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# PREVENTING POSTELECTION VIOLENCE IN AFRICA

## DRAFT REPORT

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Why do some elections facilitate democratic consolidation while others end in fraud and violence? Ghana and Kenya, for example, held their most recent presidential elections under very similar circumstances. Why did Kenya's 2007 election produce widespread fraud and violence, a clear setback for democracy, while Ghana's 2008 elections remained peaceful and facilitated its democratic consolidation? Perhaps the most critical factor was the actions of civil society organizations. In Ghana, these groups coordinated and mobilized far ahead of the election. They remained aware that the chances for a fraudulent election and a violent reaction to it were possible, and devised plans to ensure this would not occur. In Kenya, by contrast, civil society did not mobilize to prevent these actions. As a result, powerful civil society actors in the former were able to ensure a free, fair, and peaceful election, while those in Kenya were not.

Election violence is seldom random or spontaneous. More commonly, leaders of political parties premeditate protesting election results, often in response to perceived or actual electoral malfeasance that other parties and/or electoral management bodies perpetrate. In these instances, neutral third parties, such as respected religious or civil society leaders may be the only force capable of ensuring free, fair, and peaceful elections through their capacity to mediate between party leaders and maintain the independence of electoral management bodies.

To improve mechanisms of accountability of elections and other political processes, USAID tends to fund civic education campaigns, election observation programs, and capacity-building efforts that try to strengthen the civil society sector as a whole. USAID also often funds election support programs that strengthen the technical capacity of countries' election management institutions in order to increase their willingness and ability to ensure free, fair, and peaceful elections. While these efforts are important and, in many cases, necessary parts of democracy assistance, they alone cannot ensure that parties will adhere to democratic rules because they fail to engage political contestants at the very moments they are deciding whether or not to break them. Rather, high-level pressure from respected, domestic civil society leaders at these critical junctures in the electoral process can provide a more direct and effective force for bringing about free and fair elections, and preventing postelection violence. These programs add a vital missing component to USAID's existing strategy to ensure free, fair, and peaceful elections.

## THE PROBLEM

Why do some elections facilitate democratization while others, under similar circumstances, produce democratic breakdowns? Policymakers and scholars suggest that factors such as public attitudes towards democracy, the conduct of previous elections, ethnic diversity, and/or levels of economic development are important predictors of democratic consolidation. However, these typical explanations alone cannot explain divergent election outcomes. For example, before their most recent elections, both Ghana and Kenya had high levels of support for democracy, previous peaceful democratic transfers of power, significant ethnic diversity, and similar levels of economic development. Why did Kenya's 2007

election collapse into fraud and widespread violence, while Ghana's 2008 elections remained peaceful and facilitated its democratic consolidation?

We argue that the influence of robust and neutral third party domestic stakeholders explains these divergent outcomes. In Ghana, powerful civil society leaders fought hard to protect the independence of the electoral commission and put pressure on party leaders not to protest the election before the commission announced the results. As a result, Ghana's election remained relatively free of malfeasance as well as protest and violence. In Kenya, by contrast, civil society leaders had not mobilized to prevent fraud and violence, and thus were unable to stop it. Not only was the fraudulent election a setback to democracy, postelection violence killed 1,500 people and displaced 700,000 others.

Understanding the reasons for election fraud and violence, and how to prevent these events has critical practical significance for USAID's democracy and governance strategies around the world. The agency's efforts to support democracy could be more effective if, in addition to typical activities like large observer missions and civic education campaigns, they supported civil society groups and leaders capable of pressuring political elites to respect democratic processes at critical junctures of uncertain electoral processes.

## **STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING POSTELECTION VIOLENCE**

Conducting free, fair, and peaceful elections requires that candidates and their supporters believe that others will not manipulate and/or have not manipulated the outcome through nondemocratic means. Even if one party prefers honest elections, it has an incentive to try to win through unfair means if it believes other parties are going to cheat and not be sanctioned for it. Moreover, even if no party has cheated, creating the belief that it has happened may be sufficient for postelection violence to occur. Losing candidates, for example, may have an incentive to incite their supporters if they believe that creating doubt about the outcome of the election may be advantageous. This problem is especially acute in new democracies because parties and the public are unlikely to possess the information they need to determine whether others have followed or will follow democratic rules and/or whether cheating will result in sanctions. The existence of an independent third party can provide a solution to this dilemma.

Fraud is less likely if independent monitors can locate and sanction it, and election violence is more likely if such sanctions do not exist. While independent election management bodies (EMBs) are important for the conduct of free and fair elections, they do not gain autonomy through legal structures alone. Similarly, election observation missions (EOMs) and civic education campaigns can play an important role in publicizing the importance of conducting free and fair elections, but these activities alone are insufficient for preventing election fraud and violence. Domestic and/or international EOMs have the capacity to monitor and document election irregularities. However, their role does not extend to participating in the conduct of the election. Similarly, eminent outsiders also are unlikely to be able to prevent election misconduct. Rather, since party leaders often initiate these actions, countervailing forces capable of protecting the independence of EMBs and creating trust between parties and in the electoral process need to exist and be identified and supported by international donors. This pressure is most likely to emerge from leaders who understand

the domestic political and social complexities, will remain in the country long after short-term outside mediators have left, and have the capacity to pressure party leaders to respect democratic processes.

What can USAID do to facilitate this process? To push countries away from electoral violence, it can provide support to legitimate and respected domestic civil society stakeholders to access the technical and financial assistance they need to develop strategic plans for working with the electoral institutions and contesting parties to avoid violence. Such a program would bring civil society leaders who have been successful in preventing election fraud and violence in their own countries to those where similar interventions could prevent these actions. These civil society leaders would, along with international experts, assist local civil society overcome coordination problems, analyze and develop response plans for potential violent scenarios, implement strategies for gaining legitimacy and improving its standing as a neutral arbiter, and other similar support. A comparative analysis of Ghana's 2008 peaceful election and Kenya's 2007 violent one demonstrates the types of specific activities this requires.

## **EXPLAINING DIVERGENT OUTCOMES**

Why did recent elections in Kenya produce breakdown while helping to consolidate democracy in Ghana? In Ghana, civil society leaders were aware of the possibility of fraud and violence, and mobilized ahead of time to take actions that would avoid these outcomes. Their counterparts in Kenya, by contrast, had not prepared for these events and thus were unable to prevent them.

### **GHANA**

By Ghana's 2008 election, the country's two main parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had served two terms each since Ghana's democratic transition in 1992. Each had experienced political and economic exclusion while the other party ruled, and the discovery of oil contributed to the high stakes of the 2008 election.

As election activities commenced in the spring of 2008, members of civil society watched for and prepared to address problems emerging from the electoral process. This type of anticipatory mobilization was evident following the flawed new voter registration. The Electoral Commission of Ghana (ECG) had to delay it due to lack of equipment and an underestimation of the number of new voters. The controversy surrounding the delays and unexpected increase in voter registration heightened nerves regarding the credibility of the exercise, party manipulation of it, and the ECG's competency. Moreover, the violence, unpreparedness, and chaos of the exercise created a general sense of uneasiness among many Ghanaians that only increased throughout the remainder of the electoral campaign.

The ECG's mismanagement of the voter registration exercise also provided an opportunity for the NDC to exploit it for political advantage, and following voter registration, the NDC began to publicly undermine the credibility of the ECG. Such accusations became a point of contention between the parties and the ECG.

Civil society organizations saw the enmity between the parties, mistrust of the ECG, and the electorate's frustration as signals of future problems. Ghana's problematic history with democracy and recent flawed elections in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe heightened the sensitivity of CSOs to the potential for election fraud and violence, and caused them to take it seriously. Civil society groups, joining efforts under the Civic Forum Initiative (CFI), had already begun their 2008 election programs by the time voter registration began. The flawed registration process caused them to intensify their efforts to address the growing skepticism surrounding the credibility of the upcoming elections. The CFI engaged a broad-based coalition of organizations with various fields of expertise to promote the importance of peaceful elections. It also sought out the support of respected religious leaders, as the CFI was sufficiently astute to realize that on its own the group lacked the credibility and visibility to ensure that voters heeded its calls, and the capacity to mediate between the parties and protect the independence of the ECG.

The first round of voting on December 7, 2008, was relatively peaceful, orderly, and calm. The ECG announced the results within the 72-hour window mandated by the constitution. Leading up to the elections, polls were predicting the NPP to win with a substantial lead, but much to the surprise of many Ghanaians, the incumbent NPP candidate Nana Akufo-Addo had just a 1 percentage point lead over the NDC candidate, John Atta-Mills. Since no candidate received a majority of the vote, as required by the constitution to win in the first round, the ECG scheduled a runoff election for December 28, 2008, between the top two competitors, the NDC and NPP candidates. The campaign atmosphere was intense in the period that followed, and each party accused the other of manipulation during the runoff.

Tension was highest in the period following the runoff election on December 28. The media contributed to the tension. Radio stations started reporting on December 29 that the NDC and NPP disagreed over results from Volta and Ashanti regions. In addition, rumors spread that a set of suspicious figures had emerged from Kumasi, the NPP stronghold. Thousands of NDC and NPP partisans gathered outside the ECG, and the police strained to keep the peace between them. Many Ghanaians feared that violence, rioting, and looting was going to erupt.

During this period, civil society leaders played an indispensable role to maintain the peace between the parties and the integrity of the electoral process. The CFI engaged Cardinal Appiah Turkson, a prominent Catholic leader and chair of the National Peace Council, and he urged the public to stay calm. At the same time, leaders of the CFI met with both candidates to "find opportunities to bring about calm and peaceful resolution to the emerging crisis" (Christian Council Election Report 2009, 63). The CFI also approached President Kufuor and the ECG Chairman, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, and brought them into the negotiations. The result of the mediation was that both candidates agreed to accept the ECG's results, pledged to respect democratic rules, and promised to ask their supporters to remain calm.

On December 30, the ECG announced that while the NDC held a slim lead, the election was too close to call. It also stated that because of the narrow margin, it needed to hold the vote in Tain on January 2, 2009, which was unable to vote on election day, to determine the final victor. The commissioner said that the pending vote in Tain also would allow the ECG time



to investigate allegations of fraud. As the NDC had won Tain in the first round, it became clear that NDC would win the election if the NPP did not challenge the ECG's results and a number of NPP at this point began to advocate for it. Civil society leaders used this time to convince the NPP leadership that conceding the election was in the best interest of the country, while contesting it would likely lead to violence, efforts which ultimately proved successful.

Ghana's 2008 election shows how a domestic group of actors outside of the electoral management body and the election contenders came together to exert pressure to maintain peace and safeguard the democratic process. The CFI proved to be critical in disseminating information to the media and the public as well as mediating between political parties and the ECG. The information that filtered through the CFI contributed to peace efforts because it dispelled false information, built trust between the competing parties, and persuaded the NPP to accept the results as reported by the ECG. Initially, the CFI sought to leverage the resources and existing capacities of member organizations to undertake a massive peace and education effort. However, in the final days of the election, the CFI transformed itself into an emergency mediation body that brokered a peaceful transition, crucial actions for helping to consolidate democracy in Ghana.

## **KENYA**

In 2007, Kenya's incumbent president Mwai Kibaki formed a new coalition, the Party of National Unity (PNU). His main challenger in the election was Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Polls leading up to election day showed a tight race (Wolf 2009). Given the closeness of the race and fears that the PNU would manipulate the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), the ODM raised various accusations before election day, claiming that the PNU would attempt to prevent a legitimate ODM victory, in particular, by rigging Raila Odinga out of his Langata parliamentary seat (disqualifying him for the presidency) (*Standard on Sunday* 2008). Evidence at this time pointed to the possibility of malfeasance within the ECK as Kibaki replaced 19 of 22 commissioners in the run-up to the election. ODM leaders protested loudly, pointing out that the new commissioners were PNU stalwarts, but they could not stop the new appointments. These actions foreshadowed more fraudulent activities that unfolded during the election, especially in the vote-counting process.

Although voting itself was calm and peaceful on December 27, there was confusion and delay over the announcement of electoral returns. In early results on the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup>, Odinga maintained a consistent lead. ECK results on the 29<sup>th</sup> showed that Kibaki had closed the gap with Odinga. Continued and inexplicable delays in the reporting of complete and certified results began to degrade the credibility of the ECK, and, as a result, isolated protests began to erupt in Nairobi and elsewhere on the morning of the 29<sup>th</sup>. As Odinga's lead diminished, ODM continued to assert irregularities.

On December 30<sup>th</sup>, ECK chair Samuel Kivuitu attempted to hold a press conference to announce the final results from remaining constituencies and the presidential winner. Scuffles between ODM and General Services Unit officials broke out, shutting down the press conference. ODM held their own press conference in which they highlighted discrepancies

in the presidential count from select constituencies. At about 5:30pm in an undisclosed location inside of ECK headquarters in Nairobi, Kivuitu announced Kibaki's re-election on the state-run Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) with a victory of 225,174 votes. Within an hour, the KBC broadcasted Kibaki's swearing in and the country subsequently erupted in protest and violence.

Kenyan civil society organizations were unprepared to intervene to stop these irregularities. The Kenya Election Domestic Observer Forum (KEDOF) was the umbrella group that coordinated the various civil society, nongovernmental, and church organizations that monitored the elections. KEDOF received financial support from the UNDP, and was able to coordinate 17,000 observers at roughly 27,000 polling stations and ECK headquarters. Although members of KEDOF stationed themselves at ECK headquarters in Nairobi to observe the tallying process, they were not allowed to observe the vote counting.

KEDOF's initial report on the quality of the election demonstrates confusion and a lack of coherent judgment on the fairness of the process. Their statement from December 31, 2007, (after Kivuitu announced final results) states that the elections "were conducted openly, fairly, and professionally" but with doubts about the tallying process. After the elections, KEDOF faced additional scrutiny from its failure to mobilize an effective monitoring mission on election day or even to produce a final report on their activities. The mission was fraught with difficulties. KEDOF monitors observed in areas where they hailed from, which raised questions about their impartiality at polling center tabulations. Moreover, having been excluded from the tallying process at the ECK, they were unable to mediate disputes among the PNU, the ODM, and the ECK as they arose over the legitimacy of the count. As a result, civil society failed to act as a neutral third party able to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

The protests and violence that followed the disputed outcome severely eroded democratic gains in Kenya. ODM protestors took to the streets in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the election results where they were met by heavy-handed security forces that fired on unarmed civilians (CIPEV 2008). Widespread violence engulfed the country, resulting in nearly 1,500 deaths, 700,000 internally displaced peoples, and countless injuries. The fighting only stopped with the signing of an agreement mediated by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan between Kibaki/PNU and Odinga/ODM that resulted in the formation of a coalition government where Kibaki remained as president and the position of prime minister was created for Odinga.

Civil society in this instance was unable to exert any influence over the ECK or the PNU to allow for free and fair monitoring of the count. Since Kenya's 2002 election had been generally free of fraud and violence, civil society leaders did not anticipate such outcomes and thus did not have a strategy to prevent them. Although it is not possible to know whether such actions would have been sufficient to ensure a credible election, what is clear is that because they did not develop a plan, the ECK and the PNU were able to marginalize civil society with ease.

## CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PROPOSED STRATEGY

The analyses of recent elections in Ghana and Kenya point to many (but not all) of the conditions that must be present to avoid election fraud and violence. Preventing violence may not be easy (or possible), however, even if the risk of violence is evident far ahead of time. Zimbabwe's 2008 election presents a clear example. Heading into the election, Robert Mugabe knew that he could not win in a free and fair election. Nevertheless, since the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was willing to rig the contest in his favor and since security forces were willing to repress supporters of the opposition, pressure to conduct a free and fair election did not deter Mugabe from stealing it (Ploch 2008). In general, three conditions must exist to avoid election violence: the possibility of an opposition victory, the presence of genuine domestic civil society leaders, and, perhaps most surprising, only a minimally competent and independent electoral commission.

***Prospect of Opposition Victory.*** We only expect violence to occur if incumbents believe they cannot win a free and fair election. Otherwise, there is no incentive to cheat. Tanzania is a clear example (Hoffman and Robinson 2009). While the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) does not face much competition on the mainland, its rule is far less secure on the semi-autonomous Zanzibar archipelago, and many observers believe CCM stole the 2001 election there. Unsurprisingly, election violence is rare in the former, but common in the latter. Another important point is that competition and associated election violence can vary within a country. Continuing with the example of Tanzania, while in general the CCM faces little competition for most parliamentary seats on the mainland, it does face some, and violence and repression tends to be most concentrated in these areas.

***Genuine Domestic Civil Society.*** To mediate among parties and protect the independence of the electoral commission requires high levels of sustained intervention. This can only exist to the extent that domestic actors have the capacity and interest in doing so. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) exist because donors are willing to fund them but do not represent a civil society movement with the legitimacy and standing to act as mediator for political leaders. These organizations may not be committed to undertaking the type of activities that prevent election violence. Moreover, the existence of many NGOs may depend on government funding or having good relations with it more broadly, so they may not be willing to provide the type of robust intervention needed to ensure a free, fair, and peaceful election. Instead, it is more important to seek out influential individuals who have a genuine concern for peaceful elections, such as religious leaders, retired judges, and/or retired military officials. Nigeria presents a good example of this. Much election violence there revolves around control of the governorships of the country's 36 states. Violence tends to be lower in states that have local respected figures capable of intervening to prevent it than in those states where these figures do not exist and/or choose not to act.

***Electoral Commission Willing to Count Votes Accurately.*** Perhaps most surprising, EMBs do not need to be highly competent and independent to run a free and fair election. Rather, a capable domestic observer organization combined with strong pressure on candidates from neutral and respected civil society leaders to permit a free and fair election to occur can compensate for an EMB's shortcomings. Pakistan's 2008 election makes this clear. Before the election, domestic and international observers expressed great concern that the

Electoral Commission of Pakistan (ECP) would not be able to run a competent election, free of political interference. In the event, these fears were not realized. Two factors account for the ability of the ECP to preside over a generally free and fair election. First, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani mobilized the military to provide security on election day. More broadly, he was a respected nonpolitical leader who had an interest in returning the country to civilian rule through a credible election (Lobe 2008). Second, a domestic observer group, the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), was able to place its agents in polling stations to monitor vote counting in many parts of the country. While FAFEN did not provide high-level support, its presence ensured that Kayani's desire for a credible election extended to permit the accurate counting of ballots at polling stations. The combined efforts of pressure from the top and grass roots mobilization proved sufficient to hold a credible – albeit imperfect – election, and the public largely accepted the results.

## **UPCOMING ELECTIONS WHERE VIOLENCE IS A POSSIBILITY**

Over the next two years, many weak democracies will be holding elections, and violence is a distinct possibility in many of them. For example, over the next year, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe will be holding elections, and Kenya will hold elections in 2012. While it is unlikely that all of them will result in extensive fraud and/or violence, it is probable that this will occur in at least one of them. Below we discuss the scenarios that could lead to violence in three of them, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, and to what extent it may be possible to prevent it.

### **KENYA 2012**

Since Kenya's next election is two years away, it is too early to discuss specific contours of the race. Nevertheless, recent by-elections have seen considerable tension between the ODM and the PNU. More broadly, since Odinga likely received more votes than Kibaki in the 2007 election, there are good reasons to believe that Odinga will seek the presidency in 2012 as opposed to running on a national unity ticket as he did in 2002. Similarly, the ethnic tensions that caused violence to spread widely and rapidly following the 2007 election still exist. Thus, 2012 could produce a similar race to 2007 (although Kibaki cannot run again). It is also important to note that the 2002 election, the only one that did not have extensive violence since the country's return to multiparty democracy in 1992, was an anomaly in many ways. In 2002, Kibaki and Odinga ran on a national unity ticket to oust a deeply unpopular incumbent, Daniel Arap Moi. Getting rid of an unpopular president will not be an issue in 2012 since the incumbent will not be running. Hence, it is more likely that the 2012 election will resemble those in 1992, 1997, and 2007 rather than the one in 2002 (Sundet, et al. 2009).

Leveraging the memory of the fraud and violence that occurred during Kenya's 2007 election is one of the strongest forces for ensuring that it does not happen in 2012. Unlike in 2007, civil society leaders are likely to remain alert to potential problems and take them seriously. In addition, it may be possible to engage powerful actors who can deter fraud and violence that were not present in 2007.

## **NIGERIA 2011**

Extensive fraud and violence occurred in Nigeria's 2007 election, and there is every reason to believe that the 2011 election will be similar (International Crisis Group 2007, Unom and Ojong 2009). International and domestic observers believe the 2007 contest was the most flawed and violent one since the country's transition to multiparty rule in 1999. State security forces perpetrated much of the violence and the blatant politicization in the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was clear. Few of the underlying factors that led to fraud and violence in the 2007 election have improved, such as cutthroat competition for gubernatorial posts because of the access to state resources they possess. Fraud was so widespread that it is still unclear who won the presidential election.

Despite this bleak outlook, there are some positive signs that it is possible to reduce the level of fraud and violence in at least some parts of the country in the 2011 election. President Goodluck Jonathan has installed a new commissioner of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) who has broad respect. In addition, Nigeria demonstrates that individual actors at the state-level can serve as mediators to ensure peaceful elections. We also possess good information on where fraud and violence are likely to occur at the subnational level. For these reasons, it may be possible to design a program that would target preventing violence in specific contests.

## **UGANDA 2011**

There are good reasons to believe that Uganda's 2011 election will be violent, but preventing it if the conditions that could catalyze it materialize could be difficult (Okille, et al. 2010, Tucker, et al. 2005). There are three factors to consider. First, Uganda uses a two-round system in presidential elections. To avoid a runoff, the winning candidate must secure a majority in the first round. Given that President Museveni's public approval rating is below 50 percent, it is a distinct possibility that he will not secure a majority in the first round. Moreover, general distrust in the independence of the Electoral Commission of Uganda might mean that voters and/or candidates may not believe results announcing a first round victory for Museveni. Second, whether the opposition will unify is not clear. Third, given that Uganda is going to begin to export large amounts of oil, the stakes in the 2011 election are higher than in previous ones, and violence over political power has already occurred between the state and factions in the north and between state forces and the Baganda in Kampala.

One likely scenario for widespread violence would be if Museveni fails to secure a majority in the first round and opposition parties unite behind the opposition candidate, most likely Kizza Besigye, in the runoff. Besigye received 37 percent of the vote in the 2006 election, and observers believe him to be more popular today and Museveni less so than in 2006 (when Museveni won with a very slim majority). Accordingly, a runoff between the two is a realistic possibility. It is very important to note that the opposition does not need to come together in the first round for this to occur. Rather, all that needs to happen is for Museveni to receive less than 50 percent of the vote in the first round. A second scenario in which violence might occur would be if Museveni secures a majority in the first round, but there is widespread suspicion of fraud. Given the public's mistrust of Uganda's electoral commis-

sion, it is easy to envision a scenario where opposition parties mobilize their supporters, claiming that Museveni won by cheating. Given the determination Museveni has shown to remain in office, it is realistic to believe he would cheat and/or employ violence to win if faced with the real possibility of losing office. For example, security forces arrested Besigye before the 2006 election and are threatening to do so again. Ugandan police also publicly beat him in July 2010.

Unfortunately, Museveni's determination to win the 2011 election is likely to present the largest obstacle to preventing fraud and violence. As Zimbabwe's 2005 election demonstrated, it is extraordinarily difficult to conduct a free, fair, and peaceful election if a leader has the capacity to pack an electoral commission with his or her supporters and employ security forces to repress opposition candidates and supporters. At the moment, Museveni possesses these powers.

## **CONCLUSION**

Why do some elections end in fraud and violence, leading to setbacks for democracy while others facilitate democratic consolidation? We argue that standard factors, such as ethnic fragmentation, public demand for democracy, level of economic development, and political history alone cannot account for these differing outcomes. Rather, we claim that contingent factors during the election, especially the existence of civil society organizations that are able to mediate among the main parties to accept the election outcome and protect the independence of EMBs, are critical to preventing fraud and violence.

These results have practical applications for USAID's support for democratic reform. While the agency tends to focus significant attention on voter education and election observation missions, its efforts and funds might be better employed to ensure that domestic civil society organizations have the resources, capacity, and access to political leaders they need to mediate among parties and place pressure on electoral contestants to allow elections to proceed without interference.

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