An open can of Heineken in the hand of an Afghan youth pedalling a bicycle seemed an unusual sight for noon in Kabul, so I asked our driver what this was about. He laughed, and said: “Don’t you know? This is democracy.”

While democracy is notoriously difficult to define, it is generally considered to be something positive. Until the debacle of the August presidential elections, “fledgling democracy” was touted as one of the west’s great achievements in Afghanistan.

Yet we might as well be living in an alternative universe from many Afghans. Our “democracy” is about accountability, citizen participation and leaders serving at the discretion of the people. But unfortunately, many Afghans perceive “democracy” as impunity, abuse of power and a new political and business class exploiting its position to enrich itself. Above all else, many perceive “democracy” as something foreign.

While Afghan attitudes are diverse and complex, for many, the post-2001 democracy introduced by the west is perceived more as a lifestyle than a political system. As a recent paper from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit notes, it is seen both by the west (positively) and Afghans (negatively) as including not just a political system but also “liberal values such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion”. With the western emphasis on “individual liberal free-doms” over Afghan cultural and religious norms, it is no surprise western democracy has become “associated with immorality and secularism”.

The Afghans’ previous experience with “democracy” began in 1978, when the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (the communists) imprisoned and killed thousands of citizens, assaulted cultural traditions and launched the country into three decades of war from which it has yet truly to emerge. Given these two recent experiences with “democracy”, it is no wonder that in some segments of society the phrase itself has become a sort of joke or even an insult.

This is not to say that Afghans do not desire a government that is responsive to the people, but many question whether the current political leaders and system are capable of bringing that sort of just and accountable rule to Afghanistan.

With the allegations of “industrial scale” fraud and the very public discord within the international community on how to respond, the August elections felt like a success mainly for the Taliban and others who wish the government ill.

The immediate crisis has now been defused by President Hamid Karzai’s agreeing, after an astonishing round of phone calls and consultations with world leaders, to participate in a second round (mandated if no candidate exceeds 50 per cent in the first round). Yet many doubt whether the November 7 run-off election can improve on the flawed August 20 one.

In fact, fears of additional violence, fraud or an even lower turnout have reduced the appetite of many Afghans and members of the international community for a second round. While preparations steam furiously ahead, many are already looking past November 7. A credible run-off may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient to produce a government with the legitimacy that is so desperately needed to put the country on a renewed course towards stability.

As with so much else in Afghanistan, there are no easy answers. Despite Afghans’ bad memories of previous coalition governments, many feel the best way forward is a government of national unity that conveys its intention to act seriously and courageously on the grievances (security, justice) that have troubled Afghans for so long. A government of shared spoils, which simply divides power and resources among a larger circle (10 ministries for you, 14 for me), will not be seen as legitimate.

If this requires modifying elements of the political system through changing the constitution or a mechanism such as a Loya Jirga, or grand assembly, most Afghans may be willing. Given the ambiguity about what “democracy” means in Afghanistan, a pragmatic approach would not be, as some have said, a retreat to pre-democracy days. Rather, it would acknowledge that the current model is not working as planned, and that the people’s will is that it be changed to something Afghans recognise as democracy.

The writer is a research fellow at the Carr and Belfer Centers of the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University