On the Eve of Egypt's Big Day

After all Egypt has gone through in recent years, Egyptians could probably use something to celebrate, and celebrate they will, though not everyone is on board. Tomorrow the "new Suez Canal" project will be dedicated. It's a genuine accomplishment, however much it is being overhyped. For those who know Arabic, here's a selection of Thursday's early edition newspapers, both state-owned and private (Hat Tip to Thomas Gorguissian of Al-Tahrir):

The Khedive throws a Party: As Egypt Prepares for Grand Opening of Enlarged Suez Canal, Let's Remember 1869

As I've noted in a couple of recent posts this is the week Egypt is celebrating the dedication of the "New Suez Canal,"consisting of a newly dredged channel and a widening and deepening of the existing Canal, to permit increased traffic and two-way traffic in sections. It looks to be a much-hyped celebration, but it will be hard pressed to match the extravagant party staged by Khedive Isma‘il on the opening of the original Canal in 1869.

Cairo Opera in 1869

In the 1860s, Isma‘il had embarked on a spending spree, partly funded by European loans. As the French were working (with local laborers of course) to build the Canal, Isma‘il embarked on an ambitious plan to rebuild Cairo, or more precisely to build a European-style city in the reclaimed floodplains to the West of the traditional city. He also was granted the right by the Ottoman Sultan to use the title of Khedive rather than Wali. The new Isma‘iliyya quarter, what we think of today as downtown Cairo, consisted of grand, Parisian-style avenues and boulevards scattered with parks and squares, European hotels, an Opera House, several palaces, and more. The architecture was mostly French or Italianate. The Opera House was opened on November 1, 1869, just before the Canal dedication. (Most people think the first performance was the debut of Verdi's Aida, which was indeed commissioned for the occasion, but was not yet ready, so Rigoletto was performed instead. Aida had its debut in 1871.) This original Cairo Opera on what was called Opera Square next to the Ezbekiyya Gardens burned in 1971, The present Opera House on Gezira was built in 1988.

In addition to a European city and a European Opera, Isma‘il invited the Crowned heads of Europe. The French under De Lesseps were building the Canal, so France had pride of place. Napoleon III was busy (the Franco-Prussian War would break out the following year), so he sent his Empress, Eugénie, to preside. These distinguished guests would need places to stay. (The Khedive did not invite Muslim sovereigns such as the Shah of Persia or the Sultan of Morocco, however.) Other guests included painters, scholars, musician, and novelists.

Gezireh Palace after becoming a Hotel

The New Hotel (later the Continental Savoy) opposite Ezbekiyya was taken over for many of the guests, but it would not do for Royalty, so the Khedive had built a palace especially for them, just across the Nile in the Zamalek area of Gezira. This, the Gezira Palace, was where Eugénie and others were quartered. It later became a grand hotel, first called the Gezira Palace and Later the Omar Khayyam. Today the original palace forms the central core of the much-expanded Cairo Marriott Hotel and Omar Khayyam Casino. The video shows the interior in its later incarnation as a grand hotel.

Pavilion at Ismailia (Illustrated London News)

But the celebrations would not be confined to Cairo. The guests of honor were given a boat tour up the Nile and then transported to the city of Ismailia for the Canal opening. On November 17,  after a Muslim cleric and a French priest blessed the Canal at Port Said, a parade of ships sailed and steamed through the Canal to formally open it. The Empress declared it open and the guests banqueted in the desert.

The Empress on Camelback

The ceremonies brought Egypt much world attention, but there was a downside. The Khedive had borrowed heavily from Europe, and the debts were to accumulate. Ironically, though the French built the Canal, the first toll-paying ship through it was British, and the Canal would become a lifeline to British India. By 1875, with Egypt indebted and France weakened in the Franco-Prussian War, Britain acquired the shares of the Suez Canal Company. In 1879 Isma‘il was deposed in favor of his son, and in 1882 the British occupied Egypt. Isma‘il's big party was over.

Suez Openings, Then and Now

I will be talking more this week, as Egypt celebrates the grand opening of the new, enlarged Suez Canal, about the original celebrations staged by Khedive Isma‘il in 1869. Admittedly, Isma‘il's big party bankrupted Egypt and eventually brought about the British occupation. The current government is inviting plenty of world leaders seeking to emulate Isma‘il's invitation to the crowned heads of Europe. Below, a painting of the Ottoman Sultan, Emperor Franz-Josef of Austria-Hungary and Empress Eugénie of France at the opening ceremonies.

Most crowned heads today are figureheads, outside the Arab world, and there have been at least a few missteps in the ramp-up to the opening ceremonies.  

MadaMasr has a list of "Five Mishaps in Promoting and Securing the New Suez Canal" (so don't attack me as the snark is theirs). One of the "mishaps" listed are these, uh, somethings in front of the Mugamma‘ in Tahrir Square:

OH MY GOD WHAT ARE THOSE THINGS? Giant inflated Teddy Bears? WHY? Social media has compared them to the marshmallow man in the first GhostBusters film or the character in the horror film Chucky.

I hope these ... rather disturbing things are indeed, in MadaMasr's term, a mere "mishap."

In contrast I might note this, which if somewhat over the top,  at least looks delicious if fattening:

As Egypt Prepares to Open Expanded Suez Canal, Did You Know the Ship That Led the Way in the Original Opening of the Canal in 1869 is Still in Commission?

Khedive Isma‘il

Next week Egypt will be opening its "New Suez Canal," a major expansion project that includes  a newly dredged second channel in the middle section and a widening and deepening of the old canal elsewhere, and with plans for additional improvements. It will make two-way traffic feasible for more of the Canal's length and should greatly increase toll revenues and improve transit times. They're planning major ceremonies, though they'll have to go some to outweigh the spectacle staged by the Khedive Isma‘il at the grand opening of the original canal in 1869, which ultimately helped bankrupt Egypt and bring on 70 years of British occupation. I'll write more about the Khedive's big party next week, but I thought I'd drop a factoid now to bait your interest: the first ship through the Canal in 1869, leading a procession of royal yachts through the new waterway, is still in Egyptian service and under commission. She is also one of the largest yachts in the world and by some accounts the oldest steam vessel still in service, 150 years after launch. I don't know if she'll lead the new celebrations, but I hope so.

HM Yacht Victoria and Albert

During the American Civil War, the Union Blockade kept Confederate cotton from world markets, and the British textile mills turned to Egyptian cotton as a substitute. Isma‘il, acting as if this prosperity were permanent embarked on a spending spree, rebuilding Cairo, working on the Suez Canal with French help, etc. In 1865 a new Khedivial yacht was launched by Samuda Brothers on the Thames and named Mahroussa ("guarded," or "protected," a traditional soubriquet of Cairo or, sometimes, of Egypt). She was designed on the same lines as Queen Victoria's Royal Yacht, HMY Victoria and Albert, and had twin paddlewheels in her original configuration.

The Opening Procession, 1869

869Unsurprisingly,  Isma‘il had the Khedivial Yacht lead the opening procession through the Canal.On short notice I haven't found a photo of what she looked like when she still had her paddlewheels but it was modeled on Victoria and Albert, shown above. I hope to find an earlier image soon.

Isma‘il Pasha

Ironically, when Isma‘il was deposed in favor of his son Tawfiq in 1879 it was Mahrouusa  which took him into exile, and in another irony, when king Farouq was exiled in July 1952, he also sailed away on Mahroussa.

In the intervening years she had been much changed. In 1872 40 fet were added to her length, and another 16.5 feet in 1905, when her paddlewheels were replaced with triple screws. Soon after Farouq's abdication she was renamed Al-Hurriya (freedom), often spelled Horreya in Western registries. In the past 60 years she has been occasionally used as a Presidential Yacht and otherwise as a training vessel. She visited the US at least once, in 1976 for the American Bicentennial.

Still in commission and moored at Alexandria, she is taken out two or three times a year, usually for only a day or so at a time, which seems about right at the venerable age of 150. Wikipedia claims that during a visit in 2000 President Mubarak restored her original name Mahroussa, but most reports still call her Hurriya.

Today

Egypt Plans Stamp for Opening of "New Suez Canal," Apparently Forgetting that Earlier Stamp

Egypt has announced plans to issue a commemorative stamp to honor the opening of the "New Suez Canal" project, expected August 6. Artists are competing for the design.

Apparently they are forgetting, or have sent down the memory hole, the fact that they already issued one, as I noted here last year:

The Suez Canal is a sea level canal. It does not have locks. The lock shown is in Panama.

The "New Suez Canal" project, though much hyped and promised to be complete in a single year, is apparently on schedule. The catch is, it is not a new Suez Canal. It is a new shipping channel along part of the existing Canal, as well as new tunnels under the Canal and works on either side. The current canal runs 164 kilometers. The new  channel is 72 km, of which only 35 km is new dry-land digging; other areas are being deepened and widened, essentially creating a new channel mostly between Lake Timsah and Ismailia.. This graphic may help:

Large bracket on right, The Suez Canal. Small line at left, the "New Suez Canal."

The graphic is a bit unfair as it doesn't include areas being dredged and expanded or other improvements.

Relax, Oil Prices: There's Really Very Little Chance of Anyone Closing Bab al-Mandab, Let Alone the Houthis

NASA photo: Bab al-Mandab with Perim Island

Oil prices are rising steeply due to the Saudi and allied attacks on Yemen. Business reporters in particular may be fueling this with articles like this one and this one, suggesting that if the Houthis take over Yemen they could block the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, a critical choke point for the passage of much of the world's oil. Like the Strait of Hormuz to the east, this is a critical international passage that technically lies within the territorial waters of the neighboring states. And like the Strait of Hormuz, whenever tensions rise, people start worrying about a closure of the Strait. Egypt has explicitly cited this as a reason for its joining the Saudi coalition (though there are doubtless monetary reasons too). But there are multiple reasons to doubt that any Yemeni government, even a Houthi one would do it, since Yemen's own oilfields and the Aden refinery are outside the Strait and it is their lifeline to world markets, but even if a Yemeni government should be self-destructive enough to try, I don't think it could be done.

Let's start with this: you and what navy?

In response to the far less lethal threat of Somali piracy, the United States, NATO, the European Union, and even Russia, China, and Japan, dispatched warships to assure freedom of navigation. Do you think they'd let the Strait be closed? If somebody fires on a ship from Perim Island, I think they'll get an up-close and personal visit from an Aegis Cruiser (if anything is still standing after the Predator strikes).

Even if the international warships in the Gulf and Indian Ocean were not in the neighborhood, the Egyptian, Saudi, and Israeli navies are sufficient, I suspect, to deter or meet any threat. It's not the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan or Teddy Roosevelt. Sea power is global, three dimensional, and rapidly deployable.

I'm reminded of my days writing on defense issues in the region in the early 1980s, when the Soviets had bases in South Yemen and Ethiopia, the US had bases in Oman and the French in Djibouti, and there was a lot of talk about Bab al-Mandab. Unlike the Houthis, the Soviets could have closed the Strait. (At the cost, of course, of starting World War III.),

Iran has from time to time threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. And it has a navy that could credibly make the attempt. At the cost of war with the US, NATO, and probably loss of its own oil production facilities.

Though international traffic passes through territorial waters of Yemen and Djibouti (as Hormuz does between Iran and Oman and the UAE), these are international straits where the right of innocent passage (or "transit passage" as the International Convention on the Law of the Sea calls it) is guaranteed.

The closest thing to a closure of the Strait I know of was an Egyptian Navy blockade during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which was not aimed at the world's oil supply but at intercepting shipments bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. And at the time, the Suez Canal had been closed since 1967 anyway. And it was wartime, when the rules change.

Which brings me to another point. Blocking Bab al-Mandab might be possible with a serious naval force, which Yemen lacks. But is it really the most vulnerable point in the oil supply? Let's run some numbers:

Bab al-Mandab: Width 18-20 miles (16 miles between Perim Island (Yemeni) and Djibouti coast.

Hormuz: Width 21 miles, but with shipping channels only two miles wide in each direction, separated by a two-mile buffer.

Suez Canal: Width 673 feet.

SUMED Pipeline: two 42-inch pipes

If you want to block international tanker traffic, which choke point is chokiest?

Due to Arab-Israeli wars, the Suez Canal was closed for several months in 1956-57 and again from 1967-75. Sinking a few ships in the shallow canal can block it for weeks. If bad guys also attacked the SUMED (Suez-Mediterranean) pipeline (two 42-inch wide lines running from ‘Ayn Sukhna on the Red Sea to a terminal off Alexandria), not only would passage of Gulf and Yemeni oil to Europe be blocked, but so would Saudi oil from the terminal at Yanbu‘ and Sudanese oil from Port Sudan.

I really am less worried about the Houthis blocking Bab al-Mandab than I am about the instability in Sinai threatening the Canal and SUMED.

February 3 and 4, 1915: The Turks Attack the Suez Canal

For several days now, I've been dealing with the preparations for the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal. A century ago yesterday and today, the attack came. The Turkish plan depended heavily on the element of surprise, but as we have seen, due to aerial reconnaissance, British knew where the Ottomans were advancing. Ottoman hopes for a rising in Egypt against the British also failed.

Excerpts from the British Official History are available online from the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre, while the Official Naval History is excerpted here; as a result I will let those works tell the bulk of the story, interspersing my own comments occasionally

FROM the 31st January onwards the British troops stationed along the Canal expected the attack at any moment and, having had ample warning of its approach, awaited it with confidence.

The dispositions of the enemy, so far as they could be discovered, were on the 1st February as follows:

At Bir Habeita, 6 miles east of Serapeum, at least 2,500 infantry and apparently two guns; at Moiya Harab, 30 miles to the south-east and in a position such that they might be intended either to reinforce the former body or to strike at the 1st Sector in the neighbourhood of Shallufa, about 8,000 men; further north, at Bir el Mahadat, 10 miles E.N.E, of El Ferdan, about 3,000 men. On the other hand, trenches which had been dug by the Turks 5 miles north-east of Qantara now seemed to have been evacuated, and behind, at Bir ed Dueidar, only about 300 men could be seen, though the palm grove of this oasis was certainly large enough to conceal many more. In rear, on the northern Sinai route at Bir el Abd, 40 miles east of the Canal, and at El Arish on the Palestine frontier ; on the southern route at Nekhl ; there appeared to be further considerable forces.

No move by the Turks was detected on this day but for a slight advance opposite Ismailia Ferry Post, as a result of which the bridgehead there and Bench Mark Post, 2 miles to north of it, were reinforced. A little further north small bodies of the enemy in the desert east of El Ferdan were scattered by the fire of H.M.S. Clio from her station near Ballah.

Ottoman advance on the Canal

On the morning of the 2nd February it was discovered by patrols from Ismailia Ferry Post that there had been a further advance opposite that point during the night. Small detachments which moved out from the bridgehead made contact with the enemy and were in action till about 3.30 p.m. A high wind, which had grown stronger as the day wore on, whipped up the sand till the troops found themselves almost in darkness, and aerial reconnaissance became impossible. The enemy showed no immediate intention of coming to close quarters. He apparently entrenched himself in the evening 22 miles south-east of the British defences.

A French naval officer, Enseigne de vaisseau Potier de la Morandière, thus describes the reconnaissance from the Ferry Post:

On the hills, ten or fifteen kilometres from the Canal, we could see numerous traces on the sand of the columns which had moved "forward during the night. But in the plain there was nothing. The desert, in its high light, looked like a smooth cloth, but was in "reality cut by numerous depressions in which troops could be hidden. The first patrols which moved out were met by rifle fire. They were reinforced; then artillery was sent out to their support. At my side was a battery of Indian mountain artillery, commanded by a young English officer, the only European in it. He had just been ordered to go forward. A sharp command and, in a few seconds, before we could see how it was done, the guns which had been in position were packed on the mules and the column was on the move.

Meanwhile there had sprung up a sand storm which hid everything from view. I went out on to a dune with the English colonel in command of the post. But there it was even worse. Even to keep one's eyes open was horrible torture. And to think that people were fighting out in that. In the evening the detachments came in, one after another, the officers cursing the sand, the wind and the enemy, who had fallen back before them. Then quiet fell and we began to think there had been a false alarm.

Not only at the Ferry Post but on the whole twenty mile front from Deversoir to El Ferdan the British outposts were in touch with the enemy during the day. The Clio again came into action, driving the groups on which she fired out of range.

It was now more than ever certain that the attack would fall upon the central hector, though still unknown whether its main weight would be directed north or south of Lake Timsah. In view of the enemy's activity in front of El Ferdan further reinforcements were brought up to that point: an armoured train with four platoons of New Zealand infantry, and two platoons to support the 5th Gurkhas in the post on the east bank. In that part of the sector between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah there were now the following troops:-

19th Lancashire Battery R.F.A. (T) (four 15-pdrs.);
5th Battery Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two maxims);
1st Field Company East Lancashire Royal Engineers (T) (two sections);
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, less 3rd Brahmans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles);
2nd Q.V.O. Rajputs;
Two Platoons 128th Pioneers (escort to the Egyptian battery);
137th (Indian) Field Ambulance.

Of these there were six companies on the east bank; two of the 92nd Punjabis in the Tussum Post, two of the 92nd in that of Serapeum, and two of the Gurkhas at Deversoir. On the west bank were eleven posts each held by two platoons, [The total number of posts between the two lakes was twelve, but No. 1 Post on the left, which was protected by the large lagoons at the southern end of Lake Timsah, consisted of a half platoon only. It manned an observation post on a dune known as Gebel Mariam, just west of the point where the Canal channel enters the lake.], each platoon on a frontage of some 600 yards and finding three sentry posts 200 yards apart. In reserve at Serapeum were three companies. At the first sign of the attack a company of the 62nd Punjabis was ordered up from here to the danger point, mile-post 47.4, a little south of Tussum, and this company was subsequently reinforced by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.

1. The sand storm continued into the night. The Indian sentries, peering into the darkness, their faces screened in their puggarees and the breeches of their rifles wrapped round with rags, saw and heard nothing till 3.25 a.m. on the 3rd February, when an observation post at Tussum heard troops passing south-east of the post and towards the Canal bank. A moment later loud shouting and howling broke out south of the post. [The noise, in defiance of strict orders, was made by irregulars, "the Champions of Islam," calling upon Allah and adjuring the attackers to die for the faith.] Major T. R. Maclachlan, who was in command, moved a machine gun and half a platoon down to the southern flank of the post to rake the east bank. The shouting thereupon ceased and the enemy replied with ineffective machine-gun fire. 

Still there was nothing to be seen. Then the moon, only two days past full, emerged from the clouds, and dark masses were discerned moving slowly down the gullies on the east bank towards the water. Presently these masses were discovered to be pontoons and rafts carried by squads of men. At 4.20 a.m. the Egyptian battery, which had moved to this point the previous day and dug in on the top of the high west bank in order to obtain a field of view, opened fire, with good results, for it was soon observed that the two foremost pontoons had been abandoned. With the assistance of rifle fire from the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers at Post No. 5, the battery checked most of the attempts of the enemy to carry his craft down to the water.

It is not clear whether the Turks had intended to make their first crossing at this point or whether the other detachments moving on the Canal had been slightly delayed in the darkness by the rough ground. At all events, within a few minutes gangs carrying pontoons appeared upon the east bank on a frontage of a mile and a half from a short distance north of the point of the first attempt. The rapid fire of the defenders caused most of the craft to be abandoned on the bank, while the pontoons which reached the water were quickly holed and sunk.

A captured pontoon

Three pontoons only crossed the Canal, under cover of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire now opened by the enemy from the sand-dunes close to the east bank. To the south, a boat-load of Turks landed opposite mile-post 43.3, on the front of Post No. 6. The party was instantly charged with the bayonet by a small body under Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis, and all killed or wounded. The other two boat-loads landed at the original point, opposite mile-post 47.6. This party was at once attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan and Lieut. R. A. FitzGibbon with small detachments of the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers from Post No. 5. [Both officers were wounded, the latter mortally, though, after being hit, he ran a considerable distance with a message to the Egyptian battery of which he commanded the escort.] Six Turks were killed and four wounded; about twenty escaped and hid under the west bank, where they were later rounded up and captured by a party of the 2nd Rajputs. The small parties which made these gallant attacks were the only Turks to cross the Suez Canal, save as prisoners, in the course of the war. Six months later a few raiders swam the Canal near Qantara and placed sticks of dynamite on the railway line. These, however, were probably native smugglers, who had taken Turkish pay when their peacetime occupation was gone.

The Fighting in the Tussum-Serapaeum Sector

The fire from the east bank was intense and well directed, and casualties among the defenders began to mount up. But as the light improved it was seen how roughly the enemy had been handled. His iron pontoons, rafts 2 and other abandoned material littered the east bank, along which also lay many dead. His surprise crossing had been a complete failure. The pontoons were of the German service pattern, of galvanized iron, each capable of holding about 20 men. There were also a number of rafts, subsequently found to consist of a light wooden framework filled with empty kerosene tins. They were 15 feet long by 12 feet wide and equipped with long-necked crutches to enable them to be rowed across.

Yet the Turkish command had by no means abandoned hope. At dawn an attack was launched against Tussum Post, and the enemy artillery began to shell the British positions, the warships in the Canal, and merchant shipping moored in Lake Timsah. The Hardinge and Requin in turn opened fire upon parties of Turkish infantry in the desert, as they became visible, and by the time it was daylight the action was general. It was now discovered that the Turks were holding a trench 200 yards south of Tussum Post, facing westward. Enfilade fire from the machine guns in the post practically destroyed this party. It was next found that a larger body of the enemy, some 350 strong, had made a lodgement in the British day trenches east and south of the post. At 7 a.m. a counter-attack from the southern flank of the post, led by Captain H. M. Rigg, 92nd Punjabis, recaptured a portion of these trenches and took 70 prisoners. At 11 a.m. a further counter-attack was carried out against the day trenches by Lieut. J. W. Thomson-Glover, 35th Sikhs, attached 92nd Punjabis, from the northern end of the post. This was completely successful, though not until 3.30 p.m. were the whole of the trenches regained. In all 7 Turkish officers and 280 other ranks were captured or killed and a quantity of material taken in these trenches.

Br.-General S. Geoghegan, commanding the 22nd Indian Brigade, observing at 6.30 a.m. that there was no sign of an attack south of Serapeum, decided to collect at that point sufficient troops to clear the Turks still in front of or south of Tussum Post out of the trenches and sandhills. Two companies of the 2/10th Gurkhas with their machine guns moved up from Deversoir to Serapeum, where six platoons of the 2nd Rajput had also been collected. Crossing by the ferry, two platoons of the Rajputs with the two companies of the 92nd Punjabis from the post on their right, began at 8.40 a.m. to advance up the east bank towards Tussum. As this movement continued, the enemy broke in surprisingly large numbers from hummocks and sandhills in the neighbourhood of the point from which his southern boat-load had crossed during the night. But at the same moment a considerable Turkish force came into the open some three miles to the north-east, deployed, and, supported by two batteries,' began to advance in the direction of Serapeum Post. The force which carried out this attack was afterwards found to have been the 74th Regiment, 25th Division; the other two regiments of that division, the 73rd and 75th, having already been committed to the attack against Tussum Post and the Canal immediately south of it. Behind the 7th Regiment the 28th of the 10th Division, Djemal Pasha's reserve, also advanced, though how nearly it approached the Canal is not clear.

Against this superior force the British counter-attack was unable to continue. The Rajputs, pushing on along the bank, came under heavy fire and lost the officer commanding the detachment, Captain R. T. Arundell, before they were brought to a standstill. The Punjabis were concentrated on the right to face the Turkish attack, and six platoons of the 2/10th Gurkhas moved up into support, the whole detachment on the east bank being now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. But the little force held its ground and its determined front brought the enemy's attack to a standstill, nowhere nearer than 1,200 yards to the British line. A second cause of the failure on the part of the Turks to press the attack was probably the fire of the French warships Requin and D'Entrecasteaux, of which more will be said later.

The abandoned pontoons lying along the Asiatic bank constituted a certain danger, as there was a possibility of their being again employed after the fall of darkness, should the enemy re-establish himself in force upon the bank. About 7.45 a.m. Br.-General Geoghegan requested Lieut.-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., in command of T.B. 043 at Deversoir, to destroy these. The torpedo boat moved up the Canal, firing two rounds from its 3-pdr, into each pontoon. 3 Feb. Lieut.-Commander Palmes then landed to see if any still lay behind the east bank, and succeeded in blowing up two more with gun-cotton. Finally he almost walked into a trench full of Turks, but succeeded in regaining his dinghy.

While the attacks on Tussum and Serapeum were in progress, another Turkish force, advancing from the southeast, threatened Ismailia Ferry Post, on the other side of Lake Timsah. [This force consisted of the 68th regiment, 23rd Division.] This attack was never seriously pressed, the enemy's advanced troops entrenching some eight hundred yards from the defences. On the other hand his artillery, well handled, speedily became menacing. It appeared that the two field batteries were in action in support of the infantry, while from far out in the desert a 15-cm. howitzer battery also opened fire.

At 8.15 a.m. these guns, which had been directed against the Hardinge but had hitherto been shooting short, began to straddle the ship. First a ricochet carried away the wireless aerial. A few minutes later a high explosive shell struck the forward funnel, another the base of the after funnel; next a shell from one of the heavy howitzers burst over the fore part of the ship, causing casualties to the guns' crews. The steering gear was damaged and the fore stokehold rendered untenable. It was only too evident to Commander Linberry that the heavy guns had his range exactly. If he remained where he was there was considerable risk that his ship, unarmoured and highly vulnerable, would be sunk in the channel. At 8.45 a.m., therefore, the Hardinge slipped and proceeded to anchor in Lake Timsah, outside the fairway. The heavy howitzers fired only three or four rounds more at her, then switched to another target.

The artillery defence of Tussum now fell largely upon the Requin, [The Requin, whose specially dredged berth had been long chosen, had made preparation for the defence of the Sector by placing numerous range-marks in the desert. Her role was, in fact, that of a floating battery.], the only warship in the area, except the armed tug Mansourah and T.B. 043, both armed with light guns. She was searching for the enemy's field artillery and shelling small groups of infantry in front of Ismailia Ferry Post with her 10-cm. guns when she came under the fire of the 15-cm howitzers which had previously engaged the Hardinge.

She could not find the enemy battery, the shooting of which became more and more accurate. Presently it straddled the ship and the situation became uncomfortable. The crews of the 10-cm. guns, which had no protection, were moved beneath the shelter of the steel deck, and a bigger head of steam raised in case the ship should have to shift her moorings. One 27.4-cm. turret gun alone remained in action, at first without effect. But at 9 o'clock a puff of smoke was observed in the desert, corresponding with the fall of a big shell near the ship. It was estimated that the Turkish howitzers were firing from a point 9,200 metres distant. Fire was accordingly opened with the turret gun at ranges varying from 9,000 to 9,500 metres. After the third round the heavy howitzer fire ceased suddenly and was not resumed, a serious danger to the Canal being thus removed.

The Requin did further good work opposite Tussum and Serapeum, aided by the cruiser D'Entrecasteaux. The latter had received orders to move up and replace the disabled Hardinge. Subsequently these orders were cancelled, as the flagship Swiftsure was on her way down from Qantara to carry out that task. The D'Entrecasteaux therefore moved about three-quarters of a mile north of Deversoir and then received the wireless message: "Repulse the attack on Serapeum." She could see Requin's shells bursting east of that point and she herself at once opened fire with her 14-cm. guns. The crossfire from the heavy guns of the two French ships was now therefore directed upon the area of the Turkish deployment. It was probably in great measure owing to the moral effect of the melinite that the Turkish troops could not here be induced to advance.

The enemy had now been definitely repulsed between Serapeum and Tussum. His artillery continued to shell the west bank intermittently till 2 p.m., when fire ceased. The silence that followed indicated that the action had been broken off, and bodies of Turks were soon seen moving eastward, to be hastened on their way by the 24-cm. gun of the D'Entrecasteaux, firing at extreme range. The force under Lieut.-Colonel Sutton which had carried out the counter-attack now withdrew to its former position north of Serapeum. About half an hour later a small body of the enemy occupied the ridge which it had evacuated, but was shelled off it by the British artillery.

Opposite Ismailia the enemy's artillery persisted longer, numerous shells falling in the bridgehead and camp, though 3 Feb. without causing any casualties. But at 3.30 p.m. the Requin apparently silenced a battery firing on the shipping in the Timsah, and here, as further south, the action now died down.

Reinforcements of the 31st Indian Brigade, which began to arrive at Serapeum at 4.30 p.m., were not required, but they were retained in positions of close support at various points in view of the possibility that the offensive would be renewed. Major-General A. Wallace, commanding the 11th Indian Division, took over command of the front between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah. The Swiftsure had now taken up the former berth of the Hardinge, the Ocean had also moved to this part of the front, and the Hardinge had been sent to replace the Swiftsure at Qantara.

Further reinforcements for the front at Ismailia, consisting of Headquarters 2nd Australian Brigade, with the 7th and 8th Battalions Australian Infantry, arrived in the town during the evening. All was ready for the fresh attack which, it seemed probable, would have to be met in the morning. The night passed quietly, save for some musketry fire from the east bank south of Tussum Post.

Elsewhere the attacks on the Canal had been of minor importance, nowhere pressed with energy sufficient to give Major-General Wilson a moment's inquietude or uncertainty as to the enemy's real plan. In the Suez sector the enemy did not come to close quarters. Fire was exchanged between a small detachment and the post on the east bank at El Kubri, after which the Turks withdrew.

Against El Ferdan, the northernmost post of the 2nd Sector, the infantry attack was equally feeble. There had been some firing on this part of the front before dawn, and daylight discovered two lines of trenches dug about two and a half miles from the Canal. On these the Clio opened fire.

Soon after 9 a.m. two Turkish field guns began firing on the railway station, making good practice and securing several direct hits. The Clio located and engaged these guns within less than half an hour, whereupon the Turks turned their attention to her, continuing to do remarkably pretty shooting. She was hit twice and had some small damage done to one of her guns, but she sustained no casualties among her crew. By 10.30 a.m. she had silenced the Turkish guns. During the afternoon she had further practice against bodies of the enemy seen falling back towards the northeast.

At Qantara, in the 3rd Sector, there was a rather stronger attack, between 5 and 6 a.m., upon two piquets furnished by the 89th Punjabis. The machine guns and rifles of the piquets caused heavy loss to the enemy when he came up against the British barbed-wire defences, and he was driven off without difficulty. Thirty-six prisoners were subsequently brought in here and 20 dead found outside the wire. These figures did not represent the whole of the enemy's losses, as he carried off further dead and wounded in his retirement.

These feint attacks had all been conducted with so little resolution as to fail completely in their object. There were known to be further detachments of the enemy in the Suez Sector in the neighbourhood of posts other than at El Kubri, but they did not appear within machine-gun range of Baluchistan, Gurkha or Shallufa.

Although the British pursued  into Sinai, the Turkish withdrawal proved to be rapid and nearly complete.

Suez Canal Notes: Auchinleck and the 62nd Punjabis at Suez 1915

Badge of the 62nd Punjabis

Tomorrow, February 3, marks the 100th anniversary  of the Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal in 1915. I'll be narrating the battle tomorrow, but I thought I'd anticipate it with a vignette of one Indian Army Regiment that distinguished itself in the battle, the 62nd Punjabi Regiment.

This regiment's lineage traced to an Indian Army unit formed in 1759, and which had served under Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington) in one of his first great victories, at Assaye in 1803.

It arrived in Egypt in December 1914. As fate would have it, the 62nd happened to be deployed near the Tussum Post on the Canal, at the site of what would be the only point where Turkish pontoons actually reached the west bank of the Canal. Only three pontoons made it across.

Two landed at mile 47.6, and a third at milepost 43.3. The Turks (actually Syrians of various ethnicities from the 23rd Homs and 25th Damascus Divisions. The 62nd Punjabis attacked and killed or captured the Turks who made it ashore. Naik Safdar Ali and Sepoy Sher Khan of the 62nd rushed forward; Safdar Ali was killed and Sher Khan badly wounded; both won the Indian Order of Merit.

Naik Safdar Ali (source)

The next day, the 62nd was instrumental in pushing the Turks back from British trenches they had occupied on the east bank of the Canal, Havildar Muhammad Azim distinguished himself and won yet another Order of Merit.

The 62nd went on to fight hard in Mesopotamia, One of its British captains at the Canal battle was getting his first taste of combat, but not his last: Captain Claude Auchinleck, better known in World War II as Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (and to his men as "the Auk"), commander in the early stages at El Alamein and the last British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. Captain Auchinleck is standing at far right in this photo from Egypt in December 1914 of the officers of the 62nd Punjabis:

The 62nd Punjabis later became the 1st Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment, and  at Partition in 1947 were allocated to the new Pakistani Army. Today, as the ist Battalion, the Punjab Regiment of the Army of Pakistan, they are said to enjoy the oldest unit lineage of any Indian Army regiment still in existence.

The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, 1915: The British Defenses, 2: Ground Force Deployments

Having already looked at the Ottoman plans for the attack on the Suez Canal and the naval and air aspects of the British defensive plans, it's time to look at the overall plan for ground defense of the Canal.

The ground defenses were primarily manned by elements of the Indian Army, mostly from the Xth and XIth Divisions, with Territorial Artillery,  some cavalry and India's Bikaner Camel Corps, which we have met before. The Egyptian Army, which was not a belligerent, provided a few machine-gun positions.

Though the overall command of Imperial Forces in Egypt was under General Sir John Maxwell, the defense of the Canal was commanded by Major-General Alexander Wilson, Commander of Indian Expeditionary Force "E."

The British official history provides a very detailed list of deployments as of January 15, which I reproduce in full below. Between January 15 and the battle on February 3, there were some additional reinforcements: two battalions of the Indian XIth Division moved into trenches on the west side of the Canal between Bench-mark Post and Ballah Ferry; the New Zealand Brigade was brought up from Cairo; its Otago and Wellington Battalions reinforced the El Kubri crossing near Suez, while the Auckland and Canterbury Battalions went into reserve at Ismailia. The January 15 deployments appear below; I've glossed a few abbreviations that may be unfamiliar. Tomorrow, we'll begin to deal with the battle itself.

DISPOSITION OF TROOPS IN THE CANAL DEFENCES, 15TH JANUARY, 1915.

G.O.C., Canal Defences - Major-General A. Wilson.

Chief Staff Officer, Canal Defences - Br.-General A. H. Bingley.

SECTOR I. (Port Tewfik to Geneffe, both inclusive.)

Headquarters - Suez.

Troops.

30th Brigade (24th and 76th Punjabis,

126th Baluchis,

2/7th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

1 Coy. [Company] Bikanir Camel Corps.

1 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Bty. R.F.A. (T.). [Battery, Royal Field Artillery (Territorial)]

1 Indian Field Ambulance.

battalions from the XIth Division, who occupied the trenches on the west bank between the Bench-mark post and Ballah ferry. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade was also brought up from Cairo, two battalions (Otago and Wellington) reinforcing the El Kubri Post north of Suez, while the brigade headquarters, with the Auckland and Canterbury Battalions, detrained at Ismailia to fill up the reserve.

Posts in Sector.

Esh Shatt.

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

1 M.G. [Machine Gun] Section.

Baluchistan

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

El Kubri

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

1 Coy. Bikanir Camel Corps.

1 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Bn. [Battalion] (less 2 coys.) Indian Infantry.

1 Battery R.F.A. (T.).

2 M.G. Sections (Indian Infantry).

Gurkha

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

Shallufa

1 Coy. Indian Infantry

1 M.G. Section (Indian Infantry).

Geneffe

14 men, Indian Infantry.

Suez

2 1/2 Battalions (local reserve).

SECTOR II. (Deversoir to El Ferdan, both inclusive.)

Headquarters - Ismailia Old Camp.

Troops.

22nd Brigade, less 3rd Brahmans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles).

28th F.F. Bde. (51st and 53rd Sikhs, 56th Punjabis, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

Bikanir Camel Corps (less 3 1/2 Coys.).

M.G. Section of Egyptian Camel Corps.

1 Brigade R.F.A. (T.).

1 Battery Indian Mountain Artillery.

2 Field Ambulances.

Posts in Sector.

Deversoir

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

7 men Bikanir Camel Corps.

Serapeum E.

2 Coys. Indian Infantry.

7 men Bikanir Camel Corps.

Serapeum W.

22nd Brigade (less 2 battalions and one half-coy.).

1 Bty. R.F.A. (T.).

1 Field Ambulance.

Tussum

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

7 men Bikanir Camel Corps.

Gebel Mariam

Observation Post.

Ismailia Ferry

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

Bikanir C.C. (less 3 1/2 Coys.) and M.G. Section Egyptian Camel Corps.

1 Bn. Indian Infantry.

1 Bty. R.F.A. (T.).

1 Section Indian Mountain Artillery.

1 Wireless Section (T.).

1 Field Ambulance.

Ismailia Old Camp

28th Bde. [Brigade] (less one battalion and one coy.).

21st Bty. Indian Mountain Artillery.

(Local Reserve.)

SECTOR III.

(El Ferdan, exclusive, to Port Said, inclusive.)

Headquarters - Qantara

Troops

29th Bde. (14th Sikhs, 69th and 89th Punjabis, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Bn. 22nd Bde.

1/2 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

2 Coys. Bikanir Camel Corps.

2 Batteries R.F.A. (T.).

26th Bty. Indian Mountain Artillery.

Armoured Train with 1/2 Coy. Indian Infantry.

Wireless Section (T.).

Indian Field Ambulance.

Detachment R.A.M.C. (T.).

Posts in Sector.

Ballah

2 Platoons Indian Infantry.

Qantara E.

29th Bde. (less 1 coy.).

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

2 Coys. Bikanir Camel Corps.

1/2 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Bty. Indian Mountain Artillery.

Wireless Section (T.).

Qantara W.

Armoured Train, etc.

2 Batteries R.F.A. (T.).

El Kab   

1/2 Platoon Indian Infantry.

Tina

1/2 Platoon Indian Infantry.

Ras El Esh

1 Platoon Indian Infantry

Salt Works

1 Company Indian Infantry.

New Canal Works..

1 Company Indian Infantry

Port Said

1 Bn. Indian Infantry (less 2 coys.).

ADVANCED ORDNANCE DEPOT

ZAGAZIG.

Troops.

1 Bn. 32nd (I.S.) Brigade.

ENGINEER WORK

DEFENCE OF RAILWAY AND SWEET WATER CANAL.

Troops.

1 Troop Imp. Service Cavalry,

1/2 Coy. Bikanir Camel Carps,

1/2 Coy. Indian Infantry.

GENERAL RESERVE CAMP, MOASCAR.

Troops.

31st Brigade (less 1 coy.), (2nd Q.V.O. Rajput L.I., 27th Punjabis, 93rd Burma Infantry, 128th Pioneers).

32nd (I.S.) Bde., less 1 battalion (33rd Punjabis, Alwar, Gwalior, and Patiala Infantry).

Imp. Service Cav. Bd.. (less 3 squadrons and 1 troop).

1 Egyptian R.E. Section (Camels),

1 Egyptian Mountain Battery.

2 Sections Field Artillery with Cavalry Brigade.

3 Indian Field Ambulances

The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, 1915, Part II: The British Defenses, 1: Naval and Air Units

Yesterday I began this series on the Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal in January/February 1915 with a look at the Ottoman plans and order of battle. Today  we will look at the British defense preparations. The British preparations are recorded in much more detail, and today I want to begin with looking at naval and air deployments. On Monday, we'll look at the British/Indian/ANZAC ground force deployments. (Other than a few machine-gun units and some logistical support, the Egyptian Army was not used; Egypt was not a recognized belligerent.)

The Royal Navy

Admiral Richard Peirse

While both sides in the Canal battle had ground troops and a handful of aircraft, Britannia still ruled the waves, and the Royal Navy is considered the senior service, so it is appropriate to begin with the naval defense of Britain's vital naval lifeline to India. As we noted last year, the Commander-in Chief of Britain's East Indies Station in the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia, Vice Admiral Richard Peirse, had transferred his command to Port Said in order to defend the Canal.

HMS Swiftsure

His flagship, HMS Swiftsure, a pre-Dreadnought class battleship, was based at Port Said. and the other British battleship on the scene, HMS Ocean was at Suez at the southern end of the Canal. The other heavy battleship, the French Requin, was an older ship built in 1885 and now classed as  coastal defense ship. It was birthed in a dredged birth in Lake Timsah, in mid-Canal.

Besides the capital ships, there were two protected cruisers, HMS Minerva and the French cruiser D'Entrecasteaux, the British sloop Clio, the British Armed Merchant Cruiser Himalaya (to be transferred fully to the Navy later), and the royal Indian Marine Ship RIMS Hardinge, in the naval service of British India.

The British plan was to deploy these vessels along the length of the Canal, particularly in those areas where their big naval guns could be brought to bear against attackers from the East Bank. There were certain limitations. As the official Naval History notes:

Though the canal provided excellent lateral communication, its advantage was a good deal discounted by the fact that in many places the sand dunes on the east bank were too high for the shell of the heavy guns to clear. This was specially the case from El Ferdan to Lake Timsah, also with all the centre section from Timsah to Deversoir, and finally the four miles between the southern end of the Bitter Lake and Shallufa. This difficulty also necessitated special arrangements for indirect fire wherever the gunlayers could not see over the banks, and their work was further hampered by the almost continuous mirage in the desert. A minor direct fire, however, was obtained by mounting light quick-firing guns and Maxims on the tops. The patrol boats could, of course, in no case fire over the banks, but they had power to enfilade any trenches the enemy might try to establish on the banks themselves.

The ships were deployed along the length of the Canal, a key support for the Infantry and Artillery Forces deployed along the Canal. As the Turkish force approached, the Royal Navy moved to their assigned stations along the Canal.

HMS Swiftsure moved from Port Said to take station just north of Qantara. As noted, she was also the flagship.

HMS Clio

A bit further south at the Ballah Ferry, the sloop HMS Clio took up station.

French coastal defense ship Requin

The French Requin was already berthed in Lake Timsah near Ismailia, as mentioned.

D'Entrecasteaux

Now the French protected cruiser D'Entrecasteaux moved to take position near the Requin,  also in Lake Timsah, but subsequently was moved south to Deversoir near the Great Bitter Lake.

RIMS Hardinge

Near that place the RIMS Hardinge, the aforementioned Royal Indian Marine Ship, was already deployed.
 It stood to the northwest of D'Entecasteaux.

HMS Minerva

The cruiser HMS Minerva took position at the Little Bitter Lake.

Himalaya

To the southward, the armed merchant cruiser Himalaya took position at Shallufa.

HMS Ocean

And finally, anchoring this line of naval power on the south just as Swiftsure was on the north, the other battleship, HMS Ocean, took position at El Shatt, where a major road across Sinai crosses the Canal near Suez.

The British and French aircraft presence

Air power was still very new in January 1915. The Wright Brothers first flew in 1903 and sold an aircraft to the US Army in 1909. In 1911 during the Italo-Turkish War in Libya, Italy became the first country to use aerial bombing in wartime. (They also used Zeppelins.) In the Suez campaign, British land-based aircraft and French seaplanes proved invaluable in detecting and tracking the Ottoman advance across Sinai, thus denying the Turks the element of surprise. As I already discussed that role in a January 13 post,  for completeness' sake I am simply going to quote what I said then, and the passages I quoted then, and the photo I ran then:

The British had only a handful of reconnaissance aircraft available in Egypt, along with some French seaplanes. The British Official History (Military Operations Egypt and Palestine) describes the situation:

Egypt was watchful and fairly well informed. The British aeroplanes available were incapable of long flights. [The detachment under Major S. D. Massy, 29th Punjabis, consisted of three Maurice Farmans sent from Avonmouth in November, two Henri Farmans taken over in Egypt, and one B3.E2a which arrived from India in December. The aerodrome was at Ismailia, with a landing ground at Qantara. For long reconnaissances into Sinai it was found necessary to send out troops to prepare temporary landing grounds some miles east of the Suez Canal. The longest flight ever carried out was 176 miles, for which a specially large petrol tank had to be fitted to the machine. This, however, was after the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal.] The French seaplanes, put at Sir J. Maxwell's disposal in November, of which there were seven in the Aenne Rickmers - a captured cargo steamer equipped as a seaplane carrier at Port Said, were better, though far from powerful enough for the work they were called upon to perform. Hard driven Jan, by an energetic commander, Lieutenant de Vaisseau de l'Escaille, they carried out reconnaissance flights which were remarkable, particularly in view of the fact that the forced descent of a seaplane on land meant almost certain death for pilot and observer. [Thus in December Lieutenant de Vaisseau Destrem, with a British officer as observer, on two occasions flew up the Wadi Arabi from Aqaba and strove to surmount the steep range east of the valley, in order to reconnoitre Ma'an, on the Hejaz Railway. The task was beyond the power of the 80 h.p. engine, but attempts were continued by him and others until Sir J. Maxwell ordered them to stop, fearing that they would cost him one of his invaluable pilots. In the same month Lieutenant de Vaisseau Delage took off from the Doris off El Arish, flew over Gaza, then turned south-east to Beersheba. On his return his engine stopped while he was still ten miles from the sea. The wind just carried the seaplane over the water, but it was in a sinking condition when the Doris steamed up from El Arish (a distance of 35 miles) to its rescue.] From information obtained by them and from the reports of agents it became clear that the attack would not be much longer delayed, and almost certain that it would come through Central Sinai. It was known to the headquarters of the Force in Egypt that a large force, including the 10th, 23rd, and 27th Divisions, was assembled close to the frontier about Beersheba.

A report by General Sir John Maxwell, the overall commander in Egypt, discusses the air situation before and during the attack on the Canal:

Part of 30th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, under the command of Brevet Major S. D. Massy, I.A., with Headquarters at Ismailia, carried out daily reconnaissances without a single important accident. 

The French Naval Seaplane detachment, with Headquarters at Port Said, under the command of Capitaine de Vaisseau de-l'Escaille, whose services were placed at my disposal for Intelligence purposes, was continually employed in reconnoitering the Syrian, and Anatolian Coast from the requisitioned vessels "Raven" and "Anne" The results of their work were invaluable. The "Anne" was torpedoed near Smyrna during an armistice while employed by the Royal Navy, but was fortunately able to reach Mudros, where she was patched up and returned to Port Said. I cannot speak too highly of the work of the seaplane detachment. Lengthy land flights are extremely dangerous, yet nothing ever stopped these gallant French aviators from any enterprise. I regret the loss of  two of these planes whilst making dangerous land flights over Southern Syria.

The air reconnaissance capabilities may have been limited, but they gave the British ample warning that the Turkish Army was moving into Sinai.

HMS Anne (ex-German Aenne Rickmers); 2 seaplanes either side of rear mast