




Adaptive Army

PUBLIC INFORMATION PAPER

FOREWORD BY THE CHIEF OF ARMY



On assuming command of the Army, I forecast that I would review our structures and processes to ensure that we continued to adapt to changes in the security environment. I also indicated that I believed we needed to better align with structural changes in the Australian Defence Force's joint command and control over the last decade.

The last time that the Army undertook such a wide ranging re-examination of itself was in the early 1970s. Then, the Army introduced its extant Functional Command structure. The Functional Command structures served us well in the 1970s, the 1980s and into the early 1990s. However, as our operational tempo increased in the late 1990s, this structure started to show its age.

To this end, the Army has developed the *Adaptive Army* initiative to ensure that our generation and preparation of land forces is conducted more effectively and efficiently, and better aligned with the new joint command framework. Under this initiative, the Australian Army will restructure its higher command and control arrangements. The principal aims of this restructuring are:

- Improve Army's alignment with, and capacity to inform, ADF's strategic and operational joint planning.
- Better execute force generation and preparation, in a manner that balances operational commitments and contingency planning.
- Increase the effectiveness and efficiency of training within Army.
- Improve the linkage between resource inputs and collective training outputs within Army's force generation and preparation continuum.
- Improve the quality and timeliness of information flows throughout Army in order to enhance Army's adaptation mechanisms at all levels.

The *Adaptive Army* initiative, which has been robustly wargamed and modelled, demonstrates my intent for the evolution towards a more effective Army. Using this design, headquarters and formations in the Army will develop detailed solutions within the design contained here. This way, those with the best situational awareness at each level can address the challenges at their level without high levels of proscribed solutions issued from Army Headquarters. It is my intention that this will result in a better implementation of mission command in our Army.

We must ensure that Army's structure and organisation is appropriate for the challenges we face – now and in the future. We must ensure that our command and control is adapted to the changes that the Australian Defence Force has undergone in the last few years and we must improve the conduct of our force generation and preparation with the resources we are given. These are not insignificant undertakings. But we owe it to our soldiers deployed on operations, and those who will do so in future, to apply to the task every measure of intellect and energy we possess. I commend this booklet to you and welcome your feedback.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K.J. Gillespie'. The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

K.J. GILLESPIE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Army

26 August 2008

PART ONE

THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Rationale for Change

1. Adaptive organisations continually review themselves. All organisations that want to remain successful must continually review themselves to ensure they remain fit for the changing environment they are a part of now, and in the future. The Australian Army is no different. To remain successful, Army must continuously scan the environment and re-assess the relevance of its goals, and its measures of success and failure, and adapt them if required. Army must also periodically re-assess the appropriateness of its structures, processes and priorities for now, and the future.
2. In 1970, the Australian Army undertook a review to ascertain how it could best command and control Army units and prepare them for operations. The result of this – the Hassett Review – was that Army was restructured into three Functional Commands: Land Command, Training Command and Logistics Command. The changes were implemented over a three year period, being completed in 1973. While there have been some changes since that time, the structure – which differentiated the commands based on individual and collective training - has remained essentially intact for the last 35 years.
3. Since 1999, the Australian Army has constantly deployed force elements up to Brigade (plus) in strength to a diverse range of theatres. The type of operations our Army has conducted have been somewhat different from the conventional style of operations we had anticipated during the Cold War. While we had always sustained a competency in the conduct of low-level operations it would be not be an exaggeration to state that the increased lethality on non-conventional actors was unanticipated.
4. The Army's current command and control framework, with multiple levels of command in a strict hierarchical structure, reflects the pre-Joint Operations Command arrangements. Army's higher level command and control has not evolved significantly at a time when there have been huge changes in how the Australian Defence Force command and control is undertaken. There are, arguably, too many headquarters between units and Army Headquarters, which slows down decision cycles, constricts the passage of information, and the sharing of lessons learned.
5. As we have transitioned to an Army that is constantly deploying force elements, it has made us focus more on the supporting mechanisms. In particular, we have learned much in the last decade about the strengths and weakness of our current structures and processes for generating and preparing personnel and organisations for operations. Like operations, the force generation and preparation process is an interaction of multiple diverse actors, often competing for resources or influence. This creates within the force generation and preparation construct a complex adaptive system that is constantly evolving, both at the individual and collective level. This demands a systemic approach to adaptation within the force generation and preparation of Army.
6. The Army's response to this challenge is the *Adaptive Army* initiative. This will require cultural as well as organisational change. But it is a necessary evolution for the Army if it is to maintain cutting edge land warfare capabilities. It is a natural and evolutionary step in Army's continuous modernisation.

PART TWO

AN EVOLVED FUNCTIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

7. Under the *Adaptive Army* initiative, Army will be reorganised into a structure consisting of Army Headquarters and three Functional Commands (under 2-star commanders). This structure is shown below:




Figure 1. The New Army Functional Command Structure.

8. **Command and Control External to Army.** One of the key drivers in the evolution of Army's higher level structures is the requirement to better align Army with new Joint command and control structures. Under the new structure, Army Headquarters retains its function of managing Army commitments in line with the Chief of Defence Force and other national requirements. Headquarters 1st Division will have as one of its core tasks the provision of technical land advice for joint planning. It will also exercise Technical Control, on behalf of Chief of Army, over deployed Land forces. All reporting for lessons learned are fed back into Army through Headquarters 1st Division.

Implementation

9. Because of the magnitude of change required implementation of the new Functional Command structure will be phased over a number of years. This will allow Army to manage the generation, preparation and certification of force elements for extant operational commitments while concurrently moving to the new organisational structure (keeping one foot on the ground). An interim structure will be implemented from January 2009, transitioning to the final *Adaptive Army* structure by January 2011.



PART THREE

INTERIM FUNCTIONAL ARMY STRUCTURE

Introduction

10. The Interim Functional Command structure is an evolution of the current command and control framework. The three Functional Commands will be:

- a. **Headquarters 1st Division.** Headquarters 1st Division remains a short learning loop organisation. However, in addition to its principal role of undertaking higher-level collective training for directed missions and contingencies (force preparation) it retains command of three Brigades and consequently must execute a concurrent raise-train-sustain function for these formations.
- b. **Special Operations Command.** Special Operations Command, also a short learning loop organisation, will retain its extant mission and functions.
- c. **Forces Command.** Forces Command is a medium learning loop organisation, with the principal role of conducting unified individual and collective training (force generation) for a large proportion of Army.

11. The organisational diagram for the interim Functional Commands structure is shown below:




Figure 2. Army's Interim Functional Command Structure

Headquarters 1st Division

12. The key responsibility of the Commander of 1st Division is to conduct the higher level collective training of Army force elements to prepare them for operations, based on the requirements of joint commanders. Additionally, the Headquarters will retain its capacity to deploy as a two-star joint headquarters and will retain command of 1st, 3rd, and 7th Brigades. Commander 1st Division (through the work of the Land Combat Readiness Centre) will be responsible to the Chief of Army for the certification of all Army forces deploying on operations.

13. Headquarters 1st Division will retain technical control of deployed units in order to facilitate the rapid feedback of lessons.

The Land Combat Readiness Centre

The higher level preparation of land force elements for operations will be executed by the new Land Combat Readiness Centre. Its main effort will be the preparation and certification of Forces Command and, possibly in the future, Special Operations Command force elements for current operations. The organisation's secondary effort is the assessment of land force elements for the conduct of combined arms and joint operations. This will be based on clearly articulated collective standards derived for each particular mission or contingency.

With this new organisation, a single authority for mission-tailored training, assessment and certification will remove inconsistencies and duplication of effort in our current approach. Army will also review the current approach to the conduct of Mission Rehearsal Exercises in all Commands to ensure consistency. This review aims to significantly reduce the level of support requests and minimise disruptions to Army training and learning cycles.

Employing the Land Combat Readiness Centre as a standardisation authority provides an independent audit of capability that occurs in the transition between the conduct of normal raise-train-sustain activities in Forces Command and Special Operations Command, and the operational employment of Army force elements by joint commanders.

Forces Command

14. The key responsibility of the Forces Commander is to generate Army force elements through a unified approach to the conduct of individual and collective training for the majority of Army. The exceptions in the interim structure are the 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades and Special Operations Command.

15. Forces Command is responsible for the generation of assigned forces, and their training in collective skills to a standard directed by the Chief of Army. Forces Command will be responsible for reporting the standards achieved as part of the readiness reporting process and for recommending priorities for the rectification of deficiencies.

16. Forces Command will also be responsible for ensuring identified Army force elements are at a standard of manning, equipping and collective training prior to their potential allocation to Headquarters 1st Division for higher level collective training, preparation and certification for operations and / or contingencies. Forces Command has a medium term (out to 5 years) approach to adapting force elements for the conduct of operations.

PART FOUR

EVOLVED FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS – FINAL ARMY ORGANISATION

Introduction

17. The Army final Functional Command structure is constructed around Army's different temporal learning cycles. The three Functional Commands remain the same as the interim model, however some realignment of processes and allocation of formations takes place to finalise implementation of the new Army Functional Commands.

18. The organisational diagram for Army's Functional Commands as at January 2011 is shown below:




Figure 3. Army's Functional Command Structure – January 2011

Headquarters 1st Division

19. The key responsibility of the Commander of 1st Division is to conduct the higher level collective training of Army force elements to prepare them for operations. It is the Command with the shortest adaptation cycle; Headquarters 1st Division incorporates lessons from deployed forces in the preparation of force elements that will immediately follow on from those forces. This temporal dimension will be critical to how the Command functions.

20. Additionally, the Headquarters will retain its capacity to deploy as a two-star joint headquarters. Headquarters 1st Division will be allocated Operational Control to Chief of Joint Operations for the conduct of operational planning.

21. Commander 1st Division (through the work of the Land Combat Readiness Centre) will be responsible to the Chief of Army for mounting all operations conducted by Army force elements, as well as the certification of all Army force elements deploying on operations.

22. Headquarters 1st Division is the exit point for Army force elements deploying on operations, and the re-entry point for force elements re-deploying from operations. Headquarters 1st Division will retain technical control of deployed units in order to facilitate the rapid feedback of lessons, and the appropriate employment of deployed force elements by Chief of Joint Operations.

23. This structure provides a more transparent resourcing model for Army. Resourcing for Forces Command is done from Army in order to sustain the range of land warfare capabilities directed by the Chief of Army. Resourcing for Headquarters 1st Division (with the exception of the permanently assigned personnel) will eventually be from Joint funding lines because all of the preparation undertaken is based on higher direction.

Forces Command

24. The key responsibility of the Forces Commander is to generate Army force elements through a unified approach to the conduct of individual and collective training. This unified approach removes the duplication of effort that occurs in the current Army structure.

25. Forces Command will be responsible for the generation of forces, and their training in collective skills to a standard directed by the Chief of Army. This will include collective training up to unit level, and Brigade Headquarters level, as well as some combined arms training. Forces Command will be responsible for reporting the standards achieved as part of the readiness reporting process and for recommending priorities to Army Headquarters for the rectification of deficiencies.

26. Forces Command will also be responsible for ensuring identified Army force elements are at a standard of manning, equipping and collective training prior to their allocation to Headquarters 1st Division for higher-level mission-specific collective training, assessment and certification for operations and / or contingencies.

27. Prioritisation of resources for units within Forces Command will be based on where units are in their force generation process. Units having just returned from operations should not expect to have the same levels of manning and equipment allocation as those further along in the process. Forces Command will play a key role in the development of Army's commitments plan. Because it will possess an understanding of where Army force elements are in their force generation process, the Command will be required to provide input into this plan.



CONCLUSION

28. The generation of adaptive land forces for contemporary and future operations demands that Army possess an adaptive raise-train-sustain process. The *Adaptive Army* initiative is a signal to government that the Australian Army is adaptive to the security environment and responsive to Government requirements.

29. The evolution of Army's Functional Commands better positions Army to conduct its responsibilities for force generation and preparation while ensuring the most effective and transparent utilisation of resources. This ensures a more transparent linkage between desired outcomes and the input of resources. In doing so, Army will be able to better manage scarce resources and argue for additional funding where necessary.

30. *Adaptive Army* also seeks to achieve a better alignment of Army with new joint structures, and the more centralised approach in the ADF's approach to command and control that has developed in the past decade. This initiative ensures Army is best placed to influence and inform strategic and operational planning relevant to the employment of land forces.

31. The *Adaptive Army* initiative allows for a more effective balancing of current operational commitments with future contingencies without the masking of capability deficiencies that can occur in the current Functional Command approach. This requires a structural underpinning to ensure that Army does not unintentionally compromise its capacity to act in the future by over-committing itself in the present. To this end, *Adaptive Army* seeks to better assure the long-term health of Army

32. The Australian Army aspires to unify its operational philosophy of *Adaptive Campaigning* with an adaptive approach to the generation and preparation of land forces for operations. This initiative fosters the desired operational adaptivity properties in land forces throughout the raise-train-sustain continuum. The proposed higher-level command and control structures will ensure that Army is better able to adapt and respond to the challenges of generating and preparing land forces for 21st century operations.

