Figures.

Apparently, the regime (or Ahmadinejad’s people…is there much difference at this point?) have been editing pictures of rallies held in support of Ahmadinejad to make them look bigger.

We shouldn’t be surprised.  The regime has done this before to “augment” their power (think: rocket launches).

Mir offers new reasons to question Iran result

Many are turning from skeptics to sympathizers about Iran’s election results, particularly in light of the results of Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty’s May poll, published in yesterday’s Washington Post under “The Iranian People Speak.”

Asieh Mir, a Persian scholar and Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, has written a response to this article, noting several reasons why the poll results should not be believed.  You can read her post here.

Mir makes important additions to the running list of reasons – some statistical, others circumstantial – to question the results.

Following #IranElection on Twitter

This page of tweets from and about Iran’s election is interesting to reload every few minutes. For example, it’s how I learned that the BBC has themed its site in green in solidarity with the opposition.

April 24: Muzzled Media: Coverage of the Financial Crisis in Russia

Panelists from Russian and US pro-democracy media outlets will discuss the state of free information in Russia next week:

In September 2008, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told Le Figaro that the economic crisis was a European and American phenomenon, adding, “We do not have it and I hope won’t have it.” Events soon proved him wrong. But with most of the country’s media outlets tightly controlled, Russians had few sources of independent information about a crisis that soon began to affect their daily lives. What have the people of Russia been told by their media about the financial crisis? What does the lack of a free press mean for Russians as they confront declining living standards after years of relative prosperity? Will the Kremlin’s model of muzzled media and managed democracy survive the crisis?

Dmitry Sidorov (Kommersant), Daniel Kimmage, Andrei Sitov (ITAR-TASS) and Brian Whitmore (RFE/RL) will discuss these questions at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Washington headquarters, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, 4th Floor from 9:30-11:00 AM on Thursday, April 30. Moderated by David Satter (Hudson Institute and SAIS). Co-sponsored by Georgetown’s Democracy and Governance program.

It should be an interesting event for anyone intrigued by Russia Today’s US-directed propaganda and “Russia Now,” RT’s periodic paid insert in the Washington Post.

Multivector foreign policies

One concern of this blog is authoritarian cooperation. This refers to the coordinated international strategies that authoritarian governments use to keep power.

This is an excellent post about an example of that. Foreign Minister Lavrov is on record speaking about Russia’s deepening ties with populist governments in Latin America. These governments are in power because their predecessors’ “neoliberal recipes” failed to deliver on popular expectations. Their relations with Russia are based on “mutual advantage,” not ideology. Yet Russia is not seeking a Latin American sphere of influence or fomenting a new Cold War. These ties are the result of a “multivector” foreign policy, which globalization makes necessary.

Putin-Chavez summits must represent just one vector.

So what is a multivector foreign policy? Apparently Kyrgyzstan has one too. Here is one definition:

Any multivector policy is always a balance, and not always simple and easy. Kyrgyz diplomats in their assignments routinely received directions to maintain good relations with one partner without sacrificing relations with others. Multivector policies imply eschewing exclusiveness and special “spheres of influence.”

According to Gregory Gleason for RFE/RL, Kyrgyzstan’s multivector foreign policy is coming apart. President Bakiev realizes that, to stay president, he has to pick one vector and abandon others:

It may be that the unraveling of Kyrgyzstan’s multivectoral policy is less a decision of choice than an act of desperation. Bakiev is facing formidable challenges as he seeks to defend his administration from internal opposition, respond to the difficulties of the global economic downturn, and secure support from the most influential foreign partner in the Eurasian region.

Venezuela’s constitutional referendum

Last weekend, Venezuela’s new constitution won 54% approval at referendum. On one hand, it overturns term limits for all elected officials in Venezuela, especially Hugo Chavez. Many analysts therefore called the referendum a plebiscitary sanction for Chavez’s indefinite rule. On the other hand, the new constitution grants numerous social and economic rights. Moreover, progressive academics from Europe and South America helped draft it. This has led others to denounce the critics as reactionaries.

For instance, alleging a “US media campaign against Venezuela,” the country’s foreign minister lashed out against DC-based editorial pages:

Both editorials belittle Venezuelan citizens by portraying them as sheep unable to act unless motivated by bribery or punishment, incapable of judging whether or not it is in their interest to approve an amendment that would allow public officials to run for reelection for consecutive terms.

What, then, are we dealing with in Venezuela? Did professors’ magnanimous technical assistance undo prohibitions on pro-poor policy? Or is the new constitution our latest case of authoritarian upgrading?

In answering the question, a few points are worth keeping in mind:

1) 54% means an eight point margin of victory. That is not very large. One might explain eight points in terms of a “sheep” effect, to which the Foreign Minister alludes, in terms of performance legitimacy, or in terms of both.

2) As one former Venezuelan politician and social scientist notes, how could the people say no to “expanding the political rights of the citizens as a whole?” This time, the term limit repeal was a rider. When Chavez lost a referendum the last time, socioeconomic rights weren’t part of the package.

3) Most of the numerous, new rights are not enforcible anyway. I would be surprised if Chavez can guarantee free water and education for all – let alone build the infrastructure – as falling oil prices erode “petrosocialism.”

4) As “petrosocialism” becomes less buoyant, Chavez may face a crisis of legitimacy. If his performance legitimacy wanes, desire for a change of government will increase, and term limits would be instrumental in getting one. That instrument is gone.

3) Chavez’s democratic credentials are thin. He attempted a coup in 1992.

4) And procedual democracy has steadily eroded under his tenure.

Those who conclude the new, “Bolivarian” constitution attacks injustice are naive. This is an authoritarian upgrade. Chavez has made impossible promises in return for consent to his continuation in power. If political rights continue to fray in Venezuela, we should not be surprised when he dubiously wins a legal third term in 2013.

Conference: Globalizing Autocracy, US Foreign Policy, and Democracy Assistance

Wednesday, December 10, 2008
2:00 to 5:00 PM
National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC

Democracy is in decline. More troubling, authoritarian regimes are coordinating to suppress political freedom at home and abroad. What are the implications of these strategies for U.S. foreign policy and democracy assistance programs?

Conference Agenda:

2:00-3:20: Causes and Consequences of Authoritarian Globalization

• Dan Brumberg, Georgetown University and US Institute of Peace
• Larry Diamond, National Endowment for Democracy and Hoover Institution
• Tom Melia, Freedom House
• Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

3:20-3:30 Refreshments

3:30-5:00: Challenges for Democracy Assistance Programs

• Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Michelle Dunne, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Gerald Hyman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Carina Perelli, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Please RSVP. Space is limited.

Georgia result

Via IFES, the AP reports “a nearly complete vote count from Wednesday’s election indicates Saakashvili’s party will hold about 120 of the Parliament’s 150 seats.”

Last week I wrote that electoral “reforms” in Georgia were not actually reformist. While March legislation lowered the threshold for entering parliament from 7 to 5 percent, simultaneous decreases in the total number of seats and proportion of them elected under PR would be new hurdles for small parties. Reform, in other words, would benefit Saakashvili, not his opponents.

Now the main opposition party is threatening to boycott its mere 14 seats. Coverage of protests keeps pointing at fraud, but the electoral rules appear to have been the main source of opposition squeeze.

Glancing at preliminary results from the nominal tier, the ruling United National Movement is the clear leader in most districts. Yet it frequently has less than a majority, and other parties sometimes have sizable vote shares. In the list tier, the UNM is reported to have won 61 percent of votes.

Recall that one “reform” reduced the share of PR seats from 100 to 75. If one considers that no election was held under original provisions for the 150-member parliament, “reform” actually reduced the PR share from 150 of 235 seats at the 2004 election to 75 of 150 today.

The net effect of “reform” was less proportional representation and more first-past-the-post, regardless of what Saakashvili did to the PR threshold. That’s how he’s winning 80 percent of seats on 61 percent of votes.

Georgia votes: lower threshold but lower magnitude

RFE/RL optimistically reports that Georgian president Saakashvili has reduced the threshold from 7 to 5 percent for the list tier of that country’s parliamentary elections. Of course, today’s elections are for a much smaller parliament with far fewer seats elected under PR rules than in 2004. Despite the optimism, this probably will result in a smaller opposition seat share.

Since winning reelection, a seemingly humbled Saakashvili has taken pains to show that he understands the mood of both the electorate and the opposition, enacting a series of electoral reforms his supporters say are meant to boost confidence in the elections.

What “humbled” Saakashvili was his “close call in [a] snap presidential election four months ago,” according to the news service. Yet he won with over 53 percent, 18 points ahead of the runner-up. Such is his standard for competitiveness.

As usual, the details of the new system depend on the source. The overall picture since 2004 is fewer seats in general and fewer elected proportionally.

According to the electoral law, last updated 17-12-07, 50 members are elected in single-member districts and 100 are elected from party lists (Art. 91). The threshold was 7 percent, and seat allocation is by Hare quota with largest remainder (Art. 105).

IFES’ Election Guide says the 2004 elections proceeded with 75 single-member districts, 150 list seats and 10 seats reserved to “displaced persons.” Via ACE Project, the same organization says this is the system in place. The 2008 Election Guide entry, however, reports a 150-seat parliament with 75 list and 75 district seats. That is consonant with RFE/RL’s report and others.

Angus-Reid has a good description of the politics of the electoral law. Saakashvili’s allies in parliament approved the 75-75 system on March 21, with opposition leaders balking in favor of the 50-100 system, which is the one on the books as published.

Reuters, via the Washington Post, says opposition leaders accuse the president of “rigging” the elections. More problematic than outright fraud, it seems, is a lack of basic agreement (even clarity?) on the details of seat allocation.

It flies in the face of cynical reason to think the president would increase opposition prospects in response to his own electoral “close call.” More important than reducing the threshold to 5 percent, an opposition-inclusive reform, is reducing the PR tier from 150 to 75 seats, which is opposition-exclusive. A glance at the 2004 results-by-region at Electoral Geography shows why. Saakashvili’s National Movement polled an average 69.4 percent. The median share for his party was 71.8 percent. The overall effect of “reform,” I suspect, will be to further weaken opposition. The more small districts, the more seats for Saakashvili. Reducing average district magnitude is what matters here. Lowering the threshold is an empty gesture.

A closer look at 2007’s “democratic recession”

Thomas Friedman in last Wednesday’s NY Times argued America’s oil dependence and declining soft power – but mostly oil dependence – are driving a global “democratic recession.” I’m sympathetic to the concern about oil but not the logic. One, state weakness has raised the costs of freedom in some places. Two, autocrats are simply more sophisticated when it comes to keeping power. Three, and most important, the ‘developed’ democracies have not consistently supported democrats abroad. My working conclusion: soft power is indeed waning for reasons both structural and intentional.

Friedman cites the Freedom House index for 2008. Attention to where and why ratings fell reveals a more complex causal narrative.

Military interventions in democratic politics drove down ratings in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Faulty, stolen or generally unfree elections affected the Comorros, Kenya, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Russia.

Political violence rocked Sri Lanka, Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Insurgency or generally rising insecurity eroded freedom in the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Afghanistan.

Media crackdowns drove down ratings in Georgia, Mali, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela and, arguably, the Solomon Islands, where governing authorities refused to address criticism related to a cabinet appointment.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and organization increased in Burma, Lesotho and Venezuela.

Whether by violence, intimidation or dubious institutional reengineering, executives eroded checks and balances in Malawi, Nicaragua, Kazakhstan and Egypt.

Overt opposition crackdowns took place in Congo-Kinshasa, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Syria.

Corruption and the entrenchment of economic oligarchies diminished freedom in Chad, Latvia, the Philippines, Tunisia, Burma, Madagascar and Somalia.

In Switzerland, the election of overt racists merited demotion.

Government paralysis earned negative points in Lebanon.

The infiltration of state and military by drug cartels drove down ratings for Guinea-Bissau.

While Freedom House’s executive summary does mention oil in two other places, only in Chad does it cite falling transparency in the “management of oil revenues.”

Next year’s report no doubt will cite eroding executive-legislative relations in Russia, a(n attempted?) stolen election in Zimbabwe, and whatever dubious constitutional amendments, opposition crackdowns, exiles and media shutdowns the remainder of 2008 brings. It will be interesting to see how Chinese ‘foreign aid’ packages and the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation figure in.

Overall, freedom declined in 38 nominal democracies. The dominant sources of backslide were corruption, media and opposition crackdowns, state weakness, deliberate election mismanagement and entrenchments of executive power.

Oil dependence is a big problem for the US and even the rest of the world, but it is not the principal driver of “democratic recession.” Alongside more structural problems of uneven economic development and state capacity are growing gaps between flagship democracies’ missions to spread freedom and their wills and means to do so. On one hand, emphasis on stability is replacing their post-Cold War emphasis on democratization. On the other, aid conditionality loses efficacy as rising authoritarian states like China and Russia reach out to Africa and Central Asia.

If democracy is to boom in the last seven months of 2008, the old democracies need to (1) renew their commitment to democratization and (2) cooperate to balance the soft power of authoritarian alternatives.