EMBRACING THE OPPOSITION

BY PHILIP J CUNNINGHAM

A powerful regime, facing a rare moment of vulnerability, is all of a sudden interested in reform and willing to talk. It invites its arch-enemies to the negotiating table. But once the crowds are gone, what guarantee remains that the police state will not regroup and retrench and strike back with a vengeance?

Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman met with members of the opposition over the weekend. What remains unclear is if the Mubarak regime is sincerely extending an open hand of peace to the opposition, or trying to draw them in close enough so they can be slapped or lured into a trap. Is the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood a heartfelt bid to hear all sides or a plan to sow division in a protest that to date has been notable for being leaderless, secular, spontaneous and youthful?

Given the low esteem with which the Muslim Brotherhood is viewed in Israel, Europe and the US, extending an olive branch to the banned, radical opposition might seem paradoxical at first. But it is sometimes easier for entrenched power to deal with its arch-enemy, the enemy that it knows, and not only knows, but probably needs, as an existential doppelganger. On a certain functional level it may be easier for a ruthless power to deal with, if not respect, another ruthless, tightly organized entity, rather than deal with a random mass of peaceful moderates without a hierarchical political organization.

Certainly in other places, at other times, this paradoxical embrace of the opposite can be seen in effect. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US found it easier to work with Japan’s old wartime elite than the communists, pacifists and trade unionists who opposed Tokyo’s war on Asia. In recent decades, Beijing’s rulers have found it easier to engage the Communist Party of China’s arch-enemy represented by the KMT party on Taiwan, rather than deal respectfully with rag-tag individuals such as Liu Xiaobo, and many thousands of others, who demonstrated at Tiananmen Square in 1989.

Thus, what appears at first glance a gesture of inclusion on the part of the Egyptian regime might in fact be a bid to exclude the moderate core demonstrators and keep the focus on mutually antagonistic extremes instead.

Suleiman, who has emerged for the moment as Washington’s go-to guy in trying to find a resolution to Egypt’s political impasse, might be acceptable to his foreign interlocutors, but demonstrators on the scene, including Nobel laureate Mohamed El Baradei, tend not to agree. Is it really realistic to expect a regime of thirty years standing and a reputation for brutality to change its game overnight? Is it likely to keep the promises it makes under pressure?

The search to find a stand-in for the Egyptian government who is minimally acceptable to demonstrators, the regime and its foreign allies alike will continue apace.

Meanwhile, Suleiman articulated his bid for recognition by trumpeting a meeting held on his terms with selected members of the opposition. In an English language summary released on February 6, 2011 by his office, the long-standing intelligence chief put forward some promising points, even as veiled threats and dark innuendos were woven into the script.

Suleiman’s official statement offers some valuable clues as to what the regime is thinking right now. The regime has not lost its cool, it is calm and seemingly in control. It puts forward a public relations release that is part complaint, part threat, part a bid to appear reasonable, and part misdirection.

The document reads like the minutes of an "action meeting;" it is at once sophomoric and stifling, full of trumped-up promise and riddled with veiled threats; sort of like a cross between the minutes of a high school student council meeting and a withering assessment made in a US State Department cable of the sort made famous by Wikileaks.

"All participants of the dialogue arrived at a consensus..."

As is usually the case when words are offered in lieu of action, terms that sound good can mean very much or very little, and even words that please the ear can mean different things to different people. The promise to deal with the crisis "seriously, expeditiously and honestly" is hard to find fault with, but what does it mean in concrete terms, given the grim context?

To hear Suleiman bemoaning the "lack of security for the populace" is ironic when the regime itself, which Mr. Suleiman earnestly represents, is the root cause of much insecurity, guilty as it is of unbridled corruption, documented brutality and a reputation for torture.

To buttress the stability-at-any-cost argument that follows, Suleiman's text makes mention of a litany of pressing problems, such as "the disturbances to daily life, the paralysis of public services," along with school closings and logistical delays slyly suggesting that the reaction to regime injustice --the determined and courageous and largely spontaneous gathering of peaceful demonstrators-- is the problem rather than the underlying injustice itself.

Surely Egypt would be less wobbly were Mubarak to resign immediately and enjoy his forty billion dollar private fortune in exile, but that's not the kind of stability Suleiman is alluding to. It is clearly stability with the regime intact that he is after.

Not surprisingly for a public relations statement that aims to create an aura of domestic solidarity while reining in a nationalism gone awry, Suleiman pins the lion’s share of the blame on foreigners, a useful target for rogues everywhere since time immemorial.

"The attempts at foreign intervention into purely Egyptian affairs and breaches of security by foreign elements working to undermine stability in implementation of their plots," is the way he puts it, but it sounds uncannily like McCarthyism dressed up in local clothing. If Mr. Suleiman wants to reduce foreign influence in a nation that depends on tourism for ten percent of its revenue and depends on US taxpayer money to arm itself and stay afloat, he might start with refusing all aid and assistance from the US and Israel.

The text is at times haughty and uncompromising in tone. Suleiman comes across as a proud and fairly dignified figure on TV, and he has an air about him that suggests the hard-to-shake confidence of the ruling class in a country of extreme wealth and poverty. The arrogant tone shifts only briefly with a nice sop to the demonstrators in Tahrir Square. It sounds like a protective mantra, a minimum condition, perhaps one proposed by those members of the opposition present. It's a formulaic line, but one worth remembering: "The 25 January movement is an honorable and patriotic movement."

The official notes on the meeting go on to say, a bit too promisingly, that a high degree of consensus was found "on a number of political arrangements."

This section that follow seems to come in response to President Obama's public statements, calling for meaningful change, now. But it also takes a defiant note, implying some things are non-negotiable, as made evident in Mubarak's mule-like resistance to stepping down, while offering some superficial changes and a promise not to run again. "No nomination for a new presidential term will take place," says the statement. What follows are vague promises of constitutional reform which may be the product of earnest internal discussion, but also serve the purpose of buying time for the regime haunted by a ticking clock.

Clause number 7, which calls for "Restoring the security and stability of the nation, and tasking the police forces to resume their role in serving and protecting the people," certainly sounds like a bid to restore the status quo.

In the past few weeks, the police were rather more part of the problem than a solution to it, alternately engaged in heavy-handed arrests and volatile provocations of the crowd, in tandem with a disappearing act that made their invisibility painfully "visible" in the context of orchestrated looting, prisoner escapes and damage to national treasures including a statue of King Tut. For those who don’t get easily upset at head-cracking, there was the unthinkable threat of damage to priceless artifacts. (This is reminiscent of the “outrage” of the Asia Society in New York during the Vietnam War which had nothing to say about the bombing and napalming of the Cambodian people but got visibly upset at the possibility that the ruins of Angkor Wat might be damaged.)

What turned out to be a minor attack on the National Museum served up an appetite for a dose of law and order, which of course did not bode well for the crowd assembling adjacent to the museum.

The most significant areas of "agreement" that the Suleiman statement puts forward --that of releasing prisoners of conscience, ending emergency law and liberalizing the media with no extra-legal constraints-- certainly sound like welcome changes, but the devil is in the details and the implementation. The document does not promise to release political prisoners, but rather announces “the establishment of a bureau to receive complaints" which in the end might address some long-term miscarriages of justice while leaving others unresolved. What progress such a bureau might achieve would most likely be slow and halting, dragging with the glacial pace common to a bureau wrapped inside of a bureaucracy.

Likewise, for Suleiman to proclaim that the state of emergency will be lifted “based on the security situation” is to say not much at all, unless it happens soon.

The text goes on to offer a salute to the patriotic and loyal role played by Egypt’s Armed Forces, which sounds a bit like a pat on the back, since Mubarak and Suleiman sit on the top of the pyramid of a military regime, but it remains intriguing inasmuch as the army has, to date, behaved better than the police. When it comes to wishful thinking, both the regime and opposition like to think the army is on their side.

The only real clause with bite is the xenophobic stab that follows: "All participants expressed their absolute rejection of any and all forms of foreign intervention in internal Egyptian affairs."

That’s reasonable reaction for a once-colonized nation on a certain level, but it is also blatantly hypocritical, and not just because the Mubarak regime depends on US aid for its survival. Presumably Suleiman is in touch with the US State Department and the White House, and may well be taking into account specific "instructions" issued to his regime that go beyond the timorous, ambiguous, and sometimes backtracked calls for change being made by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in public. Call it diplomacy, or the art of saving face for the rich and powerful.

Overall, the statement leaves one wondering if there’s any daylight between Mubarak and Suleiman at all. Suleiman is part and parcel of, and continues to serve with something akin to abject loyalty, the self-styled modern-day pharaoh Mubarak. Like a loyal consigliere, there’s a touch of humility to the subordinate man’s arrogance, and although titular vice-president, he is quick to disavow any interest in power.

Another dedicated number-two, and coincidentally an old pal of Hosni Mubarak, none other than ex-vice President Dick Cheney, has also joined the fray. He says Mubarak is a loyal friend of the US. No stranger to arrogance himself, Cheney suggests, as he did throughout his campaign to fool the American public and force a war in Iraq, that he is privileged to know things that ordinary citizens can only guess about. In any case, he rather inadvertently drives home the point that the American public is not always aware of what kind of behind-the-scene deals are being made in its name by the White House.

In the end, if the Cairo regime, in this, its moment of desperation, finds foreign influence so truly objectionable, then it would be morally and ideologically consistent to stop accepting the hard-earned dollars of American taxpayers and go it alone, facing the wrath of a people long betrayed, not just by foreigners, but by their own leaders.

EVERY UPRISING IS DIFFERENT

Philip J Cunningham


Every uprising is different. But given shared human strengths and weaknesses, the dynamics of crowd behavior, crowd control, and crowd chaos play out in ways that strike a common chord. Having written about popular protest, cultural clashes and street marches in East Asia for two decades now, there are certain commonalities that come to fore as the events in Cairo, as reported by Al Jazeera and other Internet sources, unfold in real time on my computer screen.

-Truth is an early casualty of any conflict, and the media comes under pressure almost immediately. Competing media narratives diverge wildly, usually the storytelling of the government pitted against the storytelling of the protesters. Distortions to the truth range from outright lies and censorship, to mudslinging, misdirection and deliberate prevarications. There is obfuscation and startling clarity. There are also moments of heartfelt expression, courageous calls for change and sometimes shocking clandestine reports from the frontlines of the conflict.

-Television stations are a coveted resource for those seeking political control. State television, even when it is reduced to producing propaganda, is such an effective transmitter of information, (including mis-information, mid-direction and gaping silences) in regards to an escalating crisis that it can inadvertently help fan the flames of nationwide protest. Even when the details of a mass incident in progress are garbled or distorted by heavy-handed censorship, the fingerprints of the heavy-handedness are visible for all to see. The odd, Orwellian quality of manipulated news, what with its revved up nationalistic fervor, glaring contradictions, threatening reassurances and a rather too loud pleading of innocence, is politically charged enough to betray meta-truths about the abject nature of the regime.

-Journalists are at risk. Be it for their truth-telling capacity or simply a vengeful way of blaming the messenger, journalists often get roughed up as public disturbances unfold. Journalists are detained and denied access to key locations, often in the name of safety. Western journalists are especially easy to find as they tend to hole up in luxury hotels where they are subject to surveillance, harassment, and confiscation of film, memory chips, cameras, etc.

-Al Jazeera TV. The upstart TV station based in Qatar has come of age, although it observes, like every news service on the earth, certain ground rules and avoids certain sensitive topics. Its unique take on world news is largely ignored by US cable TV providers, but luckily Al Jazeera Internet streaming can reach a truly global audience, providing a service to viewers whose television and cable service is tilted in favor of the national agendas of the traditional media giants such as CNN, BBC, Fox and ABC. In what might be understood as a backhanded compliment, Al Jazeera has been accused of meddling by the Egyptian government.

-The Internet. Online news services, specialist blogs, Twitter and social networking tools have helped get the story out as well. Advanced information technologies, and the costly, complex devices required to view the news on, are convenient when they work well, and they work especially well across borders at global distances, but remain largely out of the reach of the poor and can be rendered momentarily worthless when the plug gets pulled, as was the case in Egypt when the Internet was turned off. The technology itself is neutral, and there are various ingenious ways to get around blocking, but despite the freedom of expression hype, modern tools are no different from the printing press or radio in the sense that they can be used to further things good and bad and can be used to promote the cause of either side through skillful public relations and information control.

-Word of mouth. Fortunately, the information ecosystem is full of diverse platforms and incidental redundancies; if one technology fails, or is blocked, other ways of transmitting information remain. This includes everything from hardy, traditional technologies such as landline telephones and fax machines to hand-painted banners, chants, slogans and word of mouth.

-Rumors. Rightly or wrongly, rumors take the place of reliable information when reliable information is hard to come by. Rumors serve to excite people to action. The more severe information control at home, the more likely agitated citizens are to turn to the latest gossip on the street.

-Crowd dynamics. When a large crowd manages to gather and assemble, especially in an environment where political gatherings are generally banned and ruthlessly suppressed, success breeds success. If ten, a hundred, a thousand brave individuals get away with the impossible, it inspires others to follow.

-Something in the air. When a large crowd asserts itself in public space and coalesces on symbolic ground, a window is opened to possible political change, an opportunity not normally evident. An indefinable “something in the air,” combined with concrete opportunities for assembly, adequate channels for expression and a broad consensus that change is desirable if not necessary, helps kick-start a major public uprising. When this takes the form of staking out contested ground in the heart of the capital its significance is magnified in a way that enables a crowd to grow exponentially. Under the natural evolution of such circumstances, the crowd is likely to be diverse and composed of people from all walks of life.

-Safety in numbers. When the numbers soar to the hundred of thousands, not only do individual members of the crowd begin to feel uncannily safe –however illusory that protective aura might be – but it gives rise to a sense that a historic turning point is at hand. Suddenly, due to a confluence of rising frustration, mutual reinforcement, strength in numbers and chance developments, there’s a perception that an unprecedented and largely unexpected overhaul to the status quo just might be possible. It’s a bid to hit society’s reset button.

-The art of the unexpected. If a protest takes root without much advance warning in a challenging environment, it has succeeded so swiftly and against such odds as to not be taken seriously at first. Rather it is treated like a fluke, something to be haughtily dismissed by men accustomed to the privileges of extreme wealth and supreme power.

-Play-acting is part of the game. Regimes under siege will resort to all sorts of cagey strategies; everything from arrogant claims of noblesse oblige, to lying about their true aims and intentions in order to buy time with which to restore power and sweep up the opposition. “Your demands have been answered,” newly named Vice President Omar Suleiman pre-emptively announced as a clearly unplacated crowd began to gather in earnest on Tahrir Square in Cairo on February 3, 2011.

-Offers of superficial change. Powerful figures will feign ignorance, sympathy, offer up partial apologies and assume a quasi-humble posture in hopes of buying time to regain power. Hosni Mubarak could make a fiction of stepping down by appointing a loyal flunky to act in his stead. Even political theatre that went so far as to appoint an unknown to power, or even a moderate opposition figure would not necessarily be evidence of serious systemic change so long as the levers of control and the powers behind the curtain remained the same.

-Insincere concessions. All sorts of promises might be made with the aim of diffusing popular rage rather than truly negotiating or acceding to popular demands. Then, once the crowd was dispersed and the security forces regained the upper hand, a purge of the opposition would follow. Then the powers that be could quietly re-impose something close to the old, unjust status quo, with the rich as rich as ever, and the police-security elite as powerful as before.

-Blatant intimidation. “Police brutality is… a daily occurrence,” but hidden, according to a US State Department cable made available by Wikileaks. The sort of abuse that was once hidden in police stations, Interior Ministry facilities, and black sites used for extraordinary renditions at the behest of the US during “peaceful” times is now out in the open. Increasingly, callous tactics and shocking abuses of power are taking place in the streets for all to see. Speeding security vans knocking people off their feet have been caught on camera, Molotov cocktails have been thrown at protesters by regime-supporting thugs, while agents-provocateur infiltrate the crowd carrying glossy posters of Mubarak, knives, clubs, even have resorted to using horses and camels to intimidate.

-Crowd solidarity. Crowds look unitary but are in fact a diverse mix. Some individual actors in a crowd are strident believers in a cause, others vaguely sympathetic, some are opportunistic, others just curious, some full of rage, others full of joy, while others still are just hapless commuters and bystanders who get in the way.

-Crowd leadership. When the names and faces of leaders of an uprising are not evident, the confusion makes the movement vulnerable to manipulation or dissolution, even as it lends strength to the impression that the gathering is truly a spontaneous mass movement. When not a scripted disciplined, partisan effort, or a expertly directed demonstration, a crowd is near impossible to control. But a large diverse crowd, even if innocent by its very lack of organization, is vulnerable to being hijacked by better organized, and perhaps more ruthless elements within.

-Popular demands. In the tentative, early stages, crowd demands are likely to focus on a simple, simplistic plea, such as calling for dialogue or removal of a single leader. As tensions rise and the impasse grows, and as violent reprisals further energize the mob, crowd demands are likely to escalate and bifurcate, with incipient divisions within the crowd coming to the fore. Who shall lead? Shall violence be met with passive resistance or violent action? Shall the extremists or moderates be allowed to win the day? Who are the real patriots? Factions will be portrayed as insufficiently moderate or insufficiently radical.

-Every crowd is different. As demonstration-weary denizens of Bangkok know all too well, crowds can be uplifting and crowds can be menacing, sometimes both at the same time. When popular protests split into competing groups, and take on “colors” as happened in Thailand in recent years with competing red shirts and yellow shirts and blue shirts and black shirts, the pretence of unity is gone and something akin to gang warfare takes its place.

-Provinces take cues from the metropole. Big demonstrations in a nation’s capital take on a symbolic importance that reverberates to the hinterland. The student-led protests in Beijing in 1989 inspired sympathetic protests in many cities across China, most prominently in Shanghai and Chengdu.

-Who speaks for the crowd? A crowd divided amongst its own, cannot articulate demands, respond to dialogue and react to concessions in a coherent way. The very definition of what the crowd wants shifts and fractures. If dialogue is taking place, it is unlikely to be fruitful in the face of rising expectations for success on the side with the upper hand.

-Lack of an exit strategy. Given the emotional momentum of shared risk, shared dreams and the bonds of instant comradeship in the midst a sea of strangers, it becomes increasingly difficult to break up the party and leave, especially in a spontaneous gathering that depends on each individual to play a role. Inside a demonstration, freedom of movement is proscribed, food and drink depends on kindness of strangers, sanitation is a mess and living in the open under the sun and moon takes its toll.

-Crowd momentum. It can be to surprisingly difficult to convince those who have put their lives on the line, or those who have been energized by the hypnotic pull of crowd dynamics, to cede the “holy” ground, even though they suffer physical discomfort and may be at personal risk. After giving their all to a cause, a human whirlwind that is part carnival, part killing fields, it seems a betrayal, especially if partisan blood has already been spilled, to yield to the other side. Even under less tragic conditions, it is hard to break from the pull of a genial, dedicated crowd and acknowledge defeat by going home.

-Crowd compliance. Even when the crowd leaders call on their supporters to leave, compliance is reluctant at best. Crowds are notoriously fickle and difficult to rope in. This was especially evident in Bangkok, Thailand last year when rank and file members of the red shirt demonstration refused to budge even with gunfire resounding down the road. There was visible shock and there were vocal wails of disappointment on the part of hard-core red shirt followers -mostly older folk visiting Bangkok from the provinces who had faithfully sat in the street for weeks by the red-shirt sound stage- when their leaders threw in the towel on May 19, 2010 and surrendered to police.

-Follow the money. Crowds crowing for a particular leader, especially if that leader is a billionaire and wily political operator, undermine their own legitimacy as they can be seen to be serving vested interests, and perhaps even pecuniary self-interest.

-Hijacking the crowd. The positive energy directed at social injustice can be appropriated and even hijacked to support one particular faction or ambitious political leader or a cultural or religious agenda to the detriment of the stated ideals. For example, while the pro-Thaksin activists in Bangkok might style their activities as being “pro-democracy”, and their rhetoric made ample use of the “D” word, in terms of hierarchical loyalties, they nonetheless share something in common with the pro-Mubarak crowds in Cairo. Taking money and marching orders from powerful political figures, or their proxies, erodes the democratic credentials of a movement.

-Cultural arguments. Culture is distorted and re-defined, providing a refuge for scoundrels. Whether it be Japan’s “unique” culture arguments justifying the interring at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo the “souls” of pro-imperial Japan warriors, or phony arguments about Japan being a whale-meat eating society, cultural values are invoked to inhibit debate and hide ulterior motives. In Egypt, Mubarak has apparently created a cult of Pharaonic overtones, making his identity and that of a proud nation seem like one.

-Family ties. As Egypt intelligence supremo Omar Suleiman says, “We all respect Mubarak as father.” He goes on to suggest it is not in the culture of good Egyptians to revolt. When a politician under fire is compared to one’s mother or father, the implication is that the dear leader is in an inviolable position, and that any resistance would be unfilial, if not futile. This presumptuous argument is deliberately fostered and foisted upon the people in order to inculcate the notion that the people owe their nurturance and very existence to the exalted leader.

-Foreign meddling. During an uprising, it’s almost certain there will be allegations of foreign involvement and hidden plots, and in this interconnected world it is easy enough to find traces of foreign involvement, especially on the part of powerful intelligence services. To make such accusations is a common enough diversionary tactic for an unpopular regime under siege, though in the case of Egypt it’s a nakedly hypocritical complaint. The Mubarak regime itself is the product of 30 years of foreign meddling as it has been supported, bolstered and groomed by Washington to the tune of one or two billion dollars a year, partly with the aim of "buying" peace with Israel, courtesy of the US taxpayer.

-Army neutrality. At such a juncture, the army's strength is paradoxically best shown by utter restraint, strict neutrality and the ability to restrain violent outbreaks without resorting to violence. If and when the army draws blood, it becomes tainted by perceptions of partisanship and weakens its legitimacy as protector of all citizens. The army is too blunt an instrument to be used in a crackdown.

-Class cleavages. Even if one knew nothing about the years of torture, mysterious disappearances and brutal police controls in Egypt, the obscene corruption of Mubarak, -personal worth estimated worth 40 billion- tells you all you need to know about why so many people, and not just the poor, hate him. The gross inequities of the status quo and corruption of the ruling class indeed need to be challenged as they are rightfully being challenged right now.

LOST IN THE SKY

Philip J Cunningham

The US State of the Union address is consummate political theatre, the highest expression of democratic showmanship. It's full of rousing words -bigger, faster, better- and lofty phrases that take flight like balloons released at a political rally -red, white and blue- that go gently leaping into the night, soaring, glistening, ebullient and full of promise.

President Barack Obama's speech on Jan 25 had a staged quality, not just because of the tight scripting, the lights and cameras, but because applause is so much part of the show that it is written into the White House transcript of the event. It's tea-leaf reading time, as pundits ponder protocol and seating arrangements, a time for trotting out model workers and latter-day Lei Feng characters whose decency and integrity serves to sanitise, by association, the wily politicians who talk about them.

Despite the well-presented rhetoric, Mr Obama contradicts himself as surely as he looks left and then to the right, then back again, keeping up with the tele-prompter. If he appears to be speaking out of both sides of his mouth, it is a testament to wanting it both ways.

After green-lighting trillions for the corrupt on Wall Street, he acknowledges that the rich, too, should be taxed. He wants to cut taxes and increase spending. He invites the Pentagon to find some fat to trim, but sends them to war, effectively a blank cheque for endless spending.

He cites the greatness of American colleges -part of what makes them great is stubborn independence that keeps the government and military at arm's length- but wants the military back on campus.

He jokes about his government's intrusive body checks at airports as a plug for trains yet unbuilt. He's shocked at a random incident of violence at home but brushes over the chronic violence of the US war effort abroad.

Politically-correct rhetoric about racial diversity and sexual tolerance in the US armed forces sounds good, but does not change a flawed foreign policy or mitigate ill-considered, inhumane military adventurism abroad.

Mr Obama conjures up a misleading vision of American troops leaving Iraq with their heads high, failing to acknowledge the tens of thousands who left on their backs, shipped out in boxes and on stretchers, having sacrificed life and limb in a gratuitous war.

And after nine years of fruitless effort to destroy the Taliban, he's calling for more bombs over the Hindu Kush.

One clear dividend of Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent state visit to Washington is that China-bashing, a popular contact sport for opportunistic political hacks in the capital, was written out of the script.

China does figure in the speech, and in largely positive light, as a goad to American competitiveness. China is "building faster trains and newer airports'', it has solar research and faster computers, it has made efforts in education and it is supporting new jobs in the United States.

What is implied but is left unsaid is that China is the new "other'', filling the vacuum left by the demise of the USSR. It has become the new yardstick, comparison with which is the new criteria for measuring American success.

Wisely avoiding a blame game, Mr Obama instead struggles to bolster a sense of American exceptionalism, even as the economy is teetering, invoking everything from the universality of US ideals to the implicit support of the Almighty in heaven above.

He cites things that supposedly set the US apart as a nation:

"We do big things... We're a nation that says "I might not have a lot of money, but I have this great idea for a new company... I might not come from a family of college graduates, but I will be the first to get my degree...''

All of the above may be true. But can the same not be said for China and other countries?

Then he sounds a bit like Bush Jr, recycling the swagger when he proclaims, "We have taken the fight to al-Qaeda'' and "we will defeat you''.

And the mild-mannered Democrat can be triumphalist, too. "Tonight we can say American leadership has been renewed and America's standing has been restored.''

But Mr Obama generally has a gentler way with words than his predecessor. Consider this Orwellian euphemism for the bloody and inaccurate drone attacks on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border: "Their leaders and operatives are being removed from the battlefield.''

At one point Mr Obama complains that cutbacks make America a plane without an engine, flying high due to the lightened load, but sure to soon "feel the impact''. Why ditch the engine? How about a "plane of state'' that is not weighed down with heavy bombs on its wing tips?

A most inappropriate comparison is invoked when Mr Obama -under whose negligent stewardship the American space programme has scuttled plans for Moon and Mars projects- declares that this is a "Sputnik moment''. More like a Sputnik yawn. A decade from now, if there are any men in space at all, it will be because China rose to pick up the challenge where America left off.

A space race is not without political drama, but how much better it would be for all of us if the urge for competitive aggression, invasion and application of military know-how were played out exploring the Moon and other uninhabited worlds, rather than pummelling delicate, crowded planet Earth.

Mr Obama closes with the usual religious pieties. But why, pray tell, should God bless America? If there is a God, it is jarring to think that the Almighty would take so prejudiced an interest in political boundaries as to bless one nation at the expense of others.

Remember those balloons? Soon after the exhilaration of release, they drift out of sight, then lose air and altitude. They shrink, shrivel, pucker up and then drop from the sky, one by one, with only tattered bits of rubber to show for their once lofty promise.


(as published in Bangkok Post)