Issandr El AmraniCook: The Egypt-US breakup
The U.S.-Egyptian Breakup | Foreign Affairs - Steve Cook:
The United States should greatly lower its expectations of what is possible in the post-Mubarak era and come to terms with the end of the strategic relationship. Expecting the new Egyptian president -- whoever that may be -- to carry on a partnership with Washington is like Václav Havel asking the Soviets for assistance after Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution in 1989. To be sure, there are no Havels in Egypt, and Washington is not Soviet-era Moscow -- but the analogy rings true enough for those people in Cairo's Tahrir Square or the Alexandria corniche who saw U.S.-made F-16s fly overhead or were choked by tear gas produced in the United States.
Stacher: It's already over
One-time contributor of the blog Joshua Stacher writes in Foreign Affairs:
Despite the tenacity, optimism, and blood of the protesters massed in Tahrir Square, Egypt's democratic window has probably already closed.
Contrary to the dominant media narrative, the Egyptian state did not experience a regime breakdown. The protests certainly rocked the system and had Mubarak on his heels, but at no time did the uprising seriously threaten Egypt's regime. Although many of the protesters, foreign governments, and analysts have concentrated on the personality of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, those surrounding the embattled president, who make up the wider Egyptian regime, made sure the state's viability was never in question. This is because the country's central institution, the military, which historically has influenced policy and commands near-monopolistic economic interests, never balked.
I'm not as pessimistic as Dr. Josh. I think the window is closing but there is still time to make major gains — the only thing is that the opposition must move quickly and coherently.
Golia: Divide and rule
There is an Egyptian maxim describing the approach to administering power long employed here and elsewhere: ‘if you starve them they’ll eat you, fill them they’ll kill you, keep them half hungry, they’ll leave you alone.’ It’s a solid strategy in rigid hierarchical societies like Egypt’s, but it fails when insular leadership can no longer gauge the people’s reality, and consequently goes too far. Lucky for them there’s a back-up plan, another tried and true technique called ‘divide and rule’. The regime has set it in motion and it is working all too well.
People are turning away from the demonstrators partly because they are confused, tired of the disruptions and generally broke, but also because the state is helping them along by pretending to compromise, by raising suspicions regarding the demonstrators’ motives (whether suggesting they are in cahoots with hostile foreign powers or that they are relatively privileged idealists who are gumming up the works for everyone else) and last but not least, by asserting that their resolve threatens Egypt’s stability.
The NDP is dead, long live in the NDP
My friend Nabil Shawkat, translator, columnist and satirist extraordinaire, has this piece in Ahram Online on the ghost of the NDP still lingering and the new Suleiman regime being very much old school:
Mubarak is now out of the picture, perhaps by orders of his vice president. He is not going to be part of the future of this country. He will either leave Egypt in an “honourable” way, or just be pushed to the back to sign papers and rolled out on occasion to repeat a few well-rehearsed phrases. Mubarak is no more. His son is no more. His party is no more. But the spirit of his rule, the essence of his regime, and the methods of his era are far from over.
It is dangerous to kill a ruling party, because like the hydra of lore, ruling parties have many heads, far-reaching tentacles, and very deep pockets. I know the army has denounced any connection with the pro-Mubarak marauders, but the repudiation is far from being completely sincere. Only yesterday I walked by a security truck near the Italian Club in Bulak, north of Tahrir Square. Inside it, a plainclothes official was organising a small mob to attack or harass a certain person. I heard the order given while I was passing by, so I looked at the license plates. Sure enough, they were army plates.
For the past few days, the army was accusing unnamed people of wearing its uniforms to spread chaos. Perhaps this was a stolen army vehicle. But then again, perhaps it wasn’t.
Also turn to Ahram for the best reporting — for over a decade — on Egypt's ruling party, by Gamal Essam Eddin. Based on what I was able to gather on the new composition of the NDP, here's a quickly updated chart:
;)
Iran's Greens in solidarity with Egypt
Solidarity protest in Tehran on 14 February — may the Green movement get a second wind from Egypt and Tunisia!
To disgruntled Iranians, though, the sight of the Iranian government cheering on the Egyptian protesters is seen as deeply ironic. In 2009, when Iranians themselves launched massive protests against the government here, Iran's leaders labeled them "Western-backed rioters" and sent paramilitary forces wielding batons and tear gas to quash their revolt.
Still, opposition leaders are hoping to use the events in Egypt as a new catalyst, and are seeking permission from the government to launch a demonstration next Monday in the center of Tehran.
Former presidential challengers Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi said they wanted to invite people to march "to express solidarity with . . . the freedom-seeking revolts of the people of Tunis and Egypt against despotic regimes," Karroubi's Web site, Sahamnews, said on Sunday.
From Iran's opposition leaders hope to draw from protests in Egypt
A timetable for constitutional reform
If you've been following this blog for a few days, you will have noticed that the debate in Egypt is centering on the question of how to proceed with either a new constitution or adapting the current constitution to the circumstances. We've highlighted the proposal by Bahgat and Abdelaty, the statement by a group of establishment figures, and indeed the debate about having multiple vice-presidents to handle a transition. And of course, at the heart and soul of the protest movement in Tahrir, the continuing non-negotiable demand of Mubarak's removal.
I just received a proposal by the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and Legal Profession, a respected local NGO, suggesting a timetable for constitutional reform. They are here in English and Arabic word files (I'd paste them but the formatting does not work well on the blog.)
Links 6 February 2011
- Mubarak Gold in UK : الوعي المصري (be cautious about this)
Seems huge, documents could be fake.
-
American politics... eeekh.
-
Report from the Congressional Research Service.
Sarah Palin on the situation in Egypt
“And nobody yet has, nobody yet has explained to the American public what they know, and surely they know more than the rest of us know who it is who will be taking the place of Mubarak and no, not, not real enthused about what it is that that’s being done on a national level and from D.C. in regards to understanding all the situation there in Egypt. And, in these areas that are so volatile right now, because obviously it’s not just Egypt but the other countries too where we are seeing uprisings, we know that now more than ever, we need strength and sound mind there in the White House. We need to know what it is that America stands for so we know who it is that America will stand with. And, we do not have all that information yet.”
Update from Tahrir
I went out to Tahrir today for the first time in a couple of days. Beforehand, I had neither the patience to wait in the long queues on Qasr al-Nil bridge and could not walk around the corniche and Abdel Moneim Riyadh Square to get to Downtown. The situation eased today, with more people finding ways to get around the city, Abdel Moneim Riyadh and Sixth of October Bridge opened for traffic, and the army controlling a tighter perimeter at Tahrir Southern and Western entrances. The quickest way to enter by far is from Champollion, Talaat Harb and Bab al-Luq entrances.
For a new regional order
Perry Anderson in 2001:
Israeli power will never yield to anything but strength. But its own has an Achilles heel. It remains a state still ultimately dependent for its defence and prosperity on the United States. Its fortune has always been a function of foreign protection, and could not survive its subtraction. If American support were ever withdrawn from Zionism, its intransigence would swiftly erode. The rigidity of public opinion in Israel, whose condition has long been its assurance of the American placet, is in this sense more brittle than it seems. If Washington were to pull the rug from under Jerusalem, unexpected changes of heart would not be long in coming. But how could America ever contemplate such a betrayal? The answer lies, as it has done ever since the fifties, in the Arab world. So long as both of the key Arab powers—Egypt with its population, and Saudi Arabia with its petroleum—remain client-states of America, the Middle East and its oil are safely in US hands, and there is no reason to deny Israel anything it wishes. But should that ever change, the fate of the Palestinians would instantly alter. America has invested enormous sums to sustain Mubarak’s moth-eaten dictatorship in Cairo, cordially despised by the Egyptian masses, and spared no effort to protect the feudal plutocracy in Riyadh, perched above a sea of rightless immigrants. If either of these edifices were toppled—in the best of cases, both—the balance of power in the region would be transformed.
The dismal political history of the Arab world over the last half-century gives little reason for thinking this is likely in the short-run. Nor is there any guarantee that successor regimes would improve on the record of Nasser and the other failures of his time. But no stasis is permanent, even in the Middle East. Any real break in its regional system of power will set the US compass quivering. Genuinely independent regimes on the Nile or in Mecca would soon put the importance of the Zionist connexion into perspective. Blood may be thicker than water, but oil is thicker than either. The captivity of the Palestinians is a consequence of a larger submission of the Middle East. The day the Arab world stops scurrying to Washington—should that ever come—Israel will be forced to disgorge its incommensurate gains. Short of that, Zionism is not likely to be moved.
Tip o' the hat: Sans Everything
How to restrain Suleiman's power
With Hillary Clinton's backing for Suleiman as the lead on a transition in Egypt, we are quickly heading towards the formation of another strongman regime that cannot be trusted to deliver on the changes needed in the political environment. There needs to be a mechanism to integrate the opposition into the heart of the state to grant full legitimacy to its demand, and reduce the perception (and reality) of Omar Suleiman being the sole man at the helm. I'm no constitutional scholar, so please consider this as a brainstorm more than a serious proposal.
Under the Egyptian constitution, the president can delegate his powers by decree to the vice-president. This is what Mubarak did to grant Suleiman the authority to negotiate with the protestors. But the Egyptian constitution also allows for more than one vice-president, article to its Article 139:
Art.139: The President of the Republic may appoint one or more Vice-Presidents define their jurisdiction and relieve them of their posts. The rules relating to the calling to account of the President of the Republic shall be applicable to the Vice-Presidents.
Even more links
A dump from my browser — don't have time to make them look nice.
• In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood Steps Up, but Role Is Uncertain - NYTimes.com
Falastin's Egypt links - 2011-02-06
Arabist reader Falastin is compiling links on Egypt for Mondoweiss — and now also for Arabist. There may be some duplication with other links on the site.
Developments
Huge crowds occupy Tahrir Square demanding president Mubarak's resignation as the government seeks to restore stability.
Matthew Cassel's great images
Even if you don't read Arabic, you might have guessed that the writing on the donkey says "Mubarak."
Check out more great photography at Matthew Cassel's website, Just Image.
Too late for reform
I like Michele Dunne — she has been consistent for a decade on Egypt, and strikes the right tone here. I remember we sat together a couple of months ago and she laughed at the idea that Omar Suleiman could be a transition figure for Egypt. Here she argues that the US should not be backing Suleiman, it should be backing bottom-up transition.
Too Late for Reform Now - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
"One of the most striking features of recent U.S. policy toward the Middle East has been that it often appeared out of touch with current realities to the point of being anachronistic—almost quaint. The dogged push for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, for example, flew in the face of truths including the facts that Prime Minister Netanyahu had no interest in reaching an agreement and Palestinian President Abbas was so weakened by the Fatah-Hamas rift that he would be unable to reach an agreement even if a good offer were put on the table. The most recent example of this unreality is U.S. calls for ‘reform’ and ‘national dialogue’ in Egypt in response to the escalating uprising.
Abu Ray comes home
Abu Ray is a contributor to the blog who brought us this great series on his trips to Iraq in the last several years. He just came home to Cairo from a trip to Indonesia.
It is one of the miracles of modern travel that less than 20 hours after I was playing in the surf on Bali’s Legian Beach with my son, I was back in Cairo. And it is also one of the miracles of modern social movements that in the 10 days I’d been gone the city had changed irrevocably.
I had left Cairo and come home to Baghdad.
Links 5 February 2011
RIP, old guard
An addendum to my last post on the NDP shuffle.
The last week has marked the end of an important semi-secret group that has had an important impact on Egyptian political life over the last 40 years: the tanzim tali'i, or Vanguard Group, which was recruited in the 1960s by among Nasserist youth to be groomed to handle the country's political affairs and continue the legacy of the Free Officers. These people were meant to be the front for Egypt's deep state, the politicians who regulated public debate while the big decisions were made elsewhere.
From a forthcoming article I wrote on the NDP (which now has to be substantially revised), here is a passage that describes the initial attack on the "old guard" of the party by Gamal Mubarak and friends:
