit Berührung across a range of temporal and spatial markers, and between and among Germans, Jews, and Turks.

Notes

[1] Z Şenocak, *Atlas of a Tropical Germany: Essays on Politics and Culture, 1990-1998*, L Adelson (trans. and ed.), University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 2000, p. 53.

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[2] L Adelson, 'Touching Tales of Turks, Germans, and Jews: Cultural Alterity, Historical Narrative, and Literary Riddles for the 1990s'. *New German Critique*, no. 80, 2000, pp. 95, 96.

[3] L Adelson, 'Against Between: A Manifesto', in *Unpacking Europe: Towards a Critical Reading,* S Hassan and I Dadi (eds.), NAi Publishers, Rotterdam, 2001, pp. 246-247.

[4] A Huyssen, 'Diaspora and Nation: Migration Into Other Pasts'. *New German Critique*, no. 88, 2003, p. 164.

[5] See R Burns, 'Turkish-German Cinema: From Cultural Resistance to Transnational Cinema?', in *German Cinema Since Unification,* D Clarke (ed), Continuum, New York, 2006, pp. 127-150; D Göktürk, 'Turkish Delight - German Fright: Migrant Identities in Transnational Cinema', in *Economic & Social Research Council Transnational Communities Programme - Working Paper Series,* Jan. 1999, <www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/mediated.pdf>; D Göktürk, 'Turkish Women on German Streets: Closure and Exposure in Transnational Cinema', in *Spaces in European Cinema*, M Konstantarakos (ed), Intellect Books, Exeter, 2000, pp. 64-76; D Göktürk, 'Beyond Paternalism: Turkish German Traffic in Cinema', in *The German Cinema Book*, T Bergfelder, E Carter, & D Göktürk (eds), British Film Institute, London, 2002, pp. 248-256; B Mennel, 'Bruce Lee in Kreuzberg and Scarface in Altona: Transnational Auteurism and Ghettocentrism in Thomas Arslan's *Brothers and Sisters* and Fatih Akin's *Short Sharp Shock*'. *New German Critique*, no. 87, 2002, pp. 133-156; and H Naficy, A*n Accented Cinema: Exilic & Diasporic Filmmaking*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001.

[6] I borrow the term Berührung from Leslie Adelson. Inspired by Zafer Şenocak's notion of an "entangled history of touch [Berührungsgeschichte] between Orient and Occident" (L Adelson, *The Turkish Turn in Contemporary German Literature: Toward a New Critical Grammar of Migration*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p. 107), Adelson has lobbied for a move away from the notion of Begegnung [encounter], which assumes "mutually exclusive collective identities" and an "absolute cultural divide" (a la Samuel Huntington's theory of a "clash of civilizations") (L Adelson, 'Against Between', pp. 245-246), and has adopted the term Berührung [touch] to "bespeak historical and cultural entanglements to which the transnational labour migration of the 1950s and 1960s has given rise in Germany" (L Adelson, *Turkish Turn*, p. 21).

[7] M Jesinghausen, 'The Sky over Berlin as Transcendental Space: Wenders, Döblin and the 'Angel of History'', in *Spaces in European Cinema,* M Konstantarakos (ed), Intellect Books, Exeter, 2000, p. 79.

[8] A Huyssen, 'The Voids of Berlin'. *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 24, no. 1, 1997: pp. 59-60.

[9] For literature on *Walk on Water*, see N Dushi, 'Israeli Cinema in a Global Context - Regaining a Minoritarian Status' (paper presented at the Foreign Language Film Conference, Carbondale, IL, October 2007), and A Kempinski, 'Reworking History through Love and Lust: Eytan Fox's Lelechet al ha-maym (*Walk on Water*)' (paper presented at the German Studies Association Conference, San Diego, CA, October 2007).

[10] Note the symbolic significance of the locations of Potsdamer Platz and Wannsee. Potsdamer Platz, which was bisected by the Berlin Wall, complements this scene's thematic of borders and boundaries. Wannsee is notorious for the House of the Wannsee Conference, where Nazi officials laid out their plans for the Endlösung [final solution]. It also bears noting that Eyal eventually decides against killing Axel's grandfather at the birthday celebration; thus, this scene of defence in the Alexanderplatz U-Bahn station serves as a displacement of the later scene in Wannsee.

[11] Of course, since Eyal is a Mossad agent (still unbeknownst to Axel in this scene), this explanation is not entirely trustworthy. On a side note, many critics noted the implausibility of Eyal's possession of a gun in this scene.

[12] Notably, this scene also becomes the point where Axel and Eyal are explicitly linked through history. Since Eyal here marks himself as a member of the German-Jewish diaspora, he and Axel are now connected through their German heritage and their ties to the Holocaust. I would like to thank Jeffrey Peck for drawing my attention to this.

[13] J Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Routledge, New York and London, 1990, p. 132.

[14] Ibid., p. 132.

[15] Ibid., p. 137.

[16] M Garber, *Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety*, Routledge, New York and London, 1992, p. 16.

[17] Ibid., p. 16.

[18] Ibid., p. 16; italics mine.

[19] I would like to thank David-Emil Wickström for drawing my attention to the use of this Hebrew phrase within the scene.

[20] M Garber, 'Category Crises: The Way of the Cross and the Jewish Star', in *Queer Theory and the Jewish Question*, D Boyarin, D Itzkovitz, & A Pellegrini (eds), Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, p. 22.

[21] Ibid., p. 36.

[22] O Weininger, *Geschlecht und Charakter: Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung*, Vienna, 1903.

[23] A Solomon, 'Viva la Diva Citizenship: Post-Zionism and Gay Rights', in *Queer Theory and the Jewish Question*, D Boyarin, D Itzkovitz, & A Pellegrini (eds), Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 150-151. Eyal's reference to Dana International is all the more surprising given that he has heretofore indicated his exclusive preference for male singers such as

Bruce Springsteen, whose song "Tunnel of Love" becomes associated with Eyal's heterosexuality over the course of the film.

[24] Ibid., p. 151.

[25] Fox articulates Eyal's shift in alliance through two shot/reverse-shot patterns near the beginning and end of the scene. As Eyal and Axel first encounter the drag queens, Fox alternates between over-the-shoulder shots of Eyal (from the point of view of Axel and the drag queens) and over-the-shoulder shots of Axel and the drag queens (from Eyal's point of view); Eyal remains the outcast within this configuration. However, when Eyal later turns around and successfully defends the drag queens against the neo-Nazis, his alliance clearly shifts. Indeed, at the end of the scene, when Eyal pulls out his gun and forces the neo-Nazis to leave the station, Fox alternates between medium shots of Eyal and of the neo-Nazis.

[26] A Kempinski, 'Reworking History', p. 7.

[27] See Solomon, 'Viva la Diva', pp. 152, 158.

[28] D Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997, p. 231.

[29] U Linke, 'Gendered Difference', p. 563.

[30] "Diva" is the song with which the Israeli singer won the Eurovision song contest. On a side note, Axel's performance in this scene recalls that of a previous scene in the film in Israel, in which he lip-syncs Esther Ofarim's "Cinderella Rockafella" (Ofarim is another Israeli singer identified with the Eurovision Song Contest). Axel's fluid sense of gender and sexuality manifests itself in his ability to switch roles; just as he says that he enjoys both sexual roles in his conversation with Eyal about anal sex, he initially performs both roles in Ofarim's song until his sister joins him onstage.

[31] U Linke, 'Murderous Fantasies', pp. 42-43.

[32] See U Linke, 'Gendered Difference'.

[33] M Garber, Vested Interests, p. 16.

[34] H Naficy, Accented Cinema, p. 5.

[35] J Peck, 'Turks and Jews: Comparing Minorities in Germany After the Holocaust'. *German Cultures, Foreign Cultures: The Politics of Belonging*, AICGS Research Report no. 8, 2007, p. 8.

[36] J Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2006, p. 102.

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The Return Home through The (Magic) Film Image

José Manuel Mouriño

Abstract
The cinematographic history of Galicia (a region in the north-west of Spain) offers a very special type of documentary closely related to the migration (specially to South America). This kind of documental films, called Documentary for Galician Emigrants, can be explained with the term correspondence by film: a way to send images from home to the foreign community, to the emigrants. The images of these films stimulate in a very special way, the configuration of the memory (the single memory and the collective memory), and show the real significance of the affective participation in cinema.
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Keywords: Cinematographic experience, home, memory, reflection, return.

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It is a fact, and to some an extent a rather obvious one, that amongst the themes that fill the various cultural expressions arising from a community that has been obliged to abandon its place of origin -a group essentially branded with the stigma of migration- one of the most noteworthy is the constant presence of lamentation over the home that has been left behind and a paean to the liberating need to return. The production of cultural artefacts is always, when all is said and done, a way of effectively condensing those ghosts or longings that continuously besiege a group, generation after generation, and the figure of the return home is undoubtedly one of the greatest concerns of any emigrant. However, once a researcher has confirmed the existence of a continual reference to this topic, he or she has to decide to what extent its presence conditions or governs the production of such artefacts, or to put it another way, whether the image of the home that has been left behind is one of the major elements in the genesis of the collection of works in which it is enveloped or whether it works simply as an illustration or appendix that is interchangeable with other types of theme. The transcendence of this formula and the aesthetic implications deriving from it will vary substantially according to whether it can be considered to belong to the former or the latter. In this respect it may be extremely interesting to consider a hitherto practically unknown cinematographic formula, one in which the communicative content is explicitly reorganised around the motif of the absent homeland, one which we could call the Documentary for Galician Emigrants.

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This formula could briefly be described as a series of short films made during the first half of the twentieth century in various parts of Galicia, for the purpose of being screened to groups of people who had emigrated from these areas and were living abroad. The films were usually commissioned from professional or semi-professional cinema producers by emigrant associations, although at times the initiative would spring from one of the early Galician film-makers.[1]

With regard to the name itself, we should here make it clear that the generic epithet Documentary for Emigrants is a tag with which these films were labelled over the course of the years. The need to classify them was by no means a matter of urgency for either the people asking for these documentaries or those who made them, and in fact only become one when their function evolved from that of providing up-to-date information in pictures, this being the initial intention behind the films, to being 'historical documents', once the task of finding, restoring and classifying them had been completed. Furthermore, in connection with their denomination, we must remember that mention has been made of a certain degree of correspondence by film, since these documentaries were a way of providing emigrants with an idea of the state of affairs during their absence, a function that can easily be compared with that of letter writing, to the extent that it may even be possible to call them moving picture postcards.

In the light of the above features, there are clear similarities between these documentaries for emigrants and home movies. Without wishing to dismiss this link out of hand, particularly due to the enriching possibilities of its nuances for this study, it should be made clear that the former were conceived as professional film productions. Along the same lines, it should also be pointed out that these commissions led to the development of an entire industrial network or fabric. The reason why I am anxious to make this point quite clear is that the existence of the genre, together with the absence of any kind of institutional involvement in its promotion, enables it (in the absence of any references that might indicate otherwise) to claim a certain degree of exclusivity in the history of Galician film-making.[2]

However, it was this very absence of any kind of 'government' promoter that meant that once the documentaries had fulfilled the purpose for which they were made their began a gradual process of abandonment which in many cases led to the disappearance of a large amount of material belonging to the genre. And it was precisely in order to prevent this process from reaching its final conclusion that the above-mentioned recovery task was undertaken, in various stages the verification of the actual existence of the films, the hunt for all the material that could be considered as belonging to the genre, the usual process of sending cans of film from South America back to Galicia for restoration, finding suitable storage space in which they could be preserved, filing them away and classifying them (at which point, as

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has already been mentioned, they were grouped together under a generic name) and finally, the production of a census.[3] All this, of course, only concerns the footage that has been recovered, and work continues on following the trail of information about films that have deteriorated beyond repair or have simply gone missing, whilst eyes and ears are permanently open to the possibility of the subsequent discovery of another item that could be included in the full list of titles.[4]

The present moment, within this process of recuperation, is one of a temporary pause, as if a period of truce had been declared. Although all the journey we have is essential insofar as without it we would be unable to analyse a series of works which would otherwise have been the anonymous victims of a disappearance, the fact that they now repose in the archives appears to be gradually eating away at the interest or desire to find new obscure areas in them, since this material is now generally considered to have been brought to light. Concern over this Galician cinematographic correspondence must henceforth lead to a breakaway from the lines of research that have been followed until now, so that its recuperation can also mean, for example, extending analysis to the study of its expressive resources, to the general features shared by these works and, in one way or another, to an attempt to universalise the way in which they work. The approach taken by researchers should not be based so much on the content of the images they contain as on the fact that they constitute a particular communicative resource, this enabling, amongst other aspects, them to be seen as a living field for experimentation, one that can be approached with a certain degree of creativity (and from this standpoint it should also be possible to produce a satisfactory interpretation as a reply to the statement that the documentaries for emigrants also served, at the time they were made, to bring exiles closer to their place of origin). In this sense, if we focus on the basic scheme that becomes apparent from the way in which they work, the systematic repetition of the fundamental gesture of recording a distant original environment in images so as to be able to offer it to a community of exiles, we will obtain an ideal paradigm from which numerous links may arise.[5]

In order to attempt to illustrate this manoeuvre, let us go back for a moment to the time when the film was being made, and reconsider what the camera really frames during that brief period of time. It is not merely a landscape that would be familiar to the eyes of the emigrant seeing it on the screen. That image functions in practice as a reactive principle for his or her memory, stimulating the recall of a past time that is inevitably associated with that place. As was recorded by the newspapers of the time, participation in the social event constituted by the screening of this footage would finally take the form of conversations that shaped the collective memory of the group through the expression and comparison of personal memories.[6] A

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documentary for emigrants could therefore be included amongst those objects which, in the words of Alan Radley, are created "specifically to help us remember", acting as commemorative artefacts, as an invitation to remember for the emigrant.[7] What is there to prevent us from including this practice in a more ambitious study of the figure of the involuntary memory and ennoble its analysis by affiliating it to the ideas on this subject put forward by authors such as Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin or Henri Bergson, or by indicating its links to Marcel Proust's Search or the work of writers like Baudelaire or Paul Valéry? Although the limited space afforded me by this short essay prevents me from going into this suggestion in any greater depth, it is sufficient for me to say that we are moving irremediably towards the study of a mnemonic ceremonial in which the object of worship is a cinematographic image. This definition could also be applied, curiously enough, to the work of Jean-Luc Godard in general, but more particularly to his Histoire(s) du cinéma (1989¬1998).[8] The relationships that arise from a slight shift of emphasis in this study are significant indeed.

Taking as our starting point the interest aroused by the discovery of certain items (an archaeological event), we thus impose upon ourselves a revaluation of the experience that seeing them must have meant (a programme that is closer to a general theory on the interpretation of images).
To continue in this sense, going deeper into the matter, it is important to note that the action taken by the emigrant with regard to what is shown on the screen is not just limited to providing the memories evoked by the images. We often see that the team responsible for filming and editing the images records certain spaces or events without any intention of highlighting them, even going so far as to put them together in an almost arbitrary sequence. In this way, things are done in such a way that the intonation ends up as something that concerns the spectator and the image to the exclusion of all else, the process through which they come into contact. In this regard we should remember the words of Merleau Ponty: The gaze gets more or less from things according to the way in which it questions them, ranges over or dwells on them. To learn to see colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a new use of one's own body: it is to enrich and recast the body image.[9]

A fundamental element in the construction of the image during its perception is therefore the type of gaze that the observer casts over the scene. The situation of the exile, far from his place of origin, however, is a much more peculiar circumstance than that of a conventional filmgoer, precisely as a result of the particular tie that binds him to what he can see on the screen.
The status of uncertainty that the cinematographic filter applies to the image of home habitually places the latter out of reach of any kind of full experience, but (and at the same time) offers it as being accessible, chimerically accessible. This manifest disposal to be seized – that of the image – which nevertheless can never be fulfilled, places a fatal distance

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between it and the emigrant, as if the spectator-emigrant were able to recognise himself in those images that are far from the centre of his being, like a body exposed to the elements. Thus, and due to the fact that these images never completely withdraw, the exile's gaze ends up believing in the promise of a return home (he needs it, because in these circumstances he is working without any possibility of taking shelter). It is precisely at this moment when, in the words of Gilles Deleuze:

We have passed, on the spot, from one space to the other, from physical space to spiritual space which restores a physics (or metaphysics) to us. The first space is cell-like and closed, but the second is not different, it is the same in so far as it has merely discovered the spiritual opening which overcomes all its formal obligations and material constraints by a theoretical or practical evasion. This is what Bresson suggested in his principle of 'fragmentation': we pass from a closed set that is fragmented to an open spiritual whole that is created or recreated. Or take for example Dreyer, where the Possible has opened up space as a dimension of the spirit (fourth or fifth dimension). Space is no longer determined, it has become the any-space-whatever which is identical to the power of the spirit, to the perpetually renewed spiritual decision: it is this decision which constitutes the affect, or the 'auto-affection'.[10]

This is the magic step or return home through the medium of the cinema screen. At some time during this narcissistic game the image has become permeable and has conceived a path that crosses it from one side to the other. It still has not allowed itself to be seized – this must be made perfectly clear – but has simply consented to be passed through without at any time violating its fundamental quality of unseizability. But, once it has been passed through (and without being able to stop, for however brief a time, at that interstice or that frontier pause), where does the gaze then rush? Deleuze talks of flights! Even at the risk of sounding too conventional, we cannot avoid commenting that there is perhaps no worse prison for emigrants than the circumstances that prevent them from returning to their homeland. If one of them indulges in a flight whilst sitting in front of the screen, it will undoubtedly be to let himself slide towards the open space of home that reverberates in his memory. In so far as he has belonged to his experience in an emotive way, the spectator has transformed the frame itself, the proposal of a misty image of home, to live it like a bridge or threshold of return in which an any-space-whatever – which stealthily captivates him – has effectively sublimated any need to return. But it must be made perfectly clear, at all times, that what is happening in reality is the realisation of the Cinematographic Experience expressed in terms of an introspective activity, according to a movement towards memory (although this may be motivated by, and at the same time provoke, what would appear to be a movement towards the image) This, I repeat, is the magic step.

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Let us end by recalling an example which, even though it has absolutely nothing to do with Documentaries for Emigrants, provides a similar illustration of the way in which this step through an image crystallises. We refer to the work of the French film director Chris Marker, in which, according to film critic Santos Zunzunegui: The image is conceived as a crossroads, a place of possible detours, delays or short cuts, a true knot of labyrinths whose various exits perhaps only lead to a series of dead-ends. Even though the author has begged those using the CD-ROM 'not to zap', 'take your time', it is impossible to avoid having the following thought: What if this device has been made for one to get lost in? (…). Basically, each image (or each text) in the CD-ROM appears like a veritable mnemonic mark.[11]

Similarly, in the opinion of Marcelo Expósito, in the film Sans Soleil (1983) by the same director: Whilst the rain gently falls on a greyish landscape, I suddenly see myself once more suddenly projected towards the Zone, by means of that electronic machine invented by Hayao in order to transform the images of the past when one is no longer able or willing to intervene in the images of the present. I find myself visiting shootings where I can see how fighter planes twist and turn in the sky, beautiful images that have been electronically manipulated, whose unreal fields of colour and fuzzy outlines make people look like ghosts, as if they were projections of our own memory.[12]

The reference to Marker, like that to Godard, is proof that at certain moments the cinematographic image manages to acquire such a degree of nobility that it becomes the utmost expression of all those hidden nuances that define us as persons, in the reflection of our desires, of our ghosts and our memory, of our greatest achievements and of our most horrendous crimes.[13] It is this revealing lucidity that provokes the return, the returns. But is this also the reason why we, or some of us at least, believe that it has to be the images – as Benjamin has said – that restore to us the presence of objects and of life itself? Is this sufficient reason to delegate our own return to our homeland or even our own salvation to their 'kingdom of shadows'? Faced with the possible futility of seeking to find a final reason in answer to this question, our task must be that of continuing to unceasingly gather and reflect on the signs that every man or woman leaves in their wake by means of images. And we must do so in order not to completely lose the trail, the trails of what observing an image really implies.

Notes

[1] One of the most noteworthy amongst this group of film-makers is José Gil (1870-1937), who through his production companies Galicia Cinegráfica and

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Galicia Films even went so far as to contemplate the standardisation and (regular) serial production of this kind of film.

[2]German film archives apparently contain footage from a work called Echo der Heimat (Echoes of the Fatherland), a project which has some similarity with the Galician experience, but which, unlike the latter, was promoted by the Nazi government. Its function, therefore, was closer to that of a propaganda symbol.

[3] For reasons of space I am unfortunately only able to provide a general reference to the painstaking and extensive work of recovering these films. The real process deserves much more detailed and rigorous coverage.

[4] Within this process of recuperation and restoration one researcher in particular deserves special mention: Manuel González. His determination to 'rescue' a large number of these films from the state of abandonment in which they were languishing in various attics and basements of numerous film collections and the premises of Galician emigrants' associations in South America - however drastic this may sound - is the main reason why this genre finally 'exists' and can become the subject of studies such as this, but additionally his work as a theorist largely underpins any analysis undertaken with regard to such studies.

[5] This factor will also revalue it in the eyes of theorists who are unaware of the specific circumstances under which culture is produced in Galicia.

[6] M González, 'Cine e emigración', in *Historia do cine en Galicia*, J Castro de Paz (co-ordinator), CGAI, A Coruña, 1996, p. 221.

[7] A Radley, 'Artefacts, Memory and a Sense of the Past', in *Collective Remembering*, D Middleton and R Edwards (eds), Paidós, Barcelona, 1992, p. 72.

[8] As Jacques Aumont has shown in his book: *Amnésies. Fictions du cinéma d'aprè*s Jean-Luc Godard, P.O.L. éditeur, Paris, 1999.

[9] M Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Ediciones Península, Barcelona, 1994, p. 170.

[10] G Deleuze, Cinema 1: The *Movement Image*, Continuum Books, London and New York, 1986, p. 117.

[11]S Zunzunegui, 'El coleccionista y el explorador: a propósito de Immemory Chris Marker, 1997' in *Mystère Marker*. Pasajes en la obra de Chris Marker, M L Ortega and A Weinrichter (eds), TyB Editores, Madrid, 2006, p. 166.

[12] M Expósito, 'Ninguna memoria sin imágenes (que tiemblan), ningún futuro sin rabia (en los rostros). Breves itinerarios sugeridos por las figuras de la memoria y el espectador a propósito de Chris Marker e Immemory' in Chris Marker: retorno a la inmemoria del cineasta, N Enguita, M Expósito and E Regueira (eds), Ediciones de la Mirada, Valencia, 2000, p. 22.

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[13]This nobility, in the case of Documentaries for Emigrants, would derive (as I have attempted to explain throughout this essay) from the devotion with which the emigrant contemplates the image of his homeland.

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Labour Migration in CIS-countries: Tendencies, Formation of Diasporas and Impact Development

Sergey Ryazantsev

Abstract

Labour migration in the CIS has become a large-scale significant socio-economic phenomenon. According to our estimation, 8-11 million people or approximately 6-8% of economically active population of the region is involved in it. Labour migration has many positive aspects for the CIS countries. The economic sectors like trade, building, transport services, and agriculture are developing owing to migrants. In the CIS labour migration generated a powerful flow of remittances. By approximate estimations, guest workers transfer and take out from Russia up to 15 billion dollars annually. With absolute transparency, this money could give the country 4.5 billion of tax deductions. The problem is in exposing these money resources. Also there are some negative aspects: the stimulation of shadow economy growth, dumping of the wage level, formation of the ethnic enclaves, and the growth of interethnic tension.

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1.   Current Trends of Labour Migration in the CIS

Labour migration in the CIS (the states of the former USSR excluding the Baltic states) has become a large-scale and significant socio-economic phenomenon. According to my estimates, 8-11 million people or approximately 6-8 percent of the economically active population of the region is involved in migration. The average number of labour migrants from the states of the region simultaneously staying abroad during a one year-period is shown in Table 1.

The principal cause of labour migration is the large difference in socio-economic indicators in the CIS countries. Against the background of the region's general decline in living standard, curtailed production and unemployment growth, some states of the region such as Russia and Kazakhstan, are notable for their socio-economic stability, high labour market capacity and high wage standards. Combined with their geographical proximity, a visa-free regime, "transparency" of crossing the borders, cultural and language community, existing relations and business ties, recognition

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(convertibility) of diplomas, these countries attract substantial flows of labour migrants from the CIS region.

　　　　Most other CIS countries fall way behind the wage levels in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. For example, the gap in official payment level in Russia is 11 times as much as in Tajikistan which stimulates active labour migration of the Tadjik workers. According to recent interview data, 60 percent of Tadjik migrants came to Russia because they were underpaid, and 40 percent due to the lack of work in their home country. About 40 percent of migrants from Tajikistan chose to work in Russia as they had an opportunity to earn more; 20 percent due to the reason that it was easier to find work there; 16 percent because Russia is a neighbouring country.[1]

　　　　The CIS countries are heterogenous regarding the links between migration and development. In my recent research, I have compared the parameters of labour migration to the economic transition reforms in various CIS countries (Table 2). Three CIS countries - Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - applying mainly the methods of "shock therapy" are regarded as "the radicals". Russia and Kazakhstan accept migrants, and Kyrgyzstan encourages their emigration. In Russia the legal entrance of labour migrants (immigrants) exceeds the departure (emigration) by eight times, and in Kazakhstan by ten times.

Table 1: Approximate Number and Destination of Labour Migrants from CIS Countries, 2006

Country of Departure	Estimated Numbers in thousands	Destination Countries	Volume of economically active population in 2006, in thousands	Share of labour migrants in total of the economically active population of the country, %
Azerbaijan	1,000-1,500	Russia, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, UAE, the USA, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand	3,820	26.2-39.3
Armenia	700	Russia, the USA,	1,226	57.0

		the countries of the Europe, Australia		
Belarus	200-280	Russia, Poland, the USA, Czechia	4,447	4.5-6.3
Georgia	200-300	Russia, Turkey	4,315[1]	4.6-7.0
Kazakhstan	1,000	Russia, China	7,823	12.8
Kyrgyzstan	600-700	Russia, Kazakhstan	2,100	28.6-33.3
Moldova	600-800	Russia, the Ukraine, Czechia, Romania, Poland, Germany, Spain, Israel, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Israel, Cyprus	1,483	40.5-53.9
Russia	1,000-1,200	Cyprus, the USA, Malta, Liberia, Germany, Greece, Japan, Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands	72,900	1.4-1.7
Tajikistan	500-600	Russia	1,926	26.0-31.2
Uzbekistan	600-700	Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, UAE, the Ukraine	9,368[2]	6.4-7.5
The Ukraine	2,000-3,000	Russia, Czechia, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Turkey, Slovakia, the USA	22,100	9.1-13.6
The CIS Total	**8,200-10,780**		**133,257**	**6.2-8.1**

Source: data of national statistics of CIS, author calculations[2]

The "intermediate group" of the CIS countries carried out the reforms slower than "the radicals", but faster than "the conservatives". In all these states (Moldova, the Ukraine, Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia and

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Azerbaijan) labour emigration obviously exceeds immigration. For example, for one labour migrant arriving to the Ukraine, there are six Ukrainian migrants who have left to work abroad. In Moldova and Tajikistan this ratio is 1:40 and 1:600 respectively.

The "conservative states" used the most cautious ways of economic reform and transition to the market economy. Uzbekistan and Belarus are the most important source countries, while Turkmenistan is almost isolated from the point of view of labour migration.

Table 2: The CIS Countries according to the Ratio of Labour Migration and System Reforms

Countries according to the ratio of foreign labour migration (emigration to immigration)	Countries according to types of economic transition reforms		
	"the radicals"	"the intermediate group"	"the conservatives"
Source countries	Kyrgyzstan	Moldova (1: 40)*, Tajikistan (1: 600)*, the Ukraine (1:6) *, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia	Uzbekistan, Belarus (1:10) *
Destination countries	Russia (8:1) *, Kazakhstan (10:1) *		
"Closed" countries (emigration and immigration is limited by the state)			Turkmenistan

Source: data of national statistics of CIS, author calculations
Note: * - the ratio of labour immigrants and emigrants.

There is a large gap between the data from official sources, which register labour migrants and the real scales of labour migration, and the estimations of illegal labour migration. The representatives of government authorities, as a rule, give higher indices of the number of illegal labour migrants in Russia, using exclusively frontier statistics. For example, the representatives of the FMS of the Russian Federation estimate the illegal immigration in Russia at the rate of 10 million people. On the basis of my

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own research, I argue that only about 5 million migrants can be considered as illegally active in Russia. These are mainly citizens of the CIS countries who have arrived in Russia under the visa-free regime, and who work or reside without proper work or residence permits.[3]

2.   Diasporas and Their Impact on Countries of Origin

Active labour migration in 1990s resulted in the formation of diasporas with migrants from the CIS countries. At present, these diasporas play an important role in economic development – they send remittances, guarantee certain levels of consumption of their households, and they invest money in their countries of origin. The following review of the various diasporas gives an indication of their importance economically, socially and politically for their countries of origin.

A.   The Russian Diaspora

Besides being an important destination for labour migrants, Russia has also become the largest exporter of manpower from the CIS region for foreign labour markets. 45-60,000 people alone go abroad as contract workers. The basic countries of employment for the Russians are the states of Europe - mainly Cyprus, Malta, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Norway - as well as the USA, Liberia and Japan. It is mainly Russians with special secondary education that are sought after abroad. They make up approximately 40-50 percent of the total number of contract workers. Russian employees with higher education make up almost one third of the migration flows. Russian skilled workers (half of the migration stream) are in demand on the international labour market, first of all in shipping and fishing industries. About one fourth of all contract workers abroad are specialists in the technical sphere, art and culture.

My interviews with Russian women have revealed their particular working conditions abroad. Financial problems and the lack of equal payment in Russia instigate women to migrate (about 80 percent). One fourth of female respondents refer to this factor as a cause of emigration. Approximately 4 percent leave in order to get married abroad. About 10 percent of the respondents have tried to apply for a permanent residence abroad before going there.[4] (Ryazantsev and Tkachenko, 2006).

Russian women have the greatest chances to get legally employed abroad in the entertainment industry, health and medical services, as well as in the social sphere. It is mainly Russian women in the age group 20-29 who are in demand in the entertainment industry. There are special visas granting protection for those who want to work in the entertainment industry. For example, the visa of an "entertainment industry employee" issued by Canada, Switzerland, Japan and Korea enables the girls to be engaged in labour activities in bars, restaurants, and other entertainment establishments. About

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76 percent of Russian women have reported abuse of their rights abroad, mainly regarding underpayment, unauthorised extension of the duration of a working day (92 percent), debt bondage, unlawful confiscation of passports and restrictions of the freedom of travel (8 percent).

On average Russian women abroad earn 800 dollars a month. Their income has helped them to purchase or repair their accommodation, pay for their education in the native country, buy household equipment, clothes etc. According to balance of payment data collected by the Bank of Russia, Russian labour migrants' remittances amount to about US$ 700-800 million. In absolute terms, this is much more than the CIS countries receive from the internal labour migrants, and in relative terms it is approximately 0.2 percent of GNP. When also taking into account unofficial remittances, annual currency receipts from labour migrants from abroad may reach US$ 3 billions.[5]

International labour migration has become a real means of "survival" and a way of improving the material well-being in the new economic conditions for many Russia citizens, especially in the provinces. Estimates show that 1-1.5 million Russians are working abroad, forming a new Russian diaspora. This diaspora performs important functions. In addition to sending remittances and making investments in the Russian economy, migrants in the diaspora promote projects with Russian partners in the spheres of business, science and technical cooperation, in education and in social support. The diaspora also maintains and disperses Russian culture and the Russian language in foreign countries. Its contribution into sports, art, science and education is valuable for many countries and forms a positive "image" of Russia abroad.

B.   The Ukrainian Diaspora

Between 2 and 3 million Ukrainians work abroad.[6] Although 230,000 Ukrainian citizens and 2.9 million ethnic Ukrainians were counted in the most recent All-Russian Census (2002), the number of the labour migrants from Ukraine may currently amount to 1-1,5 million persons. Ukrainian citizens are allowed to cross the Russian borders without a visa, using internal passports and they can stay in Russia without registration during 90 days. Ukrainians work in construction, industry, transport and agriculture and it is a skilled, experienced and disciplined labour force.

In Byelorussia, the Ukrainian diaspora may account for about 15-20,000 individuals. The Ukrainian labour migrants work as seasonal workers in agriculture and construction there. According to OECD data from 2004, Ukrainians in the Czech Republic made up one of the largest groups of guest

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workers - they were about 40,000.[1] In 2003, there were approximately 58,000 Ukrainians in Italy - it was the seventh largest foreign ethnic migrant group in the country. 85 percent of the Ukrainian diaspora in Italy were women.[7] When also taking into account illegal migrants, the size of the Ukrainian diaspora may be 60-70,000 in Italy. In comparison, recent OECD data suggests that there are 62,000 Ukrainian workers living and working legally in Portugal. In Greece, there are about 14,000 Ukrainian citizens, and about 10,000 of them are employed legally. Ukrainians also work in Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey as well as in other countries of Europe.

The socio-economic impact of the Ukrainian diaspora is great. According to IMF data from 2002, Ukrainian labour migrants remitted about US$ 133 million to their native country. Taking into account informal remittances, up to US$ 4 billion may have been sent from migrants. The Deputy of the Supreme Rada O. Bylozir considers that "labour migrants are principal investors of Ukraine, that's why government must realise moral responsibility to every single labour migrant and their families". In her opinion, all efforts should be made to sign framework agreements between the EU and Ukraine which could guarantee the social and legal protection of labour migrants. Such an agreement would also give a better opportunity to the migrants to integrate in European societies.

C.   The Moldovan Diaspora

A look at the most recent population census (October, 2004) reveals that the number of inhabitants of Moldova was reduced by approximately 360,000 persons since independence, mainly owing to emigration. Sociological surveys indicate that this exodus may be up to twice as large. According to my own estimates based on a generalisation of statistical data on countries of origin and the occupation of Moldavians, the Moldovan diaspora may consist of 600-800,000 individuals. Approximately half of the labour migrants work in East- or Central European countries (Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania). These migrants amount to about 300-350,000. The All-Russian Census (2002) found 51,000 citizens of the Republic of Moldova and 172,000 ethnic Moldavians in Russia. About 240-270,000 Moldovan labour migrants currently stay in Russia, working in industry, construction, transport and agriculture. There are about 6,000 Moldovan labour migrants in Romania and 40-60,000 in the Czech Republic. The rest of the Moldovan labour migrants work in Southern and Western European countries, of whom one of the largest group, 40,000, in Italy. To all appearances, citizens of Moldova are rather more numerous in Italy – adding those with an irregular status there may be up to 100-150,000. Half of these

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may become regularised, probably being eligible to a legalisation programme. In Portugal, there are about 80,000 Moldavians working, half of them having become regularised in a recent programme. There are approximately 40,000 Moldavians in Greece, 20-50,000 in Turkey, about 20,000 in Spain, and 15-20,000 in Israel.[8] Moldavian citizens who work abroad send home US$ 320 million per year.[9]

D.   The Byelorussian Diaspora

The Byelorussian diaspora has settled in mainly three states: Russia (about 1.2 million persons), Poland (some 165,000) and the USA (approximately 20,000) (IOM, 2002). This is a comparatively older diaspora as it was mostly formed before the break-up of the USSR. The labour migration based diaspora accounts for at least 200-280,000. Of these, 60-75 percent have settled in Russia. According to the All-Russian Census data (2002), approximately 40,000 Byelorussian citizens and 815,000 ethnic Byelorussians live in Russia. Many current Byelorussian migrants are employed in construction and repair works in the city of Moscow, in the larger Moscow region as well as in Saint Petersburg. They work both as employees and as self-employed in small teams. They carry out construction and repair works in private apartments, offices, mansions and dachas. Byelorussians also work in the oil industry in Western Siberia. A large part of Byelorussians work only in temporary jobs, and return home after completing their contracts. Formal amounts of remittances of these labour migrants are estimated at an annual US$ 54 million.[10]

E.   The Armenian Diaspora

The number of regular and irregular migrants from Armenia in the period 1990-2000 can be estimated at roughly 800,000-1 million people according to IOM data (IOM, 2001). Armenians have mainly moved to Russia, Ukraine, Western Europe and the USA. Taking into account the migration during the 1990s, the Armenian diaspora now numbers about 7 million, compared to only 2 million Armenians living in Armenia.[11] The greatest Armenian community is in Russia – about 2 million people. Many Armenians have settled in Moscow and in North Caucasus. The Armenians in Russia are mainly concentrated in the service and trade sectors – many shops, cafes, bistros, restaurants, ship workshops and small garment manufacturing workshops have been founded by Armenians. There are also numerous Armenian construction workers in Russia. Many great businessmen from the Armenian diaspora own major stores, and shares in wholesale markets, funeral services and various larger enterprises. Armenians also work in education, science, culture, health care, management and security. As for other CIS countries, Armenians have settled in Georgia (about 350,000), Ukraine (40,000), and in the Central Asian states. There are long-established

Armenian communities in USA (about 600,000), as well as in France (250,000), Canada (50,000), Argentina (50,000) and Australia (25,000). There are about 100,000 Armenian in Iran and in Lebanon respectively, and 80,000 in Syria.[12]

The importance of the Armenian diaspora for the home country is indisputable, both in socio-economic, political and cultural terms. First of all, every sixth household in Armenia benefit from remittances.[13] According to IMF (2001 data), Armenian labour migrants sent home about US$ 115 million. Surveys have shown that remittances constitute no less than US$ 300 million, or 8-9 percent of the annual GDP in Armenia. The Armenian diaspora has also played an important political role in several countries. Members of the Armenian diaspora also maintain strong cultural links with Armenia, inter alia through national and cultural associations and various cultural and educational activities. Many Armenians have integrated successfully in their host countries and have become outstanding policymakers, businessmen and sportsmen.

F.   The Azerbaijanian Diaspora

Approximately 1-1.5 million citizens of Azerbaijan work abroad. IOM estimates that 600-800,000 Azerbaijanians live and work in Russia alone, of whom 400,000 in Moscow (IOM, 2002). Azerbaijanians also live and work in Saint Petersburg, and in the regions of Siberia, North, Far East and North Caucasus. The 2002 Census in Russia registered 155,000 citizens of Azerbaijan and 621,000 ethnic Azerbaijanians. Sources of income in Russia are found both in medium and large-sized businesses, as well as in seasonal work in construction, agriculture, industry and transport. Many Azerbaijanians are active in trade with vegetables and fruits in city markets and catering, and in many places they have acquired a niche between wholesalers and retailers.[14] Besides Russia, labour migrants from Azerbaijan go to Europe, America, Asia and even Australia. In many cases labour migration to the West takes place both in the form of forced migration or as tourism. In Germany, There are about 10,000 Azerbaijanians in Germany and 5,000 in Netherlands and also in these countries they are engaged in trade. Scientists and IT-workers mainly go to the USA. In Canada, Azerbaijanians are employed in the service sector in delivery truck to shops, in Australia and New Zealand they also work on farms with sheep trimming. The most attractive Muslim states in Asia for Azerbaijanians are Iran, Turkey, Syria and UAE. Remittances from abroad benefit a large part of the Azerbaijan population, and according to IMF data from 2001, official remittances amounted to US$ 104 million, equalling more than 2 percent of GDP.[15] According to other sources, Azerbaijanians bring home roughly US$ 2.5 billion.[16]

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G.   The Georgian Diaspora

There are approximately 100,000 labour migrants from Georgia abroad.[17] There were about 198,000 ethnic Georgians and 53,000 citizens of Georgia in Russia in 2002 (Russian census data). Many from the old Georgian diaspora in Russia are employed in business, healthcare, culture and art. About 80 percent of the Georgian diaspora are employed in small businesses, market trade, or in the production of cheese and baking of bread. Georgians organise supplies of several kinds of agricultural produce to Russia. Georgian migrants bring fruits (figs, mandarins, lemons), tea and laurel list to Russian markets. Georgian migrants usually maintain close financial links with their native land by sending money to their families. Many such families live exclusively on remittances from abroad if they suffer from unemployment in Georgia. In 1999, the value of remittances sent to Georgia equalled US$ 150 million, or 5 percent of GDP (IMF, 2002). According to other surveys, remittances may reach up to US$ 2 billion.[18]

H.   The Tajik Diaspora

The number of citizens of Tajikistan working abroad is at least 200,000 (Population in Russia, 2001). An IOM surveys has suggested that up to 600,000 participate in labour migration, 85 percent of whom go to work in Russia. The majority of the Tajikian migrants are seasonal workers. Therefore, migration flows to Russia increase during the season in spring and summer for work in agriculture, construction and municipal housing. In autumn, most of these migrants return home. In some Russian territories, Tajiks constitute 75-80 percent of all seasonal workers. Tajik NGOs have estimated that no less than 1 million citizens of Tajikistan could leave for work in Russia during 2006. The major part of the Tajik population works in Russia illegally. This also makes them more vulnerable for violation of their basic rights by employers. According to the head of the Federal Migration Service A. Chernenko, the Tajik diaspora transfers about US$ 250-270 million annually to their home country and the same amount is spent for everyday consumer needs and housing in Russia.

J.   The Uzbek Diaspora

About 500-700,000 labour migrants from Uzbekistan work abroad, the major part of them in Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine and etc.) and Asia (mainly Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea and UAE).[19] The major part of Uzbeks works in small and medium-sized enterprises, where low-paid physical labour is in demand.

Labour migration to Korea is managed through bilateral treaty and the number of Uzbek citizens who wish to go to work in Korea is quite considerable probably due to relatively higher income levels. In Kazakhstan, in contrast, most Uzbeks work in agriculture and bring home very low wages,

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and in addition, violations of migrants' rights are common. In the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, 4-5,000 Uzbek citizens work annually as seasonal workers in agriculture.[20] There were 71,000 Uzbek citizens and 123,000 ethnic Uzbeks in Russia in 2002 according to census data. Many immigrants from Uzbekistan go to Russia to work as seasonal workers during the summer, and return home in autumn.

J.   The Kyrgyz Diaspora
        Kyrgyz labour migrants amount to 350-700,000 people, fewer than half of whom go to Russia.[21] The majority of these live abroad and work illegally.[22] About 70,000 are registered under temporary permits while only 5,000 thousand have work permits in Russia. 29,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan and 32,000 thousand ethnic Kyrgyz live in Russia according to the 2002 Census data. Kyrgyzstani citizens also work in southern Kazakhstan in tobacco plantations. The number of Kyrgyz here is not known exactly, but according to IOM data, they earn about US $500 per season.[23] IMF data from 2000 suggest that US$43 million is sent home on an annual basis.[24]

3.   The Impact of Labour Migration on Development
        The main economic effect from labour migration and active diasporas abroad on source countries is that remittances can contribute to a reduction of deficits in the balance of payments. Table 3 indicates dynamics of remittances according to IMF data.

Table 3. Dynamics of labour migrants' remittances in CIS-countries 1994-2003, in million US dollars

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Armenia	11,12	6,0	69,87	92,85	74,25	88,01	94,69	114,86	…	…
Azerbaijan	…	…	…	…	…	54,5	57,1	104,1	…	…
Belarus	0,4	28,5	22,6	29,1	31,7	53,6	[...]	[...]	…	…
Georgia	…	…	…	103,2	137,2	149,4	94,9	[...]	…	…
Kazakhstan	…	…	…	…	…	…	63,8	81,5	…	…
Kyrgyzstan	1,0	1,2	2,4	2,7	2,2	1,2	43,0	21,6	…	…
Moldova	[...]	1,0	3,1	1,3	1,2	1,2	3,3	80,0	101,0	320,0
Russia	200	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	700	800
The Ukraine	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	84,0	133,0	…

Source: International Monetary Fund

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The growth of remittances between 1990 and 2000 in the CIS countries was very dramatic. Such a remarkable increase could be termed as a "tsunami of remittances". To the figures indicated in Table 3, could be added significant amounts of informal remittances, the importance of which is suggested by several sociological surveys. Researches made in Armenia, for example, have shown that approximately 15 percent of households receive remittances from abroad, and remittances are the principal source of income for 8 percent of households.[25] The situation is the same in Moldova, Tajikistan and Georgia. Households usually spend remittances for current consumption. Such spending can also support the growth of several national industries and businesses in the short-term. Those sectors of the economy that benefit from remittance spending (food industry, service sector) mainly produce convenience goods. Also the construction sector is aided by remittances inflows. Experience from other countries shows that a "tsunami effect" of remittances is usually of short-term character, and that these resources need to be reasonably. A country can gain maximum benefits from remittances if these are directed into the economy. This means that an efficient model for the CIS countries would be one where labour force export is gradually substituted by export of goods and services, i.e. the development of export-oriented economic sectors.

Other alternative strategies for labour exporting countries may include improvements in production by the introduction of labour-saving technologies albeit without allowing for social crisis through mass dismissal of workers. Such processes of market adjustment usually requires investment costs borne by the owners of enterprises and sometimes they also meet resistance from trade unions. Labour migration abroad presents an opportunity to countries to switch to new economic models away from labour costs as the principal basis of the economic resources. These states must therefore create attractive conditions for domestic and foreign investments in new kinds of technologies and industries. They can use tax preferences for entrepreneurs and investors who are ready to invest in new equipment, buy tools with program management, progressive technique etc.

There is also a great deal of impacts in destination countries. Unfortunately, the authorities of some CIS-states have not yet realised the full range of opportunities that the inflow of labour migrants from abroad gives them. The levelling out of the regional disparities in socio-economic development must then be solved at the expense of migration. Improvements in migration policies would give better opportunities to engage temporary labour migrants and migrants who are ready to invest money in the national economies. Attracting and channelling investments from abroad would contribute to solving a great deal of the current social and economic problems related to education and labour markets, daily costs of living, as well as modernisation of enterprises and industries.

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Labour migration is coupled with many positive aspects in Russia and the CIS countries. The economic sectors like trade, construction, transport, and agriculture are developing owing to migrants. The example of Moscow is rather illustrative. No less than half of those working on the construction-sites of Moscow are migrants from various countries, mainly the CIS. Migrant labour is widely used in retailing - in the market stalls and stands, in the shopping malls. Migrants work as cooks and waiters at restaurants and cafes; many of them clean the streets. According to information from the Moscow City Hall, there are more than 170 large markets where 180,000 people with foreign citizenship are working legally. Migrants from the Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia work as drivers of regular buses, trolley buses and fixed-route taxis.

Guest workers fill many "niches of no prestige" with hard working conditions, which local residents do not accept. In the CIS countries, labour migration has generated a powerful flow of remittances. These sums of money can be transferred both through official channels (bank system, system of remittances) and in unregistered ways through personal and family channels. According to one estimate, guest workers transfer annually the amount of US$ 15 billion from Russia.[26] With full transparency of these flows, this money could translate into 4.5 billion of tax deductions in Russia (at the lowest rate of personal income tax - 30 percent), to say nothing of the social deductions. The problem is however in exposing these resources. Labour migration has become not only a means of survival for a significant part of the population, but also a real mechanism of spontaneous economic integration ("the integration from below") of some countries in the amorphous CIS group.

Notes

[1] L Rybakovsky, S Ryazantsev, "The International Migration in the Russian Federation", *ISPR*, Moscow, 2005, p. 39.

[2] Note: 1) the population of Georgia in 2003 is given without the data on uncontrolled territories; 2) the data given on Uzbekistan in 2002.

[3] L Rybakovsky, S Ryazantsev, p. 37.

[4] S Ryazantsev, M Tkachenko, *Labour Migration from Russia and Russian Diaspora,* Nauka, Moscow 2006, p. 43.

[5] S Ryazantsev, M Tkachenko, p. 13.

[6] I Pribytkova, *Labour Migration of the Ukrainian population in the conditions of transformation of economic and public attitudes,* Max Press, Moscow, 2003, p. 27.

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[7] T Caponio, "Policy Networks and Immigrants Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples" in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* Vol. 31, 2005, p. 34.

[8] V Moshnyaga, G Rusnak, *We Are Building Europe[...],* Kishinev, 2005, p. 10.

[9] *IMF*, 2005

[10] *IMF*, 2002

[11] R Pannossian, "Courting a Diaspora: Armenia-Diaspora Relations since 1998" in E Ostergaard-Nielsen (ed) *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations,* Palgrave, 2003, p. 142.

[12] Chlird and Rageau, 1997: 89

[13] Pannossian, op-cit.,

[14] Lyange, 1997.

[15] *IMF*, 2002.

[16] A Ynusov, *The Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Migration Aspects* in *Migration Situation in CIS countries,* Moscow, 1999, p. 86.

[17] A Topilin, "The Demographic Potential, Migration, Labour Markets in CIS Countries"*, Economica*, Moscow, 2002, p. 127.

[18] *First Russian TV Channel*, 2003.

[19] Yoo Kil-Sang, *Korea: Country Report* in *Migration and the Labour Market in Asia: Recent trends and policies,* Tokyo, 2004, p. 303.

[20] *2003 Year Book on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe: A Survey and Analysis of Border Management and Apprehension Data from 19 States,* International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna, 2004, p. 168.

[21] *Population in Russia*, 2001.

[22] Information from Kyrgyz-Press, 2005.

[23] F Pickup, *The Impact of Transition and the Afghanistan Crisis on Employment and Decent Work Concerns in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan* in WP № 13, Geneva, 2003, p. 28.

[24] *IMF*, 2002.

[25] Pannossian, op.cit., p. 143

[26] *First Russian TV Channel*, 2003

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Harnessing the Power of the African Diaspora: Institutional and Policy Dynamics

Jack Mangala

Abstract

This chapter aims to discuss major institutional and policy initiatives that seek to involve the global African diaspora into the continent's development. After revisiting the theoretical and conceptual framework of diasporas' socio-economic and political agency, I argue that, to succeed, current efforts deployed by the African Union, the World Bank and African national governments must embrace a holistic view of remittances which transcends the narrow focus on financial flows from the diaspora.

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1. Diasporas-Development Nexus: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The role of diasporas in development has long been ignored by both diaspora studies and development studies. The former was long dominated by a cultural focus, which centred mostly on issues of survival, representation, identity and return, while the latter overemphasized the political economy of development. This lacuna is being addressed through a body of recent works which has sought to reconceptualise the role of diasporas in development, especially in light of the narratives on globalisation and transnationalism. Within the limited framework of this paper, I will briefly revisit the expanding semantic domain and metaphoric implications of the diaspora concept before discussing some theoretical contentions pertaining to diasporas' socio-economic and political agency.

I.1. Semantic Domain and Metaphoric Implications

The overextension of the term diaspora, which has come to encompass a wide range of groups of people affected by displacement - and who 'feel, maintain, invent or revive a connection with a prior home'[1] - has rendered a formal definition of the concept less important than the focus on particular dynamics and processes that characterize these groups in relation to countries of origin and host countries. How is globalisation changing the ways diaspora communities conceive of and project themselves? Zeleza sums up eloquently the profound dynamics affecting diasporas:

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Diaspora simultaneously refers to a process, a condition, a space and a discourse: the continuous processes by which a diaspora is made, unmade and remade, the changing conditions in which it lives and expresses itself, the places where it is moulded and imagined (…) diaspora is simultaneously a state of being and a process of becoming, a kind of voyage that encompasses the possibility of never arriving or returning, a navigation of multiple belongings.[2]

Along the same lines, Davies refers to diaspora as both a structural and a subjective condition determined by historical forces and by prevailing structure of power relations and argues that a balance between these interconnected structural and subjective dimensions is needed in order to realize a proper comprehension of the diaspora within the migration-development nexus.[3] Mohan and Zack-Williams characterize diasporas as 'fragile deterriorialised communities whose identities is shifting, multiple and overlapping.'[4] Today diasporas have clearly emerged as transnational agents that have repositioned themselves in the global changes that have taken place over the recent decades, engaging in sustained and continuous cross-border practices.[5] How has this new transnational agent's socio-economic and political agency been conceptualised? What are the points of rupture and linkage between the new structural condition and the old one under which the "classical" diaspora operated?

I.2.   Socio-economic Agency

Since the mid-1990s, the triumph of the market economy has been accompanied–perhaps awkwardly- with an anti-etatist notion that development entails the empowerment of communities and individuals themselves who must take ownership of the development project. This paradigm shift has brought diasporas and other transnational groups and organizations back into the development discourse. In the particular case of Africa, it has been argued that migration has become a pre-eminent survival strategy for many African households.[6]

For migrants, locating the decision to migrate at the household level places strong obligation on them to succeed and remit money and other capital goods. While they certainly contribute to alleviate poverty and might help start some income-generating activities, individual remittances' impact on the homeland's 'development' hasn't been backed by any sustained empirical data. In terms of development potential of the homeland, special scholarly attention is instead being paid to the role played by diaspora organizations in supporting development. This scholarly interest is based in part on the assumption that diaspora organizations contribute to a more relevant and sustainable form of development of their homelands because people from those areas should know best what is needed.[7] However, development support through diaspora organizations is not without criticisms.

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Trager contends that diaspora development organizations tend to be dominated by elites, with men controlling the decision making-process.[8] Those activities have also been noted for some degree of "self-aggrandisement" and party politicking, which can seriously undermine their development benefits.

I.3.   Political Agency

Since development is not a merely technical matter, understanding both the politics in the diaspora and the diaspora in politics is key in discussing the diaspora-development nexus. Given the centrality of kinship identity in diasporas and their ability to influence foreign policy decision-making, diasporic political activities can be better approached by setting their study in the shared theoretical space between constructivism and liberalism.[9] Within this framework, diasporas appear to be among the most prominent actors that link international and domestic spheres of politics along several lines.[10]

Diasporas have thus been posited as challenging traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty.[11] Politically, diaspora communities have been particularly active in ethnic lobbying in host countries acting as mediators between the homeland and the host state and promoting democratisation and human rights in homelands. However, diasporas' political activism and attempts to influence developments in their homeland have not always been constructive. In fact, as shown by Weiner and Teitelbaum, diasporic activists may be a source of violence and instability in their homeland.[12]

This brief theoretical and conceptual overview has shown that strategies, initiatives and policies aimed at tapping into the African diaspora's development potential- to which I shall now turn- need to take into consideration and be structured around the profound dynamics define diasporas' socio-economic and political agency.

2.   Strategies and Programs Targeting the African Diaspora

Over the centuries, the global African diaspora has been fuelled by successive waves of 'involuntary' and 'voluntary' migration. The slave trade saw the forced transfer of tens of millions of Africans to North America, Europe, the Caribbean, Brazil, and Latin America, as well as many other parts of the Islamic world. This first stream is often referred to as the 'old African diaspora', while the 'new African diaspora' embraces millions of Africans who have emigrated all over the world in more recent times to escape persecution or simply in search of a better life. According to official estimate, this second stream of the African diaspora counts about 3 million people living in North America and Europe, the two main regions of destination.[13] Africans are clearly on the move. The old and new African

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diaspora interact with Africa on a variety of levels and tempo. Each group carries a different development potential in relation to Africa. Regarding, in particular, the modern African diaspora, it suffices to note that one third of Africa's highly qualify human resources are presently in the diaspora.[14] Overall, documented remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at $4 billion in 2003. The remaining part of the paper will survey and discuss some of the key initiatives targeting the African diaspora that have been put forward or are being developed by the African Union, African governments and the World Bank.

II. 1.   The African Union
        In the quest for Africa' liberation and emancipation, the cardinal ideology of Pan-Africanism, which advocates the continent's unity and integration - condition sine qua non of its development - originated from the plight and vision of Africans in the diaspora. The institutionalisation of the Pan-Africanism project did not, however, articulate a framework for Africa-diaspora engagement. The establishment of the AU in 2002 - which Murithi describes as 'the third institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism'[15]- represented a significant shift from decades of unstructured relationships between Africa and its global diaspora.[16] The constitutive Act of the Union, as amended in 2003, 'invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union.'[17] The amendment, which has elevated the diaspora to the rang of 'the 6th region of the Union', constitutes a milestone in the bid to incorporate the diaspora into the policy making and policy support processes of the AU as called for in the organization's 2004-2007 Plan of Action. The Plan places the diaspora at the centre of AU's priorities and provides for a special program titled Citizens of Africa, which pursues the following objectives: establishment of a diaspora expert database, systematic inclusion of diaspora expertise in AU programs, and full involvement of the diaspora in the Economic and Social Council of the African Union (ECOSOC).[18]
        But what precisely is the nature of the reciprocal relationships being envisaged? How should the diaspora be defined? How can the proper participation of the diaspora in the policy process of the AU be ensured? How can the African diaspora be mainstreamed in the activities of the AU? These are some of the central questions that have dominated AU' efforts to reach out to the African diaspora over the recent years and on which I shall now focus. But, before that, it's worth providing a quick overview of the whole process.
        On November 7-11, 2008, South Africa will host the AU-African Diaspora Summit at the level of Heads of State and Government under the theme 'Towards the realization of a united and integrated Africa and its Diaspora: A shared vision for sustainable development to address common

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challenges.' The forthcoming Diaspora Summit represents the culmination of a thoughtful consultation process between the AU and the global African diaspora. It must be noted that, in closer cooperation with the AU Commission, the government of South Africa has taken a decisive leadership role in the conception and development of the consultation process as requested by the AU Executive Council at its Eight Ordinary Session held in Khartoum, Sudan, from 16-21 January 2006 (Decision EX.CL/269 VIII). Pursuant to this decision, South Africa and the AU Commission agreed on a roadmap that involved a three-phased consultation approach to ensure the operationalisation of the diaspora initiative.

The first phase included the organization of a series of Regional Consultative Conferences (RCCs) held in Africa and the various regions of the world with sizeable African diaspora populations. The process began with national consultations in South Africa in early April 2005 and was followed by RCCs in Brasilia, Brazil (16 April 2007), London, UK (23-25 April 2007), New York, USA (22-23 June 2007), Barbados, the Caribbean (27-28 August 2007), and Paris, France (12-13 September 2007). RCCs were structured around six sub-themes which represent the broad AU diaspora agenda: (i) international affairs, peace and security; (ii) regional development and integration; (iii) economic cooperation; (iv) historical, socio-cultural and religious commonalities; (v) women, youth and children; (vi) knowledge sharing.

The second phase of this laborious consultation process aimed at operationalising the African diaspora initiative has been the African Union-African Diaspora Ministerial Conference held at Gallagher Estate, Johannesburg, South Africa, 14-18 November 2007. The Ministerial Conference agreed on a Draft Program and Plan of Action which has been translated into all working languages of the Union and is being circulated to member states for further input and comments.[19]

The third and culminating phase of the consultation process will be the Diaspora Summit to be held in South Africa by the end of 2008. AU Heads of State and Government will officially adopt the Program and Plan of Action agreed upon during the Diaspora Ministerial Conference -currently under consideration at the national level - and come out with a comprehensive blueprint for action that will set the pace for concrete actions to enable the implementation of the diaspora initiative.

One of the key issues that have dominated AU's diaspora initiative from its inception has been the question of defining the African diaspora. Who should be considered as a member of the African diaspora for operational purpose? This question, central to the whole enterprise, was finally resolved at the meeting of experts from member states held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11-12 April 2005, which adopted a definition that reads:

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The African diaspora consists of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.[20]

This definition departs from academic definitions by its simplicity and inclusiveness. It is, especially in its first half, straightforward and free of any ambiguity. The absence of a temporal or historical limitation or any reference to the cause or form of migration makes the definition very workable. The gravitational point lies, however, in the expression 'who are willing' in the second half of the definition, which places the emphasis on the individual and voluntary engagement of peoples of African descent who embrace and are disposed to help advance the cause of the continent's development project and vision as embodied in the AU.

While the consultation process has allowed to reach a consensus on some major points such as the definition discussed above, there are still a few contentious issues that need to be worked out. The first contentious issue revolves around the imperative of ensuring a proper participation and representation of diaspora representatives in related policy meetings as well as in the broader AU institutional framework. One idea being considered is to have some level of representation of the diaspora in the Economic, Cultural and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Pan-African Parliament[21].

Another contentious issue highlighted by the Diaspora Ministerial Meeting has to do with the operationalisation of the idea of diaspora as the '6th region' of the Union (along the lines of the regional economic commissions). Although this idea has become part of the conventional discourse, its practical implications are less certain. Important questions remained unanswered: How precisely would the "6th region" work and relate to the other five regions? Should the establishment be guided by a gradual approach that is strengthened on a cumulative basis? These questions call for further consideration as the AU diaspora initiative takes shape.

Overall, AU's efforts to reach out to the diaspora have contributed in bringing together different strands of efforts of member states, the wider African community, regional organizations and diaspora communities worldwide under a unified and integrated platform that can serve as both appropriate and effective framework for action. The establishment of the AU Civil Society and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) represents a clear indication of the organization's commitment to the diaspora cause. Alongside with the AU, some African governments have also stepped up efforts in that regard.

II. 2.   African Governments

Generally speaking, African governments lack public policies to harness diaspora's resources. Institutional relationships between home countries and diasporas are very weak or non-existent. However, in the wake

of the UN Global Dialogue on Migration and Development and against the background of the African Union's Diaspora Initiative, several governments in Africa have put forward a host of policies and programs designed to create conducive environments for diasporas to participate effectively in economic, political and social affairs of their home countries.

Efforts by the Nigerian government to reach out to Nigerians in Diaspora have been presented as 'a good model emerging.'[22] The Nigerian government has, for example, provided the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO) - the umbrella organization for the Nigerian diaspora - with office space within its embassy in Washington DC. The 2nd Science and Technology Conference organized in Abuja (July 2007) under the theme 'Connecting Nigeria with Her Diaspora' saw an important participation of NIDO delegates. The Nigerian government has also launched the Linkage with Experts and Academics in the Diaspora (LEAD) program designed to attract qualified Nigerians in the diaspora to the development of the Nigerian University System through short term (3-12 months) academic appointments.[23]

For its part, the government of South Africa has launched two instruments targeting its diaspora's skills and expertise. The South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) is one of the two instruments set up to achieve the transfer of skills of South Africans living abroad. The other instrument is *Where are You in the World*, a survey intended 'to understand the who, where and why of South Africans living abroad' and ultimately help policy makers design policies that encourage the skills, if not people, to return to South Africa. [24]

The Kenyan government has also embarked on intensive consultations with the Kenya diaspora on how best to facilitate their participation in national development effort. These consultations have produced a draft session paper on Maximizing the potential and input of the Kenyan Diaspora in the political process, wealth creation, employment generation and poverty reduction. The paper makes the case for the passing of a broad Kenya Diasporas Bill.

Unlike Kenya, which is developing a more comprehensive approach toward its diaspora, Ghana has adopted a series of measures that should have a positive impact in diaspora's involvement in national development efforts. The government has thus passed laws allowing dual citizenship (Dual Citizenship Act of 2000) and giving Ghanaians living abroad the right to vote in national elections (Representation of Peoples Amendment Act of 2005). In another important gesture, the government has permitted the establishment of the African Diaspora Mission at the WEB du Bois Centre in Accra with full diplomatic status. The latter must be understood in the context of the Joseph Project, launched by the government around the commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 2007, and

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which targets primarily people of African descent dispersed as a result of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Ghana's emphasis on the 'old diaspora' is quite unique among national efforts, which seem to be solely directed toward 'nationals' living abroad.

Both continental and national efforts have been supported by a number of multilateral international organizations, which have embraced the diaspora-development nexus.

II. 3.   The World Bank

In 2007, the World Bank launched its Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development Initiative in support of the AU and African governments' diaspora agendas. The Bank's initiative is aimed at providing 'African governments and the AU with analytical and possible financial support to sharpen the focus and making operational their diaspora agendas.'[25] The Bank's African Diaspora Program is structured around three core objectives, which are to: (i) enhance capacity for the delivery of improved services in strategic public sectors and institutions including financial management, education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, administration and management in participating countries; (ii) increase the quality of design and implementation of diaspora-led investment initiatives in participating countries; and (iii) facilitate improved communication and working relationships between African governments, donor agencies, and diaspora professionals to build stronger, more responsive and capable African public and private service institutions.[26]

Since the formulation of this initiative, the World Bank has intensified cooperation with the AU and African governments while engaging in a host of activities targeting the African diaspora.[27] As part of the Bank's strategy of support, the organization held an Open House for the African Diasporas in Washington, D.C. on November 29, 2007. This event offered to both sides the opportunity to clarify the expectations surrounding the launching of the diaspora program. Another important activity undertaken by the Bank has been the organization, from February 6-8, 2008, of the Joint Africa Institute (JAI) High-Level Seminar on Promoting Diaspora-led investments, and leveraging remittances as sources of financing for enhanced growth and development in Africa in Cape Town, South Africa. A particular emphasis of the Joint Institute was on the need for capacity development of member states of the AU as well as on the development of concrete strategies and operational instruments to use remittances as development tools for poverty reduction.[28] Against this background, the World Bank, in partnership with the AU, has submitted for EU funding a proposal for the creation of the African Remittance Institute (ARI). The Institute, to be located in the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, could undertake the following activities:

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(a) provide technical assistance to government institutions on putting in place regulatory frameworks; (b) carry out training and capacity building programs; (c) study remittances flows within Africa; (d) policy research and dialogue on how remittances can contribute to the development of Sub-Saharan African countries; (e) develop content and technology platforms for country-based payment and settlement systems for remittances.[29]

The World Bank has also launched the Development Market for the African Diaspora in Europe (D-MADE), which finances diaspora programs through a limited number of competitive grants.[30] The Bank has worked closely with some African governments (Ghana, Nigeria and Ethiopia) and diaspora organizations to facilitate deployment of diaspora professional networks in the health and education sectors.

3.   **Concluding Thoughts**
         This chapter has attempted to discuss the migration-development nexus in the context of the African diaspora. Long overlooked by policy makers, the development potential of diaspora communities for countries of origin has emerged, over the past years, as an important part of development discourse and strategies, especially in relation to the African continent. I have argued that financial remittances-centred approaches and strategies targeting the African diaspora will not led to a genuine development of the continent, which must be understood as encompassing a qualitative change in social, economic and political life. Such a change requires that the diaspora, from whom much is expected, be allowed – and willing- to carry out a holistic view of development in partnership with the state. The diaspora should be free to contribute – and countries of origin should be receptive to - not only financial remittances (flows of money) and human capital (flows of knowledge) –what they seem most concerned about - but also, and more importantly, to 'social remittances'[31], which Faist has articulated as 'the flow of ideas and practices which are 'good' and to which nobody in his or her right moral mind would object: human rights, gender equity and democracy.'[32]

Notes

[1] JT Shuval, 'Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm', *International Migration*, vol. 38 (5), 2000, p.42.
[2] PT Zeleza, 'Rewriting the African Diaspora: Beyond the Black Atlantic', *African Affairs*, vol. 104 (414), 2005, p.41.
[3] R Davies, 'Reconceptualising the Migration-Development Nexus: Diasporas, Globalisation and the Politics of Exclusion', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2007, pp. 59-76.

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[4] G. Mohan and Zack-Williams, 'Globalisation from Below: Conceptualising the role of the African diasporas in Africa's Development'. *Review of African Political Economy,* 92 (29), 2002, p.223.

[5] T Faist, 'Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus'. *Population, Space and Place*, vol. 14, 2008, pp. 21-42.

[6] E Akyeampong, 'Africans in the Diaspora: the Diaspora and Africa'. *African Affairs*, vol. 99, 2000, pp.183-213; J MacGaffey and R Bazenguissa-Ganga, *Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on the Margins of the* Law, James Currey, Oxford, 2000.

[7] R Honey and S Okafor, *Hometown Associations: Indigenous Knowledge and Development in Nigeria*, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1998.

[8] L Trager, Yoruba Hometowns: Community, Identity and Development in Nigeria, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2001.

[9] J Shain and A Barth, 'Diasporas and International Relations'. *International Organization*, vol. 57, 2003, pp. 449-479.

[10] ibid.

[11] E Østergaard-Nielson, 'From Remittance Machines to Euro-Turks: Ankara's Changing Perceptions of Citizens Abroad', Paper presented at the 2000 LSE Workshop on 'Perceptions and Policies of Sending Countries', London School of Economics.

[12] M Weiner and SM Teitelbaum, *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*, Berghahn Books, New York, 2001.

[13] U.S Census, 2000; Statistics Canada; IOM Migration Report 2005. Of the 3 million, 1 million have settled in the U.S.A., 282,600 in Canada, and 1.7 million in Europe. The latest number doesn't include immigrants from North Africa.

[14] See *Financial Times*, 16 July 2004, cited in IOM World Migration Report 2005. For example, Nigeria has more than half of its academic personnel working abroad. Three-quarters of all medical doctors in Ghana and Zimbabwe leave the country within a few years of completing medical school. More Ethiopian doctors are practicing in Chicago than in Ethiopia.

[15] T Murithi, *The African Union*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005, p.31.

[16] According to Murithi, op. cit. p.23, the first institutionalisation of the Pan-Africanist ideal can be situated either at the 1893 Congress on Africa held in Chicago or at the creation of the African Association in London in 1897. The second institutionalisation refers to the creation of the organization of African Unity in 1963.

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[17] The amendment to formally integrate the diaspora in the policy framework of the AU was proposed by Senegal at the AU's Executive Council meeting in Addis Ababa in February 2003.

[18] African Union, *African Common Position on Migration and development*, Banjul, The Gambia, 25-29 June 2006, Document EX.CL/277 (IX).

[19] See Report on the African Union Diaspora Ministerial Conference, 16-18 November 2007, Johannesburg, South Africa, available at http://www.gacnar.org/DCNDmetroblog.

[20] African Union, *Report of the Meeting of Experts from Member States on the Definition of the African Diaspora,* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11-12 April, 2005, section 18. It's worth noting that, at the Experts Meeting, two delegations felt strongly on the need for a two-part definition which would capture the academic or intellectual aspects and, at the same time, be more confined to the political needs of the Union. One delegation insisted on the need to add "permanently" before "… living outside the continent."

[21] The first Conference of Intellectuals of African and the Diaspora (I CIAD) proposed that 20 diaspora organizations be part of ECOSOC. See African Union, *Report of the First Conference of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora*, Dakar, Senegal, 6-9 October, 2004, Document Rapt/ Rpt/CAID (I), p.14.

[22] World Bank, *Concept Note on Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development*, Washington, 2007, p.25.

[23] Under LEAD, diaspora participants will receive a return economy class air ticket, accommodation and a compensation ranging from US $ 1,250-1,750.

[24] For example, according to the South African Nurses Council, South Africa produces approximately 2,500 nurses per year, but a 2006 study by the Centre for Global Development found that more than 4,844 were working overseas. At least 12, 206 South African health professionals in total-including an estimated 21 percent of doctors produced in the country-were practicing abroad in 2006. See Word Bank (2007), p. 26.

[25] World Bank, op. cit., p.4

[26] idem, pp.5-6.

[27] The World Bank and the African Union are working on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to try to deepen their cooperation. The MOU should formalize their collaborative efforts on the diaspora agenda.

[28] See World Bank, 'Latest News from the Diaspora Team', April 30, 2008, available at <http://www.worldbank.org>.

[29] ibid.

[30] A Development Marketplace for the African Diaspora in North America is being planned.

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[31] P Levitt and N Nyberg-Sørensen, *The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies*, Global Migration Perspectives, Geneva, 2004.
[32] Faist, op. cit., p.22.

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Researching the Irish Diaspora:
From Concept to Political Strategy

Breda Gray

Abstract
This chapter reviews the ways in which the emergence of diaspora as a reference point in social and cultural theoretical debates in the 1990s influenced my research on Irish migration at the time. It asks how we might characterize the contribution made by the contested notion of diaspora. Two main arguments are advanced. First, it is argued that instead of trying to define the notion of diaspora, or to identify the parameters of any specific diaspora, it is more helpful to examine the discourses and practices by which diaspora is brought into existence in any particular time/space. Second, and building on the first argument, the chapter examines the recent institutionalisation of diaspora within Ireland as a means of refiguring the Irish nation, both as a networked player in context of globalising economic competitive pressures, and as a sending country with a socially just relationship to the Irish diaspora and those diasporas resident in Ireland.

Keywords: Diaspora, diaspora strategy, globalisation, migration, women.

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1.   Introduction

The theme of diaspora emerged in the sociology of migration over the past 20 years mainly as a way of thinking society, subjectivity and belonging beyond the contained boundaries of the nation-state. As theoretical engagements with diaspora proliferated in western contexts at least during the 1990s, the political embracing of diasporas by many sending countries was also taking place with a variety of effects. This led to considerable conceptual and methodological debate. While diaspora is deployed theoretically to theorise different aspects of mobility, identity and belonging, diaspora remains an elusive notion, which only comes into being as a specific object of study via the discourses and practices of diaspora in specific contexts and time-spaces.

When I began writing this chapter, my plan was to examine the ways in which the circulation of diaspora in social and cultural theory in the 1990s informed my research with Irish women migrants and their peers in Ireland during that decade. However, my aim was to acknowledge its contribution, but also to consider the limits of diaspora as a framework for thinking about the politics of migration, and dispersed multigenerational

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ethnic groups. I was also jaded by the many attempts in the literature to define and offer typologies of diaspora and by other attempts to deploy it as emblematic of late-modern subjectivity: the idea that we are all diasporic now, so that in the end, it seemed to have little analytic purchase. However, when I began research for this chapter, I found that diasporas are now being actively mobilised by global institutions such as the UN and UNESCO and by numerous nation-states. Instead of moving beyond diaspora then, it seems that the notion of diaspora is being re-enchanted in the 2000s as it is politically mobilised by sending countries with support at global and local levels. I became interested in why this was happening and how it might be linked to globalisation and efforts to govern it.

This chapter is divided into three sections: first, I discuss my research on women and migration from Ireland (1980s migration to London) which was conducted in the mid-1990s, a time when the term diaspora was taken up in social and cultural theory as a heuristic device for theorising transnational lives and connections as well as intergenerational and hybrid notions of identity formation; second, I summarise changing constructions of out-migration by the southern state and elites in twentieth-century and the emergence of a discourse of diaspora in the Republic of Ireland in the 1990s; and finally, I argue that the Irish state and diaspora represent a unique case study of how diasporas have gained political significance in the twenty-first century as sending countries embrace diasporas as a means of networking themselves into global systems and adopt diaspora strategies which institutionalise, systematise and attempt to govern existing informal diasporic networks and connections.

2.   The Attraction of Diaspora - Theoretically and Empirically

The 1980s was the most recent decade experiencing considerable out-migration from the Republic of Ireland with the majority migrating to London and the southeast of England. In the mid-1990s, I conducted a study of women migrants and non-migrants of this generation which was led by two main questions: How might Irish migration be understood differently if analysed from the perspectives and experience of Irish women? And, in what ways might our understanding of migration be changed by focusing on the overlooked dynamics between those who emigrate and those who stay-put? The term diaspora appealed to me in this research because it potentially moved us beyond the dichotomous activities of emigration and immigration and placed homeland and countries of destination (and residents in these countries) in relationship to one another. Diaspora also brings gender, and women in particular, into focus because women are seen as biologically and culturally reproducing diasporas, thus a normative heterosexuality tends to underpin concerns with the survival of diasporas, and struggles over diasporic boundary-making frequently focus on women's bodies and behaviour.

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Despite these heteronormative assumptions, the refusal of binaries that marks the term diaspora in cultural theory has been productively taken up by queer theorists who focus on the unhomliness of diaspora, as well as its potential for figuring transnational queer politics. Because all of these debates are staged under the umbrella of diaspora studies, diaspora seemed a potentially productive frame for researching the gendered dynamics of migration and staying-put.

Sudesh Mishra's grouping of the many academic 'takes' on diaspora in the 1990s into three 'scenes of exemplification' is helpful and I adapt these below to point to how each use of the term helped me to analyse different aspects of 1980s Irish women's migration and staying put.[1]1 First, some theorists take a dual territoriality approach in which the homeland and receiving countries are imagined as coherent territorialised entities and 'roots' work is mobilised in such a way as to keep the 'homeland' central to diasporic memory and imaginary.[2] In this 'aborescent view of diasporic formations', diaspora is suspended between the homeland and the receiving country and the focus is on the subjective splits of those who live their lives simultaneously in relation to both host land and homeland.[3] The intensity of this 'in-between' existence is deepened at the end of the twentieth century by new communication technologies, speedier transport and new media. However, this mode of theorising tends to essentialise communities by attaching them to particular places of origin and ethnic identities, thus homogenising difference and producing forms of ethnic purity. Nonetheless, an important finding in my research was the extent to which the lives of Irish women living in London and Ireland were stretched between simultaneous familial and other expectations of their involvement in both the spaces of London and Ireland. Brah's deployment the term 'diaspora space' to enable an historicised analysis of the territorially located 'economic, political, cultural and psychic processes [...] where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed or disavowed' was helpful in framing these territorialised negotiations in less essentialised ways.[4]

A second approach in the literature is to celebrate transnational mobility as a determinately de-territorialised formation characterised by lateral rhizomorphic forms. This literature attempts to transcend nation-state and ethnic particularity, seeing identities as strategic positionings, mobile positionalities that are always contextually specific and in the process of becoming.[5] There is a shift away from roots, whether territorialised, remembered or familial, towards rhizomatic routes and notions of situation-specific becoming. This is a decentred and multi-locational view of diasporic mobilities and subjectivities. This approach can be critiqued for its ahistoric, non-located celebration of mobility and new forms of becoming. Moreover, the diaspora that emerges from this body of work can potentially be applied to all modes of existence, thus stretching the possible meanings of diaspora to

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such an extent that it loses analytical power. Nonetheless, this intervention challenged me to address the performative reproduction of normative categories in my study.

Finally, Mishra points to a body of literature that moves away from idealist discussions and adopts an archaeological approach to specific diasporas - 'the scene of archival specificity'.[6] These studies draw on archives or original research to investigate the formation of specific diasporas in time and space and may focus on individual diasporic histories, or examine similarities and differences between specific formations of diaspora and/or changes in diasporic formation over time. However, methodological discussion about how such studies might proceed and the kinds of approaches that work best in the empirical study of diasporas is still embryonic. My qualitative study (focus groups and interviews) offered one empirical account of the Irish women's diasporic experiences in Ireland and London in the mid-1990s.

3.   Changing Discourses of Emigration in 20th and early 21st Century Ireland

In this section of the chapter I offer a condensed account of the changing positioning of the southern Irish state and how these changes shaped homeland relationships to the diaspora since independence in the 1920s. As the state moved from a decolonising/postcolonial state in the 1920s and 30s (when, as a proportion of the population, out-migration from Ireland was higher than for most other European countries), to a nation-building state in the 1940s and 1950s, an EEC member state in the 1970s and 1980s, and developmental 'Celtic Tiger' state from the late 1990s-early 2000s, its espoused relationship to emigrants and the Irish community abroad changed. In the 19th century and early decades of the 20th century, the motif of exile constituted emigration as involuntary; the result of colonial rule and forces beyond individual and communal control.[7] However, by the 1940s and 50s, discourses of emigration as material necessity and an escape to modernity in cities like London or New York constructed the new state as failing to modernise economically and socially. In the 1980s, emigration was being turned into a positive sign of mobile Irish citizenship through labels such as 'the young Europeans' (used by Ireland's Industrial Development Authority in the 1980s) or 'the Ryanair generation' (as cheap London-Dublin flights became available from this newly launched budget airline).[8] Migration was gaining a different national valence in the more mobile world of globalised capitalism.

The public use of the term 'diaspora' in Ireland emerged in the 1990s when Mary Robinson deployed diaspora as a leitmotif of her presidency between 1990 and 1997. She embraced the diaspora partly as a trope for moving beyond the territorialised nationalisms (Irish and British)

that fuelled the conflict in Northern Ireland, but also as a way of symbolising a new more diverse and post-national Irish community and identity for the late-twentieth century. In doing so, she drew on the work of intellectuals and academics who, in the 1970s and 80s, saw the diaspora as a kind of 'third space' that, amongst other things, included both the Scots-Irish Presbyterian and the post-Famine Irish Catholic components of the diaspora in the USA, thereby incorporating religious and national diversity within the category 'Irish'. Since 1997, President McAleese has also given symbolic significance to the diaspora via her use of trope of the 'global Irish family'. These symbolic representations and calls for pluralism gained official recognition and momentum when the Good Friday Agreement included a provision that the Irish state should acknowledge 'the Irish abroad' as part of the nation, and a constitutional amendment to Article 2 was passed to this effect in 2000.

Emigrants and the diaspora became official objects of governance when the government established a Task Force on Policy regarding Emigrants in 2001 to respond to this 'new context in which to view the phenomenon of Irish emigration and…opportunity to put in place a new approach to meeting the needs of Irish emigrants'.[9] Thus, the diaspora was officially named as 'the Irish Abroad' and identified as a constituency whose welfare and cultural needs were the concern of the Irish government. The Task Force Report acknowledged that the nation's relationship to its emigrants and diaspora must now be problematised in the context of the national response to 'other' migrants and diasporas now resident in Ireland.[10] In 2004, the Department of Foreign Affairs established the Irish Abroad Unit and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dermot Ahern, in his opening address to a Department of Foreign Affairs Conference at Dublin Castle in April 2007 entitled 'Ireland's Attitude to its Diaspora', stated that:

> The Unit's remit is to co-ordinate the provision of Government support to Irish emigrants, those considering emigration and those who wish to return to Ireland. This includes supporting voluntary agencies working with Irish emigrants and, in accordance with Article Two of the Constitution, strengthening links with the Irish and people of Irish ancestry living abroad [...] our attitudes to our Diaspora have never been fixed, but have constantly changed over the ages [...] Today I am calling for a national debate on this country's attitude to our overseas communities. Policy in this area should not be the preserve of any group [...] We can never acquit the debt of gratitude we owe to generations of emigrants. But we can, and should, share our new resources to cherish our Diaspora.[11]

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No systematic plan or policy is offered here. However, in a later article (December 2007) the Minister refers to a Diaspora strategy:

> To administer this Diaspora strategy and the extra resources, the government established a dedicated unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs [...] Its programmes are wide ranging and innovative [...] We have to ensure that we maintain the interest of our communities abroad in Ireland as the generations go by [...] I am fully committed to maintaining this new outreach to our people - our global family – overseas.[12]

Thus, it seems that we have moved from the symbolic embracing of the diaspora by the Presidents in particular, to an embryonic institutional infrastructure for maintaining connections and the view that a diaspora strategy is worthwhile. This appeal to diaspora strategy reflects the position of a recent UN Economic and Social Council Paper on diasporas, which noted that

> There is a growing need to govern migration at a global level [...] it is in migrant-sending countries' interests to have good diaspora policies – so that they can capitalize on opportunities to promote migration and development, and so that they can manage the impacts of transnationalism on existing public institutions and policies. 13

Many have noted the increasing efforts to govern migration at a global level and changing norms with regard to how sending states relate to expatriates.[14] However, it is also important to consider the potential of the diaspora for bottom-up action and for producing diasporic spaces of contestation that can speak back to these transnational modes of population management. Globalising neo-liberal Capitalism involves a range of institutions and processes such as transnational corporations, outsourcing, a proliferation of transnational investment conferences, and the development of global institutions such as the WTO, IMF, NAFTA and World Bank, which contribute to the transnationalising of the ground rules governing trade, production and finance and re-organise the very domain of the political, often making governments more accountable to global capitalism than to any public.[15]

As global institutions and nation-states develop targeted diaspora strategies, it seems ever more important that new transnational spaces outside of the global market are created that can render governments, global institutions and markets accountable to new diasporic and transnational

networks and interests.[16] At a time when migrations, diasporas, dual citizenship arrangements and pluri-national residency are proliferating, it is important to consider how transnational or diasporic spaces might be generated and expanded into a bottom-up diasporic strategy. The contemporary assemblage of transnational processes, as Fraser argues, raises new questions about how those with a stake in the outcome of political claims making can make their voices heard. Fraser argues for an 'all-affected' principle, (i.e. all those co-imbricated 'in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives') as the basis for a diasporic public, rather than traditional notions of nation-state citizenship.[17]

Diaspora strategies are technologies of governance that are active in the constitution of new spaces and subjects with distinctive characteristics which are seen by some as the vehicles for imagining and institutionalising globalisation.[18] Perhaps in response to the Irish state's reluctance to define a strategy, two academics, Boyle and Kitchin, have produced a position paper 'Towards an Irish Diaspora Strategy' in which they state that

> it is important to conceive of the Diaspora not as a primed resource waiting to be tapped, but rather as a precious resource to be cared for and tended, valued and reenergised. As such, a strategy should not be conceived in terms of using the Diaspora but growing in partnership with it [...] The strategy should be as inclusive as possible and include the development of an affinity Diaspora (the so-called 'New Irish' who would be encouraged to continue to play for 'Team Ireland' if they return to their home country or migrate to another country from Ireland). It should also include the Irish Diaspora in its broadest form embracing individuals and organisations from all parts of the island (North and South) and of different religions (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, etc.) [...] By strategy we are envisaging the creation of a set of tools designed to encourage, promote, foster and nurture the diverse relationships between Ireland, its Diaspora and the 'New Irish' rather than the creation of a set of rigid, prescriptive management techniques. [19]

Here the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland is characterised as more than the state seeking to capitalise on the financial, human and social capital of the diaspora. It is also about redeeming a debt owed to the diaspora by those who remain in Ireland and about constructing a more inclusive community of affinity that is inclusive of diasporas resident in Ireland today. In the view of the authors, the role of the state and its agencies should be

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facilitative rather than directive by supporting existing networks and organisations and 'lightly' incubating new schemes and networks.

4.   Conclusion

Theoretical debates about diaspora in the 1990s offered a vocabulary and expanded if shaky conceptual language that signals boundary crossing and the impossibilities of categorisation. In my view, all attempts to hold diaspora together as a conceptual framework fall apart. Nonetheless, diaspora is performatively reproduced in everyday political, social and cultural discourses and practices. In Ireland it is enacted as a symbol of a 'third space' beyond the nation and nationalism where it is potentially possible to be of any religion, skin colour, sexuality etc. and also be Irish, and it was mobilised in this way most notably by President Mary Robinson during her presidency 1990-1997. Today, the Irish diaspora is being institutionalised by the Irish state, global institutional policies and academics via strategies that work in three main ways: first, as a way of redeeming an unresolved history of indebtedness to those who were forced to leave Ireland; second, as a term that can apply to those who are Irish and non-Irish immigrants in Ireland who are part of other diasporas, but by their residence in Ireland, even if they move on or return to their country of origin, are entitled to claim membership of the Irish diaspora (Team Ireland); third, and perhaps most fundamentally, as a technology of national and global governance of integration in the global economy. Diaspora here is a way of thinking about populations and producing them as a governmental category that is constitutive of new geographies and economics of globalisation.

With regard to the future, at least three issues may give rise to new formations of diaspora. First, if the current global and sending state trend towards the conscious and organised mobilisation of diasporas as resources continues, the often romantic and nostalgic diasporic relationship to the homeland will shift towards a more pragmatic and politicised relationship where, often rosy images and memories, will be replaced by political claims-making about mutual responsibilities, duties and rights. What's in it for the diaspora? Second, such global, national and local governmental shifts with regard to the management of diasporic populations may stimulate the emergence of diasporic spaces and institutions that facilitate a speaking back to nation-state and global governance (if not, such bottom-up spaces need cultivation). Finally, it seems important that diasporic formations at all levels resist the seductions of purely ethnically defined diasporic identities and instead produce diasporic possibilities that enable politics of solidarity and coalition.

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Notes

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[4] A Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 208

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[14] ibid.

[15] N Fraser, 'Transnationalizing the Public Sphere. On Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World'. *Theory, Culture and Society,* vol. 24, no.4, 2007.

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[17] ibid., p.22

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[18] W Larner, 'Expatriate Experts and Globalising Governmentalities: The New Zealand Diaspora Strategy', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,* vol.32, 2007, p. 333
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