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Governments and Muslim Communities in the West:


UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND GERMANY

Edited by Jonathan Laurence and Philippa Strum



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Governments and Muslim Communities in the West: United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany

Proceedings of a Conference sponsored by the Division of United States Studies
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

March 3–5, 2008

Edited by
Jonathan Laurence and Philippa Strum

This publication was made possible by the generous support of
The Carnegie Corporation of New York
The Heinrich Böll Foundation
The German Information Center USA/German Embassy.
“Your Source of Information on Germany,” www.germany.info;
“The Week in Germany” and “Deutschland Nachrichten,” www.germany.info/newsletter

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Available from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027

www.wilsoncenter.org

ISBN: 1-933549-41-6

Cover photos:
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Introduction

JONATHAN LAURENCE AND PHILIPPA STRUM

The number of Muslims in the United States and Western Europe has grown exponentially in the last few decades. While the figures are inexact and in some cases contested, there are an estimated 3,000,000–6,000,000 Muslim citizens and permanent residents in the United States, 5,000,000–6,000,000 in France, 3,200,000–3,400,000 in Germany, and 1,600,000 in the United Kingdom.

One of the unresolved questions for Western Muslims is how best to connect with their governments, whether national, state, county, provincial, or local entities. Many Muslims are immigrants from countries whose governments are democratic only in name and in which it is considered wisest to avoid contact with officials. They nonetheless recognize that communication with governmental entities—schools, health care providers, police, local officials—is a necessary part of life in the West. The difficulty for many Muslim communities, whether their members are relatively recent immigrants or long-standing citizens such as African-American Muslims, is compounded by their experience of governments in a post-9/11 world as largely uninformed, suspicious and unwelcoming.

For their part, government officials in these countries are trying to understand how best to connect with local Muslim communities—communities with which they have had little experience in the past. It is important for governments to identify potential interlocutors, in part to aid in security and law enforcement but for other purposes as well. Governments must have Muslim partners to turn to for practical matters such as certifying butchers as *halal*,¹ identifying chaplains for prisons and armed forces, and including representative leaders in symbolic events.

Their attempts to date have had mixed results. One problem they face is that if the governments limit their efforts at communication to mosque leaders, they reach only those Muslims—fewer than half, in some of the four countries mentioned above—who attend mosques regularly. Fear of connecting with what might prove to be a suspect organization is also part of the problem for governments seeking Muslim partners. Another element is the diversity of Muslim populations. There are Muslims from 80 countries in the United States and while there is somewhat less diversity among the Muslim populations of Western Europe, there are still differences of sending countries and of theology, degree of religiosity, citizenship status, language, age, and gender. The decentralized institutional structure of Islam presents an additional difficulty for attempts at connection.

Some governments have therefore facilitated or organized the creation of national entities, such as the German Islam Conference, the British Muslim Forum, and the French Council of the Muslim Faith. (Any governmental attempt to create such an organization in the United States would raise constitutional questions, because of the American Constitution's prohibition of governmental involvement in religion.) It is nonetheless impossible to identify one overarching Muslim organization in each country with which to communicate, given the diversity of Muslims.

A complicating factor is the rivalries among existing organizations, both within the Islamic Councils organized by governments and between those included in official consultations and those who opt out.

Local governments have also created or joined Muslims in creating institutional mechanisms for communication. The London Metropolitan Police Muslim Contact Unit is one such example. Southeastern Michigan's "Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity" (BRIDGES) brings together representatives of 12 Muslim, Arab and Sikh groups and law enforcement agencies for regular meetings. The Muslim American Homeland Security Congress was created in Los Angeles in 2006, in part to enable communication between Muslim organizations and law enforcement officers. France's "Cadets of the Republic" seeks to break down barriers by encouraging immigrants, largely Muslims, to become law enforcement officers.

The best ways to open regular channels of communication, in other words, has become a major concern of governments in nations with large and relatively recent immigrant Muslim populations. How successful are the existing efforts at facilitating governmental-Muslim communication? How might they be improved? What problems have been encountered in establishing and in maintaining them?

Recognizing that although the specifics vary from nation to nation, the general problems faced by Muslim communities and governments in the West are similar, the Division of United States Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars brought together a small group of Muslim leaders and government officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France to exchange information about techniques and strategies that have and have not worked well. The participants came to Washington, D.C. for a March 2008 conference at which they met initially for a working dinner and then for an all-day workshop. That was followed by a half-day program open to the public. The first part of this publication is a summary of the comments and thinking that came out of the workshop; the second, the presentations and discussion that followed at the public program. A list of the participants is at pages 57–60.

The conference was organized jointly by Philippa Strum, then Director of the Division, and Professor Jonathan Laurence of Boston College, who also served as the conference rapporteur. Funding for the program came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, and the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany/German Information Center USA, all of which have the organizers' and the Center's thanks for their generosity. So do the individuals at those institutions upon whom we relied and for whose support we are very grateful: Geri Mannion of the Carnegie Corporation; Sebastian Graefe and Bastian Hermisson of the Böll Foundation; and Stefan Moebs, David Schwake, Andreas Krueger, and Petra Arnhold of the German Information Center and the German Embassy.

Our thanks go as well to Dr. Justin Vaisse of The Brookings Institution, who served as translator for the workshop; to Elodie Convergne, an intern in the Center's Program on Western Europe, who volunteered her translation services for part of the public session; and to Johanna Peet of the Brookings Institution, who assisted Jonathan Laurence in his capacity as conference rapporteur. The conference's complicated logistics were managed with her usual great aplomb by Susan Nugent of the Division of United States Studies. Acacia Reed helped with research. This publication was designed by Lianne Hepler and Michelle Furman of the Wilson Center's graphic design department.

Finally, we owe our gratitude to the conference participants, who took the time from their very busy lives to come to Washington. We hope the program was useful to them and that this publication will be equally so for other readers.

NOTES

1. “*Halal*” means “permitted. Islamic law specifies the proper way to slaughter animals.

PART I
WORKSHOP

Muslims and Religious Freedom:

Local and National Perspectives

UNITED KINGDOM

Speaking at the workshop's first panel, a British presenter declared that freedom of speech and the right to hold particular beliefs and practice one's faith should be a given in a democracy. The climate in which the debate over Muslims' religious rights takes place has changed, however, especially in countries that feel threatened or have experienced terrorist attacks. The events of 9/11, 3/11, 7/7, and the attempted attack at the Glasgow airport in 2007, along with the negative media attention given to the Muslim faith, has had an alienating effect on the indigenous population in the United Kingdom.¹ That makes it more difficult for the Muslim faith to be seen as a positive contribution to mainstream British life. This is due in part to the fact that most public comment on Islam is made in the context of counterterrorism or counter-radicalization policies. The government has sought to combat radicalization among British Muslim youth by 1) tackling disadvantage and discrimination, including structural problems that contribute to inequality; 2) deterring those who facilitate terrorism by changing the environment in which terrorists can operate; and 3) engaging in a battle of ideas, challenging extremist ideas and those who espouse them. While these are worthwhile goals, many in Britain have developed mental barriers about Islam that could ultimately undermine Muslims' religious freedom. Non-Muslim Britons will have to undergo a psychological shift to gain a realistic understanding of Islam and Muslim communities, free of suspicion and fear.

Muslim leaders also have their share of responsibility in the public debate. They should portray Islam in a positive light and call for the establishment of reciprocal religious rights for non-Muslims within Islamic societies. The principle of reciprocity is the essence of justice in a multi-religious society, and Muslim leaders should support this publicly. When a Christian converts to Islam, that conversion is embraced and respected. By the same token, a Muslim who converts to Christianity is no longer a Muslim and must be respected and accepted as such—there should be no coercion at any point. There is still a long way to go on this agenda, and those who seek to gain must also be willing to give.

GERMANY

The German government is to be praised for its historic decision to establish a structured dialogue with the Muslim community, although it is regrettable that it took nearly five decades to do so. The German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, or DIK) is an admirable accomplishment of Prime Minister Angela Merkel's administration.² It has been an especially welcome surprise since the only way in which the previous "red-green" coalition of the Socialist and Green parties (1998–2005) addressed the Muslim presence in Germany was in the context of combating the terrorist threat. The government has now recognized two crucial facts: Muslims are part of German society, and steps should be taken to integrate them effectively. Some people still view Islamic schools, the *halal* slaughter of animals,³ and other Islamic practices as part of a hidden agenda designed to undermine

the German state. Advocacy for the right to practice these beliefs, however, is simply meant to gain equal access to the religious freedoms enjoyed by other religions.

Populist statements from politicians and the media have nonetheless amplified an atmosphere of distrust, especially on the topic of homegrown terrorism. The occasionally hysterical discussion about the presence of Islam in Western societies has not helped Muslims' sense of increasing discrimination in everyday life or the broader phenomenon of Islamophobia. Muslims simply do not recognize themselves in the media's depiction of them. The discussion of terrorist sleeper cells, in particular, has deepened the gap between society and the representatives of Muslim organizations, whom the larger society perceives as conflicted or ambivalent about terrorism. Islamism, furthermore, has become a term of abuse in German debates. The definitions of Islamism outlined in an influential NGO report⁴ are ambiguous, and the government needs a new set of classifications.

The solution to many of these challenges is two-fold. The government should foster both a robust community structure and a well-designed mechanism for state-Islam consultation. As discussed below, the working agenda of the government-sponsored DIK does not currently address these needs. In addition to the Islamic commandments which many Muslims fulfill individually, there are many areas of Muslim religious life, such as congregational prayers, Friday prayers, and the pilgrimage to Mecca that have meaning only when carried out in a community setting. This means that a collective effort and an organized structure are a necessity when Muslims act to protect the poor and the needy, fight injustice, disseminate that which is good and reject that which is bad, and establish fairness and justice in social relations. Instead of addressing the issues, the government asks Muslims in the DIK for an explicit commitment to the German language and German social conventions—a commitment that goes beyond the minimum requirement of Muslims' adherence to the German constitutional order. Government officials concentrate too much on these subjective, socio-cultural criteria of integration instead of focusing on the more pressing issue of religious freedom. A meaningful attempt to integrate Islam legally and politically would include, for example, the establishment of religious education, the founding of training centers for imams (mosque prayer leaders) and teachers, the representation of Muslims in broadcasting councils, the consideration of Muslim needs such as mosques and cemeteries in urban planning, and the provision of chaplains in the military, hospitals and jails.

UNITED STATES

Two previously mentioned themes are relevant in the United States: the promise of religious freedom for Muslims and the limits of Western governments' counter-radicalization strategies. Religious freedom is not an exclusively Muslim issue. If religious freedom for Muslims is discussed separately from the issue of religious freedom in general, then one might be inclined to think that Islam is an exotic specimen in need of special treatment. In fact, Muslims' needs in this context are no different than those of any other religious group, although the American Muslim population's diverse makeup makes it hard to generalize about what Muslims "need" in order to be able to practice their religion in the United States.

Although local authorities in the United States can be commended for reaching out to Muslims—an effort that reflects a massive investment of time and resources—the meetings and roundtables they have organized have not always moved beyond the discussion of superficial issues. In addition,

American authorities are guilty of a serious failure: they continue to engage either the most unqualified or non-Muslim individuals and organizations, which often are made up of renowned Islam- or Muslim-bashers. What they should do instead is take advantage of the untapped assets and resources of the most qualified people available within the Muslim and Arab communities.

It is increasingly difficult to fulfill some pillars of the Muslim faith in the United States. It is harder to worship in public places, for example, because of the general public's irrational fears—the kind of fears that led to passengers asking a pilot to “de-plane” Muslim passengers for praying before takeoff.⁵ The result is that since September 11, 2001 Muslims are reluctant to fulfill their religious obligation at prayer time. In addition, the increased scrutiny inherent in anti-terrorism regulatory activity means that American Muslims have fewer options for alms-giving and charity, making this another obligation they are unable to complete. Finally, there is an atmosphere of “constrained speech” in pulpits and podiums in mosques across the United States. Some Muslim preachers and lay leaders are afraid to speak out or voice dissent against the ill-conceived policies of the American government because of increased surveillance and a growing culture of denunciation. All of these freedoms, however—prayer, charitable donations and criticism of government policies—are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Advocacy by Muslim interest groups has been partially effective insofar as it has placed the current administration on the defensive and focused the national discussion on civil and religious liberties. Nonetheless, this advocacy has not been translated into any policy changes or real victories for Muslims' religious freedom. In order to achieve true religious freedom, three flawed paradigms must first be dismantled. The first is the open-ended war on terror; the second, the seemingly limitless unitary power of the executive branch; the third, the emphasis on prevention of radicalization, which makes it possible for a person now to be convicted of a crime for merely thinking of dissenting against a certain policy. As long as Muslims are victims of ethnic and religious profiling and are viewed as terrorist suspects, or treated as members of an exotic species or a fifth column, they will be perceived as foreign to the United States and the American dream will remain unfulfilled for them.

FRANCE

The primary challenge for Muslim communities in France is to develop organizations and an infrastructure that are politically, financially and intellectually independent from foreign influence. The French government's creation of the French Council for the Muslim Faith (*Conseil français du culte musulman*, or CFCM) was a positive if incomplete step in this direction, and more than 80 percent of the approximately 2,000 mosques in France opted to participate in the first two CFCM elections in 2003 and 2005.⁶ The relative efficiency of administrative arrangements with Muslim leadership at the local level—in the Regional Councils for the Muslim Faith (CRCM)—should not be allowed to obscure the stagnation among Muslim leaders in the national-level CFCM, which has been plagued by internal squabbling.⁷

In spite of these shortcomings, the CFCM is a good thing for French Muslims, and efforts should be made to improve the organization and empower it better to address the issues of religious observance that remain unresolved. The state wants to hear a clear, unified voice from the Muslim communities, to know who is in charge and who can best represent their religious needs—from the planning of

cemetery sections suitable for Muslim burial rites and the oversight of *halal* animal slaughter, to the appointment of chaplains in some French prisons, where as many as 60–70 percent of prisoners—but only 10 percent of chaplains—are Muslim (and many of these chaplains may not speak fluent French, or have strong local or cultural knowledge).⁸

Three steps are needed to achieve a genuinely “French” Islam. The first is ending the political pressures exerted on the CFCM by foreign governments in North Africa and Turkey; the second, making sure that mosques are funded with money that comes from within France rather than from other countries. The third step is training a corps of French-speaking imams, in a university setting, who can play a role in answering French Muslims’ questions about religion. This would eliminate the need for them to resort to television imams (*telemuftis*) or internet *fatwas* (*cyberfatwas*) that are disconnected from the social, economic, and cultural realities facing Muslims in France.⁹ Over time, the composition and agenda of the CFCM should be reformed to reduce the influence of foreign countries and enhance the theological qualifications of board members. The end result would be a CFCM whose leaders are apolitical and locally rooted; that is, competent in both text and context.

The Regional Council for the Muslim Faith (CRCM) in Rhône-Alpes has successfully ministered to the religious needs of the local Muslim population in the Lyon area, home to one of the largest concentrations of Muslims in France. A good example of cooperation in that region is the way in which mosque construction projects are overseen and approved. Representatives of four groups are involved, in accordance with a four-party memorandum of understanding: the prefect or a representative of the French state, the mayor of the city, the president of the CRCM, and the president of the association sponsoring the project. The signing ceremonies ensure that authorities view the prospective mosque as a real project, backed by religious authorities in full transparency. Local Muslim leaders gain an appreciation for being accountable and responsible to their communities. The positive results in Rhône-Alpes can be attributed to several factors. First, there is a real demand from local Muslims for help in resolving their problems about daily religious observance in the region. Second, the mayor of the region’s capital is pleased to have a single interlocutor and is a strong supporter of the council. Finally, there is good cooperation between the council and the departmental prefecture. The council’s leadership has actually encountered more resistance from various factions within the Muslim community than from state officials.

DISCUSSION

The first query in the discussion session that followed the panelists’ remarks was whether there is an expectation of “assimilation” in France, whereas the British refer to “integration.” A participant from France responded that he did not mind whether the term “assimilation” or “integration” was used—“the most important thing is that you can live your faith, an authentic faith, with complete freedom.” Through his work in facilitating state-Islam relations, and in his university teaching and research, he has never experienced any problems relating to competing identities. He is a practicing Muslim, and views himself as a French citizen of the Muslim faith. He went on to distinguish two competing visions of Islam today. One is based on a literal interpretation—a traditional reading of the Qur’an and the prophet’s sayings—and the other is based on adaptation, in which the fundamental principles are preserved but the text is adapted to the societal context, rather than the other way around. There

are two types of Qur'anic laws: fundamental or immutable laws, which do not depend on time or location, and those that are dependent on the circumstances (that is, laws that may be changed). These laws can be adapted because of changes in location, time, intellectual environment or cultural context and customary practices.

In response to the question of whether “it is a bad time to be a Muslim” in the United States, and “why the United States is so hated in Muslim countries,” an American participant responded that the challenges to Muslims in the United States are no different than those experienced by Japanese Americans, Latinos, or African Americans in earlier eras. There seems to be, historically, a need for the state always to have a “monster around for the sake of galvanizing the country.” Addressing the query about why “the Muslim world hates the United States,” the participant asserted that the Muslim world does not hate the American people. Antipathy for American policies, especially foreign policy, is the primary cause of anti-American frustration and anger in the world.

Another American participant queried a German participant about the requirements the government has put in place for participating in the German Islam Conference, and asked, “How much reassurance can you give to the ‘majority society’ without feeling that you are somehow betraying your own cause?” The German participant replied that he would prefer not to focus on German government requirements “before they address or integrate our needs and rights as Muslims. We want to talk about our needs, and they want to talk about the problems they see.” There is no conflict between the German Constitution and the Muslim faith, and as long as government consultations “stick to the Constitution,” there will be no conflict. But once they begin to expand the discussion to include “culture” and “values,” then both sides will have trouble defining the issues. “Did I violate German values by arriving late for this session, for example?”

An American participant asked whether it is really possible to exclude foreign governments from influence over Islam in France. “Can European governments realistically cut all ties and just hope that alternative financing of Muslim religious institutions will appear? What sort of practical solution could replace the important role that foreign embassies play in financial support and personnel?” A French participant replied, “Unequivocally yes, we have the means to be financially independent,” and named three potential sources of revenues for financial independence. These are the *halal* food industry, with total sales estimated at €0 million; pilgrimages to Mecca (estimated total sales, €00 million); and insurance for repatriating the deceased for burial (more than 80 percent of French Muslims opt for repatriation to their countries of origin). He recounted his involvement in a mosque project that cost more than € million, and noted that while Saudi Arabia offered financial assistance, the organizers refused to accept it because they wanted to be “the full masters” of the project. The French state accepts too much foreign meddling, and even though some foreign influence is natural, imams coming from abroad will always answer questions from French Muslims with a sensibility that is not French. He expressed the hope that with a new generation of CFCM leaders and members, these foreign links will gradually be severed and de-institutionalized.

A British participant raised the issue of whether “Islamophobia” might actually be the result of a more general “aggressive secularism,” and said that in the United Kingdom, there is a sense that religious freedoms for all faiths are being eroded: crucifixes and Sikh bangles are being banned alongside certain Muslim articles. A German participant said he has also noticed a growing tendency

to relegate religion to the private sphere. In some cases, German schools have opted to eliminate religious accommodation for all communities rather than get into discussions about *halal* meals and religious education for Muslims. This issue was supposed to have been resolved years ago for Protestants and Catholics, but the challenge for Muslims today is to deal with the secular intolerance they encounter in the public sphere. Germany should bring itself into better tune with its tradition of cooperating with religious communities.

One participant asked what police authorities in the United Kingdom are doing to combat religious and racial profiling and discrimination. The response was that the British government does not seem to recognize the possibility that its foreign policy may be contributing to a tense situation. The police should be held accountable for their actions, and “stop and searches” must be undertaken in a responsible fashion in order to avoid “terrorizing an entire community.” If Muslim leaders do not accept the fact that they have a problem in their own community, however, they will not be able to address a fundamental problem of perception. Muslim leaders should issue responsible statements about the realities of radicalization and the problems that need to be addressed.

At this point, a French participant expressed concern about the call for “reciprocity” for religious conversions. In her view, religious freedom is always a product of politics and democratic systems, and therefore believers of all faiths should interpret texts in a way that is respectful of other religions and non-believers. She wondered whether the request for reciprocity is really relevant, however, because the problem with Muslim countries is not Islam, but rather the lack of political democracy. A British participant agreed but said that there are nonetheless certain regions in the world that are not as accommodating of this debate. Where there are strong Islamic states, there is less willingness to have a discussion about religious freedom for other faiths.

A German participant asked whether the category of “German Muslim” could exist as a primary identity or whether German Muslim organizations in fact break down along ethnic lines. The response was that there is a natural role for ethnic-based organizations, but “the major challenge for these organizations” is to advocate collectively for the needs of Muslims. “The problem is not that we are ethnic organizations; it is the tendency of other states [that is, nations] to influence the countries we live in... We cannot see ourselves as representatives only of our countries of origin. We must act within the German context.”

NOTES

1. There was a series of coordinated bombings against the Madrid commuter train system on March 11, 2004. The attacks killed 191 people and wounded at least 1,800. On July 7, 2005, during the morning rush hour, four suicide bombers released bombs on a London double-decker bus and three Underground trains, killing 52 people and injuring more than 770. A car crashed into the Glasgow International Airport and burst into flames on June 30, 2007 in an attempted bombing.

2. The German Islam Conference (DIK) was convened by Federal Minister of the Interior Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble in September 2006. It included 15 Muslims along with 15 local, state and national government representatives. The DIK is organized into three working groups and one discussion group, and has held two plenary sessions to report on the working groups’ progress. See next section, “Maintaining Relations with Organized Muslim Communities.” For the government’s description of the DIK, see Federal Ministry of the Interior, “German Islam Conference (DIK),” available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2008/DIK__en,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/DIK_en.pdf.

3. “*Halal*” means “permitted.” Islamic law specifies the proper way to slaughter animals.

4. International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, Mar. 2, 2005, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3300&l=1>.

5. On November 21, 2006, six imams returning from an imams’ conference were removed from a US Airways flight leaving Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota. A passenger complained after having observed the imams praying in the airport. See Libby Sander, “6 Imams Removed From Flight for Behavior Deemed Suspicious,” *The New York Times*, Nov. 22, 2006, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/22/us/22muslim.html?n=Top/News/Business/Companies/US%20Airways%20Group%20Inc.;n.a.,> “Airline checks claim of ‘Muslim while flying’ discrimination,” Nov. 21, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/11/21/passengers.removed/>.

6. The French Council for the Muslim Faith (*Conseil français du culte musulman*, or CFCM) was created by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in 2003. Mosque representatives elect the members of a general assembly, which in turn elects the non-appointed members of the CFCM’s Executive Board. The presidents and vice presidents are chosen by consensus and in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior. For a description of the CFCM, see “The Muslim Faith in France,” (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, March 2007), http://www.ambafrance-ua.org/IMG/pdf/muslim_faith.pdf. See also ch. 5, “Liberté, égalité...laïcité: Creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith,” in Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France* (Brookings Institution Press, 2006).

7. See Mayanthi Fernando, “The Republic’s ‘Second Religion’: Recognizing Islam in France” (*Middle East Report*, n.d.), available at <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer235/fernando.html>.

8. While Muslims are ten percent of the general population in France, they constitute 25 percent of the prison population.

9. A *fatwa* is an opinion or ruling on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar or scholars.

Maintaining Relations with Organized Muslim Communities

FRANCE

A French speaker opened the session on state-Islam relations by noting that the French government's consultation with Muslims (French Council for the Muslim Faith: *Conseil français du culte musulman*, or CFCM) was always intended to be just one element in a larger program and agenda. The overall objective was to prevent the widening of a gap between Muslims and the rest of the population, and to prevent confusion between Islam as a religion and the danger posed by radical Islamists. France's experience with terrorist attacks sponsored by radical Islamists in 1995 led it to try to intensify earlier efforts to sever financial and organizational ties between French Muslims and North Africa.¹ Since 1998, the government has sought to provide full access to citizenship by fighting discrimination against French citizens of foreign origin. Some policies have encouraged minorities' recruitment into the police force, and others have targeted discrimination in job hiring. Discrimination against French citizens of foreign backgrounds is still prevalent, although it tends to be primarily racial and social rather than religious. It nonetheless has an undeniable impact on the way Muslims perceive themselves.

The CFCM has resulted in several accomplishments. First, the Muslim faith is now an officially recognized part of the French institutional landscape. Second, authorities made the deliberate choice not to choose or cherry-pick among Muslim representatives or to distinguish between a "good" and a "bad" Islam. The government invited all the trends and factions that make up French Islam, without exception, to become members of the CFCM, and most of them ultimately did so. Third, the practice of the Muslim faith has been normalized. The government's help in overseeing the mass slaughter of lambs during Eid el Adha is one good example.² The free exercise of religion is in large part related to the quality of the logistical organization that enables this freedom. The same organizational attention has helped many large mosque projects come to fruition, in contrast to the way past projects were frequently stalled because of divisions within local Muslim communities. One or two new Muslim places of worship—usually small prayer spaces—open each week in France, with a current total of approximately 2,000. The CFCM has also designated national chaplains in the military and prison system, and has begun the work of recruiting individual Muslim chaplains. In addition, Muslim sections in public cemeteries are now being created, and the first class of thirty imams in training is currently enrolled in a state-sponsored introductory course on French culture and laws at the Catholic University of Paris. A theological program at the University of Strasbourg is in the planning stages.

The consultation process also has its share of weaknesses and failures. For example, the CFCM has had difficulty improving the organization of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. France has by far the largest number of pilgrims from European countries going on Hajj—an estimated 40,000 did so in 2007—but the oversight structures are very weak, and fraud and scams are still prevalent. Travel agents and tour providers in Saudi Arabia have proven to be unreliable, and are known to have engaged in false advertising. They have occasionally left pilgrims stranded without adequate accommodations or return flights. Since this is a problem that is largely beyond the reach of the state, the progress made

on this issue would be a good test of the “self-organization” of Muslims in France. A second major weakness is the permanent instability of the CFCM’s executive board and that of a number of regional councils.³ The electoral process that designates representatives for the regional and national bodies is also imperfect, because the rules were established under the strong leadership exerted by the Minister of Interior.⁴ Instead, these should be established completely independently of the administration. Nonetheless, Islam is the only organized religion in France that has accepted a democratic process for the election of its representatives.

A considerable effort has been made by the Muslim community in France to adapt its religious practice to the specifics of French society. The organization of elections, the creation of an official role for Muslim chaplains, and the establishment of a training course for imams amount to inventing a sort of clergy within Sunni Islam, and this is quite an innovation. In spite of the weaknesses and failings of this system, the Muslim leaders who have made this effort should be commended.

GERMANY

A German government official, explaining the German approach to state-Islam relations, discussed the shortcomings of communication between Muslims and public authorities. While all Western societies and governments need better communication with their Muslim communities and citizens, one of the main problems is finding partners with whom to talk. The Muslims’ countries of origin must be taken into consideration because they influence the identity and attitude of Muslim migrants towards a wide range of issues, including the role of religion in public life. In contrast to the predominantly North African-origin population in France, or the South Asian origins of British Muslims, more than 75 percent of Muslims in Germany are of Turkish origin, five percent from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the remaining 20 percent from countries such as Morocco, Egypt, and Afghanistan.

The German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, or DIK) is widely viewed as an imperfect response to increasing polarization between some Muslims and those of other faiths, but it is a good starting point for improving integration and social cohesion. It operates on two levels. There are 15 plenary representatives and 15 government representatives (federal, *Länder* [states] and local). In addition, there are three working groups and one discussion group, each of which is staffed jointly by scholars and state and religious representatives. The topics that are addressed include political issues such as the role of women, the legal historical foundations of German society and the resultant requirement for state-faith cooperation, and threats from extremism within Islam. There has been criticism that the Conference mixes issues of religion and politics, but the politicization of religion is a fact that cannot be ignored, and a common approach to dealing with it must be found.

The German government does not adhere to any single narrative for Islam or have an opinion about who should be considered “Muslim.” By creating the DIK, the government has established a forum and a process for more dialogue and growing cooperation. The DIK has functioned since September 2006 as a constructive framework for dialogue and engagement between German Muslims and government authorities on the federal, *Länder* and local levels. The goal is to further the integration of Muslims and Islam into German society. While many German Muslims have already been integrated, a growing number—mostly second and third generation—find it difficult to fit into the society. There has not been enough engagement with local communities to combat negative

trends and the failures of integration. German Muslims have not organized themselves in the manner required by the German legal framework, as it developed with the Catholic and Protestant churches over the centuries; that is, as a legally established corporation. Muslims, however, are free to organize themselves in independent associations and have done so on the local, state and national levels.

The choice of participants in the DIK has been contested, as has the legitimacy of individual DIK members who claim to speak on behalf of Muslims in Germany. These individuals are useful if they can offer expertise or a viewpoint for those who are not formally organized. As one of the Muslim participants in the DIK said, “Thank you for picking the 15, but over time, we might have our own democratically elected participants” (that is, participants chosen by the community rather than by the government), and the government would of course accept that. At the same time, no one can deny that the DIK has led to a fruitful and productive debate. Muslims are now welcomed into German society by all German parties, and the Conference sent the strong message that Muslims should identify themselves with German society.

The government has not achieved all of its goals. Three areas are in particular need of improvement, and are currently being addressed. First, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, the federal Minister of the Interior, has met with journalists and editors to encourage them to air not only negative stories about Islam but to provide positive coverage of Muslim communities as well. Second, the introduction of Islamic religious education in German state schools will be easier with the involvement of all three levels of government in the DIK’s second working group. *Länder* have begun to create chairmanships in Islamic education at universities so that Islam is taught in German schools in a way that is fully compatible with Germany’s pluralistic society. Third, extremism must be better addressed. The DIK proposed establishing a clearing house to provide contact information designed to encourage cooperation between Muslims and the policy and security services at all levels of government. It was set up within the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in the spring of 2008.

The DIK has also achieved three intangible and perhaps invisible goals so far. The first is fostering relationships in local communities; the second, establishing transnational relationships with Muslim academics in places such as Istanbul and Sarajevo. Finally, there is a heightened understanding that assimilation is not the goal. Just as there is a German Catholicism and a German Protestantism, so there will be a German adaptation of Islam.

UNITED KINGDOM

A British speaker discussed the ways in which engaging with moderate Muslims can be a tool for combating terrorism and extremism in both the domestic and foreign spheres. The right kind of engagement can allow Western governments to overcome popular distrust and the stereotyping of the Muslim community and can lead to the decoupling of Islam, fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism in Western minds. Furthermore, government consultations with clear and consistent agendas and terms of inclusion have the power to reduce Muslims’ support for extremism and terrorism. The question of whom to consult is always difficult whenever one deals with diverse and divided groups, but some of the main candidates for discussions are liberal and secular academics, community activists, moderate religious scholars, women’s groups engaged in gender equality campaigns, spiritualists (Sufis), and moderate journalists. Governments should approach a variety of groups in extensive and

frequent dialogue on a wide range of issues, not simply in the aftermath of crisis or in response to specific security threats. A sudden rush to engage groups primarily on issues of security will always have limited success.

Governments need to communicate more effectively and ensure that they engage with all sections of the Muslim community. The terms of inclusion must be clear and consistent. Muslims believe that they are being unfairly singled out for attention, and they blame the Western media for reducing them to a set of stereotypes—bombers, billionaires or belly dancers. They view Islamophobia as the product of a deep hostility towards and hatred of Islam and Muslims that dates back to the Crusades. The risk of further marginalization is created when Muslims have the sense they are being singled out as a special case. Instead, all civilizations should be encouraged to have pride in their respective accomplishments and contributions to the world and to make honest assessments of their own shortcomings. All have, at one moment or another in their history, used violence or ruled with intolerance and hatred. The ultimate goal of dialogue should not be to change the “other” but, rather, to co-exist peacefully with the other.

The real dividing lines are not between Islam and the West but between terrorists and everyone else. We can only meet the challenge of terrorism through dialogue, and it is very important to use the right vocabulary with Muslim communities when describing the challenges. The arguments of extremists must be tackled from all angles and perspectives, including through the use of Islamic sources. If extremists use Islam as a basis for justifying attacks, then we must point out how the Qur’an prohibits murder (Qur’an 5:32) and even manifests a divine desire for pluralism and religious diversity: “You shall have your religion, and I shall have my religion” (Qur’an 106:6). Care must be taken not to use terminology that can further stereotypes or negative perceptions. In the United Kingdom, a counterterrorism phrase book has been written that, for example, instructs civil servants not to use terminology such as “Muslim terrorists” or “Islamic extremists.”

Urgent action, dialogue, and engagement are needed by governments in the West and in the Muslim world to end the ignorance that has led to rampant stereotyping on both sides. The West’s tradition of tolerance and openness is its best defense. We will not defeat evil and extremism by giving in to the fear extremists wish to impose. To succeed against terrorism and violent extremism, we will depend not on force, but on force of argument—constructive engagement and dialogue. The British government has developed interesting models of preventing extremists’ strategies to engage Muslim communities, such as the *Pathfinder Fund* and the Community Leadership Fund under the overall Winning Hearts & Minds Strategy.⁵

DISCUSSION

In the question and answer session that followed the panel, a German participant asked whether the French government’s involvement in creating the CFCM could be perceived as having been coercive or intrusive. The French speaker’s response was that it is indeed paradoxical for a self-declared secular state to intervene so blatantly in the affairs of a religious community. Government involvement was limited to the *creation* of this institution, however, and the government has steered away from the *content* of the organization or the religious debates within the Muslim community. Given the large number of groups, organizations, schools, and currents of Islam in France, the central challenge that

the government faced was to organize a framework in which these different components could enter into a productive dialogue. French administrative and political authorities were able to offer a sufficiently neutral space in which to organize and begin a dialogue within the communities. Each mosque association can appoint a certain number of delegates, and the government has no say about the internal dynamics of each association; it respects their autonomy. There has been endless debate about the appointment of the CFCM president in 2003 and 2005, but there was in the end something of a consensus about the creation of the CFCM.⁶ This does not invalidate the democratic credentials of this process, especially as it moves forward and a new generation of leaders is elected in the regional and national councils in the 2008 elections.

A participant asked about Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's February 2008 visit to Germany and his comment that assimilation is a crime against humanity.⁷ The German speaker responded that Erdoğan's visit was a crucial moment that highlighted the problems of identity-building among Muslims of Turkish origin. There is no silver bullet for Muslims' integration in Germany. The government can help facilitate individuals' acceptance of Germany as their new homeland but it cannot force the process. Governments must cope with the fact that migration dynamics have changed, as it is possible today to move from country A to country B while remaining fully immersed in country A's language and culture. When, during his trip to Germany, Erdoğan addressed his "ethnicity," he was in effect saying, "My fellow Turks." The German government responded, however, by saying, that "They are *our* Turks," and that reaction is encouraging. Fifteen years ago, there would have been the same kind of outrage, with charges that "the Turks are interfering in our internal affairs," but this time, the government in effect said, "These people are *our* people." Most Turkish media in Germany thanked Erdoğan for showing sympathy for the situation of Turks in Germany, but then added, "We can sort things out on our own," and encouraged the Turkish government to let go. Because these processes are so fluid and dynamic, it is difficult for the government to legislate on these issues. Integration has to take place from the bottom up and never from the top down.

Another participant asked the British speaker about the use of the terms "moderate Muslims" and "secular liberal Muslims" in Britain. The speaker responded by saying that there is no single Islam or unified Muslim group. The current challenge is to identify moderates and build a religious infrastructure. Dialogue with extremist groups generally lasts only ten minutes before they call everyone else hypocrites and infidels. The media is partially to blame for spotlighting extremists, since that projects a negative image of Islam, when the media could just as well focus on moderate Muslims.

An American participant asked the panel whether it might make more sense to restrict the counterterrorism effort to a debate about what is permissible in politics rather than theology. That way, all "normal" and peace-loving Muslims would be able to join with democrats in the fight against terrorism. A British participant commented that Western actions do not always correspond with the Western values of democracy, human rights, and freedom, because Western governments support tyranny in Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia, and Western governments imposed sanctions on Hamas after it won elections in the Palestinian Authority. The hypocrisy and double standard of Western governments completely undermines the democratic argument. The British speaker on the panel responded that he would try to decipher the meaning of "normal Muslim." There has been a new wave of terrorists in the United Kingdom who are not deprived but who are fully integrated

and well-educated. This diminishes the credibility of any claim that there is a necessary association between deprivation and terrorism. Extremists use theology as an argument to justify their activities, and the rest of us must therefore use theology to counter their claims.

A French participant asked for more information about the German model of state-church relations, eliciting a discussion of Germany's long history of welcoming refugees from religious persecution. The modern world and what are termed Western, democratic and constitutionally governed societies are a direct result of the resolution of the religious civil wars that almost destroyed European society in the 16th century. The French and German responses resulted in very different models. Germany ended its religious civil war by combining plural and diverse Christianity with secular government. Germans understand French *laïcité*,⁸ but such a model is inconceivable in Germany. The German government should do more in the area of imam education, since 80 percent of the imams currently serving the approximately 2,600 Muslim places of worship in Germany come from Turkey. Even though Germany has a strongly decentralized government, the central government was the catalyst for the DIK. The emphasis on implementation of the DIK recommendations, however, is on the local *Länder*-level. When Cologne's Muslims recently decided to build a mosque, they encountered local resistance, but they were able to move ahead by agreeing to lower the minaret by one or two meters and addressing practical questions about matters such as traffic congestion. If discussions are kept at the local level and a healthy dialogue is maintained, then the mutual process of integration and understanding will continue to unfold.

An American participant asked the French speaker how the ban on headscarves in French schools affects the state's relationship with the French Muslim community. The reply was that there is no relationship between the headscarf ban and the CFCM process. The mission of the CFCM is the organization of the Muslim faith, whereas the headscarf ban is a law that concerns religious neutrality in public schools. Before the March 2004 law was adopted, the neutrality principle already applied to all public servants; the law simply extended the principle to those who attend public schools—at the primary and high school level, not in universities. The parameter of this law is extremely limited and has no other consequences on religious freedom or the freedom to wear what one wishes anywhere else. A French participant commented that the young people who are most at risk of indoctrination are those who never received any religious training and who have a frail grasp of their own religious history, identity, or memory: they do not feel a strong sense of belonging to any territory or place.

NOTES

1. A blast in a Paris metro station on July 25, 1995 was the first of eight terrorist bombings or attempted bombings that were attributed to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Eight people were killed and 160 wounded in the attacks, which took place both in train stations and in markets.

2. Eid el-Adha, the Festival of the Sacrifice, celebrates the Prophet Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Ishmael at God's bidding and God's substitution of a sheep for Ishmael. It is celebrated by the slaughter of sheep, lambs or goats.

3. This discussion took place before the CFCM's third round of elections was held in June 2008. It appears to have introduced more stable leadership to the council's Executive Board.

4. For a description of the CFCM, see "The Muslim Faith in France," (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, March 2007), http://www.ambafrance-ua.org/IMG/pdf/muslim_faith.pdf.

5. Winning Hearts & Minds is a British government program designed to foster connections with Muslim organizations. See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/320752.pdf>. Under the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, the British government allocated £5m in 2007–2008 to support local authorities in fighting extremism in their communities by working with schools and mosques and “forging partnerships between police, community and faith groups.” See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/320330.pdf>. The Community Leadership Fund is a complementary program. See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/742604.pdf>.

6. Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy appointed Dalil Boubakeur, who was the rector of the Paris Mosque and the Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris, as CFCM president in 2003 and again in 2005. This became a bone of contention because CFCM elections demonstrated the Muslim leaders’ preference for two other Muslim federations over the Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris. The election results were followed, however, in determining the composition of the CFCM’s administrative council and general assembly. Boubakeur boycotted the 2008 CFCM elections, and was succeeded in the presidency by Mohamed Moussaoui, of the *Rassemblement des musulmans de France*. For an account of the situation, see Mayanthi Fernando, “The Republic’s ‘Second Religion’: Recognizing Islam in France” (*Middle East Report*, n.d.), available at <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer235/fernando.html>. Also see ch. 5, “Liberté, égalité...laïcité: Creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith,” in Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France* (Brookings Institution Press, 2006).

7. During his February 2008 visit to Germany, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave a speech in Turkish to a largely Turkish-German audience. In it, he used the terms “we Turks” and “the Germans,” and called assimilation a crime against humanity. See Ferda Ataman, “Erdogan’s One-Man Show,” *Spiegel Online*, Feb. 11, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,534519,00.html>; n.a., “Erdogan’s Visit Leaves German Conservatives Fuming,” *Spiegel Online*, Feb. 12, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,534724,00.html>.

8. Roughly, secularism in the public sphere.

The Role of Education and of Civic and Religious Associations in Integration

FRANCE

A speaker from France discussed the first generation of French Muslims that has now come of age: young people who were born in France and know no other country. They have been socialized in the French language, trained in the schools of the Republic, and have watched the same movies as non-Muslim friends their age. They have established many organizations—some of which have an explicitly religious reference—in order to be involved in French society as citizens. These groups' activities range from after-school tutoring to sports and the arts. What the members of this first generation of French Muslims are seeking is to be recognized and to define their own identity, in order to distinguish themselves from other Muslims who are not French and from other Frenchmen who are not Muslim. This is the first generation that feels both fully French and fully Muslim.

They have created organizations precisely to avoid being boxed in by ethnic criteria. They do not recognize themselves in traditional Algerian or Moroccan associations, and they do not want to be segregated by their country of origin or by that of their parents. Unlike their parents, who come from community-based systems where position and status is defined by the clan, these young French Muslims have learned to say “I” and “me.” They have also been raised in the French secular system of *laïcité* and exposed to religious pluralism throughout their lives.¹ They nonetheless hear constantly that Islam is not compatible with *laïcité*, and so they have a dilemma to resolve: what does it mean to be Muslim in the French context of *laïcité*? Young Muslims in France therefore have to think through the meaning of Islam for themselves, to return to the original text in order to understand what sense it makes in their own special context. They cannot look beyond the borders of France to find answers appropriate for their situation. They have translated and adapted the text and have realized the power of language; for example, they realize that you cannot call your fellow classmates infidels.

The result is something of a re-appropriation of the text. This has been particularly necessary for Muslim girls, because returning to the text leads them to realize the confusion that exists between true religion and practices that have become imbedded in cultural traditions. These girls live in a divided world. On the one hand, they are told to abandon Islam in order to be modern; on the other, they are told to conform to current religious practices in order to respect tradition and be faithful to their ancestors. Paradoxically, many young girls have used Islam to free themselves from their parent's traditions. They were never told that to be a good Muslim woman, they must study hard, or that knowledge is mandatory for every Muslim man and woman. They were never told that their consent in marriage is necessary; now they realize they can choose their husband of whatever origin as long as he is Muslim—nothing compels them to marry a cousin, for example.

Some young Muslim women have questioned their parents' values and traditions as other teenagers would do, but because they use Islam to do so they cannot be considered traitors. The link is not made, for example, with the traditions of the village in North Africa, but rather with religion and a shared religious identity. The result is that no one can accuse them of becoming too assimilated. At the same

time, they can lay claim to modern rights—to go to work, to pursue financial independence, to choose their own husbands and so on. Before this recent development, Muslim girls were faced with a false choice: either they could have modern rights without religion or they could have an archaic version of religion. Today, they demonstrate instead that they can be both truly modern and truly Muslim. Practicing Muslims as well as those organizations with a religious orientation now work on the basis of common values with their host society. The debate is similar to that which Christians had some years ago: “Even if in my heart I think that my religion wants me to be a good citizen, I must engage with other Frenchmen in order to share common values with my larger community.” Many “Muslim” associations are therefore open to any young person in the neighborhood who wants to join, including non-believers. These associations work on the challenges facing youth in the *banlieues*,² whether they are Muslims or not. The associations redefine Muslim values as humanist values: Muslim charity becomes a kind of humanist charity, and giving alms becomes a humanitarian action.

What really matters is that the predominant culture is French. With the aid of this culture, the young people reopen the Qur’an and realize that even though the message is divine, the interpretation is always human. By the same token, they understand that other visions of the world are not in competition with Islam. The more one mingles with other French people, including atheists and non-believers, the more one will widen the scope of one’s understanding of the world. The “others” are not seen as enemies; instead, this integration allows them to gain access to a new dimension of the message God is sending them. Even the young girls who choose to wear a headscarf stress that they do so not out of submission to men, but because it is a religious symbol to them. This is not easy in France because Islam is only beginning to be seen as a French religion. Until now, Islam was viewed as the religion of the foreigner and discussions always started from the premise that Muslims had a different culture. Youth today are redefining their identity and the Muslim component of their Frenchness.

UNITED STATES

A speaker from the United States discussed the place of religion in American education. God has not been excluded from the American classroom but has been invited in. Even though, according to the American Constitution, there can be no establishment of religion in public schools, the development of certain principles in the last 20 years has resulted in a discussion of how religion can be represented in the education system just as it has been in the public square. The guidelines developed by Charles C. Haynes³ regarding the natural inclusion of religion in the classroom have helped determine how to ensure fairness, accuracy and balance. Notwithstanding the wall between church and state, an authentic and honest conversation that is respectful of religious diversity is taking place. One of the fruits of this work, which has been going on for several decades, is the establishment of academic standards. Most of these standards follow a similar pattern in placing religious instruction into its proper context, incorporating it into American and world history, world cultures and geography in the elementary and secondary grades. Attention to religion and religious expression is also mandated as part of a multidisciplinary approach to the teaching of history, social studies, science and the humanities. Natural inclusion means that if the discussion makes no sense without the religious context, then religion should be included in the conversation, no matter what the subject. Much of the education about how to do this and the necessary pedagogical content takes place during in-service training. Islam is taught

about only in the context of other faiths; the teaching is about context and impacts on history, not religious content. This is different from a multicultural framework, which was more of a corrective view of the world that included a great deal of information about the West and very little about the rest of the world. Multiculturalism took a civilizations approach that encountered difficulty at each stage of adding topics through multicultural requests. In the racialized context of United States education, the discussion became quite ugly.

Today, there is a new model. One development in American education since the 1990s is an approach to teaching about the world in a much more global, human framework. Rather than focusing on civilizations and regions, it takes account of human history, era by era, across the globe. The approach to teaching about world religions that has proven most effective has been to situate the development and spread of world religions and their associated societies in the context of a global human history framework. This model is being advanced simultaneously in primary and secondary schools and in universities. The model makes sense of globalization, is amenable to new evidence and topics, and shows links between national history and the rest of the world by shifting the focus away from the nation-state to the world at large. It supports the belief that world history sustains citizenship in a global arena.

UNITED KINGDOM

British Muslims are increasingly confronting identity issues as they try to adopt British values while not losing their identity in the process. They also recognize the necessity of working together with those of other faiths. Since ethnic and religious differences are a frequent source of anxiety, cities are spaces of conflict as well as cohesion.

The city of Birmingham is expected to become a majority-minority city by 2012. As Birmingham continues to evolve as a multi-faith city, the need becomes greater for the groups to relate to each other. One organizational coalition, the Birmingham Citizens organization, explores key issues of city life—such as public spaces, education, and the criminal justice system—and brings together people from different backgrounds and expertise. It also aims to bring together people of different faiths and government officials for dialogue on specific issues related to the welfare of the city. This allows a diverse group of stakeholders to focus on the many things Birmingham citizens have in common, rather than dwell on the few differences among groups. Since all participants care deeply about issues such as education and the cleanliness of neighborhoods, that is what the organization focuses on. (The model was in fact borrowed from Saul Alinsky's grassroots organizing in Chicago.⁴)

Churches, mosques, and trade unions in Birmingham now have a forum in which to work together on issues of social justice. Occasionally, when Birmingham Citizens approaches the city government to do something such as refurbish a park, officials are tempted to ignore Birmingham Citizens and tell them the budget is tight or that another department is responsible. The response of Birmingham Citizens has been to gather its constituent groups in a rented room with a large audience and invite public officials to a conversation in which they are asked the question again. In that context, public officials have found it difficult to say no to a diverse audience of more than one thousand concerned citizens. This is a cheeky strategy, but it is an efficacious one. Birmingham Citizens has also persuaded Midlands police to participate in a Muslim and Islamic cultural awareness police training session. Police are now in direct contact with the Muslim community, crime levels have gone down in areas

where there is a Muslim majority, and the police have been given a community award by the Muslim community. Government, corporations, and religious civic associations—what is known as the three-legged stool—are all working together to make Birmingham a safer and livelier city.

GERMANY

The region of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) has grappled with the differences between integrating immigrants and integrating Islam. The region is home to 18 million inhabitants, four million of whom have an immigrant background. NRW has a long history of immigration and integration. The new diversity resulting from post-World War II immigration, however, has led to an increase in the number of religious communities and in the level of religious observance. There are now about one million Muslims in NRW and, according to one study, as many as 50 percent are active in mosque-related activities. In 2006 the NRW government decided to launch a 20-point action program to foster integration and start a dialogue on Islam, and the government cabinet has set up an Islam task force. The regional government holds regular discussions with Muslims about ways to integrate Islam into state institutions, as provided for under national and *Länder*-level [state level] law, through, for example, religion courses in schools and the training of imams. Although the precise content of this institutional integration has yet to be determined, the state's traditional duty to remain neutral will remain unchanged.

Discussions with Muslim organizations are not always easy. All sides must be willing to listen and to learn, and successful dialogue must never be allowed to peter out without results. It is the government's solemn duty to promote integration. Society has changed as a result of immigration, and this change will continue. The German President's desire for the self-identification of Muslims in Germany is shared by many in government: "This is my home, this is a country I want to be loyal to, whose laws I am going to observe. I am a German Muslim."

DISCUSSION

A French participant raised the matter of many government officials' confusion about the difference between cultural traditions brought from immigrants' countries of origin and the religion of Islam. French Muslims fully accept the facts, for example, that weddings must first take place in a city hall and that wives have the right to ask for a divorce, especially in situations where there has been domestic violence. The state and the policymakers in charge of integration must nonetheless understand the cultural problems experienced by many Muslims. There are some Muslim fathers who, for example, do not fully grasp the notion of shared responsibility for household wage-earning. In this context, unemployment is a particularly serious problem for French Muslim men. Women often can find jobs more easily than Muslim men—except, perhaps, if they wear a headscarf. It is frustrating for many men to see a woman become the main breadwinner in a household, however, with the traditional roles thereby being turned on their heads. The solution is to educate not only the children but the fathers as well. This kind of cultural sensitivity can be important.

An American participant asked the panelists about the importance of the religious right and anti-Muslim rhetoric in Europe. A German participant responded that it is not the religious right but rather the political right that is relevant in this context. Those who warn most loudly against the clash of civilizations, for example, seem to have an interest in just this kind of clash. It is nonetheless an historic

fact that Christians have shed more Christian blood and Muslims have shed more Muslim blood than either has of the other. Muslim organizations have a special responsibility to emphasize the differences between Islam and Muslim fundamentalism. Germany as a receiving society needs to develop a better appreciation of the fact that Islam is not monolithic; otherwise, the society will play into the hands of the radicals who claim Islam is incompatible with democracy.

A French participant recalled the 1983–1984 March for Equality and Against Racism, whose leaders were received by President François Mitterand.⁵ They told him that even those Muslims who have earned the right diplomas but whose name is, for example, Muhammad, have greatly diminished chances of getting a job. Twenty-five years later, there has still been no real political debate about the prevalence of this kind of discrimination. Instead of asking hard economic and social questions, many tend to culturalize these issues and question not only cultural compatibility but, increasingly, the Muslim religion itself. The tendency to focus on Islam as such can be seen, for example, in the popular explanations offered for youth protests. At the end of the 1980s, such protests were viewed as reflecting the youths' parents' culture, whereas in 2005, they were seen as reflecting Islam. Muslim organizations, however, are often engaged with the larger society, and their members also experience integration. The young people who have participated in urban violence have no particular understanding of the world, no cultural standards, no history, and no political worldview. It is a generation that has grown up with the antagonistic representations of “us” against “them.” Small radical groups try to take advantage of this mentality by going to places where urban violence exists in order to transform the thirst articulated in the violence. They try to give young people a ready-made representation of the world that will quench their thirst with extremism.

An American participant asked what events and opportunities exist for inter-religious engagement in Birmingham, such as visits to mosques, temples and churches. The British speaker explained that there is a great deal of interfaith dialogue, but that the Muslim community has tended to be very reactive and not necessarily proactive. On the other hand, inter-faith dialogue tends to emphasize differences in terms of creed that will always be a source of disagreement. There are many shared values and principles that can be a source of common cause, and groups and dialogues should emphasize those rather than talking only about differences.

NOTES

1. *Laïcité* means, roughly, the absence of religion in the public sphere.

2. *Banlieues* means “outskirts” or “suburbs.” Today the term is commonly used to refer to the public housing projects on the outskirts of French cities, home to the largest concentrations of Muslim immigrants and their descendants.

3. Charles C. Haynes, “A Parent’s Guide to Religion in the Public Schools,” “A Teacher’s Guide to Religion in the Public Schools,” “Public Schools and Religious Communities,” available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/biography.aspx?name=c_haynes.

4. Saul D. Alinsky was a major figure in American grassroots organizing from the late 1930s through the 1960s, when he brought together Chicago labor unions, small businesses, youth committees, and the Catholic church to fight on behalf of poor communities in areas such as fair labor practices and civil rights. See, e.g., Sanford D. Horwitt, *Let Them Call Me Rebel: Saul Alinsky, His Life and Legacy* (Knopf, 1989).

5. The march sought to raise public awareness about racism and discrimination in French society at a time when hate crimes had increased and the far-right National Front Party had achieved impressive results in several local elections.

Communities and Law Enforcement

GERMANY

A speaker from Germany discussed the German Working Group devoted to “Confidence Building Measures.”¹ It exists because of calls both for enhanced communication between security authorities and Muslim organizations and for a larger discussion about what domestic security forces expect from Muslim organizations and vice versa. In 2005, government authorities accepted an invitation to a discussion with the Central Council for Muslims (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*, or ZMD). In order to broaden the group, the Turkish Union for Islamic Affairs (*Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birliği*, or DITIB) was also invited. The result was the formal establishment of a working group and the development of the idea of “Confidence Building Measures for a Common Dialogue between Muslim Organizations and Security Authorities.” The Working Group seeks to identify the current best practices in communication between German legal authorities and the Muslim population. Despite the fact that Muslim associations in Germany condemned the terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005), and regularly speak out against forms of extremism, many German politicians still publicly criticize Muslim organizations for their alleged silence. The Working Group draws attention to the fact that Islamic associations are willing to cooperate with and support authorities in carrying out their tasks. Muslim organizations joined the Working Group in part to strengthen mutual trust and make certain that German authorities do not view Muslims and Islam negatively or in a stereotypical fashion.

This cooperation with the government was controversial within the Muslim community, especially given both the many searches of mosques conducted by authorities and the increasing incidence of Islamophobia. One question raised in the Muslim community was whether the outreach campaign by security officials singled out Muslims unfairly. Whether Muslims like it or not, their fellow German citizens continue to be confused about their community’s actual attitudes towards the use of terrorism, so participants have made the decision to find a solution within this reality and context. In the United States, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has adopted a similar cooperative approach with security entities such as the CIA and FBI since 2002, recognizing the importance of good relations with public officials and long-term social cohesion.

Four elements of the working group are of particular importance. First, both the Muslim communities and the security officials were allowed to name individual contact persons to implement whatever measures the workshop decided on. Second, lectures and forum-style events for mutual exchange between the two sides were organized, and this included an initial series of events for imams and police officers at the federal and state levels. Third, a decision was made to distribute brochures containing information about matters such as the legal foundations of the German Constitution, security issues, youth crime, violence, extremism, and domestic abuse, and online material has also been made available. Fourth, security authorities are being trained to improve their ability to think and act across cultures. This dialogue marks the beginning of a very constructive engagement, and it

has already led to cooperation on the federal, state, and local levels and helped to create an atmosphere of trust and to open communication channels that are very important in times of crisis. The active participation of Muslim groups shows that Islamic associations can be proactive in the realm of security cooperation. Finally, it also demonstrates that European Muslims can share ideas and best practices with Islamic organizations in the United States.

In September 2006, the Minister of Interior organized the German Conference on Islam (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, or DIK) to foster a dialogue with the Muslim community. The DIK consists of a plenary, three working groups and a roundtable on security matters.² The roundtable (or “Discussion Group,” as it is known) expands significantly on the “Confidence Building Measures” discussed above and includes a number of Muslim organizations other than the ZMD and DITIB, as well as representatives from civil society organizations and the world of science. It is another step in the attempt to create an atmosphere of trust between the government and German Muslims.

FRANCE

A speaker from France discussed the nexus between Muslim communities and public authorities. Until the end of the 1990s, the French government’s thinking about Muslim communities had primarily to do with security considerations. This was due in large part to the impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Europe and the special connections that were forged between France and Algeria during the colonial era. Even as late as the 1980s, however, there was no sophisticated analysis of the links between the Muslim faithful and Islamist radicalism. The two groups were conceived of separately, and most Muslim believers were considered to be moderates and to be represented by the Mosquée de Paris, which was Algerian-influenced although it did not adhere exactly to traditional Algerian Islam. Any other Islamic movements were considered to be either marginal or suspicious. The majority of people in the Muslim community were considered to be temporary migrants rather than a permanent part of the national landscape. There was no real public concern over public practices related to Islam and the Muslim community until 1989. Then, for the first time, the government made the decision to adopt initiatives to help integrate Islam, such as the creation of a French institute for imam training and, ultimately, the commitment of public authorities in 1999 to the establishment of a French representative body for Islam (*Conseil français du culte musulman*: French Council for the Muslim Faith).

By 1997, the Interior Ministry’s main focus had become combating terrorism and Islamic extremism. Today, part of the younger generation of French Muslims is being held hostage to fundamentalist discourses of Islam. There was a long tradition in France of Islamic studies before large-scale migration from North Africa, however, and the French state has continued to evolve in the past decades of substantial migration. There is now an Institute for the Study of Islam and the Muslim World (*Institut d’études de l’Islam et des sociétés du monde musulman*, IISMM). Another important initiative has been the training of imams in France. Previously, the government made no distinction between theology and cultural values. Today, the first class of 30 imams is being taught a curriculum of secular topics about France—history, language, and culture—at the Catholic Institute of Paris.

While the role of the police in both Amsterdam and in the United Kingdom are interesting case studies with potential implications for France, it would be very difficult in the French context to

put in place similar official links between the police and Muslim organizations, especially in relation to issues of security and terrorism. French Muslims simply do not want to be so closely associated with the state, a challenge that the French domestic intelligence agency (*Renseignements Generaux*) has encountered in its attempts to engage with the Muslim community.³ Things have changed in recent years, however. Just 20 years ago, it was difficult to convince French administrations that radical Islam was a matter of concern. Because France neglected to recognize Islam fully, a feeling of victimization was allowed to develop among French Muslims, and that created the conditions in which extremism could thrive. Today, there are better links and relationships between Muslims and a variety of institutional actors, not merely with the police.

UNITED KINGDOM

A speaker from the United Kingdom discussed the relationship between Muslim communities and the City of London police in the aftermath of the July 7, 2005 bombings.⁴ The City of London Police safeguard the financial heartland of London, and the Metropolitan Police cover greater London. Of the 23 bomb-related terrorist acts that have taken place in the area covered by the City of London police since 1973, only one—the July 7 bombings—was attributed to Islamist terrorists.⁵ Counterterrorism is therefore not a new phenomenon. In the aftermath of 7/7, however, a huge policing operation was undertaken, empowered in part by a 2000 law that gave the authorities wide power to stop and search people in the street.⁶ In the three weeks after 7/7, London police stopped and searched more people than they had in the previous 12 months.

While there were concerns about this new policy, the number of complaints was quite low. However, many people—not just members of Muslim communities but Sikhs as well—were stopped in the street and searched. The officers searching them sometimes found fragments of religious texts and became suspicious, and these incidents had the potential for serious offense to many citizens. It became clear that there was a problem and that the policy could not continue unchanged. The police who were doing the patrolling simply needed more education. A demand within the police force for some basic guidelines ultimately resulted in production of a large document that would be widely distributed.⁷ Written especially for a police audience, it covers many basic tenets of religious sensitivity, such as not taking police dogs into mosques, and basic information about Muslim culture and beliefs. The document has proved to be quite successful. More than half of the British police forces have purchased it, as have social services, the security services, and police forces abroad. A similar guide has also been produced about the Sikh, Hindu, and Jewish faiths.

Another document, a pamphlet called “Islam: Common Misconceptions Explained,” was produced by a Salafist organization in cooperation with the City of London Police. The interaction between police and communities is crucial, but the police do not simply go into mosques and start talking about radicalization and extremism. They have tried instead to engage Muslim communities on the basis of the communities’ own concerns, anxieties, and aspirations. At the same time, Muslims in London have been encouraged to become involved in police work. The force has looked at ways that its workplaces can be adapted so as to be more comfortable for Muslims and has, for example, installed prayer rooms and low level sinks for ablutions. It has also introduced *halal* meat options in canteens and has adapted the bank holiday leave system so that Muslims can take vacation days on their holidays.

Another publication of the City of London police was featured negatively on the website of the British National Party, a nationalist political party. The Party ran a feature on the brochure, detailing the work the police were doing on Muslim outreach and calling it a complete disgrace, as if the police had taken to preaching Islam. The police found this to be amusing and something of a backhanded compliment.

UNITED STATES

A speaker from the United States discussed the different parameters of police power in the United States and in the United Kingdom. The first European settlers in what became the United States were fearful of a strong centralized government. They therefore limited the powers of the national government through the Reserve Clause of the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, under which the states are vested with what is known as the “police power”: the power to preserve and protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the community. Under the American system of government, it is only the states—not the federal government—that have the police power. The states’ police power can be delegated, however. States have authorized the establishment of various subdivisions of government, such as cities and counties, and enabled them to form local police departments.

Unlike the American model of policing, where the role of the federal government is virtually non-existent at the local level, the British government provides funding, sets standards, and establishes policies that govern the operation of the constabularies [police]. The Exchequer [Treasury Department], for example, provides 50 percent of the funds for the constabulary’s budget. In England, the federal government plays an important role in the establishment of standards for the police, and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of the Constabulary has the responsibility for ensuring compliance with national police efficiency standards.

In the United States, however, each subdivision of state government that establishes a police department provides the necessary funding, staffing, and policy directives to support operations. Although contrasts between the two systems are striking, there are also remarkable similarities because both function under democratic governments, and the United States relied heavily on the English model in developing its system of policing. Since 1829, when the first system of democratic policing in the western world was created in England by Sir Robert Peel, the link between the people and the police has been the critical conduit for public safety and the provision of police services. Information emanating from the public helps the police identify criminal offenders and crime hazards, and enables the police department to respond appropriately. The effectiveness of this system depends upon public trust and a mutually supportive working relationship, which is the cornerstone of community policing—the style of policing commonly used in both countries.

The threat of another terrorist attack constitutes an ever-present danger in both England and the United States. The immigration issue adds to the complex matrix of challenges facing the police in the United States. The majority of the twelve million undocumented immigrants in the United States followed a path into the country across its porous southern border, and it is estimated that approximately 500,000 undocumented immigrants gain entry into the country each year. The fear is that terrorists aware of these routes may be entering the country as well.

The federal Department of Homeland Security, which has the responsibility for border security, faces a daunting challenge in providing for the safety and security of the nation's borders. Congress has been deadlocked on the immigration issue and, in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation to address immigration enforcement and border security, a number of states have passed legislation reflecting their own considerations and concerns. Much of the legislation is punitive and includes, for example, fines and revocation of licenses for businesses that hire undocumented immigrants, and the elimination of undocumented immigrants' benefits and privileges such as access to employment or driver's licenses. This is coupled with more aggressive law enforcement efforts to identify and deport unauthorized immigrants. Such actions by state and local governments have resulted in many undocumented immigrants fleeing to states and localities that have not imposed restrictive ordinances.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, has the responsibility for enforcing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. It has entered into memoranda of understanding with municipal governments pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Act, which authorizes local police to enforce immigration laws under federal supervision.⁸ Although this arrangement enhances the capacity of police to target criminal offenders within the undocumented community for arrest and deportation, it presents significant challenges.

Only about 50 of the approximately 17,000 police departments in the United States have chosen to obtain such authority under Section 287(g), but some police chiefs are under intense political pressure to participate in the program. Immigration enforcement is a hot political issue with strong emotional appeal because it impacts both public fear and the citizenry's economic concerns. The American people are highly resistant to increased taxes, and are irritated by the fact that their tax dollars are being used to pay for the health care and education of people who entered the country illegally. This is one of the primary reasons that some areas display intense hostility toward the undocumented immigrant community.

Crime is another highly emotional issue that can be invoked during an election year. Politicians have long used the issue to demonize their opponents, understanding that the American public, responding in part to the media, is fearful about violent crime. MS13, a violent criminal gang from Central America, has established itself in some American immigrant communities. Such gangs, while a plague on the undocumented community, are viewed by others as a reflection of that community, in the same manner that the Mafia distorted the public image of the Italian community half a century ago. In both instances, the crime rate for first generation immigrants is very low when compared with that of other ethnic groups in the United States. Negative public perceptions about undocumented immigrants have nonetheless helped to create a public backlash against them.

The political forces at play have resulted in a growing movement to force undocumented immigrants to return to their countries of origin, and police chiefs are being pressured by politicians to use aggressive tactics in the enforcement of immigration laws so that the environment will become sufficiently harsh and unfriendly to make the undocumented leave. Police chiefs, however, have strongly resisted this pressure.

Under former Attorney General Janet Reno, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services of the U.S. Department of Justice held two national police chiefs' summits in Washington D.C.—one

before 9/11 and one afterwards. Police chiefs at both summits named public trust as their highest priority. That is one of the principal reasons that local police chiefs are reluctant to become involved in the enforcement of immigration laws and that so few police departments have chosen to do so. No major police department has opted to assume federal immigration enforcement authority under Section 287(g), and a principle reason is the fear that if the police become involved in this practice, public trust and the capacity of the police to provide for the public safety will be undermined. The widespread fear of deportation that exists within these communities is of deep concern to police chiefs, who know that if the police uniform is equated with that of an immigration enforcement agent in the minds of the undocumented community, the community trust and support that is vital to the core mission of policing will be lost.

The Police Foundation recently conducted a series of focus groups in American communities where undocumented immigration is a major concern. One of the issues raised most frequently by community members was the fear that contact with the police created a significant risk of arrest and deportation and should therefore be avoided. Consequently, a considerable amount of unreported victimization exists in these communities, and in some instances people have turned to the gangs for protection.

From the police chief's perspective, the core responsibility of the police department is not residency status but public safety. The discharge of this responsibility requires the cooperation and support of the public. The absence of contact with the police inhibits the flow of information and makes the job of crime control much more difficult. It limits the ability of the police to identify and apprehend criminal offenders and deprives the department of the evidence required for a conviction. It may also increase the threat to the nation from terrorism, because valuable intelligence will be cut off as well.

If the United States is to address the question of immigration enforcement and public safety effectively, it must return to the principles embodied in the Constitution that establish the responsibility for immigration and naturalization with the federal government and reserve the police powers to the states. The authority granted under Section 287(g) breaches this divide and any attendant benefits are far outweighed by the loss of public trust that local police will suffer as a result of participating in this process.

The Statute of Liberty stands as a monument to the welcome immigrants have received, and as a testament to the contributions and sacrifices they have made to the nation throughout the generations. The immigration challenge facing the United States today calls our humanity to the fore, and demands sensitivity, equity, and fairness in the treatment of those who are here, irrespective of residency status. A nation of immigrants, the United States can and must do better.

DISCUSSION

A German participant commented that the challenge for Western governments is to combat the terrorist threat and maintain security while simultaneously protecting the freedom and rights of all citizens within a constitutional order. In Germany, politicians occasionally have to be reminded by the Constitutional Court of the boundaries implicit in this system. He asked the French and British speakers to evaluate the involvement of national secret services in building cooperation and circles of trust with Muslim communities. The French speaker responded that political Islam and radicalism

should be the concern of social services, not the secret services, and that the optimal role for the secret services is one that is strictly limited to combating terrorism. A German participant concurred and expressed concern that domestic intelligence agencies are nonetheless focusing on political Islam and singling out specific Muslim religious organizations. A British participant discussed the importance of the presence of very devout Muslims in the British intelligence services. When Yusuf Islam (formerly known as Cat Stevens) was arrested and deported for having tried to enter the United States, the FBI agents who escorted him back to London were surprised to see that a police officer with long flowing robes and long beard, a devout Muslim, had come to collect him from the airport.⁹

A British participant asked what the British police services want from the Muslim community in aiding the fight against terrorism, and whether the British police were blindly adopting American views about Muslims. The British speaker responded that the community can contribute by getting involved with police authorities, police advisory groups, and Muslim safety forums, and by encouraging young Muslims to join the law enforcement services. The public is capable of distinguishing between worrying about terrorism and worrying about the Muslim community.

An American participant asked how, in light of the issue of counterterrorism, police in Europe might ensure public confidence, satisfaction, and harmony in the Muslim communities while also delivering a holistic policing service to those communities. A German participant responded that even though police cooperation with religious communities has been an essential part of public policy in some *Länder* [states], the problem is that many Muslim organizations have negative perceptions of or have had negative experiences with the police. In spite of there being such little trust, the partnership is absolutely necessary. There are contact officers for German Muslim organizations, in what is known as an inter-cultural opening of the public sector. When the national Interior Minister said that Islam is now a part of German society, he implied that Islam is part of the police, the schools, and the educational system as well. A brochure has been developed in North Rhine-Westphalia to educate teachers about how to address the issue of Muslim holiday observances in schools.

A German participant noted that there seems to be agreement around the notion that the roots of terrorism should be fought, but that agreement on concepts and vocabulary is also necessary. “Terrorism” and “radicalism” can mean different things to different people. Women wearing a headscarf, for example, are often called radical or extremist. Similarly, the word *jihad* has been completely distorted in public discourse. Its true meaning goes far beyond the kind of narrow interpretation that has it referring only to combat and war, for it actually refers to a personal wrestling with oneself in order to make progress on the way to wisdom. Words such as this have been wrenched from the Muslim community, making an agreement about the meaning of key words extremely important.

NOTES

1. The group was established more than a year before the government-initiated German Islam Conference (DIK). Based on the working group’s experiences, the DIK subsequently created an expanded “Discussion Group” or Roundtable—that is, not a full “Working Group”—on “Security and Islamism.” DIK: see note 2 below.

2. The DIK was first convened by Federal Minister of the Interior Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble in September 2006. It is meant as a framework for a continuing dialogue between the German state and Muslims living in Germany. For a description of the DIK, see Federal Ministry of the Interior, “German Islam Conference (DIK),” available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2008/DIK__en,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/DIK_en.pdf.

3. In July 2008, in a major intelligence community reform, the *Renseignements Généraux* was merged with the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance), forming the new *Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur* (Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence.)

4. During the morning rush hour, four suicide bombers released bombs on a double-decker bus and three Underground trains, killing 52 people and injuring more than 770.

5. Most of the attacks have involved letter bombs and incendiary devices. The majority were the work of the Provisional IRA but other organizations such as the Kurdish PKK have also been implicated.

6. The Terrorism Act 2000 created new categories of crime and gave the police and other law enforcement officials enhanced powers. See Home Office, "Terrorism Act 2000," <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2000/>. It was followed by the Terrorism Act 2006, which makes it a criminal offense to commit "Acts Preparatory to Terrorism," "Encouragement to Terrorism," "Dissemination of Terrorist Publications," and training in terrorist techniques. It also adds to the power of police to search suspected terrorists' property and to arrest and detain suspects for up to 28 days without charges. See Home Office, "Terrorism Act 2006," <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2006/>.

7. Mehmood Naqshbandi, *Islam and Muslims in England, A Guide for Non-Muslims* (City of London Police Authority, n.d.), available at <http://www.muslimsinbritain.org/guide/guide.html>.

8. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208, 104th Congress, 110 Stat. 3009 (September 30, 1996), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ208.104.pdf. Section 287(g) is described in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act," Aug. 16, 2006, available at <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287factsheet.pdf>. It authorizes the federal Department of Homeland Security to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, under which designated state and local police are trained to perform immigration law functions.

9. Cat Stevens, a popular English singer, converted to Islam in 1977 and adopted the name Yusuf Islam. In 2004 he was denied admission to the United States, possibly as a result of confusion of his name with someone else on the U.S. "no-fly" list. He was admitted to the United States in 2006.

PART II
PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

Mounir Azaoui: Muslims and the Government of Germany

There are both positive developments in Muslim integration in Germany and problems that remain to be solved. While the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are the Western countries with the largest number of Muslim immigrants, there are marked differences among the Muslim immigrants emigrating to each of those nations.

The first difference lies in the immigrants' ethnic backgrounds. Most Muslim immigrants in France have North African origins; in Great Britain, they are primarily South Asian; and in Germany, the majority have Turkish backgrounds. The Muslim population in the United States is far more diverse, with South Asians, Arabs, and African Americans comprising the largest groups.

The second difference is the relationship between immigration and socioeconomic background. In Europe, the greatest part of the Muslim population consists of immigrants—in fact, “immigration” and “Islam” are almost synonymous. The immigrant community, the Islamic community, and the socioeconomically underprivileged communities tend to be the same.

In the United States, on the other hand, Muslims constitute at most ten percent of all new immigrants. Roughly 30 percent of all Muslims in the United States are African Americans, which makes it more difficult to characterize Islam as a non-American religion. Many of the Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia have an academic background and face fewer of the socioeconomic problems experienced by many Muslims in Europe.

The third difference among the countries is church-state relations. In the United States, because of the legal separation between state and church, Muslims do not need official recognition from the state. They are free to build their organizations and then attempt to have a voice in the public debate and in the policymaking process.

Church-state relations are quite different in Europe. In France, with its emphasis on *laïcité*, the separation between state and church is sometimes very aggressive, while Great Britain has a state church and Germany has something in-between. In many West European countries, Muslim organizations need official recognition by the state before they can attempt to exert influence on public policies.

While there are no exact figures, there are an estimated 3.2 to 3.4 million Muslims in Germany today. More than 80 percent of them are originally from Turkey, with other large groups coming from countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran and Morocco. Most of the Muslims and their ancestors came to Germany as guest workers.

While Germany has not experienced religious freedom issues such as the one involved in France's headscarf law, the country is experiencing a great deal of discussion about Muslim integration.¹ An illustrative example is the mosque-building process. There are about 2,500 mosques in Germany. Only about 150 are representative buildings with a minaret and a dome. In the last years, many Muslim communities have left smaller prayer places and have built new representative mosques. This process is positive, indicating that Muslims are part of German society, but at the same time it unleashes fear and prejudice in the society at large. The new mosque buildings themselves reflect a

process of adaptation. Just as the cities in Germany are changing, so is the architecture of mosque buildings. Early mosques were implanted mosques: mosques with architecture that was brought to Germany directly from Turkey or from Arab countries. In the next stage, mosques combining Western and Muslim architecture were built. This might be called the adaptation process. The third step is one that may well come in the future: innovative mosques, perhaps without either minarets or domes. This is not now imaginable for many Muslims but I believe it is coming, and in fact it can already be seen in some cities in Germany and in the United States.

This is an example of the process of Muslim integration. There are other examples as well, such as the regulation about slaughtering animals according to Islamic rituals, the recruitment of Muslim imams into the chaplain corps of the armed forces, the provision of Muslim religious assistance in hospitals and social institutions, the official recognition of the two Muslim religious holidays,² and the creation of cemeteries or sections of cemeteries for Islamic burial. These are areas of fundamental concern for Muslims in all the European states.

Another area in which integration is important is official recognition of Muslim organizations. In many areas, state recognition is necessary if organizations are able to involve themselves in matters such as providing religious assistance in hospitals and prisons or offering religious instruction in schools. Such recognition is important symbolically as well, helping to integrate Muslims into Germany and permitting them to feel that, like Jews and Christians, they are at home in Germany.

Germany is a secular state. There is a Constitution and separation of the state and religious bodies, but at the same time there is cooperation between state and church. Churches have numerous privileges in Germany, most notably the right to offer religious instruction in public schools. Books and teachers in public schools are vetted by the churches or by the religious communities, and the teachers are paid by the state. The German church tax [*Kirchensteuer*] is collected by the state and then given to the churches. The recognized churches have additional privileges such as seats on public radio and television advisory boards.

The goal of the Muslim organizations in Germany, therefore, is to achieve equal treatment and the same rights now accorded to the Protestant and Catholic churches as well as officially recognized Jewish communities. The German Constitution refers to religious communities rather than to churches, so logically it should not be a problem to integrate Muslim organizations into this system. In practice, however, all those privileges are regulated by the *Staatskirchenrecht*, or state-church law, which was developed in German history for the benefit of churches.

The Muslim community in Germany, however, has a structure different from that of the churches. There is no such thing as personal membership for people who attend a mosque. Islam has no clergy. These formal differences are often used by politicians to deny Muslim organizations the same rights accorded to other religious organizations. The politicians certainly could apply the Constitution in a flexible manner, but they frequently have not done so. In my view the main reason for this is that there is a mistrust of what are viewed as very conservative Islamic organizations, and a fear that the growing influence of Muslims in the political system of Germany is not good for the nation.

The birth rate of Muslims in Germany is higher than the average. Europe sometimes fears that there will be more Muslims than Christians and so the states will become Islamicized. This results in conversations that are similar to those that take place in the United States about whether Hispanics

will become a majority and threaten the Anglo-Protestant culture. We must confront these fears. Politicians must recognize that we must integrate people socially and economically so that our societies can benefit from them in the future.

At the same time, I think Muslim organizations can be equally mistrustful when they deal with the authorities. They fear transparency and the fashioning of compromises, believing that the goal of the government is to assimilate Muslims. We must speak open-mindedly about this mistrust—something we have not always done in the past. Now, happily, there is a process of dialogue between Muslim organizations and the state.

As mentioned above, more than 80 percent of German Muslims are from Turkey. There are large Turkish organizations in Germany that maintain very close ties to the Turkish government and to Turkish political parties. It is natural for the German government not to want foreign states to have a major influence on German schools and institutions. This is an area where responsibility for the lack of integration lies squarely with Muslim organizations, not the German state.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the close ties between Turkey and Germany are in part the responsibility of the German government. As the work of Jonathan Laurence has shown,³ the government preferred not to deal with problems of integration and created a kind of outsourcing by encouraging the Turkish government to send imams from Turkey to Germany.

The last two years have seen some positive developments in this area. Muslim organizations have recognized that their close ties to Turkey and other foreign states are a problem. Three largely Turkish organizations and one more ethnically plural Muslim organization have created the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (*Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland* [KRM]) to deal with problems relating to Islam.⁴

A second positive development is the creation of the German Conference on Islam, which was begun in September 2006 by Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble. In creating it, Mr. Schäuble stated that the Muslim community is an undeniable part of Germany and of German society. That was a new and weighty statement for Germany. The creation of the Conference was the first institutionalization of dialogue with the Muslim community by a government minister.

There were many controversies when the Conference was created. One of them involved the question of who would and who would not participate. Some individual Muslims were invited along with Muslim organizations. This appeared to reflect the government's belief that if it brought together conservative Muslim organizations and hyper-liberal Muslims the result would be a moderate Islam. In the last two years the government has come to understand that this is not possible. When the subject matter is the problems of mosque-building or identifying counterparts for religious instruction in public schools, it makes no sense to speak with people who identify themselves as "cultural Muslims" and do not go to mosques and are not interested in religious instruction for their children. It makes equally little sense to give individual conference participants who speak out against Islam the same weight as Muslim organizations that represent 50,000 to 200,00 people each (for a total of roughly one million). The government must deal with religious Muslim organizations if it is to have an effective impact on the community.

Nevertheless, the German Conference on Islam was a big step forward for Germany, and one that will influence the integration process of Muslims in a positive way.

There are many efforts by European governments and Muslim associations to cooperate with each other. These must be improved but a promising process has begun. The key issues for the future are the empowerment of Islamic associations and the intra-Islamic dialogue. There is now dialogue between the government and Muslim organizations in the United States, and between the governments and Muslim organizations in Europe. What is necessary is dialogue between Muslim organizations within European countries and between Muslim organizations in Europe and those in the United States. This could improve the way all the communities face the challenge of integrating into Western societies.

NOTES

1. While a few *Länder* (states) have banned headscarves in schools, the ban applies only to teachers and not to pupils.

2. Eid al-Fitr (Celebration of the Feast) takes place at the end of Ramadan; Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice) celebrates the prophet Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son as proof of his piety. Official recognition means, for example, that teachers and students can take those days off.

3. Jonathan Laurence, "Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe" in Craig Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding, *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

4. The Coordination Council brings together the four largest Muslim umbrella organizations in Germany: the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), the Islamic Council of Germany, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), and the Association of Islamic Culture Centres (VIKZ).

Bernard Godard: The Case of France

The challenge of connecting governments and Muslim communities is different in Europe than in the United States. I will limit my observations to the European experiences, where I see three main factors at work.

The first is the importance of national history. During their colonial eras, France and the United Kingdom did not recognize Muslims as full political citizens, but there are now communities of Muslims from former colonies living in the mainland. Many Muslim residents, for whom colonial history is still fresh, feel that they are not yet viewed as full citizens. This is a dangerous situation, and it has proved particularly so in France.

The second factor has to do with particular brands of secularism. France, with its system of *laïcité*, does not think the interpretation of religion is the business of government. French public authorities have no mandate to get into discussions of theology or degrees of faith. When the French government decided to create a representative Muslim body in 2003, the Interior Ministry's religion bureau (*bureau central des cultes*) turned to the organized, religious Muslim community—that is, those Muslims who run mosques or prayer associations. When the German and Italian governments convened their own national consultative Muslim bodies, by contrast, they chose participants from a wide range of Muslim leaders. In Italy, this meant leaders of Muslim civil society, not just leaders of places of worship, and included students, sociologists, women's rights advocates, and so on. In France, we did not feel we had the option of choosing which Muslims to have as interlocutors on religious affairs, so the *Conseil français du culte musulman* (French Council for the Muslim Faith – CFCM) does not include the more secular or liberal Muslims simply because they do not typically run places of worship.

The third factor is that many issues troubling Muslims in France have local rather than national solutions. Such issues are not easily addressed by a national body, so the CFCM may in some sense be limited to a purely symbolic role. If we look at the examples of local solutions to religious conflict in Morocco and the United States, we see that local ethnic communities are often able to resolve problems that would be vastly more difficult to manage if they required compromise among the leadership of competing ethnic groups at the national level. Indeed, since the CFCM's creation in 2003, there have been clashes among the different national and ethnic groups within the organization.

One example of that has to do with the Moroccan community in France, where Moroccans and descendants of Moroccans constitute the second largest Muslim group. As recently as five years ago, the kingdom of Morocco was not particularly interested in Moroccans living outside that country. The security context changed in the aftermath of September 11 and, especially after the Madrid and Casablanca bombings in 2003. After those events, the kingdom decided it was very important to maintain links with the community of Moroccans living outside the country, and created a representative body to institute closer ties with “Moroccans living abroad” (*marocains résidents à l'étranger*). Representatives of 250 French mosques were invited to Marrakesh in February 2008 to discuss whom to vote for in the next CFCM elections in France. This testifies to the strength of

ethnicity and ethnic ties in French Islam today. Turkish communities in France have similar ties to the Turkish administration in Ankara. When certain Turkish associations purchase a place of worship, they transfer the deed to the Turkish directorate for religious affairs.

I believe these links will weaken over time. The younger generation does not identify as wholeheartedly with their parents' or grandparents' countries of origin. At the same time, the older generation is not eager to cede its power to the younger generation.

It is important for European nations to recognize that Islam is now a European religion as well as a religion of other nations. Security concerns affect European Muslims as much as they do non-Muslims, if not more. Since the terrorist attacks of 7/7, Britain has worked together with a broad range of British Muslims to fight extremism. Governments must continue to conduct such outreach to help Muslim leaders make extremism less attractive to young people. Ironically, the young European Muslims who have traveled to Iraq to die in suicide attacks against Coalition forces know nothing about the Qur'an. We must help Muslim communities give their young people a proper religious education.

I do not want to end on a pessimistic note. The political participation of young Muslims in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, both as voters and elected officials, demonstrates their desire for full citizenship and inclusion in national politics. This is a very hopeful sign.

The Honorable Sue Greenwald: The View from an American City

This will be a brief summary of the ways in which the city of Davis, California has attempted to deal with the issue of welcoming and integrating Islamic citizens and residents into the life of the city of Davis, and it will include some information about how we are trying to deal with perceptions of discrimination.

Davis is a university town of 65,000 residents, located twenty minutes from the state capital in Sacramento and less than an hour and a half from San Francisco. It is the home of the University of California at Davis, one of the major University of California campuses. The Sacramento region of California has a large Islamic-American population and the university also has a large community of Muslim students and faculty in residence. The federal government plays no role in religion in the United States, so dealing with Islamic integration is for the most part left to the localities and to voluntary organizations.

The story of integrating and accepting Islamic citizens cannot be separated from Davis' attempts to embrace and accept all the ethnic and religious minorities who live there. The city has always considered itself to be a progressive community, placing a high value on human rights and celebrating the gifts that diversity brings to the community. That said, the perceptions of Davis' minority citizens often clash with the city's self-image. To the perpetual surprise of the good, liberal citizens of Davis, many minority citizens and guests feel unwelcome.

The fact that Davis' Islamic citizens tend to be professionals in the higher socio-economic classes has not lessened the perception of discrimination. The two problems that I hear about most frequently are the children's feelings of not being accepted in the schools and the ubiquitous issue of racial profiling in law enforcement. The perception of racial profiling is based on the sense of many minority group members, including many very distinguished university faculty members and other professionals, that the shade of their skin or their hair style leads to their being stopped more frequently by the police and to their not being treated well when they are stopped.

After 9/11, the Islamic community was understandably fearful of retribution and lack of acceptance. We in the government of Davis were also apprehensive about what might happen, particularly as we had experienced racial violence. Californians were particularly concerned about and sensitive to the negative potential because of the incarceration of the state's Japanese-American citizens in relocation camps during World War II. Davis has many Japanese-American citizens. A former City Council member was interned in one of those camps, as were a county supervisor's parents.

The knowledge of the damage that racism can cause also reflected a terrible event that took place in Davis in 1983. It came as a terrible shock to our community when, that year, a 17-year-old Vietnamese high school student named Thong Hy Huynh was stabbed to death by another student in a racially motivated killing. In the United States, cities and schools are completely separate jurisdictions, and each school district has or can have its own diversity programs. The reaction of the Davis school district was to create a series of institutions and events designed to deal with hate

crimes and foster inclusion. The school district created a special day called “Walk in Another’s Shoes,” for example, which takes place during the school’s Human Relations Week and consists of programs about diversity. The city government also immediately took a number of steps. Davis reactivated its dormant Human Relations Commission, which undertook diversity outreach and education and which also heard specific citizen complaints and mediated disputes. The city established the annual Thong Hy Huynh awards in the fields of civil rights, humanitarianism and human service, and now presents an annual Young Humanitarian Award and a Peace Officer of the Year Award. The City Council has a reception for the occasion that is videotaped and televised. The city organizes annual celebrations for Martin Luther King Day and César Chavez Day. These are very well attended by the entire community.

After 9/11, the city government passed a number of resolutions about hate crimes, including a resolution that opposed the excesses of the Patriot Act, with specific reference to the need to protect the civil rights of Islamic citizens and residents.¹ The city felt very strongly that federal legislation such as the Patriot Act was moving in the wrong direction.

The Davis Islamic Center is very active because Davis has such a large Islamic community. After 9/11, it held a series of open houses in which the Davis community was given tours of the Islamic Center along with descriptions of Islamic worship and teachings. Churches and synagogues invited leaders of the Islamic community to speak to their congregations about Islamic teachings and to dispel some of the myths about Islam. The Islamic Center, working with Islamic students at the university, began to host an annual community *iftar* (the evening meal that ends the daily fast during the month of Ramadan) with food, speakers and prayers. The entire Davis community is invited and the guests include many of our elected and university officials. The event has been so well attended over the last few years that we cannot now find a hall large enough to hold all the people who want to attend.

Two interfaith traditions were founded in Davis in response to 9/11. One is called Care for God’s Creation, an interfaith community whose purpose is to provide opportunities in northern California for environmental and religious groups to work together for a common purpose.² We study and take action on behalf of God’s creation, the environment. This has been a great common effort, a common glue that holds us all together. The leaders and members of the local Islamic and other religious organizations have been major participants in this.

Christian, Islamic and Jewish leaders have also joined together to hold an annual event called the Feast of Abraham. This is a community-wide event during which speakers from each of the three Abrahamic religions discuss selected fundamental questions and present teachings and insights from their respective religions. Members of the Davis community are seated randomly in groups at round tables. Each topic is addressed by a religious leader from each of the three Abrahamic religions, and there is then a discussion at the tables. The event is always well attended. One of our churches, which serves a student population, has built dormitories specifically designed so that students of different faiths can live together and get to know each other.

During the intense period after 9/11 there was an incident of perceived discrimination involving police treatment of a Muslim high school student. It became a very high profile event that created a great deal of discussion. Many people showed up at the City Council, very upset about it, and the public comment at City Council meetings went long into the night.

This event brought into focus the issue of racial profiling, which has been an acknowledged problem of long standing in Davis. Proposals for a civilian police review board were offered and were discussed at length by the Human Relations Commission and the City Council. A number of cities have such a board, which has the power to investigate police actions. The Davis Police Department was adamantly opposed to a full-blown civilian review board and the city finance department was worried about its cost because city budgets are very tight these days. The city attorney was worried about liability issues involving personnel confidentiality and labor law.

What Davis has done, instead of creating a civilian police review board, is settle on a four-part program. It includes hiring an independent ombudsman and creating both a Citizens Advisory Board and a Police Advisory Committee, along with providing diversity training for police and other city staff.

The Citizens Advisory Board consists of seventeen community leaders selected by the police chief. One position is designated for an Islamic representative. The Board meets monthly to provide input to the police department about constituent concerns and to open a two-way dialogue between the police department and the community.

The Police Advisory Committee is a little more formal. It consists of three members appointed by the city manager's office. It is very important to have a group that is not under the control of the police department but under that of the city manager, which means that it is basically under civilian control. The members are not police officers but they have backgrounds in law enforcement or the legal system—people such as retired judges, retired police chiefs and attorneys. The primary function of the committee is to review completed citizen complaint investigations. Every time a citizen makes a formal complaint, the Police Advisory Committee reviews it and makes recommendations for improving police procedure. The Committee has access to all records and can talk to the aggrieved citizens and make specific procedural changes. One such recent change, for example, involved the procedure that normally was followed after a citizen's complaint was filed and acted upon. The practice was to send the complainant a form letter about the disposition of the matter. The Police Advisory Committee suggested instead that the complainant be sent a personalized letter giving a full description of the result of the investigation and a full explanation of the thinking of the police department.

The police department is developing inclusionary training and the rest of the staff is also going to be taking this inclusionary training. Davis has always had diversity training but it is now becoming a more rigorous program.

Finally, there is the police ombudsman, an outside professional hired on contract, who has experience in mediating complaints. Citizens have direct access to the ombudsman, who maintains a good relationship with the police department but is not part of it. He helps guide citizens with complaints through the review process, reviews the complaints as well, and advises the department on how to improve the situation.

This does not mean that Davis has changed everyone's understanding or everyone's attitudes. Most of Davis' police officers are impressive but some simply do not understand the problem of racial profiling. One of the older police officers, for example, said to me, "Sue, what can we do if we hear that a black person has robbed a bank? We then have to stop black people. You always wear a straw hat outside. If someone with a straw hat robbed a bank, we'd stop you." I told him that I understood

that he was in a difficult position and had to walk a very fine line. There are not many black residents in Davis, and whenever a black person commits a crime, Davis' black citizens are stopped. What I tried to explain was that if a woman with a straw hat kept robbing banks and I was stopped a lot, I could take off my straw hat, but people cannot take off their skin color.

Davis still has problems, but these steps have helped make substantial progress. When a crescent was stolen recently from the top of the new mosque, the entire community helped raise funds to replace it.

NOTES

1. The resolution says in part, "The City of Davis and Davis Police Department reaffirms its commitment to unbiased policing and endorses the principle that no law enforcement or other city agency may profile or discriminate against any person on the basis of ancestry, race, ethnicity, national origin, color, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, physical or mental disability or religion.

"The City of Davis requests that Federal and State law enforcement officials who work within the city, do so in accordance with the policies of the Davis Police Department, and in cooperation with the Department, that they not engage in racial profiling or permit detentions without charges.

"The City of Davis affirms its strong opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act, Justice Department directives, and Executive Orders that weaken or destroy our civil rights and liberties." "Resolution to Oppose the USA PATRIOT Act," available at <http://www.city.davis.ca.us/story/pdfs/resolution-03-18.pdf>. The Act, PL 017-56 (Oct. 26, 2001), is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf.

2. <http://www.careforgodscreation.net/index.html>.

Sajida Madni: The Role of Civil Society in the United Kingdom

I am a community organizer for Birmingham Citizens, an organization in the United Kingdom. It is an organization whose many members include mosques, churches, trade unions, schools, *gurdwaras* [Sikh temples], other faith groups, and non-faith groups, all working together on issues of social justice and for the common good. Its focus is on the many things that we have in common rather than on the fewer things that we have in difference. Birmingham, England's second city, is a multicultural city of about a million people. By the year 2012, it is expected to be the first majority/minority city in Europe: the first city in which non-white ethnic groups will constitute the majority.

The United Kingdom now provides substantial government funding for such things as preventing extremism, racial equality, community cohesion and community development. Much of the money, however, goes to groups that conform to guidelines provided by councils and grant makers. The guidelines sometimes do not allow for serious discussions to take place but encourage the real issues to be brushed under the carpet. They are designed, for example, to keep the role of foreign policy in fueling terrorism and extremism out of the discussion. The money is often spent on groups that will not hold councils and public officials to account, or on groups that do interesting research, which is then ignored.

Community funding goes to mosques or Islamic organizations or churches that are doing a lot of interfaith work. The people who are prone to extremism and extremist messages, however, are not to be found in churches and mosques and other places of worship. They are people who often go unheard—people, particularly young people, who feel voiceless, alienated and segregated. It is people who have no sense of belonging anywhere who are most vulnerable when someone tells them, “You know what, you can make a great impact here. You will die doing it but you will make an impact.” I am not condoning attacks on anyone or the actions of such people. We need, however, to get into the minds of people who do not understand the sanctity of life, because it is these people, with nowhere else to turn, who are susceptible to extremist messages.

Governments have to work together with Muslim organizations to listen to people, to make all of them feel that they do matter and that they are not voiceless. Funding should go to training and developing leadership skills, so that everyone feels that they have the skills to contribute to society.

Our mosques must stop talking about young people not being attached to the mosque. Why should they feel attached to the mosque if the imam does not even speak their language? Why should they feel attached to the mosque when the mosque committees are full of men who do not speak the language of the country and seem not to remember what it was like to be young? If young people are expected to feel a connection with the mosque, then it is they who must be put on mosque committees.

As a community, we Muslims like to be reactive and insufficiently proactive. It is when something goes wrong that we send out press releases and start voicing our opinions. What we need to do, instead of complaining about policing gone wrong or the negative image that the media has of Muslims or the government not doing enough, is educate our young people and encourage them to

join the police force, become journalists, get involved with the media, join political parties or at least go out and vote. I do not believe in apathy. I believe people are disengaged because they feel voiceless and, tired of not being heard, they simply do not bother any more. It is up to us to engage them. The Muslim community has a moral responsibility to address this problem and to get people engaged in civic society.

The way to do it is, first of all, to have open and frank discussion, which implies not shirking from the real issues. If people who have no understanding of what Islam really is about make negative comments about Muslims, it is an indication that we as a community have not done a good enough job of educating people and building relationships with groups other than Muslim ones. There is a great deal of community cohesion within the Muslim community in Birmingham but there is also ghettoization and segregation. There are areas where the Somali Muslims will not talk to the Pakistani Muslims, who will not talk to the black Muslims or the Bengali Muslims. We must do a better job of uniting our own communities as well as dispelling the misconceptions that other people have about us. We must start acting together for positive change.

That is exactly what Birmingham Citizens does. One area of Birmingham faced some racial disturbances some time ago. Under the leadership of Bishop Derek Webley, the chairman of Birmingham Citizens, our organization was able to rally 40 faith leaders overnight. They held a press conference calling for restoration of peace. Bishop Webley was able to bring them together because the 40 faith leaders were already in a relationship with one another, working together on various issues. These very busy people, who head large organizations and serve on world faith councils, took the time to come together because it was important to them and because they were already in a relationship with one another.

When Tony Blair, the former prime minister, was running for office, he called our organization to talk to some young Muslims. One of our young Muslims had a 45-minute conversation with him. Blair consulted that young person again when he wanted to talk about young Muslim issues.

It is only through such relationships that extremism can be fought. The media frequently ask us, "Do you feel that you are a British Muslim first or a Muslim in Britain?" That is something that we don't think about. We are British and we are Muslim and we are Pakistani or another heritage and we embrace all of that. It is quite normal for my brother to go to church on Sunday or for me to go to the *gurdwara* on a Thursday because, thanks to Birmingham Citizens, we have a relationship with many different groups. We don't have to go tell our church leaders and our Sikh leaders that Islam means peace, because they already know that Sajida Madni is just a normal person who likes the same normal things that they like. They know we can work together on issues like education and housing that concern us all. They know I support Manchester United Football Club and enjoy football just as they do. That makes them understand that the bad image the media gives Muslims can't be right. In Birmingham, we don't try to tell people that Muslims are good people; we just talk with one another, and that does the job.

Muslim organizations have a responsibility to challenge extremism directly. There are examples from the life of the Prophet Mohammed. Muslims were persecuted in Mecca, back when the community in Mecca believed in many idols and gods, and Muslims, espousing the concept of one god, faced serious persecution. The Prophet Mohammed told a group of people who were being persecuted to

migrate to Abyssinia—today’s Ethiopia. When the Muslims reached Abyssinia the Christian king told them that they were welcome but that they had to conform to the laws of Abyssinia.

They did not reply, “No, no, we believe in the Sharia law and we want to change this community and no, you must follow our law.” On the contrary, they said, “Fine—we must follow the law of the land here.” That is what the Prophet Mohammed encouraged Muslims to do.

English Muslims are fortunate to be living in the United Kingdom, where we have much more freedom to express our religious values and practice our faith than we would in other countries. In Saudi Arabia, I would not be allowed to go out unless I were accompanied by a male relative. In Turkey, I could not work for the government because I wear the *hijab* [headscarf]. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, we have prayer room facilities; we have the freedom to organize an Islamic society just as others organize a Jewish society or a Christian society. We must recognize that publicly. We should hold the police and the government to account when we feel there is an injustice but at the same time we should be honest with ourselves and hold ourselves and each other to account. That is what Birmingham Citizens does.

I was struck earlier by a statement by Hubert Williams, the president of the Police Foundation in the United States, that American police officers cannot wear headscarves or turbans. In the United Kingdom, the police go to mosques to recruit young Muslims, who are able to wear their religious attire. Sikh police officers are able to wear their turbans. That is a substantial sign of progress.

I will conclude with a story. I am a member of various Islamic organizations. The president of one of the societies was visiting us from another country and it fell upon me to take him around Birmingham and show him the work that young Muslims are doing there. I got a group of young Muslims together and worked with them for a week. I told them that for the visit, they had to make sure that their Arabic was top notch and that they said their *Inshallahs* [if God wills] in all the right places. They had to say it at least once in every sentence, dress in their Islamic gear, and be really polite. I told them to be sure to mention that Muslims are at the forefront of community life in Birmingham.

By the time I put the young people in the back of a car and we picked up our visitor at the airport, they were all scripted. Then we drove past a street in Birmingham that has a church on one side and a convent on the other. Both the church and convent are members of Birmingham Citizens, and the young Muslims are members of Birmingham Citizens, so these young Muslims were used to going to the church and the convent as well as the mosques. They really feel at home there. As we were driving past, one of the young people called out, “Oh, and this is our church and this is our convent.”

The man said nothing but when we got to the mosque, he sat us down and he said, “You mentioned that that is your church and that is your convent. Exactly what do you mean by that?”

The same young person replied, “Yeah, well, we go to worship there on Sundays and we hold regular circles at the convent on Friday evenings.”

The president, amazed, asked, “What do you mean? How do you have ownership over somebody else’s faith institution?” And the young man explained the work of Birmingham Citizens and how we work together.

People ask me what our greatest victory is, but we have a lot of victories. Working together, we have gotten some of the most rundown parks and public spaces refurbished. Drug dealers were

pushed out. Our streets are safer. The crime levels have gone down as a result of our organizing. Some schools that were not performing well at all are performing very well now.

Our biggest victory, however, is that young and old Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs feel they have ownership of each other's faith institutions and feel comfortable going to them. We feel comfortable picking up the phone and calling the archbishop or *giana* [one who is educated in religious affairs] from the *gurdwara* and saying, "Come to our house for a meal" or "Let's get together and talk about these issues." I was recently at a conference with a young Sikh who said to me, "I've been meaning to ask a Muslim this question since the Archbishop of Canterbury made his speech, but I've been too shy to ask it. But because I have a relationship with you, Sajida, I know that you won't mind. What is your stance on this Sharia law debate?"¹ After five minutes' conversation he understood that Muslims don't want public beheadings to take place in Britain.

If only people were not too shy to ask those questions. If only we were all in relationships with one another so that people would feel comfortable enough to have that kind of discussion. Fear and misconceptions were gotten rid of just because that person felt that he had a good enough relationship with me to ask a simple question.

The Muslim community in Birmingham used to think that the police were the lowest of the low, and they wanted nothing to do with them. We got the police together in a mosque and had them share a meal with the Muslim community. The community realized that the police are human beings as well and that we need to work together. A year later, the community gave a prize to the police for working with them.

We have to work together. It is not enough to have sermons from the pulpits or speeches from stages. Success comes at the grassroots level, just by connecting to one another and simply talking with one another about our similarities rather than our differences. It is working in Birmingham. It is a model that can be used elsewhere.

NOTES

1. On February 7, 2008, Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, said in a speech that giving some aspects of Sharia law official status in the United Kingdom seemed "inevitable" and would aid social cohesion. The speech is available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/07/religion.world2>.

Question and Answer Session

QUESTION: I wonder about the risk of overemphasizing religion and Muslim communities in Western countries. There is a great deal of resentment and a feeling of exclusion in the majority communities in Western Europe, which feel that the majority populations are overlooked. This feeling breeds populism and very risky reactionary responses. Governments that are reaching out only to the Muslim community are not helping this problem whatsoever. In the Netherlands, for example, there is a strong secular tradition, but the government has been addressing Muslim communities on the basis of their religious identity. Interfaith initiatives are also useful but they exclude the significant proportion of people who do not identify based on their religion. I believe the role of the government in helping Muslim communities should include bringing people together and focusing on the group of people who are reluctant to move in the direction of an integrated society, who feel threatened by an integrated society.

QUESTION: To follow up on that: why should governments consider religious affiliation to be the most important thing about Muslim citizens? Should Muslims be treated primarily as Muslims? The danger is that if you privilege cultural and religious identities over the community of citizens with rights and entitlements, the initiative inevitably passes to people of a conservative or even a reactionary disposition. They impose an authoritarian climate on their own communities and people in those communities who feel they have more in common with the rest of society are trapped. Public identity should be based on individual rights and responsibilities, not group rights and responsibilities. Opting for a process of Balkanization, of trying to manage complex, fragile communities through gatekeepers, leads to a gradual disillusionment with the state and society.

BERNARD GODARD: I understand your concern about overemphasizing religion, but there are two problems. From the perspective of the extremely secular French system, the French Council for the Muslim Faith is not meant to represent the “Muslim community.” Rather, it is meant to provide an institutional partner for observant Muslims who regularly attend mosques and places of worship. So we designed the CFCM only to address practical matters related to religious observance, without concerning ourselves with participants’ citizenship status and without taking pains to involve the younger generation in the process. We felt that such issues were beyond our purview. Our first challenge was to give some institutional recognition to Islam as a religion that is widely practiced in France. And what happened? Criti

1-933549-41-6 cs warned that while the government may want only an interlocutor for mosque-going Muslims, some politicians and Muslim leaders may have other designs. They may want to use the CFCM to create an artificial monolithic “Muslim community” when we all know that the “Muslim community” is in fact extremely diverse. And so there is the danger that in trying to grant some representation to Islam with the CFCM, even if it is strictly limited to matters of religious observance, we create another set of problems.

We also have to resolve the real challenges of everyday discrimination that young people face, whether they are Muslims or Sikhs. I agree with you that we should not consider an individual only on the basis of his or her religious identity.

The Netherlands is a good example because you have the pillar system, which allows for a separate “humanist” pillar in state–society relations alongside the “religious” pillars. One could argue that the central pillar we need in European society is the humanist pillar and then all the other religious pillars could co-exist on a secondary level.

In France, the government does not concern itself with Muslims’ “identity.” For us, the only policy issue is public religious observance. Others may disagree and argue that governments need to engage Muslims on the issues of identity, of terrorism, mentality and tradition. But as Mounir Azzaoui said, religion is a conservative system. If you prefer to work with liberal or secular individuals outside organized religion, then you shouldn’t deal with religious leaders at all.

SAJIDA MADNI: There is resentment from other communities. Even Muslims feel that there is more emphasis on Muslims than on any other group in the United Kingdom and that government officials are overdoing it by reaching out more to Muslim communities than to any other group. The fact of the matter is that we don’t want that attention. We celebrate the day that we are not in the media. When the Virginia Tech shooting took place, the first reaction of the Muslim community was, “That is terribly sad but please let the killer not be a Muslim.”

That is why, in Birmingham Citizens, we focus on the things that we have in common and the way the Muslim community can be part of those groups. A white official of another organization for which I volunteer actually said to me, when I was writing a grant application, “I’ll write the grant bit but could you put your name on it? There would probably be a better chance of our getting it if the application came from a Muslim woman rather than from me.”

MOUNIR AZZAOU: I would agree that we have to speak less about Islam, because we have many socio-economic problems that have nothing to do with Islam. One year there was a debate in Germany about violence in schools. The media and the politicians asked the question, “What does the Qur’an say about violence?” That is irrational, because the problems were not religious; they were social and economic. Some schools had no director for one or two years; some schools had too few teachers. We have to speak about social issues such as these rather than about Islam.

At the same time, we must also recognize that there is a threat from people who are Islamist terrorists. We as Muslims must speak up about that issue whether we like it or not.

The situation is complicated. In Germany, there is cooperation between church and state. The Muslim community as a community wants the same rights being afforded to the church and to the Jewish community. It is too simplistic to say that there should be only individual and not collective rights. Germany shows that collective rights are also a factor in integration.

QUESTION: Has excessive multiculturalism allowed for the rise of parallel communities? There has been a division between immigrants who feel that they have managed to integrate themselves, not assimilate but integrate themselves into the larger communities, and those who cut themselves off and create separate communities.

There has been substantial focus on Muslim religious identity and Muslim organizations. Are your governments and organizations reaching out to people in communities that are Muslim but that don't necessarily identify on a religious basis? They may see their Muslim identity as a cultural one or as arising from their parents' or grandparents' homelands. Are these people being excluded from interacting with governments?

MOUNIR AZZAOU: The German Islam Conference is constituted of 15 people from governments at different levels and 15 people from the Muslim community. The 15 Muslims include five from organizations and ten individuals. The individuals are part of the Conference because the federal Minister of the Interior estimated that the five organizations represent only about 20 percent of the 3,200,000–3,400,000 Muslims in Germany—the 20 percent who regularly go to the mosque. The number is closer to 50 percent when you consider people who don't attend regularly but turn to a mosque when, for example, a family member dies. This means that about half of the Muslims in Germany have a connection to a mosque.

The *Länder* [state] governments now understand this problem and, at the federal level, the government is trying to work out recommendations for a means of ongoing cooperation with the Muslim organizations.

ZAHID NAWAZ: The reality is that governments often want a quick fix for situations and funding is seen as such a quick fix. If a community is making too much noise, the impulse is to give it funding in the expectation that money will keep things quiet.

There were community riots in the United Kingdom in the summer of 2000. A major cause was that there was too little interaction among communities, which were living polarized lives. Funding had become a source of conflict rather than a solution, because funding can pit one community against the other. As Sajida Madni has noted, there is a competitive process in the United Kingdom, with groups having to bid for funding. As a result of this process, the white community perceived all the funding as going to the Muslim community, the Sikh community thought all the community funding was going to the Muslim community, and so on. This was exploited by the racist far right. We have to face the realities on the ground and ask fundamental questions such as, is multiculturalism really working in European countries? Are we sleepwalking into segregation?

We must also reassess the belief that it is only alienation and deprivation that lead to extremism and terrorism. The terrorist attack at the Glasgow Airport was carried out by medical personnel.¹ Where was the deprivation or alienation here? We have to think beyond the theory that links deprivation and extremism, and try to understand the forces that are brainwashing innocent communities. In the process, we must distinguish between moderates and radicals. We must also look at what makes the ground fertile for such people.

AZZEDINE GACI: While the perception of Islam and Muslims is different depending on the country, there are things about which we can all agree. We know that both Muslims and governments must work to integrate European Muslims into the society. For their part, Muslims must adapt by developing a Muslim role that comports with the values of Europe. It is very important for us to develop customary law that fits Western realities. French Muslims must speak as French people,

German Muslims as German people, and British Muslims as British, and this will in no way negate their Muslim identity.

For their part, governments must allow the Muslims to worship in a way that respects their dignity. As President Nicolas Sarkozy of France famously noted, all religious people—including Muslims—must have the right to live their faith, to express it, and to transmit it to their children, and at the same time they must be able to respect national laws.² If this policy were implemented, it would ease the tension. The government must also teach about religions in school. Finally, and importantly, we must encourage interreligious dialogues, so we can learn how to live together.

PHILIPPA STRUM: The issues we have raised over the last two days certainly deserve examination in the days and years to come. Prominent among them have been, with whom or what should the government—national, state, provincial, or local—talk? How should the government identify the people and the organizations with whom or which it should be communicating? To what extent are a French Islam, a German Islam, an English Islam, and an American Islam being developed, and what are the implications of that development?

There has been talk about the importance of the younger generation. What is the new reality, and perhaps the promise, created by the fact that the younger generations may well be far better integrated than their parents and grandparents? What may be the threat, rather than the promise, in the fact that some members of the younger generation may at the same time feel confused about their identity and somewhat alienated?

Is there a tension between national policies and local policies towards Muslim communities and the differences that are faced by national governments and more local governments? What should be done about the feeling on the part of some local governments that things the national government has done—the Patriot Act and the reaction of some localities to it may be an American example—may not be helpful in their dealings with their Muslim populations?

What role can be played by non-governmental organizations, including faith-based organizations, that bring many people together? Can NGOs serve as an integrative mechanism?

We have barely begun to scratch the surface of these issues. We very much hope that some of the thoughts expressed in this program will be useful in the conversation that must continue.

NOTES

1. At least two of the people held in connection with the June 30, 2007 attack on the Glasgow International Airport were doctors. CNN.com/world, “Doctors among those detained in UK terror probes,” n.d., <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/07/01/london.alert/index.html>.

2. In an interview with the Catholic journal *La Croix*, President Sarkozy said, “Le sentiment religieux est si important qu’il faut qu’on garantisse à chacun le droit de le vivre, de l’exprimer, et de le transmettre à ses enfants” (religious belief is so important that it is necessary to guarantee all persons the right to live it, to express it, and to transmit it to their children). Nicolas Sarkozy, “La Loi de 1905 est un Monument,” *La Croix*, Apr. 4, 2007, available at <http://www.sarkozy.fr/edito/index.php?id=30>.

Participant Biographies

MOUNIR AZZAOU is a spokesman for the Green Muslims/Green Party and a political consultant. He is a member of the Working Group on Constitutional Issues at the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*) at the Federal Ministry of the Interior. He was the spokesman for the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*), an umbrella organization of Islamic confederations in Germany, 2001–2006. In 2005–2006, he was a member of the working group “Measures to Create Confidence” between security agencies and Muslim communities in cooperation with the Federal Criminal Investigation Office (*Bundeskriminalamt*) and Federal Office for protection of the constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*).

YANNICK BLANC was director of the General Police of the Prefecture of Paris from October 2005 until January 2008. He has been a senior-level administrator in the French Ministry of the Interior since 1992. As a Counselor in the cabinet of Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, from 1997–2000, M. Blanc joined M. Chevènement in launching the “Consultation of Islam in France” that was to lead to the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (*Conseil français du culte musulman* – CFCM) in 2003. He has continued to work on this project as head of the department of elections, associations and worship and has contributed, as legal expert, to the writing of the statutes and electoral regulations for the CFCM.

DOUNIA BOUZAR has been Senior Research Fellow in charge of the study *Islam and Social Work* at the Protection Judiciaire de la Jeunesse since 2001. She is also a member of the Higher Institute of National Defence and Security Studies, and was recently a research fellow at Dynamique Diversité. In 1989–2001 she was an educator of the Judiciary Protection of Youth at the Ministry of Justice. Her publications include *L'intégrisme, l'Islam et nous: on a tout faux* (Fundamentalism, Islam and us: we have got it wrong); *Quelle éducation face au radicalisme religieux?* (How to deal with religious radicalism?); *Etre musulman aujourd'hui* (Being Muslim today), recently published in its second edition; and *A la fois française et musulmane* (Being a French Muslim).

SUSAN L. DOUGLASS has served as Senior Researcher for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations initiative, and has been an Affiliated Scholar with the Council on Islamic Education (now the Institute for Religion and Civic Values) for over a decade, reviewing commercial textbooks in development and state curricula and standards. Her major publications include *World Eras: Rise and Spread of Islam, 622–1500*; teaching resources for the Council on Islamic Education and the National Center for History in the Schools; and a children's book entitled *Ramadan*. Ms. Douglass conducted the study *Teaching About Religion in National and State Social Studies Standards*. She serves on the Board of Directors of the Islamic Schools League of America and chairs the Editorial Board of *Islamic Horizons*.

AZZEDINE GACI has been President of the Regional Council for the Muslim Faith (CRCM) in Rhône Alpes since 2005, and rector of the Othmane mosque in Villeurbanne since 1990. He is also a senior lecturer at the Ecole Supérieure de Chimie Physique Electronique de Lyon (ESCPE), where he has taught optics, electronics, optical electronics, and telecommunications since 1995. He received his doctorate, with high honors, in electronic physics from the Institute National des Sciences Appliquées INSA de Lyon in 1992. His publications include *Le Noble Coran* (a French translation of the Qur'an) (2004) and *Recueil de Fatwas* (judicial opinions about Muslims in Europe) (2005). M. Gaci has been involved in Islamic-Christian dialogues for more than ten years.

BERNARD GODARD is an Advisor at the Central Office of Religions of France's Ministry of Interior. An expert on Islam, M. Godard has held that position since 2002. He was formerly the advisor on Islam for former Ministers of Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement (1997–2000) and Daniel Vaillant (2002–2004). Until 1997, he was in charge of questions concerning terrorism and Islamism in the French domestic security services. M. Godard has written several articles on Islam in France under the pseudonym Hervé Terrel. He is also co-author (with Sylvie Taussig) of *Les Musulmans en France*, which was published in France in February 2007 by Robert Laffont.

SUE GREENWALD is the Mayor of the City of Davis, California, which historically has been a leader both in implementing human relations outreach and in building sustainable communities. Mayor Greenwald has been involved in shaping and furthering these policies for over fifteen years. She was born in Washington, D.C., and holds a B.A. and M.A. in sociology from the University of California at Berkeley. She has been a member of the Davis City Council for eight years. Mayor Greenwald currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Yolo County Transportation District and the Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority as well.

MARKUS KERBER has been head of the Directorate-General "Policy Planning and International Developments" at the German Federal Ministry of the Interior since 2006. Before that, Dr. Kerber worked for GFT Technologies AG in St. Georgen. In December 1992 Dr. Kerber received a Ph.D. in social sciences (Dr.rer.soc.) from the University of Hohenheim for his dissertation on defense, the economy and international status. While at Hohenheim, he worked for 12 months as a research assistant for a pilot project sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation on defense expenditure, investments and international status. From April 1995 to March 1998 Dr. Kerber served as a director in the field of equity capital markets at Deutsche Bank AG in London.

THOMAS KUFEN has been State Commissioner of integration affairs of the government of North-Rhine Westphalia since 2005. In 2006, he became chairman of the state advisory board for questions concerning German displaced persons, GDR refugees and ethnic German immigrants. He has been Executive Vice-President of the Foundation Centre for Studies on Turkey in Essen since 2006, and is a past member of the District Council of the city of Essen North-West and deputy spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) parliamentary party. From 2000 to 2005, Herr Kufen was State Legislator of the Land North-Rhine Westphalia; from 2002 to 2005, he was a member of the executive body of the CDU parliamentary party of the North-Rhine Westphalian Parliament.

SAJIDA MADNI is a professional organizer with Birmingham Citizens, an organization of member institutions such as mosques, churches, trade unions, schools and other community institutions that are committed to working together for the common good. She graduated from the University of Birmingham at the age of 18, with honors degrees in English and theology, and went on to work as an English teacher at a large secondary school. In 2003, at the age of 23, she became Birmingham's youngest Head of Faculty in English as well as Head of the Citizenship department. In recognition of her achievements, she was awarded the "Young Alumna of the Year" award from the University of Birmingham in 2007. Ms. Madni is a member of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB).

ZAHID NAWAZ is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, under the Advanced Research Assessment Group. He is also an independent member of the West Midlands Policy Authority. He has served as Presidential Advisor to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, advising the President on Islamic affairs and on matters relating to Mediterranean security, including ways to enhance understanding between Islamic countries and the OSCEPA. Mr. Nawaz has been the director of the Urban Forum as well as a magistrate for the Birmingham Magistrates Court. His publications include *New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review: The Aftermath of 11 September 2001: Tackling Terrorism*; and "Libya's External Relations: Transformed or Transforming?"

TIM PARSONS is the Head of Race and Diversity for the City of London Police and has over 27 years' experience in law enforcement. Specializing in policing diverse and minority communities, he has taught and lectured on the subject of community engagement and community cohesion in 15 countries. Mr. Parson commissioned a comprehensive *Guide to Islam for Non-Muslims* which has been purchased by a wide range of public service providers across the United Kingdom. The recipient of a Masters degree in Education awarded by the University of Hull, Mr. Parsons is currently studying for an Education doctorate at the University of London. He is also a visiting lecturer at the London Metropolitan University.

SHAKEEL SYED is the Executive Director of the Islamic Shura Council, a federation of mosques and Muslim organizations serving more than half a million Muslims in Southern California. Mr. Syed represents the Islamic Shura Council in interfaith work, serving on the boards of several social justice organizations, and currently serves as Vice-Chair of Interfaith Communities United for Justice and Peace. He also serves as a volunteer chaplain with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Department of Homeland Security Detention Centers. Mr. Syed has appeared on national and international media outlets and has also written for and been cited in numerous local, national and international newspapers as well as by NPR, MSNBC, CNN and the BBC.

OĞUZ ÜÇÜNCÜ has been Secretary General of the Islamische Gemeinschaft [Islamic Community] Milli Görüs (IGMG) since February 2002. He has also been a member of the Board of Trustees of the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations since that year. After completing his Abitur degree in Hamm and vocational school in Dortmund, Mr. Üçüncü became a mechanical engineer. He has since been self-employed as a sales representative for construction and industrial needs and has chaired the youth group at the local IGMG branch in Hamm-Pelkum since 1986. In

1991, he became a member of the IGMG Regional Executive Youth Committee of East Westphalia and, in 1993, a member of the Executive Committee of the Youth Section of Milli Görüs Europe.

BISHOP DR. DEREK ANTHONY WEBLEY is one of the District Bishops of the New Testament Church of God with responsibility for parts of Birmingham and Solihull. Bishop Webley is also Vice Chair of the West Midlands Police Authority. He sits on the Authority's Crime Performance and Professional Standards and Quality committees and regularly acts as a media spokesperson for the Authority. In February 2006, Bishop Webley was awarded a Doctorate by the University of Central England in Birmingham for his distinguished and exemplary contribution to community relations in the West Midlands. In June 2007, he was awarded an MBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours List for his services and commitment to community relations in Birmingham/West Midlands.

HUBERT WILLIAMS is the president of the Police Foundation. He is a 30-year veteran of policing, including 11 years as police director in Newark, New Jersey. His experience in the civil disorders in Newark and his leadership as president of the Police Foundation prompted the City of Los Angeles to appoint him as deputy special advisor to the Los Angeles Police Commission in the evaluation of the police response to the civil disorder in that city in 1992. His publications include "Retrenchment, the Constitution, and Policing," "Terrorism and Local Police," and "The Threat of International Terrorism in the United States: the Police Response" (co-author). He was founding president of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives.

JONATHAN LAURENCE, co-organizer of the conference and its rapporteur, is assistant professor of political science at Boston College. He is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. and a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Prof. Laurence is the co-author of *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France* and the author of works including the International Crisis Group report on "Islam and Identity in Germany" (March 2007), an essay on Tariq Ramadan in *Foreign Affairs* (May 2007), and a book chapter entitled "Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe." Dr. Laurence was awarded the American Political Science Association's 2006 Harold D. Lasswell prize for the best dissertation in public policy.

PHILIPPA STRUM, conference co-organizer, is a Senior Scholar and former Director of the Division of United States Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center. She is also Broeklundian Professor Emerita of the City University of New York. Her books include *When the Nazis Came to Skokie: Freedom for the Speech We Hate*; *The Women Are Marching: The Second Sex in the Palestinian Revolution*; and *Presidential Power and American Democracy*. Dr. Strum was a member of the task force that produced *Strengthening America: The Civic and Political Integration of Muslim Americans*, and has edited Wilson Center publications such as *Muslims in the United States: Identity, Influence, and Innovation*; *Muslims in the United States: Demography, Beliefs, Institutions*; *Women Immigrants in the United States*; and *American Arabs and Political Participation*.

THIS PUBLICATION WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE GENEROUS SUPPORT OF

The Carnegie Corporation of New York

The Heinrich Böll Foundation

The German Information Center USA/German Embassy

“Your Source of Information on Germany,” www.germany.info; “The Week in Germany”
and “Deutschland Nachrichten,” www.germany.info/newsletter

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