Throughout the summer and fall of 2007, members of Lebanon's ruling March 14 coalition traveled the world to drum up support for an ambitious plan to elect one of their own as successor to outgoing President Emile Lahoud, under a controversial interpretation of the constitution that contravenes over six decades of Lebanese political practice. American and European officials embraced the plan, while Western journalists soft-pedaled its implications. Even the UN's chief Middle East envoy publicly endorsed this new reading of the requisite parliamentary quorum for electing the president.

In the end, however, many in the ruling coalition balked at taking an action widely hyped in Western capitals as a (re)birth right of Lebanon's democracy.[1] This hesitation was not a reaction to the Syrian-American rapprochement on display at the Annapolis conference (on the contrary, it preceded and facilitated the latter). In a deeply fragmented country held together mainly by elite consensus and political tradition, violating a longstanding constitutional precedent would have been a blind leap into the unknown irrespective of international public opinion.

For all of the bellicose rhetoric and brinksmanship that characterize Lebanese politics, a kind of procedural fidelity has managed to survive decades of war and occupation, a vestige of a more civilized era (and perhaps a collective remembrance of life without laws). In short, rules matter in Lebanese politics. Both the continuing evolution of Lebanon's political crisis and the implications of its ultimate resolution are unintelligible without a basic understanding of the country's unique political system and the constraints it imposes on the players.

Consociationalism and Democracy

Lebanon is governed less by explicit constitutional provisions than by a body of political traditions reflecting elite consensus over the years. The 1926 constitution said very little about the nuts and bolts of Lebanon's sectarian power-sharing system. It was the informal 1943 National Pact that reserved the presidency for Maronite Christians, the office of prime minister for Sunni Muslims, and (a few years later) the office of parliament speaker for Shiite Muslims, while apportioning parliament seats according to a fixed sectarian quota. This informal understanding became the cornerstone of Lebanon's consociational democracy, cemented only by longstanding political precedence.

Lebanese consociationalism, as historian Theodor Hanf has aptly noted, is a political system in which "important decisions cannot be taken by simple majority" and "in effect, every large community has a right of veto."[2] This principle, implied in the National Pact, is reinforced by constitutional provisions that require balanced sectarian representation in the cabinet and coordination among the governing "troika" to promulgate law. Assuming that elected representatives act as guardians of core communal interests (at least in moments of national crisis), Lebanon cannot be governed legitimately for very long if one of its three main sects is profoundly alienated from the rest of the country.

Although the concept of minoritarian veto power (or, more euphemistically, "consensual democracy") is somewhat at variance with the majoritarian ethos of Western democracies, it is central to the logic of consociationalism. The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, has a clause that enables each of the three co-presidents (representing Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs) to block any government decision deemed to be "destructive of the vital interests" of his/her constituents.[3]

The vital interest provisions in Lebanon's constitution are somewhat less explicit, but similar in scope. Article 65 requires the approval of two-thirds of cabinet ministers named in the decree forming the cabinet for legislation involving "basic national issues," a broad appellation as defined in the text (ranging from Grade One civil service appointments to the annual budget). Moreover, the cabinet cannot legally convene without a two-thirds quorum. In addition, Article 69 states that a cabinet is automatically dissolved if it loses more than one-third of the members specified in the decree forming it. These provisions allow a "one-third plus one" or "blocking" minority to effectively obstruct the functioning of government either by refusing to attend cabinet meetings or by resigning en masse to force the dissolution of the cabinet.

Although quorum denial and boycotts are understood to be methods legitimately used only in exceptional circumstances, they have become common instruments of Lebanese politics during the past three decades of (arguably exceptional) civil war and foreign occupation. The implicit threat of such tactics has heavily influenced how coalition governments are formed and how they function (very often not for the better).

During their occupation of Lebanon, the Syrians made sure that all cabinets had at least a blocking minority of ministers who owed their shirts (politically speaking) to Damascus. This was readily apparent from 2000 to 2004, when the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's economic liberalization program was derailed by ministers close to President Emile Lahoud. This highlighted a glaring drawback of the consociationalism - any minority of ministers, not just those representing an embattled sectarian group (as imagined by the writers of the constitution), can effectively veto cabinet functions, even if they are a motley assortment of opportunists beholden to a foreign government.

The Presidency

Under the First Republic (1943-1989), the presidency was the most powerful executive office and a symbol of Christian privilege. However, the 1989 Taif Accord (and associated constitutional amendments) transferred most of its prerogatives wholly or partially to other governmental actors. The president still designates the prime minister, but after "binding" parliamentary consultations (Article 53). He (or she) can issue executive decrees, only now they must be "countersigned" by the prime minister. He still has the power to negotiate treaties, but "in agreement" with his Sunni counterpart (Article 52). He can "request the reconsideration" of laws passed by parliament, but has no formal veto power. In short, president has virtually no ability to promulgate anything on his own.[4]

The only real power retained by the stripped down office derives from an apparent technicality - the president's signature is still required to promulgate a broad spectrum of government decisions falling under the authority of other branches. This may have been intended less to qualify his loss of power than to make it superficially more palatable to Christian deputies during the Taif negotiations, but a strict reading of the constitution allows an uncooperative president to greatly obstruct the normal functioning of government. Consequently, he can wield considerable influence (for good or ill) simply by bargaining away his approval on everything that requires his signature.

At least this was how it worked during the "era of Syrian tutelage." With no prior historical reference for the post-Taif presidency, this precedent is hardly the final word on interpretation of the president's powers. Nevertheless, the ambiguity made it very difficult for the ruling March 14 coalition to govern the country alongside Lahoud after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. Although it's not entirely clear what happens if the president refuses to cosign the decree establishing a cabinet of which he disapproves, the coalition did not want to find out and Lahoud won cabinet positions for three of his close supporters, despite having no parliamentary strength of his own (true to form in the mercurial world of Lebanese politics, two of them subsequently defected to March 14). In addition, Lahoud was able to prevent the coalition from unilaterally purging the judiciary and military officer corps (both of which were heavily vetted by the Syrians during the occupation).

Interestingly, while most traditional Maronite political and religious leaders have been generally supportive of the March 14 coalition, they have staunchly opposed its attempts to circumvent Lahoud's authority, fearing that the political precedent and loss of institutional prestige would permanently weaken the last vestiges of Christian executive privilege. In their view, no short-term political gain was worth taking this long-term existential risk.

Presidential Elections

Significantly, the Lebanese president is elected not by popular vote, but by parliament - a process somewhat analogous to the selection of the prime minister and parliament speaker. While the three leading political offices (collectively known as the "troika") are distributed by sect, the specific occupants are chosen by representatives of the entire nation (a distinct feature of the Lebanese consociational model). Most Christians have embraced this process because it normally gives them a greater voice in choosing the president than would a direct popular election. Their allotment of parliament seats (even after Taif reduced it to half) has always substantially exceeded their declining demographic strength.

However, an important political tradition arose that effectively prevented the election of a president purely on the strength of Christian legislative power - the requirement of a two-thirds parliamentary quorum in presidential elections. In practice, this has meant that a blocking minority of parliamentary deputies can obstruct the election of a president if they feel their vital interests are at stake.

The two-thirds parliamentary quorum requirement in electing the president is not explicitly mandated in the constitution. The only direct mention of any parliamentary quorum is in Article 34, which reads that "the Chamber is not validly constituted unless the majority of the total membership is present." However, because Article 75 of the constitution emphasizes that parliament is "considered an electoral body and not a legislative assembly" when it meets to elect the president, most prominent legal scholars agree that Article 34 is not applicable.[5]

The rather convoluted textual justification for a two-thirds quorum begins with Article 49(2) of the Lebanese constitution:

The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a two-thirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority shall be sufficient.[6]

Because a two-thirds majority is required to win the first ballot, the reasoning goes, the necessity of a two-thirds quorum to convene the first ballot is implied. Therefore, if two-thirds of the deputies are not present when parliament convenes to elect the president, a first ballot cannot be held and the door to election of the president by majority vote alone in subsequent ballots remains closed.

Article 49 was probably not intended to establish minority veto power over the election of presidents, at least not as a routine instrument of politics. At most it was intended to create a check on majoritarian control presidency subject to further refinement, an "escape hatch" to be legitimately used only in exceptional circumstances when the unity of the nation is threatened. This became the prevailing interpretation less because of textual wording than because of Lebanese political tradition.

The two-thirds quorum requirement was respected in all 11 of Lebanon's post-independence presidential elections, despite often severe security conditions and the perilous political vacuum that loomed as a consequence of failing to secure an orderly succession. In 1976, leftist Muslim militias shelled parliament in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent a quorum from convening to elect a new president. In 1982, Muslim MPs failed to muster a large enough boycott to prevent the election of the late Bashir Gemayel (in both cases, the first session called to the elect the president was postponed for lack of a quorum).

In August 1988, most Christian deputies failed to attend a session called to elect a successor to President Amine Gemayel, in large part because Samir Geagea's Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia barred the way. This prevented a quorum and blocked the election of a pro-Syrian (and American-backed) candidate supported by most Muslim MPs, leading to a presidential vacuum and the birth of two rival cabinets. What had previously served as a check on Christian legislative supremacy now functioned as a hedge against non-Christian and foreign "appointment" of the president. This turnabout became even more pronounced after the reduction of Christian legislative strength under the Taif Accord. Since more Christians are elected in Muslim majority districts than vice versa (particularly during and since the Syrian occupation), quorum denial is seen as the only way for deputies elected on the strength of Christian votes to prevent the others from "appointing" a weak and pliable president.

The Current Standoff

Although the March 14 coalition won a slim majority of the seats in the May/June 2005 parliamentary elections, it failed to win a two-thirds "super-majority" due its trouncing by Michel Aoun's FPM in predominantly Christian districts and the sweep of Shiite districts by Hezbollah and Amal.[7] In Lebanon's political system this distinction is critical. Lack of a supermajority not only ruled out impeaching Lahoud without the consent of other political forces, but denied the coalition carte blanche to choose his successor.

The current political dispute in Lebanon was originally centered around the ruling March 14 coalition's refusal to form a national unity government (in Lebanese lexicon, a government with a blocking opposition minority) with the opposition, led by the Shiite Islamist Hezbollah movement and the secular Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which together with their allies control 45% of parliament. Recalling the futility of supporting Hariri's "reforms" with a Lahoudist minority blocking cabinet votes, Western governments were invariably sympathetic to this stance.

However, refusing to form a national unity cabinet precipitated the resignation of all Shiite ministers (and one Lahoudist Christian) from the cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in November 2006. This brought the cabinet into conflict with Article 95, which stipulates that "confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the formation of the Cabinet." In addition, the preamble states, "There shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the pact of communal coexistence."

Although the opposition's claim that this renders the Shiite-less cabinet illegal is questionable (Article 95 says only that the formation of cabinets must be representative), a confessionally imbalanced government is little more than a transitional caretaker administration even under the most permissive reading of the constitution - legal, but not fully legitimate. Most Lebanese consider such a government unacceptable unless internal or external conditions make it impossible to correct the balance.

While Hezbollah's arms and foreign ties are disconcerting to many Lebanese, most do not consider a state of affairs that has prevailed for decades to be a sufficiently extenuating circumstance to justify such a sweeping departure from Lebanon's constitutional tradition. The Hariri family's relations with Saudi Arabia and the influx of Gulf arms and financing into the Sunni-dominated Internal Security Forces (ISF) are equally disconcerting to many Lebanese,[8] as is the Bush administration's talk of a "strategic partnership" with the Lebanese army.[9] Whatever the foreign sponsorship scorecard may be (and it is worth recalling that the FPM has no foreign ties and an antipathy toward Damascus), it is neither new nor confined to the Shiite community.

Although the Siniora government's confessional imbalance could have been superficially remedied through the appointment of new ministers, few (if any) prominent Shiite public figures were willing to defy Hezbollah's boycott of the cabinet. The appointment of fringe anti-Hezbollah Shiite figures would have exacerbated sectarian tensions, while doing little to bolster its perceived legitimacy. For this reason, Siniora refused either to accept the resignations of the departing ministers or to appoint new ones. This constitutional albatross is central to understanding why many in the ruling coalition are reluctant to be seen as flouting the constitution on the presidential election.

The Election

From the minute the 2005 election returns came in, everyone understood that the quorum was going to be a problem when Lahoud's term expired. Although the FPM's Christian popular vote triumph did not translate into a majority of Christian seats (due to Syria's embedding of many Christian communities in majority Muslim districts), this hardly mattered to Aoun. Insisting that he was the people's choice to be president, the former general let it be known early on that he would obstruct the ascension of anyone else.

After the FPM forged a joint opposition front with Hezbollah/Amal in 2006, the March 14 coalition faced a blocking minority in parliament clearly intent on influencing the election of the president. Although Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah endorsed Aoun's candidacy, both were willing to accept either the election of a consensus candidate who they (or their masses of supporters) could influence or the election of a March 14 candidate for a two-year interim presidency until new parliamentary elections are held in 2009 (which they expect to handily win).

Naturally, those in the March 14 coalition who oppose such compromises found a sympathetic ear in the Bush administration, which hoped to secure the election of a president committed to implementing UN resolutions calling for disarmament of Hezbollah. The only conceivable way to achieve this (for Hezbollah and the FPM would clearly not accept such a candidate) was by violating the traditional two-thirds quorum requirement. Geagea and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (both neoconservative favorites) aggressively campaigned for March 14 MPs to convene (with or without the consent of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri) and elect their own candidate by simple majority if the opposition refused to agree on an acceptable president. Normally, the admissibility of such a move would be reviewed by the Constitutional Council, but this body has been defunct for two years owing to the failure of Siniora and Lahoud to agree upon its composition.

As negotiations between March 14 and the opposition repeatedly deadlocked in the months preceding the expiration of Lahoud's term, Western support for a half-plus-one election grew. Although American officials initially sidestepped questions about the quorum ("It's your constitution," Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman replied when asked by a Lebanese reporter),[10] they were presumably instrumental in persuading UN Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen to declare in September that an "absolute majority" is sufficient to elect the president in the absence of a two-thirds quorum.[11] Although UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon hastened to explain that Roed-Larsen's personal opinion "should not be viewed as an official position of the United Nations," [12] French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner dropped his own (somewhat ambiguous) bombshell a few days later. "Why not?" he replied when asked if he supports the election of a president by simple majority, before cautiously adding that Article 49 is "not very clear" and should be redrafted.[13] Clearly, the March 14 coalition could count on Western support should it proceed with a "half-plus-one" (the slightly pejorative Lebanese slang for simple majority) election. "Countries that support such a president should send their armies to protect him," Aoun fired back.[14]

However, Jumblatt, Geagea, and their American backers faced a vexing Catch-22 in pushing for an election without the two-thirds quorum. Given the scale of the political precedent being overturned, the plan would have a prayer of working out only if a highly credible figure served as president. However, respected Christian figures in the coalition were apprehensive about serving as a "half-plus-one president." All of the presidential aspirants wanted to be a comprise candidate accepted by the opposition in exchange for other concessions (such as a national unity government), not a divisive figurehead. When Boutros Harb declared his candidacy in August, he called it "conditional," pledging to "pull out of the race if politicians fail to reach a common understanding on the quorum."[15] Nassib Lahoud introduced himself as "the candidate of the full quorum." [16]

While the bombastic rhetoric of Jumblatt and Geagea about an absolute majority quorum may have been intended primarily to strengthen the coalition's leverage in negotiations over a compromise candidate, it was never clear who they could credibly threaten to install if the opposition refused an acceptable compromise. Speculation ranged from Geagea himself to Johnny Abdo (a close associate of the late Hariri), but a Christian hardliner or staunch Hariri loyalist would never have been able to transcend the stigma of a half-plus-one ascension. It is rumored that Nassib Lahoud was willing to step into the role if necessary, but he never confirmed this publicly (even after declaring his support for a half-plus-one election). Geagea's warning that the opposition would "regret" rejecting the declared March 14 candidates was empty bluster.

At a minimum, any credible candidate for a half-plus-one ascension would have needed the patriarch of the Maronite church, Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, to bless the process. Toward this end, Washington and its allies repeatedly tried persuading Sfeir to declare that a quorum of two-thirds is not needed, but to no avail. On the contrary, he publicly declared that a two-thirds quorum is required (albeit while urging the opposition not to boycott) and repeatedly emphasized that there was no alternative to a consensus president. Once again, while sympathetic to the political goals of the March 14 coalition, traditional Maronite leaders remained unwilling to sanction any infringement on the institution of the presidency.

A second possible method of bolstering the legitimacy of a fifty-plus one election presented itself in August with a parliamentary by-election to fill the seat of the recently assassinated Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel. The father of the deceased, former President Amine Gemayel, was running for the seat in his home district, against a virtually unknown FPM candidate, and before an overwhelmingly Christian electorate that is both anti-Syrian and accepting of political primogeniture. After billing the struggle as a referendum on the March 14 coalition (and implicitly its right to choose the next president), Gemayel narrowly lost. Since no credible claim to be implementing the will of the Christian people could now be made in pushing forward with a fifty-plus-one presidency, the idea rapidly lost steam.

Even within the ruling coalition, there were voices of dissent. Most notably, former Justice Minister Bahij Tabbara (a leading member of Hariri's Future Movement) publicly expressed his support for the two-thirds quorum requirement.[17] Outraged by such dissent, Jumblatt declared that anyone in the coalition who thinks of compromising on the presidency is a traitor to be "condemned morally and politically." [18]

In the last weeks of Lahoud's term, Bush administration officials appeared to drop their pretense of neutrality on the quorum, though the wording was again surprisingly careful. "[I]n many democracies, the president gets elected by a majority, and the constitution of Lebanon allows that," said U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad when asked about the quorum (a perfectly true statement that deftly skirted the quorum issue).[19] Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch echoed Khalilzad in testimony before Congress, explaining that two previous Lebanese presidential elections were decided by "the barest absolute majority of votes" (also true, but they met the two-thirds quorum requirement). [20]

This pattern of stopping a hair short of actually endorsing a violation of the quorum requirement is somewhat puzzling, as an unambiguous endorsement might have had a greater impact in Lebanon. At any rate, the main US concern was to discourage concessions by March 14. Noting that "there's a lot of talk right now about compromise in Lebanon," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that the coalition should not be forced into accepting "extraconstitutional measures,"[21] an oblique reference to the constitutional amendments that would be needed either for Gen. Michel Suleiman (at that time the leading prospective compromise candidate) to fill the post (sitting high-ranking civil servants are not allowed to run for election) or for a two-year interim presidency (Aoun's preferred resolution).

Some Western media outlets chimed in by characterizing the two-thirds quorum as an opposition demand rather than a longstanding precedent. The New York Times went a step further by informing its readers (incorrectly) that "the constitution would allow the governing coalition to elect its candidate" in the ten days preceding the end of Lahoud's term. [22] The paper was apparently referring to Article 73, which stipulates that parliament "meets of its own accord" to elect the president on the tenth day preceding the incumbent's departure if the speaker has not summoned it for this purpose. However, Article 73 says nothing about a quorum. While some legal experts have argued that the text is clearly intended to prevent a vacancy in the office and therefore implies flexibility on the quorum, the matter is heavily disputed.[23]

The coalition's hesitation to unilaterally push forward with a half-plus-one election was reinforced by the recognition that Lahoud could respond with his own "counter coup." For months, the president had threatened to appoint an interim cabinet to govern the country if March 14 MPs refused to elect a legitimate successor before his term expired. The legality of such a move was very dubious, as Article 62 of the constitution stipulates that the president's powers are temporarily transferred to the cabinet should the office become vacant. While Article 53 allows the president to "issue, on his own authority, the decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or considering it resigned," the labored wording of the clause suggests ceremonial authority (not the ability to unilaterally dissolve a sitting cabinet). Under this scenario, Lahoud would have convened "binding consultations" with parliament afterwards, but these would have been boycotted by March 14 members, enabling him to appoint a new, rival cabinet of his choosing. Whether Lahoud was really willing to fall on his sword politically (for he would have been branded an international pariah) is unclear, but such a move would have been viable only if the coalition first rocked the constitutional boat with a fifty-plus-one election.

With parts of the capital already a commercial ghost town due to the July/August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and a sprawling opposition sit-in that just entered its second year, the so-called "two governments" scenario was a nightmare for anyone who had major economic interests in Lebanon. Although March 14 ideologues and fringe political leaders were willing to risk this scenario, support for a fifty-plus-one election among the commercial elite never approached the kind of critical mass that would have been needed to press forward (even if there had been a viable candidate). The opposition was well aware of this fact, but it largely escaped most outside observers unaccustomed to deciphering Lebanese political rhetoric.

It appears that an understanding was worked out under which Hariri (pressured, perhaps, by the Egyptians and Saudis) committed to respecting the two-thirds quorum requirement in exchange for Lahoud's quiet departure. At any rate, the president stepped down without incident on November 23 and the powers of the vacant presidency automatically transferred to the cabinet. Once a unilateral election of the president was off the table, Hariri quickly recognized that Suleiman - a pillar of the Lebanese security apparatus during the occupation who had since earned a reputation for political neutrality and competence - was the only viable compromise candidate and instructed his allies to say so publicly.

This apparent concession didn't break the political log jam, as the opposition has demanded agreement over the formation of a national unity government and a new electoral law before accepting the ascension of Suleiman. Aoun simply doesn't see an "equidistant" president as a March 14 concession (in his view, this has always been the best the coalition could conceivably hope for).

In hopes of jumpstarting support for a half-plus-one election within the coalition (or, slightly more realistically, bolstering the perceived threat of one) Washington finally made an unambigous public endorsement of a new quorum requirement, this time from none other than President George W. Bush himself. "Majority plus one ought to determine who the president is," he said on December 20 (adopting the lexicon familiar to Lebanese), "and when that happens, the world ought to embrace the president."[24]

Although this and subsequent expressions of support for a fifty-plus one election are undoubtedly encouraging the Geagea/Jumblatt wing of the coalition to reject compromises acceptable to Hariri, they do not appear to be winning over a broad enough coalition of vested interests in favor of taking the risk. At any rate, the opposition appears unconcerned by the threat of a fifty-plus-one election (indeed, some may prefer that the coalition embark on such a risky adventure over a prolongation of the standoff).

That Aoun and Nasrallah should use the system's minoritarian checks to thwart the coalition is ironic, as they represent two ideologies (secular nationalism and Shiite Islamism) that are among the least compatible with consociationalism. Some supporters of the coalition view an opposition veto as a perversion of this ideal. Others go further, questioning the viability of vital interest fail-safes altogether. "The principle that decisions ha[ve] to derive from sectarian unanimity," writes one prominent pro-March 14 analyst, is a recipe for "permanent stalemate."[25]

However, while lowest common denominator consensus on basic national issues doesn't make for bold or innovative government, it provides a modicum of stability by preserving what are perceived to be the vital interests of each major community. During times of unrest, the Lebanese state is expected to carefully operate within this consensus precisely because it rules out bold unilateralism by whatever political coalition has captured power at the moment. As vexing as the current political stalemate may be, this is a tradeoff most Lebanese are still willing to make.

Notes

  [1] The Los Angeles Times echoed the sentiments of many Western observers in calling the March 14 coalition's abrupt acceptance of Gen. Michel Suleiman as Lebanon's new president a "perplexing twist." "A leader for Lebanon; Beirut's top general, who has ties to Syria and Hezbollah, is in line to be president. Will democracy follow?" The Los Angeles Times, 30 November 2007.
  [2] Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline and Rise of a Nation (IB Taurus: London, 1993), p. 73.
  [3] The veto must be ratified by a two-thirds majority of his "home" parliament (primarily representatives of his own ethnicity). See Samuel Issacharoff, "Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Fall 2004).
  [4] The office is not, as one Western media outlet reported, the "top authority" in Lebanon's government (except in the most symbolic sense of the term). "Presidential Election Has Lebanese Parties In a Bitter Struggle," The Washington Post, 24 September 2007.
  [5] For a good overview of thinking on this issue by the late constitutional expert Edmond Rabbat, former Minister of Justice Bahij Tabbarah, and former judge Abdo Oueidat, see Issam Michael Saliba, Lebanon: Presidential Election and the Conflicting Constitutional Interpretations, The Law Library of Congress, accessed 21 November 2007.
  [6] As translated by Paul E. Salem, The Beirut Review, No. 1 (1991). Available online at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/le00000_.html
  [7] Even this bare majority was possible only because of Hezbollah's endorsement of the March 14 electoral slate. As The New York Times noted, "the endorsement of the Shiite Hezbollah party was critical for the opposition (Jumblatt) slate" in Baabda-Aley, where the number of Shiite voters was substantially larger than the coalition's margin of victory. [See "Returning Lebanese General Stuns Anti-Syria Alliance," The New York Times, 14 June 2005]. Hezbollah's endorsement also prevented rival Sunni politicians from effectively mobilizing the Arab nationalist current against the Hariri family, which was a factor in several mixed Sunni-Christian districts of north Lebanon.
  [8] Shiites comprise less than 10% of new recruits into the ISF. It is "seen as a sectarian Sunni force," said former United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) spokesman Timur Goksel (now a professor of public administration at the American University in Beirut). "Not just the Shiites say it, but the Christians too: that it's to make up for the lack of a Sunni militia." See "Lebanon builds up security forces; The move is seen as a bid to counter Iran and Shiite ally Hezbollah," The Los Angeles Times, 1 December 2006. See also "West helps Lebanon build militia to fight Hezbollah," The Globe and Mail (Canada), 1 December 2006.
  [9] "U.S. to Build 'Strategic Partnership' with Lebanese Army," The Associated Press, 19 October 2007.
  [10] "Feltman Plays Coy About US Position on How To Fill Lahoud's Post; Interpretation is up To Lebanese: This is your Constitution, Not Ours," The Daily Star (Beirut), 31 August 2007.
  [11] "Sfeir condemns foreign meddling," The Daily Star (Beirut), 14 September 2007.
  [12] Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, The United Nations, 18 September 2007.
  [13] "Kouchner hails 'renewed dialogue' in Lebanon," The Daily Star (Beirut), 14 September 2007.
  [14] "Who's for president?" The Economist, 29 September 2007.
  [15] "Harb ties run for presidency to consensus on quorum," The Daily Star (Beirut), 31 August 2007.
  [16] Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 26 August 2007.
  [17] Michael Young, "Should we worry about the Hariri camp?" The Daily Star (Beirut), 30 August 2007.
  [18] "Jumblatt rules out reconciliation with the opposition," The Daily Star (Beirut), 15 August 2005.
  [19] "Security Council calls for fair and free presidential elections in Lebanon," The Associated Press, 5 November 2007.
  [20] C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, 8 November 2007.
  [21] "Lebanese presidential crisis looms ahead of Rice's meeting with Europeans," The Associated Press, 3 November 2007.
  [22] "An Opposition Leader Sees a Way Out for Lebanon," The New York Times, 13 September 2007.
  [23] "Constitution vague on last 10 days of presidency," The Daily Star (Beirut), 15 November 2007.
  [24] "Hezbollah Rejects Bush Lebanon Comments," The Associated Press, 21 December 2007.
  [25] Michael Young, "Lebanon's pact: prelude to a postmortem," The Daily Star (Beirut), 19 December 2007.