

The Syntax of Objects: Agree and Differential Object Marking

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Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation

The Syntax of Objects: Agree And Differential Object Marking

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Colorless green ideas sleep furiously

Noam Chomsky, 1957

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## Introduction

Spanish Existential Constructions (SEC) with *haber* (“to be-existential”) exhibit at least two peculiar properties. First, not every type of nominal can occur as an internal nominal of *haber*-sentences; for instance *John* or *he/him* cannot be the internal nominal of *haber*. At first sight, this restriction seems to be the familiar Definiteness Effect that also characterizes English *there-be* sentences. However, a closer examination reveals that Spanish is more restrictive than English in this respect. *There-be* sentences do admit definite/specific nominals, but, when this happens, a special reading is triggered, namely, the so called list-reading. Spanish *haber*-sentences do not allow list-readings with the nominals in question; when a nominal like *John* or *he/him* is included as an internal nominal of *haber*, the sentence is plainly ungrammatical. The second property, widely recognized in the literature, is that the internal nominal in SECs is an accusative object and not a nominative subject (see (2b) below). Significantly, ungrammatical SECs with objects like *Juan* or *him* cannot be rescued by using the marker *A*, which can mark objects of this type with all transitive verbs (the so called Differential Object Marking). In other words, the objects that cannot appear in *haber*-sentences are exactly the ones that can be marked with *A* with all transitive verbs. This situation asks for a unified explanation.

This dissertation, taking the above correlation as a point of departure, investigates the nature of Differential Object Marking (DOM), using Spanish as a case study. I propose that DOM can be understood by exploring the interaction between case and agreement; in

particular, by assuming that the operation Agree is sensitive to the feature specification of probes and goals.

My main theoretical tool is the operation Agree, as defined in Chomsky 2000, 2001 and much more subsequent work (in particular, Bošković 2005, 2007a,b). Agree predicts a correlation between case and agreement that depends on the matching of  $\phi$ -features in the elements involved in the operation, that is, the probe and the goal. A probe P searches inside its domain for a goal G that matches its features. For P to be able to probe G, P needs to have an unvalued feature; otherwise there would be no reason for it to function as a probe. This unvalued feature in P will be valued by a matching G with valued features; when P is a traditional case-assigner and G a nominal element, an Agree relation between them may also result in case-valuation (that is, case licensing) of G. However, if there is a difference between the feature specifications of probe and goal, valuation may not occur. In particular, P must match all the  $\phi$ -features of G in order for it to value the case feature of G. If a probe is  $\phi$ -incomplete, it cannot value the case feature of a  $\phi$ -complete goal.

A particularly interesting piece of data that supports this conclusion is provided by a dialectal split that SECs exhibit with respect to agreement. For a subset of Spanish dialects (which I call SI), agreement with the internal nominal is not possible (1), but in other dialects (SII), the internal nominal agrees with the verb, despite the fact that the nominal in question is an accusative object (as shown by the cliticization (2a-b):

- (1) a. Hubo dos estudiantes en la fiesta *SI*  
 Was two students at the party  
 There were two students at the party.
- b. Los hubo  
 CL-was
- (2) a. Hubieron dos estudiantes en la fiesta *SII*  
 Were two students at the party  
 There were two students at the party
- b. Los hubieron  
 CL-were

In this dissertation, I argue that the constructions in (1) and (2) have a small  $\nu$ , which is responsible for accusative case licensing. Small  $\nu$ , which I argue has only the [number] feature (that is, it is  $\phi$ -incomplete), probes the internal nominal in (1)-(2), valuing its own number feature. Regarding the agreement difference in (1)-(2), I argue that T in SII has only one unvalued  $\phi$ -feature, namely [number], its [person] feature being valued. As a result, T in SII can probe small  $\nu$ , which yields the agreement in (2). On the other hand, in SI, where I argue T has all its  $\phi$ -features unvalued, the  $\phi$ -incomplete small  $\nu$  cannot value the feature of T, and then T must receive default agreement. Notice also that, if small  $\nu$  is assumed to be  $\phi$ -incomplete, then small  $\nu$  cannot value the case feature of nominals that

are  $\phi$ -complete. I show that this straightforwardly accounts for the absolute impossibility of having nominals like *Juan* or *him* as internal nominals of *haber*, even under list-readings, under the assumption that the nominals in question are  $\phi$ -complete. If the small  $v$  in SECs (responsible for checking the accusative case of  $\phi$ -incomplete nominals) has the same feature specification as the small  $v$  in all other transitive constructions, the same mechanism accounts for DOM. This means that assuming a  $\phi$ -incomplete small  $v$  for SECs is not an *ad hoc* device for a particular construction, but a core property of Spanish (and perhaps of other DOM languages as well).

In general, DOM is manifested in Spanish by the fact that nominals that are both specific and animate are marked with A. I contend that these nominals have a complete set of  $\phi$ -features. All other nominals are  $\phi$ -incomplete; in particular, they do not have the feature [person]. Additionally, as mentioned above, I contend that small  $v$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete, that is, it does not have the feature [person]; this means that small  $v$  cannot match the  $\phi$ -features of  $\phi$ -complete nominals (like *John* or *him*), hence is not able to value their case. This system provides a uniform account for the ban on certain nominals inside SECs and Spanish Differential Object Marking. Nominals like *John* or *him* (which are  $\phi$ -complete) cannot be objects in SECs because there is no case checker available at the point where they need to check case. In regular transitive constructions, there is an additional case checker, a Dative head, which is able to value the case of  $\phi$ -complete nominals. As a result, such nominals get the A-marker.

As is commonly assumed, syntactic derivations proceed in different stages, called phases.



The complement of a phase is spelled-out (i.e. shipped to the interfaces) once the phase is completed. This means that all the elements inside a phase complement must check all their features before the phase level is reached. The small  $\nu$  in transitive constructions heads a phase. As a result, if an element is trapped inside the complement of small  $\nu$  without having checked all its features, the derivation crashes. Following Bošković 2005, 2007, I assume that if a nominal inside a phase complement has not checked all its features, the nominal must move to the edge of the phase to avoid being spelled-out with unchecked features (which, incidentally, allows us to dispense with the EPP). In DOM constructions, the nominal raises to [Spec,  $\nu$ P], from where it is able to establish a new Agree relation with a Dative head (following Bošković's system, I argue that the nominal in fact raises to [Spec, DatP]), which accounts for the presence of the dative marker (in Spanish as well as in the majority of DOM languages, the marker for DOM objects is also the dative marker).

The dissertation is divided in four chapters. The first chapter explores the properties of SECs, including the ban on  $\phi$ -complete nominals and the aforementioned dialectal difference with respect to agreement (SI and SII). I extend the analysis briefly outlined above to other constructions, including the so called temporal existential constructions and agreement with raising verbs, where parallel dialectal differences are attested.

The second chapter is dedicated to the properties of Differential Object Marking with Spanish simple transitive verbs. Contrary to the majority of the literature, I claim that A is not a marker of specificity per se; that is, although it is true that objects that are both

specific and animate must be marked with A, animate objects that are not specific can optionally be marked with A too. I capture this difference by assuming that Spanish determiners have two versions: D and \*D. I contend that \*D determiners must be non-specific, whereas D determiners can be specific or non-specific. Additionally, \*D determiners, which are inherently non-specific, are incompatible with the [person] feature. This means that nominals with \*D determiners end up being  $\phi$ -incomplete, and then they are able to check case against small  $v$  (so A will never appear with them). D nominals host a [person] feature (if animate), in which case they are  $\phi$ -complete, unable to check case against small  $v$ . As a result, they check their case with the Dative head. The above predicts that A must appear with D nominals (which can be specific or non-specific), but it is not mandatory with non-specific objects, since the latter have also the \*D option. The chapter presents a thorough discussion of specificity in Spanish DOM (with both definite and indefinite determiners), which is implemented by using global and local choice functions. I also discuss several pieces of data that have been considered exceptional in Spanish DOM, in particular, the presence of A with inanimate objects with some verbs, and the mandatory presence of A with some clearly non-specific quantifiers (like *nadie*). I offer an account of these previously puzzling issues that supports the current framework.

The third chapter analyzes DOM with ditransitives and coordinate structures. I present data that are not discussed often in the DOM literature (although some of the data have been identified a while ago). In some cases, in ditransitive constructions, the A marker for the Direct Object (DO) can drop if an Indirect Object (IO) is also overtly present. Interestingly, this dropping is sensitive to the heaviness of the objects, the presence of a

pause between DO and IO, and word order. I show that the dropping can only happen if both objects are in the same linearization domain and provide an explanation for the generalization in question. I also discuss some of the effects of DOM on coordination, which includes the well-known ban on the coordination of DOM and non-DOM objects, and certain restrictions on the possibility of pseudo-gapping with DOM and non-DOM objects.

The fourth chapter briefly discusses some of the properties of DOM beyond Spanish. The possibility that DOM may be a phenomenon broader than traditionally thought is explored. I examine the key differences between DOM and several constructions and operations in other languages, including Object-Shift, antipassive, the *ba*-construction, the ban on extraction from specific objects (the Specificity Condition). I also show that my analysis of Spanish DOM can account for Kannada, another DOM language, without any substantial modification.

Although much more cross-linguistic comparison is necessary, the suggestion that DOM is a result of an interaction between case and agreement (that is, that DOM arises because the initial case-checking head, small *v*, is unable to check accusative case of certain nominals) opens up, I believe, a new venue to investigate Differential Object Marking, since it makes DOM a core grammatical phenomenon. This dissertation aims to establish this idea.

## Chapter 1

### Case and Agreement in Spanish Existential Constructions<sup>1</sup>

In Spanish Existential Constructions (SEC) (1a), the internal nominal (which corresponds to the so called “associate” in English) receives Accusative Case (ACC), as we can see from the presence of the ACC clitic (CL) in (1b):

- (1)      a.    Hay            un hombre      en la habitación  
                 Is            a man            in the room  
                 There is a man in the room.
- b.    Lo            hay  
                 CL-ACC    is

There is a long standing tradition among Spanish grammarians in favor of considering the internal nominal of SEC to be an object, not a subject—see Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1754-1759 for a review of traditional grammar analyses of *haber* sentences, and also Suñer 1982b, a, Torrego 1984b, Díaz 2004, Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006d, among others. The main arguments concern the post verbal position of the nominal and the ACC cliticization.<sup>2</sup> Following this tradition, in this dissertation, I will

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<sup>1</sup> Previous versions of this chapter have been published in Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006b, c, d.

<sup>2</sup> This position has been challenged occasionally; see Cuervo 1881, Luque Moreno 1978, García Llebra 1983, Nicita 1997, Treviño 2003. This literature uses three types of argument against the claim that the nominal in question is not a subject. First, they characterize the nominal, which is the only argument in the sentence, as the “psychological subject” (as opposed to “grammatical subject”). Second, they show that the nominal agrees with the verb (in SII), which, they argue, shows that it has become a true “grammatical subject”. Third, they observe the absolute lack of preposition *a*, which usually appears with some direct

Spanish is split in two dialects with respect to SEC. In Spanish Dialect I (SI), the verb has a default value (3rd person, singular):

- But in Spanish Dialect II (SII), the verb agrees with the ACC nominal, even when the nominal is a clitic:<sup>4</sup>

- objects in Spanish. Obviously, the first argument makes use of a different notion of subject; in this perspective, *subject* is a notion independent of structural considerations, a view from which I depart (i.e. I assume that the subject is defined structurally). I will show in the following section that the nominal does not actually enter into an Agree relation with T in SECs, eliminating the second argument. I will also give reasons why the third argument is not strong enough—see footnote 13.

(i) UN HOMBRE      había en el jardín  
A MAN              was in the garden

<sup>4</sup> I will use SI for the dialect without agreement, and SII for the one with agreement. When there is no indication, the sentence is good or bad in both dialects.

- b. Los            hubieron  
CL-ACC   were

Given that the nominal [dos hombres] is Accusative the data are a direct challenge for theories that link together Agreement and Case (like Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004). In SII, the nominal seems to be in agreement with T, but T cannot be its Case-licensor because T does not value ACC. This means that Chomsky's 2000, 2001 account of English Existential constructions, according to which the internal nominal in *there-be* sentences (the so called "associate") checks case against T and receives nominative, cannot be directly extended to Spanish.

In this chapter, I will present an analysis of SEC that nevertheless supports a relation between Case and Agreement, as well as the operation Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005b, a, 2006), by postulating a small  $\nu$  in SEC. The proposal is compatible with other studies that have proposed that there are several types of small  $\nu$ , with different properties (see Boeckx 2003, Legate 2003, Folli and Harley 2004, among others).

I will contend that small  $\nu$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete. This small  $\nu$  probes the internal nominal and checks its Case (Accusative) only if the nominal is also  $\phi$ -incomplete. This proposal predicts that nominals that are  $\phi$ -complete, for instance proper nouns or some personal pronouns, will be banned from *haber* sentences, given the inability of this  $\phi$ -incomplete small  $\nu$  to check the Case of  $\phi$ -complete nominals; I demonstrate that the prediction is borne out—the elements in question are disallowed in SEC even with list readings, in

contrast to English.<sup>5</sup>

I will argue that the difference in agreement between the two dialects comes from a difference in the specification of  $\phi$ -features in Tense (T). We will see that as a result of this difference, in SII, the operation Agree can value the  $\phi$ -features of T using the small  $v$  as a goal, but in SI Agree fails to do so, and therefore T in this dialect has to resort to a mechanism of default agreement. Interestingly, the verb is irregular in SI, but it tends to regularize in SII, a fact that will be attributed to the above difference in the process of  $\phi$ -valuation.

I will show that the current analysis enable us to explain a number of additional properties and procedures in Spanish, including some correlations between SI and SII with respect to agreement in temporal existential constructions, raising verbs with *haber* (have, be-existential) and certain issues regarding the syntax of *estar* (be-locative) and *parecer* (seem).

Furthermore, I will show that, if extended to all Spanish small  $v$ s in the relevant respects, my proposal explains the syntax of Spanish ACC objects, in particular, it predicts that, if the  $\phi$ -incompleteness of the small  $v$  prevents this element from valuing the Case of direct object (DO) when the DO is  $\phi$ -complete, then the DO must raise to check its Case with

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<sup>5</sup> The clitic *lo* in (1b) will be argued not to be specified for [person]. On the other hand, the pronouns in (i), which are unacceptable even in the list reading, are specified for [person] (see the discussion in section 1.3.1):

(i) \*Me/Te/Nos                      había  
      Me/Te/Us                      was  
      There was me/you/us

another head (a Dative head). I will show that this explains the presence of the element “a” that precedes the objects in question (the so called Differential Object Marking), illustrated in (4):<sup>6</sup>

- (4)        Juan besó a María  
             John kissed A Mary  
             John kissed Mary

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, I will establish the fundamental intuition regarding the correlation between Existential Constructions and Differential Object Marking, and its relation with the Definiteness Effect. In Section 1.2, I will present the proposal that there is a small  $\nu$  in SEC. In Section 1.3, I will refine the idea by proposing that the small  $\nu$  in *haber*-sentences is  $\phi$ -incomplete and that, in SII but not in SI, T has an interpretable  $\phi$ -feature. I will discuss some consequences of this idea with respect to temporal existential constructions in section 1.4, with respect to additional dialectal differences in section 1.5, and with respect to raising verbs in section 1.6. Section 1.7 presents the conclusions for this chapter.

### **1. 1. Existential sentences and Differential Object Marking**

Like English *there-be* sentences, Spanish *haber*-sentences display a Definiteness Effect (DE, Milsark 1974). However, Spanish existential sentences seem to be more restricted, since they do not allow nominals that are specific and animate, not even with list-

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<sup>6</sup> The full technical details of the DOM system will be discussed in chapter 2.



readings:<sup>7</sup>

(5) a. Había un hombre en la habitación  
was a man in the room  
There was a man in the room

b. \* Había Juan en la habitación  
was the man in the room  
\* There was the man in the room

(6) a. Lo/La había  
CL-MAS/CL-FEM was

b. \*Me/Te/Nos había  
Me/Te/Us was  
There was me/you/us

Zucchi 1995, McNally 1997, Keenan 2003, among several others, argue that the DE should receive a purely semantic/pragmatic explanation. In that sense, we could argue that (5b) and (6b) merely shows the DE at work, and in fact this has been proposed (see Saab 2006). I will show here that this cannot be the whole story (see also Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006a).

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<sup>7</sup> See below for discussion of (6a).

For McNally 1997, an account of the DE should include an explanation for the list-readings that we find with specific nominals inside existential sentences (7b):

- (7) a. —Is there any taxi driver in this town?  
b. —Well, there is John.

According to her, the DE arises from the requirement of a novel discourse referent to support the truth of the existential assertion; however, this requirement can be overridden if the existential sentence is presupposed to be true. This is established in condition (8):

- (8) If an existential sentence is presupposed to be true in the context in which is uttered, its re-introduction into the context is not accompanied by the instantiation of any discourse referent.  
(McNally 1997: 327)

Condition (8) correctly predicts list-reading sentences in the right context. These sentences, as in (7), generally appear after questions, with raising intonation, with no prepositional phrase (Milsark 1974, Rando and Napoli 1978, Hannay 1985, Safir 1985, Abbott 1992, McNally 1997).

Significantly, Spanish does not accept this type of sentences with the verb *haber*, which is the verb used in Existential Construction:

- (9) a. —Hay            algún taxista            en este pueblo?  
                          Is there        any taxi driver        in this town?

- b. —\* Bueno,            hay            Juan  
                          Well,            there is        John.

Sentences like (9b) do not have a list-reading, they are plain ungrammatical. It is important to stress that we cannot attribute this fact to the Definiteness Effect alone (contra Saab 2006), because in (9b), given the list-reading context, the DE is expected to be cancelled by (8), as in (7b). This does not happen in Spanish, which raises a potential problem for (8). I contend, however, that the reason for the ungrammaticality of (9b) is syntactic, and that Condition (8) can be maintained, even for Spanish.

What is particularly interesting—and I believe this is the core difference between the Spanish DE and the English DE—is that the nominals that are not allowed even under list-readings with *haber* are specific and animate. To obtain a list-reading with these nominals, Spanish must use *estar*.<sup>8</sup>

- (10) a. Está/\*Hay        Juan  
                          Is                    John  
                          There is John

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<sup>8</sup> This restriction survives in non-restrictive *haber*-relatives (to form a relative here, we need *estar*):

- (i) Juan,        quien        \*hay/está        en la esquina  
       John,        who        is                in the corner

- b. Estás/\*Has            tú  
are                        you  
There is you.

A very similar effect obtains with Spanish unmarked direct objects. In Spanish, specific animate Direct Objects (DO) are normally marked by the preposition *a* “to”, which is the dative preposition:

- (11) a. Besó una mujer UNMARKED ANIMATE OBJECT  
kissed a woman (non specific)  
He kissed a woman

- b. \* Besó      María  
         kissed    Mary  
         He kissed Mary

- (12) a. Besó a una mujer MARKED ANIMATE OBJECT  
kissed PREP a woman (specific)  
He kissed a woman

- b.    Besó        a                    Mary  
         kissed    PREP            Mary  
         He kissed Mary

I will explain the details of this phenomenon, which is an instance of the so called Differential Object Marking (DOM, see Bossong 1982, 1983-1984, 1985, 1991, among many others) in chapter 2. For now, to capture these facts, I will use the generalization in (16)—which is very similar to the one provided by Heusinger and Kaiser 2003: 53:<sup>9</sup>

(13)

Marked Object	[+animate] [+specific]
Unmarked Object	[+animate] [-specific]
	[-animate] [+specific]
	[-animate] [-specific]

Differential Object Marking has been observed in a number of languages—Bossong 1991, Torrego 1998, Aissen 2003 and the references therein. Among Romance languages, Spanish shares DOM with Rumanian,<sup>10</sup> but we also find DOM in languages as diverse as Hindi and Turkish. Let me illustrate the phenomenon with respect to Turkish, which is not exactly like Spanish because it does not have an animacy constraint. However, what is important for us is that the accusative suffix *-yı* is dropped if the object is non specific (just like the Spanish preposition *a* is dropped with non specific animate objects):

<sup>9</sup> As we will see in chapter 2, this generalization has severe limitations, which have not prevented it from being the standard view on DOM in the literature (see Zagana 2002: 13). I will give a detailed description of this issue in chapter 2.

<sup>10</sup> In Spanish and Rumanian, DOM is very robust. But DOM can also be found in non-standard varieties of Italian (Southern Dialects in particular), Gallego, Portuguese and French (see Pensado 1995a: 14-16, de Jong 1996: 53-93).

- (14) a. Bir araba isti-yor-um UNMARKED OBJECT  
a car want-PRES-1SG  
I want a car (*non specific*)
- b. araba-yı isti-yor-um MARKED OBJECT  
car-ACC want-PRES-1SG  
I want the car *or*  
I want a car (*specific*)

Furthermore, with Turkish existential sentences, the internal DP cannot have the suffix – **yı**. As in English and Spanish, in this case, the internal DP has a non specific reading:<sup>11</sup>

- (15) a. Buranda bir araba var  
Here a car exist  
There is a car here
- b. \*Buranda araba-y<sub>1</sub> var  
Here car-ACC exist  
There is the car here

In other words, it seems that there is a correspondence between being a marked object and some particular interpretation, which I will refer to as INT (this is the interpretation

<sup>11</sup> I thank Serkan Şener and Nilufer Şener for discussion of these data.

marked objects have). In addition, the unmarked object receives the complement of INT (which I will call INT'). For Turkish, INT is [+specific] and therefore INT' will be [-specific]. To the extent to which (13) is correct, for Spanish, the situation seems to be as follows:<sup>12</sup>

(16)

Marked Object	INT	[+animate] [+specific]	a
Unmarked Object	INT'	[+animate] [-specific]	b
		[-animate] [+specific]	c
		[-animate] [-specific]	d

This is similar to what we have observed with respect to the restrictions on the internal nominal of *haber* sentences, which I will now express as the following:

(17) The nominal of *haber* always receives INT' and never INT.

This means that its object will always be unmarked (without preposition *a*), which is, of course, true.<sup>13</sup> There is nothing particularly new here. But, by combining (16c) and (17),

<sup>12</sup> As we will see in chapter 2, one major problem for this generalization is that marked objects actually do not need to be [+specific]. It is, however, true that unmarked objects cannot be both [+animate] and [+specific], which means that (17) holds, and this is the relevant generalization with respect to Existential Constructions.

<sup>13</sup> In principle, this removes the possibility of using the lack of preposition to suggest that we are not dealing here with an ACC object, which has been proposed occasionally (see, for instance García Llebra 1983, Groat 1999)—see footnote 2.

we can make an additional prediction:

(18) Objects that are [-animate] but [+specific] can be *haber* objects.

Notice, however, that (18) must be restricted by the Definiteness Effect, which bans [+specific] nominals from existential sentences (for semantic reasons, as explained). This means that [-animate] nominals that are [+specific] can appear under *haber* with list-readings (which are the readings left over once we factor in the DE):

- (19) a. —Hay            alguna diversión            en este pueblo?  
              Is there    any entertainment        in this town?
- b. —Bueno,        hay            la piscina  
              Well,        there is        the pool

This also means that objects that are both [+animate] and [+specific] cannot be under *haber*, no even with list-readings. This is exactly what we found when we discussed (9b).

In fact, some researchers have used data like (19) to argue that there is no Definiteness Effect in Spanish existential constructions, which is not true. For example, Suñer 1982a: 70 denounces what she calls “the myth of Definiteness Restriction in *hay* sentences”. Consider these sentences, where the definite article (*el*=the) is allowed in *haber*-environments:



- (20) ...y allí no hay *el problema* de...  
...and there, there-isn't *the problem* of...  
[Suñer 1982a: 70]

These nominals are [-animate]. If we shift to a [+animate] object, the resulting sentence becomes ungrammatical:

- (21) \*...y allí no hay *el estudiante* de...  
...and there there-isn't *the student* of...

In fact, Suñer 1982a: 82 notes that *haber*-sentences are degraded with specific and animate objects, but she does not attach any significance to this fact, arguing that this is a side effect from the requirement of preposition with this kind of object in Spanish. I claim that this is not a “side effect”, but the main effect we need to explain, given the following generalization that we can now postulate:

- (22) If a nominal is allowed in *haber*-sentences, then it will be allowed as an unmarked object with any other transitive verb.

Unfortunately, the generalization has at least one strong exception. Some negative quantifiers are allowed under *haber* but they require A with other verbs:<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Throughout this dissertation, I will use capital A to indicate the “a” (lit. “to”) used in Spanish Differential Object Marking.

- (23)      a    No      hay      nadie      en casa  
                  Not      is      nobody      in house  
                  There is nobody at home
- b    No      maté      \*(a) nadie  
                  Not      killed      (to) nobody  
                  I didn't kill anybody

I will show in chapter 2, however, that the presence of the preposition with *nadie* in (23) is accidental, depending on independent properties. If (22) is correct, the DE in existential sentences and the DE with unmarked animated objects are the same phenomenon, at least for Spanish (and Turkish, *mutatis mutandi*). Then, we may entertain the idea that what unifies both DEs is a grammatical property that is common to both of them, which in turn correlates with (16). I will discuss this property in the next section.

## 1.2. A small *v* in existentials

In this section I will present the idea that *haber*-sentences in Spanish have a small *v* that is responsible for the ACC Case. Actually, under the Agree system, given that we have an ACC object (cf. 1), there is no choice but to postulate a functional head with  $\phi$ -features and the ability to probe the object, that is, small *v*:<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See Deal 2006 for the idea that, even English *there-be* sentences need a small *v*. For German, which also exhibits ACC in the existential construction, Czinglar 2001 proposes a Voice projection (in addition to T).

(24) Hay un hombre en la habitación


Is a man in the room

There is a man in the room

(25) [TP T- $\phi$  [vP v- $\phi$  [VP hay [SC [un hombre] [en la habitación]]]]]

Under the Agree system (cf. Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004), T and v have a set of uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features (person, number, gender) that are unvalued. They probe into their c-command domain, looking for goals with valued  $\phi$ -features—a nominal, for instance. Once they match a goal, the goal will value their uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features, and, as a reflex of this, the goal will get its uninterpretable Case-feature valued. It is a matter of controversy how this “reflex” happens. For Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004 it just happens as a stipulation and in situ; for Bošković 2005, 2007b this is obtained by positioning a valued [case] feature in the probe (that would be ACC in small v), and making the goal move to c-command the probe to check case (the relevant DP thus becomes a probe, probing small v, which then serves as a goal, under Agree). The checking of ACC case in Spanish Existential Sentences does not provide evidence to tease apart these possibilities. For that reason, I will outline the details of the Agree system using Chomsky’s assumption, which will suffice as expository device. However, we will see in chapter 2 that, when we extend the analysis to Spanish DOM, the second alternative makes interesting predictions and proves to be useful. The reader should keep this in mind.

In the above system, a probe cannot be left with its  $\phi$ -feature unvalued, since Spell Out will not be able to delete them, producing a crash. A goal must value its Case-feature for the same reason. If T is the probe, the goal will be NOM; if  $v$  is the probe, the goal will be ACC. This is achieved by the operation Agree. For now, let me say that the operation Agree applies as shown in (26). The small  $v$  probes the internal nominal, and the nominal values small  $v$ 's  $\phi$ -features under Agree; as a reflex of this, the nominal gets ACC:<sup>16</sup>



Given this proposal, some problems immediately arise. According to Chomsky 1995, small  $v$  has the lexical property of having an external argument and valuing the ACC of the internal one. This is the way Chomsky encodes Burzio's Generalization, according to which:

(27) All and only the verbs that can assign a  $\theta$ -role to the subject [i.e. an external argument] can assign accusative Case to an object.

[Burzio 1986:178]

The small  $v$  that I propose for SEC can value the ACC of the nominal but it does not have

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<sup>16</sup> I am abstracting away from [gender] in this dissertation.

an external argument. Since, for Chomsky, BG is a lexical property of  $v$ , nothing prevents other kinds of  $v$  from having different lexical properties. In fact, if the lexical properties [external argument] and [valuing ACC] are assumed not to necessarily correlate, we expect four types of  $v$ :

- (28)
- a. [+external argument] and [+valuing ACC]
  - b. [+external argument] and [-valuing ACC]
  - c. [-external argument] and [+valuing ACC]
  - d. [-external argument] and [-valuing ACC]


Notice that at least two of them are attested: (28a) is Chomsky's 2000  $*v$  for transitive verbs, and (28d) is the unaccusative  $v$ . In addition, (28b) could be associated with unergative verbs (assuming that there is no cognate object, or that the cognate object does not receive ACC in narrow syntax).<sup>17</sup> If this line of reasoning is correct, the lack of a  $v$  like (28c) would be a gap in the paradigm. Of course, (28c) is perfectly suited for Spanish existentials. Thus, I conclude that BG does not hold empirically. Actually, we know that BG is violated in several languages and constructions (see Haider 1985, Yip *et al.* 1987, Marantz 1991, Harley 1995, Reuland 2000, López 2001, Woolford 2003 and many others); in fact, most researchers (including Burzio 2000) consider BG to be an epiphenomenon (see the papers in Reuland 2000).

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<sup>17</sup> Under Hale and Keyser 1993 framework, a transformation from a combination like [V [N walk]] into [V walk] would take place in the pre-syntactic component (a sort of lexical syntax). In this scenario, an incorporation N-to-V could render the Case feature inactive. Since this type of verbs does not have an object position in narrow syntax, then we need something like (28b). However, it could be argued that the process described above happens in the syntax, and then unergative constructions would simply be transitive constructions. I leave this issue open.

There is another problem with (25)-(26): apparently, the  $\phi$ -features of T remain unvalued, so, under Chomsky's system, (24) should be ungrammatical, since the nominal does not enter into an Agree relation with T, and therefore the  $\phi$ -features of T remain unvalued. We cannot say that a null expletive EXPL takes care of the  $\phi$ -features of T because expletives are base-generated in Spec, TP (Chomsky 2000, 2001, Bošković 2002a), so T cannot probe EXPL, under the assumption that probing happens only under c-command (that is, the probe has to c-command the goal). More importantly, EXPL is supposed to be  $\phi$ -incomplete, that is, it has only [person] and not [number], thus, it is unable to value the features of a  $\phi$ -complete T.<sup>18</sup>


Interestingly, according to Chomsky 2000, in English existential sentences, once T has valued its  $\phi$ -features by probing the nominal, the expletive THERE can probe T and value its own [person] feature. This means that valued heads can be goals:



If any head with valued  $\phi$ -features may be the goal for a probe with unvalued  $\phi$ -features, we can value the  $\phi$ -features of T in sentence (24) using the small  $v$  (whose  $\phi$ -features have been valued by the internal nominal) and Agree:

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<sup>18</sup> Notice that a difference needs to be established between THERE-expletives and IT-expletives. The former are defective and cannot value T; the latter (which also include, for instance, French *il*) can value T. As should be apparent, there cannot be an IT-expletive in SEC, since this would predict that T would *always* have the same  $\phi$ -features, which is not true (compare (1) vs (3)). I thus assume that there is no null expletive in SEC (as argued by Picallo 1998 and Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006d; for a different view see Torrego 1984b).



This is possible because the  $\phi$ -features of  $v$  are still there after it undergoes Agree with the nominal, which values its  $\phi$ -features, since the deletion procedure applies only at the point of Spell-Out. Although they have already been valued, the  $\phi$ -features have not been deleted because Spell Out applies just at the end of a strong phase. I assume that the small  $v$  in question is not the head of a strong phase, because it does not have an External argument. Notice that this implies that there is a mechanism of mediated agreement: the nominal values small  $v$  and small  $v$  in turn values T (under the conditions discussed in the next section).<sup>19</sup>

Notice also that the small  $v$  in question does not have any unvalued [Case:   ] to value.<sup>20</sup> At first sight, this is trivial ( $v$  just doesn't have to check Case), but it allows us to make a crucial observation: a head (in this case T) can get its  $\phi$ -features valued without assigning any Case.<sup>21</sup> This seems to be true for T in both SI and SII:

<sup>19</sup> For related proposals in other languages and constructions see Butt 1995, Legate 2005, Frank 2005, among others (see also Bhatt 2005 and Bobaljik 2006 for discussion of the limitations of this mechanism).

<sup>20</sup> The situation is still the same if we assume, with Bošković 2005, 2007b, that there is a *valued* [case: ACC] in  $v$ : in this framework, the feature comes with small  $v$  from the lexicon, so it does not come from Agree. More details on this system will be provided in chapter 2.

<sup>21</sup> Notice that this does not appeal to Chomsky's 2000, 2001 notion of *defective head*, according to which a head (for instance, an infinitival T) can get a value for its  $\phi$ -features but it is unable to value the case feature of the relevant nominal. In (30), it is not the case that T cannot value a case feature (so, it is not defective); instead what happens is that small  $v$  does not have any case feature to be valued.

- (31) a. Llueve  
       rains  
       It rains
- b. [TP T- $\phi$  [VP Llueve]

In Spanish (both SI and SII), T with  $\phi$ -uninterpretable features can get a default value [3p, SING] if no head with interpretable  $\phi$ -features is available in its c-command domain. This default value could be implemented via a pronominal subject clitic (SCL) that values the  $\phi$ -features of T, rendering inactive its ability to value NOM. The morphological manifestation of this subject clitic could be the [3p, SING] suffix that we find in these verbs, in accordance with similar ideas developed in Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 1998, Picallo 1998, Kato 1999, 2000, Díaz 2004, Ticio 2004.<sup>22</sup>

Let me emphasize another assumption to be in position to fully assert my proposal. As has been observed (Boeckx 2003), the requirement for a head with uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features (the probe) to value its features in order to value the Case-feature of the goal is a way to encode the Inverse Case Filter—that is, the requirement for a traditional Case-assigner to discharge its Case to an assignee (Bošković 1997b, 2002a)—in the Agree system. This also gives us a way to derive a weak version of the BG (actually Chomsky 2000 suggests this too), that is, it is possible to assume that there is a type of small  $\nu$  which must value accusative and assign an external theta role, without precluding the

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<sup>22</sup> In principle, this subject clitic could replace the idea of a null expletive as responsible for valuing the  $\phi$ -features of T, and it also could render unnecessary the idea of default agreement. I will come back to this issue later in the chapter.



possibility of other types of small  $v$  (as in (28)).

Assuming that  $T$  is always present in a sentence (nothing really new here), if a second lower  $\phi$ -head (small  $v$ ) is present, there are only two (grammatical) options:

- (32) i. There is another argument between  $T$  and the second  $\phi$ -head (the External argument), and  $T$  values its  $\phi$ -features by probing this argument.
- ii. There is no other argument between  $T$  and the second  $\phi$ -head, then, either:
- a.  $T$  values its  $\phi$ -features by probing the second head (provided that this head has already valued its own  $\phi$ -features by probing the internal argument), or else
- b. A subject clitic/default agreement values the  $\phi$ -features of  $T$ .

According to (32i), we need an external argument to value the  $\phi$ -features of  $T$ , since the internal argument is in the domain of another probe. Obviously, this makes the BG an epiphenomenon, since it depends on the necessity of  $T$  to value its  $\phi$ -features, but BG can be violated if the  $\phi$ -features are valued using a goal different than the External argument. According to (32ii) a probe can in turn be visible as a goal for another c-commanding probe, even if it has no Case feature, presumably violating the Activation Condition (AC)—according to which a goal must have an uninterpretable feature to undergo agreement.<sup>23</sup> A solution has to be developed, even under stricter Chomsky's assumptions: otherwise, his idea that the expletive probes  $T$  in English existentials constructions like (29) would violate the AC, since  $T$  has no Case-feature. Notice, however, that for

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<sup>23</sup> See Bošković 2007b for arguments that the AC does not hold for Agree.

Chomsky, AC depends on the presence of any uninterpretable feature. T is then still active since its  $\phi$ -features are uninterpretable. Since the same is true in (32ii), there is no problem with respect to AC here.

Having established the plausibility of (30) in Chomsky's Agree system, in the next section, I turn to the dialectal difference noted above with respect to agreement in SEC. I will slightly adjust (30) to account for it.

### 1.3 Object Agreement: existentials in SI and SII

In this section, I will present an analysis of the dialectal difference in Spanish with respect to agreement in existential constructions notice in section 1.1. I will propose that the small  $\nu$  in SEC is  $\phi$ -incomplete (it does not have [person]). In addition, an interpretable [person] in SII-T will account for the dialectal difference in agreement. Recall that there are two dialects of Spanish with respect to agreement in existential constructions:

(33)	Hubo	dos hombres	en la fiesta	<i>SI</i>
	was	two men	in the party	
	There were two men at the party			

(34)	Hubieron	dos hombres	en la fiesta	<i>SII</i>
	were	two men	in the party	
	There were two men at the party			

This difference has been attested by several researchers, and it seems to be present in Spanish at least from the XIV century (Bello 1847, Cuervo 1881, Kany 1951, Lapesa 1980, Montes 1982, Suñer 1982b, a, Obediente 1984, Bentivoglio 1989, Miles 1990, De Mello 1991, Navarro Correa 1991, De Mello 1994, Nicita 1997, Domínguez *et al.* 1998, Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999, Díaz-Campos 1999-2000, 2003, Treviño 2003, Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006c, d, Saab 2006). In the present times, SI is predominant in Peninsular Spanish (PS), whereas SII is predominant in Latin American Spanish (LAS)—see, for instance, Bello (1847:§781), who denounces this agreement as an “almost universal vice”. But SII is also present in PS as a non standard variety, and SI is usually imposed as a prescriptive rule in LAS—so, in LAS, it is not hard to find educated speakers with both SI and SII.<sup>24</sup>

Given that the social and geographical distribution of these varieties is complex,<sup>25</sup> I will

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<sup>24</sup> It is necessary to keep this in mind. That a given speaker can accept both versions of existentials constructions does not mean that the agreement is optional—against some suggestions to the contrary: Contreras 1976: 142, Westphal 1980: 61, Treviño 2003: 179. At best, speakers who accept both are bi-dialectal. Being a native speaker of SII myself, I remember my surprise when I was first introduced to SI as the “correct” dialect. Now, however, I can accept SI *haber*-sentences. See also footnote 46.

<sup>25</sup> The distribution of the phenomenon has received considerable attention in the sociolinguistic literature, where it is usually called “the personalization of *haber*” (Silva-Corvalán 2001: 30)—see Montes 1982, Obediente 1984, Bentivoglio 1989, Navarro Correa 1991, De Mello 1991, 1994, Domínguez *et al.* 1998, Díaz-Campos 1999-2000, 2003, among others. Notice, however, that this literature generally considers the agreement in SII as evidence that the nominal is a subject and no longer an object, but without discussion of the lack of other subject properties, and no explanation is provided for the presence of the ACC clitic. Some authors explicitly belittle this fact: “La posible realización de este SN como un pronombre coreferencial no parece ser un argumento que interese a los hablantes” [The possible realization of this NP as a coreferential pronoun does not seem to be an argument that calls the attention of the speakers] (Domínguez *et al.* 1998: 33). These opinions, however, must be considered in their real dimension, since they show something very important. The presence of agreement in the data is so pervasive that the researchers are willing to consider the nominal as a subject, putting aside other properties. Then, we can consider that the sociolinguistic explorations confirm that the agreement between the nominal and *haber* is widely spread, despite the fact that the nominal is an object or even an ACC clitic. This should not be so strange, since agreement with the verb does not need to be a property of subjects, as minimal cross-linguistic examination immediately shows.

simply use SI and SII to refer to the varieties without and with agreement, respectively. Keep in mind, however, that SI and SII are really shorthands for a family of dialects that share the corresponding phenomenon. Although I will present some correlations between the difference in (33)-(34) and other properties of SI and SII, nothing prevents the dialects inside SI or SII to differ in other aspects of their grammars.

Under the current assumptions, the explanation for SII (34) is straightforward: the nominal values the  $\phi$ -features of  $v$  (as a result of which the nominal gets ACC), and  $v$  values the  $\phi$ -features of T. T, then, ends up indirectly agreeing with the nominal (i.e. it ends up having the  $\phi$ -features of the nominal, which is responsible for the agreement patterns). However, (33) shows that in SI T cannot probe its goal, and therefore it gets a default value. Given that in both cases we have  $v$  (because there is ACC: recall that both dialects accept (1)), the question is what could prevent T from valuing its  $\phi$ -features by probing  $v$  in SI? To answer this question, let's return to the restrictions on the internal nominal in *haber*-sentences.


### **1.3.1 Restrictions on the internal nominal and $\phi$ -incomplete small $v$**

I contend that nominals that are specified with [person] are not possible inside *haber*-sentences. This means that there are nominals that do not have [person] feature, and they are precisely the ones that are allowed under *haber*. There is a long standing tradition, which can be traced back to Benveniste 1966, arguing that the category of Person should be restricted to the participants in the speech act, that is, the First Person and the Second

Person. Under this perspective, the non-participant, the Third Person, is a non-person.<sup>26</sup>

In a feature-based system, being non-person would mean that the item in question lacks a [person] feature, that is, it is  $\phi$ -incomplete. I will adopt the view that some nominals have a [person] feature, but I will also assume that other nominals lack this feature. This means that some nominals are  $\phi$ -complete, but others are  $\phi$ -incomplete (they lack [person]).

I assume the following classification of nominals with respect to [person]—see Harley and Ritter 2002, Adger and Harbour 2003, Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2004, among others, for related proposals in relation with other languages:




As in the traditional view, if a nominal refers to a participant in the speech act, it will be marked with [person]. Notice that these nominals are very few, in fact, they are the First and Second Person pronouns. Notice further that First and Second Person pronouns are always interpreted as both specific and animate. That is, only non-participants display all combinations of semantic properties [ $\pm$ animate] and [ $\pm$ specific]. We then have the

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<sup>26</sup> This traditional view has been challenged, however. For instance, relying on data from an extensive cross-linguistic survey, Siewierska 2004 argues that excluding the Third Person “would severely skew our understanding of a number of facets of the category of person” (Siewierska 2004: 8), although she acknowledges that the Third Person has a distinct nature from the First Person and the Second Person. See also Nevins 2007, who voices similar concerns.

following:



It is natural to assume that the subset of non-participants that are similar to the participants can also have the [person] feature that the participants uncontroversially hold. I thus suggest that, at least in some languages, non-participant nominals that are both specific and animate receive a [person] feature, slightly departing from the traditional view.<sup>27</sup>

A language then may link the possibility of having a [person] feature with the semantic properties of being animate and specific, given that these properties are always connected with nominals that necessarily hold the [person] feature (the participants). Then the language would grant the feature [person] to all nominals that are both animate and specific, even if they refer to non-participants. That may not be the only possibility.

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<sup>27</sup> It is not clear, however, how far we are from a Benvenistean position. If we take the idea of “non person” to be related with the value of [person], and not with the category itself, we could reconcile the two positions. If First Person is [person:+1-2] and Second Person is [person:-1+2], Third Person could be [person:-1-2], which leaves room for [person:+1+2], a pronoun that refers to both participants (the inclusive *we*), a possibility very well attested among languages. I have no space here to explore all the consequences of this move. For expository reasons, I will continue to use [3p] to refer to non-participants nominals that carry [person].

Another language could interpret the opposition between participants and non-participants with respect to [person] only on the basis of animacy, or only on the basis of specificity. Such languages would grant a [person] feature only to animates (or to a subset of them, depending on how close they are understood to be with respect to the participants) or only to specific nominals (or to a subset of them, under the same conditions)—see chapter 4 for examples of languages that instantiate these possibilities.

The above allows an interpretation of the [person] feature that is uniform across participants and non participants, but changes across languages (see also the discussion in chapter 4): in a given language being [person] means being both specific and animate, and the particular value of the feature informs the corresponding participation in the speech act (see footnote 27). I also suggest that only nominals that do not receive the feature [person] will be  $\phi$ -incomplete, that is, they will have no [person] feature. I contend that this is what happens in Spanish—for other possibilities see chapter 4. In that sense, for instance, a proper noun like *Juan*, which is specific and animate, has an interpretable [person:-1-2] feature. On the other hand, a nominal like *azúcar* “sugar”, which is both non animate and non specific, has no [person] feature.

An interesting situation arises with the ACC clitic *lo*. This form is allowed under *haber*-sentences, as we have already observed:

- (37)      a.    Hay      una casa            en el parque  
                  is        a house            in the park  
                  There is house in the room

b. La hay

CLITIC is

In this case, *lo* is not animate, since it stands for “a house”. We assume, then, that here *lo* does not have a [person] feature—and in this case it is not specific, since it is inside an existential sentence. However, when *lo* is animate, it must have a [person] feature:<sup>28</sup>:

(38) Lo vi a Juan

CLITIC saw to John

I saw John

Then, I assume two different forms for *lo*: one with [person] (as in (38)) and the other without [person] (as in (37)). Interestingly, in some Spanish dialects, the ACC clitic with [person] has a morphological expression (*le*) different from *lo* without [person].<sup>29</sup> An interesting prediction then arises. In *leísta* dialects (the ones that distinguish *lo/le* with respect to the direct object), the form *le*, that is, the one that has a [person] feature, should not be possible with *haber*-sentences. This prediction is borne out:

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<sup>28</sup> Notice also that here, in a clitic doubling structure, *lo* must be specific (as argued by Suñer 1988, among others).

<sup>29</sup> The relation between these phenomenon (usually called *leísmo*) and the Differential Object Marking (the presence of preposition with some direct objects) that Spanish shows has been noticed long ago. For instance, Lapesa 1968: 549), quoted by Pensado 1995: fn4, characterized the *leísmo* as a process that “tiende a distinguir gramaticalmente las categorías de persona y cosa” [tends to grammatically distinguish the categories of person and thing]. The dialectal differences with respect to these clitics are more complex, however. For instance, there are dialects where *le* substitutes *lo* completely. See Fernández-Ordoñez 1999 for a thorough description.



- (39) \*Le había  
Him was  
There was him.

Furthermore, in non-*leísta* dialects, the ones that have a single form (*lo*), the clitic *lo*, cannot have an animate interpretation when used in *haber*-sentences:

- (40) a. \*Hay Juan  
Is John  
There is John
- b. \*Lo hay [if *lo*=*Juan*]  
him you  
There is him.

This is evidence that Spanish can express morphologically the split between nominals that are animate and specific, and nominals that are not. I claim that it does so by using the feature [person]. The exact process and conditions that allow the insertion of the [person] feature will be spelled-out in chapter 2, since they are mostly relevant for DOM-marking.<sup>30</sup> The important thing here is that [person] nominals are precisely the kind of

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<sup>30</sup> We will see that it is actually only animacy that controls the insertion of [person], but that this feature gets deleted if a nominal cannot be specific, so [-specific,+animate] nominals may still end up without [person]—I will delay the technical details until chapter 2. Notice that this does not affect the current argument regarding existentials.

nominals that are banned from Spanish *haber*-sentences.<sup>31</sup>

- (41)      a.    \*Me/Te/Nos        había  
                 Me/Te/Us        was  
                 There was me/you/us
- b.    \*Has        tú  
                 are        you  
                 There is you.

It is crucial to stress that [person] nominals are not possible here even with list-readings. It is not the case that in (41) we have a different reading, these sentences are simply ungrammatical, which is different from English, where the corresponding sentences are accepted with a list-reading (an observation that can be traced back to Milsark 1974). Therefore, as explained above, the restriction in question cannot be accounted for by using the Definiteness Effect (contra Saab 2006). I propose that the reason for the ban in question is that small *v* appears without the feature [person], i.e. only with [number]:<sup>32</sup>

- (42)            *v*  
                 [number]

---

<sup>31</sup> Notice that this implies that some specific nominals are allowed under *haber* (with list-readings), if they are inanimate, as discussed above. Recall also noting that in dialects that distinguish between *lo* and *le* (as ACC clitic), *le* is banned from *haber*-sentences, as predicted.

<sup>32</sup> As mentioned above, I am abstracting away from other features like [gender], since these do not play any role in the system I am developing here. For other analysis where syntactic heads can be underspecified, see Béjar 2003: 37 and the references therein.

This means that only objects that are not specified for [person] will be allowed in the structure in question. If an internal nominal is specified for [person], small  $\nu$  will be able to probe it and to value its own [number] feature, but it will not be able to value the [case] feature of the object, given Chomsky's 2000, 2001 suggestion that incomplete  $\phi$ -features cannot value [case], expressed in a principle to maximize matching effects:

(43) Maximize matching effects

[Chomsky 2001: 15]

This requirement for probes must be relativized to the features of the goal. Small  $\nu$  is still “incomplete” (in the absolute sense) when it probes objects with no [person] feature, but it is complete with respect to the features of the goal. In other words, Chomsky's suggestion can be interpreted in this way:<sup>33</sup>

(44) Condition on Case-valuation

Only a probe P that matches all the relevant features of a goal G can value the [case] feature of G

So far, this is common to SI and SII. A problem arises here. Recall that I have suggested above that  $\nu$  serves as a goal for T, valuing its  $\phi$ -features. Notice however that small  $\nu$  should not be able to value the  $\phi$ -features of T because it is  $\phi$ -incomplete. Here we are looking at the other side of valuation: from the goal to the probe. This situation is not

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<sup>33</sup> Notice that I am assuming that T is not able to value the [case] feature of a nominal dominated by  $\nu$ P. The reason for that is that T needs to probe  $\nu$  and cannot escape its interference, failing to probe across  $\nu$ . In other words, we are dealing here with a minimality effect, since small  $\nu$  is the closest goal to T.


covered by (44). Let me then assume a version of Béjar 's 2003 Condition on valuation  
(where, f=features):

(45) Condition on  $\phi$ -valuation

G(oal) values P(robe) if and only if all uninterpretable  $\phi$ -f(P) match  $\phi$ -f(G)

[Adapted from Béjar 2003: 65]

In other words, all the uninterpretable features of the probe P must match the  $\phi$ -features of the goal G, in order for the uninterpretable features of the probe P to get valued. This basically means that there are two process of valuation under Agree: Case-valuation (which must satisfy (44)) and  $\phi$ -valuation (which must satisfy (45)). In other words, the Agree operation has three steps:<sup>34</sup>



<sup>34</sup> This will be particularly important when we discuss default agreement in the next subsection.

Therefore, although (42) allows us to explain the [person] restriction on internal nominals in *haber*-sentences (given (44)), it gives us a new problem, because now we don't have a way to value the  $\phi$ -features of T (given (45)). Let's put this aside for a moment.

There is another difference between SI and SII, in addition to the agreement difference noted above. In SII SEC, but not in SI SEC, the T can have a person value that is different from the one in the nominal. In fact, as discussed above, the nominal in SEC does not have [person] (it is non specific), but T shows [person] inflection:

- (47)      Habemos                      dos estudiantes en la clase    *SII*  
               Habéis  
               Are-1P-PLU                      two students in the class  
               Are-2P-PLU  
               *Lit:* We there are two students in the class

The same sentence is not acceptable in SI:

- (48)      \* Habemos                      dos estudiantes en la clase    *SI*  
               \* Habéis  
               Are-1P-PLU                      two students in the class  
               Are-2P-PLU

It is important to notice that (47) still is an existential sentence. First, it is subject to the

Definiteness Effect:

- (49)      \*Habemos            los estudiantes en la clase    *SII*  
               Are-1P-PLU        the students in the class

Second, it is still subjectless, in fact, it is impossible to use an overt subject (either preverbal or postverbal):

- (50)      a. \*Nosotros   habemos        dos estudiantes en la clase        *SII*  
                       We            are-1P-PLU    two students in the class
- b. \*Habemos    nosotros    dos estudiantes en la clase        *SII*  
                       Are-1P-PLU   we            two students in the class

This behavior allows us to confirm that (47) is not the Spanish equivalent of any of these English sentences (where the speaker is a student):<sup>35</sup>

- (51)      a. We have two students in the class  
               b. We are two students in the class

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<sup>35</sup> In fact, Spanish has also these possibilities, using the verb *tener* (“to have”) or *ser* (“to be”)—notice that here we have an overt subject:

- |      |          |         |                             |
|------|----------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (i)  | Nosotros | tenemos | dos estudiantes en la clase |
|      | We       | have    | two students in the class   |
| (ii) | Nosotros | somos   | dos estudiantes en la clase |
|      | We       | are     | two students in the class   |

(47) is, then, truly an existential sentence. Given that [person] nominals are not allowed under *haber*, the question is where do [1p] and [2p] come from? The situation is even more puzzling if we take into consideration the fact that this dissociation between the person in T and the person in the nominal agreeing with T is possible with other verbs in both SI and SII. As discussed in Hurtado 1984, Fernández-Soriano 1989, Contreras 1991, Olarrea 1996, Ordóñez 1997, Ordóñez and Treviño 1999, Ortega-Santos 2004, Ticio 2004, and others, Spanish (SI and SII) subject nominals can trigger first or second person in T when they refer to a group that includes the first or the second person:

- (52) Los estudiantes      asistimos      a la clase regularmente  
    asististeis  
      The students      attended-1P-PLU      the class regularly  
    attended-2P-PLU  
      We, the students, attended the class regularly  
      You, the students, attended the class regularly

The question is why SI does not allow this dissociation with *haber*. This is the same question regarding why *haber* in SI does not agree with the internal nominal but SII does.

The standard analysis for (52) is to assume that the overt nominal is left-dislocated and that there is a *pro* in [Spec, TP] which is responsible for the features in T (Contreras 1991, Olarrea 1996, among others):<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> It is worth noticing that the idea that the subject is in a A-bar position, above [Spec, T], is not limited to cases like (52). See Barbosa 1995, Hulk and Pollock 2001, Ortega-Santos 2004, among others, for some

- (53) [Los estudiantes [TP *pro*-1p      asistimos              a la clase regularmente ] ]  
 The students                              attended-1P-PLU    the class regularly

We could try to apply this analysis to *haber*-sentences in SII, assuming an internal a *pro* with [1p] or [2p], which would be responsible for the features of T, with the overt nominal right dislocated to some position:

- (54) [ [    Habemos      *pro*-1P ]    dos estudiantes en la clase]              SII  
          Are-1P-PLU                              two students in the class

But if this is correct, we cannot explain (41): nominals specified for [person] are not allowed in *haber*-sentences. It seems, thus, that we do not have anything that could value the  $\phi$ -features of T in SII SEC.

I think we can solve all these questions at the same time, by assuming an interpretable [person] feature in T. I will discuss this proposal in the next subsection.

### 1.3.2 Interpretable [person] in SII T and a repair strategy for SI T


I propose that in SII the effects just discussed are triggered by an interpretable [person] feature in T. This will solve all the issues noted above. First, given that the [person] feature in T is interpretable in SI, we don't need to value it (it already has a value). So

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discussion.



only the [number] feature needs to probe small  $v$ , which is fine because small  $v$  has only [number], satisfying (45):



Second, given that now the [person] feature is interpretable in SII, it can vary freely, resulting in [1p], [2p] or [3p], without agreeing with the internal nominal (as in (47)). This has the effect that we do not even need to resort to a *pro* to explain mismatches between the  $\phi$ -features of T and the overt subjects. Third, given that in SI T has uninterpretable [person] and [number], the small  $v$  won't be able to value the [person] feature (because small  $v$  is incomplete, as discussed). This is actually a welcome result for SI, since we want to produce a situation where T in this dialect receives a default value in SI *haber*-sentences. We then have a situation similar to (31), repeated here as (56), where T has no element to value its features:<sup>37</sup>

- (56) a. Llueve
- rains
- It rains
- b. [TP T- $\phi$  [VP Llueve]

<sup>37</sup> Notice that the internal nominal in SI *haber*-sentences cannot value the features of T, because it has already checked its [case] feature, hence it is no longer active for Agree; furthermore, it is also incomplete, as discussed above.

(56) clearly shows that SI (and also SII, but this is not applicable to *haber*-sentences for the reasons discussed above) has a last resort strategy to repair this situation, which I will discuss in the next section.

Before doing that, let me close this section by discussing some possible objections to the solution we have just seen for SII. Saab 2006, discussing a preliminary version of this chapter, has suggested that the ungrammaticality of (50) is somehow a consequence of the Overt Pronoun Constraint (OPC), which bans overt pronouns that are in contrastive distribution with empty ones from acting as a bound pronoun (Montalbetti 1984). It is difficult to see, however, how the OPC can apply here since the very issue of contrastive distribution between overt and empty pronoun is at stake here. In other words, the OPC does not ban overt pronouns *per se* (not even from being bound), but only bound readings in overt pronouns when both overt and empty pronouns are syntactically possible (Montalbetti 1984: 89-94). In addition, if we accept that the OPC shows that *pro* is somehow less specific than its overt counterparts, and therefore that the sentences in (50) are excluded by the Definiteness Effect (as Saab 2006 suggests), then it should be possible to obtain list-readings with overt pronouns, under Condition (8). This is, however, not possible:

(57) a. —Hay      algún taxista      en este pueblo?

Is there   any taxi driver   in this town?

b. —\* Bueno, habemos nosotros

Well, there-are we

So, we disregard the possibility of having *pro* in (47).

On the other hand, if the [person] feature of T in SII is already valued, as I have proposed above, it means that the feature must be associated with each tense morpheme (each instance of T). Therefore, different tense morphemes could adopt different settings, that is, a morpheme for a particular tense may have a valued [person] feature, but another morpheme for a different tense may not. This prediction is also borne out. Díaz-Campos 2003 shows that, for Venezuelan Spanish, the possibility of agreement is sensitive to the tense morpheme. In Venezuelan Spanish, imperfect and present perfect favor pluralization but preterit does not (Díaz-Campos 2003: 9). In principle, other SII varieties could be different. We will discuss in the following sections other consequences regarding the tendency of *haber* to regularize.

A possible objection is that the interpretable [person] feature of T in SII only combines with plural, being impossible in singular:

(58) \* Habías un estudiante en la clase

Is-2P-SIN a student in the class

*Lit:* You there is a student in the class

However, it can be argued that this is a result of a semantic restriction. The interpretable [person] feature in T forces an inclusive relation with the set defined by the internal nominal. In that sense, the situation is similar to other cases of inclusive relations. For instance:

(59) *We* went to the movies, and *you* bought the pop corn.

A possible reading for (59) is that the hearer (*you*) is part of the group defined by *we*. Obviously, this reading is not available if both pronouns are in singular.<sup>38</sup>

(60) *He* went to the movies, and *you* bought the pop corn.

Although a full-fledged theory of inclusive relations may be necessary (I have no space here to elaborate it), the intuition is clear enough to suggest that we are on the right track, and that the restriction of the interpretable [person] feature in T to sentences with plural internal nominals is not a problem to my solution (contra Saab 2006)—see also Lyons 1999: 313-315 for arguments that the restriction of this phenomenon to pluralities has a semantic origin.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Another inclusive relation that requires a plurality is partial control (see Landau 2001 for discussion):

(i) John decided PRO to meet at the coffee shop.

In (i), *John* controls PRO only partially, since the subject of *meet* must be plural (John is just one of the people meeting). If this condition is not met, partial control cannot arise:

(ii) John decided PRO to walk home alone.

<sup>39</sup> Notice that this problem is not limited to my solution. A *pro* analysis faces the same challenge (see Olarrea 1996, Ordóñez 1997). Saab's 2006 solution is peculiar: he stipulates that the relevant elements here are "inherently plural". I could certainly do the same thing without changing anything else in my system,

The remaining question is how the unvalued [person] feature in T gets valued in the SI dialect. As briefly pointed out when (31) was discussed, there are plausible candidates for this strategy: default agreement or subject clitic. We will discuss each of them now.

### *1.3.2.1 Default agreement*

Recall that T in SI has an uninterpretable [person] feature, which cannot be valued by probing small  $\nu$ , since the latter is  $\phi$ -incomplete. A possibility is to value it by default. The idea of default agreement has been proposed by several authors to deal with situations like the one just discussed—for a sketch of a theory of default agreement in the Agree system, see Béjar 2003: 76-80. A problem that always arises is how to restrict it. If default agreement were allowed to repair all instances of unvalued  $\phi$ -features we would predict no crashes in the Agree system (when it comes to  $\phi$ -features) and, possibly, multiple instances of disagreement. However, the idea of default agreement is necessary in the system we are developing here. Minimally, we can define *default agreement* as the presence of a feature in a head that cannot be explained by Agree.

Recall that the Condition on  $\phi$ -valuation (45) restricts  $\phi$ -valuation to instances where the Goal is complete with respect to the Probe. In addition, I am assuming that some nominals (precisely the ones that are allowed under *haber*) are  $\phi$ -incomplete (they have

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but I think that an exploration of inclusive relations shows some promise to derive this restriction. I have left that for future research. Saab adopts my general solution for the situation in Spanish Existentials (a small  $\nu$  that can check ACC), but rejects the claim that it is  $\phi$ -incomplete, claiming instead that the effects of incompleteness can be derived from the Definiteness Effect, together with the Overt Pronoun Constraint. As we have just seen above, this cannot be correct.

only [number], no [person])). Given the combination of these assumptions, we would expect that these nominals would not be allowed as subjects of any T in SI, because, by hypothesis, T is  $\phi$ -complete in SI but these nominals are not.<sup>40</sup> Notice that there is no problem with the [case]-feature of these nominals, which can be valued, under the Condition on Case-valuation (44). The problem is the  $\phi$ -valuation of T. Notice further that we cannot assume that there is an unconstrained mechanism of default agreement that repairs this situation. This will predict a default value in T, which does not happen—these nominals, when possible, agree with T:

- (61)        Llegaron                dos autos  
               Arrived-3P-PLU    two cars  
               There arrived two cars.

In (61), if there is a small  $\nu$ , it is  $\phi$ -less and caseless, that is, it does not have  $\phi$ -features and it cannot assign any case; consequently, it does not interfere with the probing of the nominal by T.<sup>41</sup> No default agreement (3P-SING) is possible in (61). In addition, in this sentence we have a situation similar to existential constructions: recall that the  $\phi$ -incomplete  $\nu$  cannot value the  $\phi$ -features of the  $\phi$ -complete T in existential constructions in SI:

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<sup>40</sup> This is not a problem in SII, where T has only one uninterpretable [number], which can be valued by the interpretable [number] of these nominals, under (45).


<sup>41</sup> Alternatively, there could simply be no small  $\nu$  in (61). See, however, Legate 2003 and Deal 2006 for the idea that unaccusatives do need small  $\nu$ .

(62) Existential constructions

SI



(63)  $\phi$ -incomplete subjects



Recall that the Condition on Case-valuation (44) does not prevent the [case]-feature of the nominal from being valued by T (since T does match all the  $\phi$ -features of the nominal). On the other hand, if we do not allow the nominal to value the [number] feature of T in (63) we will create a mismatch between Case and Agreement: the Goal will get a [case]-value, even if it is not able to value any  $\phi$ -feature of the Probe. We need to allow sentences like (61), where the subject is  $\phi$ -incomplete but it still agrees and checks case against a  $\phi$ -complete T. Obviously, we need to allow  $\phi$ -valuation in this case. I propose the following condition:<sup>42</sup>

(64) If a Goal G receives a [case]-value from a Probe P, it must value all the uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features that the P is matching.

This allows the valuation of the [number]-feature in T, and leaves the [person]-feature unvalued. Then, we can propose a mechanism of default value that may repair heads that have incomplete valuation, in other words, if one feature needs to be valued, because of

<sup>42</sup> Notice that this situation suggests that case-valuation happens under Match, although it produces  $\phi$ -valuation.

(64), the remaining unvalued features will receive default agreement—see Béjar and Rezac 2003: 54 for a similar claim. In (61) and (63), this means that T will receive default [3p]. This is fine, because [1p] and [2p] nominals are always  $\phi$ -complete, so default agreement will be unnecessary in those cases. Notice further that the above does not affect our discussion of small  $\nu$  and the ban on [person]-nominals in *haber*-sentences; in this situation, the problem was Condition (44), that is, the [case]-value of these nominals. The Condition on  $\phi$ -valuation (45) is satisfied there.

Existential constructions, that is (62), cannot fall under Condition (64), since here the Condition of  $\phi$ -valuation (45) applies, because there is no [case]-valuation involved. This means that small  $\nu$  cannot value the [number]-feature of T in (62), under (45), which corresponds to the situation in SI SEC (recall that the [person] feature of T in SI is uninterpretable). Therefore the mechanism of default agreement must be even richer than suggested, being able to repair heads that are totally unvalued, as long as they do not value the [case] of any goal. A general characterization may then be that default agreement applies to  $\phi$ -features that are not involved in [case]-valuation,<sup>43</sup> if they fail to meet Condition (45). This is what happens in the situation illustrated in (62), which corresponds to SEC in SI. As stated, (45) could be in conflict with (64), however. I will therefore modify (45) as follows (where f=features):

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<sup>43</sup> Notice that even in (63), which corresponds to (61), the feature that receives a default value, that is, [person], is not involved in [case]-valuation, since it does not match anything in the nominal.



(65) Condition on  $\phi$ -valuation (modified)

If a Goal G does not receive a [case]-value from a Probe P, G values P if and only if all uninterpretable  $\phi$ -f(P) match  $\phi$ -f(G)

The modified version makes (65) the caseless counterpart of (64).


*1.3.2.2 Subject clitics*

In this section, I will consider one implementation of the default agreement mechanism, which is intended to be the sole means of resolving situations where default agreement in T is called for (i.e. no other mechanism for giving default agreement to  $\phi$ -features of T will be necessary under the analysis about to be presented).<sup>44</sup> In particular, I will consider the possibility that a subject clitic values the  $\phi$ -features of T in both (56) and *haber*-sentences in SI. This possibility would be the morphological instantiation of the default agreement mechanism. The morphological manifestation of this clitic is a [3p, SING] suffix, a solution that is in line with several analysis for subject agreement in null subjects languages—see Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 1998, Kato 1999, 2000, Díaz 2004, Ticio 2004, among others. Following this tradition I will call this CL a subject clitic (SCL), although it will be attached to a subjectless T. We can see the process here:

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<sup>44</sup> The discussion below is somewhat tentative. If the subject clitic analysis to be developed is not adopted, we can still fall back to the more traditional default agreement mechanism without affecting the rest of the analysis developed in this chapter.

- (66) a. Había dos autos en el garage SI  
 was two cars in the parking lot  
 There were two cars in the parking lot



In (66), the agreement takes place as explained before. What is different is that T receives a SCL with a specified value: [3p, sing] (let me call it *invariable* SCL), which surfaces as a verbal suffix. As a result, T values its  $\phi$ -features. In other words, since in SI T cannot value its  $\phi$ -features by probing  $v$  (i.e. probing  $v$  would not result in valuation of the  $\phi$ -features of T in SI given (65)), it does so by using the SCL, a morphological resource. If this is correct, the difference between SI and SII can be stated as the difference between the mechanisms to value the  $\phi$ -features of T. In SII, where the [person] feature of T is interpretable, Agree between T and  $v$  is possible, whereas SI, where the [person] feature of T is uninterpretable, must resort to a SCL, because Agree won't be able to value the  $\phi$ -features of T, given that small  $v$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete.

Let me explain the distribution of the invariable SCL. We don't want this SCL to be freely attached to any verb in SI. This would predict that any sentence could have [3p, SING], which is contrary to the facts. On the other hand, we do have instances of invariant SCL in SII too, as showed by (56). Let me assume that SCL must appear only if T has no

other way to value its  $\phi$ -features. To be more precise, a SCL must be used in SEC with *haber*-sentences (in SI), otherwise, the derivation will crash, for the reasons discussed above. It is worth noticing that the verb in (56), i.e., *llover* (to rain), allows a nominal to trigger agreement with T in Spanish, under certain circumstances in both dialects; in this case, the SCL is avoided, since T can establish a relation with a nominal, which gets NOM (no accusative cliticization is possible in this sentence):

- (67)      a   Llovieron      insultos      sobre el árbitro  
                  rained-PLU      insults      over the referee  
                  Lit: “Insults rained over the referee”  
                  (to mean something like “The people insulted the referee a lot”)
- b. \* Los      llovieron  
                  CL      rained-PLU

In existential constructions, an additional  $\phi$ -head is present (the small  $v$ ). Since, as discussed,  $v$  has already valued its  $\phi$ -features, in SII, T (which has interpretable [person] but uninterpretable [number]) can probe  $v$ , valuing its uninterpretable [number]. However, SI requires the presence of SCL because here T also has an uninterpretable [person], which cannot be valued by small  $v$ , because small  $v$  has no [person], as discussed above. If we further assume that this SCL is  $\phi$ -complete, with a value of [3p, SING], we explain why the [number] feature of T is SING. As just mentioned, if  $\phi$ - $v$  can value the  $\phi$ -features of T, no SCL will be necessary. This is precisely what happens in SII. Notice that this

amounts to saying that the verbal suffixes in existential *haber*-sentences in SII are not the manifestation of some SCL, but the morphological counterpart of the  $\phi$ -valuation. There is some evidence that this is indeed the case, which I will discuss in the next section.

We may push the SCL analysis tentatively by taking into consideration the claim made by several researchers (Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 1998, Kato 1999, 2000, Díaz 2004, Ticio 2004), that Spanish also has SCLs that license null subjects in non existential sentences. If we add to this picture the suggestion (made by Manzini and Savoia 2002) that the inflection (or the SCLs) is also able to receive the external  $\theta$  role, and that, therefore, there is no *pro*, we have an interesting parallelism between both forms of SCL.<sup>45</sup> The consequences of these suggestions are beyond the goals of this dissertation. It is important to keep in mind that my analysis does not depend on them. If the suggestions regarding SCL are ultimately proven wrong, that is, if we need a mechanism of default agreement different from SCLs, the system developed here will still work.

So far, we have seen that, for SII, Agree is enough to explain the situation in SEC. Provided that small *v* has only uninterpretable [number] and that T has interpretable [person] in addition to uninterpretable [number], T can probe small *v*, valuing its [number] feature (the only one that needs to be valued). With this mechanism, I have explained the ban on [person] nominals, the agreement with the verb, and the ACC Case. There is no need for any default agreement mechanism in SII SEC. I have proposed that in SI T has a complete set of uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features, which is the only difference with respect to

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<sup>45</sup> Notice that the invariable SCL for SI SEC will be the only one (with [3p, SING]), but for non existential sentences we need a whole set of SCLs. This is not a disadvantage with respect to the *pro* analysis, since, if we use *pro* to value the  $\phi$ -features of T, we will also need a whole set of different *pros*.

SII. Given this, under Condition (65), the  $\phi$ -features of T cannot be valued by probing small  $v$  (although everything else remains the same); accordingly, T does not agree with the nominal in SI, but always surfaces with [3p, SING]. Since Agree is not responsible for this value, an additional mechanism is necessary. We have seen that, when  $\phi$ -features are not involved in the [case]-valuation of a goal and, in addition, Condition (65) is not met, the  $\phi$ -features must get a default value.

#### *1.3.2.3 T in SII non existential constructions*

A final question I want to address here is what happens with T in non existential constructions in SII. There are two possibilities. It has a [person] feature that is interpretable (as in SEC) or not. Suppose that it has not, that is, that T in SII non existential constructions has both uninterpretable [person] and [number]. The first question to address is why we cannot use this T, which has complete uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features, in SEC too. If we could, we would predict the agreement in SEC to be optional in SII. The T with all uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features will give us a default value (as in SI), and the T with interpretable [person] will give us agreement with the nominal. But we have already seen that this is unlikely (see footnote 24). If we say that the T with two uninterpretable features is banned from SII SEC because there will be no way to value its [person] feature (given that  $v$  has no [person]), under the assumption that there is no default agreement or SCL in SII, we will face the problem that one of these mechanisms must be present in SII too (to explain (56)). I conclude, then, that SII has a unique T with

an interpretable [person] and an uninterpretable [number].<sup>46</sup>

Given that in non existential constructions there is a subject and there is no restriction regarding the [person] value of the subject, we could ask how the [case] feature of the subject is valued. T in SII has a full set of  $\phi$ -features; it just happens that one of them is interpretable. Therefore, it will be able to match all the relevant features of the goal, valuing its case.<sup>47</sup> This is different from small  $v$ , which is truly incomplete, even with respect to a potential goal with full  $\phi$ -features, since it lacks [person]. This allows me to retain the conclusion that there is a unique T for all sentences in SII.

#### *1.3.2.4 The tendency of haber to regularize in SII*

I will suggest in this subsection that the process of valuing the  $\phi$ -features of T with an invariable SCL or with default agreement (in SI) may leave a morphological form different from the one that results from valuing by Agree (in SII). Remember that in Spanish (both dialects) it is possible to have a mismatch between the overt subject and the features in T:

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<sup>46</sup> It is worth noticing that, if the agreement proves to be actually optional, the idea of two Ts, one with interpretable [person] and the other without it, will be a viable solution. If the agreement is optional in SII, but ungrammatical in SI, this will mean that the only difference between SI and SII is that, in addition to the normal T with full uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features, SII has a T with an interpretable [person] feature.

<sup>47</sup> This means that Match is an operation that involves the category as a whole, not feature by feature—but the  $\phi$ -valuation itself can be feature by feature. Here it is worth mentioning that there are proposals that the so called EPP property can be satisfied only under Match, without valuation (Boeckx 2003). Given that under the Inverse Case Filter Hypothesis (Bošković 1997b, 2002a), the EPP property and the necessity of checking Nominative are the same (to be more precise, the EPP in T is deduced from the later requirement), we can extend Boeckx's idea by saying that Match is enough to value Nominative. This is not the place to explore all the consequences of this suggestion.

- (68) Los estudiantes hemos asistido a la clase regularmente  
habéis asistido  
The students have-1P-PLU attended the class regularly  
have-2P-PLU attended  
We, the students, have attended the class regularly  
You, the students, have attended the class regularly

For SII (but not for SI, as discussed), this situation can be replicated with existential *haber*-constructions. For illustration, I repeat here (47) as (69):

- (69) Habemos dos estudiantes en la clase *SII*  
Habéis  
Are-1P-PLU two students in the class  
Are-2P-PLU  
*Lit.* We there are two students in the class

Surprisingly, in the first person plural, the morphological form of the verb is *habemos* and not the expected *hemos* (compare (68) with (69))—see Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1758 for discussion of these data. Interestingly, the form *habemos* is the regular form, whereas *hemos* is the normal irregular form that is used in any other occurrence of the verb *haber* in first person plural (for instance, as an auxiliary in (68)). In other words, in (69) the verb *haber* has been regularized (the irregular form *hemos* is ungrammatical in these constructions). I suggest that this very strange fact is a

consequence of the already mentioned distinction between the strategy of valuing the  $\phi$ -features of T by using default agreement or an SCL, which gives us the form *hemos*, or the strategy of using Agree, which gives us the form *habemos*.

In (68), the presence of SCLs could explain the apparent disagreement; in fact, dialects that do not have these SCLs—like Puerto Rican Spanish—do not show this phenomenon (see Ticio 2004 for an analysis in this direction).<sup>48</sup> We have already discussed what happens in (68) in section 1.3.1. The overt subject is in the left periphery. The morphological merging of a [1P, PLU] SCL with *haber* renders the irregular form *hemos*. As seen, in (69), which is possible only in SII, the operation Agree values the  $\phi$ -features of T. T can get valued only by probing  $v$ . An invariable SCL (or default agreement) is not necessary in SII SEC. Since this time no relevant morphological operation will occur (because there is no SCL or default agreement), but just the pure morphological interpretation of T's  $\phi$ -values set by Agree, *haber* surfaces in its regular form.<sup>49</sup> This explanation, however, is not totally conclusive, because the regularization does not affect the whole paradigm.

Contrary to what happens in the present tense discussed in (69), in the preterite tense, SII *haber*-sentences do not regularize the verb.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> This means that we would not need *pro* to account for the disagreement: SCLs will suffice.

<sup>49</sup> I must say that I don't claim that all regular/irregular differences among verbs should be analyzed like this. SCLs are perfectly compatible with regular verbs (in fact, in (68) the second person is regular). I suggest that what causes the regularization is that this is a sort of "new process" (the probing of  $v$  by T), which forces the morphological component to reanalyze the inflection.

<sup>50</sup> In order to be regular, the verbal forms of *haber* should be *habimos* (1p-PLU) and *habieron* (3p-PLU), using the unmodified root *hab-*.



- (70) Hubimos dos estudiantes en la clase  
 Hubieron  
 Were-1p-PLU two students in the class  
 Were-3p-PLU

It is worth noticing, however, that some dialects of SII—remember that SI and SII are just shorthands for different families of dialects—show another case of regularization. In the two dialects the present form of *haber* (*hay*) does not show agreement morphology.<sup>51</sup> Fernández-Soriano 1999: 133) suggests that this is because the morpheme *-y* (a remnant from an old locative clitic) blocks the presence of agreeing morphemes. This locative clitic can be found in French (*y*) and Catalan (*hi*), and it could be related to Italian expletive *ci* (Fernández-Soriano 1999: 133). In these languages, the clitic is productive, but *hay* is the only form that has this element in Spanish. That means that this is a morphological fossil, with no role in the construction, except blocking the morphological presence of the agreement. The exceptional form *hay* has these morphological components (roughly speaking):

- (71) a. SINGULAR *hay*
- |    |                           |                       |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| ha | -PRESENT-3PERSON-SINGULAR | -MORPHOLOGICAL FOSSIL |
| ha | ø                         | y                     |

<sup>51</sup> I am going to call *hay* an *exceptional* form, as oppose to *normal*. The familiar regular/irregular distinction does not fit so well here, since some normal forms of *haber* are also irregular. The form *hay* can only appear in the [3p] present tense (singular or plural) of existential constructions; it's an *exceptional* form of *haber*. The *normal* form in third person singular present should be *ha* (as it appears in the auxiliary position of all verbs). As auxiliary or in the imperfect tense in SEC, however, *haber* is *regular* (and not just *normal*) in both dialects.

b. PLURAL *hay*

ha	-PRESENT-3PERSON-PLURAL	-MORPHOLOGICAL FOSSIL
ha	ø	y

Note that the normal forms for third person present with *haber* are the following (see also footnote 51):

(72) a. SINGULAR ***ha***

ha	-PRESENT-3PERSON-SINGULAR
ha	ø

b. PLURAL ***han***

ha	-PRESENT-3PERSON-PLURAL
ha	n

Notice, however, that strictly speaking, these are not regular forms (but they are normal in the sense that they do not receive *-y*), since true regular forms should be formed by using an unmodified root (in this case *hab-*) and the present suffix; since the [1p] present suffix is a zero morpheme, a true regular form should surface as *habe*, with the theme vowel *-e*, following the model of *comer* (“to eat”), *come* (“I eat”), which is a true regular verb. However, in some dialects of SII, the exceptional form *hay* [áj] becomes *haen* [áen] or *hayn* [ájan], that is, it allows the plural *-n* to be suffixed to the verb, unblocking the

effect of -y, as reported by Kany 1951: 257 for rural Argentinean, Lapesa 1980: § 133 for substandard Venezuelan, Montes 1982: 384 for Colombian Antioqueño—see also Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1758. As in the case of *hemos* > *habemos*, I want to suggest that this process of normalization is triggered because T is valuing its  $\phi$ -features by probing  $\nu$ , without intervention of any SCL or default agreement process. If this line of reasoning is correct, we have evidence here that T indeed probes  $\nu$  in SII, and that an invariable SCL is responsible for the lack of agreement in SI. However, since, as noted above, this regularization does not affect the whole paradigm, this conclusion should be taken with some reservation.

#### 1.4 Temporal existential constructions

In this subsection I will present data from the so called “temporal existential constructions” (TEC) (Rigau 2001), which seem to have a behavior similar to SEC, but also present some interesting differences.<sup>52</sup> Some verbs that indicate elapsed time can also combine with a nominal, in particular, *hacer* (lit. “to make”) and *ir (para)* (lit. “to go (for)”):

- (73)       Hace       un mes    que Juan murió  
               makes    a month   that John died  
               It makes a month since John died

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<sup>52</sup> TEC and SEC are similar in that they are both subjectless: the internal nominal does not enter into an Agree relation with T—see Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999 and Rigau 2001 for some discussion.

- (74) Va (para) un mes que Juan murió  
 Goes (for) a month that John died  
 A month has gone since John died

As expected, in SI no agreement surfaces between the nominal and the verb, which is an indication that a SCL is present here also. In some dialects of SII (in particular in some SII substandard varieties), the agreement is possible:

- (75) Hacen dos meses que Juan murió *SII (substandard)*  
 make two months that John died  
 It makes two months since John died

- (76) Van (para) dos meses que Juan murió *SII (standard)*  
 Go (for) two months that John died  
 Two months have gone since John died

There are, however, two types of temporal-existential verbs, as reported by Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1748-1751, among others. The first one—TEC1, exemplified in (73)-(76)—takes a nominal that expresses time with a proposition that expresses an event. The second one (TEC2) is a sort of temporal adjunct that behaves like a preposition:

- (77) Juan vino hace dos años  
 John came makes two years  
 John came two years ago

Only TEC1 can trigger agreement in some dialects of SII. TEC2 never triggers agreement in any dialect:

- (78) \*Llegó hacen dos horas *SI and SII*  
 came make-PLU two hours  
 He came two hours ago  
 [Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1750]

Only TEC1 allows cliticization of the object (at least for SI):

- (79) a. Hace veinte años que nos casamos *SI*  
 makes twenty years that we married  
 It makes twenty years since we married

- b. Los hace  
 CL-ACC makes  
 [Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1750]

This is not possible with TEC2:

(80) a. Nos vimos      hace      un mes  
               Us saw          makes      a month  
               We saw each other one month ago.

b. \*Nos vimos      lo      hace  
               Us saw          CL-ACC      makes

Fernández-Soriano and Táboas-Baylin 1999: 1750 interpret this contrast as evidence that in TEC2 the form *hace* is no longer a verb, but maybe a preposition (see also Rigau 2001). However, this is not so clear, since the form allows some inflection, for instance, simple future tense morphology:

(81) Nos vimos      hará      un mes  
               Us saw          make-FUT      a month  
               We saw each other probably one month ago.

This inflection is, however, severely limited in TEC2. No past or perfect tense is possible:

(82) a. \*Nos vimos      habrá      hecho      un mes  
               Us saw          have-FUT      made(PARTICIPLE)      a month  
               We saw each other probably one month ago.

- b. \*Nos vimos    hizo    un mes  
 Us saw        made    a month  
 We saw each other one month ago.

These possibilities are available for TCE1.

- (83) a. El lunes        habrá        hecho    un mes    que Juan murió  
 The Monday    have-FUT    made    a month that John died  
 On next Monday, it will be a month since John died
- b. El lunes        hizo        un mes        que Juan murió  
 The Monday    made    a month        that John died  
 On past Monday, it was a month since John died

Let's accept the suggestion that *hace* in TEC2 is a preposition. Putting aside the issue of how a verb is transformed into a preposition, the presence of inflectional morphology in TEC2, although limited, could be interpreted as the presence of valued features in the forms *hace* or *hará*, that is, there is no uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features, and the forms are not able to check structural Case. This could be a problem for its internal nominal, since there will be no  $\phi$ -head to value its [case] feature. However, the nominal is an argument of *hace*, and it receives a thematic interpretation from it (temporal, we could say). So it meets the requirement for inherent Case assignment. Let's assume that this is what happens in TEC2.

On the other hand, TEC1 behaves like *haber*-sentences, except for the restrictions on its nominal (it must be a nominal compatible with the thematic interpretation that the verb assigns). It allows cliticization of its object, and agrees with it, in some dialects of SII. Then, I propose that there is also a small  $v$  in this kind of TEC, and that in the relevant dialects, T also probes  $v$ . Given that the same mechanism can apply here, this reinforces that idea that a small  $v$  with  $\phi$ -features, which is probed by T, is responsible for Case and agreement in *haber*-sentences. In addition, for SI dialects which do not allow agreement in TEC, we can also adopt the proposal that there is an SCL or a process of default agreement, as explained.

An interesting question arises here with respect to the SII dialects that do not allow agreement in TEC 1 (these are in fact the Standard SII dialects). The question is why, if the probing of  $v$  by T is available in SII, these dialects do not make use of it in TEC 1. We must take into consideration the fact that SCL/default agreement is also available in SII. The presence or absence of SCL could depend on an idiosyncratic option, according to the verb. In fact, there is some evidence that this is indeed the case. For instance, in Standard Peruvian Spanish (which is typically SII), there are two different TEC verbs that behave differently with respect to agreement. The verb *hacer* (lit. “to make”) does not allow agreement in this dialect, but the verb *ir* (lit. “to go”) does:



- |      |          |           |                |                          |
|------|----------|-----------|----------------|--------------------------|
| (84) | *Hacen   | dos años  | que Juan murió | <i>Standard Peruvian</i> |
|      | make-PLU | two years | that John died | <i>Spanish</i>           |

It makes two years since John died

- |      |        |         |           |                |                          |
|------|--------|---------|-----------|----------------|--------------------------|
| (85) | Van    | ya      | dos años  | que Juan murió | <i>Standard Peruvian</i> |
|      | go-PLU | already | two years | that John died | <i>Spanish</i>           |

Two years have gone since John died

The question is what could be this idiosyncratic characteristic of the verb that prevents the agreement here. We can make use of the inherent Case property of TEC2. The thematic situation is the same in TEC1, and inherent Case is indeed an idiosyncratic property. So, for some dialects of SII, the TEC1 verb *hacer* assigns inherent Case to its internal argument. Under the assumption that inherent Case deactivates the  $\phi$ -features of the nominal (Chomsky 2000: fn 88, Stepanov 2002), T cannot value its  $\phi$ -features using Agree, thus an SCL or a mechanism of default agreement must be used, as in SI *haber*-sentences. Other verbs of the same dialect (for instance (85)) do not have inherent Case to assign, so they allow agreement.

Another interesting issue arises here. Given that the form *hace* in some SII dialects can assign inherent Case, and given that nominals with inherent Case cannot feed Agree, we predict that small *v* is not possible there, since it would not be able to value its  $\phi$ -features—or alternatively, that it receives default values, and that ACC is not the

morphological realization of inherent case in Spanish.<sup>53</sup> Under the assumption that ACC clitics are possible only under Agree with the small  $v$ ,<sup>54</sup> no clitics should be allowed for these constructions. The initial data seem to confirm this prediction. SII Speakers that cannot accept agreement in *hace*-sentences also have resistance to accept the accusative clitic:

(86) a. Hacer dos horas que espero *Some SII dialects*

Makes two hours that I wait

It makes two hours since I'm waiting

b. ?? Las hacer

CL-FEM-PLU makes

The same speakers accept the clitic and agreement with other TEC1 verbs:

(87) a. Van dos horas que espero *Some SII dialects*

Go two hours that I wait

Two hours have gone since I'm waiting.

b. Las van

CL-FEM-PLU makes

<sup>53</sup> Notice that this does not change the fact that these sentences are subjectless. The internal nominal does not receive structural case, that is, it does not enter into an Agree relation with T either.

<sup>54</sup> In fact, it has been proposed (see, for example, Franco 1993) that ACC and DAT clitics are the  $\phi$ -features in the head responsible for case-valuation (small  $v$ , in our case). See Zagana 2002: 184-194 and the references therein for discussion on this topic with respect to Spanish clitics.

The situation is not so clear, however. The judgments are not as steady as we would expect. But there are interfering factors. First, the sequence *Las hace* is actually ambiguous; it can also mean “S/he makes them”, and under this reading it is a perfectly normal sentence—notice that no ambiguity arises in *haber*-sentences or with other cases like (87). In addition, the agreeing *hace* is identified as substandard, in other words, it is heavily stigmatized; so it is not implausible to suggest that the speakers are trying to suppress the agreement, but fail to suppress the clitic.

A more rigorous data collection is needed before we can draw firm conclusions regarding *hace*-sentences, in order to properly classify the speakers of relevant dialects and identify the interfering factors. I will leave this for future research. However, the discussion of TEC shows a possible scenario where we can observe two mechanisms to value the  $\phi$ -features of T, as in *haber*-sentences: (i) by probing  $v$ , and (ii) by default agreement or the insertion of a SCL. Given the idiosyncratic differences among TEC verbs with respect to the possibility of inherent Case assignment, it is possible that, even inside SII, sometimes the agreement gets suppressed together with the cliticization. In fact, it has been reported that the same happens in some dialects with at least a subset of *haber*-sentences. We will discuss this in the next subsection.

## 1.5 More dialectal differences

Treviño 2003 reports a dialect that, at least for a subset of *haber*-sentences (the locative ones, that is, the ones that can be paraphrased by *estar*), does not allow either agreement or cliticization of the internal nominal.<sup>55</sup> According to Treviño 2003, there are three types of *haber*-sentences in Spanish: locational (paraphrased by *estar* “to be (locative)”), unbounded (paraphrased by *existir* “to exist”) and contingent (paraphrased by *tener* “to have (possessive)”).<sup>56</sup>

(88) Hay una víbora detrás del sofá *locational*

Is a snake behind the sofa

There is a snake behind the sofa

PARAPHRASE: Detrás del sofá está/\*existe/\*tiene una víbora

Behind the sofa is/\*exist/\*has a snake

(89) Hay tréboles de cuatro hojas *unbounded*

Be-plu clovers of four leafs

There are clovers of four leafs

PARAPHRASE: Existen/\*están/\*tienen tréboles de cuatro hojas

Exist/\*is/\*has clovers of four leafs

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<sup>55</sup> Unfortunately, the author does not provide any external characterization of this dialect. Actually, she seems to imply that this behavior is common to all Spanish, or at least all SII. This is, however, not true, as the discussion until now has shown.

<sup>56</sup> For comparable distinctions in English, see Hornstein *et al.* 2000 and Felber 2002.

- (90) Hay monarquía en Suecia *contingent*  
 Is monarchy in Sweden  
 There is a monarchy in Sweden  
 PARAPHRASE: Suecia tiene/\*existe/\*está monarquía  
 Sweden has/\*exist/\*is monarchy  
 [Treviño 2003: 179-180]

In all SII dialects, included the one reported by Treviño (let me call it SII-T), unbounded and contingent *haber*-sentences can replace its object with an ACC clitic and they show agreement, as discussed. In SII-T, however, a locational *haber*-sentence “bars or strongly disfavors verb-agreement and object-clitics” (Treviño 2003: 180). This is a behavior that resembles the one we just saw with TEC1 in some dialects. If this is correct, the existence of SII-T may represent evidence in favor of the system I am developing here. That is, we can suggest that inherent Case is involved here too (actually Treviño suggests Partitive Case as a possible explanation). We will address this issue later; first let me raise a note of caution.

Although Treviño claims to “have gathered a considerable body of data” (2003: 178), she actually presents few examples of agreement violation in locational *haber*-sentences. She also warns us that in general, the agreement facts in her data “are quite complex and not as steady in their behavior, as far as native speakers’ performance and judgments are concerned” (2003: 184),<sup>57</sup> but she nevertheless thinks that, with respect to locational

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<sup>57</sup> Interestingly, this is similar to the situation with *hace*-sentences in the previous subsection.

*haber*-sentences, “agreement on the verb is felt alien” (2003: 184) by the speakers of SII-T. With respect to the clitic, it could be the case that some interfering factors are conspiring to obtain the same result. For instance, in both SI and SII, the cliticization of bare nominals renders some differences in the judgments:

- (91) a. ¿Quieres helado?  
           Want ice cream  
           Do you want ice cream?
- b. % Lo quiero  
           CL want  
           I want it
- c. (Sí) quiero  
           yes want  
           Yes, I want

The same is true for existential constructions.<sup>58</sup>

- (92) a. Hay helado?  
           is ice cream-MAS  
           Is there ice cream?

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<sup>58</sup> Notice that this is a case of “contingent” *haber*, so the effects of SII-T do not apply here. Besides, the variability in the judgments seems to be cross-dialectal.

b. % Lo hay

CL is

c. (Sí) hay

yes is

Yes, there is

Given that we are dealing here with a general property of Direct Objects for all verbs (and not only for existential constructions), in this case it is difficult to assume that there is no small  $\nu$  if the clitic is not licensed (in other words, we do have structural Case here). A better alternative will be that the clitic needs something additional to be properly licensed; it could be a high degree of specificity, as has been proposed in the literature (for instance, see Suñer 1988), or topicality (Leonetti 2003, in press-b, a). In any case, there may be abstract agreement between  $\nu$  and the object, even when the latter is a bare noun. In fact, the object in *haber*-sentences cannot be doubled by a clitic:

(93) a. Hay un niño en el parque

Is a kid in the park

There is a kid in the park

b. \* Lo hay un niño en el parque

CL was a kid in the park

There were some kids in the park


In addition, there is another difference with respect to cliticization between locational *haber*-sentences and other types, which is not directly addressed by Treviño 2003. More importantly, this seems to hold for both SI and SII. Locational existential sentences do not allow cliticization of the nominal alone, that is, they cannot cliticize only the object, stranding the locative phrase—as observed by Díaz 2004: 36:

- 76





relation between *haber* and its internal nominal. In fact, the internal nominal seems to be in a thematic relation with the PP. It is standardly assumed that existential constructions include a Small Clause SC (Stowell 1981, 1983, Safir 1985). Let's accept Stowell 1983's idea that SC is an XP with the nominal in its Specifier and the predicative phrase in its Complement (for discussion of SC structure, see the papers in Cardinaletti and Guasti 1995). If so, a SC is identical to a  $\nu$ P structure (in fact, Koopman and Sportiche 1988's formulation of the Internal Subject Hypothesis assumes that the subject forms a Small Clause with the VP). For locational *haber*-sentences, the predicate will be a Prepositional Phrase (PP):



Notice that the nominal is the external argument of the PP, and then, it will receive a  $\theta$ -role (the *locatum* as opposed to the *location*, which will be the internal argument of PP). If we assume that X is involved in the assignment of the external  $\theta$  role—naturally extending standard assumptions regarding  $\nu$ P—we have a potential inherent Case assigner.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Some issues arise with respect to symmetry with other inherent case configurations. Here the assigner does not c-command the assignee. If we accept that c-command by the assigner is necessary for inherent case assignment, we could still implement the idea just described by incorporating X into the verb *haber*. This will create a c-command relation. In fact, this gives us another possibility to implement the assignment of inherent case. If X incorporates into *haber*, it could give the ability to assign inherent case to the resulting element *haber*+X; in this case, *haber*+X will be the inherent case assigner, under standard c-command. I will leave this issue open. It is worth noting, however, that Lasnik 1999b: 86-87, following Saito and Hoshi 1994's analysis of Japanese light verb constructions, makes a similar suggestion.

Since inherent Case is a lexical property, it could be an idiosyncratic property of X in SII-T—it does not need to be a general property of X in all of Spanish. Once the corresponding nominal has inherent Case, it will be frozen for Agree, as discussed above. This means that it cannot value  $\phi$ -features of any head, T or  $v$ . Then, neither agreement nor clitics will be possible, as discussed above. Given that inherent Case blocks Agree, one could ask if in all instances of SI *haber*-sentences (with a default value) we have inherent Case. However, we cannot use the idea that inherent Case blocks Agree to explain the differences between SI and SII with respect to agreement discussed above. If a nominal receives inherent Case, we predict default values in T and no clitics, but although T in SI existential constructions has a default value, such constructions do allow clitics, as noted above.

## 1.6 A prediction with respect to raising verbs

Another prediction is made, given the idea that T probes small  $v$ . If a defective T (in Chomsky's 2000 sense; that is, typical raising infinitival T) is on top of the small  $v$  in *haber*-sentences, the  $\phi$ -features of a higher non-defective T can be valued by  $v$  in SII but not in SI. This prediction is borne out. The nominal agrees with the finite verb in SII (this sentence is ungrammatical in SI):

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According to Lasnik, in English, the predicate of the small clause in existential constructions raises to  $V^0$  (and then to  $\text{AgrO}^0$ ) to assign inherent case (partitive case) to the internal nominal.

- (97) Parecen haber dos hombres en el jardín *SII*  
 seem-PLU to be two men in the garden  
 There seem to be two men in the garden

On the other hand, in SI, T is not valued by Agree, as discussed, and then it receives [3p, SING]:

- (98) Parece haber dos hombres en el jardín *SI*  
 seems-SING to be two men in the garden  
 There seem to be two men in the garden

This is illustrated here (using a SCL for SI):<sup>60</sup>

- (99) SII  
 [ T- $\phi$  *Parecen* [TP T-def [vP v- $\phi$  [VP *haber dos hombres en el jardín* ]]]]

- (100) SI  
 [ T-SCL *Parece* [TP T-def [vP v- $\phi$  [VP *haber dos hombres en el jardín* ]]]]

This contrast between the two dialects—noticed by Suñer 1982a: 100-107 but left unexplained—is straightforwardly accounted for under the assumption that T can probe

<sup>60</sup> Notice that I am abstracting away from the role of T-def (defective T) here. There are two alternatives. On one hand, it could be that T-def is defective because it has no  $\phi$ -features (at least in Spanish); in this case, it is completely outside of the Agree system. On the other hand, it could be that it is defective in the sense that its  $\phi$ -features are not able to value Case (after all, the  $\phi$ -features do surface in some languages, like Brazilian Portuguese), but still are able to participate in Agree; if the later is true, in (99), T-def could probe v- $\phi$  and then serve as a goal for the higher T- $\phi$ . I will leave this issue open.

small *v*. Notice, in addition, that, as in matrix *haber*-sentences, agreement is maintained with clitics in SII; on the other hand, SI also allows ACC clitic, but no agreement surfaces, as predicted:<sup>61</sup>

(101)	Parecen	haber-los	SII
	seem-PLU	to be-CL-ACC-PLU	

(102)	Parece	haber-los	SI
	seem-SING	to be-CL-ACC-PLU	

Before turning to the conclusions, let me briefly comment on a hypothesis that has been proposed with respect to Case in SEC. Demonte 1989: 165-167, Treviño 2003 (for Spanish), Rigau 1994 (for Catalan), among others, have suggested that the nominal in SEC receives Partitive Case from the verb, following ideas presented by Belletti 1988, and Lasnik 1992, 1995a, 1999b.<sup>62</sup> My proposal can be seen as a way to implement the Partitive Case Hypothesis inside the Agree system, although with different technical details, since my analysis assumes that the nominal checks Case in a lower position, without relation with T. It seems clear that (given that in Spanish the internal nominal receives ACC and not NOM) Chomsky's 2000, 2001 analysis of English existential constructions, according to which the nominal checks case against T and receives NOM, cannot be extended to Spanish.

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<sup>61</sup> Notice that here there is no source for ACC other than the small *v* of *haber*. *Parecer* (to seem) does not license ACC.

<sup>62</sup> See also Martin 1992, Bošković 1997b, 2002a, 2005, Epstein and Seely 1999, Boeckx 2000, among others, for arguments in favor of the Partitive Case Hypothesis. For discussion of its limitations, see Chomsky 1995: 288, Vikner 1995: 171-176, Vainikka and Maling 1996, Hornstein 2000, among others. For a recent argument that, even in English *there-be* sentences, the internal nominal has to receive case from a source other than T, see Hornstein 2007.

## 1. 7. Conclusions: beyond existential sentences

I have given an explanation for a dialectal split in Spanish with respect to agreement in Existential Constructions with *haber*. In the SI dialect the verb has a default value (3rd person, singular), but in the SII dialect, the verb agrees with the internal nominal, despite the fact that the nominal is accusative, as shown by the cliticization data. This state of affairs seems to be a direct challenge for theories that link Agreement with Case, since, in SII, the nominal seems to be in agreement with T, but T cannot be its Case-licensor because T does not value ACC. However, I have presented an analysis of the phenomenon in question that preserves the relation between Case and Agreement and supports the operation Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004).

I contend that Spanish existential constructions with *haber* have a small *v* which accounts for the presence of ACC (in both dialects). Additionally, I have shown that there is a ban on nominals with [person], the underlying assumption being that only [1p], [2p] and some [3p] nominals are marked for [person]. The ban is motivated by the fact that Spanish Existentials Constructions with [person] nominals, contrary to their English counterparts, cannot have a presentational (or “list”) reading: they are simply ungrammatical. Interestingly, in SII, *haber* can be inflected for [1p] or [2p] even when the internal nominal is [3p]; furthermore, in these cases, it is not possible to use an explicit subject (that is, these sentences are still existential). If we postulate a *pro* with a [person] value ([1p] or [2p]) as responsible for the valuation of T in SII, we would expect that it could be replaced by a lexical pronoun, which is contrary to the facts. In addition,

*pro* would violate the ban on [person]-marked nominals in Spanish Existential constructions.

I have shown that we can solve all these problems by postulating: (A) a small  $\nu$  with only [number] and no [person] for Existential constructions in both dialects, and (B), for SII, a T with an interpretable [person] feature, in addition to its uninterpretable [number]. According to (A), if small  $\nu$  has only [number], the ban on nominals with [person] is explained, given the assumption that a probe must match all the features of its goal. Being incomplete, small  $\nu$  cannot value the case-feature of nominals with [person]. If the nominal does not have [person], the probe  $\nu$  will be complete with respect to its goal, then it will be able to value its [case] feature. In SII, given that T has only one uninterpretable feature, namely [number], it can probe  $\nu$ , producing the effect of object-agreement—this is possible because the  $\phi$ -features of  $\nu$  are still present, since the deletion procedure applies only at the point of Spell-Out. (B) correctly predicts that in SII *haber*-sentences, the verb can be inflected in all persons, even if no nominal has the proper value. In addition, in SI, where both  $\phi$ -features ([person] and [number]) in T are uninterpretable, small  $\nu$  is incomplete with respect to T, thus unable to value its features, and then T must get a default value—which can be implemented by using a SCL.


Further predictions have been borne out with respect to raising verbs as well as other differences between SI and SII. We have been able to account for the corresponding difference in the agreement pattern with respect of raising verbs in SI and SII. We have seen that appealing to the idea that inherent case bleeds Agree explains why we have

neither agreement nor clitics in a subset of SEC in some SII dialects (as well as in some TEC). In addition, the tendency of *haber* to regularize in SII suggests that T indeed probes small  $\nu$  in SII. More precisely, I have argued that the regularization of *haber* represents a morphological reflex of valuation of T via probing of small  $\nu$ .

An additional prediction arises if we extend the analysis to all Spanish small  $\nu$ .

Recall that the ban on [person] nominals in *haber*-sentences, which is responsible for the impossibility even of list-readings with these nominals (that is, their absolute ungrammaticality), is explained because small  $\nu$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete, hence it fails to value the case-feature of  $\phi$ -complete nominals:<sup>63</sup>

(103)




I have assumed that this  $\nu P$  is not a strong phase; which means that the nominal cannot escape  $\nu P$  to establish a dependency with T. Under Bošković 2005, 2007b's version of the PIC, movement is motivated by an uninterpretable feature ( $uK$ ) in the goal, that is,

<sup>63</sup> Notice that the failure of Agree under (44) can also be obtained if the nominal undergoes movement over  $\nu$  (as in Bošković 2005, 2007b), since  $\nu$  is still incomplete there.



with respect to (103), by an uninterpretable case-feature in the nominal. The reason why *uK* drives the movement is that a nominal with *uK* cannot get trapped in the unit that is sent to Spell-Out, that is, the complement of a phase (we can assume, for ease of exposition, that *uK* is PF-incompatible). Since *vP* in SEC (that is, in (103)) is not a phase (which means its complement is not sent to Spell-Out), the nominal does not have any reason to move; it stays in situ with a *uCase*, even after *T* is inserted, which is fine so far, since it is not yet trapped inside a phase complement:

(104)



When *T* probes small *v* (which has been in turn given a value for its [number] feature by the nominal), small *v* has the ability to check the [number] feature of *T*. Given this, there are two possibilities. In SII, this is all we need:<sup>64</sup> *T*, which has an interpretable [person] feature in this dialect, has all its features valued, so that it can no longer serve as a probe; as a result the φ-complete internal nominal never gets case. In SI, there is a process to repair incomplete heads, a version of default agreement, which must be used with all *T*s

<sup>64</sup> I am disregarding the possibility of checking EPP, in line with Epstein and Seely 1999, 2006, Boeckx 2000, Grohmann *et al.* 2000, Bošković 2002a, 2007b, Wurmbrand 2006, among others (see also fn. 47).

with an  $\phi$ -incomplete subject. In all sentences of this type, such a subject only values the [number] feature. The [person] receives default agreement, that is, [3p]. This is fine because all [1p] and [2p] nominals are  $\phi$ -complete, only [3p] nominals are  $\phi$ -incomplete. However, in SECs small  $v$  intervenes between T and the nominal, which prevents T from probing the nominal.<sup>65</sup> So, a  $\phi$ -complete nominal will never get Case in SI either.

What would happen if we assume the  $v$  that is found in normal transitive constructions, that is, with verbs other than *haber*, also lacks the [person] feature, just like its *haber*-counterpart? The prediction is clear: we will have the same results, namely, the restriction on [person] objects. Only nominals that are not specified for [person] will be able to check Case against the small  $v$ . If a nominal is specified for [person], the small  $v$  will be able to probe it and to value its own [number] feature (so no  $\phi$ -features will remain unvalued); however, it will be incapable of valuing the Case feature of the nominal, given the assumption that  $\phi$ -incomplete heads are not capable of valuing Case. I contend that this is exactly what happens in all Spanish transitive constructions.


The small  $v$  with transitive verbs, although  $\phi$ -incomplete, is a strong phase. Therefore, again under Bošković 2005, 2007b's version of the PIC, if the nominal stays in situ, it will not be able to check Case, because it will be spelled out. Hence, it is forced to move, to avoid being sent to Spell Out without checking Case, which is possible because now  $vP$  is a phase. If we further assume that there is an additional Dative head that can value the case feature of the shifted-object, we have an explanation regarding why the object carries a DAT marker, namely, the preposition "a" ("to")—which is the so called

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<sup>65</sup> Notice that I am assuming a strict locality condition, that is, that there is no multiple Agree.

## Differential Object Marking phenomenon:

(105)



A possible question is if, when merged, the subject would create any locality problems in this picture. There are two possibilities. The first one is to adopt a split-vP structure, similar to the one proposed by Koizumi 1993, 1995 and Lasnik 1995b, where the subject is base-generated above phrases to which objects move for case-licensing (that is, above DatP, for Spanish). The second one is to adopt an analysis that assumes that Spanish subjects are not real subjects (see Barbosa 1995, Olarrea 1996, among others); under such analysis, the relevant subject features, including  $\theta$ -features (assuming that  $\theta$ -roles are features, as in Bošković 1994, Bošković and Takahashi 1998, Lasnik 1995b, 1999b, 2003a, Hornstein 1999, 2001, among others), could even be checked by agreement morphemes (see also Manzini and Savoia 2002), assuming that they are clitic-like, as discussed in the previous sections.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> The post-verbal subject remains as a problem. But there is a variety of solutions. For instance, there are analysis that assume that the post-verbal subject in Spanish is a right specifier (see Zubizarreta 1994, 1999)—in chapter 3, I adopt a similar approach for the DO-IO order. Other analysis are based on lower copy pronunciation (see Stjepanović 2003 and, for Spanish, Ortega-Santos 2006). I leave this issue for future research.

The picture that arises from these considerations is, I think, interesting. Under the current analysis, the small  $v$  in SEC and the small  $v$  in regular transitive constructions are alike: both are  $\phi$ -incomplete (and perhaps neither have a subject). The only difference is that the small  $v$  with regular transitive sentences has a thematic role to assign. The small  $v$  with SEC has no thematic role to assign—notice that this could account for the lack of phasehood with the latter small  $v$  (as discussed above). However, Differential Object Marking in Spanish is a phenomenon that requires much more discussion. I will address it in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The properties of Spanish DOM**

Spanish is perhaps the most studied of all DOM languages, at least in the Western tradition. There is an overwhelming amount of serious literature that deals with this phenomenon from diverse perspectives and with different goals; there is also a number of states of the art and commented bibliographies (Niculescu 1959, Ariza Viguera 1989, Pensado 1995). The vast majority of the works are concerned with the issue of spelling out the exact descriptive rules that predict the presence/absence of the preposition *A*—the most detailed descriptions are Fernández Ramírez 1986: 148-190 and Torrego 1998, 1999. As we will see, total agreement is far from being reached. However, there are at least two dimensions that everybody has to contemplate in one way or another: specificity and animacy; some researchers also add a third one: telicity. Topicality, affectedness and the need to avoid confusion with the subject are also considered as the driving forces behind Spanish DOM. Not everybody uses this terminology, or even accept these dimensions as relevant. Curiously enough, there have been few attempts to integrate all these factors in a comprehensive way—the most successful of these attempts has been, in my opinion, Torrego 1998. There are even fewer attempts to compare in a systematic way the descriptions and generalizations regarding Spanish DOM with the hundreds of other DOM languages—for relevant works, see Bossong 1985, 1991, Isaak 2000, Aissen 2003, Lima 2003, 2006, Carnie 2005.

Given this situation, this chapter has four goals. The first one is descriptive: I will spell out the reasons why many authors have claimed that specificity, animacy and telicity are implicated in DOM, and discuss the motivation behind the quest for different or related factors (in particular, topicality and affectedness, but also person). The second goal is to review the theoretical literature on Spanish DOM from a critical perspective, showing that, in spite of their crucial achievements and insights, these theories have enough descriptive and explanatory limitations to warrant proposing an alternative account. The third goal is to present what I consider the fundamental contribution of the generative literature to the DOM phenomenon: that the morphologically marked object is in a different syntactic position than the morphologically unmarked object. I will endorse this stance, showing that we can derive this state of affairs from the principles that govern the interaction between the feature specifications of different DP/NPs and their case-checking dependencies. This constitutes the gist of my proposal: in accordance with the theory outlined in chapter 1, there is a  $\phi$ -incomplete small  $v$  in all Spanish transitive sentences, which is not able to check the case of  $\phi$ -complete nominals. As a result, they need to look for a case value outside of  $vP$ . Finally, I will show that this point of view not only leads to considerable empirical gains (virtually eliminating the “exceptional” character of some DOM sentences), but it also leads to a simplification of the whole DOM system, which is a valuable explanatory advantage and put us in a position to address the issue from a comparative perspective. The following sections are dedicated, respectively, to each goal.

## 2. 1 Describing Spanish DOM

The most common claim regarding Spanish DOM is that objects that are [+specific] and [+animate] are marked with the preposition A, and all other objects are unmarked. The following is the basic paradigm behind these claims:<sup>67</sup>

- (1) a. Juan        besó        **a**        María        [+animate, +specific]  
         John        kissed     A        Mary  
         John kissed Mary

- b. \*Juan        besó        María  
         John        kissed     Mary  
         John kissed Mary

- (2) a. María        quiere        **a**        un abogado        [+animate, +specific]  
         Mary        wants        A        a lawyer  
         Mary wants a (specific) lawyer

- b. María        quiere        un abogado        [+animate, -specific]  
         Mary        wants        a lawyer  
         Mary wants a lawyer (any lawyer)

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<sup>67</sup> Throughout this dissertation I will use capital A to translate the form “a” (lit. “to”), which is the dative preposition, but it also have different values—for instance directional (“toward”) and temporal (“at”).

(3) a. \*Juan destruyó **a** la ciudad [-animate, +specific]

John destroyed A the city

John destroyed the city

b. Juan destruyó la ciudad [-animate, +specific]

John destroyed the city

John destroyed the city

(4) a. \*Juan destruyó **a** una ciudad [-animate, -specific]

John destroyed A a city

John destroyed a city

b. Juan destruyó una ciudad [-animate, -specific]

John destroyed the city

John destroyed the city

Besides its very well known limitations, which, of course, are acknowledged, the generalization that emerges from the above paradigm has been assumed by several researchers to be the core set of data that a satisfactory explanation for the distribution of Spanish DOM must account for. A correlation like (5) is explicitly endorsed very frequently—for instance in Zagana 2002: 140, Heusinger and Kaiser 2003: 53, among several others:



(5)

Marked Object	[+animate] [+specific]
Unmarked Object	[+animate] [-specific]
	[-animate] [+specific]
	[-animate] [-specific]

We will discuss this generalization now, dissecting each of its components, starting with specificity.

### **2.1.1 Specificity and Spanish DOM**

As is well known, specificity is not a straightforward notion. As Farkas puts it, “the notion of specificity in linguistics is notoriously non-specific” (Farkas 2002: 19). In this dissertation, I do not aim to make any special contribution to this complex issue. However, given that nature of my proposal, I cannot escape discussing it, especially because the relevance of this dimension has been questioned, mainly in recent years. For discussion of the notion of specificity in the context of DOM languages, the reader is referred to Kliffer 1982, King 1984, Laca 1995, Pensado 1995, Brugé and Brugger 1996, Torrego 1998, Blear 1999, Lyons 1999, Torrego 1999, Brugé 2000, Farkas 2002, Heusinger 2002a, Farkas and Heusinger 2003, Heusinger and Kaiser 2003, Leonetti 2003, 2004, 2005, López 2006, among others. The following discussion relies on their observations.

Almost all the literature on Spanish DOM considers the preposition *A* to be a marker of specificity (see Torrego 1999 for an overview).<sup>68</sup> There are arguments in favor of this conclusion, and also arguments against it (although the last ones are not really well understood). I will show, following Brugé and Brugger 1996, Blears 1999: 175-186, Brugé 2000, Leonetti 2003, 2004 and López 2006 that *A* is not a marker of specificity *per se*. We will find that indefinite objects marked with *A* can be interpreted as specific; however, the specific reading is not mandatory. While it is true that there is a preference for the specific reading (in the sense that it is the first reading available without additional context), this preference can be overridden under appropriate discourse and linguistic contexts. In addition, since definite objects can have non-specific readings (see Heusinger 2002a and the references therein for discussion), it is predicted that definite objects could appear without *A*, which is also correct, an observation that is often ignored (see, however, Heusinger and Kaiser 2003).<sup>69</sup>

Evidence in favor of *A* as a marker of specificity is provided by the following set of data (the examples mirror similar sentences from Torrego 1999 and Leonetti 2003):

- (6) a. Había            (\*a) un policía en el parque.  
           there-was    *A*    a policemen in the park  
           There was a policeman in the park.

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<sup>68</sup> It is important to keep in mind that the expression “marker of specificity” has, for the time being, no theoretical content, beyond expressing the fact that the presence/absence of the preposition *A* shows a degree of alternation with the specific character of the DP. I will come back to this issue.

<sup>69</sup> Although it has been recognized that generic definite objects do not require *A*, I will show that actually no definite object *requires* *A* in all cases.

b. Tenía (\*a) un amigo.

he-had A a friend

He had a friend.

(7) a. Busca a una enfermera que habla español.

looks-for A a nurse that speak-INDIC Spanish

He looks for a nurse that speaks Spanish.

b. Busca una enfermera que hable español.

looks-for a nurse that speak-SUBJ Spanish

He looks for a nurse that speak Spanish.

(8) Había besado \*(a) varias de sus amigas.

Had kissed A several of his girlfriends

He kissed several of his girlfriends.

(9) Besó \*(a) toda chica con sombrero.

kissed A every girl with hat

He kissed every girl with hat.

In (6) we observe that A is incompatible with existential sentences, a typical context where specific nominals are excluded (as we saw in chapter 1, the internal nominal is

actually an object, not a subject, see also Suñer 1982a, among others). In (7) we see a distinction between an object modified by an indicative clause (7a) and an object modified by a subjunctive clause (7b); as observed by Rivero 1977, objects modified by subjunctive relative clauses cannot be specific. In (8) we have a partitive element, which is typically considered to be specific, and in this case A is mandatory. (9) shows that strong quantifiers,<sup>70</sup> which are also banned from *haber*-sentences, have to take A. The data in (6)-(9), then, provide *prima facie* evidence that A is a marker of specificity.

Nominals with definite determiners seem to provide additional evidence for the claim that A is a marker of specificity. As Heusinger 2002a explains (see also Lyons 1999: 57-60), building on observations by Quine 1960: section 31, 146ff, the traditional view of specificity as a subset of indefiniteness (as in Givón 1978 and many others) cannot be maintained. The distinction between specific and non-specific items can be extended to definite nominals too (see also Fodor 1970: 130-215 for discussions of ambiguities with definite nominals inside intensional contexts):<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> The difference between strong and weak quantifiers can be tested by the possibility of inserting the quantifier in an existential sentence. Strong quantifiers are banned from *there-be* sentences, as well as from *haber*-sentences. See Milsark 1977, Barwise and Cooper 1981, Keenan 1987, among several others; and for Spanish, Suñer 1982a: 61-100.

<sup>71</sup> The non-specific/specific readings were originally termed “non referential” and “referential”, respectively. The shift to “non-specific/specific” is due to Baker 1966 and Fillmore 1967, according to Heusinger 2002a. With respect to definite NPs, Fodor 1970: 132 distinguishes “referential” and “attributive” readings, and claims that this difference should not be given the same status as the specific/non-specific distinction, but she admits that the notion of “having somebody in mind” (that she uses to characterize specificity) can be applied to definite NPs too.

(10) John is looking for **the dean**...

a. ...whoever it might be. [non specific]

b. ...namely for Smith, who happens to be the dean. [specific]

[Heusinger 2002b: 248]

Interestingly enough, there are languages whose article system marks specificity and not definiteness—for instance Maori (Chung and Ladusaw 2004), and according to Lyons 1999: 59, this situation is not unusual outside Indo-European languages. This provides additional reason to depart from the traditional view that holds that specificity is a subset of indefiniteness.<sup>72</sup>

If specificity (and not definiteness) is the notion behind Spanish DOM, the sentences corresponding to (10a-b) should be, respectively, without A and with A, which is in fact the case:

(11) a. Juan está buscando el decano, sea quien sea  
 John is looking-for the dean, be-SUBJ who be-SUBJ  
 John is looking for the dean, whoever it might be.

b. Juan está buscando al decano, es decir, a Smith  
 John is looking-for A+the dean, is to say, A Smith  
 John is looking for the dean, namely for Smith.

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<sup>72</sup> Heusinger 2002a takes the Turkish accusative marker to be a morphological marker of specificity, also independent of definiteness (Turkish does not have a definite article); see also Öztürk 2005.

It is worth mentioning that (11a) may sound inappropriate for some speakers but this is just an interference from an interaction between specificity and definiteness. If we assume that “a definite singular expression unambiguously denotes or refers to one object, i.e. the object can be identified as the only one that is denoted by the expression” (Heusinger and Kaiser 2003: 44), we can find the source of the potential confound for accepting (11a): at first sight there seems to be a conflict between the conditions for the definite nominal and the possibility that more than one individual satisfies the conditions for Juan’s object of searching in (11a)—a possibility stressed by the subjunctive clause *sea quien sea* (“whoever it might be”). However this nuisance can be overridden when we introduce an appropriate context—here we use a strategy provided by Heusinger and Kaiser 2003: 50 to better isolate *de dicto* (non-specific) readings with definite expressions:

- (12) Juan está buscando                    el decano que mejor maneje   su Departamento  
        John is looking-for                    the dean that better run-SUBJ   his department  
        John is looking for the dean that better run his/her department.

It is important to notice that, as expected, the non-specificity of definite nominals is not a possibility restricted to potential DOM objects (animate and specific, let’s say), but is a general property of the combination of the definite article and a subjunctive clause that forces non-specificity (see Quer 1998: 106, Leonetti 1999: 865, Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3265-3266, Ahern and Leonetti 2004, among others):

(13) Juan está buscando

John is looking for

a. la casa que                      esté más cerca de su oficina                      [non specific]

the house that                      be-SUBJ more close to his office

b. la casa que                      está más cerca de su oficina                      [specific]

the house that                      be-INDIC more close to his office

(13a) is felicitous if John does not know the house he is looking for (he wants to buy a house close to his office, for instance). (13b) is felicitous only if John does have some knowledge about the house (for instance, he just bought it by phone, has the address, and is looking for the exact place). These data confirm that specificity is not really a subset of indefiniteness, but an independent property, as argued by Heusinger 2002b, a. Given the above discussion, we can agree with Heusinger and Kaiser 2003 in that definiteness does not play a role in Spanish DOM.<sup>73</sup> Rather, the relevant notion behind Spanish DOM is specificity. As we will see later, this conclusion presents a serious problem for OT-based explanations of DOM, at least as they are presented in Aissen 2003, which predict that all definite objects should be A-marked. As we has just just seen, this cannot be correct.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> According to Heusinger and Kaiser 2003: 42, definiteness might play a role in some American Spanish dialects, but this is not confirmed by systematic explorations of DOM in these dialects (as in Heusinger and Kaiser 2005).

<sup>74</sup> More generally, this is also a potential problem for the so called Definiteness Hierarchy (Croft 1990, 2003), which assumes a ranking like this:

(i) Definite > Specific > Non-specific                      [Croft 2003: 132]

Under this view, it is expected that non-specific elements are also non-definite. As I have shown above, this is not true. I will come back to this issue in the next section, when discussing the OT-model.

I would like to add more evidence in favor of this conclusion. Heim has pointed out that the definite article in superlative constructions like *the higher mountain* is sort of “indefinite” (Heim 1999: 8-9)—see also Selkirk 1977, Szabolcsi 1986, Herdan and Sharvit 2006, among others. If this is correct, we predict that superlative constructions in an object position can appear without the preposition A. This prediction is also borne out:

- (14) Está buscando        el decano más alto  
       is looking-for        the dean most tall  
       He is looking for the tallest dean.

In addition, Herdan 2007 shows that amount relatives (in the sense of Carlson 1977b) have a covert superlative morpheme; given the above discussion, we then predict that they should be fine without the A-marker. This prediction is borne out:

- (15) Contrató        los ingenieros que había en la oficina  
       hired-he        the engineers that there was in the office  
       He hired the engineers that there were in the office

It is crucial to stress that in (14)-(15) the A-marker is possible. In fact, the generalization in (5)—under the traditional assumption that all definite determiners are specific—expects them to have a mandatory A-marker, but this is not the case; in these sentences A is optional:



(16) a. Está buscando (al/el) decano más alto  
 is looking-for A+the/the dean most tall  
 He is looking for the tallest dean.

b. Contrató (a) los ingenieros que había en la oficina  
 hired-he A the engineers that there was in the office  
 He hired the engineers that there were in the office

Thus, although the behavior of definite nominals does provide evidence in favor of rejecting the idea that specificity is a subset of indefiniteness, it represents a challenge for the generalization in (5). A satisfactory solution for DOM should address these data.

An interesting situation arises with nominals denoting kind, which do not need to have A:

(17) a. Antoñito buscaba la mujer rica  
 Antoñito looked-for the rich women  
 Antoñito looked-for the rich women

b. ...una fuente de vida nueva que purifica el hombre moral  
 ...a source of life new that purifies the man moral  
 ...a source of new life that purifies the moral man.

[Fernández Ramírez 1986]

Commenting on these examples, Brugué and Brugger 1996 observe that kind-nominals can receive A:

- (18) ...una fuente      de vida nueva      que purifica      al      hombre moral.  
      ...a source          of life new          that purifies      A+the    man moral  
      ...a source of new life that purifies the moral man.

[Brugué and Brugger 1996: 6]

They claim that (18) is due to the fact that kind-denoting nominals can freely have [+animate] or [-animate], and therefore that the object has [-animate] in (17), preventing the insertion of A. As it should be apparent, this represents a major departure from the idea that animacy is a semantic notion—a step that other researchers are also willing to take (see Torrego 1998: 55). I reject this move, and contend that the peculiarities of these nominals should be accounted for by resorting to the idea that kind-denotation is a reading available independently of referentiality (as in the tradition stemmed from Carlson 1977a), keeping [animate] as a semantic feature.

I leave the explanation for the presence/absence of A in the above example for section 2.3, but I want to conclude here that, given that definite nominals can drop A even when they are not kind-denoting (as previously discussed), it seems more reasonable to assimilate the dropping of A to a more general property of determiners. In other words, there is no correlation between having A and being a kind-denoting expression. Notice

that this also challenges the generalization (5), since it implies that neither specificity nor animacy is enough to define kinds (that is, the behavior of kind-denoting expressions with respect to DOM is not captured by (5)).

There are three conclusions to be drawn from the discussion of definite nominals. First, definiteness by itself does not play a role in Spanish DOM—as Heusinger and Kaiser 2003 also conclude. Second, the Spanish DOM phenomenon provides evidence in favor of Heusinger 's 2000 notion of specificity, namely the idea that specific nominals are not a proper subset of indefinite ones; hence definite nominals can also be classified as (non)-specific. Third, given that non-specific definite nominals can have A optionally, this challenges the almost universally accepted claim that A is a marker of specificity. As I will show now, indefinite nominals also provide evidence in favor of the third conclusion.

It is sometimes observed (see Pensado 1995: 32-33, Brugé and Brugger 1996, Blears 1999: 175-186, Brugè 2000: 211, Leonetti 2003, 2004, López 2006: 145-149) that indefinite objects marked with A are not necessarily specific. Rather, as argued by these authors, A-objects have the possibility of being specific, but they do not need to be so. Their evidence comes from the fact that A-marked objects are possible (although not mandatory) with other grammatical devices that are related to non-specificity, in particular nouns modified by subjunctive clauses (19a) and nominals without determiners (19b):

(19) a. Juan busca            a    una enfermera            que sepa            español.

John looks-for    A    a nurse            that speak-SUBJ    Spanish

John looks for a nurse that speaks Spanish.

b. El comité            busca            a    estudiantes            con buenas calificaciones

The committee    looks-for    A    students            with good grades

The committee looks for students with good grades.

As observed by Rivero 1977 for Spanish (see Quer 1998 for other Romance languages), subjunctive relative clauses are incompatible with a specific reading of the nominal whose head they modify; (19a) then must be non-specific, in spite the fact that it does have A. Additionally, in Spanish, determinerless nouns cannot have a referential reading; thus (19b) must be non-specific, but it does have A. So, it seems that A does not actually encode specificity.

Additional evidence comes from the fact that both DOM and no-DOM objects can have *de re* and *de dicto* readings in intensional contexts.<sup>75</sup> A typical test to differentiate between *de re* and *de dicto* readings is provided by sentences like this:

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<sup>75</sup> When reporting propositional attitudes (as beliefs or desires), sentences exhibit an ambiguity with respect to the quantified expression. Take the sentence:

(i) John believes that a French engineer is efficient.

This could mean either of the following:

(ii)	a.	John believes that French engineers are efficient.	<i>de dicto</i>
	b.	Some engineer is such that John believes that he is efficient.	<i>de re</i>

In the *de re* reading (ii-b), John directly attributes a property (being efficient) to a particular engineer. In the

(20) John wants to hire a French engineer.

If John wants to hire Mary, but he does not know that Mary is French, then the nominal *a French engineer* must have a *de re* reading, and it cannot have a *de dicto* reading, which requires that John knows that the person that he wants to hire has to be French. In Spanish, *de dicto* readings can be obtained with or without A:

(21) a. Juan quiere contratar    a    una ingeniera francesa

John wants to hire        A    a engineer French.

John wants to hire a French engineer.

b. Juan quiere contratar    una ingeniera francesa

John wants to hire        a engineer French.

John wants to hire a French engineer.

According to native speaker judgments, both (21a) and (21b) are felicitous in a situation where Juan wants to hire Mary and he does know that she is French; that is, both of them can have a *de dicto* reading. With respect to the other reading, in the case of (21a), there is no problem obtaining a *de re* reading; in addition, there seems to be no strong preference for one reading or the other in (21a). But this is not the case for (21b); if someone utters (21b), there is a strong preference for the *de dicto* reading. However,

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*de dicto* reading (ii-a), such property is not linked to any particular engineer. Notice too that, in (ii-b), John does not need to know if the engineer he deems efficient is French.

native speakers judge (21b) to be felicitous under circumstances that seem to require a *de re* reading. Consider (22):

(22) Peter, Bill and Juan are having lunch together in the cafeteria, discussing candidates for a position in engineering. Then, Mary, a beautiful girl and a candidate, enters the cafeteria, and Juan, who does not know that Mary is French, says “I want to hire her!” To excuse Juan for his inappropriate comment, Peter says to Bill:

(23) Parece que Juan quiere contratar    una ingeniera francesa

Seems that John wants to hire        a engineer French.

It seems that John wants to hire a French engineer.

Native speakers judge that Peter has uttered a felicitous sentence in this case.<sup>76</sup> We should not conclude so rapidly that *una ingeniera francesa* has a “specific” reading. In a context like (22), Peter knows that John wants to hire Mary; given that he also knows that Mary is French, for Peter, it is also true that John wants to hire a French engineer: as it is well known, wide readings entail narrow ones (see Ruys 1992: 6-11 for some interesting discussion on this issue). In other words, *una ingeniera francesa* is taken *de re* by the speaker, but it does not refer to any particular individual with respect to Juan. This seems to fit the description of the so-called “non-specific *de re*” readings (see Fodor 1970,

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<sup>76</sup> Notice that Juan is the subject of the sentence, but he is not the speaker, that is, Juan is not a participant in the speech act. This is relevant since specificity is said to be dependent on conditions related to the participants in the speech act, especially the speaker (see Fodor 1970, Enç 1991, Lyons 1999: 165-178, Farkas 2002, Heusinger 2002a, among several others)—see also fn 77.

Bonomi 1995, von Fintel and Heim 2003, among others).<sup>77</sup> If this is correct, we can conclude that non-A objects cannot be specific.

This suggests another possibility to deal with non-specific/narrow readings of A-objects: these readings are obtained under entailment from specific/wide ones. This would mean that the A-objects in question are not really non-specific. This is, however, not true. The examples in (19) already point to this direction. In those cases, the specific interpretation is not available; therefore, their non-specific reading cannot come from the latter. There is additional evidence here.

Donkey-sentences provide a test for non-specificity (see Heim 1990 for discussion). Indefinites in donkey-sentences cannot be specific, they need to have a bound reading with respect to the universal quantifier:

(24) Every farmer that owns a donkey beats it.

A-objects are perfectly fine with donkey-sentences:<sup>78</sup>

(25) Toda cadena que contrata a un actor famoso gana dinero con él.

Every network that hires A an actor famous, wins money with him

Every network that hires a famous actor, wins money after him.

[Bosque 2001: 25]

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<sup>77</sup> Notice that “specific” implies *de re* but *de re* does not imply “specific”; “non-specific” does imply *de dicto*, however (and, of course, *de dicto* implies non-specific)—see von Fintel and Heim 2003: 6-7 for a formal implementation of this correlation (and lack thereof).

<sup>78</sup> (25) and (27) come from Bosque 2001, who is not discussing DOM, but he does use them to test non-specificity, with different purposes.

More evidence is provided by so called cleft conditional sentences (see Gutiérrez Ordóñez 1994 for Spanish). Since, in the if-clause, such sentences have free variables whose content is identified in the copulative clause, they constitute another ground for testing non-specificity:

(26) If John loves any girl, it is Mary.

A-objects are fine with cleft conditionals:

(27) Si Juan ha conocido a una persona interesante en su vida, ha sido María

If John has met A a person interesting in his life, has been Mary

If John has ever met anyone interesting in his life, it is Mary

[Bosque 2001: 26]

The above discussion leads us to an inescapable conclusion: the preposition A cannot be a marker of specificity. Although this is in conflict with the vast majority of the literature on Spanish DOM (see Torrego 1998, 1999 and the references she cites), it is also true that the literature has put aside the problems presented by the examples discussed above, limiting itself to explaining the paradigm in (1)-(5), which has been a useful idealization so far, but it needs to be refined if we ever want to advance our understanding of Spanish DOM. It is necessary to point out that this idealization is not something particular to Spanish DOM researchers, but is quite common in the DOM literature in other languages



and in different frameworks; for instance, OT researchers make similar idealizations with respect to the languages they work on—to say it in Aissen words, her model “oversimplifies in some respects” (Aissen 2003: 471).<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, there has been a growing line of research on Spanish DOM that has pointed out this problem and has also concluded that A is not a marker of specificity; see Pensado 1995: 32-33, Brugé and Brugger 1996, Brugè 2000: 211, Leonetti 2003, 2004, López 2006: 145-149 (a conclusion already anticipated in the rich descriptive literature on Spanish DOM; see in particular Fernández Ramírez 1986: 148-190 and Laca 1995). I will side here with this line of research, in light of the evidence presented so far.<sup>80</sup>

At this point, and putting aside for the moment the issue of animacy (which I will include in the next section), we could raise the following question: does the A-marker make any contribution to object interpretation? I contend that the A-marker does not make any semantic contribution, and this claim seems to be firmly grounded in the above discussion. But data that seem to contradict it has already been presented (see (6)-(9)).

On one hand, there are some objects that cannot accept the preposition A, precisely those that cannot be specific—I repeat (6) here:

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<sup>79</sup> Although Aissen’s system has been improved to overcome some of her “oversimplifications” (as in de Swart 2003 and Morimoto and de Swart 2006), the issue of specificity remains the same.

<sup>80</sup> Notice that this conclusion also undermines explanations of DOM that are based on the framework of generalized conversational implicatures (García García 2005)—since they rest on the assumption that A-marked objects are more informative. In other words, as recognized by García García 2005: fn. 14, this line of research does not predict cases where the presence/absence of A makes no difference with respect to the information conveyed by the sentence.

(28) a. Había (\*a) un policía en el parque.

there-was A a policemen in the park

There was a policeman in the park.

b. Tenía (\*a) un amigo.

he-had A a friend

He had a friend.

We already seen in chapter 1 the case of existential sentences (like (28a): [+specific] objects are not admitted there because the small *v* in *haber*-sentences cannot value their case-feature (because they are  $\phi$ -incomplete)—as we will see later in this chapter, this means that *haber*-sentences do not have what it takes to mark objects with A (a Dative Phrase). In chapter 3, I will show that possessive verbs like *tener* (to have) present a similar case, which will be shown to account for the lack of A in (28b). Additionally, the contrast between indicative and subjunctive clauses modifying objects—presented in (7)—does not really show that A is a marker of specificity, since A is optionally possible in the example with subjunctive clauses (29), as discussed above:

(29) Busca (a) una enfermera que hable español.

looks-for A a nurse that speak-SUBJ Spanish

He looks for a nurse that speak Spanish.

Pending an account of the optionality (which I will provide later), we can conclude that the lack of A in the above examples is not evidence against the view that A is not a marker of specificity.

On the other hand, there are some cases where A is mandatory, precisely those constructions where the object must be specific. Two of them have already been presented in (8)-(9): partitive constructions and objects with strong quantifiers. I repeated them here in (30a) and (30b) respectively:

- (30) a. Había besado      \*(a) varias de sus amigas.  
          Had kissed            A    several of his girlfriends  
          He kissed several of his girlfriends.
- b. Besó            \*(a) toda chica con sombrero.  
          kissed            A    every girl with hat  
          He kissed every girl with hat.

The other case, provided by Bosque 2001, is related to a very well known alternation between pre- and post- nominal adjectives—see Ticio 2003: 112-145 for a thorough discussion of the issues and the relevant literature concerning this phenomenon and its consequences for understanding the structure of DPs. Prenominal attributive adjectives force a specific interpretation of indefinites and they must receive A:

(31) a. Busco      (a) un actor famoso

look-for A a actor famous

I am looking for a famous actor.

b. Busco      \*(a) un famoso actor

look-for A a famous actor

I am looking for a famous actor.

[Bosque 2001: 27]

I will leave the full explanation of these facts for section 2.3, but let me advance the following idea, which will allow me to conclude this section.

I will assume that Spanish has two definite, non definite types of determiners, which I will name D and \*D. This distinction cut across definite and indefinite determiners, across quantifiers (weak or strong), and across kinds, and in fact, across all types of determiners. That is, definite and indefinite determiners can be D or \*D. The crucial difference between D and \*D is that D can optionally be specific or non-specific, whereas \*D cannot be specific:

(32)

D	[+specific] or [-specific]
*D	[-specific]

It is important to spell out what I mean by [+specific]. As I mentioned in the beginning of this section, I do not aim to contribute anything special to the notion of specificity. I use [+specific] as stand for a set of properties that may or may not be related. In particular, I mean by [+specific] two things: (i) a choice-function interpretation, and (ii) a strong interpretation. This means that only D determiners have the possibility of receiving a choice function (in the sense of Reinhart 1992, 1997, Kratzer 1998 but also Heusinger 2002b), but they do not need to do so, and only D determiners can be weak or strong; in turn \*D determiners cannot receive a choice function, nor they can be strong.

For indefinite determiners, this distinction should be straightforward, assuming that their specificity can be accounted for by the availability of a choice function (as in Reinhart 1997, Kratzer 1998; see also Lidz 2006 for an application of choice functions to the specificity effects induced by DOM-objects in Kannada). A choice function is a function that maps from a set of individuals to a particular member of that set:

### (33) Choice Function

A function  $f$  is a choice function  $CH(f)$  if it applies to any non-empty set and yields a member of that set.

[Reinhart 1997: 374]

To see an example, let's consider this sentence:

(34) Every student reads some book.

In the wide-scope reading, there is a particular book that every student reads (*The Minimalist Program*, for instance). This reading can be represented by assigning a choice function to *some*:

$$(35) \exists f (CH(f) \wedge \forall z (\text{student}(z) \rightarrow z \text{ read } f(\text{book})))$$

According to (35), there is a function  $f$ , such that for every  $z$ , if  $z$  is a student, then  $z$  reads the book selected by  $f$  (namely, *The Minimalist Program*).<sup>81</sup> As extensively discussed by Reinhart 2006, this sets the cornerstone for a principled explanation of a number of issues regarding scope and QR (far beyond DOM systems). Following Lidz 2006 (who works on Kannada), I take choice functions as a tool also relevant to accounting for specificity in DOM-objects.

Indefinite determiners, then, come in two flavors:  $D$  and  $*D$ . Indefinite  $D$  determiners have the possibility of optionally receiving a choice function, whereas indefinite  $*D$  determiners do not have that possibility.

Definite determiners, on the other hand, are not usually understood as having choice functions; in fact, according to Reinhart 1997: 368-370, determiners have to be weak in order to receive a choice function, although not all weak determiners can receive it—which means that we have to understand the indefinite  $*D$  as a weak determiner that

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<sup>81</sup> Notice that existential closure is needed to bind the function variable. There is some debate concerning to where the closure applies, an issue that is only relevant for sentences with intermediate scope. For Reinhart 1997, existential closure can apply at any point in the derivation; for Kratzer 1998, it can only apply at the root node. See Lidz 2006 for ways to tease these options apart in the context of DOM languages.

cannot receive a choice function. But Heusinger 2002b has found an interesting way to use choice functions to analyze definite determiners, by distinguishing what he calls a local choice function (the ones analyzed by Reinhart) from a global choice function (GCF), which can be applied to definite DPs. GCF can be successfully used to represent the salience structure in the discourse and in this way it determines the actual reference of definite DPs. To evaluate the technical details of this notion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, so let me merely illustrate it with an example (taken from Heusinger 2002b).

The lake Constance is a large lake on the Rhine, located between Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, which contains three islands: Mainau, Reichenau and Lindau. The definite expression *the island on Lake Constance* then can refer to three different individuals, namely, the island Mainau, the island Reichenau and the island Lindau, depending on different situations:

If we hear the expression [*the island on Lake Constance*] from a Reichenau fisherman, he probably means the island Reichenau; if we encounter the same sentence during a guided tour through Lindau it will rather be the island Lindau that is meant; however, uttered by the Earl, owner and occasional inhabitant of Mainau, the sentence is sure to be about the island Mainau.

[Heusinger 2002b: 68]

Assuming that each context  $i$  has its own choice function  $F$ , a definite DP *the N* is interpreted in this way (informally):

(36) The selected *x* in the context *i* such that *x* is *N* or the most salient *x* in *i* such that *x* is *N*.

[Heusinger 2002b: 68]

This means that the uniqueness requirement usually associated with definite expressions can be actually interpreted as the unique availability of the referent in a given context, that is, a global choice function picks up the salient individual in a particular context.<sup>82</sup> If we assume that definite determiners can also be *D* or *\*D* and that *\*D* determiners cannot receive a global choice function, this implies that definite *\*D* cannot receive a global choice function, meaning that it cannot pick an individual referent, but other non-referential/non-specific interpretations are available, as discussed: nominals modified by subjunctive clauses (37a), modified by clauses containing comparative adverbs (37b), modified by superlatives phrases (37c), or modified by amount relative clauses (37d):

- (37) a.    Juan está buscando        el decano,        sea        quien    sea  
               John is looking-for        the dean,        be-SUBJ    who       be-SUBJ  
               John is looking for the dean, whoever it might be.
- b.    Juan está buscando    el decano que mejor maneje    su Departamento  
               John is looking-for    the dean that better run-SUBJ    his department  
               John is looking for the dean that better run his/her department.

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<sup>82</sup> Interestingly enough, as observed by Laca 1995: 83, the discourse saliency of a referent highly increases the likelihood that a definite animate object referring to it will be marked with *A*, whereas the lack of saliency decreases it.



c. Está buscando el decano más alto

is looking-for the dean most tall

He is looking for the tallest dean.

d. Contrató los ingenieros que había en la oficina

hired-he the engineers that there was in the office

He hired the engineers that there were in the office

I assume that the determiners in (37) are \*D determiners. As discussed above, all these sentences can have a version with the object marked with A. I contend that, when A is present, this means that a D determiner is present. This is consistent with the view (expressed in (32)) that D can have a specific reading, but it does not need to have it.

From the above discussion, the following generalization emerges, putting aside animacy (until the next section):

(38) Definite Determiners

	I	II
D	Can receive a global choice function	Must have A (if animate)
*D	Cannot receive a global choice function	Cannot have A

Notice that (38) does not imply any causal relation between I and II, it is just a descriptive correlation; that is, (38) should not be understood as saying that A is the carrier of the global choice function. We will explain this correlation in section 2.3.

With respect to indefinite determiners, recall that \*D has to be understood as a weak quantifier that cannot receive a local choice function. D in turn can be strong or weak, but, crucially, it has the possibility of receiving a local choice function:

(39) Indefinite Determiners

	I	II
D	Can receive a local choice function Can be strong or weak	Must have A (if animate)
*D	Cannot receive a local choice function Cannot be strong	Cannot have A

Again, this is just a descriptive correlation, which will be explained in section 2.3. As in the case of definite determiners, this also implies that A is optional with some indefinite determiners, precisely the ones in the contexts where the choice function is not enforced (40); but A is mandatory if the indefinite must receive a choice function (41) or if the determiner is strong (42), as discussed above:

- (40) a. Juan contrató      a      un actor famoso  
           John hired            A    a actor famous  
           John hired a famous actor.

b. Juan contrató un actor famoso

John hired a actor famous

John hired a famous actor.

(41) Juan contrató \*(a) un famoso actor

John hired A a famous actor

John hired a famous actor

(42) a. Juan contrató a todo actor famoso

John hired A every actor famous

John hired every famous actor.

b. \* Juan contrató todo actor famoso

John hired every actor famous

John hired every famous actor.

Notice that in (40) the A-marker is optional only under the non-specific interpretation; if (40a) is understood as specific, that is, if (40a) receives a local choice function, A becomes mandatory:

(43) Juan contrató \*(a) un actor famoso, Sean Connery

John hired A a actor famous, Sean Connery

John hired a famous actor, Sean Connery

Likewise, weak quantifiers can receive A optionally, under the non-specific interpretation (that is, without a choice function):

(44) a. Juan contrató        a    dos actores famosos  
           John hired            A   two actors famous  
           John hired two famous actors.

b. Juan contrató        dos actores famosos  
           John hired            two actors famous  
           John hired two famous actors.

This is exactly what we expect from the generalization in (39): only D determiners can have choice functions, and only D determiners can be strong. However, D determiners do not need to have a choice function, as witnessed by the compatibility of A with cases discussed above, where it is not possible to receive a choice function:

(45) a. Subjunctive clauses  
           Busca            (a)   una enfermera que hable            español.  
           looks-for        A    a nurse that speak-SUBJ            Spanish  
           He looks for a nurse that speak Spanish.

b. Donkey sentences

Toda cadena que contrata      (a) un actor famoso gana dinero con él.  
 Every network that hires      A an actor famous, wins money with him  
 Every network that hires a famous actor, wins money after him.

c. Cleft Conditionals

Si he conocido      (a) una persona interesante      en mi vida, ha sido María  
 If has met      A a person interesting      in his life, has been Mary  
 If I have ever met anyone interesting in his life, it is Mary

We can summarize these findings in the following tables, which, once again, should be understood only as descriptive correlations, without any theoretical import with respect to the A-marker:<sup>83</sup>

(46)

[no choice function & A]	(40a)
[no choice function & no A]	(40b)
[choice function & A]	(41)
*[choice function & no A]	(43)

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<sup>83</sup> Recall that, as discussed above, local choice functions are not compatible with strong quantifiers, so we cannot combine (46) and (47), but the reason for this is entirely independent from DOM systems.

(47)

[weak & A]	(44a)
[weak & no A]	(44b)
[strong & A]	(42a)
* [strong & no A]	(42b)

So far, I have not explained the reasons for these correlations, but, as should be apparent, according to (46)-(47), if something forces the specificity of the object (that is, if something forces the nominal in object position to have a choice function or if the object has a strong quantifier), it must receive A. On the other hand, if the specificity is not forced, or if the object has a weak quantifier, A is optional. This means that A is not a marker of specificity, since the presence of A does not force specificity.

A final conclusion must be added with respect to kind-denoting nominals, which, as discussed above, can have A optionally:

- (48) Una fuente      de vida nueva      que purifica      (a) el hombre moral  
A source            of life new            that purifies      (A) the man moral  
A source of new life that purifies the moral man.

I take this optionality to indicate that kind-denoting nominals can freely be D or \*D. This assumption, combined with the system I will present in section 2.3, will explain the presence/absence of A in (48), just as in the cases discussed above.

Now I will turn to the less complicated issue of animacy in Spanish DOM.

### 2.1.2 Animacy and Spanish DOM

The relevance of animacy for Spanish can hardly be denied. There are some minimal pairs that are distinguished just by the feature [ $\pm$  animate]:

(49)

[+animate]	[-animate]
<i>Alguien</i> Somebody	<i>Algo</i> Something
<i>Nadie</i> Nobody	<i>Nada</i> Nothing
<i>Quién</i> Who	<i>Qué</i> What

In all [+animate] cases above, objects *must* receive A:

(50) a. Vi      \*(a)   alguien      en el parque  
              saw    A    somebody    in the park  
              I saw somebody in the park

b. No vi    \*(a)   nadie      en el parque  
              No saw    A    nobody      in the park  
              I saw nobody in the park

c. \*(A) quién vi en el parque?

A who saw in the park

Whom did I see in the park?

On the other hand, none of the [-animate] cases can receive A:

(51) a. Vi (\*a) algo en el parque

saw A something in the park

I saw something in the park

b. No vi (\*a) nada en el parque

No saw A nothing in the park

I saw nothing in the park

c. (\*A) qué vi en el parque?

A what saw in the park

What did I see in the park?

Notice that all the cases in (50) are “non-specific”, so they provide further confirmation that A cannot be a marker of specificity. In fact, such cases have been a particularly hard issue for proponents of the A-as-a-specific-marker hypothesis, and some proponents of the hypothesis have even suggested that those items are actually specific—see for instance Kliffer 1982: 203-204 and Torrego 1998: 175 fn. 156. I contend that this cannot



be true, based on the fact that the elements in (49) are possible with existential sentences:<sup>84</sup>

(52) a. Había            alguien  
           there-was        somebody  
           There was somebody

b. No había            nadie  
           No there-was    nobody  
           There was nobody

c. Quién        había?  
           Who        there-was  
           Who was there?

As discussed in chapter 1, the lack of A in existential sentences does not have anything to do with specificity distinctions, but with the case-assignment mechanism.

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<sup>84</sup> Of course, it is always possible to imagine a systematic ambiguity: for Torrego 1998: 175 fn. 156 the items in (50) are [+specific] in sentences like (51) but [-specific] in existential sentences. However, if this were correct, it would mean that [+specific] is not really a semantic/pragmatic feature—see also Torrego 1998: 55 for the idea that not even [+animate] is semantic. Here, I reject this notion. In addition, for *quién* (who), we could entertain the possibility that it is D-linked (in the sense of Pesetsky 1987), that is, discourse-linked, and then [+specific]; this, however, can not be true, since aggressively non-D-linked phrases—like *the hell* (or its equivalent in Spanish, *diablos*)—are perfectly compatible with *quién*, preserving the obligatory A:

(i)    \*(A) quién    diablos    viste    en el parque  
       A who        demons    saw     in the park  
       Who the hell did you see in the park?

There is a subclass of nominals that it is easy to recognize as animates: pronouns, proper nouns of persons and animals; all of them must take A (as observed many times; see Fernández Ramírez 1986, Laca 1995, Torrego 1999 for overviews on the issue of animacy in Spanish DOM):

(53) a. Lo vi \*(a) él

CL saw A he

I saw him

b. Vi \*(a) Pedro

saw A Peter

I saw Peter

c. Vi \*(a) Fido

saw A Fido

I saw Fido

With other animate DPs, A can be dropped, under the circumstances described in the previous subsection (in relation with specificity):

(54) a. Juan está buscando (a) la decana que mejor maneje su Departamento

John is looking-for A the dean that better run her department

John is looking for the dean that better run his/her department.

b Busco (a) un actor famoso

look-for A a actor famous

I am looking for a famous actor.

c. El comité busca (a) estudiantes con buenas calificaciones

The committee looks-for A students with good grades

The committee looks for students with good grades.

A particularly convincing example of the relevance of animacy for A-marking is provided by the behavior of the noun *pueblo*, which can mean either *town* (in which case it is [-animate]) or *people* (in which case it is [+animate]). Only the [+animate] meaning triggers the presence of A—as observed by Torrego 1998: 67, among others:

(55) a. Buscan el pueblo de Numancia

looking-for the town of Numancia

They are looking for the town of Numancia

b. Buscan al pueblo de Numancia

looking-for A+the people of Numancia

They are looking for the people of Numancia

There is a subclass of animates, though, that can never receive A: bare nouns without

modifiers—as observed by Torrego 1984a, Contreras 1986, Lois 1989, Brugé and Brugger 1996: 8-10, among others:<sup>85</sup>

(56). El comité                busca            (\*a)    estudiantes

The committee        looks-for    A        students

The committee looks for students.

Notice also that the nominals in (54) do not need to have a specific reading even if A is present. That is, as discussed in the previous section, A does not preclude a non-specific reading. So, in principle, we cannot use specificity (or rather the lack thereof) as an explanation for the mandatory lack of A in (56). I will account for this lack of A in section 2.3.

On the other hand, non-animate nominals do receive A under certain circumstances, as has been pointed out by many authors (see Hanssen 1945: 296, Molho 1958, Rebollo Torío 1976/1977, Luján 1978, Weissenrieder 1985, Fernández Ramírez 1986, García Martín 1988, Lois 1989, Weissenrieder 1990, 1991, Laca 1995, Contreras 1996, Torrego 1998: 55, Martín 1999, Torrego 1999: 1788, Company Company 2002, Zagana 2002: 13-14, Barraza Carbajal 2003, Heusinger and Kaiser 2003, Estrada García 2005, Martín 2005, Laca 2006), who have consequently questioned the relevance of animacy to Spanish DOM:

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<sup>85</sup> However, bare nouns with modifiers can receive A optionally (see (19)).

(57) Los ácidos atacan (a) los metales

The acids attack A the metals

Acids corrode metals.

[Molho 1958: 215]

Notice that (57) is not a case of figurative speech. It is well-known that, when objects are personalized, as for instance, in cartoon-like situations, they behave (not surprisingly) like [+animate] objects, and therefore they receive A:

(58) La sartén atacó a la olla

The pan attacked A the pot

The pan attacked the pot.

But in (57) *attack* means *corrode*, in fact, if we use the more technical *corroer* (“corrode”), the A stays optional:

(59) Los ácidos corroen (a) los metales

The acids corrode A the metals

Acids corrode metals.

Pushed by this kind of examples, some authors have proposed to interpret the notion of [animate] in a different way. Torrego 1998: 55, using a category borrowed from Jackendoff 1983: 180-183, suggests to use [ACTOR] instead. It is unclear, however, how

this can be applied to (57). If anything, following Jackendoff's definition ("the one that is performing the [ACTION]" — Jackendoff 1983: 180), the [ACTOR] in (57) is *Los ácidos*, no *los metales*. Even if we extent the definition to mean "capable of performing an [ACTION]" or "autonomous" (as Torrego seems to have in mind), it is still unclear what action are the metals capable of performing or how they are autonomous. Thus, I reject this notion.

However, it is true that [animate] needs some clarification, and most certainly it cannot be limited to "living" individuals. I think it is natural to assume that animacy is a notion related to the autonomy of motion. This includes not only humans and animals, but also things like vehicles. If so, this means that we have a [+animate] in this case:

(60) ...atravesando el Pont Neuf, vi al barquito en cuestión  
crossing the Pont Neuf, saw A+the little+ship in question  
crossing the Pont Neuf, I saw the little ship in question  
[Laca 1995: 83]

This idea of animacy as autonomy of motion implies that things that are understood as lacking motion cannot be [+animate], and they do not receive A:

(61) \* Vi (\*a) la casa en cuestión  
built A the house in question  
I built the little ship in question

It is possible to suggest that the semantic [ $\pm$  animate] should be replaced by an alternative [ $\pm$  motion] as the feature relevant for DOM, but I would continue using [ $\pm$  animate] for expository reasons.

As it should be apparent, this does not apply to (57), since metals do not satisfy this criterion. I will come back to the issue of truly non-animate objects that receive A in the next section. Let me point out for now that there are a number of verbs where A is *mandatory*, even when the object is very clearly non-animate:

(62) a. Un adjetivo califica a un sustantivo

An adjective qualifies A a noun

An adjective qualifies a noun

b. Los días siguen a las noches

The days follow A the nights

The days follow the nights

[Torrego 1999: 1788]

Cases like these have been taken by several researchers as crucial evidence that the key factor behind DOM is actually a principle of distinguishability between the subject and the object, in the sense that, according to these authors, A marks the object when the object has the same properties as the subject, i.e., when both are animate and specific (see Hills 1920, Weissenrieder 1985, 1990, 1991, Contreras 1996, Zagana 2002: 14, Morimoto and de Swart 2006, among several others)—this is sometimes expressed as the

potential for ambiguity between subject and object, given the relatively free order in Spanish (see Laca 1995: 69-74, Torrego 1999: 1784 for some discussion of this issue).

Since the presence of A with non-animates poses a challenge for the classic OT analysis of Aissen 2003 (which I will discuss in the next section), some researchers working in this framework have proposed a formal implementation of this idea that could make it compatible with OT. Morimoto and de Swart 2006, following a similar idea presented by de Swart 2003 and De Hoop and Lamers 2005 for other DOM languages, propose a constraint of minimal semantic distinctness for Spanish, according to which the arguments of a transitive clause must be minimally distinct, that is, the subject must be higher than the object on the relevant semantic scales (animacy and definiteness). When this constraint is violated, the object is marked, giving rise to a DOM system:

#### (63) DISTINGUISHABILITY

Mark objects that are not outranked by the subject in prominence (animacy, specificity).

[Morimoto and de Swart 2006: 232]

However, this analysis is easily falsified:

- (64) El huracán                  provocó    (\*a) la tormenta  
The hurricane                  caused                  the storm

In this case, both subject and object have the same degree of definiteness and animacy,



but the marker is not possible. Thus, I reject explanations based on (63) or any of its antecedents (like the subject-object ambiguity).

I will show in section 2.3 that the examples discussed above do not constitute a problem for the generalization regarding Spanish DOM based on animacy, since there is good evidence to suggest that in these cases the A is accidental. Before doing that, however, it is necessary to discuss a couple of more notions often associated with Spanish DOM.

### **2.1.3 Other factors: topicality, event structure**

There is a tradition of research that tries to encompass DOM from a discourse-related perspective (Isenberg 1968, Laca 1987, García 1993, 1995, Laca 1995, Delbecque 1998, Leonetti 2003, 2004, García García 2005, among others). In this approach, the use of A is driven by the topic-nature of the nominal. It is important to point out that “topic” in this line of research is meant to refer to “aboutness”—in that sense, it is related to the notion of internal or low topic (Cecchetto 2000, Belletti 2001, 2004). It has been difficult for these researchers to establish that this discourse notion is the decisive factor behind DOM (as recognized by Delbecque 1998: 400-401), given that many nominals can have a “topic” interpretation without being A-marked, and that A-marked nominals do not need to have this interpretation (see also Martín 1999: 472-473).

There are mechanisms in Spanish that are more clearly discourse-related; for instance, clitic-doubling, whose relation to topicality has been suggested by Núñez del Prado 1997

and Suñer 1999.<sup>86</sup> From this point of view, the clitic acts like scopal marker to allow a presuppositional reading, given that assumption that, in order to obtain this reading, the object must reach the domain of the restriction (Diesing 1992); for Germanic, this is obtained by moving the DP overtly (Object-Shift), while Spanish does this by using the doubling clitic (and the doubled object stays in situ, at least overtly). There are alternative views. For Sánchez 2005, at least for Limeño Spanish, clitic-doubling structures are not topics, but instances of indentificational focus (in the sense of Kiss 1998). All authors agree that there is a contrast between clitic doubled and non-doubled structures:

(65) a. Vi        a    Susana

Saw    A    Susan

I saw Susan.

b. La vi        a Susan

CL saw        A Susan

I saw Susan

Everybody agrees the object in (65a) conveys new information (it is informational focus). For Sánchez 2005, (65b) is not presuppositional, but an instance of indentificational focus (which, as proposed by Kiss 1998: 245, identifies a subset of elements of a contextually given set).<sup>87</sup> Evidence to this effect comes, for instance, from the fact that it is not

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<sup>86</sup> Cecchetto 2000 and Belletti 2005 also treat doubling structures in Italian as corresponding to internal topics.

<sup>87</sup> In fact, Núñez del Prado 1997: 238-269 observes that the “presuppositional” character of clitic-doubling must be understood as “familiarity” and it cannot mean “understood” object, which is different from the

possible to continue a sentence that introduces a novel element in the discourse with a clitic-doubling structure, but it is possible to do so with a clitic-only structure:

- (66) a. I saw Mary. ...
- b. La saludé efusivamente  
CL greeted effusively  
I greeted her effusively
- c. # La saludé a María efusivamente  
CL greeted A Mary effusively  
I greeted her effusively

[adapted from Sánchez 2005: 24]

This would mean that in (66b) we do have a topic, but not in (66c).

I will not attempt to decide this matter. I only want to observe that DOM is compatible with all alleged interpretations (compare the sentences in (65). This means that DOM does not affect the informational structure. Given that clitic-doubling does correlate with the informational structure, we conclude that clitic doubling and DOM must be kept as separate phenomena. See also López 2006 for the idea that DOM is not equivalent to Germanic Object-Shift, which I interpret as indicating that DOM nominals are not necessarily internal topics, a point of view that I will adopt here. This also means that

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presence of the clitic alone (see (66b)).

theories that fit well with Germanic Object-Shift (as, for instance, Diesing 1992 and De Hoop 1992) cannot be applied to DOM, as López 2006: 153-165 also concludes (see also Lidz 2006 for the same conclusion with respect to DOM in Kannada).<sup>88</sup>

There is an additional notion that has also been related to DOM, in particular by Martín 2005, 2006. According to Martín, DOM objects have the ability to quantize the event. Quantization is a concept proposed by Krifka 1989, 1992, 1998 to describe the quantificational structure of nouns and events, which allows us to clearly spell out the relation between the direct object (the theme) and the event. In Krifka's framework, there is a homomorphism between the structure of the theme and the structure of the event. Chunks of the theme are assigned to parts of the event and when the theme has been extinguished, the event is over. A nominal is quantized when it is possible to determine its quantity, and event is quantized when bounded. The boundedness of the event must not be confounded with its delimitation (or telicity, as in Tenny 1994). As pointed out by Kiparsky 1998 (see also Ritter and Rosen 2001, 2005), a bounded event requires that the participation in the event be absolute, which means that bounded events are not compatible with adverbials expressing degrees of participation.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> In addition, the claim that clitic-doubling and DOM must be treated as separate phenomena casts some doubts on the relevance of Kayne's Generalization (Kayne 1975, Jaeggli 1982, 1986, Bleam 1999: 160-201) for DOM:

- (i) Kayne's Generalization (KG)  
An object NP may be doubled by a clitic only if the NP is preceded by a preposition.

In other words, it is not possible to suggest that A and clitic-doubling have the same source (for instance, specificity), and that KG emerges as an expression of some kind of overt agreement. Additional, as observed by Suñer 1988: 399-401, there are many cases of KG violations in several Spanish dialects (see also Sánchez 2005).

<sup>89</sup> This is not the same as saying that bound events are not compatible with durative phrases (as the difference between *in one hour*/*for an hour*, which is used to test the delimitation of the event).

- (67) a. # Mary owned the book very much.  
 b. # The customer bought the vase a bit.  
 c. # John recalled the password radically.  
 [Kiparsky 1998: 270]

Following Krifka, Martín 2005 assume that events can be quantized or cumulative.<sup>90</sup>

(68) a Cumulative

If a predicate P applies to x and y, it also applies to the sum of x and y, provided that it applies to at least two distinct entities

b. Quantized

If a predicate P applies to x and y, y cannot be a proper part of x

In this sense, according to Martín 2005: 194, DOM objects (and only DOM objects) can quantize the event, and thus, they are similar to subjects, which have this ability (Krifka 1989). This, as Martín notices, is a way to reestablish the hypothesis of distinguishability (63). It is, however, not true that DOM objects quantize the event (but Martín's considerations hold for a subset of DOM objects, as we will see).

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<sup>90</sup> These definitions are informal. They can be formalized in this way:

(i) A predicate P is cumulative iff  $\forall x, y [ [P(x) \wedge P(y) \rightarrow P(x \oplus y)] \wedge \text{card}(P) \geq 2 ]$

(ii) A predicate P is quantized iff  $\forall x, y [ P(x) \wedge P(y) \rightarrow \neg y > x ]$

[From Martín 2005: 185, who adopts Krifka 1989]

First, DOM objects are perfectly compatible with adverbials expressing degree of participation:

- (69) a. Juan quiere        un poquito        a María  
         John wants        a bit                A Mary  
         John loves Mary a bit
- b. Juan molestó muchísimo                a María  
         John bothered very much                A Mary  
         John bothered Mary very much
- c. Juan hirió considerablemente                a María  
         John hurt considerably                A Mary  
         John hurt Mary considerably

This means that DOM objects do not necessarily quantize the event, since events in (69) must be unbounded.

Secondly, it is perfectly possible to have quantized events with unmarked objects:

- (70) a. Encontré (#muchísimo) el libro  
         Found        (#very much) the book  
         I found the book (#very much).

b. Probé (#un poquito) el teorema

Proved (# a bit) the theorem

I proved the theorem (# a bit).

c. La caja contiene (#considerablemente) dos relojes.

The box contains (#considerably) two watches.

The box contains two watches (#considerably).

This means that, contrary to Martin's suggestion, unmarked objects can quantize the event.

Additionally, plural objects can multiply the event (which is a sign of quantization), even if they are unmarked:

(71) a. Vi los libros

Saw the books

I saw the books

b. Vi a los enfermos

Saw A the ill

I saw the patients

Contra Martin's report (2005: 194), in both cases in (71) there can be more than one event of seeing (at different times, for instance). Spanish DOM then seems to be insensitive to quantization. This conclusion is compatible with findings regarding other DOM languages (e.g. Turkish and Hebrew), which are also claimed to be insensitive to quantization (as pointed out by Ritter and Rosen 2001: 441-442).

Interestingly, there are some cases where plural DOM objects seem to quantize the event as well as cases where unmarked objects cannot do so. More interestingly, the former cases are limited to DOM objects that receive A irregularly, that is, when they are [-animate], illustrated by (62), repeated here as (72):

(72) a. Un adjetivo califica a un sustantivo

An adjective qualifies A a noun

An adjective qualifies a noun

b. Los días siguen a las noches

The days follow A the nights

The days follow the nights

[Torrego 1999: 1788]

In all these cases, if the object is plural, there must be multiple events. This is in fact Martin's original evidence (2005: 194) for his proposal, which, as we saw, cannot be extended to all DOM objects. In addition, in (72) the sentences are not compatible with



adverbials expressing a degree of participation:

(73) a. Un adjetivo califica (# un poquito) a un sustantivo

An adjective qualifies (# a bit) A a noun

An adjective qualifies a noun (# a bit)

b. Los días siguen (# considerablemente) a las noches

The days follow (# considerably) A the nights

The day follow the nights (# considerably)

Moreover, as observed also by Martín 2005: 194, there are some verbs where the event must always be [-quantize], and in these cases, the object can never get A, which is further evidence in favor of the idea presented here:

(74) El huracán provocó (\*a) las tormentas

The hurricane caused (\*A) the storms

In (74), there cannot be multiple events of causation, and, as expected, the sentence is compatible with adverbs of degree of participation:

(75) El huracán provocó hasta cierto punto las tormentas

The hurricane caused up to certain point the storms

The hurricane caused the storms up to a point.

Notice that this eliminates any possibility of using quantization to revive the notion of distinguishability as the force behind DOM.

In section 2.3, I will explain the presence of A in (72), without giving up the idea that the nominals in these sentences are [-animate]. I will show that there is a connection between the presence of A and the mandatory quantization in these sentences.

Another notion that has been argued to be a factor behind Spanish DOM is affectedness (Torrego 1998: 18-20). The evidence comes from contrasts like the following:

(76) a. Juan buscó                    (a)        un ingeniero  
         John looked for        A        an engineer  
         John looked for an engineer

      b. Juan golpeó            \*(a)    un ingeniero  
         John hit                A        an engineer  
         John hit an engineer

In (76a), the A-marker can be dropped (subject to the conditions discussed in the previous sections), but in (76b) it is mandatory (even if the object is understood as non-specific). The difference between these sentences is the nature of the verbal predicate. The object in (76b) is affected by the action of *golpear* (“to hit”). Affectedness is a notion

proposed by Anderson 1979, which has proved useful to capture a number of grammatical phenomena (see Anderson 2006 for an overview). It implies that the object undergoes a physical or psychological change, a condition that is not met in (76a).

Notice, however, that the mandatory character of A in (76b) is still subject to the animacy constraint, that is, even with verbs that affect their object, A is not possible if the object is inanimate:

- (77) Juan golpeó      (\*a) un escritorio  
      John hit            A     a desk  
      John hit a desk

I contend that to account for these facts it is enough to assume that affecting verbs select a D nominal as an object. Following the mechanism I will propose in section 2.3, which is common for all other cases, this predicts a mandatory A with these verbs for [+animate] nominals, but it does not allow the A with [-animate] nominals.

Before presenting this mechanism, I will review some previous accounts of Spanish DOM.

## 2.2 Previous accounts

In this section, I will review two kinds of theories that have offered a comprehensive account for Differential Object Marking in Spanish from a syntactic perspective. They are Functional-OT and GB/Minimalism.

There is a significant amount of functional and typological literature dealing with Spanish DOM, which I will not review here (see Molho 1958, Niculescu 1959, Roegiest 1979, 1998, Kliffer 1982, Weissenrieder 1985, 1990, 1991, Lazard 1989, García Martín 1992, 1996, Herrera Caso 1997, Delbecque 1998, García Martín 1998, Clements and Yoon 2006). However, the gist of the functional and typological analyses, that is, the postulation of a set of hierarchies that correlate with the A-marking, has been incorporated in a formal fashion in Functional-OT.<sup>91</sup> These hierarchies are taken from the typological literature (Silverstein 1976, Croft 1988, Comrie 1989, Croft 1990, 2003).

There is also a prolific line of research stemming out from the notion of degree of transitivity (Hopper and Thompson 1980)—see Næss 2004b for a nice overview and a careful presentation of the main issues—which has made its way to Spanish (for instance, Weissenrieder 1991, Clements and Yoon 2006, among others). This literature has made an impact in formal frameworks like Optimality Theory, starting a productive venue to describe DOM languages. For these reasons, I will choose functional OT as the representative of this approach. The limitations we find here, discussed below, are also

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<sup>91</sup> It is worth noticing that this move is not always welcome in the typological literature—see Haspelmath 2004 for some criticism.

applicable to other models of this family.

### 2.2.1 The Functional-OT framework

Aissen 2003 presents an explanation for DOM that relies on a harmonic alignment of two hierarchies or scales involved in the distribution of DOM. Harmonic Alignment (see Prince and Smolensky [1993] 2004) is an operation of combining two scales in order to obtain a set of constraints. The operation connects the highest element on a binary scale with all the elements in other scale, from the highest to the lowest; in addition, it connects the lowest element on the binary scale from the lowest to the highest. The scales in question are given below (from Croft 1988):<sup>92</sup>

(78) RELATIONAL SCALE: Subject > Object

(79) a. ANIMACY SCALE: Human > Animate > Inanimate

b. DEFINITENESS SCALE: Pronoun > Name > Definite > Indefinite Specific > Non Specific

After harmonizing (78) and (79a) with (79b), we obtain these sets of Harmonic scales, respectively:

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<sup>92</sup> Notice that in the Animacy Scale, “Animate” actually means “Non Human Animate” (otherwise we would oppose “Animate” to “Human”). With respect to the Definiteness Scale, we have to assume that a phrase like *the cat* is “Definite” and also “Specific”, and a phrase like *a cat* is “Indefinite” but it could be “Specific” or “Non Specific”. As we saw in section 2.1.1, this by itself constitutes a problem since definite determiners can also be non-specific, which correlates with the A-marking. Aissen 2003 does not discuss any of these notions, merely assuming the hierarchies.

(80) HARMONIC ANIMACY SCALES

- a. Subject/Human > Subject/Animate > Subject/Inanimate
- b. Object/Inanimate > Object/Animate > Object/Human

(81) HARMONIC DEFINITENESS SCALES

- a. Subject/Pronoun > Subject/Name > Subject/Definite > Subject/Specific >  
Subject/Non Specific
- b. Object/Non Specific > Object/Specific > Object/Definite > Object/Name >  
Object/Pronoun

The Harmonic scales express the markedness reversal between subject and object: what is marked for objects is unmarked for subjects and vice versa. In other words, the scales show the likelihood for a member of the Relational Scale (78) to be placed high or low in the Animacy Scale (79a) or in the Definiteness Scale (79b). In that sense, the scales are harmonic (or markedness) hierarchies, which can be treated as Avoid constraints, if we reverse their rankings:

(82) ANIMACY CONSTRAINTS

- a. \*Subject/Inanimate >> \*Subject/Animate >> \*Subject/Human
- b. \*Object/Human >> \*Object/Animate >> \*Object/Inanimate

(83) DEFINITENESS CONSTRAINTS

- a. \*Subject/Non Specific >> \*Subject/Specific >> \*Subject/Definite >>  
\*Subject/Name >> \*Subject/Pronoun

- b. \*Object/Pronoun >> \*Object/Name >> \*Object/Definite >>  
       \*Object/Specific >> \*Object/Non Specific

These constraint hierarchies imply that a sentence will be penalized if its subject or its object does not comply with the markedness reversal. Notice that DOM objects are “marked” objects, that is, objects that do not comply with the markedness reversal. For Aissen, the gist of DOM is that “marked” objects are also morphologically marked.<sup>93</sup> To encode this correlation, Aissen (2003: 447) proposes this constraint:

(84) STAR ZERO

\*Ø<sub>C</sub> : Penalizes the absence of a value for the feature CASE.

\*Ø<sub>C</sub> is compatible with a situation where all objects have a morphological mark of Case. But we need to induce Case-marking just for the “marked” objects. It is necessary (i) to connect \*Ø<sub>C</sub> with the Animacy Constraints (82) and the Definiteness Constraints (83), and (ii) to find a way to neutralize \*Ø<sub>C</sub> in the relevant cases. In order to connect \*Ø<sub>C</sub> with (82) and (83), Aissen proposes to apply the operation of Local Constraint Conjunction (Smolensky 1995).<sup>94</sup> The conjunction between \*Ø<sub>C</sub> and the constraints (82) and (83) results in a set of subject and object-oriented constraints that include \*Ø<sub>C</sub> in each point of the scale. Here, I will represent only the object-oriented constraints, since they are the

<sup>93</sup> The reader should be aware that two senses for *marked* are being used here. In the sense of the markedness reversal, “marked object” means that the characteristics of the object are unexpected (for an object). In the morphological sense, it simply means that there is an overt marking accompanying it (preposition, case ending, etc).

<sup>94</sup> According to this operation, by conjoining two constraints C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub> in a domain D, we obtain the constraint C<sub>1</sub> & C<sub>2</sub>, which is violated if both C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub> are violated.

ones relevant for DOM.<sup>95</sup>

(85) a. LOCAL CONJUNCTION OF  $*\emptyset_C$  WITH THE ANIMACY CONSTRAINTS

$*\text{Object/Human} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C \gg \ *\text{Object/Animate} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C \gg \ *\text{Object/Inanimate} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C$

b. LOCAL CONJUNCTION OF  $*\emptyset_C$  WITH THE DEFINITENESS CONSTRAINTS

$*\text{Object/Pronoun} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C \gg \ *\text{Object/Name} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C \gg \ *\text{Object/Definite} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C$   
 $\gg \ *\text{Object/Specific} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C \gg \ *\text{Object/Non Specific} \ \& \ *\emptyset_C$

[Aissen 2003: 448]

Since this ranking enforces case marking for all objects, we need a way to neutralize  $*\emptyset_C$ .

To achieve this, Aissen posits an additional constraint:

(86)  $*\text{STRUC}_C$ : Penalizes a value for the morphological category CASE.

[Aissen 2003: 448]

$*\text{STRUC}_C$  can be inserted at any point in the ranking established by (85), obtaining the different cutting points that we see in various DOM languages. Obviously, this system is not yet ready for Spanish DOM, because it can only apply to languages where just one dimension (Animacy or Definiteness) is used for DOM. To make the system suitable for two dimensional languages, Aissen conjoins the Animacy Constraints (82) and the


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<sup>95</sup> Keep in mind, however, that there are languages that exhibit Differential Subject Marking (DSM), although they are far less common (Aissen 2003: 472-474). Of course, a question arises immediately regarding why DSM is so rare. Notice that nothing prevents a local conjunction with the subject-oriented constraints.



Definiteness Constraints (83). As in the one-dimensional cases, the resulting constraints need to be conjoined with  $*\emptyset_C$ , obtaining constraints of this form:

This yields a huge set of possibilities for a cutting point, that is, the point where \*STRUC<sub>C</sub> can be inserted. An additional complication arises: according to Aissen 2003, in some constructions DOM is optional, then, \*STRUC<sub>C</sub> can be reranked at will, at least in some portions of the ranking. This is then her proposed hierarchy for Spanish:



[Adapted from Aissen 2003: 472]

<sup>96</sup> In this figure, a constraint like:  
i. [\*Object/Human & Object/Pronoun] & \* $\emptyset_C$   
is abbreviated as follows:  
ii. \*Oj/Human-Pro & \* $\emptyset_C$

mandatory where the constraints always dominate \*STRUC<sub>C</sub>; in these cases, the object must be: Human Pronoun, Human Proper Noun, Animate Pronoun (non-human), Human Definite, Animate Proper Noun (non-human), or Human Specific (non-definite). Second, the marking is optional when \*STRUC<sub>C</sub> and the constraints can be reranked; in these cases, the object is Inanimate Pronoun, Animate Definite (non-human), Inanimate Proper Noun, or Animate Specific (non-human, non-definite). Finally, the marking is impossible if \*STRUC<sub>C</sub> always dominates the constraints; in these cases, the object should be: Human Non-Specific, Inanimate Definite, Animate Non-Specific, Inanimate Specific (non-definite), or Inanimate Non-Specific.

Given that definite determiners can also be non-specific, as discussed in section 2.1.1, the fact that the A-marker is optional in such cases is not covered by (88); the same happens with kind-denoting nominals (and these problems cannot be solved by adjusting the position of \*STRUC<sub>C</sub>: it is necessary to redefine the components of the Definiteness Scale). Additionally, animate non-specific nominals can receive A optionally, but A is predicted to be absent by (88) (although in this case it will be enough to adjust the position of \*STRUC<sub>C</sub>). Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.1.2, with some verbs, inanimate objects must receive the A-marker, but (88) predicts this situation to be impossible (and there is no way to encode this information in (88)).

Aissen acknowledges that (88) “oversimplifies [the data] in some respects” (2003: 471)—this situation is not limited to Spanish DOM: her proposal for Hindi has the same empirical limitations, as she acknowledges. Nevertheless, she thinks that the facts “are

consistent with the basic hypothesis: if overt marking is possible with direct objects with property  $\alpha$ , then it is possible with direct objects with property  $\beta$ , where  $\beta$  dominates  $\alpha$  [in (88)]” (2003: 468). However, as should be apparent, this cannot be true if some inanimate objects (which are in the low portion of (88)) receive a mandatory A, but some definite objects (located in the high part of (88)) receive an optional A.

In fact, the whole issue of markedness reversal can be called into question, as has already been noted, even in the OT framework (de Swart 2003), strictly on an empirical basis—see also Filimonova 2005 for other languages where the marking does not comply with the expectations of the hierarchies, which means that they will challenge (88) too.

Næss 2004a also points out that, if we follow the logic of markedness reversal, some very well established mechanisms, like incorporation of objects (Baker 1988 and many others), are unexpected, since this process usually involves “demotion” of “typical” objects. In other words, incorporation deprives prototypical objects of “objecthood”, contrary to what we would expect. In that sense, the notion of “more appropriate object” becomes meaningless. In fact, Næss also suggests that DOM is not a mechanism to mark that the object is more definite or more animate, but, rather simply the fact that it is affected. As it is well-known, affectedness is a property of the participants in an event, which correlates with animacy and definiteness; this means that DOM has to be understood from the point of view of the event structure too, a point very often disregarded in the literature—see however Torrego 1998, Ritter and Rosen 2001, 2005, Martín 2005, 2006.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> This is, of course, not true regarding the functional literature (see Næss 2004b for a careful review and some innovative proposals).

Regarding later OT models for DOM (like de Swart 2003 and Morimoto and de Swart 2006), they add to the picture the notion of distinguishability, and propose a constraint that interacts with Aissen's system, which we already discussed (see (63), repeated here as (89)):

(89) DISTINGUISHABILITY

Mark objects that are not outranked by the subject in prominence (animacy, specificity).

[Morimoto and de Swart 2006: 232]

As we discussed in section 2.1.2, (89) is also empirically wrong for Spanish. The reader is referred to Carnie and Jelinek 2003, Carnie 2004, 2005, Isaak 2000, Newmeyer 2002, Haspelmath 2004, among several others for discussion of the empirical limitations of the functional framework with respect to other DOM languages.

## **2.2.2 The GB/Minimalist framework**

Spanish DOM (and DOM in general) has attracted little attention in the GB/Minimalist framework. Although the issue is often addressed when dealing with related phenomena—in particular clitics (Strotzer 1976), clitic doubling (Suñer 1988, Franco 1993, Bleam 1999), ditransitives (Strotzer 1976, Demonte 1987, Cuervo 2003), information structure (López 2006), subjects (Fernández-Soriano 1989, Contreras 1996),

pronouns (García 1975) and reflexives (Schroten 1972)—and it is always noted in broad reviews of Spanish syntax from a generative perspective (see Demonte 1989 and Zagana 2002, to mention a couple that offer some fresh perspectives on the issue)—there are actually only three comprehensive studies of Spanish DOM from a formal-theoretical syntactic perspective: Isenberg 1968, Brugé and Brugger 1996, and Torrego 1998, and only the last two are from a GB/Minimalist perspective.<sup>98</sup> I have referred to them a number of times in this chapter, and I will discuss their key theoretical claims in the following sections. Before that, let me point out that there are actually many important descriptive and theoretical articles that deal with DOM from a generative point of view, which have been in fact mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, they do not attempt to encompass the whole phenomenon.


I should also add that, in recent years, there have been some attempts to address Spanish DOM from a purely formal semantic perspective, inside the generative tradition (see Agüero-Batista 2005, Blears 2005). This is certainly a welcome venue of research, and I do not aim to contribute anything new to it; however, it must be pointed that so far this tradition deals only with animate objects where A is mandatory, putting aside the cases where it is optional (recall from our discussion in the previous sections that A is optional with animate non-specific objects). The issue of inanimate objects with A is also not addressed in this line of research.

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<sup>98</sup> I will not discuss Isenberg 1968, since it is not based on GB (see Schroten 1972, Laca 1995, and Pensado 1995 for some criticism of this approach).

### 2.2.2.1 Brugé and Brugger 1996

Based on the Empty Category Principle (ECP) and on the notion of Partitive Case (Belletti 1988), Brugé and Brugger 1996 propose that the trigger for DOM is a [+animate] feature in nominals. They assume that the A-marker is hosted by a functional projection FP, which is part of the extended projection of the nominal. The A-marker is specified for [+accusative] and [+animate], which restricts its presence to animate objects. Non-animate objects cannot receive A in their system; in addition, specificity, according to them, plays no role in the distribution of Spanish DOM. The structure they propose for transitive sentences is the following:



In addition, Brugé and Brugger 1996 assume the following version of the ECP (from Cinque 1990: 49):

(91) Empty Category Principle

A non-pronominal empty category must be properly head-governed by a head nondistinct from [+V].

The A-marker does not count as a proper lexical governor, since it is distinct from [+V], but, if present, it does count as an intervener, preventing the verb from properly governing an empty  $D^0$ . This accounts for the absolute lack of A with bare nouns, which we already saw in section 2.1.1. Since they assume that A is mandatory if F is [+accusative] and [+animate], animate bare nouns must receive Partitive Case (in the sense of Belletti 1988). Given that, when modified by other phrases, determinerless nouns can have A, Brugé and Brugger 1996: 22 assume that the modification strips an empty  $D^0$  from its status of empty category, by supplying some abstract features (as suggested by Longobardi 1994), or by allowing N-to-D movement (as proposed by Delfitto and Schrotten 1991).

Given that theirs is not the most common view on the A-marker, Brugé and Brugger 1996 spend some time showing that A cannot be a marker of specificity, since it is compatible with [+specific] readings. I have discussed this issue at length in section 2.1.1, adding some new evidence to this effect. I am thus siding with these authors in this particular point, although I do not accept that specificity is not a factor in the distribution of Spanish DOM. As discussed in section 2.1.1, the A-marker can appear with non-specific objects, but it is optional in those cases, and only in those cases, a generalization for which Brugé and Brugger 1996 have no account. In addition, they distinguish kind-interpretation from object-interpretation, claiming that kind interpretation can freely be [ $\pm$  animate], which

accounts for the possibility of dropping A with kinds; as we discussed earlier, this idea is highly counterintuitive.


Although they account for a broad variety of cases, it is important to notice that Brugué and Brugger 1996 do not discuss cases where inanimate objects do receive A, which is a major empirical limitation of their study. I will, however, adopt the view that [+animate] is the initial trigger of Spanish DOM, and I will offer an account for the problematic cases below. In addition, we have to notice that, once the ECP is out of our theoretical array (see Chomsky and Lasnik 1993), we lose the main theoretical mechanism of their account.

#### *2.2.2.2 Torrego 1998*

The most comprehensive study of Spanish DOM is, without doubt, Torrego 1998. With the conception of the Syntax-Semantics interface based on Diesing 1992 and Hale and Keyser 1993, Torrego 1998 presents the idea, which I will also adopt here (although with very different motivation and technical details), that A-objects are higher than unmarked objects. For her, A-marked objects undergo overt raising to the specifier of  $\nu$ P, over base position of the subject:



(92)



According to Torrego, this configuration accounts for the properties she attributes to A-marked objects: they have to be specific and animate, and they delimit the event. For her, the secondary specifier of small *v* is a privileged position, in three different senses. First, it is the locus of specificity (as in Diesing 1992), that is, only specific objects can raise and any raised object must be specific. Second, extending an idea from Marantz 1984 regarding subjects, she assumes that in this position the object receives a secondary agentive role, which is compatible only with animates. Finally, adapting suggestions from Marantz 1990, Travis 1992 and Hale and Keyser 1993, she claims that A-objects have the ability to delimit the event (telicity), a point to which I will return.

Furthermore, she assumes that *v* has a D feature that attracts the marked DO, and that A also has a D feature to check against *v*. She also indicates, as an alternative, that there is a [person] feature involved in the checking; although she does not elaborate on the details of the latter checking, she suggests that the [person] feature may be the reason for the animacy restrictions.<sup>99</sup> Notice that for Torrego, the raising of the object happens for two

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<sup>99</sup> It is worth noticing that there exists a long standing trend in Spanish traditional grammar that associates some notion of Person to A-marked objects; in fact, the marker is often called “the personal A” in this

different reasons. On one hand, there is a particular position reserved for a subset of objects, namely, specific and animate objects, which means that the objects in question must raise there. On the other hand, A-objects have to check a D feature, which requires them to raise to [Spec, *v*P]. Both A-marked and unmarked objects check structural accusative case against small *v*, but only the former raise.

Additionally, Torrego distinguishes two kinds of A-markers. According to her, affected A-marked objects receive inherent case from their verbs, in addition to the structural case they check, that is, they are quirky objects (Torrego 1998: 23-25 and 43), whereas non-affected A-marked objects receive only structural case. Although this accounts for the mandatory presence of A with affecting verbs (irrespective of the specificity of the object), the possibility of inherent case for affected objects must be relativized to animate nominals, since non-animate objects do not receive A, even if affected, as discussed in section 2.1.3.

According to Torrego 1998, telicity also plays a role in Spanish DOM.<sup>100</sup> She bases her claim on contrasts like (93), where the sentence with the A-object (93a) is ambiguous between an accomplishment and an activity, but (93b), without A, can only be an activity:

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literature (see Bello 1847, Cuervo 1881, Fernández Ramírez 1986, Pensado 1995 and several others). It is necessary to point out that “Person” in this tradition means an individual, that is, a particular person or animate being (although the notion is not fully elaborated). I think Torrego is aiming to link herself with this line of thought, but she does not make this explicit. As should be evident from chapter 1, I claim that the feature [person] plays a crucial role in Spanish DOM, which is a way to incorporate this tradition into a formal framework.

<sup>100</sup> As discussed in section 2.1.3, the boundedness of the event (quantization) must not be confused with its delimitation (telicity).

(93) a. Laura escondió      a      un prisionero durante dos años.

Laura hid                      A      a prisoner during two years

Laura hid a prisoner during two years.

b. Laura escondió      un prisionero durante dos años.


Laura hid                      a prisoner during two years

Laura hid a prisoner during two years.

(93a) is ambiguous between a repetitive act of hiding (an activity) and a unique act of hiding (an accomplishment). (93b) has only the repetitive reading. I entirely agree with this judgment (as do other native speakers I have asked); however, I think that there is no need to invoke telicity to account for the presence of A in (93a). On the activity reading, the object is [+specific], whereas on the accomplishment reading the object is [-specific]. This is enough to obtain the difference. Note that, since the object in (93a) is ambiguous between specific and non-specific, this is additional evidence that A cannot be a marker of specificity, as already concluded in section 2.1.1. It is also worth noticing that Torrego has to appeal to an additional factor in this case, since for her all A-marked objects must be specific. Notice also that I do not mean to say that there is no a relation between the A-marker and a telic difference ((93) shows that), but that this relation is mediated by specificity. This is by no means a novel idea, since the relation between specificity and telicity has been recognized for a long time (at least since Verkuyl 1972).

Torrego also links the presence of A in DOM with the dative preposition that Indirect Objects receive (which is also A). According to her, what unifies the two is the

quirky/lexical/inherent nature of Dative case. Notice that she does not mean that DOM-objects are Dative, only that, like Dative objects, DOM-objects can receive inherent case (but they don't all have it). However, she does suggest a relation between the dative preposition P and small *v*, by proposing that small *v* selects an intermediate projection headed by a null Preposition P, which, in later work (Torrego 2002), she identifies with the dative preposition that incorporates into BE to create HAVE, discussed by Freeze 1992 and Kayne 1993:



Torrego uses this idea to explain a correlation that she establishes between clitic-doubling and the alleged behavior of causative constructions in some Spanish dialects. According to Torrego 1998, 2002, South Cone Spanish speakers do not accept both sentences in (95):

- (95) a. La            felicitamos            a    la pianista  
          CL-her    congratulate            A    the pianist  
          We congratulated the pianist.

- b. Ese guardia            hizo            al            chico    guardar            la botella.  
          That policeman            made            A+the kid            to put away    the bottle  
          That policeman made the kid to put away the bottle.

[Torrego 2002: 347-348]

The implication is the following: if a speaker can accept the clitic doubling in (95a), then he/she cannot accept the preverbal causee in (95b). According to Torrego, this difference is produced because in these dialects, the  $vP$  does not select the abstract preposition  $P$ , but a  $DP$  that can host the clitic (for this reason, there can be a clitic in these dialects):

(96) [ $_{vP}$  SUBJECT  $v$  [ $_{DP}$  D-clitic [ $_{vP}$  V A-OBJECT ] ] ]

However, although Limeño Spanish does not actually count as South Cone (a term used to refer to both Argentina and Chile), in this dialect sentences like (95a) are also accepted (as reported by Sánchez 2005: 14, Mayer 2006), but (95b) is equally acceptable. This means that the fact that some dialects (as Peninsular Spanish) cannot have (95a) must be explained by appealing to the specific properties of clitic doubling, independently of DOM. This reinforces my previous conclusion that clitic doubling and DOM are separate phenomena.

There are additional problems for Torrego's account. She assumes that all A-marked objects have to be [+specific], but, as discussed in section 2.1.1, this is not true. Notice that there is no obvious way in her system to accommodate the fact that A-marked objects can be non-specific, since she relates the presence of A to the idea that there is a dedicated position for specific objects.

Additionally, if the reason for the animacy restriction is that there is a secondary agentive

role in [Spec,  $\nu$ P], then it is predicted that all A-marked objects must be [+animate], which is contradicted by the facts (as shown in section 2.1.2), Torrego simply assumes a [+animate] feature in all marked objects, which means that [ $\pm$  animate] cannot be a semantic feature (Torrego 1998: 55). Putting aside its circularity, the proposal is not only counterintuitive, but it also undermines her system, since it breaks the semantic correlation between the secondary agentive role and the (now non-semantic) [+animate] feature.

Although I will not adopt Torrego's account of Spanish DOM, it is important to note that my approach is Torregian in its essence: DOM objects are also higher than unmarked objects in my analysis. I will also incorporate an important component of Brugé and Brugger 1996, namely the assumption that animacy is the initial trigger for DOM. To do that, I will use the idea developed in chapter 1 that small  $\nu$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete in all Spanish transitive sentences, and therefore that  $\phi$ -complete nominals cannot check case against it. I will assume that all animate nominals receive a [person] feature, but that this feature is deleted under certain conditions (depending on the D/\*D distinction discussed in section 2.1.1), which will allow me to accommodate the specificity facts discussed earlier in this chapter. The result of the system is that only  $\phi$ -complete objects can receive the A-marker.

## 2.3 Agree and DP structure

### 2.3.1 The main mechanism: raising by Agree

As outlined in chapter 1, I assume that the main mechanism for DOM is the operation Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005b, a, 2006, Bošković 2005, 2007b, a). Under Bošković 2007b, a version of the Agree system, where movement is driven by an uninterpretable feature (uK) in the goal G, there are two types of movements that are related to Agree. I will call these movements: Blind Movement and Checking Movement.

#### (97) Blind movement

If a uK of a phrase XP is not valued/checked in a given linearization domain (the complement of a phase PH), XP must move to the edge to avoid been frozen from further movements.

$$(98) \quad \begin{array}{c} [\text{PH} \quad \text{XP} \\ \text{uK} \end{array} \quad [\text{PH}' \quad \cancel{\text{XP}} ] ]$$

#### (99) Checking movement

If a Probe P matches the interpretable feature (iF) of a Goal G, G having a uK, G must move to the closest position c-commanding P to check/value its uK.

$$(100) \quad \begin{array}{c} [ \quad \text{G} \quad [ \quad \text{P} \quad [ \quad \text{G} \quad ] ] \\ \text{iF} \quad \cancel{\text{uF}} \\ \cancel{\text{uK}} \quad \text{K} \end{array}$$

Notice that Checking Movement implies that, in order to complete the operation Agree, G and P actually c-command each other (see Bošković 2005, 2007b, a).<sup>101</sup> At this point, it is not important if K in P is interpretable or not. Both alternatives are possible, as long as we assume that K in P is valued. If there is an iK, this is the standard assumption; but there is an alternative. Pesetsky and Torrego 2007 show that uninterpretable features can be valued too; that is, there is no biconditional relation between the interpretability of features and the valuation of the features; under this view, there can be four types of features:

- (101) a. [uF: ] : uninterpretable, unvalued  
       b. [uF:  $\alpha$  ] : uninterpretable, valued  
       c. [iF: ] : interpretable, unvalued  
       d. [iF:  $\alpha$  ] : uninterpretable, valued

Since this alternative exists—and it is perfectly compatible with the Agree system, as highlighted by Pesetsky and Torrego 2007 who offer a variety of phenomena that instantiate the possibilities in (101)—the only thing needed is that K in (100) is valued; it can be interpretable or uninterpretable.

At any rate, if K in P is valued, the checking/valuation of uK in G follows the same procedure as checking/valuation of uF in P, that is, Agree, which means that it should be subject to the same conditions, which, although not made entirely explicit in Bošković 2007b, a, can be naturally accommodated in his system.

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<sup>101</sup> Only if P has a uF; without it, this is not possible.



I further assume that, for Spanish, the initial trigger for DOM is the animacy of the object. Animacy, however, is a semantic property of nominals, and by itself does not play a role in the Case/Agreement system. However, as it has been soundly established in the literature, there is a correlation between animacy and Case/Agreement—the exact effects of animacy on the structure will be discussed in the next subsection. I propose to represent this correlation using the feature [person] for the reasons discussed in chapter 1—in sum, because the elements that uncontroversially hold this feature, namely personal pronouns, are always animate. In that sense, the proposal is similar to the one made by Kratzer 2006, since she assumes that phi-features do not actually carry an interpretative force, but they are in the DP to negotiate Case and Agreement. Since this does not imply that  $\phi$ -features cannot have a value, nothing changes if we assume that this [person] feature is uninterpretable, which would be in line with the system outlined by Pesetsky and Torrego 2007, who assumes that interpretation and valuation do not correlate with each other, as just seen in (101). However, I will continue using the traditional notation, mainly for expository reasons (for instance, a [*i*person:-1-2] in the nominal).

I further assume that Agree is governed by a principle that maximizes matching effects (for discussion of the various effects of this principle see McGinnis 1998, Chomsky 2001, Béjar 2003, Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006d, Bošković 2007b, a, among others):

(102) Maximize matching effects


[Chomsky 2001: 15]

It is important to stress that I do not interpret (102) as a preference principle, but as requiring simultaneous matching of all uninterpretable feature. In that sense, (102) could be restated in this way:

(103) Match only once.


If P does not match all the uninterpretable feature of G, G must wait to check its features until all the Ps that match G's uninterpretable features are inserted into the structure, and then match all of them at once by Checking Movement (that is, by probing its Ps; G would then probe all the Ps in (104) only after raising to its final landing site):

(104)




Notice also that, if there is a phase before all the relevant Ps enter the structure, G must move to the edge of the phase, although it would not check any of its uninterpretable features (Blind Movement). It would check all its features at once after the relevant Ps have been introduced (Checking Movement):

(105)



In addition, it is in principle possible that lower  $P_1$  (which is valued by  $G$ ) is not able to value a single feature of  $G$  (under certain conditions to be established). When that is the case,  $G$  must raise out of the phase complement looking for another probe  $P_2$  (notice that the features of  $P_1$  can be valued when  $P_1$  matched (and probed)  $G$ , before  $G$  undergoes movement:

(106)



We will see immediately that Differential Object Marking instantiates the possibility depicted in (106).

As explained in chapter 1, I assume that with all transitive verbs in Spanish, the small  $v$  has only [number] and no [person]:

(107)  $v$   
[number]

That means that in Spanish only nominals that are not specified for [person] will check

case against small  $\nu$ . If an internal nominal is specified for person, small  $\nu$  will be able to probe it and value its own [number] feature, but it will not be able to value the [case] feature of the object. This comes from (102), or more specifically, from the corollary of (102) that we discussed in chapter 1 (based on Béjar 2003):


(108) Condition on Case-Valuation

Only a probe P that matches all the relevant features of a goal G can value the [case] feature of G.

As a result, a [person] nominal cannot value its Case against small  $\nu$ . If a nominal cannot check its Case inside  $\nu$ P, it must move out to avoid being spelled-out with an unvalued feature, creating a new specifier of  $\nu$ P to escape (Bošković 2007b, a); here is a schematic picture of the process, as briefly discussed in chapter 1:<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> In (109), the discontinuous line indicates valuation under Agree, with the higher element functioning as the probe. Notice also that the nominal establishes an Agree relation with the Dat head, and moves to c-command it in order to check case.



This is what happens in Spanish: [person] nominals move via [Spec, vP] to an additional head, which gives them Dative Case, which I assume is manifested by the A-marker.<sup>103</sup> Recall for Bošković 2007b, a, there must be a c-command symmetry between probe and goal in the case under consideration here: the probe must c-command the goal for  $\phi$ -valuation, but the goal must c-command the probe for case-checking; more precisely, the elements in question probe each other (i.e. they are both probes and goals). This implies that the goal has to move to the specifier of its case-checker. A [person] object then has to c-command the DAT head. On the other hand,  $\phi$ -incomplete objects (i.e. the ones that are not specified with [person]) only need to c-command small *v*.

<sup>103</sup> For the complete details of this process, see the discussion of (126).

This analysis maintains a difference in height between the landing sites of the two types of objects, implementing it by placing [person] objects in the specifier of the DAT head, while non-person objects are located in [Spec,  $\nu$ P] (so, unlike non-person objects, [person] objects do not stop in [Spec,  $\nu$ P], but raise further). Notice that (109) instantiates (106), a situation that is produced by the Condition on Case-Valuation (108), under the assumption that small  $\nu$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete. That is, the lower probe must be ignored because it is not capable of checking the case-feature of the goal.

As mentioned, I interpret the maximization condition in (102) as requiring that Agree values features of G only when P fully matches the features of G (an interpretation that is also used in (108), for case-valuation); that is, G can get a value only when G is getting a value for all its features. Given this, the combination of Blind Movement (97), Checking Movement (99) and the maximization of matching effects (102) makes two interesting predictions. Bošković 2007a spells out the first one: if G has more than one unvalued feature, it must wait until all Ps that hold the relevant uninterpretable features have entered the structure before undergoing Checking Movement: G gets a value only at the point at which G probes its Ps, that is, when G undergoes Checking Movement. This is expressed in (104). As shown in (105), this situation does not affect Blind Movement: if a phase-level is reached before G can get a value for its features, G will undergo Blind Movement—this is, in fact, the way successive cyclic movement is implemented in the system (see Bošković 2007a).

Given that the  $uK$  of  $G$  is valued/checked under Agree, as previously assumed, then if  $G$  has several unvalued features, and, as explained above, moves to check the features, i.e. undergoes checking for all the features at the same point, a second prediction arises. It is possible that a higher  $P_2$  could have a  $K$  feature with a value that is different from the value of the  $K$  feature in a lower  $P_1$  (which was the first one that probed  $G$ ). If this happens, the prediction is that  $G$  will have a value that corresponds to the higher  $P_2$ , and not to the lower  $P_1$ . Let me illustrate this.

Assume the following:

- (110) i. one goal  $G$  with two unvalued features  $uK$  and  $uH$
- ii. two probes  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  with  $[K: \alpha]$  and  $[H: \beta]$  respectively
- iii.  $P_2$  has also a  $[H: \gamma]$

Filling the valued features gives us the following feature specification for  $G$  and  $P$ s:

- (111) a. 


$P_1$	$G$
$[uF: \quad ]$	$[iF: \delta]$
$[K: \alpha ]$	$[uK: \quad ]$
	$[uH: \quad ]$
- b. 

$P_2$	$P_1$	$G$
$[uF: \quad ]$	$[uF: \quad ]$	$[iF: \delta]$
$[K: \gamma ]$	$[K: \alpha ]$	$[uK: \quad ]$
$[H: \beta ]$		$[uH: \quad ]$

Suppose  $P_1$  enters the structure first. Then, under (102),  $G$  cannot move to probe  $P_1$  (at point (111a)), because  $P_1$  does not match all the features of  $G$ . Given this, either  $G$  stays in situ or  $G$  undergoes Blind Movement to the specifier of  $P_1$ , depending on whether or

not  $P_1$  heads a phase. Notice that  $P_1$  does get a value for its  $uF$  under Agree (by probing  $G$ ), because it does match the features of  $G$  maximally, since maximization is a one-way relation, as discussed in chapter 1:

(112)




Notice that, if  $G$  undergoes Blind Movement,  $G$  will c-command  $P_1$ , but it will not probe  $P_1$ , because of (102).

When  $P_2$  enters the structure,  $G$  moves to a position c-commanding  $P_2$ , as a result of which it also c-commands  $P_1$ . However, given that  $P_2$  also has a  $K$ , and  $K$  in  $P_2$  has a value ( $\gamma$ ) that is different from  $K$  in  $P_1$  ( $\alpha$ ), the  $uK$  in  $G$  will be  $\gamma$  and not  $\alpha$ , because  $P_2$  is closer than  $P_1$ . This is illustrated below:




(113)  $P_2$  enters the structure




As discussed above, if  $P_1$  heads a phase, then  $G$  will undergo Blind Movement to the specifier of  $P_1$ , and the condition on maximization will prevent any feature valuation at this point:

(114)




When  $P_2$  enters the structure, its  $uF$  gets valued by probing  $G$ :

(115)



After (115), G undergoes Checking Movement, and then its uninterpretable features will get valued by P<sub>2</sub> and (crucially) not by P<sub>1</sub>:

(116) G moves to c-command P<sub>2</sub> (Checking Movement)



The theoretical possibility described above has empirical support. I claim that this is precisely the case of non animate nominals receiving A, and causing the quantization of

the event. Recall from the discussion of (72)-(73) that there are some verbs whose object must quantize the event (one of the arguments concerned the fact that they are not compatible with adverbs expressing degree of participation). In such cases, regardless of any other factors, A is mandatory:

(117) a. Un adjetivo califica      (# un poquito)      \*(a) un sustantivo

An adjective qualifies      (# a bit)      A a noun

An adjective qualifies a noun (# a bit)

b. Los días siguen      (# considerablemente)      \*(a) las noches

The days follow      (# considerably)      A the nights

The day follow the nights (# considerably)

Adapting ideas from Ritter and Rosen 2001 and Martín 2005 (who in turn use ideas from Krifka 1989, 1992), I assume that when an event must be quantized, there is a projection XP whose head X has an interpretable [quantize] feature with a value ‘yes’: [*i*quant: YES]. I understand this to mean that a head with the feature [*i*quant: YES] has the ability to quantize the event using the nominal in its specifier. I further assume that X has a Dative feature: [case: DAT]. This implies that, with verbs like those in (117), where the event is always quantized, this XP must always be present. The object must raise to [Spec, XP] to obtain the quantization. To achieve the raising, I assume that the nominal also has a [quantize] feature, which is interpretable but unvalued: [*i*QUANT:    ], a possibility explored by Pesetsky and Torrego 2007 on independent grounds (as we already discussed

with respect to (101)).<sup>104</sup> Then, if we add the  $\phi$ -features, the X in XP has the following feature structure:

- (118)           X  
           [*u*person:   ]  
           [*u*number:   ]  
           [*i*quant: YES]  
           [case: DAT   ]

In turn, the relevant nominal has the following feature structure (if inanimate):

- (119)           DP  
           [*i*number:  $\alpha$  ]  
           [*i*quant:     ]  
           [*u*case:     ]

This gives us all the ingredients we need to derive sentences like (120), which exhibit the characteristics observed—see the discussion of (72)-(73):

- (120)   Los días siguen       a las noches  
           The days follow       A the nights  
           The day follow the nights

In (120), [*las noches*] is a DP that does not have a [person] feature since it is not animate.

Therefore, in principle, [*las noches*] should be able to check ACC case against small *v*.

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<sup>104</sup> Perhaps [quantize] does not need to be interpretable in the nominal (but it can be, since nominals can be quantized independently of the event, as argued by Krifka 1989, 1992, and many others); if it does not have to be interpretable, the nominal will have a more familiar [*u*quant:   ]. As mentioned above, for the system developed here, it is enough that the feature does not have a value.

We can also ask what [*i*quant: no] would mean; in particular if it is in any respect different from the plain lack of the feature. If it is not, then it can be dispensed with, and then [quantize] will be a feature with a unitary value (namely ‘yes’), a possibility that it is not at all strange in feature systems, and my analysis would remain unchanged.

However, given that it has to quantize the event, [*las noches*] must have a [*i*quant: ] feature. I contend (adapting an idea from Martín 2005) that verbs like the ones in (120) select a nominal with a [quantize] feature and, consequently, have to have a phrase in their extended projection (which is XP from above) to value this feature of their object. Notice that this feature is not freely assigned to nominals, that is, not all nominals have it, since we do not see its effects everywhere. I assume that this feature is hosted in the highest functional projection of the nominal. As I will show in section 2.3.2, this projection is KP. This means that K comes in two flavors: with the [quantize] feature and without it. When needed, K enters the numeration with a [quantize] feature.

In the framework I have developed so far, this means that [*las noches*] cannot check ACC case against small *v*, because small *v* cannot value nominal's [*i*quant: ] feature. Remember that we interpret the maximization condition in (102) as requiring that Agree can value features only when the probe fully matches the features of the goal (see also (64) in chapter 1). This requirement is not met here: being inanimate, the nominal does not have [person], but small *v* is still incomplete with respect to the object since small *v* does not carry a [quantize] feature. Since *v*P is a phase, [*las noches*] undergoes Blind Movement to [Spec, *v*P]. It will further raise to [Spec, XP], when X enters the structure. From that position, given that X is higher than *v*, the value that [*las noches*] will get for its case feature is DAT and not ACC, which explains the mandatory presence of the A-marker in (120). A remaining issue is how the [person] feature of X is valued. We have already encountered this situation in chapter 1.


Recall that we noted in chapter 1 that  $\phi$ -valuation is forced when the G receives a case value from its Probe. I expressed this with Condition (64) in chapter 1, which I repeat here:

- (121) If a Goal G receives a [case]-value from a Probe P, it must value all the uninterpretable  $\phi$ -features that the P is matching.

This allows the valuation of the [number] feature in X; however, it leaves the [person] feature unvalued. As discussed in chapter 1, a mechanism of default agreement has to be assumed to repair heads that have incomplete valuation. In other words, if one  $\phi$ -feature needs to be valued—in this case, the [number] feature, as required by (121)—the remaining unvalued  $\phi$ -features will receive default value. In the case under consideration, this means that the [person] feature in X will receive default [3p]. This is parallel to what happens with  $\phi$ -incomplete nominals when they check case against T, discussed in chapter 1, which does not cause any mismatch, since [1p] and [2p] nominals are always  $\phi$ -complete, so default agreement will not need to be invoked in those cases.

The derivation for (120), including default agreement for [person] in X, is expressed in the following partial structure:

(122)



It is important to stress that this is exactly the situation predicted by the Agree system, discussed above regarding (116). Given that the lower probe  $P_1$  (in this case  $v$ ) is incomplete with respect to the goal  $G$ , the valuation of  $G$ 's features must wait until  $P_2$  (in this case  $X$ ) enters the structure; at that point,  $G$  raises to the specifier of  $P_2$  ( $X$ ) and values its features against the higher probe  $P_2$ , not  $P_1$  (given that it is closer). For (120), this means that  $G$  (*las noches*) will get DAT and not ACC.

The system outlined so far allows us to make another prediction. As discussed above, the verbs like the ones in (72) or (120) must have an XP projection with a [quantize] feature

to account for the mandatory quantization of the event. This also accounts for the unexpected presence of A with non animate verbs. If there are also verbs that can have XP optionally, we predict that these verbs will require the quantization of the event if A is present. That is, the prediction will be the following: the verbs that have the possibility of having the aforementioned XP projection can have inanimate objects with the A-marker. Different from the verbs like those in (120), which are just a handful (see Torrego 1999: 1788), this other group of verbs have XP only optionally; this means that the presence of A will not be mandatory with these verbs. However, when these verbs do have XP (and consequently A with inanimate objects), the event must be quantized (in other words, the XP option will force both quantization of the event and A-marking of the object, regardless of (in)animacy). This prediction is borne out, as I will now demonstrate.

As discussed earlier, in some cases, A is possible with inanimate objects. This is actually one of the most troubling facts about Spanish DOM, which has led the researchers either to give up any generalization or relativize the notion of animacy, concluding that animacy, as Torrego puts it, “does not seem to be semantic in nature” (Torrego 1998: 55). This conclusion seems to imply that semantically inanimate objects with A are really animate in some other sense. It is hard to see what this sense could be.

Some researchers claim that, given this situation, it is impossible to study the phenomenon relying only on judgments from constructed examples (Laca 1995); that is, that we are in the unpleasant situation that we cannot trust native speakers intuitions, given the generalized impression that A is somehow connected to animate nouns (the



traditional grammarians even call it “the personal A”, by which they mean the A used for persons), and the fairly well spread presence of A with inanimate objects in real discourse (see Fernández Ramírez 1986 and Laca 1995 for some examples from written texts), which are actually not so hard to construct either (see Luján 1978).

Given this situation, and to be on the safe side, I will use examples taken from collected corpora, in particular, the Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual (CREA), an online database of oral and written texts taken from both Peninsular and Latin American Spanish, maintained by the Real Academia Española, which has more than 160 millions words.<sup>105</sup> It is beyond my goals at this point to conduct a full scale description of DOM in this corpus (a project that is something to keep in mind for the future). So I have chosen to search for two inanimate A-phrases: *a las paredes* (to the walls) and *a las columnas* (to the columns).<sup>106</sup>

The phrase *a las columnas* had 35 occurrences and only three of them were direct objects; *a las paredes* had 232 occurrences, and only seven of them were direct objects. This not surprising since “a” also has a directional meaning (like English “to”), which is quite common and is not relevant here. In addition, some verbs also require prepositional objects with “a”—such cases are different from the cases in (72) because their objects cannot be cliticized with an accusative clitic (for instance, *referirse a* (to refer to)).<sup>107</sup> As predicted, all the cases with inanimate direct objects preceded by A were cases with a

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<sup>105</sup> It can be consulted here: <http://corpus.rae.es/creanet.html>

<sup>106</sup> The plural forms have to be used to properly test for quantization.

<sup>107</sup> Through this dissertation, in the text and in the glosses, I have consistently used capital A to indicate the “a” that is used for DOM objects. When reference to other types of “a” is necessary, I indicate so by using “a” or “to”. The reader should keep this in mind.

quantized event. As illustration, let us consider two examples with the same verb:

- (123) a. la matriz [...]      que      rodea      a las paredes celulares vegetales  
the matrix      that      surrounds      A the walls cellular vegetable  
the matrix that surrounds the vegetable cellular walls
- b. los mesones que rodean      a las columnas  
the tables that surround      A the columns  
the tables that surround the columns

[from REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA: Banco de datos (CREA) [en línea].

Corpus de referencia del español actual. <<http://www.rae.es>> [April 27 2007]]

It is not possible to have a non-quantized interpretation in these sentences. In (123a) it must be the case that the matrix surrounds each of the cellular walls, and not the cellular walls as a whole. The same holds for (123b): the tables have to be around each column. So, in both cases there are multiple events of surrounding. What is crucial here is that, if we drop the A-marker, the quantization becomes optional:

- (124) a. la matriz [...]      que      rodea      las paredes celulares vegetales  
the matrix      that      surrounds      the walls cellular vegetable  
the matrix that surrounds the vegetable cellular walls
- b. los mesones que rodean      las columnas  
the tables that surround      the columns  
the tables that surround the columns

That is, it is possible to interpret a unique event of surrounding in both sentences in (124), even if that interpretation is highly unlikely in (124a). Under the system we have outlined here, this is predicted. The Spanish DOM system is not sensitive to quantization, that is, quantization can happen freely to A-marked and unmarked objects (see the discussion of (69)-(71)). In other words, the semantic property of quantization does not need to have a morpho-syntactic reflex.<sup>108</sup>

Under normal circumstances, A-marking is depending on animacy. As discussed above, some verbs (like those in (120)) have a mandatory XP projection that forces the quantization of the event and the raising of the object; given that XP has a DAT case, the objects in these cases must take a DAT value (i.e. A) for its case feature (X being closer to it after object raising). In addition, verbs like *rodear* in (123)-(124) can have an optional XP that, when chosen, triggers the same effect: mandatory quantization and A-marker. This means that *rodear* is a regular DOM-marking verb, which marks its object in a manner consistent with the animacy constraint, and is insensitive to quantization. However, it can optionally take a quantizing functional category, in which case it would mark its object with A irrespective of animacy.

We can actually construct minimal pairs that reflect this alternation between A-marking and quantization:

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<sup>108</sup> But in some languages (like Finnish), there is a systematic morpho-syntactic correlation with quantization. See Ritter and Rosen 2001 and the references therein. I suggest that Spanish DOM expresses the same thing with a subset of verbs.

- (125) a. El chico abrazó      a las columnas  
           The kid hugged      A the columns  
           The kid hugged the columns.
- b. El chico abrazó      las columnas  
           The kid hugged      the columns  
           The kid hugged the columns.

The only meaning that (125a) has is where the kid hugs the columns one by one. Only (125b) has the meaning where the kid hugs all the columns at once (but the reading where the kid hugs the columns one by one is available in (125b) too).

Given this, we can safely conclude that Spanish DOM is really sensitive to animacy, and the A that appears with inanimate nominals with some verbs is a result of independent factors, given the mechanism explained in (116).<sup>109</sup>

The remaining question is how specificity enters into the picture. To answer this question, I will need to address an issue that is often neglected with respect to DOM systems in general (but see Lidz 2006 for Kannada): how the structure of DP is related to case checking.

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<sup>109</sup> A question that remains open is what causes the verbs in question to behave like this (after all, not all verbs can license A with inanimate objects, as has been widely observed). I will not solve this question here, and I will merely assume that including an optional quantizing functional projection is a lexical property of a subset of verbs. Further research with corpora data could help discover a unifying property of these verbs.

### 2.3.2 Inside DP

To address this question, let me assume a structure for Spanish DP along the lines of Ticio 2003, with three domains, which I will represent by K, D and small *n*—simplifying Ticio 2003 just for expository reasons:<sup>110</sup>

$$(126) \quad [_{KP} \ K \ [_{DP} \ D \ [_{nP} \ n \ [ \ NP \ ] \ ] \ ] \ ]$$

K is the locus of the [case] feature (along the lines of Bittner and Hale 1996). That is, K has an unvalued case feature that needs to be checked under Agree. For direct objects, K can get two values (depending on the head that values the case), which in turn get different morphological exponents:

$$(127) \quad \begin{array}{lll} \text{a.} & K & \leftrightarrow \quad a \\ & [u\text{case: DAT}] & \\ \\ \text{b.} & K & \leftrightarrow \quad \emptyset \\ & [u\text{case: ACC}] & \end{array}$$

(127a) results from entering into a checking relation with the DAT head, and (127b) results from entering into a checking relation with the *v* head.

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<sup>110</sup> For Spanish DP, Ticio 2003, following Grohmann and Haegeman 2002, proposes that the DP is divided into three prolific domains (in the sense of Grohmann 2000): a thematic domain, an agreement domain and a discourse domain. The full display of functional categories is this:

$$(i) \quad [_{\text{TopP}} \ [_{DP} \ [_{AgrP} \ [_{nP} \ [NP \ ] \ ] \ ] \ ] \ ]$$

Notice that (126) differs from (i), but nothing significant should be attached to this difference. In fact, KP can be considered the equivalent of TopP, by assuming that TopP is the final host of case and  $\phi$ -features. Additionally, (126) conflates AgrP and *nP*, but nothing will change if we have an AgrP in addition to *nP*. The important thing is that, like Ticio's system, (126) also expresses the idea that there are three different domains inside DP and, as we will see, crossing from one to the other has some consequences.

This means that the A-marker for DOM is not actually a preposition, a fact that has been very well established in the literature (Schroten 1972, Strotzer 1976, Jaeggli 1982, 1986, Demonte 1987, Brugé and Brugger 1996, Torrego 1998, among several others).<sup>111</sup> This also means that the Dative case, at least for DOM objects, is structural and not inherent. Although this may be at odds with some traditional assumptions, according to which Dative is an inherent case, it has been proposed independently on empirical grounds that Dative can be structural (see Franks 1994, Bošković 2006b). In fact, there have been proposals that Dative can be structural even for Spanish argumental indirect objects (Masullo 1992, Torrego 1998). None of this, of course, rules out the possibility of inherent Dative for some instances of Dative (e.g. for some verbs in German or Icelandic).

Notice also that (127a) implies that the A-marker for DOM is the same as the regular Dative for indirect objects—I will discuss evidence for this in chapter 3. For Spanish DOM, this suggestion was first made in the generative framework by Schroten 1972: 49-76, who worked on the Case Theory outlined by Fillmore 1968, where this comes out naturally. However, the idea has also been proposed in different frameworks, and it also has some support from a historical perspective (see Pensado 1995 for an overview). The proposal to conflate the case of DOM-objects and Indirect Objects has been criticized on the grounds that, in Spanish, DOM objects can be passivized but regular IO Datives cannot. As it should be apparent, this is not a valid objection in a framework that assumes that grammatical functions are not primitives, nor do they depend on overt case

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<sup>111</sup> The claim is based on c-command relations inside ditransitive constructions, which have particular properties that I will address in chapter 3.

morphology.

Passives are derived by raising the object to subject position from its base-generated position, which is the standard assumption at least since Chomsky 1957. In the passive, there is no small *v* to assign accusative; instead, the internal nominal checks case against T, receiving nominative. The Dative projection, even if present, plays no role. Different from other languages, regular Indirect Objects in Spanish cannot get passivized because the structural conditions do not allow the relevant A-movement.<sup>112</sup> In addition, the idea that Spanish DOM objects have Dative case receives substantial support from the fact that, even when DOM languages do not correspond to a particular family or area, the most common marker for DOM objects is the Dative marker (Bossong 1985, 1991),<sup>113</sup> which can hardly be a coincidence.

As we have discussed in the previous section, DOM arises from the fact that small *v* is  $\phi$ -incomplete, hence, it cannot value the case feature of  $\phi$ -complete nominals. This means that I need to explain how a nominal ends up being  $\phi$ -complete or  $\phi$ -incomplete. By doing so, I aim to substantiate that idea that DOM is a byproduct of the relation between the structure of DP and the conditions on case-valuation imposed by the Agree system.

We have already discussed some aspects of this issue in chapter 1. Recall that we are

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<sup>112</sup> See McGinnis 1998, 2001 for the idea that the IO in certain languages (and constructions) cannot undergo A-movement (and, therefore, cannot get passivized) after the DO leapfrogs over it. If the IO is base-generated in a position higher than the DO, after leapfrogging, the DO will end up in a position closer to T, preventing the IO from undergoing A-movement to T. In languages that do passivize the IO, different structural conditions prevent the DO from leapfrogging over the IO, which is then closer to T.

<sup>113</sup> Among the few exceptions are Hebrew, Rumanian and Turkish.

assuming that animacy in the nominals is the trigger for DOM (through the [person] feature). In order to connect the  $\phi$ -feature [person] to animacy, I postulate the following condition with respect to the distribution of [person] in Spanish:<sup>114</sup>

(128) Spanish Distribution of [person]

If [+animate] in N, then [person] in small *n*.

Notice that (128) is not an arbitrary stipulation. As discussed in chapter 1, nominals that uncontroversially hold a [person] feature, that is, [1p] and [2p] pronouns, are always [+animate]. It is natural to assume that a language could link the possibility of having the [person] feature to one aspect of these pronouns, namely the fact that they are [+animate], and therefore this language will grant [person] to all [+animate] nominals.

The reason why the [person] feature should appear in *n*, and not in a higher head in the structure of DP (cf. (126)) can be reduced to locality: *n* is the head that immediately c-commands NP, thus, [+animate] is visible from there. Alternatively, it could be proposed that [person] actually starts in N, and then it raises—which would make this very similar to a proposal made by Lidz 2006 with respect to Kannada (another DOM language), and which is naturally compatible with the subsystem I will outline immediately. I leave open the choice between the two options noted above, but the reader should be aware that nothing hinges on it.

As discussed above, Agree is subject to a principle that maximizes matching effects (102).

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<sup>114</sup> So [animate] is not involved in feature checking; its “reflex”, [person], is.



Given this, it seems natural to assume that the relevant features cannot stay scattered across different heads inside the DP, that is, I assume that the whole DP counts as a single goal. I thus argue that all  $\phi$ -features must raise to K, where the [case] feature is located. This is not an arbitrary condition, but it is motivated by (102).<sup>115</sup>

The raising of the  $\phi$ -features can be achieved by using feature percolation, a mechanism that is familiar in the literature, for which, in what follows, I will offer an implementation. Under traditional assumptions, an  $X^0$  element (a head) is conceived of as a bundle of features:


- (129)      [ H ]  
               [person:  $\alpha$      ]  
               [number:  $\beta$      ]  
               [case:  $\gamma$        ]

Percolation makes possible the creation of associations between a feature F and a head H that does not originally host F in its lexical entry; that is, a feature F hosted by a head A becomes part of the feature bundle of another head H (in that sense, it is a sort of re-bundling):

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
<sup>115</sup> This makes the current system different from the already mentioned mechanism proposed by Lidz for Kannada, which also raises features across the nominal extended projection invoking “unusual” reasons (Lidz 2006: 29-30). I can in fact also use (102) to motivate Kannada facts, in accordance with the system outlined here, and still in Lidz’s line of reasoning. I will come back to this in chapter 4.

(130)



After percolation applies in (130), the resulting structure is:

(131)



It is reasonable to subject this operation to strict locality conditions. The strongest hypothesis is that we can only associate a feature to the next c-commanding head. This is expressed here:

(132) A  $\phi$ -feature F hosted by a head A can percolate to another head B iff:

- i. B c-commands A.
- ii. There is no head  $\Gamma$  such that  $\Gamma$  c-commands A, and B c-commands  $\Gamma$ .
- iii. B is compatible with F.

(132) forces percolation to be bottom-up, and provides a way to stop it based on lexically defined properties of the c-commanding head: if the next head is not compatible with a  $\phi$ -feature, the association cannot proceed.

This is all we need to derive the interactions between specificity and animacy that we find in Spanish DOM, as I will now demonstrate.

Recall from the discussion in section 2.1, that there are two types of D in Spanish: D and \*D:

(133)

D	[+specific] or [-specific]
*D	[-specific]

As discussed earlier, the distinction between D and \*D cuts across definite determiners, indefinite determiners, and kinds.

Let us consider first the case of definite DPs. As discussed in section 2.1.1, A-marking depends on the possibility of having a referential interpretation, which I understood as the possibility of having a global choice function (a function to pick up the salient individual in a given context, as defined by Heusinger 2002b). Only if the object has a referential interpretation, the presence of A is enforced (134); otherwise, it is optional (135):

(134) Juan está buscando al decano, es decir, a Smith  
 John is looking-for A+the dean, is to say, A Smith  
 John is looking for the dean, namely for Smith.

(135)a. Juan está buscando al/el decano, sea quien sea  
 John is looking-for A+the/the dean, be-SUBJ who be-SUBJ  
 John is looking for the dean, whoever it might be.

b. Está buscando al/el decano más alto  
 is looking-for A+the/the dean most tall  
 He is looking for the tallest dean.

I can assume that the object nominal in (134) has a D definite determiner, and that the object nominals in (135) can have D or \*D determiners. Given this, the only thing needed now to capture the presence/absence of A is to assume that only D is compatible with [person], that is, that only D can host [person]: \*D determiners are incompatible with [person], which means that \*D cannot host [person], that is, [person] cannot percolate to \*D.<sup>116</sup>


The above predicts that if a [+animate] nominal, that is a nominal that receives a [person] feature in its small *n*, has \*D as the head of its DP, the [person] feature will get stranded

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
<sup>116</sup> It is possible to stipulate that this is a purely lexical restriction on \*D. Another possibility is to suggest that this restriction is derived from the fact that some uncontroversially [person] nominals, like [1p] and [2p] pronouns, are prototypically referential. Given that \*D cannot be referential, this would account for its inability to host [person].

in small  $n$ , which means that it cannot raise to K. I then assume that a stranded feature must be deleted or the DP could not count as a single goal (which means that it could not count as a goal at all).


Under the system outlined earlier, a nominal gets A only if it has a [person] feature, since it then must raise to the Dative phrase, getting a DAT value for its case feature (the A-marker). This means that \*D nominals cannot get A, since they cannot have a [person] feature in K. Let me illustrate this. The nominal *decano* (dean) in all the cases in (134)-(135) starts as an NP with an animate feature [ANI] (only the relevant information is represented):



After small  $n$  enters the structure, the condition on the distribution of [person] (128) applies, and  $n$  ends up hosting a [person] feature:



Now, there is an option between D and \*D. If \*D is chosen, one consequence will be that the whole definite DP will be non referential, that is, it will not be able to receive a global choice function. The other consequence is that \*D will not be able to host the [person] feature, and therefore the [person] feature will get stranded, unable to reach K. To allow for the nominal to count as a single goal, this stranded feature must be deleted:<sup>117</sup>




This means that K will end up without a [person] feature. Under the current system, this means that the nominal will be able to check case against small  $v$ , as a result of which it receives ACC, that is, the nominal will not have an A-marker. This is what happens in the A-less options of (135).

On the other hand, if we choose D, then it becomes possible to assign a global choice function, that is, the nominal has the possibility to be referential. But D also has the ability to host a [person] feature. Therefore, the [person] feature will end up in K, after

<sup>117</sup> Notice that the original position of the [number] feature is orthogonal to the current system. For the sake of parallelism, let me assume that [number] starts on  $n$  and raises to K under the same procedure discussed above (since all the heads in its path are presumed to be compatible with this feature).

successive percolations (to D and K):



In (139), the nominal has a complete set of  $\phi$ -features, which means that it will not be able to check case against small  $v$ , which is  $\phi$ -incomplete (specified only with [number]). Therefore, under the system described in the previous section, the nominal must raise to the Dative phrase to check DAT, as a result of which it gets the A-marker. This is what happens in (134) and the A options of (135). Remember too that D does not need to take a global choice function, that is, it does not need to be referential. This predicts that nominals can get A without being referential, as in the corresponding versions in (135).

It is important to stress that the system discussed above predicts optionality for the A marker with non-referential animate nominals, a fact that has been extremely difficult to capture in other theories (including OT, at least for definite nominals), which routinely appeal to an idealization of the data, retreating to the partial generalization described in the beginning of the chapter in (1)-(5).

The same system can be straightforwardly applied to indefinites, where the same predictions arise. Indefinites can also be D or \*D. If D is chosen, the [person] feature will be able to raise to K, which will end up being  $\phi$ -complete, and the nominal will not be able to check case against small  $v$ . Therefore, after checking their feature against the Dative phrase, D indefinites will end up being A-marked. \*D indefinites, on the other hand, cannot host a [person] feature; if the nominal has a \*D indefinite, the [person] feature will get stranded (and deleted), resulting in the  $\phi$ -incompleteness of K, and the subsequent lack of A-marker (because  $\phi$ -incomplete nominals can check case against small  $v$ ). In other words, D indefinites must be A-marked, and \*D indefinites cannot be A-marked. Since D indefinites can have a local choice function (that is, D indefinites can be specific), but they do not need to, the system also predicts an optionality of the A-marker for non-specific indefinites. This is exactly what we have:

- (140) Toda cadena que contrata      (a)      un actor famoso gana dinero con él.  
       Every network that hires      A      an actor famous, wins money with him  
       Every network that hires a famous actor, wins money after him.

As discussed in section 2.1.1, donkey sentences (like (140)) are a test for non specificity and they are possible with the A marker. The same holds for cleft conditionals:

- (141) Si Juan ha conocido      (a)      una persona interesante      en su vida,      ha sido María  
       If John has met      A      a person interesting      in his life,      has been Mary  
       If John has ever met anyone interesting in his life, it is Mary



The presence or absence of A in (140)-(141) depends on the choice of D or \*D. Notice that, when D is selected, the lack of a specific reading is forced not by D (which has the potential to be referential), but by the particular environment in which the object is placed (donkey sentences, cleft conditionals). On the other hand, if the environment forces specificity, \*D cannot be selected, and the only possibility is D. Under the current system, the prediction is that objects placed in environments that force specificity must be A-marked. As discussed in section 2.1.1, the prediction is borne out. A prenominal adjective forces the specificity of the nominal, and in this case, the nominal must have the A-marker:

- (142) Busco        \*(a) un famoso actor  
          look-for A a famous actor  
          I am looking for a famous actor.

As we also discussed in section 2.1.1, strong quantifiers must have A:

- (143) a. Había besado        \*(a)        varias de sus amigas.  
          Had kissed        A        several of his girlfriends  
          He kissed several of his girlfriends.
- b. Besó \*(a) toda chica con sombrero.  
          kissed A every girl with hat  
          He kissed every girl with hat.

This means that strong quantifiers are D elements, and therefore they trigger the procedures described above for D elements (that is, they always end up marked with A). Weak quantifiers, on the other hand, can be freely D or \*D, and the A-marker in these cases is optional:

- (144) Besó (a) algunas chicas  
 kissed A some girls  
 He kissed every girl with hat.

Remember also from the discussion in section 2.2.1 that kind-denoting nominals can optionally have A:

- (145) Antoñito buscaba (a) la mujer rica.  
 Antoñito looked-for A the rich women  
 Antoñito looked-for the rich women

As mentioned earlier, when confronted with similar sentences, some researchers (for instance, Brugé and Brugger 1996) even claim that kind-denoting elements can freely be [ $\pm$ animate], a position that I find counter-intuitive. Under the current system we can account for the optionality of A with kinds straightforwardly: kind-denoting nominals (like the one in (145)) are always animate, but they can freely be D or \*D. Notice that this implies that kind-denoting nominals instantiate a reading that is different from merely

definite or indefinite DPs (in the spirit of Carlson 1977a). A possible question to ask here is what difference could it make for a kind-denoting nominal to be D or \*D. I contend that it makes no interpretative difference, and that this is a reflex of the fact that all other Spanish determiners are D or \*D. However, this difference is not totally innocent, as we will see immediately.

It is worth noticing that, with both definites and indefinites, the \*D determiner is the “marked” form with respect to D. By this I do not mean a morphologically marked form (D and \*D are homophonous), but that the \*D form is more specified than D, that is, it marks the lack of referential reading—whereas, D is, sort of speaking, “unspecified” with respect to the possibility of referential reading (that is, it can have referential reading or not).<sup>118</sup> Assuming that “unmarked” forms are preferred, we may be able to explain the well-known preference for A with animate objects.<sup>119</sup>

In fact, for kind-denoting nominals, the use of A is also preferable. With some verbs, this preference is even stronger. Brugé and Brugger 1996 notice the following contrast, which they attribute to the fact that a verb like *exterminate* can have only objects that denote kinds:

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<sup>118</sup> The reader should keep in mind that there is a shift in the use of “marked” here. Crucially, I do not mean here that “marked” stands for “with the A-marker”. Ironically, the “unmarked” D actually ends up morphologically marked with A.

<sup>119</sup> Notice that this is not an application of the Elsewhere Condition. If this condition were to be invoked here, D would never surface, leaving these nominals always without A, contrary to the facts. Furthermore, D and \*D are options for the numeration (they are both in the lexicon), not the result of competition between rules. This means that the Elsewhere Condition does not apply here. The only thing that I want to state here is a general preference for the “unmarked” forms, provided that they are not in competition.

- (146) a. ? Las enfermedades y la guerra han exterminado el hombre  
           the illnesses and the war have exterminated the man  
           the illnesses and the war have exterminated the man
- b. Las enfermedades y la guerra han exterminado al hombre  
           the illnesses and the war have exterminated A+the the man  
           the illnesses and the war have exterminated the man

[Brugé and Brugger 1996: 6]

This confirms that D is the preferred option with kind-denoting nominals.<sup>120</sup>

So far, I have accounted for the fact that animate definite nominals that do not receive A cannot be referential. On the other hand, D nominals (which get [person] in K) can have a choice function but they do not need to; this accounts for the fact that A-objects can but do not need to be specific, as discussed in the text. In other words, the system straightforwardly accounts for the core data of Spanish DOM.<sup>121</sup>

We can also use the above system to account for a particularly recalcitrant set of data, for which no theory I know of offers any solution. Consider again the data in (50), repeated here:

<sup>120</sup> It is still unclear why this contrast is not reproduced in other contexts. I have no final account for this.

<sup>121</sup> As a matter of fact, I am extending the traditional core data of Spanish DOM by including the optional cases of A, which are not encompassed by the standard generalization (presented in (5)).

(147) a. Vi \*(a) alguien en el parque

saw A somebody in the park

I saw somebody in the park

b. No vi \*(a) nadie en el parque

No saw A nobody in the park

I saw nobody in the park

c. \*(A) quién vi en el parque?

A who saw in the park

Whom did I see in the park?

The problem here is that the above objects, although animate, cannot be specific, which in our system means they must be \*D. This should predict that they cannot get A, but in fact A is mandatory here.


It must be observed that there is something peculiar about these items: *nadie*, *alguien* and *quien* (besides their mandatory A). They are amenable to a clear morphological analysis, on the grounds that they all have a similar ending and a similar interpretation (animate non-specific).

(148) a. nad-ie


b. algu-ien

c. qu-ien

I propose that *ie/ien* is the spell out of the [animate] feature. I also contend that the items in question are complex lexical items, by which I mean that they are formed in the lexicon (in the spirit of Hale and Keyser 1993). We have been assuming that the basic components of any nominal are K, D, *n* and N ((126), based on Ticio 2003). I will assume the same here. Given that the elements in question are always non-specific, it is reasonable to assume that the D-component must be \*D. The structure of these items before merging with K should then be the following:




In accordance with (128), a [person] feature will be present in *n* (I will abstract away from other  $\phi$ -features):



At this point, by hypothesis, \*D cannot get associated with [person]. This is so far the

situation we find with any \*D. Notice, however, that, different from the other \*Ds discussed previously, the structure in (150) is a single complex lexical item, and that the next item to merge is K, a different lexical item. Being a lexical item entails the atomicity of the elements in questions. According to DiSciullo and Williams 1987:49, who implement a version of the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis (Lapointe 1980), a lexical item is atomic, that is, the hierarchical structure of the features inside of it is not visible from the outside (but, of course, the features themselves are). In other words, only features that have percolated to the head of the word are visible from the outside.

In that sense, what we want is that, when K is merged with (150), K could see \*D's features as a whole, that is, as being part of a single unit, as an atomic element. This will allow association of [person] to K, skipping the effects of the incompatibility of \*D to host [person], since it means that \*D would be flattened, that is, [person] would already be in the head of the word. This possibility is illustrated here:



K would then get [person], and these nominals will end up with the A-marker, following the mechanisms discussed above.

For (151) to be possible, it is crucial that the [person] feature is still there at the point at which K enters the structure. Indeed, there is no need to delete the feature at this point. As discussed above, stranded features must be deleted to ensure that the whole DP acts like a single goal. But \*D cannot be a goal for Agree relations before K enters the structure, so [person] is not deleted yet. Given that \*D is atomic, when K is merged, the [person] feature can freely percolate to K.

An interesting confirmation of this mechanism comes from an additional twist in the behavior of *nadie* and *alguien* (reported by Suñer 1988 and López 2006: 149 fn. 155). These elements have a mandatory A in sentences like (147), that is, when they are bare (without modifiers), but when they take adjuncts—which I assume are base-generated as right specifiers (see Ticio 2003 for discussion)—the A becomes optional:


(152) a No encontré      (a) nadie      que pudiera encargarse  
           No found          (A) nobody    that could charge-self  
           I didn't find anyone that could take charge.

b. Busco            (a) alguien      que sepa tres idiomas.  
           Look-for    (A) somebody    that knows three languages  
           I am looking for someone that speaks three languages.

The merge of the relative clause, a phrasal constituent should happen before the merging of K. Obviously, the resultant node (\*DP) cannot be atomic:



(153)



If the head of \*DP were still be atomic (as in (151)), nothing would change here: K would still be able to see the [person] feature, which means that the nominal would have to get A. Notice, however, that the A-marker is optional in cases like (152); therefore, we have to provide a way to allow K to count the internal structure of \*D; since [person] feature percolation to K would then be blocked, this would yield the option without A.

A question arises regarding how to achieve the flattening of the structure of features. For the features relevant for this discussion (the  $\phi$ -features), in the vast majority of cases, this is vacuous: simple lexical items do not have their  $\phi$ -features organized in a hierarchical structure, so they are inherently atomic. But the issue is relevant for complex lexical items. I assume that complex lexical items enter the numeration with their internal structure intact, and that this structure must be flattened.<sup>122</sup> For Chomsky 1995: 249, given bare phrase structure, lexical items are ambiguous between minimal and maximal

<sup>122</sup> There is no need to postulate an independent mechanism of flattening (restructuring of the features, for instance): it could be enough to assume that the internal structure of complex lexical items becomes inaccessible. I will not discuss the issue further in this dissertation, but it seems apparent that a more detailed discussion of the morphology-syntax interface (in particular, in relation with atomicity) can provide a more principled account.

projections (see also Bošković 2002b). If a complex lexical item counts as a minimal projection, it must be atomic, therefore, its internal structure is inaccessible. But if it counts as a maximal projection, it is accessible.

It is usually assumed that adjuncts can be inserted either cyclically or acyclically. It seems safe to assume that when \*D merges with the clearly phrasal adjunct, \*D should be considered as having inherent structure (which means \*DP would be a maximal projection). In this case, [person] would not be able to percolate to K. However, the adjunct can also be inserted acyclically, *after* K merges with \*D. In this respect, since it is not present in the structure when K and \*D merged, it does not interfere with K-\*D relations, and K can receive [person] in the manner discussed above. We then obtain the desired result.<sup>123</sup>

There is a final set of data that requires explanation. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, bare nouns without modifiers cannot receive A, but A is optional if the bare noun receives a modifier:

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<sup>123</sup> Another possibility is to assume that when a complex lexical item merges with another head, it must count as a minimal projection (that is, as a head), but when it merges with a maximal projection, it remains ambiguous between a maximal and a minimal projection. In that sense, in (151), \*D merges with K, another head; therefore, it counts as a minimal projection, and its internal structure must be flattened (i.e. it becomes inaccessible). As a result, the [person] feature will percolate to K, which in turn will be  $\phi$ -complete, and consequently will have to get the A-marker. On the other hand, in (153), \*D merges with a maximal projection, hence it remains ambiguous between a minimal and a maximal projection. If the former, its internal structure is inaccessible (so it will end up with A); if the latter, it is still accessible, so \*D will count as an intervener between the [person] feature in small *n* and K, impeding the percolation (as a result, the nominal will not get A). If this is correct, this recalcitrant piece of data is not only accounted for, but becomes evidence in favor of the bare phrase structure system.

- (154) a. El comité busca (\*a) estudiantes  
 The committee looks-for A students  
 The committee looks for students.
- b. El comité busca (a) estudiantes con buenas calificaciones  
 The committee looks-for A students with good grades  
 The committee looks for students with good grades.

The optionality of A in (154b) suggests the familiar D/\*D distinction. To explain the lack of A in (154a) I will assume that there is no KP-DP layers in bare nouns without modifiers; that is, they are small *ns*. The consequence will be that they do not have a case feature to value (and therefore they stay in situ).<sup>124</sup> But the KP-DP layers must be present if a bare noun has a modifier, assuming that the modifier is introduced within those layers. We thus account for these data without appealing to the ECP (contra Brugé and Brugger 1996), which is a welcome result, because the ECP cannot be naturally accommodated in the theoretical toolkit of the Minimalist Program, since the ECP is based on the notion of government, which has been abandoned—for good reasons (see Bošković 1994 for discussion on this issue).

Further evidence in favor of the above suggestion may come from the fact that we find a similar contrast with bare nouns in other positions, like Subjects and Indirect Objects (which are not subject to DOM constraints, so this lack of KP-DP layer is an independent

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<sup>124</sup> This may be a way to implement processes like semantic incorporation (Van Geenhoven 1998) or pseudo-incorporation (Massam 2001). I leave this issue open.

fact). Bare nouns are not possible without modifiers in those positions—as discussed early by Suñer 1982a, who coined the term “Naked Noun Constraint” to describe this situation (see also Pérez Silva 1990 and Martín 1999: 473-478):

(155) a. \* Ingenieros construyeron el edificio  
 Engineers built the building

b. Ingenieros sin preparación construyeron el edificio  
 Engineers without preparation built the building  
 Engineers without skills built the building.

(156) a. \* Le dieron el proyecto a ingenieros  
 CL-DAT gave the project to engineers

b. Le dieron el proyecto a ingenieros sin preparación  
 CL-DAT gave the project to engineers without preparation  
 They gave the project to engineers without skills.

The reason is for this constraint is that the naked nominal cannot be in a case-checking position, since, lacking KP, a naked nominal cannot participate in Agree relations.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Interestingly, with post-verbal subjects, a naked noun is possible:

(i) Llegaron ingenieros.  
 Arrived engineers  
 There arrived engineers.

## 2.4 Summary and conclusions

We have reviewed the core set of data relevant to Spanish DOM as well as the problematic data, such as the optionality of A with non-specific objects, the presence of A with inanimate objects, and the mandatory A with some non-specific quantifiers (like *nadie* and *alguien*). We have seen that the mechanism of Agree (which we have used in chapter 1 to account for Spanish existential constructions) is able to account for all of them, as long as we take into consideration some key aspects of the structure of Spanish DP. My main conclusion is that the initial trigger for DOM is the animacy of the object, which requires a [person] feature in small *n*, a low functional head in the DP. This feature has to raise to a higher head, subject to conditions imposed on the operation that raise it, which reflect the peculiarities reported in the phenomenon. In particular, if the [person] feature cannot be hosted by one of the intermediate heads, we get a  $\phi$ -incomplete nominal, which will end up without A.

A novel prediction was tested with respect to the relation between quantization and the presence of A, which confirms the mechanism of Agree assumed here. I provided an account for the presence of A with non-animate nominals, without the counterintuitive stipulations that other GB/Minimalist solutions were forced to make. This result of the system represents a major advantage over the Functional-OT system of Aissen 2003, since there is no way to accommodate this property in her system.

Additionally, we have been able to accomodate the cases of optional A with non-specific

nominals, which represents a major advantage over Torrego's 1998 system. My analysis, however, preserves the fundamental part of her insight, namely, that A-marked objects are in a higher position than A-stripped objects.

The Spanish DOM phenomena discussed so far have been limited to monoclausal transitive sentences. In the next chapter I will examine DOM in non monoclausal sentences and ditransitive constructions, which, I believe, provide further support for some key aspects of the system presented here.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Beyond the simple transitive clause**

#### **3.1 DOM in ditransitives**

One interesting set of properties of Spanish Differential Object Marking concerns its interaction with the Dative Indirect Object in ditransitive constructions. I will discuss two aspects of the interaction here. The first one, perhaps one of the most elusive and controversial aspects of the phenomenon, concerns the deletion of A-marking on the Direct Object in the presence of an Indirect Object. The second one, where the issues are better understood, concerns the question of the height of the objects, i.e. their c-command relations (with the corresponding effects in scope). Both issues have a potential impact in the system I have developed in the previous chapters. I will dedicate this chapter to them.

##### **3.1.1 Double A**

In chapter 2 I proposed that the Spanish DP is a projection headed by K, which hosts the case feature (following Bittner and Hale 1996, and others, in a way that is compatible with the structure of DP argued for in Ticio 2003). In addition, in chapter 1, I argued that, given that Spanish small *v* is  $\phi$ -incomplete (it does not have a [person] feature), nominals with a [person] feature cannot check their case against small *v*.  $\phi$ -complete nominals then must check their case against a Dative head, and consequently, they get Dative, which accounts for the A-marker with such nominals:

- (1)            K                            ↔            a  
                  [ucase: DAT]

The DP in question then ends up with the same structural case as the Indirect Object (see Franks 1994, Bošković 2006b for the idea that Dative can be structural, a possibility that has also been pursued for Spanish argumental IO (Masullo 1992, Torrego 1998)). Given this, a question arises regarding what happens in ditransitive constructions. Under the system I am developing here, we would expect to have two objects marked with Dative (i.e. A) if the DO is  $\phi$ -complete. There is evidence that this is the right conclusion.

With respect to the Dative marker (that is, A), there is a long standing trail of observations that strongly suggests that there is some competition for the A-marker: one A can be dropped in a ditransitive sentence when both objects are full DPs (2a), which is not possible if the Indirect Object is not a full DP (e.g. when it is just a clitic, as in (2b)):

- (2)    a.   Juan    le                    presentó        María    a        Pedro  
                  John    DAT-CL    introduced        Mary    to        Peter  
                  John introduced Mary to Peter
- b.   Juan    le                    presentó        \*(a)        María  
                  John    CL-DAT    introduced        A        Mary  
                  John introduced Mary (to him/her)

In fact, the presence of an additional A decreases the grammaticality of the ditransitive



sentence in (2b):

- (3) ?? Juan le presentó a María a Pedro  
John CL-DAT introduced A Mary to Peter  
John introduced Mary to Peter

On the surface, the contrast between (2a) and (3) represents a problem for the system developed here, since it seems that the object in (2a) is getting accusative, that is, it is getting a case value from small *v*, which I argued is not possible, as discussed in the previous chapters. However, I will show that this state of affairs actually constitutes evidence in favor of my analysis.

The observation that the A-marker can be dropped in some cases is very old in the traditional grammar of Spanish, although it has never been expressed in the way I will present it. The nineteenth century grammarian Andrés Bello, perhaps the most reputed traditional grammarian ever, noticed the possibility of dropping the A in ditransitives, and he offered this sentence:

- (4) Presentaron la cautiva Zenobia al vencedor  
Introduced the prisoner Zenobia to+the victor  
They introduced the prisoner Zenobia to the victor  
[Bello 1847: §900]

The way this issue has been addressed in the descriptive literature, however, is not consistent. The possibility of dropping A has been occasionally denied by using examples that do not allow the dropping (without explaining what happens in other cases). Several researchers report the dropping with skepticism, but still, it is mentioned quite often—as Torrego graciously puts it: “the linguistic literature on Spanish is replete with examples of objects preceded by the dative preposition that mysteriously go awry in ditransitives” (Torrego 1998: 131).<sup>126</sup>

The reports about this issue can be divided in different kinds—a split that, as we will see immediately, can be found even inside the same paper, which enhances the “mysterious” character of the phenomenon. For some, the preposition just does not drop at all (Pensado 1995: 25, Brugé and Brugger 1996: 11 fn. 14), or they suggest a dialectal split (Brugé and Brugger 1996: 29 fn. 34); others believe that A drops in all relevant cases (Schroten 1972: 59, Laughren and Eisenclas 2006); most researchers suspect that A drops only in some occasions (Demonte 1994: 460-461, Torrego 1998: 131-147, Campos 1999: fn. 77); many use examples with A-dropping while discussing related issues without mentioning the lack of A (famously, Strotzer 1976: 206 et seq.); some suggests that the dropping of A is optional with ditransitives (Suñer 1988: 401). The issue has even made its way to the prescriptive grammar, where it is recommended to drop the A to avoid a potential ambiguity with the Indirect Object (Real Academia Española 1931: 191), a reason that was also invoked by Bello 1847: §900 (and others after him).

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<sup>126</sup> Despite her observation, which is correct, she does not cite any references, merely stating that her data come from Strotzer 1976, who does not actually make this claim explicitly (but does provide examples of this sort in her monumental dissertation about Spanish clitics).

I will take the side of the majority in this case, that is, I will suggest that dropping A is not possible in all occasions, but I will provide motivation that is very different from the reasons invoked in other literature to explain this dropping. Additionally, I believe that my analysis can help us explain why there is so much controversy around this particular issue in the literature.

It is clear that the dative markers cannot drop freely. Only the A-marker that corresponds to the DO can drop; the A for the IO cannot be deleted:

(5) a. El jefe le presentó [DO el empleado] [IO a Pedro]

The boss CL-DAT introduced the employee to Peter

The boss introduced the employee to Peter

b. \* El jefe le presentó [DO al empleado] [IO Pedro]

The boss CL-DAT introduced A+the employee Peter

The boss introduced the employee to Peter.

Secondly, if the A-marker drops, the A-stripped object (the DO) must precede the IO (cf. (5a)):

(6) \* El jefe le presentó [IO a Pedro] [DO el empleado]

The boss CL-DAT introduced A Peter the employee

The boss introduced the Peter to the employee.

This is relevant because, normally, there is a degree of freedom with respect to the word order between DO and IO:<sup>127</sup>

(7) a. Juan le dio un libro a María  
 John CL-DAT gave a book to Mary

John gave a book to Mary

b. Juan le dio a María un libro  
 John CL-DAT gave to Mary a book

John gave a book to Mary

Third, clitic-doubled IOs seem to allow the dropping more easily than their non-doubled counterparts, at least for some speakers (Demonte 1994: 460-461, Torrego 1998: 131-147). A note of caution is necessary here. Besides well-known correlations between doubled and non-doubled IOs (Strotzer 1976, Masullo 1992, Demonte 1994, Torrego 1998, Bleam 1999, 2003, Cuervo 2003, Montrul and Perpiñán 2006, among others), there seems to be dialectal or even individual variation with respect to the possibility of doubling IOs. Clitic-doubling with the IO is far more common than non-doubling (see Branchadell 1992 and the references therein).<sup>128</sup> Then, perhaps it is not a surprise that there are also mixed judgments with respect to the possibility of dropping the DO A-marker in ditransitives if there is no clitic-doubling for the IO (some speakers report that

<sup>127</sup> V+DO+IO (7a) may be considered the neutral order, but (7b) is not deviant at all.

<sup>128</sup> Notice also that there is a difference here with clitic-doubling with the DO, which is much more restricted (but also subject to dialectal variation).

this is not possible, others that it is optional). Given this situation, I will put aside here the non-doubled cases, restricting the discussion to the doubling structures.

Before presenting my proposal, I will review some of the solutions that have been presented in the literature, and briefly point out the problems they face.

First, it is unlikely that there is a dialectal split behind the A-dropping for doubling structures (in the relevant cases), as Brugé and Brugger 1996 suggest.<sup>129</sup> The phenomenon is reported using sources from very different origins. In addition, Brugé and Brugger 1996 claim that the split is Latin American Spanish versus Peninsular Spanish, with the first variety allowing the dropping and the second prohibiting it; nevertheless, they report a personal communication from Violeta Demonte (Brugé and Brugger 1996: 29 fn. 34), who is a linguist born and raised in Spain and allows the dropping (and even wrote about it: Demonte 1994: 460-461); other speakers of Peninsular Spanish I have consulted also allow the dropping in the cases discussed here. Furthermore, since these authors do recognize that the dropping exists at least in one variety, a question remains regarding how to capture this option; they present no solution.<sup>130</sup> So, pending a full examination of dialectal variation of Spanish DOM in ditransitives, here I will assume that the dropping of A does not behave differently in Peninsular and Latin American Spanish.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Demonte 1994: fns. 30 and 31 cites certain reports according to which proper nouns resist dropping A. If this is correct, then it may be a dialectal difference, since this is not the case for all Spanish speakers. I have no explanation for this.

<sup>130</sup> In fact, their analysis completely bans the dropping of A, since, as explained in chapter 2, section 2.2.2.1, they assume that A is mandatory with nominals that are accusative and animate.

<sup>131</sup> It is an interesting question to ask if Spanish DOM in general (not only with respect to ditransitives) shows dialectal variation. Almost all of the few reports on this issue are contradictory and anecdotic: some

Secondly, the suggestion that a speaker drops A to avoid ambiguity with the Indirect Object conflicts with the fact that this dropping does not happen all the time; in fact sometimes it cannot even take place (even with clitic-doubling structures, as I will show later). Morimoto and de Swart 2006: fn 6, who, as discussed in chapter 2, propose that a constraint on distinguishability between subjects and objects is responsible for Spanish DOM, try to interpret the A-dropping in ditransitives as showing support for their proposal. They appeal to the idea that two A-markers would introduce ambiguity (this time with the IO). However, as it should be apparent, the absence of A reintroduces the lack of distinction with respect to the subject, which the presence of A was supposed to avoid. This means that the facts in question are actually evidence against the distinguishability hypothesis.<sup>132</sup>

Finally, I would like to discuss the most attractive (but ultimately incorrect) solution to the problem posed by the dropping of A in ditransitives, put forward by Torrego 1998: 131-147. The contrast that Torrego tries to explain is the following:<sup>133</sup>

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researchers claim that Latin American Spanish is more restricted with respect to the use of A, others claim that it is more liberal (see Pensado 1995: 17 fn. and references therein). As far I know, the only fairly systematic exploration of Spanish DOM looking for dialectal differences is Heusinger and Kaiser 2005, who show that Peninsular and Latin American Spanish are quite similar in this respect, except perhaps for the interaction with clitic doubling, a fact that could be assimilated to the very well-known dialectal differences between these varieties in the latter domain, which, as we discussed in chapter 2, must be analyzed independently. If DOM is indeed a stable phenomenon across Spanish dialects, this is a remarkable situation, given the wide range of differences that Spanish dialects exhibit and the very subtle (that is, potentially unstable) conditions that govern DOM. This means that DOM is a core property of Spanish, not a peripheral phenomenon. This strongly points out toward a theory based on core grammatical devices (like the system I am developing here).

<sup>132</sup> It is always possible to propose (especially in the OT framework, which these authors use) that the distinguishability with the IO outranks the distinguishability with the subject. However, this predicts that A would have to be dropped in all ditransitive sentences, which is again incorrect. Besides, the distinguishability with the subject is also in question, as discussed in chapter 2.

<sup>133</sup> Torrego uses only one ‘?’ for (8a). I use two ‘??’ because this corresponds better with my judgment (also expressed in (3)). However, everybody agrees that (8b) is worse than (8a).

(8) a. ?(?) Presenté al alumno al profesor  
 Introduced A+the student to+the professor

I introduced the student to the professor.

b. \* Describí al alumno al profesor  
 Described A+the student to+the the professor

I described the student to the professor.

[Torrego 1998: 134]

According to her, in (8b) the DO cannot raise out of the VP, which is crucial to get an A-marker. The direct objects in (8) then must be in different case-assignment domains. The DO in (8a) raises to [Spec, vP] and receives case (i.e. A) because it checks a D-feature against small *v* (which is the general solution Torrego applies to Spanish DOM, as discussed in chapter 2); also in (8a), the IO receives a second instance of accusative in situ from the v-V compound, when V raises to *v*. The verb does not allow the object in (8b) to raise out of VP (for reasons that are not explained, see footnote 134); as a result, the DO gets case in situ, which means that the A-marker cannot appear.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Notice that this analysis undermines Torrego's explanation of the DOM system in general, since she is assuming that the case of [+specific, +animate] is systematically assigned after raising the object. She recognizes this, but she also "leave[s] open the question of why the derivation of some ditransitives verbs prevents the accusative object from raising overtly" (Torrego 1998: 179 fn 5). She tries to suggest that somehow affectedness is related to this difference; however, since it is hard to argue that the verb in (8b) (*to describe*) is an affecting predicate, she gives up any semantic characterization, claiming that in (8), there is a syntactic difference (*describir* does not allow object raising, but *presentar* does), "whatever the semantic difference" is (Torrego 1998: 135).

Torrego also tries to link the dropping of A to a certain interaction between the clitic and the procedure of Case checking; however, she pays attention solely to the presence of the clitic with DO, putting aside the fact that it is actually the presence of IO clitic that shows a systematic difference (which is, after all, the very issue that Strotzer 1976, whose data Torrego relies on, tried to account for).

- (9) ? Describí el alumno al profesor  
 Described the student to+the the professor  
 I described the student to the professor.

There is a problem with the data in (8), however. As mentioned above, IOs in Spanish require clitic-doubling in several cases, perhaps in most cases (see Strotzer 1976 for a lengthy overview of different possibilities). *Describir* (to describe) is a verb whose IO is better with a doubling clitic, but with *presentar* (to introduce), the presence of the clitic makes no difference for the grammaticality; and this is independent of DOM, as we can see in (10):

- (10) a. ?(Le) describió su casa a Juan  
 CL-DAT described his house to John  
 He described his house to John
- b. (Le) presentó su casa a Juan  
 CL-DAT introduced his house to John  
 He showed his house to John.

In other words, ditransitive sentences without IO-clitic doubling are not really suitable for comparison between verbs (since some verbs prefer the clitic-doubling option for independent reasons). On the contrary, given that all verbs allow IO clitic-doubling, it is



safer to check the relevant property with IO clitic-doubling structures. In fact, if we restore the clitic in (8), the contrast disappears:

(11) a. ?? Le        presenté        al        alumno        al        profesor  
           CL-DAT   introduced        A+the    student        to+the    professor  
           I introduced the student to the professor.

b. ?? Le        describí        al        alumno        al    profesor  
           CL-DAT   described        A+the    student        to+the        the professor  
           I described the student to the professor.

Interestingly, both sentences become better if we drop the A in the DO:

(12) a.    Le        presenté        el    alumno        al        profesor  
           CL-DAT   introduced        the    student        to+the    professor  
           I introduced the student to the professor.

b.        Le        describí        el    alumno        al    profesor  
           CL-DAT   described        the    student        to+the        the professor  
           I described the student to the professor.

Another case that does not fit well with Torrego's explanation of A-dropping is *wh-in-situ*—see Reglero 2004 for a thorough revision of the conditions that govern Spanish *wh-in-situ*. In simple transitive sentences, *wh-in-situ* questions must have the A-marker:

(13) a. Juan vio a quién

John saw A who

John saw who.

b. \* Juan vio quién

John saw who

John saw who.

However, when there are two wh-objects in situ, the A must be dropped, no matter what the verb is:

(14) a. Le presentaron (\*a) quién a quién

CL-DAT introduced A who to who

They introduced who to whom.

b. Le describieron (\*a) quién a quién

CL-DAT described A who to who

They described who to whom.

Notice that (14b) with A is worse than (11b)—I will provide reasons for this later.

So, although the interactions between DOM and clitic-doubling may need further

clarification, it seems clear that we need to find an independent source for the dropping of A. I contend that the reasons for this dropping are not related to case checking, but with the conditions on the linearization process. There is very strong evidence in favor of this view, and the data have been, again, noticed for a long time, but the generalization has remained elusive so far.

When discussing the dropping of A, Andrés Bello, the aforementioned nineteenth century grammarian, presents an example where, as he said it, “es inevitable la repetición del a” [it is inevitable to repeat A] (Bello 1847: §900).<sup>135</sup>

- (15) El traidor Judas vendió      a Jesús      a los sacerdotes y fariseos  
 The traitor Judas sold      A Jesus      to the priests and Pharisees  
 The traitor Judas sold Jesus to the priests and Pharisees.  
 [Bello 1847: §900]

Although Bello does not conclude anything from his observation, the interesting thing about this sentence is that one of the objects is heavy. On the other hand, (3), repeated here as (16), has short objects:

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<sup>135</sup> A similar sentence is provided by Meyer-Lübke, also in the nineteenth century:

- (i) Recomiende usted      a mi sobrino      al      señor director  
 Recommend you      A mi nephew      to+the      senior director  
 Recommend mi nephew to the director.  
 [Meyer-Lübke 1899: §350]

Examples like (i) (see also (42)) are the primary evidence for those who deny that A-dropping can happen (for instance, Pensado 1995: 25).

- (16) ?? Juan le presentó a María a Pedro  
 John CL-DAT introduced to Mary to Peter  
 John introduced Mary to Peter

It is unlikely that we could explain this difference purely on the basis of a case-theoretical approach (as in Torrego 1998), which contends that there are different mechanisms of case-checking related to different verbs, since in this case we have a difference with the same verb. In fact, we can follow Bello's intuition further, and find ways to modify (16) and look for the results. The sentence improves notably with heavy objects (17a), as expected, but also if we have a pause (17b), or if we displace one of the objects (17c):

- (17)a. Juan le presentó a María de las Nieves a Pedro Vargas Prada  
 John CL-DAT introduced A María de las Nieves to Pedro Vargas Prada  
 John introduced María de las Nieves to Pedro Vargas Prada

- b. Juan le presentó a María, a Pedro  
 John CL-DAT introduced A Mary to Peter  
 John introduced Mary, to Peter

- c. A Pedro, Juan le presentó a María  
 to Peter John CL-DAT introduced A Mary  
 To Peter, John introduced Mary

In other words, manipulating the adjacency or the size of the objects blocks the dropping of the A-marker:

(18)a. \*Juan le presentó María de las Nieves a Pedro Vargas Prada  
 John CL-DAT introduced María de las Nieves to Pedro Vargas Prada  
 John introduced María de las Nieves to Pedro Vargas Prada

b. \*Juan le presentó María, a Pedro  
 John CL-DAT introduced Mary to Peter  
 John introduced Mary, to Peter

c. \*A Pedro, Juan le presentó María  
 to Peter John CL-DAT introduced Mary  
 To Peter, John introduced Mary

This calls for an explanation. The above data resemble the so called syntactic Obligatory Contour Principle (OCP), and more in general, the idea that adjacency and PF identity play a crucial role in blocking the pronunciation of otherwise expected elements (Perlmutter 1971, Stemberger 1981, Menn and MacWhinney 1983, Hoekstra 1984, Mohanan 1994, Pesetsky 1997, 1998, Yip 1998, Franks 1998, Plag 1998, Anttila and Fong 2000, Bošković 2001, 2002c, Bobaljik 2002, Neeleman and van de Koot 2004, Richards 2006, Bošković and Nunes 2007, inter alios.)

In fact, this possibility has already been explored by Richards 2006 with respect to the dropping of the case-marking element in several DOM languages. Richards presents an analysis of sentences like (16) based on the idea that linearization targets labels and not terminal nodes, and therefore two DPs in the same linearization domain have to be distinct enough to get linearized.<sup>136</sup> According to Richards, this condition is not satisfied in (16). Richards bases his analysis on Torrego 1998, and suggests that the case assignment domain for (16) is also its the linearization domain. Given Torrego's suggestion that some verbs do not accept the dropping of A (because they have different case-assignment domains), in these cases the linearization domains must be different.

Richards proposes the following condition on linearization:

(19) Distinctness

If a linearization statement  $\langle \alpha, \alpha \rangle$  is generated, the derivation crashes.

[Richards 2006: 4]

Distinctness can be understood as targeting the label of the constituents involved in the linearization, but, as Richards also points out, it can also be understood as targeting the features of the head. There are also various situations that prevent Distinctness from crashing the derivation. They involve either modifying one of the relevant constituents (to make them different) or putting them in a different linearization domains, which will

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<sup>136</sup> If X merges with YP and projects XP, in the resulting structure  $[_{XP} X [_{YP} Y Z ]]$ , X, Y and Z are the terminal nodes, and XP and YP are the labels. A linearization domain is, in principle, the complement of a phase.

mean that no linearization statement  $\langle \alpha, \alpha \rangle$  will ever be generated, assuming, as it is standard, that linearization statements are relative to certain domains (see Fox and Pesetsky 2004 for some discussion and a profitable use of this strategy). Richards assumes that the drop of the dative marker in DOM languages instantiates the first option (as in (5a)), repeated here as (20):

- (20). El jefe      le            presentó      el empleado      a Pedro  
           The boss    CL-DAT   introduced    the employee    to Peter  
           The boss introduced the employee to Peter

I contend that the lack of dropping in the sentences in (17), which are not discussed by Richards, are instances of the second option. Of course, I do not claim that Distinctness drives the operations that are behind the surface order in (17); rather, these operations, however they are implemented, bleed Distinctness, that is, place the objects in different linearization domains.

In the case of (17a), one of the objects undergoes Heavy-NP shift (HNPS). Notice that it is enough that one of the objects is heavy to prevent the A from dropping (as already shown by Bello's example in (15), repeated here as (22)):<sup>137</sup>

- (21) Juan    le            presentó      a María      a Pedro Vargas Prada  
           John    CL-DAT   introduced    A María      to Pedro Vargas Prada  
           John introduced María to Pedro Vargas Prada

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
<sup>137</sup> As we will see immediately, the order of the objects does not play a role here.

- (22) El traidor Judas vendió a Jesús a los sacerdotes y fariseos  
 The traitor Judas sold A Jesus to the priests and Pharisees  
 The traitor Judas sold Jesus to the priests and Pharisees.  
 [Bello 1847: §900]

So, it seems clear that heavy objects prevent the dropping of A. The question is how HNPS prevents the generation of a linearization statement of the form  $\langle \alpha, \alpha \rangle$ . Notice that the system outlined so far requires that both objects in ditransitive constructions check case against the Dative head. The syntax of ditransitive constructions is a topic with several ramifications, which I would not want to bring up here (see Branchadell 1992, Masullo 1992, Demonte 1994, 1995, Torrego 1998, Cuervo 2003, among others, for discussion of this issue in Spanish). I will limit myself to the question of case-checking in ditransitive construction.

I adopt Cuervo's 2003 proposal, based on Pylkkänen 2002, that both objects in Spanish start in an Applicative Phrase below VP:


(23)





Under the system outlined in chapter 2, if the DO is  $\phi$ -incomplete, it will check case with small  $v$ , moving to [Spec,  $vP$ ] (it will not get the A-marker, which requires that the DO raises to DatP). As mentioned in the beginning of this section, I am assuming that the IO has to check structural case, which means that it has to raise to [Spec, DatP].<sup>138</sup> Given that  $vP$  is a phase, the IO has to stop first in [Spec,  $vP$ ] (this is Blind Movement from chapter 2, section 2.3). I also assume that the dative clitic is hosted by the corresponding case-checking head (following Franco 1993, and others), that is, Dat:

(24) Unmarked DO



<sup>138</sup> This does not preclude the possible assignment of inherent dative, as long as we assume that there is also structural dative (IOs would then be quirky objects), combining structural case and inherent case—see the discussion in the next page.

As mentioned above, there is relatively free order between DO and IO; to account for this I assume that the specifier in the DatP can be either at the right or at the left.<sup>139</sup> Notice that, in principle, it does not matter in which order DO and IO move to [Spec,  $\nu$ P], provided that the IO is  $\phi$ -complete. In (24), the DO undergoes Checking Movement, which means that it is no longer a goal for higher heads. If the IO is  $\phi$ -complete, small  $\nu$  cannot check its case (since, by hypothesis, small  $\nu$  is  $\phi$ -incomplete, as discussed in chapter 1), and then the IO has to raise to [Spec,  $\nu$ P], where it is the only possible goal for higher heads.

A potential locality problem arises with respect to IOs that are  $\phi$ -incomplete, since now small  $\nu$  should be able to check its case. Given that the IO is closer to  $\nu$  than the DO, the question is what would prevent the IO from receiving accusative from small  $\nu$ . I will adopt a solution provided by Cuervo 2003, with a slight change. Following Cuervo 2003 I assume that the Appl head assigns inherent dative to the IO; different from her, however, I also assume that the IO is a quirky object, that is, that the IO must also check structural case—for a discussion regarding the need to combine inherent and structural case to account for quirky case see Nomura 2005:19-21 and the references therein.

In order to implement this idea, I propose that the Appl head values the case feature of the nominal, but, given the quirky nature of the dative case feature, this valuation does not prevent the nominal from undergoing Checking Movement to check its dative feature

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<sup>139</sup> Right specifiers have been used to account for word order in other Spanish constructions; for instance, postverbal subjects (Zubizarreta 1994, 1999) and NP modifiers (Ticio 2003).

with a matching head (in fact, such movement is necessary).<sup>140</sup> As a result, the IO will still be a goal visible for heads that match its dative case feature. Given that, as is well-known, nominals with quirky case can check structural case against a head with a value different than the value of its inherent case, a question still remains regarding why it cannot check structural accusative against small *v*. However, now the competition between the two objects for small *v* is unbalanced, that is, the IO has already a value. Recall also that the actual valuation happens by Checking Movement, that is, when the goal c-commands the probe (i.e., when the goal probes its probe).


We can assume that there is a preference principle for quirky case: nominals with quirky case prefer, if possible, to check their structural case against probes with the same value than its inherent case. Give this, a quirky case nominal would withhold checking its structural case if the probes it c-commands (after Checking Movement) does not match the value of its inherent case, waiting for another goal that satisfies this preference. If the probe does appear in the same phase, the quirky case nominal checks structural case against this new matching head. If a matching head is not merged during the same phase, the nominal in question checks structural case with the remaining head. In (24), there is additional head, namely, the Dat head. Therefore, the IO will not check structural case against small *v*, but against Dat. The problem noted above then disappears.

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<sup>140</sup> Notice that the above may be interpreted as implying a difference between the valuation process (equivalent to case-assignment) and the checking process (under matching). In other words, for regular objects Checking Movement values the case feature of the object, whereas for quirky objects Checking Movement merely checks it (provided that the checking head has a matching case-value). For an argument in favor of a purely checking approach (as opposed to case-assignment) see Bošković 2006b. See also Torrego 1998 for the assumption that IOs are quirky elements. Nomura 2005:53-54 also claims that inherent case is valued case.


With respect to  $\phi$ -complete DOs, small  $v$  cannot value their case, as also discussed in chapter 2, section 2.3. Therefore, the DOs must undergo Blind Movement to [Spec,  $vP$ ] and from there, Checking Movement to DatP (together with the IO).

(25) A-marked DO



In (25), Dat is checking the case of two goals. We could assume that, in order to do so, Dat must attract its goals at the same time, which would mean that it can attract them in any order—in a way similar to the analysis provided by Bošković 1999, 2002c for focus

movement in Bulgarian. As mentioned above, the specifiers of Dat can be on the left or on the right. The combination of these assumptions predicts the following configurations for ditransitive sentences with A-marked objects:<sup>141</sup>



This state of affairs predicts ambiguous scope between IO and A-marked in ditransitive constructions: in (26) the DO c-commands the IO but in (27) the IO c-commands the A-DO. As we will see in the next section, in ditransitive sentences where the IO is doubled by a clitic (the only structures we are dealing with in this dissertation, as mentioned above), the scope relation predicted by (27) are not obtained, that is, the A-marked DO

<sup>141</sup> Notice that for (26b) and (27b) the lower specifier can be on the right too, but this would not produce a change in word order (remember also that V raises to T, taking all the heads in its path with it).

apparently would be higher than the IO (independently of word order):<sup>142</sup>

(28) a. Le enviamos a un profesor famoso a todas las facultades de medicina

CL-DAT sent A a professor famous to all the schools of medicine.

We sent a famous professor to all the schools of medicine.

b. Le enviamos a todas las facultades de medicina a un profesor famoso

CL-DAT sent to all the schools of medicine A a professor famous.

We sent a famous professor to all the schools of medicine.

In (28), the DO has scope over the IO, and the inverse scope cannot be obtained—this is an old observation with respect to the height of the objects in ditransitive constructions (Demonte 1987, Leonetti 2003, 2004, López 2006). I will present a more detailed discussion in next section, but for now (28) is enough to establish the need to block (27). Here I will present a mechanism to that effect, which will be based on my previous claim that IOs also receive inherent case.

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<sup>142</sup> I must stress that I am putting aside the structures without clitic doubling, where both the dropping of A and the scope relations have been argued to follow different patterns from the corresponding doubling structures, independently of DOM; some researchers (see Masullo 1992:60) even argue that the IO that is not doubled by a clitic is not actually a dative argument, but a PP modifier. I must also point out that the literature on scope relations between DO and IO in Spanish (regardless of DOM) is not in complete agreement (compare, for instance, Demonte 1994 with Cuervo 2003 and Montrul and Perpiñán 2006). The discussion here and in the next section should then be taken carefully, since it is limited to ditransitive sentences with A-marked DO, where the IO is doubled by a clitic. The situation is further complicated by the fact that clitic-doubling is subject to dialectal variation. A full scale exploration of scope relations between DO and IO is necessary but I leave it for future research. See Strotzer 1976, Masullo 1992, Demonte 1994, Torrego 1998, Bleam 1999, 2003, Cuervo 2003, Montrul and Perpiñán 2006, Leonetti in press-a for extensive discussion. It is worth noticing, however, that the analysis of the relations between DO and IO in the literature rarely includes discussion of DOM—for exceptions, see Torrego 1998 and Leonetti 2003, 2004.

Recall that, following Cuervo 2003, I have assumed that the Appl head assigns inherent case to the IO. I have also proposed that IOs are quirky objects, by which I meant that they receive an inherent dative value, but they still need to check this dative value against a Dative head. Recall that the Dat head attracts both objects; however, by hypothesis, the IO already has a value, but the DO has not. I contend that this asymmetry causes the IO to raise first, assuming that a purely checking movement (see footnote 140) must happen as soon as possible. The DO, which requires valuation, raises second. The possibility in (27) then never arises.<sup>143</sup>

There is a final question that the issue of case-checking for the dative brings up. We could ask if it is possible for the IO to receive just inherent case and remain in situ (as Cuervo 2003 suggests). Since this would mean that the IO would remain inside  $\nu$ P and that the DO would raise out of  $\nu$ P, the consequence would be that IO and DO would always be in different linearization domains: the IO would stay inside the complement of small  $\nu$ , and get linearized first. This, however, would bleed Distinctness, and the A would never drop. Since the A does drop, I conclude that both IO and DO raise out of  $\nu$ P and therefore they are in the same linearization domain. This reinforces the idea that Dative is structural case, which is the position I took in chapter 2.

From the previous discussion, it should be apparent that both objects end up in the same

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<sup>143</sup> Notice that I am not assuming tucking-in (Richards 2001), which means that the DO will move on top of the IO. Notice too that the system predicts a number of lower copies for both DO and IO (see (25)), which could potentially create different scope relations under reconstruction. I assume, following Chomsky 1995: 326-327, that there is no A-reconstruction, at least not for scope reasons (Lasnik 1999b has even suggested that A-movement does not leave traces)—for further discussion on this issue see Boeckx 2001 and Lasnik 2003b.

domain, which means that, if they are linearized together (as for example in a linearization statement like (31), to be discussed immediately), Distinctness (i.e. (19)) will be violated. The A-marker is then dropped to avoid a violation of Distinctness. As mentioned above, if the linearization domains change, Distinctness is also respected.

Turning now to HNPS instances, I would like to propose that HNPS—which has received several treatments in the literature (see Nissenbaum 2000: 59-94 for discussion of some alternatives)—should be treated as a result of a constraint on linearization. This makes HNPS a purely spell-out phenomenon.<sup>144</sup> Let me briefly show how HNPS could work. If the first linearization cycle is the  $\nu$ P phase, the first linearization domain is then the complement of  $\nu$ , given Chomsky’s proposal that what is sent to Spell-Out is the complement of the head phase. For our purposes, this is irrelevant, since in the relevant cases (see (25)), there are only copies inside [Comp,  $\nu$ P]—the linearization algorithm does not see copies (see Fox and Pesetsky 2004). The objects must get linearized in the next linearization cycle, ZP, which includes DatP in its linearization domain.<sup>145</sup>

(29) A-marked object (from (25))

[<sub>ZP</sub> ... Z [<sub>DatP</sub> A-OD IO [ <sub>$\nu$ P</sub> ... ] ] ]

This means that there will be two possible linearization statements (see the discussion regarding (26)):

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<sup>144</sup> There are a number of additional questions that this speculation brings up, which I have to leave for future research.

<sup>145</sup> I do not want to speculate about what ZP could be. It may be CP or IP. It has in fact been proposed that linearization domains are not the same across languages.



- (30) a. A-DO > IO [from (26a)]  
 b. IO > A-DO [from (26b)]

If the DO and the IO are both Dative, as I have assumed in this dissertation for the A-marked object, the statements in (30) are affected by Distinctness (19), since it implies that both are a KP with the same case value:

- (31) KP > KP

As a result, one A-marker must be deleted. Recall that we saw in the beginning of this section that the A-marker for DOs is the only one that can be deleted (see the discussion regarding (5)). Following the standard assumption that inherent case must be preserved (Freidin and Sprouse 1991), I suggest that this is a consequence of the IO receiving inherent case, as I discussed above—recall that IOs are quirky objects, i.e. IOs can receive inherent and structural case. Let's assume that the process of A-deletion can only target the first A it encounters. If the process of A-deletion cannot target inherent case markers, then it is predicted that the A corresponding to IO, which is both a structural and an inherent case marker, cannot be deleted:

- (32)\* El jefe            le            presentó    [IO   Pedro]    [DO   al empleado]  
 The boss       CL-DAT   introduced       Peter                A+the employee  
 The boss introduced the employee to Peter.

In addition, we predict that it would not be possible to have the following word order if the DO is  $\phi$ -complete:

- (33) \* V IO DO  
(if DO is  $\phi$ -complete)

The reason for this is that in this context no A-marker can be deleted. The DO is not first, so its A is not visible for the deletion. The IO is inherent, which makes it also undeletable. This is exactly why (6), repeated here as (34), is ungrammatical:

- (34)\* El jefe            le            presentó    [IO    a    Pedro]    [DO    el empleado]  
The boss      CL-DAT    introduced        A    Peter            the employee  
The boss introduced the employee to Peter.

Given that no A-marker can be deleted, both A-markers stay, and the sentence becomes ungrammatical, since it violates Distinctness:

- (35)\* El jefe            le            presentó    [IO    a    Pedro]    [DO    al empleado]  
The boss      CL-DAT    introduced        A    Peter            A+the employee  
The boss introduced the employee to Peter.

Although the idea that Dative can be inherent in addition to structural might have more

consequences that the ones discussed here, I will put them aside. I want to point out, however, that this does not affect Distinctness, which can be understood as targeting only the values of KP, irrespective of their origin (structural or inherent)—see Richards 2006 for other uses of this assumption.

Now, suppose that one of the KPs is heavy (it does not matter here if it is the DO or the IO). Let's mark it with a subscript H (only for expository reasons):

$$(36) \quad [_{\text{ZP}} \dots Z [_{\text{DatP}} \text{KP} \text{KP}_H [_{\text{vP}} \dots ] ] ]$$

The only thing that a HNPS rules needs to do is to be able to linearize DatP and the heavy  $\text{KP}_H$ , putting the heavy element in the end. In this way,  $\text{KP}_H$  will be preceded by all the elements of DatP (including the other KP):

$$(37) \quad \text{DatP} > \text{KP}_H$$

Notice that (37) is not affected by Distinctness. (37) linearizes a KP and a DatP, not two KPs (the other KP gets linearized as a result of being the one left inside DatP). As a result, there is no need to delete any A-marker.

Notice further that there is an additional possibility here. Suppose that (37) is not the only linearization order. Suppose that (38) is also possible, at least in Spanish:

(38)  $KP_H > \text{DatP}$

This means that the effects of HNPS are neutralized, that is, a heavy object will precede a non-heavy one (which is possible in Spanish). But (38) will not be affected by Distinctness; hence, here we should not be able to delete the A-marker in this configuration either. This prediction is borne out.

(39) a. \*Juan    le            presentó        María de las Nieves        a Pedro  
         John    CL-DAT   introduced        María de las Nieves        to Pedro  
         John introduced María de las Nieves to Pedro.

b. \*Juan    le            describió        los alumnos y profesores a Pedro  
         John    CL-DAT   introduced        the students and teachers to Pedro  
         John described students and teachers to Pedro.

(40) a. Juan    le            presentó        a María de las Nieves        a Pedro  
         John    CL-DAT   introduced        A María de las Nieves        to Pedro  
         John introduced María de las Nieves to Pedro.

b. Juan    le            describió        a los alumnos y profesores        a Pedro  
         John    CL-DAT   introduced        A the students and teachers        to Pedro  
         John described students and teachers to Pedro.

I also want to point out that, although I have implemented HNPS as an effect on linearization (which makes it naturally compatible with the Distinctness condition), that is, as a post-syntactic rule, the analysis can be maintained if HNPS is a syntactic rule. It will be enough to assume that the landing site of HNPS is the specifier of ZP (in (36)), and that this can be a right specifier (for (37)) or a left specifier (for (38))—provided that [Comp, ZP] is still the domain of linearization.

Finally, given that HNPS has some degree of optionality (it can even be applied to some light DPs), we may be able to account for the skepticism that some speakers (including several researchers, as discussed above) exhibit with respect to the A-dropping. Some speakers may be able to apply HNPS more freely than others, thus allowing the “double A”.

Let’s return now to the other cases in (17), that is, (17b)-(17c), repeated here as (41a) and (41b):

- (41) a. Juan      le                      presentó              a María,              a Pedro  
                  John      CL-DAT      introduced              A Mary              to Peter  
                  John introduced Mary, to Peter
- b. A Pedro,      Juan              le                      presentó              a María  
                  to Peter      John              CL-DAT      introduced              A Mary  
                  To Peter, John introduced Mary

In the case of (41a), we must assume that a pause indicates different linearization domains; this sentence can in fact be a case of right dislocation. It is obvious that in (41b), where the one of the objects has moved to the beginning of the sentence (the sentences involves left dislocation), the objects are in different linearization domains.

Perhaps a case that is less clear is the following—modeled from a sentence provided by Meyer-Lübke 1899: §350, which is used sometimes to deny the existence of A-dropping (Pensado 1995: 25):

- (42) Juan        le                presentó        a María        en París        a Pedro  
          John        CL-DAT        introduced        to Mary        in Paris        to Peter  
          John introduced Mary to Peter in Paris

Here, there is a constituent intervening between the objects. However, it seems reasonable to assume that adjuncts are in a different linearization domain from complements (after all, they may even merge acyclically (Lebeaux 1988, Stepanov 2001a)); given that one of objects is on the right edge, it is possible to suggest that we may also have right dislocation here. If this is correct, (42) can be unified with (41). This means that dislocation is the phenomenon that is saving these constructions from violating Distinctness.

Now, suppose that there is some context that allows us to neutralize the effects of HNPS

or dislocation; the prediction will be that all speakers would reject this kind of examples.

I believe that *wh-in-situ* is such a context and that this is the reason why (14), repeated here as (43), is categorically bad with both As:

(43) a.    \* Le        presentaron    a    quién    a quién

CL-DAT    introduced    A    who        to who

They introduced who to whom.

b.        \* Le        describieron    a    quién    a    quién

CL-DAT    described        A    who        to    who

They described who to whom.

I do not believe that there are any Spanish speakers who accept (43) but not (44)—to the extent that they accept *wh-in-situ* questions in the first place (see Reglero 2004 for discussion):

(44) a.    Le        presentaron        quién    a quién

CL-DAT    introduced            who        to who

They introduced who to whom.

b.        Le        describieron        quién    a quién

CL-DAT    described            who        to who

They described who to whom.

Under the system outlined in this dissertation, in (43) the nominals are identical (two KPs with the same values and the same PF). Therefore it is possible to apply the same criterion that Bošković 2002c uses for multiple wh-fronting in Bulgarian, Russian, and Romanian, that is, that sequences of homophonous wh-phrases must be avoided.<sup>146</sup> The strategy that Spanish uses is to delete the first A-marker, which makes the wh-KPs non-homophonous. Notice further that failing to drop the A-marker with wh-in-situ questions is worse than failing to drop it in declarative contexts—as expressed by the ‘\*’ in (43) and the ‘??’ in the other cases (see (3), repeated here as (45)):

- (45) ?? Juan    le                    presentó    a    María    a                    Pedro  
          John       CL-DAT       introduced    A    Mary    to                    Peter  
          John introduced Mary to Peter

I contend that the reason for this contrast is that (43) violates both Distinctness and the constraint on sequences of homophonous phrases, whereas (45) only violates Distinctness.

The above data provide strong evidence in favor of the idea that a Dative head licenses the case of DOM objects in Spanish, since the analysis give above depends on both DO and IO having the same marker (e.g. A) which is licensed by the same head. It is also worth noticing that the form [a] has other values in Spanish; in particular, it can be a full preposition (then, heading a PP, not a KP); when this happens we do not get A-dropping:

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<sup>146</sup> These languages front all wh-phrases, but fronting is not possible if it would result in a sequence of homophonous wh-phrases.



- (46) Juan le presentó a María a las tres  
 John CL-DAT introduced A Mary to the three  
 John introduced Mary at 3.

This means that we are not dealing here merely with a constraint on phonetic form.

Note also that Richards 2006 observes that dropping similar to Spanish A-dropping is attested in Chaha, Hindi and Miskitu, all of them DOM languages that also have Dative as the marker for DOM-objects; see also Patel 2007: 31-32 for Kutchi Gujarati, another DOM language with a Dative DOM-marker. In all these languages, the DOM-marker is dropped in ditransitive sentences, as a result of Distinctness.

Another argument that suggests that the A-marker is the same for DO and IO may be provided by the fact that a single A-marked relativized element can be related to both DO and IO—as observed by García 1975 (who quotes real texts). This shows that the dative marker can serve as a marker for both objects, even at the same time, which may be used as evidence that the case value is the same:

(47) No tenían ningún respecto por las mujeres, muchísimo menos por las jovencitas,

They have no respect for women, far less for the young ones,

a las que

A the that

to whom/whom

levantaban las polleras y maltrataban con las injurias más ofensivas

lifted the skirts and mistreated with the slurs most  
offensive

they lifted the skirts and mistreated with the most offensive slurs.

[García 1975: 93]

In this sentence, we have two coordinate relative clauses with a common antecedent (*jovencitas*) and a common relative item (*a las que*). The gaps in the clauses are the Indirect Object and the Direct Object. The example is a case of Across-the-Board (ATB) movement, and its structure is as follows (abstracting away from other properties):<sup>147</sup>

(48) [<sub>KP</sub> a las que] [levantaban las polleras [<sub>IO</sub> ~~a las que~~] y [maltrataban [<sub>DO</sub> ~~a las que~~]] ]

to whom lifted the skirts ~~to whom~~ and mistreated ~~whom~~

<sup>147</sup> See, however, Franks 1993 for the idea that morphological case is not enough to license ATB dependencies.

To summarize, we have seen in this section that there is evidence in favor of the DOM A-marker as Dative, which is licensed by the same head that licenses regular Dative object (i.e. Indirect Object).

### 3.1.2 The height of the objects

The situation with respect of the exact position of the object with respect to the verb has never been clear in the literature of Spanish. Torrego even suggested that there is no “direct empirical evidence determining where the object raises...The target of object raising in Romance languages has to be determined on purely theory internal grounds” (Torrego 1998: 6). For simple transitive constructions this may be true. Since the verb always raises to T, as it is generally assumed for Spanish (and other Romance languages)—at least since Emonds 1978 (see Zagana 2002: 164-168 for specific discussion of Spanish)—we cannot use relative position to the verb to determine object height.<sup>148</sup> Also, the position of the adverbs is extremely free in Spanish,<sup>149</sup> which makes it also very difficult to draw conclusions from the position of the object relative to the adverbs.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> A possible argument from word order is provided by Bošković 1997a: 243-244, using the fact that Spanish violates the Superiority Condition. According to Bošković, this is possible because the DO has to leave the VP and check case in [Spec, AgrOP], over the subject, which stays in [Spec, VP], thus being closer to the final landing site.

<sup>149</sup> Spanish adverbs can be virtually any place in the simple clause: x S x V x O x

However, some adverbs cannot appear before a preverbal subject, and a few others cannot appear between the preverbal subject and the verb (see Zagana 2002: 162-164 for some details).

<sup>150</sup> Most adverbs can freely appear between the verb and the objects. A few adverbs (like *allá* “there”) seem to require to be in a intonational phrase that does not contain the object (Zagana 2002: 163), but even if this is violated, the deviance is just minimal (the brackets in (i-iii) represent intonational phrases):

(i) [Conoció allá] [a una mucama]  
      Hired there     A a maid  
      He hired a maid there.

The scope of adverbs can be more informative, though. It has been standardly assumed that these sentences show evidence for the direction of adverb adjunction:

- (49) a. John [intentionally [twice [knocked on the door]]]      intentionally > twice  
       b. John [[[knocked on the door] intentionally] twice]      twice > intentionally

In (49a), where *intentionally* scopes over *twice*, there is only one intention, which was to knock twice. In (49b), John has two instances of intentional knocking on the door. This contrast has been used as evidence that in the first sentence adverbs are left-adjoined, since in this way *intentionally*, being higher, can have scope over *twice*; in the second sentence, which requires the opposite, the adverbs are right-adjoined (see Andrews 1983, Pesetsky 1989: 19, Bošković 1997b: 121-122, among others). This contrast has been used as a test to determine if the object has left the VP (Bošković 1997b: 121-122, Stjepanović 1999: 83-84, Reglero 2004: 65-66). For Spanish, the results do not distinguish between A-marked and unmarked objects:<sup>151</sup>

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- (ii) ? [Contrató allá a una mucama]  
       Hired there a maid  
       He hired a maid there.

Interestingly (at least for my judgment) this requirement is waived if the object is unmarked:

- (iii) [Contrató allá una mucama]  
       Hired there a maid  
       He hired a maid there.

Although this suggests a difference between the objects (A-marked vs. unmarked), which may be related to height, I will leave the issue for future research, because the deviance, which is minimal, is related to intonational phrasing, so it is necessary to explore the correlations between syntax and intonation, an issue that is beyond the goals of this dissertation.

<sup>151</sup> Notice that the possibility of having a single constituent [*intentionally twice*] does not arise in Spanish, since in this language *twice* is actually a DP (*dos veces*, “two times”).

- (50) a. Juan golpeó        la puerta        deliberadamente        dos veces  
           John knocked    the door        intentionally        twice
- b. Juan besó        a María        deliberadamente        dos veces  
           John kissed    A Mary        intentionally        twice

Both sentences in (50) are ambiguous, having the readings in (49), that is, with *intentionally* > *twice* and *twice* > *intentionally*. In order to obtain the reading in which *intentionally* scopes over *twice*, the adverbs must be left-adjoined; then, the object must be out of the VP in both sentences. Interestingly, as noticed by Reglero 2004, the scope is also ambiguous with ditransitive constructions; thus the reading with *intentionally* > *twice* is evidence that both objects leave the VP:

- (51) Juan    le        enseñó    el libro    a María    intencionalmente    dos veces  
       John    CL-DAT   showed   the book   to Mary   intentionally        twice  
       [Reglero 2004: 66]

This discussion shows that all objects leave the VP: both marked and unmarked DOs, as well as IOs (see Torrego 1998, Suñer 1999, 2000, Cuervo 2003, De Pedro Munilla 2004 for similar conclusions). However, it does not show us anything about the relative position of A/non-A marked objects. As discussed above, in the system I developed in chapter 2, the A-marked object is higher than the unmarked object, i.e. the DOM objects must be in a Dative projection above *vP*, and unmarked objects are in [*Spec, vP*]*—see*

(24)-(25). Notice that this means that both objects, marked and unmarked, are outside of VP, which captures the above scopal data. However, as noted above, the data in question do not tell us anything about the relevant position of the A/non-A marked objects. Ditransitive sentences, however, are more informative in this respect.

As noticed by Leonetti 2003, 2004 and others, the A-marked DO in ditransitive constructions behaves as if it is higher than the unmarked object in these constructions. This conclusion comes from asymmetries with respect to scope. In (52a), the unmarked DO must have narrow scope with respect to the IO, that is, the sentence is interpreted as saying that a different expert was sent to each department; in (52b), the DO has wide scope with respect to the IO, that is, in these case the same expert was sent to all the departments.<sup>152</sup>

(52) a. Le           enviamos    un especialista       a todos los departamentos afectados.

CL-DAT   sent            an expert               to all the departments affected.

We sent an expert to all the departments affected.

b. Le           enviamos    a un especialista       a todos los departamentos afectados.

CL-DAT   sent            A an expert               to all the departments affected.

We sent an expert to all the departments affected.

[Adapted from Leonetti 2004: 102]

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<sup>152</sup> Notice that in (52b) the IO undergoes HNPS. Under the view advocated in the previous section, HNPS is a PF rule, that is, it does not changes scope relations. This is confirmed by the fact that in (52b) the HNPS-IO cannot scope over the DO. As discussed in the previous section (see (28)), the scope relations in (52) hold with the V IO DO order, which may be evidence that the difference in word order is just a matter of the direction of the specifier, not a different hierarchical position.

Recall that, according to the system presented in chapter 2, the A-marked object can optionally receive a choice function, but it does not have to. Then, (52b) should also have a reading similar to (52a), that is the narrow scope reading, but it does not have such a reading. I then conclude that this happens because in this case, the DO is higher than the IO.

Recall also that A-marked objects can receive choice-functions, but do not need to. This means that the mandatory wide reading of the DO in (52b) cannot be a result of a mandatory choice function assignment but of the fact that the DO is higher than the IO.<sup>153</sup> Notice also that in (52a), where the animate object is unmarked, the DO cannot receive a choice function, according to the system we developed in chapter 2, where unmarked objects have a \*D, an element that cannot receive choice functions and that is incompatible with [person] features (so the [person] feature associated with animate nominals has to be deleted). Note that Distinctness is not relevant to the D/\*D difference, since it targets the highest projection, which is the traditional noun phrase. So, the contrast between (52a-b) is consistent with the system developed in chapter 2.

The system makes an additional prediction, with respect to the difference between animate and inanimate objects. Animate nominals that are combined with D must receive A; having D entails they can receive an optional choice function, as explained. On the other hand, if they have a \*D, they cannot receive a choice function, and they cannot

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<sup>153</sup> In that sense, this is a case that corresponds to the so called “positional specificity” rather the “inherent specificity”, which corresponds to nominals that receive choice functions—see Lidz 2006 for discussion of these notions with respect to Kannada, another DOM language.

receive A either, because \*D is incompatible with the [person] feature needed to force the nominal to check case with the Dative projection. But inanimate nominals do not receive a [person] feature ever (and if they receive A, it is only by accident, as explained in chapter 2). This means that inanimate nominals are free to have D or \*D, which is fine, because they can receive a “specific” interpretation too (that is, a choice function). The prediction is then that inanimate objects could optionally receive a choice function interpretation in ditransitive constructions, which will have the effect of wide scope (independent of DO-IO order, for the reasons discussed above). This prediction is borne out:

(53) a. Le            construimos   un edificio   a todos los departamentos de idiomas  
           CL-DAT   built                a building    to all the departments of languages  
           We built a building to all language departments.

b. Le            construimos   a todos los departamentos de idiomas   un edificio  
           CL-DAT   built                to all the departments of languages   a building  
           We built a building to all language departments.

(53a) and (53b) are ambiguous. The sentences can mean that a single building was built for all language departments or that a different building was built for each one of them. This ambiguity does not obtain with unmarked animate objects, as discussed above. This means that the DO in (53) is still lower than the IO, but it can optionally receive a choice function, which accounts for the wide reading—see also footnote 153.



Similar conclusions arise from other quantifiers. The distributive quantifier *cada* (each) forces a distributive reading on the indefinite it c-commands. This reading is blocked with A-marked DOs, but allowed with unmarked DOs (also independently of DO IO order):

(54) a. Le devolvieron un prisionero enfermo a cada tribu.  
 CL-DAT returned a prisoner sick to each tribe.  
 They returned a sick prisoner to each tribe.

a'. Le devolvieron a cada tribu un prisionero enfermo.  
 CL-DAT returned to each tribe a prisoner sick.  
 They returned a sick prisoner to each tribe.

b. ?? Le devolvieron a un prisionero enfermo a cada tribu.  
 CL-DAT returned A a prisoner sick to each tribe.  
 They returned a sick prisoner to each tribe.

b. ?? Le devolvieron a cada tribu a un prisionero enfermo.  
 CL-DAT returned to each tribe A a prisoner sick.  
 They returned a sick prisoner to each tribe.

[Adapted from Leonetti 2004: 102]

This means that in (54a) the IO c-commands the DO, but that is not the case in (54b); in

other words, in the latter, the A-marked DO is in a position higher than the position occupied by the unmarked DO in (54a). Interestingly, with inanimate nominals the wide/narrow ambiguity in (53) disappears, as expected:

- (55) Le           construimos       un edificio a cada departamento de idiomas  
CL-DAT built               a building to each department of languages  
We built a building to each language department.

This again means that the ambiguity in (53) depends on the possibility of choice function assignment, which, as is well known, cannot be done under the scope of a distributive quantifier (that is, in (55)). This also confirms that the unmarked DO is lower than the IO.

This discussion does not tell us what the positions in question are, but only that A-marked objects are higher than unmarked ones, a position that is in agreement with other accounts of Spanish DOM (see Torrego 1998, Leonetti 2003, 2004, among others).

Given this state of affairs, we predict that short DOs without the A in ditransitive constructions—which, as discussed in the previous section, can drop the A because of constraints on the Syntax-PF interface, in particular, Distinctness, which affects linearization (recall that they are already located in [Spec, DatP])—should behave ambiguously with respect to scope facts. Since they do raise higher than the IO, they should be able to scope over it, although they end up without the A for different reasons. This prediction is borne out:

- (56) Le           enviamos       un experto       a todos  
          CL-DAT   sent            an expert       to everybody  
          We sent an expert to everybody

Sentence (56), where the A is excluded for the reasons discussed, is ambiguous. Both scope relations are possible: it can be a unique expert that was sent to everybody, or it can be one different expert for each one. In the first reading, the A is dropped because of Distinctness: DO and IO are in the same linearization domain (both are in [Spec, DatP]), as discussed in the previous section (in other words, this reading has the same derivation than (52b), except that the A drops). In the second reading, the A was never there; the DO is at [Spec,  $\nu$ P] and the IO is at [Spec, DatP].

Interestingly, if we change the DO-IO order the ambiguity disappears:

- (57) Le           enviamos       a todos       un experto  
          CL-DAT   sent            to everybody   an expert  
          We sent an expert to everybody

(57) only means that a different expert was sent to each one. This is predicted under the current system. Since A-dropping targets only the first A and the IO-A cannot be deleted, it follows that A-dropping happens only in the DO-IO order. Given that (57) is grammatical, the only possibility is that A was never there, which means that the DO has

a \*D determiner (in other words, the A was never there).

The above data provides strong evidence that the A-dropping does not have a purely syntactic origin, but is a by-product of the so called Syntactic OCP, as discussed above.

### 3.2 DOM, Small Clauses and Possessor Raising

There is another type of construction that exhibits a contrast between A-marked and unmarked objects: a clause that embeds a Small Clause inside. It is a long-standing observation that a Direct Object inside a Small Clause can be optionally marked with A. The basic paradigm is represented by the verb *tener* (to have):<sup>154</sup>

- (58) a. Tiene (\*a) un hermano  
has A brother  
S/he has a brother
- b. Tiene (a) un hermano en la cárcel  
has A brother in the jail  
S/he has a brother in jail

We can be sure that (58b) contains a Small Clause because the object can be cliticized independently of the PP:

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<sup>154</sup> I will indicate, as is traditional, the impossibility of using A with (\*a). This means that in (58a) the A-marker is not possible. Additionally, I will indicate the lack of optionality for A (i.e. obligatory A) with \*(a).

(59). Lo tiene en la cárcel

CL-ACC has in the jail

S/he has him in jail

It is worth noticing, however, that there is a difference between (58a) and (58b). The first sentence, where A is not possible, must be interpreted as involving inalienable possession (with respect to the subject). This interpretation is not mandatory in (58b). We can confirm this with a different possessor:

(60) a. \*Ella tiene un hermano de Juan

She has a brother of John

b. Ella tiene \*(a) un hermano de Juan en la cárcel

She has A a brother of John in the jail

Notice that in (60b) A becomes mandatory: if the interpretation with inalienable possession is not possible, A must be present. This suggests that what blocks the presence of A in (58a) is the mandatory inalienable possession interpretation. In fact, we can confirm this with other verbs, in particular, with the so called dative external possessor that is possible in some ditransitive constructions (independently of the DO-IO order, as witnessed by (61a-b)),<sup>155</sup> as noted by Brugé and Brugger 1996. They attempt to explain

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<sup>155</sup> The term dative external possessor construction is used because the possessor (which has dative case) is not inside the phrase that contains the possessee. As witnessed by (61), the possessor (*el hijo de Paco*

the lack of A by claiming that in cases like (61) the possessee must have the feature [-animate]:

(61) a. Juan le robó (\*a) la novia al hijo de Paco  
 John CL-DAT stole A the fiancé to+the son of Paco  
 John stole Paco's son's fiancée.

b. Juan le robó al hijo de Paco (\*a) la novia  
 John CL-DAT stole to+the son of Paco A the fiancé  
 John stole Paco's son's fiancée.

I reject the claim that the possessee must be [-animate] in these sentences, for obvious reasons. In fact, I think that the system I am developing here predicts these facts, when we introduce some fairly common assumptions about the syntax of possession, as we will see below.

The syntax of external possession is a hotly debated topic in Syntax. There are all kind of proposals regarding this issue, ranging from movement and control to treating it as a semantic or pragmatic effect (see Landau 1999, Payne and Barshi 1999, Coene and D'hulst 2003, Vermeulen 2005, among others, for extensive cross-linguistic discussion and references). For Spanish (and other Romance languages), there is a solid tradition that assumes a movement analysis (Hornstein *et al.* 1994, Uriagereka 1998, Bleam 1999, Cuervo 2003), where the possessor starts as a constituent of a lower phrase and moves

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
“Paco's son”) is in a different phrase than (*la novia* “the fiancé”).

out to obtain Dative case. According to Bleam 1999: 94-112 and Uriagereka 1998, both possessor and possessee are based generated in a Small Clause inside a DP. In the internal possessor construction (62), the possessee raises to an internal agreement projection, whose head is spelled-out as *de* (of); on the other hand, in the external possessor construction (61), in addition to the possessee raising to [Spec, Agr], the possessor raises to [Spec, DP] and from there, unable to receive Case, has to raise further to check Dative.


- (62) Juan    robó    la novia    del    hijo de Paco  
        John    stole    the fiancé   of+the   son of Paco  
        John stole Paco's son's fiancée

This is illustrated here:

- (63) a. Internal Possession



b. External Possession<sup>156</sup>



I will assume this structure here, and in particular Uriagereka's 1998 analysis for the syntax of possession in Spanish—which follows similar ideas first suggested by Szabolcsi 1983 and Kayne 1993. In other words, (63b) can also be the syntax for (58a), *mutatis mutandi*, as Uriagereka proposes. The difference is that in this case, with *tener* (to have), the possessor raises to subject position and gets Nominative. If this is correct, it is crucial that *tener* does not have a Dative case to assign. Before coming back to (58), let us make sure that this is indeed what happens.

Recall from chapter 1 that I assume that *haber* does not allow a Dative head. It is very well known that *haber* and *tener* belong to the same family of verbs (together with *ser/estar* (to be)). A relation between the verbs that instantiate *have* and *be* has been

<sup>156</sup> Notice that the possessor raises to [Spec, DatP], which can be to the right or to the left, accounting for the word order in (61a-b).



proposed by Freeze 1992,<sup>157</sup> who shows that these verbs are related, suggesting a unique deep structure for all of them in the relevant respects. Also, Kayne 1993 uses Freeze's account (combined with ideas from Szabolcsi 1983) to explain several properties of the possessive—for similar ideas in the context of Romance languages see also Guéron 1995, Longa *et al.* 1998, among others. A comparison between Spanish and English is extremely revealing in this respect. We can trace a very complex scenario here. In table (64) I intend to represent some of the basic properties that relate the verbs in question, without the intention of being exhaustive. As we can see, given the set of properties associated with *be* and *have*, Spanish has a more finer-grained distinction than English:

Properties	Spanish	English
a. Passive	Ser	Be
b. Individual-level predicates		
c. Locative (for events)		
d. Progressive	Estar	
e. Stage-level predicates		
f. Locative (for individuals)		
g. Existential	Haber	Have
h. Auxiliary		
i. Possessor	Tener	

- (65) a. El ratón era perseguido por el gato PASSIVE  
The mouse was chased by the cat

b.	El gato era inteligente	INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
	The cat was intelligent	
c.	La clase es en este edificio	LOCATIVE (EVENTS)
	The class is in this building	
d.	El gato estaba persiguiendo al ratón	PROGRESSIVE
	The cat was chasing the mouse	
e.	El gato estaba cansado	STAGE-LEVEL
	The cat was tired	
f.	El gato estaba en la casa	LOCATIVE (INDIVIDUALS)
	The cat was in the house	
g.	Había un gato en la casa	EXISTENTIAL
	was a cat in the house	
	There was a cat in the house	
h.	El gato ha muerto	PERFECT
	The cat has died	
i.	El gato tiene un collar	POSSESSIVE
	The cat has a collar	

It is quite possible that each one of the “properties” in (64) has a different surface syntactic configuration and that such “properties” can be grouped in a different fashion in

different languages. To account for all these properties is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I want to highlight a correlation between Possessor and Existential (expressed in English by *have* and *be* respectively):

(66)

Properties	Spanish	English
Possessive (64i)	Tener	Have
Existential (64g)	Haber	Be

Following Freeze 1992 and Kayne 1993, I assume that possessive *tener* (have) is derived from the incorporation of an abstract Dative preposition into an abstract verb BE. I further assume that this abstract Dative preposition is actually the same as the Dat projection I have been using so far (which, in fact, is a way to express a proposal made by Torrego 2002, as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2). If Dat incorporates into BE, it can no longer serve as a probe, therefore it cannot check Dative case.<sup>158</sup> As also suggested by Freeze 1992, Spanish *haber*, although expressed by English *be*, is actually a HAVE-type existential verb—for systematic differences between BE-type and HAVE-type existentials see also Svenonius 2002: 5-9 and Schoorlemmer 2005—and consequently, Dative case assignment is also excluded.

Evidence for this claim comes from the fact that purely BE verbs, for instance, *ser*, which do not incorporate a Dative preposition, do not exclude Dative case:

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<sup>158</sup> In a system where movement is driven by a feature in the moving element (Bošković 2007b), there would need be a feature on the Dat head indicating the need for incorporation. We would then know that Dat needs to incorporate even before BE enters the structure, which is when the Dat head needs to serve as a probe.

- (67) Tu amor        le        es indiferente        a María  
       Your love     CL-DAT is indifferent        to Mary  
       Mary is indifferent to your love.

Even more interestingly, this is true even when we have a possessive reading, that is, we can have Dative external possessors with BE-verbs:

- (68) La novia        le        es indiferente        a Juan  
       The fiancé    CL-DAT is indifferent        to John  
       John is indifferent to his fiancé.

- (69) La mano        le        fue cortada        a Juan  
       The hand       CL-DAT was cut                to John  
       John's hand was cut.

Notice further that BE-verbs cannot check Accusative case for nominals. Therefore, in (68)-(69) the possessee has to raise to [Spec, TP] and gets Nominative. The possessor, as explained, raises to a Dative head.

It is worth noticing that verbs that include a Small Clause (SC) do show the presence of ACC (as can be inferred from the cliticization):

(70) a. Juan es [sc [~~Juan~~] [un buen abogado]]

John is ~~John~~ a good lawyer

John is a good lawyer.

b. Juan lo es

John CL-ACC is

There is, however, a very important difference between this cliticization and the one regarding ACC objects. The clitic does not substitute for the nominal in (70). I will assume a structure with an internal SC for these sentences. Then, the nominal starts in the SC and raises to [Spec, TP]:<sup>159</sup>

(71) a. [TP [VP [SC [nominal] [predicate] ] ] ]

b. [TP [nominal]<sub>i</sub> [VP [SC t<sub>i</sub> [predicate] ] ] ]

Given this, it seems reasonable to assume that the predicate has been substituted by the clitic in these cases.<sup>160</sup> This is confirmed by the fact that no agreement arises in these contexts: the ACC clitic always appears in the invariant form *lo*, which I assume is  $\phi$ -less. Forms with  $\phi$ -features are ungrammatical, which indicates that there is no agreement

<sup>159</sup> In Chomsky's 2000 system, this happens to satisfy the EPP. However, as discussed in chapter 1, it has been argued that there is no EPP. There are alternative explanations for raising of subjects. See Epstein and Seely 1999, Boeckx 2000, Grohmann et al. 2000, Bošković 2002a, 2005, 2007b, Epstein and Seely 2006, Wurmbrand 2006, among others.

<sup>160</sup> In fact, clitics like the one in (70) are usually called "predicate clitics" (see Sportiche 1995 for some discussion in the context of a Romance language).

with the nominal:

(72) a. María es una buena abogada

Mary is a good lawyer-FEM

b. María lo es

Mary CL-ACC is

c. \*María la es

Mary CL-FEM-ACC is

(73) a. María está muy ocupada

Mary is very busy-FEM

b. María lo está

Mary CL-ACC is

c. \*María la está



Mary CL-FEM-ACC is

If verbs in the *ser-estar-haber* family indeed have an underlying common structure, as the relevant literature suggests, then we may have an explanation for the apparently strange small *v* in Spanish existential constructions that I have postulated in chapter 1. It comes from the same small *v* that is necessary to license SC with these verbs (see discussion below regarding SC licensing). The difference between the two small *vs* is that

with *haber*, the head  $v$  has  $\phi$ -features, whereas with *estar/ser* it doesn't—for proposals that different kinds of small  $v$  produce different syntactic and semantic effects, see Boeckx 2003, Legate 2003, Folli and Harley 2004.

Having  $\phi$ -features or not has a very important consequence for case-valuation. The  $v$  with *haber* is able to value ACC Case because it is able to establish an Agree relation with the nominal, given that it has  $\phi$ -features. This means that the small  $v$  in *haber*-sentences is licensing both the nominal and the SC. It seems plausible that the small  $v$  has an additional set of features (let's call them Predicate-features) that can establish an Agree relation with the head of the SC—a PredP category, as it is sometimes proposed (Bowers 1993).

With *ser/estar*, however, the small  $v$  can only license the SC, because it does not have  $\phi$ -features. The [case]-features of the nominal must be valued by T; therefore, with *ser/estar*, the nominal will get NOM, whereas with *haber* it will get ACC. This is illustrated below:



Recall from chapter 1 that in (74), T- $\phi$  values its  $\phi$ -features by probing v- $\phi$  (in SII, the

Spanish dialect with agreement) or by getting a default value (in SI, the Spanish dialect that does not show agreement with the internal nominal). Since  $v$  is  $\phi$ -less in (75), it does not interfere with the relation between the nominal and T- $\phi$ . If this is correct, the family of verbs *ser*, *estar*, *haber* (that is, the BE-HAVE family) share something special: they all require a small  $v$  to license its internal SC. In the case of *ser* and *estar*, this small  $v$  is  $\phi$ -less, so the nominal needs to value its Case by undergoing Agree with T, receiving NOM. In the case of *haber*, this small  $v$  has  $\phi$ -features, so the nominal can receive ACC—and T either probes small  $v$  (SII) or receives a default value (SI), as discussed earlier.

This means that the idea of a special small  $v$  (a small  $v$  without external argument) is not an *ad hoc* device for explaining the properties of *haber*-sentences, but that its presence may be motivated by the need to license the internal SC that all verbs of this class have. It is of course not clear why a SC needs to be licensed in this way. But, as mentioned above, we could be dealing here with a general property of embedded clauses. Even full embedded clauses trigger the presence of an ACC clitic, which, I assume indicates the presence of small  $v$ . It is also possible to suggest that it is a property of clauses in general (at least in Spanish), that is, that clauses need case (see Bošković 1995 and, for Spanish, Velásquez 1991).

- (76)      a.   Juan    dijo    que volverá  
                  John    said    that come-FUT  
                  John said he will come



- b. Juan lo dijo  
 John CL-ACC said

Significantly, if a verb does not have accusative, it cannot have a clause as an object either. In Spanish, *filosofar* (to think philosophically) is incompatible with an accusative clitic, and it does not have the possibility of taking a clausal complement:

- (77) a. \* Lo filosofa  
 CL think-philosophically
- b. \* Filósofa que la vida es bella  
 Think-philosophically that the life is beautiful
- c. Filósofa sobre el hecho de que la vida es bella  
 Think-philosophically about the fact that the life is beautiful

A deeper exploration of these issues is needed, which I will leave for future research.

Having established that possessive *tener* (to have) cannot have a Dative case, let's return to the contrast in (58), repeated here as (78). Remember that A is not possible under inalienable possessor interpretation:

(78) a. Tiene (\*a) un hermano

has A brother

S/he has a brother

b. Tiene a un hermano en la cárcel

has A brother in the jail

S/he has a brother in jail

In fact, A becomes mandatory if the interpretation with inalienable possession is not possible—as in (79), repeated from (60b):

(79) Ella tiene \*(a) un hermano de Juan en la cárcel

She has A a brother of John in the jail

We can capture this distinction by assuming that Determiners that trigger inalienable possession are always \*D and never D, that is, only \*D determiners can have the syntax described in (63b).

Actually, this proposal is not really new. Vergnaud and Zubizarreta 1992, discussing inalienable possession in French, have suggested that the definite Determiner in these constructions is what they call an “expletive article”. We can express the same idea by using \*D. This not only captures the above distinctions with respect to *tener*, but also the Dative external possessor construction—I repeat (61a) here:

(80) Juan le robó (\*a) la novia al hijo de Paco  
 John CL-DAT stole A the fiancé to+the son of Paco  
 John stole Paco's son's fiancée

If the Determiner in (80) is \*D and not D, the object will never receive A: its [person] feature will be deleted because it will get stranded since \*D cannot be associated with it. The same happens in (78a). On the other hand, if the Determiner is D, then the object must have A, but it does not demand an inalienable possession interpretation, as (79) shows. Then, we do not need to adopt the rather counterintuitive idea that the possessee in the external possessor construction is [-animate], as Brugé and Brugger 1996 suggested.

An additional prediction arises. Since definite articles can be \*D too (as discussed in chapter 2, and shown in (80)), we predict that we can have A-less definite articles with *tener* and that they will receive an inalienable possession interpretation. This prediction is borne out:

(81) Ella tiene el hermano en la cárcel  
 She has the brother in the jail  
 She has her brother in jail.

Interestingly, (81) also contains a Small Clause. This means that it would be incorrect to

make A-marking dependent on the presence of a Small Clause in the cases discussed earlier (see (58)). The A-marking is dependent on the properties of the DP in combination with the Agree system. There is nothing special about this situation, which is not exceptional but regular, under the system developed here.

### 3.3 DOM and coordination

It is well known that A-marked objects cannot be coordinated with unmarked objects:

- (82) \*? Mencionaron a Juan y el libro  
 Mentioned A John and the book  
 They mentioned John and the book.  
 [Camacho 1999: 2646]

This is usually derived from the ban on coordination of dissimilar constructions. In that sense, at the first sight, (82) does not seem to be particularly interesting, since any theory that postulates a formal difference between the objects in question can rule it out (it may suffice to assume two different kinds of Accusative, for instance, provided that the languages count them as dissimilar). We will see, however, that this cannot be the case.<sup>161</sup>

There is a contrast, however, with coordination that involves two objects that are supposed to be marked:

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<sup>161</sup> In addition, it must be noticed that languages do admit coordination of DPs with different case-values: *They and me left*.

(83) a. Visitaron            a Juan        y María  
           Visited            A John        and            Mart  
           They visited John and Mary.

b. Visitaron            a la profesora        y        la alumna  
           Visited            A the professor        and        the student  
           They visited the professor and the student

Interestingly, these sentences have a particular meaning: they are only grammatical if the event of visiting happened to both individuals at the same time. They do not have the reading where the visiting occurs in at different times; so, in (83) there cannot be two events of visiting, that is, the event cannot be quantized (see also the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.1.3). This is not the case if we put A in both nominals:

(84) a. Visitaron            a Juan        y a María  
           Visited            A John        and            A Mart  
           They visited John and Mary.

b. Visitaron            a la profesora        y        a la alumna  
           Visited            A the professor        and        A the student  
           They visited the professor and the student

The sentences in (84) are ambiguous: there can be one event of visiting or two. We can represent the difference by saying that in (83) there is only one KP projection, with two coordinated DPs inside, whereas in (84) the coordination is between two different KPs:

(85) a.  $[_{KP} K [_{BP} [_{DP} ] \text{ and } [_{DP} ] ]]$

b.  $[_{BP} [_{KP} ] \text{ and } [_{KP} ]]$

Under the assumption that the BP can quantize the event, but it cannot do it if it is not the maximal projection, we capture the above ambiguity. In (83), the BP is inside the KP (see (85a); in (84), it is the maximal projection (see (85b). Note also that, if the Boolean Phrase is headed by *or*, and not by *and*, it is not possible to have a single A-marker:

(86) a. \*? Visitaron      a Juan      o María

Visited      A John      or María

They visited John and Mary.

b. \*? Visitaron      a la profesora      o      la alumna

Visited      A the professor      or      the student

They visited the professor and the student

This is, of course, expected, given that with *or* it is normally not possible to have a

single-event interpretation.<sup>162</sup>

Now, if (85) is a possible scenario, then we could ask why (85a) cannot be a possible structure for the object in (82), allowing it to bypass the ban on coordination of dissimilar constituents:

- (87) \*? Mencionaron [KP a [BP [Juan] y [el libro] ] ]  
Mentioned A John and the book

After all, it seems that animate nominals can be coordinated with inanimate ones (so animacy by itself cannot be seen as making dissimilarities relevant for coordination):

- (88) Juan y el libro son incompatibles  
John and the book are incompatible.

This means that (87) is actually more interesting than we originally thought. Recall that in the system I have developed in chapter 2, in order for a KP to be able to get an A, it must have a [person] feature, since only this way small  $\nu$  (the probe), which has only [number], will be incomplete with respect to the goal. However, [person] starts inside the DP, and it must find its way up to K. In a structure like (87), the only path to K is through the head of BP. It is natural to assume that the Boolean element requires that both coordinated DPs have the [person] feature. Notice that this does not affect the

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<sup>162</sup> It is worth noticing that there is a marginal reading with a single-event interpretation that is possible for (86), that is, the reading on which John and Mary, and the professor and the student, are the same person. This reading, however marginal, confirms the intuitions about the unity of the nominals with a single A.

grammaticality of (88), since there we can assume that the coordinate element has a structure like (85b), that is, with two different KPs (both in Nominative) and BP as its maximal projection:

- (89) [BP [KP Juan] y [KP el libro] ] son incompatibles  
John and the book are incompatible.

In fact, (89) may be the only possibility for subjects, given the well known fact that subjects always quantize the event, and the assumption that BP cannot quantize the event if it is embedded in other structure.

This means that (87) is actually ruled out by the traditional ban on dissimilar constructions, which, however, does not refer to case, but to feature specification in D. These data, then, provide crucial evidence to distinguish the purely semantic [ $\pm$ animate] feature from the  $\phi$ -feature [person].<sup>163</sup> A purely semantic ban on coordination of animate nominals cannot account for both (87) and (88), but a ban on coordination of DPs with different  $\phi$ -features (i.e. with or without [person]) can.

Another issue regarding the interaction between DOM and coordination concerns pseudogapping. If coordinated sentences do not both have the same kind of object (A-marked or unmarked), pseudogapping is not possible, a matter that has never been discussed in the DOM literature on Spanish:

<sup>163</sup> This sets the basis to consider [person] an interface feature (in the sense of Svenonius 2006), that relates structure with meaning.



- (90) a. \* Juan besó        a María y Pedro        la pared  
              John kissed        A Mary and Peter        the wall
- b. \* Juan besó        la pared y Pedro        a María  
              John kissed        the wall and Peter        A Mary
- c. Juan besó        a María y Pedro        a Carolina  
              John kissed        A Mary and Peter        A Caroline  
              John kissed Mary and Peter did Caroline
- d. Juan besó        la fotografía y Pedro        la pared  
              John kissed        the picture and Peter        the wall  
              John kissed the picture and Peter did the wall

Under the assumption that pseudogapping involves VP-ellipsis (Lasnik 1995c, 1999a), and given that, in the system that I am developing here, both objects leave the VP, the question is what prevents a derivation like the following, with VP ellipsis:

- (91) \* Juan besó [DATP    a María [vP [VP ] ] ] y    Pedro [vP    la pared    ~~[VP ]~~ ]  
              John kissed        A Mary                                and    Peter        the wall

Notice that appealing to a vP ellipsis may not help either, since in (90b) we would have a

vP as the antecedent:

- (92) \* Juan besó [vP la pared [VP ] ] y Pedro [DATP a María [~~vP~~—[VP ]]]  
John kissed the wall and Peter A Mary

We can consider the possibility that the VPs involved are not really equivalent. Under Merchant 2001 theory of ellipsis, VP-ellipsis would be blocked if these VPs do not have the same meaning (to be more accurate, if the entailments of the antecedent are not the same as the entailments of the target). There seems to be no independent evidence for this assessment, however. Therefore, it has to remain a stipulation that a VP that has been extended with a Dative Phrase has some semantic property that makes it different from other VP that has not been extended in this way.

Another possibility is to assume that the parallelism requirement does not hold only for the deleted part, but also for what is not deleted (following Fox and Lasnik 2003, Park 2005, among others). This will also give us a difference, since, in the system I have developed here, the A-marked object lands in [Spec, DatP], but the unmarked object lands in [Spec, vP], as shown in (92), which breaks the parallelism (in other words, we have a DatP only in one conjunct).

### 3.4 Remaining issues

There are a couple of issues that I want to address before closing this chapter. I must stress that both of them will be briefly discussed below, in spite of their obvious importance, because they involve external factors that would lead me too far if I were to integrate them into the discussion. The issues in question involve DOM inside nominalizations and the interplay between DOM and causative constructions.

It has been claimed that nominalizations do exhibit DOM (Torrego 1998: 38-41, Richards 2006). I contend that this is not correct. At the first sight, it seems quite clear that there is no DOM in nominalizations: an object inside these nominals gets the usual *de* (of) case-marker (which, in addition, is common for theme and agent) and not A:

- (93) a. La acusación        del        profesor  
          The accusation     of+the   professor
- b. El asesinato de Juan  
          The murder of John
- c. La eliminación de los competidores  
          The elimination of the competitors

However, as observed by Torrego 1998: 38-39, for *some* nominalizations, when the agent

is realized with a possessive determiner, the case marker shifts to A:

- (94) Su acusación            al/\*del            profesor  
      His accusation        A+the/of+the        professor

But this is not the case for all nominalizations:

- (95) a. Su asesinato        \*a/de        Juan  
      His murder        A/of        John
- b. Su eliminación        \*a/de        los competidores  
      His elimination        A/of        the competitors

Torrego 1998: 171 fn 29 claims that the impossibility of shifting is restricted to non-affected objects, the implication being that all affected objects inside nominalizations must shift the marker to A if the agent is expressed by a possessive determiner.<sup>164</sup> As shown by (95), this is not really true. The possibility of using A seems to be idiosyncratic, depending on the verb that is nominalized (but it is still true that non-affected objects do not shift). Torrego also suggests that process nominals (in the sense of Grimshaw 1990) trigger this shift. Notice, however, that the nominals in (95) are process nominals too.

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<sup>164</sup> There is also a question regarding the issue of defining affectedness. For instance, we could ask if *to accuse* (the verb relevant in (94)) is an affecting predicate or not. Torrego includes “psychological change” in her definition of affectedness (which presumably includes *to accuse*). Since *to murder* and *to eliminate* (where Torrego’s generalization does not apply) are clearly affecting predicates, I will not discuss the issue here. See also the discussion in section 2.2.2.

For these reasons, I reject the claim that we have DOM inside nominalizations. A question remains, of course, with respect to the reasons of the attested shift to A (see example (94)). I will leave this for future research, speculating now that some nominalized heads can have an optional inherent Dative which surfaces when there is an additional Genitive constituent; that is, it seems that some verbs are developing an aversion to double Genitive (as a result of which a Genitive is replaced by Dative).

The final issue I want to address, also briefly, concerns causative constructions. This is a vast topic, with a large body of research, which includes detailed empirical observations and theoretical discussions that go well beyond DOM (for Spanish and other Romance languages see Kayne 1975, Strotzer 1976, Zubizarreta 1985, 1987, Reed 1992, Treviño 1994, Guasti 1996, Cerbasi 1997, Wunderlich 1997, Torrego 1998, Jiménez Peña 2001, Cépeda 2006, Folli and Harley 2007, among many others).

A crucial fact in Spanish causative constructions is that the causee always has an A-marker if the infinitive is transitive:

- (96) a. Hicieron pasar la noticia a la televisora  
           Made broadcast the new A the network
- b. Hicieron vender la casa a Juan  
           Made sell the house A John

However, as the cliticization shows, it is not really clear that we have a DOM-object in all these cases. In (96a) the causee is replaced by the IO-Dative clitic LE, whereas in (96b), the form LO (which is never used for IOs) is possible:


- (97) a. Le            hicieron    pasar            la noticia  
           CL-DAT    made            broadcast    the new
- b. Lo            hicieron    vender            la casa  
           CL-ACC    Made            sell            the house

So, the actual case of the causee is a legitimate issue to examine. Is it Dative or Accusative? This issue is particularly important in the current system, since I am assuming that the case of the DOM object is actually Dative. So we would then expect that in those cases where the A is mandatory, it must be Dative.

A clarification is in order with respect to the form of the clitic. It is well-known that Spanish is split in (at least) two dialects with respect to the form of the masculine clitic for Direct Objects (see Gutiérrez Ordóñez 1999 for an overview). Generally speaking, the dative form LE can be used for some Direct Objects in one dialect (called the *leísta* dialect), but the form LO must be used in the other dialect for the same objects. Interestingly, LE is used in the *leísta* dialect with DOM objects, and it is not used for unmarked objects. Although this provides support for the system we are using here, a question remains about the dialects that only have LO.

Notice that, as it is standardly assumed, in Spanish the verb must raise to T, taking with it all the heads on its path. Assuming that clitics are hosted by their corresponding functional heads (Dat and small *v*), we can postulate that the difference between *leísta* and non-*leísta* dialects resides in the way the complex *v*+Dat is interpreted morphologically. In *leísta* dialects it is interpreted as LE; and in non-*leísta* dialects as LO. In both dialects, however, a single Dat is always LE, and a single *v* is always LO. This is illustrated below:

(98)



That is, we have the following correlations between the dialects:

(99)

	v ❶	DAT ❶
Non-leísta	LO	LE
Leísta		

(100)

	v+DAT
Non-leísta	LO ❷
Leísta	LE ❸

In other words, LO is the morphological realization of *v* in both dialects, and LE is the morphological expression of DAT in both dialects. But when we have a complex head *v+DAT*, which is the case with DOM objects, the *leísta* dialect expresses this with LE, whereas the non-*leísta* dialect expresses it with LO.<sup>165</sup> The consequence of this state of affairs is that, in the non-*leísta* dialect, LE can only be a reflex of DAT, that is, it indicates that the nominal is a regular Dative and not a DOM-object. Notice that this implies that clitics are the heads of small *v* and Dat, that is, probes in the process of structural case checking (as in Franco 1993, Linares 2005, among others).

Therefore, for non-*leísta* dialects, the case of the causee in (96a) must be a regular Dative, not a DOM-object, whereas the causee must be a DOM-object in (96b). As has been noticed for a long time (see Strotzer 1976 for a detailed discussion), sentences like (96b) also have a LE counterpart:

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<sup>165</sup> Notice that ditransitive constructions require both heads to be expressed separately, so option ❶ prevails.



(101) Le            hicieron    vender    la casa  
                  CL-DAT   made            sell           the house

In other words, for a significant number of verbs, the causee can be a regular Dative or a DOM-object. This is not without consequences. The LO version is usually understood as being more agentive than the LE version, that is, the higher subject is understood more like an agent than simply a cause. However, this agentive reading is not absent in (101), at least for non-*leísta* dialects.

Given the system outlined so far, it is unlikely that we can derive these differences purely on the basis of Case/Agreement relations (for an account based on a different case assignment mechanism, see Torrego 1998). For this reason, I will put causative constructions aside. Further research on the semantic properties of these constructions and their relation with clitics and clitic climbing will allow a better understanding of their interaction with DOM. I leave that for the future.

## **Chapter 4**

### **A brief cross-linguistic exploration of DOM**

A fundamental question that should be addressed when dealing with DOM is the following: why do we have two different ways to mark the direct object in so many languages? The number of languages that have different morphological markers for the direct object is more than 300 (Bossong 1985, 1991); if we add the languages that have different agreement markers corresponding to different types of objects, we have a mechanism that is a good candidate for a universal. Moravcsik 1978 presents a range of languages with differential marking and concludes that there exist a considerable cross-linguistic convergence in the ways the marking mechanism works in these languages (see also Bossong 1982, 1983-1984, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1997, Aissen 2003, de Swart 2003, Lima 2003, 2006, among others, just to mention a few works that take a cross-linguistic perspective).

The need to come up with an integrated solution to different DOM systems is urged by the fact that, in the languages where the acquisition of DOM has been investigated—for instance, Spanish (Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006b) and Turkish (Ketrez 2003)—children seem to acquire the conditions to tease apart the two types of marking of DOM objects very quickly and with no errors, despite the fact that the conditions that govern this phenomenon are not simple, as we have seen in the previous chapters. It is important to stress that, as shown in Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006b, this errorless performance of children is not limited to commission, but it includes omission as well; that is, it is not

only the case that children do not use the marker when they should not, but they also do not fail to use it when they should use it. This is relevant because it has been noticed that, although children tend to have few errors of commission in general, they do make errors of omission (Snyder in press). This clearly suggests the idea that some core mechanism of the grammar is responsible for the distinction in question, i.e. the distinction is not a peripheral or language-particular device.

It was Bossong 1982, 1985, 1991 who coined the term Differential Object Marking (DOM) to refer to languages that have the split in question. I have adopted this term in general, but I need to point out that, at least in its normal use, the term has some limitations. For instance, it does not include the so-called head-marking languages (which exhibit what we could call Differential Object Agreement), which are also sensitive to the same kind of constraints.<sup>166</sup>

One important problem of both traditional and non traditional treatments of DOM languages is that the property makes the languages in question somehow special with respect to others languages. This is consistent with a narrow view of the phenomenon, according to which it takes place in a subset of languages. However, no DOM-parameter has been ever proposed, to my knowledge. I think the reason for this is two fold. First, all the elements usually involved in the phenomenon (case marking, agreement, person hierarchies, functional hierarchies, markedness) have to be universal, and in fact they are allegedly present in all languages, but not all languages have (a narrow) DOM; a certain

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<sup>166</sup> In these languages, the agreement markers appear in the corresponding head depending on conditions similar to DOM languages (animacy and specificity).

degree of arbitrariness in selecting the type of language with DOM then has to be admitted. Second, under a narrow view of the phenomenon, there are very few consequences of being a DOM or a no DOM language. So, at the first hand, DOM looks like an issue where syntax has little to say; I think, however, that this is not correct. Using Spanish in the previous chapters, I have tried to make a case that DOM is consequence of a broader phenomenon, namely, the way Case and Agreement interact with each other. In this chapter, I will explore the nature of DOM from a cross-linguistic perspective, keeping an eye on the aspects of the system I have developed for Spanish. The goal of this chapter is not to achieve a comprehensive solution for DOM, but to point out some aspects in the properties of other DOM languages that suggest that the system outlined for Spanish is not a language specific-artifact but it has some potential to be used cross-linguistically. I leave for future research a full scale cross-linguistic exploration of DOM.

#### **4.1 Is DOM universal?**

Let's assume, as a working hypothesis, that universally there are at least two different positions that license the Direct Object, as we found to be the case in Spanish. Although this idea has strong similarities with long standing intuitions in this respect, stemming from Diesing 1992 seminal work, it aims to suggest something else: that the reason for the different positions is actually syntactic, and not just semantic. If this is correct, it means that all languages have an object split; what is different is the types of object that are licensed in each position and the means that languages use to mark this licensing. For many analyses (for instance, Aissen 's 2003 OT system discussed in chapter 2), DOM is

limited to languages where one type of objects is morphologically marked and the others are unmarked. This excludes, for instance, Finnish or Scottish Gaelic, where there are two morphological object-markers, and a semantic difference between the objects correlates with the markers—for Finnish see Holmberg and Nikanne 1993, Kiparsky 1998, 2001, 2005, Csirmaz 2005, among others; for Scottish Gaelic see Ramchand 1997. It also excludes languages like German or Icelandic where all objects receive the same morphological marker, but there is a semantic split between the objects that correlates with their position in the sentence (object-shift)---see Holmberg 1986, Diesing and Jelinek 1993, Holmberg and Platzack 1995, Bobaljik 1995, Thráinsson 2001, among others. And of course, it excludes English, where all objects are morphologically unmarked.

If we were to propose a system where all these possibilities are instances of the same phenomenon, the first picture that emerges from these considerations is the following (A and B indicate different morphological objects and Ø the lack of a morphological marker):

(1)

		DO Position 1	DO Position 2
a.	Finnish, Scottish Gaelic	A	B
b.	German, Icelandic	A	A
c.	Spanish, Turkish	A	Ø
d.	English	Ø	Ø

In other words, there are two universal positions to license the Direct Object. Finnish and Scottish Gaelic mark each of them with a different marker, German and Icelandic with

the same one, Spanish and Turkish only mark one position, and English does not mark any of them.

In the system I am trying to push here, objects must hold some dependency with the head that licenses their case (as discussed in chapters 1 and 2). In this scenario, the difference in the cutting point for DOM-objects, the exact types of objects that are marked or unmarked, depends on the lexical properties of the corresponding elements (the head and the nominal object), and the conditions imposed on the dependency between those heads (by Agree, in our system). Notice the above this would greatly improve the child's ability to acquire DOM, since it implies that actually all languages have it; the only thing that the child must learn is how to mark these positions, that is, under which conditions s/he should use A, B or Ø.

This picture, however attractive, faces some serious challenges, as we will see. Nevertheless, I think that we can learn a lot about the nature of the phenomenon by entertaining (1)—even if we ultimately have “to throw away the ladder after having climbed up”, to borrow Wittgenstein's metaphor. Pursuing that goal, this chapter takes (1) as the point of departure.

Table (1) essentially predicts that the difference is arbitrary: there is nothing fundamental about being (1a) or (1c), just the object markers, merely a morphological difference. However, this is plainly false. There are significant differences between each of the language-types predicted by (1). Languages like (1a) exhibit a high sensitivity to the

structure of the event in correlation with the markers (in particular to quantization, see Ritter and Rosen 2001, 2005, among others). Languages like (1b) exhibit Object-Shift, that is, a displacement of the object that correlates with informational structure (see Diesing 1992, Meinunger 2000, López 2006, among many others).<sup>167</sup> (1c) is the traditional DOM. English (a (1d)-type language) exhibits at least one form of sensibility to conditions that are related to DOM: it is not possible to do wh-extraction from definite and specific objects (Chomsky 1973, Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981). This may be an independent effect, but, as Stepanov 2001b suggests, if specific nominals (but not non-specific nominals) are assumed to move out of VP, the effect can be accounted for by the ban on movement out of moved elements.

It is possible to suggest that all the phenomena in (1) may actually be present in Spanish, in different degrees, which would cast some doubts on the idea that (1) represents a unified phenomenon. This still leaves out a crucial question with respect to DOM (understood as (1c)): Turkish, Spanish and other DOM languages do not use the marker under the same conditions. Therefore, we have to provide at least a suggestion regarding how these differences could be described in the system I have developed. I will do that in the next section.

Before doing that, let me point out that (1) allows us to raise the issue of markedness, which is commonly associated with DOM. I will address this question now, extending it to all types in (1) (exploring the possibility of a unification).

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<sup>167</sup> Following Bošković and Takahashi 1998, Bošković 2006a, and others, I take “object shift” to cover also what others call scrambling in German.

#### 4.1.1 The question of markedness reversal

Position 1 in (1) is usually associated with a particular interpretation, which I will call **INT** (which is variable across languages). INT is *compatible* (but not identical) in Position 1 across languages. By *compatible* I mean that the objects with an INT in one language may be a subset of the objects with the INT in another language.

For languages like the ones in (1c), this *compatibility* is usually deduced by assuming a universal hierarchy inside the semantic categories that interact with DOM (as explained in chapter 2, when we discussed Aissen's 2003 system; see also Isaak 2000, Newmeyer 2002, Carnie and Jelinek 2003, Carnie 2004, Haspelmath 2004, Carnie 2005). These hierarchies are taken from the typological literature (Silverstein 1976, Comrie 1989, Croft 1990, 2003). The functional literature is also relevant to this topic; in particular, the prolific line of research stemming from the notion of degree of transitivity Hopper and Thompson 1980—for Spanish, see the papers in Clements and Yoon 2006. In this respect, we have discussed the OT model for DOM, which aims to integrate the functional-typological findings in a formal fashion (Aissen 1997, 1999, 2003, de Swart 2003, among others).

Now, under standard assumptions, Position 2 is associated with the complement of INT, which I will call **INT'**. INT' varies across languages in a way that mirrors the variation in INT, that is, the different INT's should also be compatible in Position 2 cross-



linguistically. Given this state of affairs, (1) is saying that an object in Position 2 cannot be marked if an object in Position 1 is also not marked. This is the common wisdom about DOM.

Under this view, the key mechanism behind DOM is the notion of markedness reversal, according to which there is an imbalance between syntactic functions, such that there is subset of nominals (with INT interpretation) that are more appropriate to be subjects, and therefore less appropriate to be objects; DOM, under this approach, is a mechanism to mark these “less appropriate objects”.<sup>168</sup> Obviously, this point of view will be compromised if we can find situations that violate the markedness reversal. There are indeed cases where some objects in Position 2 are marked, but some objects in Position 1 are not.

We have seen cases of this violation in Spanish (see the discussion in chapter 2). In sentences like (2), both the subject and the object have the same degree of definiteness and animacy, but the marker is not possible, which means that markedness reversal does not apply:

- (2) El huracán            provocó    (\*a) la tormenta  
      The hurricane       caused            the storm

This is not unique to Spanish. Two cases in point involved the antipassive construction in ergative languages and the *ba* construction in Chinese.

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<sup>168</sup> The properties of INT are normally associated with subjects.

In the antipassive construction (Kalmár 1979, Bittner 1987, Baker 1988, Bok-Bennema 1991, Johns 1992, Bittner 1994, Schmidt 2003, Wharram 2003, among others), the object receives an INT' interpretation, but, very frequently, it also receives a morphological case marker (generally, oblique). In fact, the object with the INT interpretation must be unmarked, as we can see in (3b), which includes an antipassive:

- (3) a.   Kaali-p                 nanoq      toqup-paa                                 West Greenlandic  
          Kaali-ERG          bear          kill-IND.SING  
  
          Kaali killed the polar bear.
- b.   Kaali      nannu-mik          toqut-si-voq  
          Kaali      bear-INST          kill-ANTIPASSIVE-IND.SING  
  
          Kaali killed a polar bear.

[Schmidt 2003: 390]

Even more interestingly, this is not the case for all languages with antipassive. For instance, in Nez Perce (Rude 1985, Deal to appear, among others), the antipassive is morphologically unmarked, and the object in the transitive construction is morphologically marked:

(4) i. Iin-im                ciq'áamqal                hi-p-teetu                núkt                (ANTIPASSIVE)

1SG-GEN                dog                3SUBJ-eat-HAB                meat

'My dog eats meat' [roughly, 'my dog does meat-eating']

ii. Iin-im                ciq'aamqal-nim                péé-p-teetu                nukú-ne (TRANSITIVE)

1SG-GEN                dog-SUBJ                3/3-eat-HAB                meat-OBJ

'My dog eats meat'

[Deal to appear: 2]

An interesting question that arises here is why Nez Perce should have an antipassive construction at all (as (4) shows, there is not even an antipassive morpheme). Deal (to appear), following Rude's 1985 initial proposals, convincingly shows that the semantic conditions that apply to regular antipassive languages (Bittner 1994, Wharram 2003) also apply to Nez Perce. However, one could still ask why Nez Perce is not like Turkish: Öztürk 2005 also treats the morphologically unmarked objects in Turkish DOM as "demoted" objects—more precisely, as undergoing pseudo-incorporation (in the sense of Massam 2001)—and the semantic effects are very similar to the ones we find in the antipassive. Of course, Turkish, in contrast to Nez Perce, is not an ergative language, and the common wisdom is that antipassive is linked to ergativity. At the very least, the antipassive construction still shows a phenomenon that does not comply with markedness reversal.

The *ba* construction in Chinese, which is sensitive to both animacy and definiteness (see Zou 1993, Li 2001, van Bergen 2006 and several others), also provides evidence against the view of DOM that relies on markedness reversal. Adding more interest to the picture, *ba* constructions seem to show an interplay between differential marking and object-shift (but see the following sections). As is well known, word order in Chinese is usually strict; however direct objects can (and some times must) undergo object-shift. In situ objects are never marked, but most shifted objects must be marked by the pre-nominal element *ba*:

- (5) a. Ta    \*(ba)    yi-ge pingguo    chi le  
          He    BA    one-CL apple    eat PRT  
          ‘He ate an apple’

- b. Ta    \*(ba)    wo    da le  
          He    BA    I    hit PRT  
          ‘He hit me’

[van Bergen 2006: 7-9]

Sometimes, however, *ba* is optional:

- (6) Ta    (ba)    na-ge pingguo    chi le.  
          He    BA    that-CL apple    eat PRT  
          ‘He ate that apple.’

[van Bergen 2006: 7-9]

Notice that, from the point of view of a definiteness/specificity scale (a degree scale from [+definite] to [-definite]), (6) is in the middle of (5a) and (5b). Too put it in terms of markedness reversal, (5a) is a “more appropriate” object than (6); but still (5a) is obligatorily marked and (6) is not. As van Bergen 2006 observes, following similar concerns pointed out by de Swart 2003, this situation requires a departure from the traditional conception of DOM. Indeed, de Swart 2003, also working in an OT model, proposes a constraint of minimal semantic distinguishability, according to which the arguments of a transitive clause must be minimally distinct, that is, the subject must be higher than the object on the relevant semantic scale; when this constraint is violated, the object is marked, giving rise to a DOM system. As we discussed in chapter 2 (when we discussed sentences like (2), this way of reinterpreting DOM does not really work.

Næss 2004a also points out that, if we follow the logic of markedness reversal, some well-known grammatical process that affect objects become unexpected. For instance, incorporation of objects (Baker 1988 and many others); since this process usually involves the “demotion” of “typical” objects (with INT’), Næss wonders why are precisely the typical objects the ones that are target by this process. In other words, incorporation deprives prototypical objects of “objecthood”, leaving non prototypical ones as the only remaining objects. In that sense, the notion of “more appropriate object” becomes meaningless, independently of DOM systems.

With respect to the marker, the picture that emerges from the previous considerations is something along these lines:

(7)

		DO Position 1	DO Position 2
a.	Finnish, Scottish Gaelic	A	B
b.	German, Icelandic	A	A
c.	Spanish, Turkish	A	Ø
d.	West Greenlandic	Ø	A
e.	English	Ø	Ø

In other words, what is relevant is the fact that there are two positions available for the object, not how the object itself is marked (or if it is marked at all).

#### 4.1.2 Object Shift is not DOM

The general idea that I have developed for DOM is the following. The initial case-licensing head (small *v*) is unable to check accusative case of certain nominals, because of the way *Agrees* operates (more precisely, *Agree* fails to value the case feature of the nominals in question). As a result, these nominals need to look for another way of checking their case feature. In Spanish and, presumably in the vast number of languages where the differential marker is the same as the dative marker (Bossong 1991), this head is a dative head; the object has to raise to be in the checking domain of this other head. Notice that this does not have to be the only way to repair the failure of *Agree*; in fact, different mechanisms may be available, giving rise to the possibilities in (7). In this

scenario, it is tempting to propose that all the slots in (7) emerge from an interaction between case and agreement; when there are two different ways to license different kinds of objects, each way corresponding to one position. In particular, in line with the mechanisms discussed in the previous chapters, we could imagine that the feature structure of one type of object makes it impossible to license the object in the first position it encounters (what I am calling here DO Position 2). Therefore, the object must raise to get licensed upstairs, with an additional mechanism, which does not need to be the same across languages.

A major set back for this picture is the behavior of Object-Shift languages, that is, the slot in (7b). There is a strong correlation between informational structure and Object Shift. In languages like Icelandic and German, shifted objects act like internal topics. That is, there is a discourse-motivated reason to shift the object. It is reasonable to assume that a [+topic] feature drives the movement (as, for instance, in Meinunger 2000 for German), or, alternatively, that there is a topic-like interpretation assigned to the internal periphery of the clause. Taking this second position, López 2006 argues that DOM-objects do not need to have a topic interpretation, but (as also observed by Diesing 1992) OS-objects must be interpreted as topics—see also the discussion in chapter 2. Notice also that it is not enough for Icelandic OS-objects to be definite or specific; if an object is focused, it cannot shift:

- (8) Hvað las Jón ekki?  
       what read Jón not

- a. Hann las ekki bækurnar  
he read not books-the
- b. # Hann las bækurnar ekki.  
he read books.the not

[López 2006: 161]

An OS-object is only felicitous if it is discourse anaphoric:

- (9) [Jón went into town a month ago and bought things for 20000 kroner: books, clothes, CDs. When he came home, he listened to all of the CDs that he bought but ...]

... hann las bækurnar ekki fyrr en miklu seinna. [Ice]

... he read books.the not before than much later.

[López 2006: 161]

These conditions do not apply to DOM-objects, which can be focused or not, and they do not need to be discourse anaphoric.<sup>169</sup> In that sense, as anticipated in chapter 2, Object-Shift and internal topicality in general, must be considered independent of DOM.

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<sup>169</sup> I am putting aside here the alleged optionality of Object-Shift (at least for full DP/NP, Holmberg and Platzack 1995: 162-165). Bobaljik 1995: 346-351 argues, however, that Object-Shift always happens, but sometimes the lower copy needs to be pronounced to avoid a disruption of adjacency between the verb and an inflexional morpheme, in the context of Holmberg's Generalization—see also Bobaljik 2002 and Bošković and Nunes 2007 (Diesing 1996 also argues that Object-Shift in Icelandic is actually mandatory).



### 4.1.3 The Specificity Condition does not drive DOM

As noted above, English objects are subject to a constraint that resembles DOM phenomena: in general, it is not possible to extract from definite or specific objects. This constraint is sometimes called the Specificity Condition (Chomsky 1973, Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981, Mahajan 1992 among others), which simply states that specific DPs cannot hold traces inside:<sup>170</sup>

- (10)      a. \* What did you buy the books about t?  
              b. What did you buy a book about t ?

In Spanish, the Specificity Condition holds—subject to further constraints, see Ticio 2003, 2005 for discussion and references:

- (11)      \*¿De qué autor has leído [los libros t ]?  
              of which author have-you read the books  
              [Ticio 2005: 238]

However, the specificity effect is independent of DOM. (11) presents a case where an unmarked object cannot hold a trace inside. DOM objects, under the same conditions, do not allow extraction either:

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<sup>170</sup> See Yoshida 2003 and others for some limitations on this characterization of the Specificity Condition.

- (12) \*¿De qué universidad            has contrado            [a los ingenieros t ] ?  
    of which university            have-you hired            A the engineers

In addition, according to Mahajan 1992, in Hindi the Specificity Condition does not hold (that is, wh-elements can be extracted from specific objects). However, as is well known, Hindi is a DOM language. This confirms that the Specificity Condition is not related to DOM, and therefore it cannot be used to characterize (for instance) English as a DOM language.<sup>171</sup>

We have seen in this section that, even when there are several phenomena that show some resemblance with the conditions associated with DOM, they cannot be mechanically incorporated into the DOM system. This does not necessarily mean that it may not be possible to come up with a mega-system from which all of the phenomena discussed above would emerge, but it does mean that DOM has its own properties, that is, that the options in (7) are not merely superficial differences behind a single phenomenon.

#### **4.2 The DP-vP connection: Kannada**

If we consider that DOM emerges from an interaction between case and agreement, and (perhaps more generally) the licensing of nominals, it should not be surprising that there is a wealth of interfering factors.<sup>172</sup> These mechanisms interact with other components of

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<sup>171</sup> It is worth noticing, however, that Stepanov 2001b argues that specific and non-specific objects in English are in different positions; if this is correct, it would mean that this difference belongs to (1)

<sup>172</sup> Notice further that this opens the possibility that Position 1 and Position 2 could be collapsed in some languages, under the assumption that both kinds of objects are licensed with different mechanisms, but

the grammar. To see an example of how far these interactions go, consider the case of Kannada, a language where DOM-marking is sensitive to animacy and specificity, but where all plural objects must be marked (regardless of their animacy or specificity):<sup>173</sup>

- (13) a. \*Pratiyobba vidyaarathi      **eraDu**    **pustaka-gaLu**   huDuk-utt-idd-aane  
every student                          two         book-PLU           look.for-NPST-be-3S.M  
  
Every student is looking for two books.
- b. Pratiyobba vidyaarathi      **eraDu**    **pustaka-gaL-annu**   huDuk-utt-idd-aane.  
every student                          two         book-PLU-ACC           look.for-NPST-be-3S.M  
  
Every student is looking for two books.’  
  
[Lidz 2006: 25]

This state of affairs asks for an integrated solution, which should include the relation between the structural case position of the nominal (in the clause) and the position of the case feature and the plural feature inside the nominal (NP/DP). I claim that we can capture the apparent anomaly illustrated (13) by using the idea that different feature structures in the nominal have effects on the case/agreement system, also the gist of my analysis for Spanish in chapter 2.

without displacement (this means that no EPP feature on the target or a relevant uninterpretable feature on the above elements would be invoked in Chomsky's/Bošković's systems respectively).

<sup>173</sup> Interestingly, this situation is not a peculiarity of Kannada, but is present in other DOM languages with overt case marking too—for instance, Hup (Epps 2005). It is sometimes related to the well known phenomena associated with split number marking, which is also sensitive to animacy and definiteness—see Corbett 2000: 54–132 for an overview.

The facts in Kannada are a little bit more complicated than the description above indicates. According to Lidz 2006, the following table captures the relevant generalizations regarding Kannada DOM:

(14)

	ANIMATE	INANIMATE
MARKED	de dicto / de re ❶	de re ❸
UNMARKED	* ❷	de dicto / de re ❹

[Lidz 2006: 12]

Remember that *de dicto* readings correspond to non-specific interpretations, whereas *de re* readings correspond to specific interpretation. This means that box ❶ is saying that all animate objects are marked, regardless of specificity; also, as boxes ❸-❹ show, inanimate objects can be all unmarked, but they can optionally have a case-marker if they are specific. As noted above, we must add to (14) the information that all plural objects are marked, irrespective of their animacy or specificity. Notice that (14) requires that all animates must be marked too, regardless of their specificity.

Recall from chapter 2 that a [person] feature must be present if a nominal is animate. In turn, the [person] feature will get the object morphologically marked (with the marker A, in Spanish), under the Agree system developed here. We can extend this analysis to Kannada straightforwardly capturing ❶ and ❷.

Interestingly, in Kannada the DOM marker (-*vannu*) is not Dative but Accusative (the

Dative marker is *-age*). Let's assume that, in Kannada, different from Spanish, small *v* is complete, that is, it has both [person] and [number]:

- (15)        *v*  
              [person]  
              [number]

At first sight, this seems to be odd, since this will mean that a [person] object will have no problems checking its case against small *v*. However, I claim that this is exactly what happens: Kannada [person] nominals are able to check case against small *v* and they get Accusative.

However, there are two additional properties of Kannada nominals that we have to consider. First, Kannada does not have overt article; following Bošković 2006a, let me assume that this means that it does not have DP (so the D/\*D distinction that was used to capture specificity distinctions in Spanish has to be expressed in another way)—see Chierchia 1998 for interpretation of nominals that do not have DP). Secondly, Lidz 2006 suggests that Kannada only projects a [number] phrase with plural nominals.<sup>174</sup> Let me interpret this fact by assuming that only plural nominals have a [number] feature. This means that the relevant feature specifications of Kannada nominals (represented here by G) are as follows:

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<sup>174</sup> This may be related to the previous property—Lidz does not go that far, though (he actually assumes a DP projection).

(16)

	Singular	Plural
Animate	G [person]	G [person] [number]
Inanimate	G	G [number]

Note that inanimate singulars do not have either [person] or [number]. Now, recall from chapter 1 that the Condition on Case-valuation requires that the Probe match all the features of the Goal:

(17) Condition on Case-valuation

Only probes P that match all the relevant features of a goal G can value the [case] feature of G

However, the condition does not require the Goal to match all the features of the Probe. This means that if small  $\nu$  is complete, it can value the case-feature of all the nominals in (16), except inanimate singulars, since inanimate singulars do not have any  $\phi$ -feature to match. This straightforwardly accounts for the fact that all plural objects receive the Accusative marker. It also accounts for boxes ❶, ❷ and ❹ in (14). ❶ gets marked because animate objects have [person]; therefore, there cannot be any unmarked animate (as \*❷ expresses). On the other hand, ❹ cannot get marked because singular inanimate nominals are  $\phi$ -featureless; so small  $\nu$  does not match anything in the Goal G (which in

turn cannot act as a probe to check its case). The only remaining set of data is ❸ (for singulars).

Here we can adopt a solution already suggested by Lidz 2006, adapting it to our framework. Lidz suggest that some Kannada nominals can be “inherently specific”, which he understands as the need to receive a choice function. I have already used a similar device for Spanish in chapter 2—although it had an opposite sign: \*D can be understood as a sort of “inherently non-specific”. Recall also that Kannada does not have overt Determiners, so we cannot use a D/\*D distinction as we did for Spanish. Let’s assume that the locus of the distinction is K, that is, we have a K/\*K distinction in Kannada, which merely translates Lidz’s solution to our framework:

(18)

K	de dicto / de re
*K	de re (i.e. it <i>must</i> receive a choice function)

The only thing that we need now is the following set of morphological exponents:

- (19) a.        K                :        -*vannu*  
               [φ-F: α]  
               [K: ACC]
- b.        K                :        Ø  
               [K: ACC]
- c.        \*K              :        -*vannu*  
               [K: ACC]

This means that if a Kannada object has  $\phi$ -features, any type of  $\phi$ -features, [person] or [number], it will get *-van nu*, under the mechanism just explained (19a). But if an object does not have  $\phi$ -features, there are two options: if it must receive a choice function, then it will get *-van nu* (19c); if it does not need to receive a choice function, it will be unmarked (19b).

The remaining issue is how the nominal in (19b) and (19c) gets the case value. It cannot get the value from a small  $v$  represented in (15), for the reasons discussed above (there are no  $\phi$ -features to match). There are two options here. One is that there is an additional projection that also checks ACC, and the relevant objects, that is, ❸ and ❹ (for singulars) in (14) move there under the same conditions explained for Spanish (the combination of Blind Movement and Checking Movement in chapter 2). This second projection would have to be a kind of small  $v$  without  $\phi$ -features. The other possibility is that (19b), which corresponds to ❹, is actually default case (that is, no ACC), whereas (19c), which corresponds to ❸, is inherent accusative. I do not have sufficient information on Kannada to tease apart these options at this point. I leave the issue open.

I would like to stress that I have accounted for Kannada DOM (to the extent that the generalization in (14) is correct) without adding any substantial pieces to the system developed for Spanish. The only relevant differences are lexical. This can be interpreted as an indication that the DOM system being developed here, which is based on the connection between the feature specification of DPs and the conditions on Agree, is on the right track. Additional Kannada data with respect to other correlations still needs to



be checked, but the initial picture seems to give us a promising result.

It should also be added that the Kannada generalization in (14) provides evidence against an OT approach to DOM, since it directly contradicts the entailments based on constraint reranking (see chapter 2). That is, an OT-based model cannot account for Kannada without significant modifications, while the current approach is able to account for both Spanish and Kannada with essentially the same system.

### **4.3 Systematic DOM differences**

A significant merit of Aissen's 2003 OT system (and related work) is that it offers a principled way to describe fine-grained differences that are attested across different DOM languages. In fact, as pointed out by Aissen, this achievement provides a possible standpoint to criticize Torrego's 1998 account of Spanish DOM: there is little space in her system to describe cross-linguistic differences. Recall however that the force behind the OT system for DOM does not actually belong to OT itself: it is borrowed from the typological and functional literature (the Definiteness and Animacy hierarchies), as discussed in chapter 2. Torrego does not try to run her system against the hierarchies, but it is not impossible that such an attempt could gain some cross-linguistic confirmation for her system (even if further assumptions are needed). It is not our place to check this.

However I do have the obligation to show that the system I have developed here has some potential to at least describe DOM systems cross-linguistically. The fact that we can

account for Kannada already gives us some advantage.

Although I have presented some critical considerations that are problematic not only for the OT system, but also for the hierarchies on which it is based (recall the discussion of (7)), let me try to check how the mechanism I have developed here fares with respect to the hierarchies. This attempt should not be considered an endorsement of the hierarchies; much more discussion and empirical exploration needs to be done to actually do that (or the opposite). This is just an attempt to see how the differences that the hierarchies predict can be accommodated in the system I have developed. In that sense, the following discussion should be considered merely descriptive.

The central idea is that the interpretation of the feature [person] varies according to the hierarchies. Taking as a point of departure the set of languages invoked by Aissen, and the parameters used by her, DOM languages belong to three different groups:

- (20) a. Languages in the Definiteness Scale
- b. Languages in the Animacy Scale
- c. Two-dimensional languages

Running the interpretation of the feature [person] against the Definiteness Scale, we obtain the following values for the feature [person] for each of the languages.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> The characterization of the particular languages that are mentioned in (21) and (22) is based on the information provided by Aissen 2003.

(21)

	Catalan	Pitjantjatjara	Hebrew	Turkish	Written Japanese
Pronoun	[person]	[person]	[person]	[person]	[person]
Name					
Definite					
Indef Specific					
NonSpecific					

Running the interpretation of the feature [person] against the Animacy Scale obtains the following correlation:

(22)

	Yiddish	Dhargari	Dhalandji
Human	[person]	[person]	[person]
Animate			
Inanimate			

Under the assumption that in the corresponding languages there is also a small  $v$  that has only [number] and not [person], the correlations in (21) and (22) predict the type of object that will get marked for each language. For two-dimensional languages it will be necessary to combine the values in (21) and (22).<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Interestingly, this will predict more possible languages than are actually attested, which is also a problem in Aissen's system (see Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2006b for further discussion on this issue).

As witnessed by the situation faced in Kannada and Spanish, this matching is far from being perfect. In fact, (21) and (22) inherit the empirical problems from Aissen 2003, which have been discussed in several places through this dissertation. A more comprehensive discussion of particular languages is needed to achieve a better system. It may even be the case that the (21)-(22) correlations are entirely wrong, that is, that the cuts they predict do not actually fit the differences between marked and unmarked objects that we find in these languages. Interestingly, if this were the case, Aissen's system would likely collapse, but not the system that we have developed here, as also witnessed by our account of Spanish and Kannada, languages that do not fit (21)-(22)—nor the combination of them, as discussed above.

Let's provide an additional piece of evidence in favor of the system I have developed. Turkish is usually assumed to be a well-behaved DOM language—by which I mean a language that does conform to (21) or the corresponding generalizations in different frameworks. However, this language also exhibits a type of “exceptional” data that we find in Spanish.

Recall that when we discussed the quantifiers *nadie* (nobody) and *alguien* (somebody) in chapter 2, I noted that they constitute a *prima facie* evidence against the idea that A is a marker of specificity. Although animate, *nadie* is non-specific, but it still receives a mandatory A marker:

(23) a. Vi \*(a) alguien en el parque

saw A somebody in the park

I saw somebody in the park

b. No vi \*(a) nadie en el parque

No saw A nobody in the park

I saw nobody in the park

As noticed by Brugé and Brugger 1996, the same holds for Turkish. The quantifiers *kimse* (nobody) and *birisi* (somebody) must have the accusative marker that characterizes [+specific] objects:<sup>177</sup>

(24) a. Kimse-yı görmedim

nobody-ACC saw

I saw nobody

b. Ali birisi-nı gördü

Ali somebody-ACC saw

Ali saw somebody

(25) a. \*Kimse görmedim

nobody saw

I saw nobody

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<sup>177</sup> They provide no account for these facts (or the corresponding Spanish data). Persian, also a DOM language, exhibits similar behavior in this respect.

b. \* Ali    birisi            gördü

Ali    somebody    saw

Ali saw somebody

[Brugé and Brugger 1996: 47]

This suggests that the Spanish “exception” cannot be treated like a language-specific quirk, but as a regular consequence of the DOM system. It also provides some reason to believe that the system we used to explain the Spanish data is not really an ad hoc solution.

As I said in the beginning, much more discussion and cross-linguistic comparison is needed to actually claim victory over the DOM puzzle. In this dissertation DOM is a result of an interaction between case and agreement, in particular, it arises because the initial case-checking head, small  $v$ , is unable to check accusative case of certain nominals because of the way Agree operates. I believe this idea points directions that may allow us some new ways to look at DOM.

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