While the American and international debate over Libya continues, the situation in Bahrain has just taken a sharp turn for the worse.  A brutal crackdown on the protestors followed the controversial entry of security forces from Saudi Arabia and three other GCC states.  Media access has been curtailed, with journalists finding it difficult to gain entry to the Kingdom (I was supposed to be in Bahrain right now myself, but elected not to try after several journalists let me know that they were being denied entry and several Embassies in Doha warned me off).  The road to political compromise and meaningful reform -- which appeared to have been within reach only a few days ago -- now appears to be blocked, which places the long-term viability of the Bahraini regime in serious question.

The response of the Bahraini regime has implications far beyond the borders of the tiny island Kingdom -- not only because along with Libya it has turned the hopeful Arab uprisings into something uglier, but because it is unleashing a regionwide resurgence of sectarian Sunni-Shi'a animosity.  Regional actors have enthusiastically bought in to the sectarian framing, with Saudi Arabia fanning the flames of sectarian hostility in defense of the Bahraini regime and leading Shia figures rising to the defense of the protestors.  The tenor of Sunni-Shi'a relations across the region is suddenly worse than at any time since the frightening days following the spread of the viral video of Sadrists celebrating the execution of Saddam Hussein.

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The approval by the Arab League of a No-Fly Zone for Libya, combined with increasingly urgent appeals from the Libyan opposition and some Arab voices, has helped build support for an international and American move in that direction. I am just leaving the Al-Jazeera Forum in Doha, where I had the opportunity to discuss this question in depth with a wide range of Arab opinion leaders and political activists as well as several leading Libyan opposition representatives (see this excellent post by Steve Clemons from the same conference). There is both more and less to this Arab support than meets the eye. Arabs are indeed deeply concerned about the bloody stalemate in Libya, and want international action. But if that action takes military form, including the kind of bombing would actually be required to implement a No-Fly Zone, I suspect that the narrative would rapidly shift against the United States.

While Arab public opinion should not be the sole consideration in shaping American decisions on this difficult question, Americans also should not fool themselves into thinking that an American military intervention will command long-term popular Arab support. Every Arab opinion leader and Libyan representative I spoke with at the conference told me that "American military intervention is absolutely unacceptable." Their support for a No Fly Zone rapidly evaporates when discussion turns to American bombing campaigns. This tracks with what I see in the Arab media and the public conversation. As urgently as they want the international community to come to the aid of the Libyan people, The U.S. would be better served focusing on rapid moves toward non-military means of supporting the Libyan opposition.

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I've spent the last few days in Beirut, thanks to a kind invitation from the American University of Beirut to give a talk about the role of the new media in the wave of Arab uprisings.  I took advantage of the trip to meet with a wide range of Lebanese politicians and political strategists, journalists and academics, as well as some local NGO specialists and some of that "youth" you hear so much about these days. And a really crazy taxi driver, but that's another story.  The highlight, perhaps, was the young woman at Saad Hariri's office, who had absolutely no idea who I was before I introduced myself, carefully perusing The Middle East Channel on her laptop.  

What struck me most about my conversations was the sense of calm, even complacency, in the Lebanese political class about the stability of the political scene and of their relative insulation from the wave of Arab protests.   Across political trends, few seemed especially worried that Lebanon would experience any kind of protest wave, or that the forthcoming indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon would lead to any particular turbulence. Indeed, there was little sense that they were especially affected by the Arab revolutions.  I can't quite decide whether to be reassured by this confidence that Lebanon really was different, or worried that it reflects an out-of-touch political elite about to be rudely surprised.  

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I've been traveling and writing some longer-form essays over the last two weeks, and am about to take off for two weeks in the Middle East.   But before I do, I want to put in a plug for the "Revolutions in the Arab World" FP e-book which I edited with Blake Hounshell and Susan Glasser.  I'm very proud of how quickly we were able to turn around the book, how well the real-time reporting and analysis stands up, and how beautifully produced the final version really is.   From the day we returned from the holiday publishing vacation, FP and the Middle East Channel were all over these historic, exhilerating, sometimes terrifying transformations.   The eBook offers a fantastic new publishing format to bring together the best of that analysis, to create something new and lasting out of the frenzy.   Check it out. 

In the meantime, this seems like a good time to step back and reflect:  where do things stand in the great upheavals which have shaken the Arab world over the last two months?  What should the Obama administration do about it?   

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The unfolding situation in Libya has been horrible to behold. No matter how many times we warn that dictators will do what they must to stay in power, it is still shocking to see the images of brutalized civilians which have been flooding al-Jazeera and circulating on the internet. We should not be fooled by Libya's geographic proximity to Egypt and Tunisia, or guided by the debates over how the United States could best help a peaceful protest movement achieve democratic change. The appropriate comparison is Bosnia or Kosovo, or even Rwanda where a massacre is unfolding on live television and the world is challenged to act. It is time for the United States, NATO, the United Nations and the Arab League to act forcefully to try to prevent the already bloody situation from degenerating into something much worse.

By acting, I mean a response sufficiently forceful and direct to deter or prevent the Libyan regime from using its military resources to butcher its opponents. I have already seen reports that NATO has sternly warned Libya against further violence against its people. Making that credible could mean the declaration and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya, presumably by NATO, to prevent the use of military aircraft against the protestors. It could also mean a clear declaration that members of the regime and military will be held individually responsible for any future deaths. The U.S. should call for an urgent, immediate Security Council meeting and push for a strong resolution condeming Libya's use of violence and authorizing targeted sanctions against the regime. Such steps could stand a chance of reversing the course of a rapidly deteriorating situation. An effective international response could not only save many Libyan lives, it might also send a powerful warning to other Arab leaders who might contemplate following suit against their own protest movements.

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It's frankly hard to believe today's news that Hosni Mubarak has finally stepped down as President of Egypt without a wave of bloodshed.  After yesterday's disappointment and today's anxiety, nothing could have been more welcome.   There will be plenty of time for post-mortems, and there will be an enormous amount of hard work to come to ensure that this actually becomes a transition to democracy and not simply to a reconstituted authoritarian regime.  But for today, it's okay to simply celebrate -- to stand in awe of the Egyptian people and their ability to topple a seemingly impenetrable dictator through massive, peaceful protests.  Nothing will ever be the same, and no Arab will ever forget today's scenes broadcast on al-Jazeera. This was an unprecedented victory for the Egyptian people, and at last a vindication of the Obama administration's patient and well-crafted strategy. 

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It's hard to exaggerate how bad Hosni Mubarak's speech today was for Egypt.   In the extended runup to his remarks, every sign indicated that he planned to announce his resignation: the military's announcement that it had taken control, the shift in state television coverage, a steady stream of leaks about the speech.   With the whole world watching, Mubarak instead offered a meandering, confused speech promising vague Constitutional changes and defiance of foreign pressure.   He offered a vaguely worded delegation of power to Vice President Omar Suleiman, long after everyone in Egypt had stopped listening.  It is virtually impossible to conceive of a more poorly conceived  or executed speech. 

Omar Suleiman's televised address which followed made things even worse, if that's possible, telling the people to go home and blaming al-Jazeera for the problems.   It solidified the already deep distrust of his role among most of the opposition and of the protestors, and tied his fate to that of Mubarak.    Even potentially positive ideas in their speeches, such as Constitutional amendments, were completely drowned out by their contemptuous treatment of popular demands.   Things could get ugly tonight --- and if things don't explode now, then the crowds tomorrow will be absolutely massive.    Whatever happens, for better or for worse, the prospects of an orderly, negotiated transition led by Omar Suleiman have just plummeted sharply.  

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There seems to be a congealing narrative that the Obama administration has thrown in its lot with Omar Suleiman, abandoned its push for democratic change, and succumbed to short-sighted pragmatism.  It's easy to see the attraction of this perspective.   Hopes and expectations that Friday would be the climactic day of Mubarak's departure shattered on his obstinate refusal, leaving many people deflated and frustrated.  Comments by the State Department's mail-carrier Frank Wisner that Mubarak should stay and more cautious language from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in Munich are dots easily connected, especially by a Washington media corps primed for signs of Obama's weakness or intra-administration splits.  Suleiman and Mubarak's men are also pushing this narrative of a softening American position in order to deflect perceptions that they are under foreign pressure and to discourage Egyptian protestors.   Tahrir Square protestors have been primed from the start to express their dismay with Obama, since he could never have satisfied their hopes. 

But this narrative, so politically convenient for so many different actors, captures only one part of the truth. It's right that the administration was frustrated by Mubarak's rejection of the blizzard of messages they sent along all channels on the need to begin an immediate and meaningful transition.  The President may not have said the magic words "Mubarak must go" -- and a good thing, too, since it clearly would not have worked -- but the administration's message that he should in the days leading up to Friday's "Day of Departure" was unmistakeable.  But at this point, the hard reality is that we may not get the cathartic moment of Mubarak's plane departing to the cheers of millions of Egyptians celebrating a new era.  The struggle is now shifting to the much messier terrain of negotiations over the terms of Egypt's transition, with public and private jockeying over matters ranging from the esoteric (proposed language for Constitutional reforms) to the symbolic (Mubarak's role). 

Crucially, as it adapts to this new game, the administration has not in the least backed down on its calls for a meaningful transition.  While all the media focused on Clinton's supposed pro-Suleiman message in Munich, her overall message was very strong on reform.  President Obama and Robert Gibbs have repeatedly and consistently demanded in public that a meaningful transition begin immediately.  When Suleiman dismissed the call to repeal Egypt's Emergency Law, Gibbs quickly called his statement "unacceptable."  The question is now how the administration can best exercise its limited influence in order to ensure that the coming months see a real and meaningful transition to a more democratic, pluralistic, transparent and accountable Egyptian government.

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