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Bob Graham, the former Florida Senator who chaired the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, has an op-ed in today’s Post about the threat posed post bin Laden. While his analysis that the current threat posed by AQ to America is from “significant but smaller attacks” is correct, Graham overstates AQ’s capabilities, matching them to AQ's intentions for a WMD attack.
Over at the Atlantic I have a new piece up on how the death of bin Laden can end the stereotype that Democrats are "soft" on national security and give President the political space to chart a new course on national security:
In May 2004, a senior Bush Administration official was asked by the Wall Street Journal about the challenges facing John Kerry as he sought to address national security issues, and in particular the war in Iraq, in his campaign for the White House. "It's never stopped being 1968" for Democrats, the official said.
There was no need to spell out what "1968" meant. It was shorthand for the caricature of Democratic "weakness" and anti-military attitudes, dating from the party's opposition to the war in Vietnam, that has become the prism by which the Democrats are viewed on national security issues -- and by which the party often views itself. The challenge for Kerry wasn't Iraq; it was in battling this negative perception of Democrats as weak and indecisive on national security and foreign policy. As time would tell, it became one of the proximate causes of his defeat that November.
For more than four decades the perception of Democratic "weakness" on foreign policy and national security has been one of the most dominant and distorting political stereotypes in modern American politics -- affecting not only how voters perceive Democrats, but also how the party approaches these issues. It has become a knee jerk political mindset that shapes the attitudes, policy preferences and even career choices of progressive foreign policy and national security analysts. Perceived political vulnerability about the party's ability to keep America safe and strong has led Democrats, time and time again, to engineer their national security policies around looking tough rather than necessarily doing what they believe is best for the country. The politics of vulnerability don't just influence policy -- often, they trump it altogether.
But on Sunday, May 1, that meme may have finally died.
With the killing of bin Laden, Democrats have, for the first time in more than four decades, the chance to retire the notion that they are not tough enough to protect America from external danger. Beyond that immediate political function, it provides Democrats with the opportunity to chart a new course for American foreign policy. The question now is whether they will take advantage of this previously unbeknown political space.
Read the whole thing here
This post by Nina Hachigian, who is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.
I went to an interesting exhibit yesterday, called 91 92 93, on display at the Schindler house in Los Angeles. In it, three artists, Andrea Fraser, Simon Leung and Lincoln Tobier, each revisited a work they had done some 20 years earlier. Tobier’s piece documented the political impact of Roger Ailes, long before Rupert Murdoch hired him to create Fox News. Tobier told the story of how Roger Ailes fathered the “orchestra pit” theory of the media with this question: “If you have two guys on a stage and one guy says, 'I have a solution to the Middle East problem,' and the other guy falls in the orchestra pit, who do you think is going to be on the evening news?”
Ailes has certainly taken his theory to new heights with Fox News. But it is pervasive now, and no more so than with China. Only certain issues with China make the headlines—the value of its currency, the new jet fighter, the recent brutal crackdown on artists and political activists. While those issues are each very important, what the media coverage of the US-China relationship does not tend to reveal is how broad it has become.
In addition to the mother of all bilateral forums, the annual Strategic & Economic Dialogue that was just held in Washington, D.C. , where the big issues like trade imbalances are on the agenda, look below at the list of over 40 other formal dialogues or cooperative efforts that exist or soon will between the US and Chinese governments. This is far from a complete list, and it does not include the multilateral fora where the US and China are always interacting, like the G-20, IMF, East Asia Summit and APEC, among others. Non-government cooperative efforts are not listed either.
All this exchanging can lead to tangible change. The deliverables from this week’s S&ED were not breakthroughs, but were progress nonetheless. And we cannot expect much more when two massive nations with different systems of government, history and values are trying to work things out.
There is no G-2. The US and China, even if they did see eye-to-eye, could not solve global problems on their own. But deepening the very broad working relationship is a step in the right direction.
Continue reading "Looking Past the 'Orchestra Pit' on China" »
Even leaving aside the thorny problem of a Middle East peace plan, the White House has set itself a very difficult challenge in putting a "New Middle East speech" on the agenda: too much demand. Americans are still struggling to decide what to make of events from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya to Syria to Pakistan. The political jockeying over them has paused, well, no, it hasn't, with Mitch Daniels wrapping himself in the flag of Syrian protestors today. Meanwhile, the peoples of the region mix hope, skepticism, and some well-deserved indifference -- the Egyptians made their own revolution, after all -- our way. Speaking to one audience in a way that is intelligible and doesn't trip on the internal quirks of the other audience will be enormously difficult. Herewith, four themes that should cross the divide:]
Aligning U.S. interests with values. Americans cheered with Egyptians --and Syrians -- in the streets and prayed for Ghaddafi's victims as they did for bin Laden. time to remind everyone that Muslims suffered greatly from Al Qaeda terrorism, and to re-amplify the Administration's words about the rights of peoples everywhere. Time also to explain to Americans how, long-term, this will be in our security interest.
No cookie-cutters, no short-term fixes, no naivete. My "three nos" for the Middle East. Arab peoples themselves, and their well-wishers abroad, will have to invest in economic growth, institutional reform and rule of law. The US will have to be patient and get used to partners who speak their own minds and take their time -- and sometimes take decisions that we don't like. Equally, our core interests -- including Israel's security but also our economic and terrorism cocnerns -- will still be our core interests. And, tragically, there are no quick fixes.
The civilian toolkit comes of age. American and Arab audiences alike can profitably hear the US make a new commitment to leading with diplomatic, economic, social and communications tools -- from Twitter to debt relief -- and to spell out how, if the US invests in those tools, and in partnerships that let other countries and institutions do some of the work, we'll reap rewards even in a time of sparse budgets.
Understanding the challenges ahead. Firm messages to Al Qaeda and other estremist groups that they will not be allowed to grow strong at the expense of weak new governments; to Iran that efforts to gain in the region will further expose its government's own weakness as its people seek the freedom of Egyptians. And a down payment on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- unfortunately, perhaps the thing the Arab world wants most to hear -- a pledge of unshakable support for Israel, and greater engagement with the Israeli people (ie, a trip date...) combined with plain language about how Israel must prepare itself to make peace and live in a world of newly- and legitimately-empowered Arab citizens; and a pledge of continued support for legitimately elected Palestinian authorities that meet the conditions previously set out (ie, who is in government and how matters, even under a Fatah-Hamas unity government) and that use the public legitimacy conferred by teh unity government to take, as well, the hard steps to get ready for peace.
This post by Scott Bates, the former senior policy advisor for the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. Bates is currently vice-president of the Center for National Policy and can be reached at sdbates66@hotmail.com.
In a world full of national security challenges, none demands more urgent focus than the conundrum that is Pakistan. For at least a decade, Pakistan has consistently been one of the top three national security worries for the United States with issues ranging from being a center of nuclear proliferation to its inability to prevent its territory from serving as a sanctuary for the Taliban/Al Qaeda alliance launching attacks against US troops in Afghanistan.
The recent killing of Osama Bin Ladin revealed at best, a Pakistani regime either unwilling or unable to be an effective ally in our ongoing battle against Al Qaeda. Troubling questions need to be answered. What did Pakistani officials know about Bin Ladin’s presence and when did they know it? How effectively have Pakistani national security officials used $20 Billion in US aid to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Why is the main debate in Pakistan today focusing on the US “violation” of their sovereignty in attacking Bin Ladin instead of on their own failure to find him? Is Pakistan worthy of the designation of major non-NATO ally and the steady stream of financial assistance provided by the American people?
To answer these questions and fashion a long term and sustainable approach to relations with Pakistan, Congress should authorize and the President should support the creation of a “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations”. Precedents are available for quickly moving forward with just such an effort.
The 9/11 Commission served as a thorough and credible fact finder concerning the events of 9/11. Its factual findings provided a necessary narrative on the events and raised questions that then could be answered with future policy action. The Iraq Study Group trained consistent attention on one national security challenge and provided a series of potential options for policy makers. In each of these instances the national security challenge to be confronted needed sustained focus and bi-partisan engagement. In a world of rapidly changing events demanding many responses, the President and the US Congress need the assistance of just such a Commission to provide the answers and options regarding our past and future relationship with Pakistan.
A “Commission on US Pakistan-Relations” should be provided with sufficient resources to gain a high level expert staff that is able to conduct interviews, investigations and support hearings that could culminate in a Final Report to be delivered within six months. The Commission Membership should be appointed by a combination of the President and Congress; two from the Speaker of the House, one from the Democratic Leader of the House, two from the Senate Majority Leader, one from the Senate Minority Leader, and five from the President of the United States.
Our relationship with Pakistan is too important for the security of our nation, and for the peace of South Asia region to let be shaped by the pressures of cable talk shows and the necessarily shifting attention of senior policy makers. The creation of a “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations” can go far toward letting the American people know that policymakers are not satisfied with the status quo, are committed to finding answers and charting a new and sustainable way forward for protecting our interests in this most challenging part of the world.
One of the more interesting elements of the OBL post-mortem is the emerging criticism of Pakistani behavior in allowing the world's most wanted terrorist to stay hidden for years in its country. American policymakers and analysts now seem shocked, shocked to discover that Pakistan is an uncertain and unhelpful ally to the United States.
Forgive me for saying: where have these people been? Let's step back for a second and remember what we basically knew about Pakistan before last Sunday.
1) Pakistan has actively harbored remnants of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, for years. The basic assumption in the higher reaches of the US government is that bin Laden and other top lieutenants escaped across the Afghan-Pakistani border in the wake of the battle of Tora Bora and have been there ever since. Now whether elements in the Pakistani government or military knew where bin Laden is and were helping him or even if they didn't know where he was - it was not exactly a secret that bin Laden has called Pakistan home for much of the past 9 1/2 years. And it's also not a secret that Pakistan wasn't expending much of any effort to help the US find him.
2) Terrorist attacks against the US have been actively plotted from Pakistan. Just as one small example, we know that Faisal Shahzad, the convicted terrorist who sought to blow up a bomb in Times Square was trained in bomb-making techniques in Waziristan, Pakistan. So not only was Pakistan home to some of the most wanted terrorists in the world, but it's terrain served as a training ground for other terrorist groups intent on killing Americans - and of course was also a staging ground for larger attacks, like the Mumbai massacre, in India.
3) Pakistan is aiding and abetting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Lastly, we know that Pakistan is actively supporting and providing safe haven to Afghan Taliban insurgents that are killing American soldiers on an almost daily basis. We know that the Quetta Shura continues to serve as a sanctuary for Afghan Taliban leaders and the movement's political leadership - and remains unmolested by Pakistan. We know that Pakistan has a long-standing relationship with the Haqqani network. We know that the Pakistani foreign minister is actively encouraging the Karzai government to abandon United States support. We know that Pakistan while the recipient of large amounts of US aid has since 2009 actively sought to undermine US military and political aims in Afghanistan.
So to sum up, well before Osama bin Laden's body was dumped in the Arabian Sea, we knew that the Pakistani government is a state sponsor and abettor of international and regional terrorism; we know that it is assisting groups with the blood of American soldiers on its hands and we know that it harbored and provided safe haven for al Qaeda members - either on purpose or via incompetence - for nearly 10 years. Now we can quibble over whether these were active decisions of the Pakistani government or whether they being carried out by rogue elements of the country's military and in particular its intelligence services (an issue that Mosharraf Zaidi tackles with great brilliance today) - but we do know that the Pakistani government has expended little to no effort in dealing with these issues. And we know that billions in US assistance has done little to influence Pakistani behavior either in shedding ties with jihadist terror groups or acting in support of direct US national interests.
So why again is everyone surprised to discover that bin Laden was living a hop, skip and jump from Pakistan's capital? If anything it only serves to confirm what we already knew about Pakistan but for some reason, had long denied.
I’ve been a bit out of the loop for a few days but I’ve watching with almost stunned fascination the debate that has unfolded over the past few days about the legality of killing Osama bin Laden.
In fairness, part of the problem is with how badly the White House has bungled the public information part of this job. I give the White House and the President credit for the execution of this operation and the manner in which they have pursued bin Laden since taking office. But their behavior since Sunday night - and their public narrative on what happened then - has only added to the confusion.
I will forgive the President for getting some basic elements of the story wrong the night the attack happened, but the fact that John Brennan went before the cameras on Monday and offered a briefing that had key facts wrong and was corrected by White House press spokesmen Jay Carney the next day is not only embarrassing but it also fed the sense that the White House is not being honest. (Although at the same time credit must be given for correcting the record after the fact).
In a sense though, none of this should be terribly surprising. First reports on an incident like this, where you’re likely dealing with a host of contradictory eyewitness reports, are going to get some basic facts wrong. It’s a bit like a game of telephone. However, the White House should have waited before putting the whole story out and considering the sensitivity of the matter they should have gotten their facts straight. Still, while this certainly seems to have been badly handled I’m having a hard time seeing it as conspiratorial.
The problem, however, is that others hold a different view. The White House’s mistakes have led to a bizarre cottage industry of claims about what did happen – and some rather exaggerated arguments about he legal ramifications. Today for example, Glenn Greenwald argues that many people, including Democrats, are indifferent about how Osama bin Laden was killed because they just view his death as an unadulterated good – legality be damned. This is what he calls the bin Laden exception. I am sympathetic to this argument because I'm sure it accurately reflects the views of many people. But it rather clearly ignores an entirely reasonable position regarding OBL’s killing – that he was a legitimate military target and everything that happened in Pakistan on Sunday night was legal and proper.
From that perspective it is important to remember that based on the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) it is the view of the US Congress – and the President – that the US was at war with al Qaeda.
Here’s the key phrase from the AUMF:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
This is a legal argument that has been consistently upheld by the US Congress; by Presidents Bush and Obama, by the Supreme Court and by the United Nations.
Now I understand that some may not support this legal opinion, but it is vitally important to acknowledge that viewing bin Laden as a legitimate military target – and no different from any solider on a battlefield – is not only a completely reasonable argument, it is one that is firmly grounded in US and international law and is supported by a wide array of legal scholars both inside and outside of government. So this isn’t just a case of victor’s justice or revenge. It is legally appropriate to believe that the US had the right to go into this compound and kill Osama bin Laden, even if he wasn’t carrying a weapon.
There is of course an exception -- as there would be an exception in any battlefield engagement – was Osama trying to surrender? To date the only “evidence” that he was is a report passed along by an anonymous Pakistani intelligence officials (the same people who were either lying about OBL’s whereabouts in Paksitan or unaware of them) claiming that OBL’s daughter says he was held captured for 10 minutes and then killed. This hardly qualifies as evidence and I find remarkable that Greenwald, for one, considers it as legitimate a source as what is announced publicly by US officials. However, it should be noted that if this story is true it would be an illegal act and absolutely worthy of further investigation: and it would represent an extrajudicial execution.
The fact is, only if Osama was in the act of surrendering or had been captured and killed is there any real legal question here. Otherwise this is the legitimate killing of an appropriate military target. This is in fact, very similar to the killing of Admiral Yamamoto during WWII, an unarmed, but legitimate military target shot down by US bombers
Now the argument has also been made that after some initial armed resistance no other shots were fired at the Navy Seals thus suggesting that OBL wasn’t resisting. That is Monday morning quarterbacking. There is simply no way for the US troops involved in this engagement to know that resistance had ended; that they had taken fire suggested that they were being violently opposed and they every reason to fear further attack. Thus any individual in the compound would likely – and rightly - have been considered a threat.
Second, the fact that Osama didn’t have a weapon is irrelevant. A soldier can be killed on the battlefield even if they are unarmed. Osama is no different. Also the fact that soldiers allegedly saw him pop his head out and retreat deeper into his compound is, in fact, an act of resistance and again makes him a legitimate target.
There is one issue here – was Osama trying to surrender? Were his arms raised in the air; was he waving a white flag etc? If not, the US Navy Seals in question had every legal right to kill him.
Lastly, one of the further problems with this debate is we also get into the question of second guessing decision made by soldiers on the ground, in highly stressful situations. Should the Seals have given bin Laden an opportunity to surrender? Did they misread his actions coming into his bedroom? Perhaps, but I’m not sure any of us are in a position to say otherwise or question with any veracity on the ground decision-making during a military engagement. That these troops were instructed to kill bin Laden - and only capture him if he surrendered - is not only not suspicious, it's completely appropriate. After all, he was a legitimate military target. That the US soldiers encountered initial resistance and retreat of that target only increased the likelihood that he would be killed on the spot.
The very fact that so many of us are gleeful over the fact that this monster is dead doesn’t change any of those basic facts or obviate the legality of what happened. Osama got what he deserved; both legally and morally.
In the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden and the rampant speculation on the nature of the intelligence used to plan the raid, the National Security Network and the Center for American Progress held a press call this morning with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Paul Eaton, NSN Senior Advisor; Ken Gude, Managing Director for National Security at CAP; Matthew Alexander, Air Force interrogator who led the team that tracked down the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq; and Glenn L. Carle, former CIA Clandestine Service officer and Deputy National Intelligence officer for Transnational Threats, to examine the methods used by military and intelligence officials -- what these practices and policies are and how they fit into the United States' overall counterterrorism and foreign policy.
Listen to the call here .
Read the transcript here.
Selected highlights from the call (more after the jump):
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MATTHEW ALEXANDER: I’ll be the person to go on record and say that we do know that other interrogation techniques would have worked and produced more info definitively. And why do I say that? Because we have Saddam Hussein, who was captured without using them, and we have Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who my team tracked down and killed, without using them.
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QUESTION: I was wondering if [...] what this demonstrates is – what we know now is that actually there was more information left, you know, undiscovered because of torture rather than discovered because of torture?
GLENN CARLE: [...] The answer to that is yes, that I’m convinced that that’s the case from personal, first-hand experience.
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MAJ. GEN. (RET.) PAUL D. EATON: Enhanced interrogation techniques has a corrosive effect on the good order and discipline [of American troops] to the point where the commanding general at the time, General Petraeus, had to issue a letter that set a higher standard for the conduct of the American soldier than was set by the president and the vice president and secretary of defense of the United States.
EATON: This is a war of ideas and I will not allow the Taliban to set the moral standard for America.
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KEN GUDE: It [the decision by the Bush administration in 2005 to shut down its bin Laden unit in the black sites in Eastern Europe] seems to indicate that the Bush administration itself did not view information that was being produced from those interrogations as in any way decisive or critical in the hunt for bin Laden.
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Continue reading "UPDATED**: Experts Comment on Collecting Effective Intelligence" »
As deluge of news coverage on the death of Osama bin Laden continues, and some go to great lengths to credit George Bush with putting policies in place that ultimately led to bin Laden's death, it’s worth reminding ourselves that President Bush and his administration had an opportunity to nab bin Laden at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in 2001. But their decision-making during that episode failed. The opportunity was squandered. In contrast, in Abbotabad, Pakistan, President Obama’s clear-eyed choices and ability to effectively multi-task in the last few weeks made all the difference. Three key decisions illustrate the difference between the meek, unfocused choices Bush made and what ultimately caught bin Laden.
Prioritizing competing demands
Peter Bergen’s definitive account of the battle for Tora Bora explains how the Bush administration’s attention was distracted by the planning process for Iraq. “In late November, Donald Rumsfeld told Franks that Bush ‘wants us to look for options in Iraq.’… Franks points out in his autobiography that his staff was already working seven days a week, 16-plus hours a day, as the Tora Bora battle was reaching its climax. Although Franks doesn’t say so, it is impossible not to wonder if the labor-intensive planning ordered by his boss for another major war was a distraction from the one he was already fighting.” It’s a well-worn story but one worth repeating: President Bush botched a golden opportunity for a quick, early, relatively decisive victory in the war on terror in favor of pursuing the ultimate war of choice in Iraq.
In contrast, President Obama – while managing the uprising in the Middle East, the war in Afghanistan and a government on the brink of shutdown – could have been too distracted to pay attention to what were surely incomplete intelligence reports saying the CIA had located bin Laden. He could have followed the advice of members of Congress and put the U.S. in the lead of the war in Libya, which would have occupied a significant portion of the national security apparatus’s attention. All of those things could have taken President Obama’s eye off the goal of capturing bin Laden. This opportunity could have been squandered. (Of course, most presidents will take any opportunity – even a risky one – to score a foreign policy victory of this nature. And rightfully so, but that makes President Bush’s failure at Tora Bora all the more stunning.)
Continue reading "Decision Points: Tora Bora vs. Abbottabad" »
Let me start off by saying that I am really glad Osama bin Laden is dead. He attacked my hometown, he murdered my good friend, Brock Safronoff and his actions led to the deaths of many more Americans and far more Muslims. Good riddance to him and the blight that he represented on humanity.
Now with that out of the way, here's my hastily crafted piece for World Politics Review on why the death of bin Laden could mean an end to the war on terrorism:
While the death of Osama bin Laden represents the long overdue demise of one man, its impact on the long-term trajectory of American foreign policy is likely to be more profound: Along with bin Laden, so too dies the "global war on terrorism." This does not mean that there are no longer any terrorists who want to kill Americans and other Westerners. Neither does it mean that al-Qaida will simply disappear overnight. And another major attack could return the U.S. and its allies to a war footing.
But bin Laden's death does mean that the exaggerated role that terrorism has played in America's foreign policy discussions for the past 10 years can finally come to an end. Osama bin Laden, for better or worse, was the face of the terrorist threat to America. As long as he was at large, not only would the war on terrorism remain seemingly unfinished in the eyes of the American people, but the threat would remain viscerally real -- even though from all accounts his operational role in al-Qaida had diminished. With his death, the terrorism narrative that has held this country in its thrall for 10 terrible years has taken a rather significant and perhaps fatal hit.
. . . For 10 long years the American people allowed the deaths of 3,000 of their fellow citizens -- and the possibility of additional deaths -- to justify squandering blood, treasure and policymaking attention on a breathtaking scale. Sunday night, the life of a nihilistic, pyschopathic and deranged terrorist came to an end. That his death might signal the beginning of the end of our own national bloodletting makes the news all the better.
Read the whole thing here
So I hadn't quite realized how unpopular David Petraeus was in Pakistan until I read this piece in the New York Times today:
The appointment of Gen. David H. Petraeus as director of the Central Intelligence Agency puts him more squarely than ever in conflict with Pakistan, whose military leadership does not regard him as a friend and where he will now have direct control over the armed drone campaign that the Pakistani military says it wants stopped.
Pakistani and American officials said that General Petraeus’s selection could further inflame relations between the two nations, which are already at one of their lowest points, with recriminations over myriad issues aired publicly like never before.
The usually secretive leader of the Pakistani Army, Gen.Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has made little secret of his distaste for General Petraeus, calling him a political general.
Now it almost goes without saying that the CIA's relationship with Pakistan is the most important US agency relationship to any other country in the world. And on a good day, that relationship stinks (a situation only further inflamed by the Davis incident and Pakistan's general disinclination to do anything helpful for the United States in regard to the war Afghanistan and fighting al Qaeda). But it does beg the question, will the Petraeus selection make that relationship better or worse?
Now in a sense perhaps we shouldn't dwell on the issue. After all, the US relationship with Pakistan is in terrible shape and I genuinely don't think there is a good way to improve upon it unless we dramatically shift US strategy in Afghanistan. But if Petraeus is being picked in part because of his knowledge of the operational arts; if those operational arts are most relevant when it comes to the US relationship with Pakistan and in particular the fight against al Qaeda; and if Petraeus is mistrusted by the Pakistanis . . . well then what exactly is the value added of putting Petraeus in the DCI job? I'm not asking the question in jest; behind some fuzzy notion of "leadership" I'm at a loss in understanding why Petraeus is the best person for the job, especially since there seem to be a number of indicators that would point to him being the wrong man (not to mention the fact that it's impossible to believe that anyone at the White House actually trusts him).
Aha, but perhaps I've missed David Petraeus's most obvious attribute - over to you Mr. President:
I'm also very pleased that Leon's work at the CIA will be carried on by one of our leading strategic thinkers and one of the finest military officers of our time, General David Petraeus.
Petraeus is one of our leading strategic thinkers? Interesting. Now clearly generals occasionally show some level of strategic enlightenment. Eisenhower comes to mind; so to does George Marshall, even Colin Powell for a brief moment - but field commanders? Isn't Petraeus's greatest skill on the tactical level? Where has he shown great strategic thinking? As a person who thought (among others) that the US not only could, but should conduct armed social work and nation building in Afghanistan, well I'm not sure that "great strategic thinker" is the description that comes to mind.
So aside from the obvious political advantage of keeping Petraeus inside the tent I'm just having hard time seeing why Petraues got picked . . . unless of course the political advantage is the reason why. But who would ever accuse the Obama Administration of putting the politics of foreign policy ahead of actual foreign policy decision-making?
So I'm still having a hard time getting my head around the fact that President Obama has chosen David Petraeus to be his new director of central intelligence. Was Joe Lieberman busy? Here's someone who became a public advocate, rather than advisor, during presidential deliberations on Afghanistan policy; someone who misled the President about the ability of the military to turn things over to the Afghan security forces by the summer 2011 and someone who repeatedly used media leaks and public media appearances to advocate for a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that by all accounts is failing spectacularly.
I mean I understand the concept of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer, but this is sort of ridiculous.
This issue, notwithstanding, my concern about this move is two-fold: one is that it continues the further militarization of our intelligence agencies, away from intel gathering to covert operations; and second I fear for the impact on Afghanistan policy.
On the first point, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti have a smart article on how these moves continue the process of basically turning the agency into a militarized, operational arm of the Pentagon. So not only do you have someone at Langley who seems to be a big advocate of special operations; but you put someone at DoD (Leon Panetta) who built up the covert action capability at the CIA. Hard to imagine that either will suddenly slow down the cooperation between the two agencies on this front. And if one of the goals of the Obama Administration was to shift attention away from terrorism as the focus of US foreign policy I'm not sure how giving top national security jobs to the guy who built up the CIA's clandestine service over the past two years and the guy who managed the last two American wars achieves that goal. If anything it ensures that two of the Administration's top strategic thinkers (and I use those words guardedly) will have an intimate and perhaps overweening focus on terrorism as the focal point point of US national security policy.
Also it's worth remembering here that the CIA is primarily a civilian, espionage agency - not a hornet's nest of covert ops (no matter what Hollywood movies might tell you). How is Petraeus going to fare in that part of the job; managing the CIA's intel gathering mandate? Maybe this is the direction that the Administration wants to take the agency, but it does raise the very serious question of whether the Petraeus's likely focus on military operations and cooperation with DoD will have a deleterious impact on the intel-gathering part of the CIA's mandate. Does Petraeus have any track record of being able to effectively manage this fairly significant aspect of what the CIA does? Might be a question worth exploring at this confirmation hearings.
On Afghanistan, there is another more serious concern. While I am glad to see Petraeus out of day-to-day management of the war (if only because it would theoretically allow the White House to establish more control over the mission) I do wonder about the impact on the future of that policy.
Today there is something of a divide in the Obama Administration between those who think the time has come to being political reconciliation with the Taliban - and a more influential group that believes military pressure against the Taliban must be maintained and that the time is not right for negotiations. It appears, from the outside, that Petraeus comes down on the latter camp; believing that continued pressure will wring eventual concessions out of the Taliban.
It's worth asking what effect this will have on analysis about Afghanistan with the agency. Knowing that Petraeus is an advocate for a very specific policy choice in Afghanistan could have a potentially chilling effect on analysts in the agency. After all, there is some evidence that Petraeus has weighed in heavily on these matters in the past (the White House's December Af/Pak review comes to mind). How this affects the tenor and tone of intelligence analysis that gets passed up the chain of command to the White House and elsewhere is not an insignificant issue. It seems for the sake of Afghanistan policy that it might be better if the person in charge at Langley didn't have his thumb on the scale.
In the end, the White House seems to be adopting the view that it's better to have Petraues inside the tent pissing out, then pissing in. But there is a cost for doing so - and I'm not sure that the White House fully appreciates it.
So while political Washington has completely lost its mind over the President’s birth certificate . . . there’s actually a war going on in Afghanistan. It’s being fought by real flesh and blood American soldiers. And it’s not going well.
Yesterday, nine Americans (8 soldiers and 1 civilian) were murdered at Kabul airport by a disgruntled Afghan Air Force officer. Now having spent several hours at the Kabul airport I would have to say this is one of the more secure locations in Afghanistan with more security than you can shake a large stick at. That even here American servicemen are not safe from violence is troubling indeed. That these soldiers were killed by an individual nominally fighting on the same side as the US against Taliban is even more upsetting. That this attack is the seventh time this year that Afghans in police or military garb have killed NATO or Afghan forces (24 of them) . . . well you get the idea.
But as long as we’re on the subject of terrible American allies, how about that Pakistani government? According to the Wall Street Journal the Pakistani foreign minister recently met with President Karzai and advised him to go tell the US to fly a kite:
Pakistan is lobbying Afghanistan's president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan—and its Chinese ally—for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy, Afghan officials say.
The pitch was made at an April 16 meeting in Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who bluntly told Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the Americans had failed them both, according to Afghans familiar with the meeting. Mr. Karzai should forget about allowing a long-term U.S. military presence in his country, Mr. Gilani said, according to the Afghans.
It should be noted here that the official telling President Karzai to break with the Americans is not a member of the Pakistani military or the ISI. It's the country's foreign minister (a member of the civilian government), who is trying to convince Karzai that he would be better off abandoning the country that provides Pakistan with $1.5 billion a year in assistance.
And here's my favorite part:
Pakistani officials say they no longer have an incentive to follow the American lead in their own backyard. "Pakistan is sole guarantor of its own interest," said a senior Pakistani official. "We're not looking for anyone else to protect us, especially the U.S. If they're leaving, they're leaving and they should go."
"No longer" have any incentive! Ha! Remind me again when that incentive to follow the American lead actually did exist.
And yet it seems some American officials are still holding out hope that this represents a good development for US-Pakistani relations. In a follow-up piece in the Washington Post, Josh Paltrow quotes an American official:
“The good news,” the official said, “is that I think that there’s some prospect that Afghanistan will become the common ground on which the U.S. and Pakistan” can solidify their relationship.
I'm not really sure how this latest incident leads to that conclusion. In fact, what this does show is how decidedly the US and Pakistan don't see eye to eye on the future of Afghanistan. But of course that has been obvious for a decade no matter what US officials try to convince themselves of.
Apparently all this political wrangling has left our other great ally Hamid Karzai not sure of what to do - although this also could just be a move on his part to wring more concessions out of Washington in upcoming talks about a long-term strategic partnership between the US and Afghanistan. I guess those American soldiers being maimed and killed (in part by bombs built in Pakistan) is not enough to sway Karzai toward the US side.
So to sum up, we have American soldiers being killed by the same Afghan security forces that we are spending billions of dollars to train and fight the Taliban; we have the President of Afghanistan discussing with the Pakistani foreign minister abandoning the United States; and we have the Pakistani foreign minister actively working to undermine US interests in Afghanistan.
Other than all that the war seems to be going great.
Oh, how the right wing blogosphere is crowing over Ryan Lizza's New Yorker piece on Obama foreign policy. All their charges of fecklessness fully confrmed -- confessed even! But before we get too excited, let's take a breath and look at what all the shouting is about. As I see it, the question on the table is the following: how can the United States get others to go along with what we want?
From my reading of the commentary this week, the right wing's better idea is the same idea they're always pushing. US policy needs to be firmer, more resolute, uncompromising, unwavering, resolute, and insistent. More like we really mean it.
I certainly understand that standing pat on American power and righteousness is a more gratifying stance. America is powerful and mainly in the right (though when we get it wrong, we really get it wrong). But that's beside the point. I don't make foreign policy judgments on the basis of how good it makes me feel about America. My basic belief in the country is plenty solid and doesn't need to be buttressed by beating our chest internationally.
For all their crowing, the hard liners are arguing a flimsy if not delusional premise: that the United States can bend others to our will just by being resolute. Exactly how will that work? How many places will we engage militarily? How many sets of sanctions will we impose? Will we need international support? Will any resistance be stirred up, if we cast humility aside in favor of pigheadedness? Do these questions ring any bells?
I note that Les Gelb is even more exasperated this week than I am. Gelb's Daily Beast column lambastes Republican critics as well as the media for a constant flow of knee-jerk diatribe that isn't being challeged to present plausible alternatives. He even draws a parallel with birtherism. I don't think we can lump these foreign policy critiques into that reprehensible category, but looking at Donald Trump's role in the debate is instructive. It's safe to say that most of the conservative commentators have devoted much more thought to foreign policy than Trump. Even so, Trump's statements about putting an end to OPEC's "fun" with high oil prices or getting a better deal from the Chinese seem to be just a cruder version of far-right foreign policy -- their approach in pure-Id form. You be the judge, more similar or dissimilar?
On one side of this debate is the idea that American leadership is a matter of ignoring the concerns and misgivings of others. For the US to accommodate concerns or step back and let other nations take the lead is a show of weakness. Mistrust toward the United States must be denied rather than defused, and international goodwill is a luxury.
Ultimately that will be a losing argument. Despite what the right wing says, suspicions about America's intentions and leadership are not a matter of self-doubt but of international political reality. It's something to be recognized and softened, rather than bulldozed through. Most Americans understand the need to convert international resistance into support. They realize the importance of getting the world's help, rather than sitting on a high horse of our own self-satisfaction. As it's often said, there's no limit to what you can accomplish if you don't care who gets the credit. Besides, for Republicans to win this argument, they have to airbrush the history of Bush-Cheney foreign policy into a glowing success. Think they can do that?
Sunday’s Washington Post featured a Jackson Diehl column entitled “The mirage of an Afghanistan exit.” The column has many problems, the biggest being that it fundamentally misrepresents arguments made by proponents of pursuing political solution. Having set up those strawman, he sets about knocking them down.
One of the main problems with the column is that Diehl says proponents of broad talks that would engage the various players in Afghan society, along with regional players, are looking for a “quick political fix,” a “mirage” he calls “seductive.” He’d be right if anyone was saying talks would be quick or easy. But nobody is claiming that.
The influential Century Foundation report that energized this debate around Washington in the last month says, “As it is, a process leading to negotiations and finally a peace settlement is likely to be a prolonged and very uncertain affair. The gulf between the Taliban insurgency and the constituencies of the Afghan republic is wide; and the concerns of the international stakeholders vary and occasionally clash.”
Steve Coll’s New Yorker article, which first reported talks back in February, argued “even under the best of circumstances, an Afghan peace process would most likely mirror the present character of the war: a slow, complicated, and deathly grind, atomized and menaced by interference from neighboring governments.” If those are Pollyannaish, I’d hate to hear pessimistic.
Next on the list is Diehl’s problematic argument that talks would undermine democracy. He writes, quoting former presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah, that “a conclusion is being made that in Afghanistan democracy is not needed.” Again, nobody is arguing that.
Continue reading "No One is Pretending Peace Talks are Easy" »
Over the past two years, I have been generally supportive of the Obama Administration's foreign policy, with the notable exception of Afghanistan policy. But I think Spencer Ackerman has a very smart post that makes one of the most coherent and stinging criticisms of how President Obama approach to foreign policy and national security over the past two years:
In both cases [closing Guantamao and the war in Libya], the Obama team dedicates what it considers a calibrated amount of effort to achieve a goal that it publicly states is vital. Why the calibration? To avert arousing political headwinds that can thwart the goal; and undo other aspects of its agenda . . .
The undercurrent running through both - at least somewhat - is fear. Obamaaccommodates himself to the politics of fear instead of confronting them.
I think this is spot-on, but actually it doesn't go far enough. Spencer has picked up on a pattern of White House behavior, particularly in regard to contentious and politically potent issues. Indeed, if there is one disturbing characteristic of President Obama's foreign policy to date it is, quite simply, that the President is far too easily diverted from his stated goals and foreign policy convictions because of political opposition.
On multiple issues, from Afghanistan and Gitmo to Libya and the Middle East peace process, Obama has laid out a policy, either publicly or privately, and then steadily backed away from it in the face of opposition, either from foreign governments, domestic political constituencies or his own military. He has far too often pursued the policies of least political resistance. While this criticism has been levied at Obama's conduct of domestic policy, I actually think this is a charge that misses the mark - the political constraints are simply far greater on domestic policy. But on foreign policy and national security the President has far greater autonomy, authority and control of the public narrative, via the bully pulpit - and yet repeatedly Obama has backed away from asserting that authority and staking out policy territory with the potential for causing him political pain.
Take Afghanistan for starters. To read Bob Woodward's "Obama's War" is to read about a President that appears to have serious misgivings about escalation in Afghanistan and deep-seated concern that he was being manipulated by the military to approve increased troop levels. Yet he was seemingly incapable of publicly standing up to his own generals and demanding a more restrained policy for the war. Part of this, I imagine, was a fear of getting in a public food fight with the military (having not served in the armed forces and being a Democratic President, and all) - and part of it, no doubt, was a fear that if there was another terrorist attack on US soil Republicans would repugnantly pounce on "retreat" from Afghanistan as the reason why.
Instead of changing the narrative away from the "war on terrorism," as John Brennan had hinted at in a memorable speech at CSIS from the summer of 2009 or explaining to the American people that the threat from al Qaeda has diminished and cannot justify a 100,000 troop presence in Afghanistan . . . Obama embraced this false narrative - playing up the threat of terrorism from al Qaeda to justify an escalation of troop levels about which he appeared to have serious doubts. As a result ten years after 9/1 terrorism remains the dominant foreign policy narrative of American foreign policy.
In his last Twitter communication before he was tragically killed in the Libyan town of Misrata, Tim Hetherington wrote, "In besieged Libyan city of Misrata. Indiscriminate shelling by Qaddafi forces. No sign of NATO."
It seems odd that there was no sign of NATO air power in Misrata, which has been under siege for several weeks now and has been subject to flagrant attacks against civilians by Gaddafi forces. After all it was just under a month ago that President Obama declared, “some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”
Of course these words were spoken about the potential for a civilian bloodbath in Benghazi, but it seems, increasingly, that if Misrata were to fall we could be dealing with a similar situation. Surely there is the risk of significant civilian casualties, even massacres. If the US and NATO is engaged military in Libya to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe why are they not acting more pro-actively to protect civilians in Misrata?
The answer to this conundrum is, of course, not overly complicated. Both the US and NATO have pledged not to put troops on the ground in Libya so they will go only so far to protect Libyans as can be accomplished via air power. In a very real sense this exposes the farcical nature of our intervention in Libya. We are there nominally to protect civilians, but that goal is a constricted one; and is subservient to the larger imperative of the White House to limit military and, in turn, political exposure to the conflict. In short, we are willing to protect civilians, but only so long as we don’t actually put American or European troops in harm’s way.
At the Huffington Post, David Wood captures the essence of this dilemma and the problems it is causing in bureaucratic Washington:
Washington took the bold step of committing military force, but not enough to win. The administration waited to apply very limited military force until it was almost too late, and now, it has painted the U.S. "into a corner." In the resulting stalemate, Libyan rebels and civilians are being ruthlessly pursued and killed while the United States, in effect, stands helplessly by.
The White House wanted the Pentagon to come up with a low-cost regime-change plan for Libya. Ideally, this strategy would have toppled Col. Muammar Gaddafi without bogging the U.S. down in another inconclusive foreign adventure. And by no means could the plan have included young American infantrymen advancing under fire across the sand.
The military kept insisting that no such option existed. A real regime-change operation, some officers argued, requires "boots on the ground." That was a cost the White House, given rising domestic pressure to bring the troops home from Afghanistan and Iraq, was unwilling to consider.
The White House thought the Pentagon was disrespecting the president by refusing to propose a politically acceptable action plan, while the Pentagon became furious that White House officials didn't "seem to understand what military force can and cannot do,'' the official said.
In the past I have been critical of the US military for not only disrespecting the President but for openly manipulating him on Afghanistan policy. But in this situation, it is the military that is being played. The White House by refusing to consider putting troops on the ground has given the military an impossible mission – protect civilians without ground forces or even the ability to effectively conduct close air support. What’s worse, unless the White House wants to more fully escalate the conflict they’ve made it practically impossible to fully protect Libyan civilians from Gaddafi’s wrath - a contradiction of why we went to war in the first place.
So now the choice is to maintain a status quo that Tony Cordesman rightly points out could lead to more civilian suffering or escalate the conflict, put boots on the ground and ensure that Qaddafi is toppled. Neither option is terribly palatable, but both provide compelling evidence about the dangers of embarking on a military intervention in both a half-cocked and half-assed manner.
I'm sympathetic to Cordesman's argument that we now must consider putting troops on the ground to salvage our policy in Libya and end a war that we have helped to escalate, but it's a terrible choice we face. One can argue at great length about whether it was right to go to war in Libya in the first place . . . but what seems incontestable is that trying to fight a limited war on the cheap that doesn't meet our military objectives, but furthers some rather fuzzy political ones is no way to fight a war.
This Frederic Wehrey piece in Foreign Affairs explores some of the cleavages and divisions in Libya's population/power structures that could come to the fore if and when the Qaddafi regime is toppled - as well as some of the challenges in rebuilding (or building anew) a society left dilapidated by years of inept dictatorial rule:
After Libyans, and much of the civilized world, rejoice in the seemingly inevitable fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi, the country will face the difficult task of repairing a society long traumatized by the Middle East's most Orwellian regime. Libya lacks both legitimate formal institutions and a functioning civil society. The new, post-Qaddafi era, therefore, is likely to be marked by the emergence of long-suppressed domestic groups jostling for supremacy in what is sure to be a chaotic political scene.
In the near future, even with Qaddafi gone, the country may face a continued contest between the forces of a free Libya and the regime's die-hard elements. In particular, Qaddafi's sons -- Saif al-Islam, Khamis, Al-Saadi, and Mutassim -- and their affiliated militias may not go quietly into the night; the struggle to root them out may be violent and protracted...
Lined up against these Qaddafi holdouts are the members of the Libyan military and officer corps who have joined the opposition. [...]
Libya's tribes will also be critical for governance and reconciliation. Qaddafi's 1969 coup overturned the traditional dominance of the eastern coastal tribes in Cyrenaica in favor of those drawn from the west and the country's interior. Although the Qaddafi regime was, at least in theory, opposed to tribal identity, its longevity depended in large measure on a shaky coalition among three principal tribes: the al-Qaddadfa, al-Magariha, and al-Warfalla. [...]
In the post-Qaddafi era, the recently defected tribal bulwarks of the ancien régime -- the al-Magariha and the al-Warfalla -- will play a critical role in lending legitimacy and unity to a new government. That said, the weakness and fragmentation of the military and the tempting availability of oil resources highlight the very real threat of tribal warlordism.
In a prior post, I raised the all-too-possible specter that the aftermath of Qaddafi's ouster could give rise to (or perpetuate) internecine conflict that would require policing by international forces and/or a prolonged nation building effort in order to avoid a massive conflagration. Wehrey's piece highlights some of the fault lines along which such conflicts could erupt.
While it is possible that Libya could undergo a smooth, relatively violence-free transition to stable governance, we cannot afford to plan based on best-case-scenario assumptions. Though this is no great insight, it remains true: wars, revolutions and lesser armed conflicts are notoriously unpredictable.
Considering the enormously expensive, long-term, resource-intensive nation building/policing efforts that the United States is currently undertaking in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be beyond imprudent to risk getting embroiled in yet another such enterprise at this juncture. Which is why my reaction to the possibilities discussed in this piece in the Small Wars Journal was more of hopeful relief than concern:
Let’s make something clear, the civil war in Libya will not end in a stalemate. The French will likely intervene with ground forces and topple the Gaddafi regime, and they will probably do it within a month. It is quite possible that they will do so with Italian help. President Obama has fervently wished for America to be just one of the boys; in the end, this may be a case of wishing for something so much that you get it. America has abrogated the role of global marshal that it assumed after World War II. Every posse needs a Marshal to lead it. The French will likely pick up the tin star they found lying in the street of the global village. [...]
None of this is to say that the French may not be walking into a situation similar to that we faced in 2004-6 in Iraq when Iraqi factions fought over the remains of their country and the more radical factions turned on their would-be Coalition Force liberators. Libya will likely be a mess for years to come. However, I am suggesting that the U.S. will not be calling the shots if the French intervene decisively, and we should think about if that is what we really want. [emphasis added]
A situation in which France, rather than the United States, takes the lead in managing a potentially chaotic, conflict riddled, post-regime-change environment in a foreign country (that we remain largely ignorant of on a granular level) sounds like something that we should not only "want," but strongly encourage. While ceding the lead role does have its drawbacks in terms of prerogatives and priorities, we quite simply do not have the resources to lead the "posse" in every global conflict that we choose to intervene in - especially at a time when we are already leading the pack in two other theaters.
Here is the most ironic passage in Jacob Heilbrunn's National Interest article on Samantha Power as the embodiment of a foreign policy paradigm shift:
Power has a penchant for dramatizing history through people rather than considering broader forces. She states in the acknowledgments to “A Problem From Hell” that a friend from Hollywood advised her to create a drama by telling the story through characters. And that is what she did.
Why ironic? Because he's written an article on Samantha Power as the embodiment of a foreign policy paradigm shift. Actually, I don't want to be too harsh about the Heilbrunn piece, especially since it compares quite favorably to the meandering paranoid screed that Stanley Kurtz gave us on the same subject. In keeping with Heilbrunn's earlier critique of such hyperpartisan intemperance on the far right, he offers a sober examination of the interventionist approach.
That said, though, I have to take issue with two of Heilbrunn's main indictments against interventionism. The first concernts the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Heilbrunn recounts his own exchange with Power at a conference the following year. He pressed her on the seeming contradiction of decrying inaction in the face of tyrannic butchery, yet laying off Saddam:
Her response? The Bush administration was not acting multilaterally and Saddam’s actions, at that point, didn’t meet the definition of genocide even if they had in the past. It is an answer that I never found fully satisfactory, at least for someone who was otherwise championing the cause of stopping mad and bad dictators around the world.
While Heilbrunn may be unpersuaded, the distinction between what Saddam was doing in the early-2000s versus his merciless crackdowns in the late-1980s and early-1990s is hardly a fine point. Every so often when this question resurfaces, I feel compelled to dust off Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth's authoritative essay on the issue, "War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention." In a nutshell, the point of intervention is not to stop the dictators, but to stop what they're doing or are about to do. As Roth put it, resort to force "should be taken only to stop current or imminent slaughter, not to punish past abuse." In other words, what Heilbrunn tags as hypocrisy is actually a pretty stringent criterion for military action.
Which brings me to my second objection. Since Heilbrunn elides the crucial point above, this leads to his further misreading of foreign policy liberals' views on democracy promotion. Portraying liberal interventionism as the orthodoxy of a new elite, here's how he summarizes our dogma:
This elite is united by a shared belief that American foreign policy must be fundamentally transformed from an obsession with national interests into a broader agenda that seeks justice for women and minorities, and promotes democracy whenever and wherever it can—at the point of a cruise missile if necessary.
As to our supposedly itchy cruise missile trigger finger, well op. cit. Ken Roth. But let me sketch a larger picture and resist the idea, speaking at least for one liberal, that the worldview focuses on social justice at the expense of other concerns.
It's fair to say that many emerging liberal foreign policy leading lights are firmly internationalist -- with the aim of helping spread peace and economic and political empowerment as widely as possible. For some of us (especially yours truly) the main idea is to strengthen the rules-based international order, and in that light, the fight with Qaddafi is about reinforcing a norm against leaders making war on their own people. Yet we're hardly blind to the trade-offs among the goals of national security, economic growth, and the spread democracy. While the United States has important concerns about repression in China, the most urgent agenda is clearly balanced economic growth. Lest anyone think that geostrategic competition has been shunted aside, I'd only mention the Obama Administration's backing of Southeast Asian fears over China's maritime claims. And for all the criticism of President Obama's low-key response to the 2009 people-power protests in Iran, the reason was precisely due to worries about undercutting our efforts on Iran's nuclear program.
By applying limited force on behalf of limited interests, interventionists have no doubt taken a substantial risk. We indeed make some of these calculations based on a broader concept of enlightened self-interest and global leadership. But we are calculating nonetheless -- not, as some might believe, treating the other nations of the world as a social engineering project.
Andrew Exum makes a wry observation about European security.
Here's the way this read in today's Washington Post: “The Americans have the numbers of planes, and the Americans have the right equipment,” said Francois Heisbourg, a military specialist at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.
Here's the way this should have read in today's Washington Post: “The Americans have the numbers of planes [because the European states neglected to buy them], and the Americans have the right equipment [because the Americans actually designed and then manufactured the right equipment],” said Francois Heisbourg, a military specialist at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.
Andrew goes on to note that Europe should "either stop talking so tough regarding military interventions or to re-invest in truly independent military capabilities."
But why should they? After all, European governments know they can rely on US military might and taxpayer dollars to subsidize their security needs and prevent them from actually investing in a more robust security apparatus. And when European leaders like Sarkozy decide to talk tough they can count on America to provide the military muscle to back up their words - as has been the case with Libya.
The bottom line is that as long as the United States continues to feel that it has an obligation to underwrite European security needs . . . it will continue to underwrite European security needs. And European countries will continue to free ride off of US security guarantees and not develop the "right equipment" and strategy to protect and further their own interests. In the world's most most stable and prosperous region we have created a bizarre situation where US resources and arms are underpinning a security structure that could quite easily be taken over by the inhabitants of that region!
As my good friend Sean Kay notes, "The most fundamental missions of NATO are achieved - Europe is integrated, whole, and free. The challenge now is to ensure that this is sustained via the European Union. By jealously hanging onto an irrelevant dominance over European security policy, the United States hinders effective EU security integration and ironically damages America's own interests. If the United States can't hand over lead authority in Europe where can it?"
Precisely. The Libya engagement provides many lessons for policymakers (few of them good) but this is one that is likely receiving less attention than it should. So long as the United States insists on subsidizing European security we're going to be the ones upholding European security interests - and well past the point when that makes any sense at all.
Adam Curtis, a documentary filmmaker, traces a loose history of the modern concept of humanitarian intervention in the West and its philosophical underpinnings - punctuated, unsurprisingly, with several compelling documentary film clips.
While historians may quibble with certain aspects of his rendition, there was one passage that stood out:
The movement had begun back in Biafra because a group of young idealists wanted to escape from the old corrupt power politics. To do this they had simplified the world into a moral struggle between good and evil.
They believed that if they could destroy the evil - by liberating victims from oppression by despots - then what would result would be, automatically, good.
But the problem with this simple view was that it meant they had no critical framework by which to judge the "victims" they were helping. And the Baghdad bombing made it clear that some of the victims were very bad indeed - and that the humanitarians' actions might actually have helped unleash another kind of evil. [emphasis added]
These concerns speak directly to my apprehensions about US military involvement in Libya. Even a muscular No-Fly-Zone was not likely going to prove sufficient to enable an out-trained and out-gunned rebel force to topple Qaddafi, yet escalating after that fact was made clear by sending in ground forces would be ill-advised to say the least (two wars is likely enough for the moment). Even arming the rebels (like a No-Fly-Zone, this option has a certain arms-length, antiseptic appeal on the surface) is an extremely risky endeavor, with the potential to destabilize the nation and its environs for decades to come.
More importantly, as I tried to emphasize in my prior piece, we should be careful what we wish for: if the rebels do manage to usurp Qaddafi, what comes next could prove worse in many respects. It is not fanciful to imagine that a country with no history of democratic rule and weak civil institutions would be fertile ground for violent purges, power struggles, protracted civil wars and/or insurgencies (with forces loyal to Qaddafi attempting to re-claim the power and privilege recently lost - see, ie, the Baathists in Iraq - and rebel forces keen to settle scores - see, ie, the Mahdi Army purges in and around Baghdad). These armed conflicts would be exacerbated if the rebels receive large amounts of weapons, and the country is awash in arms.
Would the US feel compelled to intervene if such situations were to evolve as a direct result of our armed intervention? Would we commit to policing the population and nation building lest such conflicts run rampant? Either scenario would be enormously costly and time consuming, both of which are understatements in the extreme.
But as the Curtis quote illustrates, we can not and should not assume that merely removing an odious regime will inevitably lead to a positive outcome, or that the forces that oppose a given despot must be, ipso facto, righteous.
The essential lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan should not be limited to the notions that wars are almost always far more costly than advertised (in monetary terms), that they unleash myriad unforeseen destructive forces that can have regional implications and that disengaging from them is exceedingly difficult (already, we have been in Afghanistan longer than the Soviets, and our impending deadline to withdraw from Iraq is causing much consternation for US military leaders).
That list must include the proposition that unseating even a noxious regime is no guarantee that the aftermath will be easily manageable, conflict free or anything short of tragic for the populations that we are ostensibly attempting to help - or that there are not also noxious elements amongst our putative allies in the underlying population.
This is perhaps the least surprising development to come out of Pakistan - recipient of billions of dollars in US military and economic assistance and supporter of the Taliban insurgency killing American soldiers in Afghanistan:
Pakistan has demanded that the United States steeply reduce the number of Central Intelligence Agency operatives and Special Operations forces working in Pakistan, and that it put on hold C.I.A. drone strikes aimed at militants in northwest Pakistan, a sign of the near collapse of cooperation between the two testy allies.
Pakistani and American officials said in interviews that the demand that the United States scale back its presence was the immediate fallout from the arrest in Pakistan of Raymond A. Davis, a C.I.A. security officer who killed two men in January during what he said was an attempt to rob him.
In all, about 335 American personnel — C.I.A. officers and contractors and Special Operations forces — were being asked to leave the country, said a Pakistani official closely involved in the decision.
Honestly, who could have seen this coming? It's not as if the United States hasn't plied Pakistan with military assistance for the past ten years and it's not as if the Pakistanis have pretty much refused to take any critical steps to further US strategic interests (that don't also directly benefit Pakistan). You can't really blame the Pakistanis for being annoyed at the US, particularly after the Raymond Davis incident, but this whole decline in cooperation is indicative of how fragile the "partnership" between the US and Pakistan remains - and always has been.
Back in December 2009 one of the key elements of the Obama Administration's Afghanistan strategy was to strengthen ties with Islamabad. In fact, in some key respects it's almost more important than the war in Afghanistan. Since then relations between the two countries have gotten worse, particularly on a host of issues crucial to US security interests. And because of the US reliance on Pakistan as a transit point for resources into Afghanistan our ability to put pressure on Islamabad is even more constrained.
For what it's worth, color me skeptical that drone strikes in the FATA will cease; the Pakistanis benefit too much from them to cut them out completely. But the critical issue in US-Pakistan relations is the Afghan Taliban safe havens - and on that front we've of course seen no progress and no shift in Pakistan's strategic calculus. One can imagine that this latest downturn in relations only makes it less likely that anything positive is about to happen.
In her Wall Street Journal column Friday, Peggy Noonan criticized the international intervention in Libya as an example of excessive activism. Pointing to Dwight Eisenhower and her own mentor Ronald Reagan as model presidents, Noonan dusts off the classic argument against action for action's sake -- 'don't just do something, sit there!' But as much as I admire Eisenhower's leadership and embrace prudence as a virtue, I find Noonan's case unpersuasive. Despite what she says, President Obama's Libya decision was more grand strategy than grand gesture.
The more I think about these issues, the heart of the debate seems to be between realism about outcomes versus realism about alternatives. Interventionists are charged with impulsivity and failing to think through the contingencies. But was the option of staying at arm's length truly more realistic?
One thing that Noonan notes is the pressure for action from the international media:
The administration no doubt feared grim pictures from Benghazi and the damage those pictures could do to the president's reputation and standing.
Just to point out the obvious, the damage would have been much more severe for the people of Benghazi; so it isn't just a matter of perceptions. That's not to say perceptions don't factor into it -- they cannot be dismissed, nor should they. Indeed it's a strange sight to watch a living legend political communicator be so dismissive about media perceptions.
Noonan is at least consistent in her argument, stressing the importance of being "steely-eyed" and "responsive to immediate and long-term strategic needs." But again, damning the Libya intervention as an emotional response is too facile a critique. It overlooks the strategic interest in a rules-based order, an international community in which some abuses of power and violations of humanitarian principles are considered beyond the pale.
Are critics of the intervention being realistic about the alternative of failing to intervene? They ask about the ambiguous outcome and lack of consistency in response to the different (or similar) situations in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, or Sudan, for that matter. Here's my question: can someone explain why the United States should stay on the sidelines when an international consensus wants to forcibly resist a despot's brutal crackdown? Does that make strategic sense?
The ambiguous outcome -- and its twin, the ambiguous objective -- indeed pose a problem. By keeping the military commitment within constraints (rather than whatever-it-takes open-endedness), President Obama is playing a game of chance rather than certainty. The calculation is that the Qaddafi regime is weak enough to be ousted by the combination of Libyan rebels on the front lines, coalition forces over the horizon, and defections from Qaddafi's own forces.
Where Peggy Noonan sees an emotional impulse, I see underwriting a calculated risk. We just don't know if it will be enough to remove Qaddafi. Looking at it through the realism of alternatives, giving limited help for an uncertain outcome is still better than the certainty of abandoning Libyans rising up against Qaddafi to their fate. Remember the key facts. The opposition asked for the help and understood it would be limited. A surprising international consensus called for the intervention.
I think these ambiguities are characteristic of the world in which we live. They make for difficult dilemmas and uncomfortable choices. With all due respect to former Secretaries of State James Baker and Henry Kissinger, the criteria for intervention they lay out in Friday's WaPo seem sensible on their face, but require a degree of clarity and certainty that will be very hard to find.
If you're looking for an example lofty rhetoric not backed up by forceful action, look at US actions right after the first Iraq War in 1991, probably the most under-discussed historical analogy of the current debate. Many will recall President George H.W. Bush's prudent (and wise) decision not to press on to Baghdad and remove Saddam from power. What's less remembered are the signals from Washington encouraging Saddam's foes to rise up against him -- as Barry Lando, the episode's leading expert, reminds us. An Iraqi insurrection indeed sprouted, with the expectation of American support. None came, and they were slaughtered by Saddam. The situation in Libya is the reverse; the rebellion was initiated internally, and the US and others stepped up with material backing. As I say, a response that was better than the alternatives.
One of the key elements about US policy in Afghanistan that nearly all sides seem to agree upon is that without success in standing up the Afghan government and without success in getting Pakistan to turn on the Afghan Taliban safe havens in their country - the mission will likely fail.
With that as a starting point, it makes reading the latest White House report on Afghanistan/Pakistan acutely depressing reading. To be sure there is very little here that can be considered good news - for every possible step forward, there are one or two steps back. And what's more there is very little indication that the fledgling progress we have made is sustainable - either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
But on the issue of safe havens and the performance of the Karzai government it is particularly distressing - and speaks to the failures of the current strategy.
First on safe havens. Much of the media focus of the report is on the challenges facing Pakistan in going after Pakistan Taliban militants. But from the perspective of US policy in Afghanistan, this is a sideshow - the real issue is the sanctuaries and here the report has nothing good to say:
The denial of extremist safe havens in Pakistan cannot be achieved through military means alone, but must continue to be advanced by effective development strategies.
Actually let me revise that statement - the report has basically nothing to say on this issue (as the above sentence suggests). There is a great deal about how the US is laying the foundation for a strategic partnership with Pakistan "based on mutual respect and trust" but no sense of when or even whether the Pakistani government will shift their strategic calculus against the Afghan Taliban. And as press reporting suggests there has been little progress on this front. Until there is, military success in Afghanistan will be hard to achieve and even harder to sustain. That the report basically punts on that question is telling.
How about the Karzai government? Here the report is more explicit, regrettably so. From July to December 2010, the report says that progress on building the capacity of the Afghan government is "static" - which basically means very little improvement at all. Indeed, the report notes that on the sub-national level (which is more critical to the US war-fighting effort than the national level) progress is particularly non-existent. Recruiting for district or provincial offices remains poor, the Afghan government has shown little inclination to take on corruption - and while security improvements are cited, the report does note that the security situation in the north has actually worsened. (Of course, if one wants to draw a verdict on Hamid Karzai they can also consider his appalling behavior that led indirectly to the horrific killings of UN workers in Mazar-i-Sharif last week.)
The best the report can point to is "modest" improvements in training of the ANSF, but the force is still deeply dependent on ISAF forces to conduct operations and attrition rates, while better are still high.
In short, there is very little positive to report - but in the areas most crucial to the current strategy, progress is basically non-existent or fledgling. Now I have a feeling that an email will be headed my way soon after I publish this post that talks about security improvements as a first step forward and strengtening Afghan capacity as the next step. But to be honest, I'm not seeing any reason to believe that this second is possible (it's always been the most intractable element of our strategy and one where US influence is the most limited).
This question this report should raise is how much longer do we try to do the impossible (get Pakistan to adjust its strategic calculus vis-a-vis the Taliban and the Karzai government to be something they aren't) before we shift our strategy to what actually is possible?
