

news

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To Our Readers



Photo by Karl Vilhjálmsen

The social and political environment in Africa has in many respects changed markedly since the late 20th century. This was the point of departure of a conference held in Uppsala in June this year on ‘The African Com-

mission and the New Challenges and Opportunities for Human Rights Promotion and Protection in Africa Today’. The conference was hosted by CODESRIA and the Nordic Africa Institute as an important effort to assess, promote and forward the agenda of human rights in Africa. There was a high level of participation of the African Commission and the African Union, as well as representatives of African local and regional NGOs and research institutes. It was emphasised that in the new context the Commission’s mechanisms have to be strengthened for a more effective follow-up and implementation of its decisions. The Commission has made substantial progress in its 17 years of operation and has become an important organ within the African political scene. But even more is required in order for human rights to become an accepted feature of the political process in Africa.

In the first commentary of this issue, Øystein H. Rolandsen, Horn of Africa adviser at Norwegian People’s Aid in Oslo, summarises in a concise way the background to the present crisis in Sudan. He reminds us that – as in other cases – the history of the country and the region of Darfur is an important factor for understanding the background of the current conflict. It

is essential to understand the context in order to grasp all the information that floods over us daily about the Sudanese crisis. The regional neighbours, as well as the AU, have taken an active role in trying to mediate and resolve the conflict. It is for all of us to hope that a peaceful solution will be found as quickly as possible to avoid further suffering for the many victims of this prolonged conflict.

The second and third commentary are by Margaret Lee, a Visiting Scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies of John Hopkins University, Washington, DC, and Henning Melber, Research Director at our Institute. They reflect upon present efforts directed at regional economic integration in Africa within the context of global trade arrangements. The many initiatives for regional economic integration, in combination with overlapping initiatives under the new WTO trade regime, seem rather to “separate and divide, instead of bringing African economies and interests closer”. Both authors call for stronger and independent initiatives from within Africa in order to re-visit matters of regional economic collaboration and to seek the effective involvement of the majority of the African populations in these countries in the process.

We are also pleased to present some of the major themes of three research programmes/projects being implemented at the Institute, namely ‘Religious history and gender relations in Kilimanjaro, Northern Tanzania’ (Päivi Hasu), ‘State recuperation, resource mobilisation and conflict: Researching citizenship and capacity in African states’ (Lars Buur) and ‘Power and counter-power in Zimbabwe: Political violence and cultural resistance’ (Björn Lindgren). ■

Lennart Wohlgemuth

Perspectives on the crisis in Darfur



By: Øystein H. Rolandsen
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The crisis in Darfur, Sudan, has been on the headlines for the past months. In this commentary, Rolandsen explains why he considers the crisis a reflection of a Sudanese governance crisis at national level.

The peace process between the government of Sudan and the southern based Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had a breakthrough in the summer of 2002 when the Machakos protocol was signed. This process has received considerable coverage in international media, but more recently the conflict in Darfur has often been mentioned as a counter-balance to triumphs at the negotiation table. The two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have displayed military capabilities that clearly threaten the central government's position in the region. Despite massive coverage the crisis in Darfur is still presented as an isolated event. A broader perspective in terms of history and implications for political processes elsewhere in the Sudan and within the region helps to explain the causes of the conflict and the way it is being fought. A comprehensive analysis of these issues needs more space, but some elements of the context of the conflict are presented below.

Historical roots of the conflict

The history of Darfur is an important factor when explaining the background to the current conflict. From the 15th century until its conquest by the Turco-Egyptian regime centred in Khartoum in 1874 Darfur was an autonomous state with strong roots in the local Fur tradition. After the end of the Mahdist revolution in 1898 until 1916 Darfur was again established as an independent state. Darfur was included in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1916. A system of indirect rule was instituted and during the 1940s, as a modern political system was being established in Northern Sudan, Darfur became a stronghold of the Ansar sect and its Umma party. Later the Muslim Brotherhood also found supporters in the region. Despite this apparent inclusion in political processes at the centre, the people of Darfur – even the intellectual elite – were not expected to play an active role in national politics.

There have been constant low-scale conflicts for several decades in Darfur caused by ecological degradation and failed rains; a classic battle for resources, particularly land. The state has lacked policing capacity and as a consequence, it has been common practice among all ethnic groups to arm themselves and organise self-defence mechanisms and minor clashes have occurred from time to time. When the first reports of heavy fighting in Darfur occurred in January/February 2003 this was an escalation of a conflict in a region where large groups have been excluded and marginalised from political processes and economic development since the establishment of the Sudan as a political entity.

Why a crisis now?

Although the current conflict in Darfur has historical roots it is still necessary to find explanations as to why it started to escalate in early 2003. It seems that the fear of being further

politically marginalised as a consequence of the government of Sudan – SPLM/A peace process was an important factor when the SLM and JEM decided to start attacking military installations in Darfur. Yet, it took a while before the rebels presented any elaborate political programme or list of demands. SLM has been the group with the presentation of the most coherent and elaborate political programme. Their most important demands are more local autonomy, improved economic development for Darfur, better representation at the national level and an end to ethnic discrimination.

Considering the relatively flexible demands of the rebels it seems that a negotiated settlement would have been preferable to the government of Sudan. This makes it difficult to explain the overly brutal retaliation following the initial attacks from the rebel groups in Darfur. Even though neither SLM nor JEM has made any secessionist demands, part of the explanation might be that the government of Sudan fears increased regional autonomy will mean that the government loses control in the region. Giving in to these demands could also increase the pressure from marginalised groups in other regions to have similar arrangements. Moreover, there are secessionist sentiments among the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, the Southern Blue Nile and in Abyei. However, it is not in the sense that these peoples want to form their own states, but rather that in the event of the establishment of an independent South Sudan they would like to join it. Although it is not plausible that other regions such as Darfur would decide to join an independent South, the fear that other discontented groups might follow the example of the JEM and SLM/A may have led the government to feel that it was necessary to demonstrate that rebellion does not pay.

Spill-over effects

Darfur might appear to be a regional backwater, but it is in fact a central piece in the complicated game of domination and destabilisation between Chad, Libya and the Sudan. The recent developments in Darfur have complicated the relation-

ship between Chad and the Sudan. The main reason for this is that Chad's current government with President Idriss Deby is to a large extent dependent on support from the Zaghawa people whose homeland straddles the border between Chad and Darfur. The Zaghawas are also well represented in the SLM and JEM which puts pressure on Deby to sympathise with their cause. But Chad is a weak state and is dependent on support from the stronger Sudan. For these reasons it was difficult for Deby to play the neutral role as facilitator for peace negotiations as both parties accused him of favouring the other side. That a considerable number of refugees have entered Chadian territory is of course something that now requires political action from the Chadian government. Libya has had its own agenda for a long time. Some claim that it is Libyan political agitation that has led to the increased focus on the divide between Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur. Continued conflict in Darfur might block the peace process in the South which as a consequence will affect the Sudan's relations with all its eastern and southern neighbours as well.

Background of the Janjaweed

The Janjaweed groups are often mentioned and news reports explain in detail their appalling modus operandi. Civilians are the main targets and the objective is to kill or at least expel the agriculturalist population from Darfur. Recently it has also become commonly known that the Janjaweed have been recruited, outfitted and paid by the Khartoum government. What is less known is that the strategic use of local militias has been a major element in Khartoum's counter-insurgency strategy since the mid-1980s. The Government of Sudan has systematically exploited local animosities by arming and enticing local warlords and their followers to fight rebels and harass civilians in hot spots around the country. For example in the Upper Nile province local groups opposing the SPLM/A have been given arms and funding by the Khartoum government since the early 1980s. Initially they fought the SPLM/A, but during the 1990s these militias were used together with the regular army in the government's attempt to

de-populate the oil prospecting areas in western Upper Nile. More recently, in spring this year, elements of this militia were used in the Shilluk Kingdom in eastern Upper Nile in displacing approximately 100,000 people by attacking and burning down their villages. In the early 1990s, militias took part in an ethnic cleansing process in the Nuba Mountains which resembles what is happening in Darfur today, as the majority of the Nuba people are Muslim and the area belongs to Northern Sudan.

There are several negative aspects to this fighting by proxy. One is the lack of control. As long as the government uses the militia to attack and plunder it appears that Khartoum can decide where and when the attacks will take place as this corresponds with the militia leaders' wishes. But it might become difficult to demobilise and disarm the Janjaweed since this is contrary to the interest of the militias themselves. In the event that government attempts in earnest to stop the militias it is likely that they will refuse to hand in weapons and they might even decide to use them against their previous allies. It is also worth mentioning that by using local militias to fight their wars, the government in Khartoum is eroding the central state's monopoly of use of legitimate violence. This means a further weakening of the Sudan as a state. It also contributes to widening the gap

between ethnic groups which makes peace more difficult to achieve.

Conclusion

The crisis in Darfur is not caused by a local conflict going out of control. It is a reflection of a governance crisis at a national level in the Sudan. The background to the conflict is similar to that of the South: a late and weak integration in the central state combined with marginalisation and struggle over resources. The peace process in the South is part of the reason why the people in Darfur chose open rebellion, and the Government of Sudan's heavy-handed response may be motivated by fear of similar outbreaks elsewhere in the North. Also the way in which the government of Sudan chooses to fight the rebellion – relying on local militia groups to attack civilians suspected of belonging to ethnic groups that support the rebellion – resembles government strategies in Kordofan as well as in the South. The vested interest of Chad and to some extent Libya in the outcome of the conflict lifts the crisis up to the international level. As the African Union is deploying troops and extensive international interventions are being debated it is important to be aware of these factors or else such interventions might turn into another Iraq or Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. ■

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The US and EU – Undermining regional economic integration in Africa



By: Margaret C. Lee

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“Instead of enhancing Africa’s integration into the world economy, the free trade agreements proposed by the US and EU will likely result in Africa’s further marginalization”, Margaret Lee concludes this commentary on trade agreements between Africa and the US and EU.

The most recent report by the United States Department of Commerce on trade between Africa and the US paints a glowing picture of the impact that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has had on increased access for African countries to the US market. In 2003, according to the report, there was an increase of 54 percent (just over USD 14 billion) in African exports to the US over 2002. A closer read of this figure, however, reveals that 80 percent (over USD 11 billion) represents petroleum exports to the US. The remaining 20 percent (less than 3 billion) consists of textiles and apparel (USD 1.2 billion), transport and equipment (USD 732 million) and agriculture (USD 241million). While the 2003 report does not identify the major beneficiary countries, the 2002 report identifies them as Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon, Lesotho, and Kenya. Together these five countries accounted for 93 percent of AGOA utilization. More revealing, however, is

that an estimated 85 percent of non-petroleum AGOA exports to the US originate from countries in Southern Africa. It therefore makes sense that the US government should identify the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as the first African regional economic organization targeted for a free trade agreement with the US under the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

The idea of Western powers seeking free trade agreements with Africa originates from the EU. In fact, the US government makes it very clear that in seeking a free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union, it is attempting to ‘level’ the playing field with the EU following the 1999 free trade agreement signed between the EU and South Africa. Like the proposed US–Southern African Customs Union free trade agreement, the EU–South Africa free trade agreement served as the model for future free trade agreements with the EU’s African, Caribbean and Pacific partners. The governments of Eastern and Southern Africa have enthusiastically embraced the free trade agreement negotiations with the EU in the form of economic partnership agreements. In fact, at a conference in Pretoria in March 2004 on trade and investment in the SADC region, I felt like I had committed heresy when I queried whether such economic partnership agreements were a hindrance to regional economic integration in Africa. This query followed a presentation on economic partnership agreements by a person from the COMESA Secretariat who explained how Eastern and Southern Africa is to be reconfigured into two new entities in order to negotiate economic partnership agreements with the EU. The first entity is to consist of 16 countries representing the EU–Eastern and Southern Africa economic partnership agreement and the second eight countries representing the EUSADC economic partnership agreement. I later

discovered that the EU initially planned to negotiate one economic partnership agreement with the entire Eastern and Southern Africa region.

The objective of this article is to assess the extent to which the US and EU are undermining regional economic integration in Africa through the creation of free trade agreements with African countries.

From non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade agreements

The EU, in justifying the transformation from non-reciprocal trade agreements with its African, Caribbean and Pacific partners under the Lomé Conventions to reciprocal trade agreements under the Cotonou Agreement, argues that the former are not WTO (the World Trade Organisation) compatible. In not being WTO compatible, such agreements, according to the EU, are deemed to be illegal because they discriminate against member countries that do not have non-reciprocal access to the EU market (e.g. developing countries outside Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific). This explanation would be laudable if the EU, along with the US, were committed to freer and fairer trade. By maintaining huge trade-distorting subsidies and non-tariff barriers to trade against developing countries, it is obvious that this is not the case. The removal of such trade barriers, according to the World Bank, would increase global income by USD 500 billion annually by 2015, with most of the increase being realized in poor countries.

Another irony about the EU's alleged commitment to WTO compatibility is the reality that the EU and US, as the world economic hegemonies, determine what is deemed to be WTO compatible. Consequently, for the US, the African Growth and Opportunity Act is not deemed to be WTO incompatible. In fact, under the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 (AGOA III), signed by President Bush on July 13, 2004, AGOA beneficiary countries will have their non-reciprocal access to the US market extended until 2015.

In terms of negotiating a US–Southern African Customs Union free trade agreement, unlike the EU, the US government has been very transparent with respect to its objectives. They include,

as previously mentioned, leveling the playing field with the EU, and providing US farmers, workers, businesses, and families with greater access to the Southern African Customs Union market. In terms of textiles and apparel, where the Southern African Customs Union countries have experienced the greatest benefit from AGOA, the US government plans to negotiate fully reciprocal access to the Southern African Customs Union market for the US textile and apparel sector.

The US and EU have proclaimed that both AGOA and the Cotonou Agreement will result in economic development, including poverty reduction/eradication, increased regional economic integration, and Africa's further integration into the world economy.

Free trade agreements with the US and EU

In addition to trade, free trade agreement negotiation issues will include investment, intellectual property rights, e-commerce, transparency, labor standards, the environment, government procurement, dispute settlement, transparency, competition policy, and sanitary and phytosanitary rules. While there may be some benefits arising from providing Western countries with greater access to African markets, including technology transfer, investment, and greater economic efficiency, the costs will likely outweigh the benefits.

Anticipated costs include revenue losses, possibly resulting in the worsening of the regional debt situation; de-industrialization; increased unemployment; increased poverty; fragmentation of export and tariff regimes; loss of export competitiveness; undermining of local agricultural and industrial production arising from EU and US dumping; more trade diversion than trade creation; and undermining existing regional economic integration strategies.

In order for the EU to successfully negotiate an economic partnership agreement with the Eastern and Southern Africa economic partnership agreement group and the SADC economic partnership agreement group, both entities have to at least become free trade areas (preferably customs unions). All of the 16 Eastern and Southern Africa economic partnership agreement members (the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Kenya, and Uganda) are members of other regional economic organizations that are at various levels of market/trade integration. These include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community. Similarly, with the exception of one country, all the members of the EU–SADC economic partnership agreement (Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania) are also members of other regional economic organizations, including the Southern African Customs Union. In the case of the EU–SADC economic partnership agreement, South Africa only has observer status, and as previously mentioned, has its own free trade agreement with the EU. In addition, as members of the Southern African Customs Union, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (the BLNS countries) are *de facto* members of the EU–South Africa free trade agreement. Given this reality, the negotiations for the EU–SADC economic partnership agreement should be very interesting.

The proposed economic partnership agreement configurations raise serious questions about the continued viability of regional economic integration in Eastern and Southern Africa, which was already in a perilous state prior to the EU's reconfiguration of the region. Since 2000, all the regional economic organizations in Eastern and Southern Africa have signed new agreements with a view to deepening regional economic integration. The plethora of existing regional economic organizations in Eastern and Southern Africa is not a reflection of economic logic, but of political realities. Similarly, the two new regional entities for the economic partnership agreement negotiations reflect regional political realities, and in literally cutting paths through existing regional economic organizations, the potential exists for sowing further seeds of political and economic instability. With the carrot in one hand and the stick in the other, African governments are being promised financial compensation if they comply

with the EU's aspirations and threatened with further marginalization if they do not. Seemingly the only way that the countries of Eastern and Southern Africa can successfully negotiate the two proposed economic partnership agreements with the EU is to disband all other regional economic organizations and negotiate an Eastern and Southern Africa economic partnership agreement free trade area and a SADC economic partnership agreement free trade area. This is not realistic. However, time is of the essence since all economic partnership agreements must be in force by January 1, 2008. With an EU–Eastern and Southern Africa economic partnership agreement and an EU–SADC economic partnership agreement in place, the EU would have successfully undermined home-grown African efforts at regional economic integration.

A US–Southern African Customs Union free trade agreement will no doubt further challenge the economic stability of the Southern African Customs Union countries. This has already been done with the revenue losses experienced by the BLNS countries as a result of the EU–South Africa free trade agreement. A similar free trade agreement with the US will further erode revenue losses and result in the dumping of cheaper and more efficiently produced US products. These products in turn will enter the markets of the SADC countries as a result of the porous regional borders. This will further undermine regional economic integration among the SADC countries. Losing non-reciprocal access to the US market, Lesotho and Swaziland will likely lose the gains they have made under AGOA since textiles and apparel are their major exports to the US. The extent to which the BLNS countries are vulnerable to a prospective US–Southern African Customs Union free trade agreement is evident in the fact that the US government has provided computers to their negotiators in order to enhance their negotiating capacity.

Conclusion

It is perplexing that the US and EU sees the need to gain greater access to the markets of a region, sub-Saharan Africa, whose income is the equivalent of one European country – Belgium. After two

decades of structural adjustment programs there exists irrefutable evidence that openness, without an appropriate economic development strategy in place, does not result in economic growth and development, or increased integration into the world economy. Such integration, it is argued, is a consequence of economic growth and development and not greater openness. Instead of enhancing Africa's integration into the world economy, the free trade agreements proposed by the US

and EU will likely result in Africa's further marginalization and the undermining of the already perilous state of regional economic integration in Africa. On the one hand it seems unbelievable that African governments have not rebelled against these proposed free trade agreements, but on the other, the history of rebellious states against world hegemonies does not bode well for countries that are struggling to stay afloat amidst the rising tide of the vicious waves of the ocean. ■

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Challenges to regional integration: The case of SADC



By: Henning Melber

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Less rather than more regional cooperation and integration is the result of recent trends in the relations between SADC and partners like NEPAD, EU and the US, according to Melber. See what his opinion is based on in this analysis of the situation.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Swedish authorities drafted and ultimately adopted (on 27 June 2002) a 'Swedish Strategy for Support for Regional and Subregional Development Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa' as a framework for the period until 2006. The document concludes that "there is a need to attempt to define more closely what is meant by regional relevance" (para. 2.2). In the light of the rapid changes taking place, the current forces adversely affecting regional integration require continued assessment in order to possibly readjust any truly supportive role in regional schemes.

Recent trends, more clearly emanating since the adoption of the Swedish policy document, point in an altogether different direction than the strengthening of regional cooperation through the initiatives at present being undertaken within increasingly global arrangements. The new factors include:

- the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) with a modified agenda on policy and security issues among African states;
- the adoption and implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as an – at least officially proclaimed – AU strategy with an (unfortunate) emphasis in its implementation on socio-economic (and to some extent security) issues;
- the further enhancement of bi- and multilateral trade agreements between external agencies and individual African states, which might have a potentially dividing impact on regional integration issues, such as the EU free trade agreement with South Africa or the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the US, as well as G8 projects of its African Action Plan in support of NEPAD.

Not only matters related to the global economic exchange, but also recent political developments and their treatment in multinational bodies might require new assessments of the state of regional collaboration in various African settings. One example to illustrate this case is the controversy over Zimbabwe. This escalated into a sharp division of views within the Commonwealth group of states over the continued suspension at the end of 2003 and as a result of these debates showed the divisions over the policy towards Zimbabwe within SADC too. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that the inability of SADC to agree on a common denominator concerning the policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe has an almost paralysing effect. The current dilemma is in actual fact a good example to illustrate the political obstacles within SADC and the limits towards further regional cooperation with the aim of enhanced integration.

NEPAD

The same can be concluded from the current trends within NEPAD. It seems to increasingly emerge as a type of mega-NGO to channel aid-funds into developmental projects, which at best claim, but in reality fail, to be driven by a desire towards enhanced regional collaboration. The programmes and policies funded under NEPAD are implemented mainly by countries and not by regional bodies. Hence NEPAD in effect more undermines than strengthens an agency such as SADC (or any other regional institution). This is a trend notwithstanding the fact that NEPAD attributes substantial relevance to regional bodies when identifying ways and means to achieve the defined socio-economic goals.

NEPAD claims that its agenda is “based on national and regional priorities and development plans”, which ought to be prepared “through participatory processes involving the people” (para. 49). So far, however, no visible signs in SADC would indicate that the collective (multilateral) efforts aim at a united approach of the region in its relations with the outside world. Nor does NEPAD so far translate its noble aims into practical steps for implementation. The blue-print emphasises sub-regional and regional approaches even under a separate sub-heading. It stresses “the need for African countries to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration ... to improve international competitiveness” (para. 94). But the crux of the matter lies there: the emphasis on international competitiveness comes at the expenses of strengthening the local economy and the local people. As Patrick Bond in his annotated critique of NEPAD points out, integration in Africa should as a priority “meet the socio-economic and environmental needs of its citizenries” instead of seeking to turn even more into an export platform.

NEPAD claims further to enhance the provision of essential regional goods as well as the promotion of intra-African trade and investments, with another focus on “rationalising the institutional framework for economic integration” (para. 95). But again, such an approach neglects the local/internal in favour of the global/external

orientation. The implementation of NEPAD will hence most likely have the adverse effect and assist in an increased outward orientation of a regional bloc at the expense of internal consolidation. It is interesting to note in this context, that notwithstanding the decisive role of South Africa within NEPAD, SADC has so far hardly acknowledged and certainly not embraced the initiative. Illuminating enough, the SADC Executive Secretary Prega Ramsamy manages in a recent essay on NEPAD to mention SADC just in one general cross-reference to the need for working closely with sub-regional institutions.

The European Union

The EU–South Africa free trade agreement had an even more divisive effect on the Southern African region by entering into a preferential trade relationship with one country and thereby enhancing differences within the region resulting from existing conflicts of interest among the national economies. South Africa herself, the monetary zone, the South African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC are already not in harmony at any time and less so given the effects of the free trade agreement on regional economic matters. Hence the EU intervention adds more friction.

The new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the EU not only seek to replace the previous Cotonou Agreement by means of sub-regional separate negotiations but also aim towards compatibility between EU–ACP trade relations and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). They are hence dependent upon the settlement of the Doha Development Agenda’s controversial and yet unresolved issues. Interesting enough, the draft European Constitution makes no reference to cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific states. It is only fair to assume that the EU enlargement shifts interest even further away from the neighbouring continent towards more collaboration closer to Brussels. In addition, the negotiations by the EU aim at separate accords with each region, and no country may negotiate in more than one bloc. As such, SADC is reduced to seven member countries (half of the 14 SADC

states) under the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations.

It is not far-fetched to see that there is an inbuilt conflict between regionalism as it exists and the negotiations of new multilateral processes. Countries might differ over the advantages between benefits from the continued protection of regional arrangements or the creation of individual preferential access within other trade agreements. As Ian Gillson and Sven Grimm argue: "regionalism may actively serve to undermine the multilateral process, since regional agreements establish margins of preference for members over non-members. As such, for members of a preferential trade agreement, multilateral liberalisation can have costs associated with erosion of preferences". But if regionalism is considered as a problem or obstacle towards further global harmonisation under the WTO, it stands little chance of being a viable point of departure for strengthening the South (or any Least Developed Countries) within the global trade arrangements.

Instead, the predictable outcome of the current negotiations under the WTO related agreements is a "shrinking of development space", as Robert Wade calls it. To avoid such inequalitarian pseudo-partnerships, he argues, a shift in balance "from the drive to homogenize trading commitments to other states towards granting states reasonable scope to choose appropriate levels of national protection" is required. A development strategy would therefore have to operate in a zone where internal as well as external integration reinforce rather than undermine each other. Instead, issues of internal integration (including issues of regional integration) have largely dropped out of the development agenda as the gospel of the free trade paradigm dominates the discourse.

The United States of America

The same limiting effects can be expected from the free trade agreement between SACU and the US. The SACU-US agreement seems to promise nothing different from AGOA, which tends to separate and divide instead of bringing African economies and interests closer. The benefits from AGOA differ among African countries according to their

resources. Ironically, within those countries having been allocated a Least Developed Countries status under AGOA (receiving additional preferential treatment), external capital (from mainly East Asian countries) has managed to exploit the opportunities created under preferential tax regimes for supplying the US market with cheap textiles from these countries. The by and large unqualified and underpaid workforce in the local sweatshops is hardly reaping any benefits from the super-exploitation. Nor does the fiscus in these states, as initial investments and running costs for operations are substantially subsidised with public revenue instead of the operations providing any tax income from the profits generated.

Such recent trends indicate less rather than more regional cooperation and integration, at least in macro-economic terms among the official membership in such bodies as SADC. The political and security interests might promote, with increased support by the G8, the strengthening of initiatives towards closer regional collaboration in reducing armed conflicts and securing more stability. Such stability continues however to be perceived as regime security, in contrast to a concept of human security. The latter would give primacy to human rights in favour of the citizens and not preference to the governments in power. It therefore remains a task to at least fit human rights into the trade matrix, as Thoko Kaime has recently demanded for SADC.

Even if there are achievements in this direction, the multidimensionality and heterogeneity of a region like Southern Africa is likely to persist and may eventually increase, as Fredrik Söderbaum concludes. This does not prevent external support towards further positive regional interdependence. But – as Liisa Laakso summarises – this requires more than merely the opening up to the global economy. More so, it would have to re-visit matters of regional economic collaboration and seek involvement of the majority of the African population in these countries. The current initiatives by the EU and the US under the WTO offer little to no promise to contribute to such a desirable tendency, neither in SADC nor elsewhere. ■

Poverty and prosperity in contemporary African Christianity



By: Päivi Hasu
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A trans-national religious movement variably called neo-Pentecostalism or charismatic Christianity has been spreading across Africa during the past couple of decades. It is attracting the urban middle class as well as the rural poor across the continent. Many of the charismatic churches and ministries are characterized by Faith Gospel also called Gospel of Prosperity or Health and Wealth Gospel. This form of gospel, discussed particularly by Paul Gifford, has it that Christians should be healthy, wealthy and successful. A believer has the right to health and wealth, and can obtain these blessings by a positive confession of faith. This Christianity that claims to address questions of poverty and prosperity is now flourishing in the declining African economies.

The advocates of prosperity gospel formulated a theology of giving in order to receive. Christianity means success, and success depends on giving tithes to God. And the wealth of the Christian is for evangelisation, not for investment. The idea of receiving through giving can be traced to such American preachers as Kenneth Hagin and Kenneth Copeland. For many of the religious entrepreneurs the idea of receiving through giving, and the consequent divine fundraising are means to meet the expenses of the costly

ministries. In Africa, the ones who know their Bible and have the skill to preach and teach can establish ministries as religious enterprises and as income generating activities.

As Gifford has suggested, this message of prosperity, health and wealth finds resonance in African religious thought because it embodies the traditional orientation of African religion. According to the traditional religious worldview religion has to do with achieving material well-being. Prosperity gospel therefore coalesces well with the central preoccupations of the African religious thought as it is concerned with the good life here and now: health, prosperity and success in life.

Tanzanian example

Prosperity gospel is now gaining followers not only among the middle class urban Tanzanians but also in the poverty-stricken rural areas. The advocates of this message preach among other things about wealth, and usually promise a reward to come in this life: You believe in Jesus as your personal saviour, you pay your tithes; and you will be blessed with even greater success. Some prosperity preachers teach the biblical promise of receiving a hundred fold of what one has given.

Christopher Mwakasege, a non-denominational charismatic preacher is considered by some as the icon of the contemporary revival movement in Tanzania. He has previously worked as the senior economist at the head office of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania where he had the church-run social and development projects as his responsibility. He is currently the Executive Director of an NGO called Tanzania Social and Economic Trust involved in research, campaigning and awareness creation on social and economic issues. He has served as an advisor un-

der the President's office in matters related to the national external debt crisis and debt reduction strategy. He has also been involved in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme in Tanzania as a representative of NGOs. He attends national and international meetings at organizations such as IMF representing NGOs. And he has contacts to at least one of the Nordic foreign ministries.

Mwakasege has also established another NGO, a ministry called Manna. He travels around the country to all the largest cities and arranges seminars that last up to two weeks. The largest attendance estimates have been up to 30,000 persons on a single day. Apart from organizing seminars his ministry produces audio and video tapes and broadcasts on several radio stations that can be heard in nine countries of East and Central Africa. Mwakasege also maintains a sophisticated website which includes prayers, testimonies, teachings, questions and answers, pastoral letters, seminar reports and information about possibilities of contributing to the activities of the ministry. He also has a large body of material titled 'The Christian and the economy' published on the website. In 2004 his message has included prayers for the state of Tanzania and the election of 2005 together with encouragement of Christians to register for voting.

In December 2003 he had a seminar targeted at the urban middle class in Dar es Salaam titled 'What do you do when your salary does not meet your expenses?'. Apart from the biblical message he discussed the changes in the Tanzanian economy, consequences of economic liberalization on subsidized health care and education, principles of doing successful business, market research, discovering one's personal talent etc.

Teacher and his message

Mwakasege's message did not only relate directly to the problem of insufficient income of the ordinary Tanzanians. It was also about the significance of the offerings to prosperity in general and about the means to cover the expenses of the ministry in particular.

Mwakasege differs in a crucial respect from some other proponents of prosperity gospel.

According to him, faith alone cannot guarantee prosperity. He does not emphasize the importance of work en route to prosperity as much as he discusses markets and business. There is a need to do market research for any profitable business and a need to understand the law of demand and supply. But the view that he shares with many others is that God did not want man to be poor and that the material success is to come in this life. His message reflects the famous words of President Julius Nyerere as he states: "God created man as his own image; God is not poor and therefore he did not create man as the image of the poor. God is the one who gives man the power to gain wealth. God is the one who teaches man to make profit. The wealth that one gets from God is there to spread gospel. The ones who believe in God and follow his commands will get back a hundred fold when still in this world." Wealth is needed not only to satisfy the human needs but also to make offerings so that gospel can be spread: "Who do you think will donate money for the purpose of spreading gospel if not the Christians? And how do the Christians give money if they don't have it? And how would they have money if they think that it is a sin to have a lot of money?"

Many of Mwakasege's topics refer indirectly to his own NGO and his income generating activities. First, one needs to have know-how to run a profitable business, and second, one needs to do market research in order to identify the supply and demand: "You do market research on what the other NGOs offer and what they lack or fail to do. You identify the need and then you respond to the need." He is also clear about his own know-how on being successful: "If the teacher is not wealthy do not think of becoming his disciple. If his education has failed to make him wealthy how is he going to make you wealthy? Explain to me, who will listen to an evangelist or any other servant who tells you to trust in God in everything if he has patched clothes himself?"

The field and the firm

In his teachings about the significance of offerings Mwakasege combines in the most clever way the message of getting back a hundred fold and the

need of his ministry to receive contributions. What makes the message so ingenious is that the power whose doings cannot be questioned and whose ways are unknown to human beings responds whenever it is suitable for him.

Mwakasege uses two different metaphors about the nature of offerings: Firstly, the biblical metaphor of sowing and reaping in due season whenever it suits God: "This is about the season and your patience in waiting for the harvest. But some people get into despair. The ones who cannot learn to put up with the fact that God rewards when it suits him cannot harvest what has been sown." Secondly, he uses a modern metaphor of corporations and shareholding: "God wants you to give offerings as your capital that you invest in the firm. Those of you who understand matters of stocks and shares know that they are not part of your daily expenses; they are your investment. God wants you to have enough money to continue buying more of his stocks in the firm of Lord Jesus. And when you continue giving in this way Lord Jesus continues making profit and he will return it back to you."

The way in which Mwakasege manages to maintain the distinction between the sacred and the profane is that at the end of the day the returns from God may come in an immaterial form that is more valuable than any material gain: "God himself comes to receive the tithes but he does not come empty-handed. You will be given the word of revelation to move you ahead. Those who know how to pray will pray for something better than money. God may tell that he will bring you a revelation to get you out of the trouble but you may say that you want money to get out of your trouble. God says: 'No, I have something bigger to give you, I will give a revelation, I will give you the word, I will give you know-how.' God will empower you to prosper. It is not a matter of dropping money from heaven."

Heavenly bank

A young born-again woman described the importance of offerings to any born-again Christian and her own bookkeeping system and the savings that she has placed with God:

"If I give an offering I write down the date and I follow it. It is as if you have opened a bankbook. I have given to God and how many times have I received? I follow until I have come to a hundred fold. Offerings are no joke. Offerings are a big thing for the born-again and those who know God. For any born-again it is a sin to use the tithes that belong to God. The ordinary Christians do not understand the meaning of offerings. But if you go to the meetings of the revival movement, if you count the offerings of the people who are born-again, it is altogether different! If you go to church, there is nobody who gives 10,000 sh in the offerings. But if you go to the revival meetings you see that one has given 20,000 sh, another one 50,000 sh. Why? Because they understand the meaning of the offering. We who are born-again we know the profit we get from God. You wait patiently after you have sown. God replies when it is his time to reply. You don't know how many years. But I know that God replies. If he does not reply today, he replies tomorrow. If he does not reply tomorrow then perhaps the day after tomorrow".

Conclusions

Charismatic Christianity is appealing across Africa to a range of people from the relatively affluent urban middle class to the marginalized and the rural poor. The new churches and movements tend to be so successful partly because they address the existential problems and economic survival and give hope for change. The hundred fold return for the tithes in the indefinite future is therefore a persuasive promise. The Tanzanian example presented here may not be the most typical case of all. However, it is all the more interesting and important given that the evangelist promoting prosperity gospel is a rather high profile professional with international contacts and connections, and is involved in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme in one of the poorest countries of Africa. ■

Suggested reading on page 36!

State recuperation, resource mobilisation and conflict

By: Lars Buur

Co-ordinator of the research programme 'State recuperation, resource mobilisation and conflict: researching citizenship and capacity in African states', the Nordic Africa Institute

The research programme explores the complex inter-connections between post-colonial state recuperation, resource mobilisation and conflict in African states. Through the prism of resource mobilisation – formal and informal taxes, user fees, self-help and aid – the dynamics behind state recuperation and its effects are explored with regard to the constitution of different types of citizenship, forms of democratic organisation and sorts of conflict. The term recuperation is intended to describe the processes by which the re-constitution of state legitimacy and forms of state practice (particularly in areas such as resource mobilisation and service provision) are embarked upon during social, political, economic and administrative reforms in African states. It is generally accepted that conflicts are generic to reform. Despite the widespread agreement about the need to decentralise governance, formalise a range of societal sectors and improve the public sector in developing countries by increasing resource mobilisation, conflicts arise as soon as agendas become specific. Conflicts over formalisation of societal sectors and resources often offer rich and compact pictures of competition over rights, contestation of law and decentralisation plans and how authority and legitimacy are produced and challenged. Obvious questions such as the following will be explored: Which kind of taxes and/or forms of revenues give rise to certain kinds of conflicts? What role does the sequence of reform activities and resource mobilisation play in the articulation of certain kinds of conflicts? Who or which key protagonists feature most prominently in conflicts related to reform and resource mobilisation?

Besides paying attention to conflict the programme explores the consequences formal and

informal resource mobilisation, service provision and societal formalisation have for the constitution of different kinds of citizenship. It is becoming increasingly clear that the colonial distinction between citizens with rights and membership of the political community on the one hand, and subjects governed indirectly through a range of different arrangements such as traditional authority, local justice structures, party or interest groupings on the other, continues to underlie practices of citizenship in Africa, if not elsewhere. As a matter of fact, attempts at reform and formalisation are often underpinned by trends towards informalisation not only in the form of the development of 'informal business sectors', but more generally new waves of 'informalisation' appear in the slip-stream of neo-liberal reform attempts. The programme will, through the prism of resource mobilisation, explore the constitution of 'differentiated' or 'conditional' citizenship; pointing to the fact that *de jure* rights have not necessarily been converted into *de facto* rights for many of the most poor sections of African populations. As such the programme will focus on preconditions for state capacity building and planning by focusing on state practices and the relationship between state practices and state subjects that underpins claims to legitimacy.

In programmatic form the tentative objectives of the programme are:

- To explore, through the prism of resource mobilisation, the dynamics behind state recuperation attempts in African countries where states have limited presence and/or legitimacy and are undergoing institutional capacity reformation (decentralisation reforms);
- To explore resource mobilisation in a broad sense as a way of bringing the state and citizenship into

being through techniques and institutions in everyday life, as well as through locally situated struggles over resources, recognition, inclusion and authority;

- To assess the effects of resource mobilisation in relation to the enrolment of state-subjects, accountability and the creation of new arenas for conflict.

New modes of governance have naturally required the emergence and formation of a whole new range of democratic organisations, interest groups and socio-economic campaigns, such as groups working to counter privatisation of core services, which draw on and align themselves with global anti-privatisation formations. While acknowledging that these transitions are not reducible to global processes, neither can they be separated from effects of 'globalisation' such as the spread of neo-liberal governance, including decentralisation initiatives and various economic reforms. Other aspects of the transition include loss of formal employment and informalisation of job opportunities, in other words formalisation of some economies and informalisation of others. Just as state-civil society relationships become reconfigured – that profoundly reshape urban and rural public spaces – such changes are often securitised in new ways. There is therefore an intimate link between the production of informality and formality and security and law enforcement where the distinction between public and private law enforcement becomes harder to maintain. This has consequences for changing livelihood practices underpinning political, gender and generational relations.

Research networks

In order to position its work on the securitisation of reform initiatives, the programme has placed its work within the international research network 'From inequality to insecurity?' based at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). The overall goal of the network is to reach a better understanding of recent trends in international development thinking and action that centre attention on violent crime, conflict and modes of governance. During the last decade, the global

development community as well as many developing countries has become increasingly preoccupied with issues of security and seeks to redefine and redirect development aid as a means to prevent or resolve violent conflict. This trend does not necessarily coincide with the growth in violent crime and conflict. However, the emergence of global complexes that link security with development open up research questions on a paradigmatic plane. Namely, how might 'development' be conceptualised, theorised and analysed when socio-economic inequality and poverty become re-conceived as problems of security rather than as issues of economic growth and distribution on the one hand and of human rights, political action and citizenship on the other? The Nordic Africa Institute has in this regard invited three South African and Mozambican researchers to participate in the work of the network. Their papers will form part of a forthcoming book focusing on the shift from development to security in Southern Africa edited by Steffen Jensen (Roskilde University), Finn Stepputat (DIIS) and Lars Buur (NAI).

The programme focuses in its initial phase on two empirical fields of action, recent decentralisation initiatives in Mozambique and formalisation of informal sectors in South Africa. The work will evolve around two research networks: 'Resource mobilisation and the formalisation of informal sectors in the new South Africa'; and 'Decentralisation and resource mobilisation in Mozambique'.

First, a *research network focusing on a recent decentralisation initiative in Mozambique* known as Decree 15/2000 is being established. The decree aims at formalising the relationship between rural 'community authorities' and the state. In accordance with post-war constitutional commitments to democratic decentralization, a system of elected local governments in the form of municipalities was instituted in 1997. Contrary to reform initiatives in other Southern African states, the legal framework for municipalities made provision for elected local governments only in 33 urban municipalities and not in any rural areas. In rural districts a three-tiered local state administrative structure and Decree 15/2000 enact local governance. Mirroring the processes of re-traditionalisa-

tion across Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990's, the decree is the first piece of post-colonial legislation to officially recognize 'traditional authority' in Mozambique. The decree includes three categories of authorities that can be legally recognised by rural communities: 'traditional chiefs', former post-colonial party/state secretaries, and other leaders legitimized as such by the respective local communities. Recognised authorities are envisaged to perform the roles as representatives of rural communities and assistants of the state. They are delegated a range of key state-administrative tasks that inter alia include policing, taxation, population registration, law enforcement, land allocation and rural development. Besides administrative tasks, they are envisaged to perform various elements of civic-education in their communities, e.g. fostering a patriotic spirit, supporting the celebration of national days, promoting environmental sustainability, encouraging and enforcing payment of taxes, preventing crime, epidemics and HIV/AIDS, as well as preventing premature pregnancy and marriage.

The Mozambican network will, firstly, assess the implementation process of Decree 15/2000 by posing questions such as: How did the different key role players experience the initial steps of implementing the decree? How was the concept of 'community' interpreted and practised in the identification/appointment of 'community authorities'? Did the implementation process produce conflicts between different aspects of the 'traditional systems' internally and externally and between 'traditional organisation of authority' and other forms of authoritative organisations and interest groups – e.g. the 'secretaries of suburbs or villages', also included in the decree? Are there significant cross-regional differences in how leaders were identified/appointed and in how recognition ceremonies were conducted? What is the significance of the regional variations? Secondly, the network will assess the functionality of delegating state tasks to community authorities by asking: How are tasks delegated to the new authorities? What functions are community authorities performing in relation to previous functions/roles? Has participation of local communities in development

and public administration increased: as regards tax collection, improved crime rates, and level of integration of state and traditional police/law enforcement? What unexpected outcomes/side-effects can be detected? What regional differences with regard of tasks and responsibilities can be detected?

Second, the programme is engaged in setting up a *South African research network on the formalisation of a variety of societal sectors* at present under reform, state formalisation and regulation through state law initiatives, local by-laws and national and local governance initiatives. The sectors under consideration are: the taxi industry; informal markets including street hawkers and spaza shops; money lending businesses; justice enforcement; housing; electricity; water; and shebeens (informal pubs and bars). South Africa provides a good testing ground for understanding the positive and negative effects of neo-liberal reform initiatives and resource mobilisation strategies. Firstly, despite the fact that large sections of the population participate in the informal economy, the South African Revenue Services have managed to generate more funds than the national government has interest in distributing due to neo-liberal policies and to some extent lack of capacity to distribute in an accountable manner. Secondly, despite many claims to the contrary, since the first democratic election in 1994 South Africa has undergone and is undergoing rapid socio-economic transformations that have implications on all levels of society. There has been a radical restructuring of local government and administration structures, redrawing of municipal boundaries and formation of new private-public partnerships (PPPs) with regard to delivery and payment of key services such as water, electricity and garbage collection. These in turn have profoundly reconfigured subject-citizen statuses as well as relations between the private and public domains and between state and subject/citizen. Thirdly, attempts to regulate and formalise sectors of society that previously fell outside the formal economy and governance structure have not had the same consequences for different classes. It is important to recognise that it is an unevenly emerging nation-state that today

stands out in the African landscape of nation-states as an economic and socio-cultural driving force. As a consequence of contradictory processes of reform initiatives severe socio-economic conflict and unrest prevail.

The aim of the South African network is to come up with a comprehensive overview that allows for sector-wide comparison of the mentioned sectors informed by the following questions: What kinds of citizenship (such as individual or republican) are being developed in each sector? What forms of democratic organisation have evolved or are being promoted? What forms of inclusion and exclusion take place in the sectors under scrutiny with regard to gender, generation, and citizenship status? What modes of revenue extraction are applied in each sector? What cultures of accountability are encouraged or have developed for each sector? Lastly, what kinds of conflicts have evolved in the slip-stream of formalisation, outsourcing and private-public partnerships?

The two regional research networks will form part of the basic methodological approach of the programme and two workshops are planned for 2004/05 with the first to be held in South Africa convened by Dr. Janet Cherry from the South African Human Science Research Council in Port Elizabeth and Lars Buur (NAI). The title for the workshop will be: 'Conflicting forms of citizenship: Researching the effects of changed modes of governance'. The second network workshop will be held in Maputo in 2005 with the title: 'An assessment of the implementation of decen-

tralisation policy 15/2000: Experiences, obstacles and conflicts'.

Topical workshops

The research networks are combined with a series of topical workshops that would serve as forums for exploring the overall ideas informing the programme. The first topical workshop was held in Johannesburg in June 2004 hosted by Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) with the title: 'Ritualisation of the state: Neo-popular state rituals in Mozambique and South Africa' (see workshop report on page 28). The workshop was convened by Dr. Achille Mbembe from WISER and Lars Buur (NAI). The aim of the workshop was to discuss and analyse present day forms of state ceremonies and rituals as these relate to current intense focus on 'good governance' and economic/political 'corruption'. A second topical workshop on 'accountability' is at present being planned for autumn 2005. The working title is: 'Cultures of accountability: Towards an understanding of corruption, governance and democratic consolidation in Mozambique and South Africa'.

Commissioned studies

As part of the two regional research networks the programme has commissioned three studies. The first two studies will be on the recapitalisation process of the taxi industry and its effects for local conflict development and either the privatisation of electricity and water or the liquor industries in South African townships. The third study will be on privatisation of water management in Mozambique. The studies will be effectuated in late 2004 or in 2005. The commissioned works are aimed at securing research on resource mobilisation initiatives and reforms where such research is not available or supporting already initiated research plans at some of the research institutions that will form part of the network. ■

Invitation to panel at the AEGIS European Conference on African Studies

June 29 – July 3, 2005 at the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, UK

One of the panels (no. 36) at the conference will be on the theme 'New roles for traditional leaders in resource mobilisation and rural development: Expectations, obstacles and conflicts'. It will be hosted by Lars Buur, the Nordic Africa Institute, and Helene Kyed, the Danish Institute for International Studies. Titles and abstracts for the panel can be submitted until

1 November 2004 to either Lars Buur (lars.buur@nai.uu.se) or Helene Kyed (hmk@diis.dk).

More information on the conference is available at www.nomadit.co.uk/~aegis/

Governance, culture and resistance in Zimbabwe



By: Björn Lindgren

(PhD) Researcher, the Nordic Africa Institute. Current research project: 'Power and Counter-Power in Zimbabwe: Political Violence and Cultural Resistance'.

Many influential news agencies, like the BBC, portray Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe as a dictator and the Zanu-PF government as corrupt and oppressive. Political violence has increased steadily since the parliamentary elections of June 2000. The country's economy has degenerated to the point of collapse, and many people have become more dependent on international humanitarian assistance than ever before. But counter-images have also been produced, for instance by the London-based periodical *New African*. These images portray Mugabe and the Zanu-PF government as bold and, building on pan-Africanism, as one of the few governments in Africa that dare to contest European neo-colonialism and American imperialism.


What both views have in common, however, is a somewhat misleading perception of the state, which is not very congruent with the contemporary world. Transnational global-local relations have profoundly changed the role of the state. Yet commentators, journalists and academics alike, are often stuck with an image of the state as, to paraphrase cultural anthropologists James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, "vertically encompassing". The first of these terms, verticality, refers to the state's often being imagined as "above society",

and the latter, encompassment, to the state's being viewed as encompassing its localities.

The perception of the state as vertically encompassing is evident in both the BBC type and the *New African* type of portrayals of the Zimbabwean state. In the BBC type, President Mugabe and the Zanu-PF government are almost solely responsible for 'state violence', despite the fact that transnational co-operation between foreign donor agencies and Zimbabwean NGOs strongly influences the conflict. In the *New African* type of portrayals, the independent African nation-state is seen as the only legitimized political body to defend and punish people within its borders. Yet there are human rights proponents active not only within the inter-state UN system but also within transnational NGO networks.

Governance today has thus to do not only with how the state in various ways forms citizens and subjects, but also with how other actors, such as international donor agencies and locally based NGOs, govern people transnationally. In many parts of Africa, this development has gone hand in hand with neo-liberal policies, advocated not least by the World Bank and IMF, first through structural adjustment programmes, and then through so-called 'good governance'. In many cases, this has undermined the authority of the state, and one could say with some confidence that colonialism in this respect has indeed been followed by neo-colonialism and/or American imperialism.

In conflict-ridden areas, however, the alliance between international donors and NGOs may not be that unholy. In the case of Zimbabwe, international donors, in accordance with EU



and US sanctions, have ceased to support state authorities. Instead, they channel resources to what is perceived as 'civil society', that is, mainly to the Zimbabwean NGO sector. There are today a number of NGOs, trusts, and civic organizations in Zimbabwe that strongly criticize their president and government. From the perspectives of many people within these organizations, they are not sitting in the laps of foreign donors. On the contrary, many of them regard themselves as main actors, using whatever economic resources are available to achieve their goals.

In 2002, the Zanu-PF government implemented two restrictive laws that forcefully circumscribed the possibility of journalists and human rights activists to criticize the president and the government: the Public Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. This has made cultural workers dealing with the performing arts, such as theatre, music, and dance, important as carriers of dissenting voices and resisters of violence. I would like to exemplify with one such NGO, Rooftop Theatre Productions, which today is financed by various foreign donors, and which relies heavily on transnational networks with other civic organizations in southern Africa.

Rooftop is based in the capital, Harare. It co-operates with other NGOs both in Zimbabwe and southern Africa as well as in other parts of the world. It mainly performs its plays on stage, but lately it has also been involved in film and video productions. At least 75 percent of everything that is broadcast on the radio and television in Zimbabwe is supposed to be Zimbabwean produced, and 40 percent of the Zimbabwean-made products is supposed to be produced outside the state-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). In theory, this makes it possible for Rooftop and others to make films and broadcast them on television. But many of their productions are too critical of the government to be broadcast on ZBC, which is the sole television station in Zimbabwe.

One of Rooftop's latest plays, 'Superpatriots and Morons', is such a play. This play was rehearsed in Stockholm in May 2003, and it had

its première in Harare the month after. It deals with the increasing gap in Zimbabwe between the political elite and ordinary citizens. The play alternates between two sets of scenes. One is the presidential office with the president and his lackey; the other is various queues for food and other necessities, where people discuss politics and the economy.

In August 2003, 'Superpatriots and Morons' was also performed in the rural areas. Ten theatre groups were trained to perform the play. They thereafter performed it thirty-five times each throughout Zimbabwe. Rooftop has further secured money to make a film of the play, or to "document" it, as it says, since in this way it is regarded as theatre rather than film. In May 2004, the play was performed in Harare again, after which it was banned. Rooftop has no illusions that its 'documentary' will be shown on ZBC but aims despite this to reach an audience both inside and outside the country. One way to do this is to show it on video in small 'video canteens', which Rooftop is currently trying to set up in Zimbabwe and which it wants to develop in other countries in southern Africa as well.

Rooftop is only one of a number of Zimbabwean NGOs, trusts, and civic organizations that are linked to each other in a transnational network throughout southern Africa and elsewhere. One could easily trace more of Rooftop's connections, both to donor organizations such as Swedish Sida, Dutch HIVOS, and Norwegian NORAD, and to NGOs in southern Africa such as the Southern African Theatre Initiative in South Africa and Mfuku wa Utamaduni (the Culture Trust Fund) in Tanzania. As long as neighbouring political leaders in southern Africa are passive bystanders, and South Africa's 'quiet diplomacy' does not yield results, it is the pressure from these NGOs and the transnational network they are engaged in that puts pressure on the government and the opposition party MDC to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe.

In order to properly understand these processes, we need to break free from the perception of the state as, in Ferguson and Gupta's terms, "vertically encompassing". Governance is no

longer, if it ever was, something that only governments engage in, since states, through which governments rule, are only one of several types of actors governing. To go beyond the dichotomous rhetoric in both media and academia that focuses either on president Robert Mugabe and the Zanu-PF government as the sole governors, or on European neo-colonialism or American imperialism as some kind of alien and abstract outside forces, it may be more fruitful to focus on sometimes unanticipated actors involved in

down-to-earth political and social practices. By studying political practice on the ground, in the existing web of local-global relations, as it were, the question of who is governing and why becomes an open, and empirical, question. ■

The article is based on a presentation made at the Nordic Africa Days, Uppsala, 3-5 October 2003, and is an updated version of a longer article published in LBC News, no. 4-5, December 2003.

Banda's hegemony in Malawi: Politics in song and dance



Photo by Mai Palmberg

**By: Reuben
M. Chirambo**

Researcher and lecturer, Department of English, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, and guest researcher at the Institute, spring 2004

In Dr. H.K. Banda's Malawi, 1964–1994, songs and dances were not only a constant feature of the president's political life as entertainment but also instruments for advancing his political ideology. Chirambo actually suggests that through the songs and dances Banda achieved popularity and legitimacy that could account for the longevity and stability of his regime for close to thirty years.

Thousands of women, men and schoolchildren lined both sides of the street leading to the stadium for about a mile or so. Many would have been standing there for more than five hours, sometimes under the scorching sun or in rain. Women clad in the red, blue, or green Malawi Congress Party uniform with President Banda's face prominently imprinted on it led the singing. As soon as Banda's motorcade approached the beginning of the lines, its sirens ceased leaving only the neon of lights to flash on as the women surged in to surround the motorcade singing, dancing, ululating, and drumming. In an instant, Banda was out of the limousine and into the back of the open land-rover. From there he waved his flywhisk in rhythm with the songs of praise and adoration from the crowd. The motorcade glided at the pace of the dancing women into the stadium. From a distance, Banda in the back of the open land-rover seemed as if he was riding on the shoulders of his dancing crowd. As the

motorcade approached the Kamuzu stadium, the giant doors of the main gate opened with precise timing to allow the King of Malawi to enter into a packed stadium. Only Banda and no one else used these gates, marked with his name, portraits, and slogans. Amid more ululation and handclapping from distinguished guests that included senior party officials and foreign envoys, Banda took his place on the VIP platform.

Then group after group coming from all over the country took their turns in the centre circle to sing and dance their praise, prayers, and gratitude to the almighty and beloved leader, fondly called *Nkhoswe* (Guardian and Protector), *Ngwazi* (Conqueror), Messiah, Lion, *Wamuyaya* (President-for-Life), or simply *Kamuzu*. In the songs as in speeches, they pledged unflinching loyalty to Banda and called for punishment for his opponents and critics. From time to time, Banda majestically walked down into the dancing arena to dance and sometimes sing. Each time he did that, the entire VIP stand stood up to clap and shout, *Mkango! Mkango!* meaning Lion. Most of the groups had special invitational songs for Banda that he could not resist. Then in his speech he thanked them for the beautiful singing and dancing and responded to their messages. His departure from the scene was in the same fashion as the arrival. The singing and dancing women escorted him out of the stadium. Banda's arrivals like his departures at all the places where he appeared in public were highly dramatized rituals, full of pomp and ceremony.

In all this singing and dancing, Banda was literally at the centre. Besides being the sole subject of all this performance, when he came down into the dancing arena to sing and dance, he planted himself at the centre of the performance and, I suggest, in the hearts of his subjects. The dominant themes of the songs, which essentially utilized slogans, praise names, and titles that described Banda's historical role in Malawi's politics provided a conceptual framework and material for the formation and advancement of the ideology of Kamuzuism. Kamuzuism was the idea that Banda was the God-chosen leader for Malawi, the

only one and for life. Kamuzuism also stated that Banda was the all wise and especially blessed to be the leader for the country. Therefore, he alone knew what was best for the people.

At the level of performance, these songs and dances where Banda was involved not just as the subject but also as a participant, provided the greatest opportunity for fraternization, bonding, and the making of an intimate relationship between Banda and his subjects. As the people sang and danced with him, not only did they identify with him more closely but also came to love him. These performances were the greatest manifestation and creation of a relationship of hegemonic power between Banda and his subjects.

My research, therefore, identifies songs and dances in Banda's Malawi as avenues and instruments of hegemonic politics through which Banda achieved his most effective control of his subjects. It suggests that through these Banda achieved popularity and legitimacy that could account for the longevity and stability of his regime for close to thirty years, 1964–1994. He appropriated and manipulated cultural traditions and expressions of the people for his political purposes. Songs and dances were not simply a constant feature of Banda's political life as entertainment but instruments for advancing his political ideology too. As the site of intense political activity, songs and dances placed culture at the heart of political life for Banda and they placed Banda at the heart of the cultural expression of the people and into the hearts of the people. In this case, culture, more than political institutions/structures such as parliament among others, became the site of real political power for Banda. ■



Researching young Africans

An emerging field among Nordic scholars

By: Catrine Christiansen

Danish Research Fellow, the Nordic Africa Institute

Across Africa children and youth are becoming increasingly central to the social and political processes of the continent. Currently they constitute approximately 50 percent of the populations and this figure is likely to further increase well into the twenty-first century. African children and youth are living in a time where the AIDS pandemic, wars, and poverty challenge values and organizational forms. And they are precisely 'living'. They are navigating their paths through societal transformation and at times lethal upheavals as they are exploring their own lives.

Despite this, the focus on African children and youth has only recently emerged as a separate field of research among scholars working on contemporary Africa. When the African Studies Association of the US chose to make 'Youth' the overall theme for their annual meeting in 2003, the event exposed a field of research characterised by inadequate methodological and theoretical approaches. While most researchers were able to include Youth in their general field of interest and thus stick to the overall theme of the conference, there was quite a distance between the researchers whose *main focus* is on young Africans.

Given the obvious importance of establishing this field of research to prospective studies in Africa and development as well as for policy matters, three Nordic anthropologists gathered at the Nordic Africa Institute close to 30 Nordic social scientists working with a principal focus on children and youth in Africa. The workshop held on 14–16 May 2004 with scholars coming from Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Iceland provided an overview of the Nordic research competence.

Classification and application

The initial issue was to define the social categories of children and youth according to factors such as classificatory age, position in the generational hierarchy, gender or social status of relative dependence. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork all over the African continent discussions revealed differing cultural conceptions of whom to include in the two aforementioned categories. Moreover, several papers illustrated *situational* categorisation of young people as respectively 'children', 'youth', and 'mothers'. The diverse local cultural notions of 'children' and 'youth' were accepted by most of the gathered scholars to reflect the lived reality, simultaneously, however, with a common conformity to efforts paving the road for comparative academic works.

Yet this field of interest is hardly limited to academia; rather academics are entering a domain of applied work. During the last decade intervention agencies have given increased attention to the livelihood of young Africans and provided assistance through rather fixed conceptualisations of children and youth in marginalised social situations. Papers dealing with young people taking part in armed conflicts, political turmoil or being affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic exposed the need for scholarly commitment to discussions about young people *at risk* (entitled to assistance through external classifications of e.g. 'child soldiers', 'street children', 'AIDS orphans', and 'war orphans') and *as risk* (trapped in poverty, violence, and political marginalisation). Furthermore, discussions revealed the need for research providing broad knowledge on the life-worlds of youngsters living in exposed social situations

that moves beyond the portraits of *either* victims or perpetrators.

Social being and becoming

Whether being a child or youth, male or female, rural or urban, Liberian or Tanzanian, a 'nobody' or a 'somebody', young Africans are coming of age in societies characterised by high levels of gerontocratic control, economic crisis or decline, and an unprecedented high level of human mobility. Several papers shed light on the way children – though particularly youth – seek to realise their social being within the family sphere. Despite being in the lower parts of the generational hierarchy, young people's – male and female alike – agentive abilities were illustrated by diverse strategies to improve their social position; varied ways of navigating social ties and events to obtain resources in their quest for a better future. Drawing on rather different fieldwork papers presented interesting, yet rather fragmented, knowledge on the politics and meaning of education, procreation, social relatedness, and health awareness in young people's attempts to enter adulthood and/or better their life chances.

Considering the present strain on extended family ties and young people's common dissatisfaction with elders, youngsters often create close bonds with peers, neighbours, and co-religionists. Within schools, Moslem and Christian fellowships as well as within a magnitude of informal relationships (especially in urban areas) young people challenge notions of the 'global' and the 'local', the 'traditional' and the 'modern'. As the interrelatedness of the communication flows and popular cultures intensifies at the same time as the global socio-economic divides are increasing, young African urbanites experience manifestations of being (culturally, religiously) 'in the world' as well as (socially and economically) marginal to it. Several papers shed light on the effects of the globalisation of media, products and cultural formations on urban youths and how they negotiate the relationship between their everyday life, mass media communication and their identities within the schism between centrality and marginality.

Nordic network

Since the gathered scholars make up the current Nordic competence within this new scholarly field in African studies, revised papers will be edited for a publication that will make this capability known within as well as outside the Nordic countries.

Further aims of the workshop were to establish a network between the scholars and to discuss interest in making the Nordic region a space for researching children and youth in Africa. The final session summed up the general themes to take further. These included: young people engaged in conflicts, politics, and violence; interrelatedness between education, health and social structures; youth and religion (religion as a strategy for adulthood); youth and modernities; dynamics of rural-urban and space-place; and issues related to the body and sexuality. Moreover critical voices expressed needs for theorizing gender as well as relations between gender, modernity, mobility, and morality. Finally it was pointed out that this workshop followed the tendency of conferences to pay much more attention to youth than children.

An application has been handed in for resources (during the period 2005–2007) to hold seminars, lecture series, a summer school, and annual conferences, events that are planned to take place across the Nordic region and in Africa. It is anticipated that this network will collaborate with CODESRIA's Child and Youth Institute, at least in organising a common conference.

The organising committee consisted of Henrik Vigh, Copenhagen University, Mats Utas, Uppsala University, and Catrine Christiansen, Nordic Africa Institute. The studies presented were grouped into the following thematic sections: 1) Children and youth as soldiers; 2) Changing family structure; 3) Urban youth; 4) Coming of age; 5) The politics of childhood and youth; and 6) Social navigation. The responsibilities of discussants were taken up by: Christian Kordt Højbjerg, Copenhagen University, Eva Poluha, Stockholm University, Bawa Yamba, Diakonhjemmet Højskole, Oslo, Karin Norman, Stockholm University, Michael Whyte, Copenhagen University, and Nadia Lovell, Uppsala University. ■

Call for applications to initiate Five Nordic networks

An initiative to further collaboration on emerging fields of research

The Nordic Africa Institute is pleased to launch its new initiative to stimulate further collaboration on contemporary Africa within the Nordic region. The idea is to support the establishing of narrowly defined thematic networks that will enhance the infrastructure among researchers working on African and development issues within the Nordic countries, and will hopefully generate long-lasting interaction between researchers working on emerging fields of research. During a period of four years each network will be given the financial means to be able to meet twice in the Nordic region.

Application for networks

A network should be initiated by at least five researchers (including, but not exclusively, PhD-candidates) representing multidisciplinary backgrounds from different Nordic countries. While students below PhD-level are welcome to participate in the networks they should not be among the five responsible initiators required to form a network.

The following must be included in an application:

- A description of the field of research including clarification on how this is an emerging field of interest for studies on contemporary Africa and description of the exact focus area (one page),
- Brief CVs of the researchers who are initiating this network,
- Statement of who among the interested researchers will be the contact person authorised to communicate with NAI's Network Committee,
- Provisional work plan.

Practical and financial resources

NAI has established a Network Committee consisting of the Research Director, two Nordic researchers, and one administrator, which will be responsible for the selection and management of the networks. This committee will provide financial resources for the members to meet twice within four years. Each network is entitled to receive a grant of up to 40,000 SEK for each of their two workshops. It must be emphasised that the tasks involved in running a network are the responsibility of its members.

Deadline

Applications for a network should be sent to Catrine Christiansen by e-mail, mail or fax **no later than 15 November 2004** and these should not exceed two pages. The Network Committee will assess the selection and notify all contact persons by e-mail by the end of the year.

For more information, please contact:

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Conferences and meetings

Africa Events in Iceland

5–7 May 2004, Reykjavik, Iceland

The University of Iceland, the Icelandic International Development Agency ICEIDA together with the Nordic Africa Institute organized a series of events on developments in Africa in Reykjavik with the aim of increasing knowledge about Africa among the general public as well as among specialists. The events attracted both media coverage and good attendance. Three public events took place: Amin Kamete and Henning Melber, both researchers at the Nordic Africa Institute, gave a seminar on the Current Situation in Southern Africa with case studies from Namibia and Zimbabwe. Carlos Lopes of the UNDP acted as discussant and Magnfríður Júlíusdóttir from the University of Iceland chaired the session. A second event focused on the Images of Africa in School Text Books with presentations by Kristín Loftsdóttir, Assistant Professor at the University of Iceland, and Mai Palmberg, researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute. The third event was entitled How Does Aid Work? Development Co-operation Revisited with Carlos Lopes, at present UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Brazil, as keynote



Left: Audience at the University of Iceland. Below: Mai Palmberg, the Nordic Africa Institute, and Kristín Loftsdóttir, the University of Iceland.



Photos by Bergthor Sigurdsson

speaker. His presentation was entitled Ownership and Policy Dialogue in International Aid: An assessment of three perspectives. A panel discussion followed with comments by Nanna Hvidt from the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lennart Wohlgemuth and Amin Kamete from the Nordic Africa Institute. Desirée Lewis, guest researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, gave a talk at the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Iceland on the theme: Nationalism's Strong Women.

Susanne Linderos

Looking to the Future: Social, political and cultural space in Zimbabwe

24–26 May 2004, Uppsala, Sweden

This international conference organised by the Nordic Africa Institute brought together a blend of scholars and civil society actors from within Zimbabwe, Zimbabweans from abroad as well as scholars committed to research matters related to Zimbabwe from various other countries. Partici-

pants travelled from as far as the Southern African region, Canada, the USA, the UK and Italy, to meet some of those scholars residing in the different Nordic countries. The aim of the debates was to assess the character, causes and impacts of Zimbabwe's crisis in different social spheres and to

Photo by Mai Palmberg



Janah Ncube, Director, Women in Politics Support Unit, Harare.

discuss possible future perspectives.

The selection of participants was on the basis of their merits as committed scholars or civil society activists in advocacy

roles not merely confined in their orientation to party-political affinity. Instead, they shared as a common denominator the loyalty to the people of Zimbabwe and were guided by values and norms transcending narrow (party) organisational links. Participants were motivated in their discourse and deliberations to explore and occupy the 'space in between' the polarised frontiers to secure – as much as possible under the given circumstances – common sustainable ground beyond the we-they dichotomy and divide. After the intensive, but at the same time relaxed, two and a half days the more than thirty participants agreed that the atmosphere was constructive and encouraging. It allowed for an open debate in an environment which emphasised the common ground instead of differences between those sharing their views.

A total of 14 papers and several comments were presented in three thematically oriented

sessions sub-divided into socio-economic and -political issues as well as cultural production. They were conducted under the responsibility of the three co-organising researchers at the Institute: Amin Kamete ('Gender and Age in African Cities' programme), Henning Melber ('Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa' project) and Mai Palmberg ('Cultural Images in and of Africa' project) respectively. Karolina Winbo was in charge of the organisational and administrative support and arranged for both a pleasant working atmosphere and an entertaining side-programme offering opportunities to learn more about Uppsala.

Stanley Nyamfukudza presented 'Reflections on Zimbabwe's intellectual development' as an opening plenary speech, while Terence Ranger delivered a public keynote lecture at a university hall on 'The Uses and Misuses of History in Zimbabwe'. Lionel Cliffe and Lloyd Sachikonye summarised the presentations and discussions during the conference as a report back and input for the concluding session. Some of the contributions are currently being selected for publication in various forms. As a first result, a compilation has been edited for the Current African Issue series (no. 27) of the Institute as *Media, Public Discourse and Political Contestation in Zimbabwe* (see under Publishing, p. 35).

Henning Melber

From Violent Conflicts to Civil Governance. AEGIS Thematic Conference

27–28 May 2004, Uppsala, Sweden

In its capacity as an active member institution of the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS), the Nordic Africa Institute organised a Thematic Conference on the occasion of the annual Plenary Meeting of representatives from the AEGIS member institutions, taking place at the Institute on the following day (29 May). Furthermore, an AEGIS Conference Steering Committee met to prepare the forthcoming European-African Conference organised by AEGIS in mid-2005 in London.

The AEGIS Thematic Conference brought together close to 30 scholars – mainly from the Nordic countries (but also from as far as Canada and several African countries) with those in the AEGIS network in various other (in total 12) European countries – to discuss a variety of topical issues on both a theoretical and a case study basis. They had in common that they were related to violent conflicts and their impact on matters of civil governance. Presentations combined and reflected a wide range of disciplines. Socio-anthro-

pological case studies represented a strong element but were complemented by contributions from disciplines such as human geography, as well as the sociological and political science perspectives. Case studies (in most cases based on extensive field research) explored aspects of the dynamics of violent conflicts in Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Liberia. Other presentations approached related issues of conflict and conflict resolution in countries of the Horn of Africa, Burkina Faso, Malawi and South Africa. A special session addressed lessons learned from the genocide in Rwanda a decade ago.

In a concluding panel, several participants from AEGIS member institutions commented on the two-day conference and the presentations. Panellists included Patrick Chabal (London, president of AEGIS), Ulf Engel (Leipzig), Holger Bernt Hansen (Copenhagen), Gerti Hesseling

(Leiden, board member of AEGIS) and Alessandro Triulzi (Naples, board member of AEGIS).

The Conference and Plenary Meeting were organised by Henning Melber and Susanne Linderos respectively and benefited from the committed support rendered by Nina Klinge-Nygård. Participants were entertained with an additional programme. It included a boat cruise on the river Fyris to explore and enjoy the lovely surroundings of Uppsala at one of the best times of the year (it was an unplanned surprise that it would pour with rain that evening – which did no harm to the splendid mood). The final evening was spent in the newly renovated historical market hall, which had just opened again after it was completely burnt down two years ago. This is further evidence of the fact, that the AEGIS network explored new grounds in many respects.

Henning Melber

Ritualisation of the state. Neo-popular state rituals in Mozambique and South Africa

3–4 June 2004, Johannesburg, South Africa

This international workshop was the first topical workshop forming part of the work of the Nordic Africa Institute's research programme 'State Recuperation, Resource Mobilisation and Conflict' initiated in 2003. The workshop was arranged in cooperation with Dr. Achille Mbembe, Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER), Johannesburg. It was attended by almost 20 scholars from South Africa, Mozambique and Denmark who engaged in discussions of present day forms of state ceremonies and rituals as these relate to the current intense focus on 'good governance', decentralisation and economic/political 'corruption'. Over the last decade, the adoption of norms of 'good governance' and an anti-corruption ethos has become part of the conditionalities from international financial institutions, developmental agencies and lately NEPAD. 'Good governance' and corruption have captured the public imagination in the whole of the African continent. The structural adjustment and neo-liberal economic

policies of donor and international financial institutions have undermined the autonomy of nation states. We have witnessed a growing disjuncture between political and economic possibilities as a result of the prescribed downsizing and change in the modus operandi of the developmental state and of globalisation. One consequence is that throughout the world, the public has experienced a considerable loss of confidence in political leaders and by extension the capacity of governments to deliver on development priorities, to create jobs and to create secure and safe environments for their citizens. Against this backdrop, the idea of the state (P. Abrams: 'Notes on the difficulty of studying the state' in *Journal of historical sociology*, no. 1, 1988) as a symbolic focal point of political will placed above inequitable interests seems to have become more important.

Within this overall context the workshop explored how, in light of the wave of democratisation that has rolled over Africa during the last two

decades, state rituals take place in South Africa and Mozambique. In particular the workshop examined whether we have seen a move away from state spectacles using various registers of pomp, conspicuous consumption and sumptuous presentations of status and power (see for example A. Mbembe: *On the postcolony*. Berkely, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2001) towards more modest, engaging, maybe dialogic forms of representation, which we tentatively could term 'neo-popular' or 'neo-populist'. We asked if, for example, decentralisation initiatives, the construction of new development sites, national as well as local monuments or commemorative events like state funerals, 'human rights day', or 'reconciliation day' and so on make a difference. Today regime changes are nearly always followed up by the institutionalization of 'commissions of enquiry', or high profiled court cases, into the 'corrupt' practices of former incumbents and their supporters.

Professor Jonathan Hyslop, in this regard, presented an excellent paper on how the ruling party in South Africa – the African National Congress – over the last decade has dealt with corruption within its own ranks. His finding was that for the leadership the integrity of the party seems to be more important than the integrity of the state. Along the same lines of investigation Dr. Steffen Jensen grappled with how the new local governance units, Ward Committees, in the former homeland of Nkomazi in South Africa tried to separate themselves from the political domain of party politics. But as he made clear the dividing lines between state and party were often difficult to maintain. Researcher Joaquim Fumogave insights into how conspicuous consumption by political leaders in Mozambique is interpreted by ordinary citizens, playing both on comic and tragic forms of expression. Assistant Professor Steven Robins presented a paper on how museums are reworking the public record of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and in this process challenge official history writing. PhD candidate Helene Maria Kyed and Dr. Lars Buur, together with Gonçalves Euclides presented papers on a recent decentralisation initiative, the recognition

of traditional authorities in Mozambique, exploring how the official ritualised form incorporated both colonial, post-colonial socialist and neo-liberal 'good governance' modes of operating. Along the same lines of investigation but in a different context Dr. Horacio Zandemela took issue with how privatisation of water management in Maputo both made possible and attempted to pacify or even neutralise public participation in the process. The public events investigated by the presenters suggested that the ritualised events could resemble 'cleansing rituals' attempting to produce the state as a neutral arbitrator outside the tainted 'selfish' domain of politics. But they all gave insight into how this script more often than not broke down and became inserted in or overtaken by the domains of selfish interests and party political imperatives.

Public and performative dimensions of governance and politics are not new but have always been crucial for nation-state spectacles and celebrations, and for political rhetoric and processes of political identification during colonial and post-colonial regimes. The workshop therefore also encouraged presentations of papers that investigated particular genealogies through which African states have presented themselves and their citizens, and through which subjects are produced through official school, military or crime prevention systems, as well as political and bureaucratic practices more broadly. The colonial, post-colonial and recent neo-liberal democratic trajectories of Mozambique and South Africa are configured differently with regard to (colonial and post-colonial) bureaucratic systems, as well as race, class and gender relations. These differences need to be kept in mind in order to assess the relationship between present forms of state ritualisation and legitimate governance. In this regard PhD candidate Nsizwa Dlamini explored the construction and use of Zulu Kingdom monuments in the former apartheid homeland of Zululand and their relationship to present day nation-state building. Dr. Leslie Wits traced changes and continuities in how the apartheid state and the new democratic state celebrated key Afrikaner events and concluded that the content

of the events had changed considerably while the forms of celebrating key events during apartheid and post-apartheid resembled each other in the most striking manner. Dr. João Paulo Coelho in this regard analysed the changing ritual form and modes of party/state interactions with the Mozambican population since independence to the present day neo-liberal mode of democratic governance. He concluded that the main audience addressed by the party/state had changed from being the general population to becoming the international audience of donors. Researcher Taciana Lopes explored the various elements of law enforcement that today structures the justice sector ranging from traditional community courts, over post-independence tribunals to western influenced state courts concluding that, depending on context, none of them seems to be hegemonic.

Dr. Finn Stepputat from the Danish Institute for International Studies, besides giving a comparative paper on elections in Guatemala as state rituals attempting to produce legitimacy in a democratic system well embedded in various

other rationalities, functioned together with Dr. Achille Mbembe as commentator on the papers. Besides the above mentioned objectives the aim of the workshop was also to enable scholars from South Africa and Mozambique to meet and network. Despite the geographical closeness of the two countries, academic exchange has traditionally been scarce, partly due to language obstacles. In order to counter the language barrier, simultaneous rendering of language and translation of Portuguese written papers were provided for the workshop. Publication based on the proceedings will be pursued in the form of a guest edited number of a recognised African journal as well as a book on a later stage. Participants at the workshop strongly encouraged the organisers to enable a continued exchange, possibly expanding the network to include researchers from Angola and Zimbabwe, exploring the theme of 'post-socialist trajectories' in Africa and their impact on democratic and political agency.

Lars Buur

The African Commission and the New Challenges and Opportunities for Human Rights Promotion and Protection in Africa

9–10 June 2004, Uppsala, Sweden

Academics, activists and policymakers from around the world gathered in Uppsala for this conference, which was organised by the Nordic Africa Institute jointly with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights. The conference attracted some 40 participants, of whom four represented the African Commission (the Chairperson, Ms Salamata Savadogo, the Vice-Chair, Mr Yaser ElHassan, the Secretary Mr Germain Baricako, and one of the Commissioners of the African Union Commission, Julia Joiner (for Political Affairs). Africa based as well as international Human Rights NGOs were well represented.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted in 1981, entered into force in October 1986. Today, all the members of the African Union are party to the Charter, which provides for rights and duties, and establishes a supervisory mechanism for the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission). The African Commission has now been in existence for over 16 years. Its activities therefore provide a wealth of experience that justifies retrospection about the state of, and promotion of, human rights and good governance in Africa. In 1998, an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights was established to be operative in a few years time. It is expected to increase the influence of the Commission in achieving the ideals of the Charter.

The conference focused on two major issues. It underlined the new context in which the Commission's mechanisms had to be strengthened for the more effective follow up and implementation of decisions reached. There was also the emerging context with globalisation, democratisation and the new regionalist impulses, resulting in the fact that the state of human rights in Africa has somewhat improved. On the other hand, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the armed conflicts, widespread and deepening poverty and other scourges of great magnitude still pose formidable challenges for human rights. Globalization itself has brought new challenges for human rights protection, as forms of violations become more complex and the ease with which they cross borders makes them less easy to tackle. The social and political environment is therefore in many respects different from what it was when the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was being drafted more than two decades ago.

At the institutional level, the parent institution of the African Commission, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), has been transformed into the African Union, with a much stronger Executive Commission ('Secretariat'). In and around the African Union, new institutions have emerged and others are in the making: a Peace and Security Council, an African Court of Human Rights, a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, and an African Parliament. These are in addition to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court in Sierra Leone and a host of new national institutions dealing with Human Rights, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The mandates of many, if not most, of the new regional institutions partly overlap with that of the African Commission. Some of the new institutions will actually be taking over certain functions of the African Commission. This is the case with the African Court of Human Rights that is going to play the role of interpreting the African Charter. There is therefore a real need to rationalise these institutions and their roles. The African Commission also needs to reposition itself in the new regional institutional landscape, and re-define its mandate. With some seventeen years

of existence and active engagement with human rights issues behind it, the African Commission can actually play a leading role in setting the human rights agenda on the continent, and in defining the roles of the other institutions as well. It can also play a key role in making the African Peer Review Mechanism under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) framework more effective.

The conference was therefore timely, and its policy relevance can hardly be over-emphasised. It is quite obvious that the African Commission can no longer do business as usual, in disregard of the changed context and the presence of other key institutions dealing directly or indirectly with human rights in the region. The African Commission cannot continue to function with the meagre human and financial resources that it has been coping with over the years, and the low level of autonomy that has so far characterised it as an institution.

The opening keynote address was delivered by Justice Hassan Jallow, Under Secretary General of the UN and Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, who also took part in drafting the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. He pointed out that with the massive atrocities on the continent resulting in gross violations of human rights, "many Africans legitimately are losing or have lost confidence in their governments. Many feel that these have failed the people. So people in Africa are looking for institutions 'beyond' and/or 'above' their national states (such as the African Commission) for redress". Human rights norms do exist; the major challenge is the implementation of these norms. It was noted that although there have been some improvements in the governance systems, particularly with the demise of the notorious dictatorial regimes that plagued the continent, and the establishment of pluralistic and participatory political systems, there are still a number of countries where repressive laws are in force. Another point made was that human rights in Africa have been greatly undermined by armed conflict resulting in genocide in some cases, and producing millions of refugees and internally displaced people. The African human rights predicament,

Justice Jallow argued, is further compounded by widespread poverty, and the spread of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria.

In this bleak picture, the work of the African Commission and the ongoing developments in the continent, many of which are taking place in and around the African Union, stand out as major signs of hope. These include the entry into force of the Protocol for an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights on 25 January 2004, the adoption of a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women, the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union with a stronger executive commission, NEPAD, the adoption of an African instrument for combating corruption (the African Union Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption, adopted by the African Union in July 2003), and the general evolution towards greater accountability for human rights violations, as shown by the proliferation of truth and reconciliation commissions, and human rights commissions and courts.

In this context, Justice Jallow further argued, the African Commission needs to be strengthened, through a number of measures ranging from increasing the funding of the Commission, the strengthening of its status and mandate, enhancing its independence and impartiality, to consolidating and enhancing its activities. In his concluding remarks, Justice Jallow made a strong appeal for the creation and consolidation of democratic space, which is a *sine quo non* for the enjoyment of human rights. "Political governance in Africa should emphasize not only processes (i.e. periodic elections), but must also focus on content, i.e. the pursuit and implementation of the substantive goals of good governance, i.e. social and economic progress. Governments should relentlessly strive to ensure the realization of all categories of rights and freedoms for all without distinction. All these are pointers to the need to go beyond the preoccupation with human rights in the narrow sense to institute and sustain broad programmes of good governance in Africa."

The context was also the subject of the first panel of the conference, with leading scholars

such as Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, Chris Haynes, Alice Karekezi Urusaro, Henning Melber, and Birgit Lindsnæs, addressing issues such as globalization, human rights and development, emerging issues in human rights, human rights and new forms of civic engagement, human rights discourses and cultures, and the African Commission, NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism.



Photo by Awa Ba

In the panel: Anita Klum, the Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights; Julia Joiner, African Union; Lennart Wohlgemuth, the Nordic Africa Institute; Salamata Sawodogo, President, and Baricako Germani, Secretary, both of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; and Ebrima Sall, CODESRIA.

In a second keynote presentation, Professor Shadrack Gutto of the University of South Africa, discussed the new institutional landscape of truth commissions, special courts, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. He observed that the African Commission exists in a broad political context, with much of its functioning depending on its relationship and interaction with State parties and the African Union. The new constitution of the AU and its Peace and Security Council, NEPAD and its African peer-review mechanism, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, also present new opportunities and challenges as partners with whom the Commission shares common goals. While this new landscape has meant increased competition for already existing institutions such as the African Commission, most delegates stressed the new opportunities, which are there to be seized by a well-established, proactive and

open Commission. It was therefore emphasized that now is a crucial time for the Commission – to take its proper place on the African scene and translate policies into actions in favour of the African people.

The second focus of the discussions was on the essential requirements for making the African Commission a strong player in the field of human rights promotion and protection in Africa. Attention was focused on requirements for the optimal functioning of the Commission and its Secretariat, at the micro and macro levels. Several speakers emphasized the need to be creative in terms of access to resources, resource management, autonomy of the members of the Commission, access by Africans to information on the work of the Commission and the linkage between human rights and development. Others focused on procedures, state reporting, missions of the Commission, mechanisms, special rapporteurs, networking with NGOs and national human rights institutions, parliaments etc. The debates were very constructive and led to interesting conclusions and recommendations, perhaps the most important of which is that the African Commission should be more proactive and try and take advantage of its seventeen years of experience in interpreting the African Charter, promoting human rights and working with civil society and policy makers to help in shaping the governance and human rights agenda in Africa. For it to be able to perform such a role, the African Commission, it was recommended, must be further strengthened financially, institutionally, and in human resources (a presentation on the Inter-American Human Rights System made it obvious that the African Commission is far too under-resourced).


As has been noted above, what is new is the context in which human rights in Africa are being discussed. There is clearly a global movement that favours human rights work, although the kinds of issues that need to be addressed have also become both more complex, but also in some respects more 'basic', given that, often, it is the most fundamental human right, the right to life, that is itself under threat, as is the case with the horrendous violence and the scourges like HIV/AIDS. Perhaps more

striking, however, are the rapidly changing institutional landscape in Africa, the heavy premium now being put on democracy and, especially, the resolve with which the Commission of the African Union, and its Chairperson Alfa Oumar Konare, and his staff, seem to be addressing governance, human rights and development issues on the African continent.

In conclusion, it is noted that the African Commission has made substantial progress in its 17 years of operation and must be seen as an important organ within the African political scene. Much more is however required in order for human rights to become an accepted feature of the political process in Africa. This was the key point in the endnote speech delivered by Sidiki Kaba, president of the International Federation of Human Rights. It is therefore the duty of all the friends of the African Commission to do their utmost to support the institution so that it can take its proper place among other African regional organizations and work positively for the development of the continent. In this regard, participants were encouraged by the presence at the conference of the Swedish State Secretary for Development Cooperation, Ms. Annika Söder, three representatives from the Swedish Foreign Ministry, one from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), three from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), one from Danida, the Deputy Director of the Danish Centre for Human Rights, a representative of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute in Sweden, and the high level participation of the African Commission and of the African Union in the person of Ms Julia Joiner. A small committee was established to take the recommendations of the conference further, and to communicate them to the African Union at a later stage. CODESRIA and the Nordic Africa Institute will also be enriching their respective research agendas with issues brought up at the conference.

*Ebrima Sall, CODESRIA, Dakar;
Lennart Wohlgemuth, the Nordic Africa Institute;
Cyril Obi, the Nordic Africa Institute and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos*

Recent publications



Gisela Geisler

Women and the Remaking of Politics in Southern Africa Negotiating Autonomy, Incorporation and Representation


ISBN: 91-7106-515-6, 241 pp, 280 SEK (appr. 28 euro)

This book traces the history of women's political involvement in Southern Africa, in anti-colonial struggles and against apartheid, analyses the post-colonial outcomes and examines the strategies that have been employed by women's movements to gain a foothold in politics.

It looks in detail at the experiences of women both in and with the women's wings of political parties through the early years of independence up to today, discusses the successes and failures of national machinery for the advancement of women and analyses the activities of women's movements over time. Extensive material from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa is compared and juxtaposed, as women politicians and women's movements learned from each other's experiences over time.

The study also critically addresses the uneasy relationship between the women's movements and the state, and between women activists and women politicians as they have negotiated cooptation, integration and exclusion. Based on an extensive literature review and innumerable interviews with women politicians and activists as well as fieldwork, and spanning half a century and half a continent, the historical depth and geographical spread of the study put it in a class of its own.

Gisela Geisler is a senior researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.



Eva Poluha

The Power of Continuity. Ethiopia through the eyes of its children

ISBN: 91-7106-535-0, 250 pp, 270 SEK (appr. 27 euro)

Children play a vital role as a source of information on politics but have been neglected as political actors in research contexts. In this study, children are used as a window to an Ethiopian society where hierarchical relations persist, despite the numerous political and administrative transformations of the past century. With data gathered through participant observation the book examines how young, Addis Abeba school children learn to adapt to and reproduce relations of super- and/or subordination based on gender, age, strength and social position. The children's experiences are viewed in the historical context of state-citizen relations

where hierarchy and obsession with control have been and continue to be dominant. The discussion focuses on the power of continuity in the reproduction of cultural patterns and political behaviour, and on how change towards more egalitarian relations could come about.

Eva Poluha has a PhD in Social Anthropology from Stockholm University, 1989. She is Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology, at Dalarna University.

Henning Melber (ed.)

Media, Public Discourse and Political Contestation in Zimbabwe

Current African Issues no. 27, ISBN: 91-7106-534-2, 39 pp, 80 SEK (appr. 8 euro)


The current situation in Zimbabwe under the ZANU-PF government shows increasing signs of abuse of power by those in political control. They also direct their desire to suppress criticism towards the media. Press organs in private ownership have been closed down and journalists have been physically harassed, arrested and expelled. Laws are abused to regulate and manipulate public opinion by a policy of banning. Worldwide condemnation of the growing restrictions upon the freedom of expression goes hand in hand with the protests inside the country against the growing tendencies of totalitarian rule.

Current events are critically reflected upon and the background to these developments is summarised in this publication. It is based on some of the contributions to a recent conference on Zimbabwe organised by the Nordic Africa Institute and offers insights into the contested space of public opinion in Zimbabwe. The critical analyses of current developments are there-by complemented with particular reference to the media sector in the ongoing battle for hegemonic control over the public sphere.

Sarah Helen Chiumbu is the current Director of the Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe Chapter.

Henning Melber is Research Director at the Nordic Africa Institute.

Dumisani Moyo is a Lecturer in the Media and Communication Studies Programme (Department of English) at the University of Zimbabwe.



Francis Akindès

The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire


Research Report 128, ISBN: 91-7106-531-8, 46 pp, 100 SEK (appr. 10 euro)


With the coup d'état of 24 December 1999 and the politico-military conflict that started on 19 September 2002, Côte d'Ivoire broke with its tradition of political stability, which had served as a model in the West African sub-region. It is now facing an unprecedented crisis that is not only jeopardising the continuity of the state, but has also introduced a culture of violence into the society.

This study has three objectives. The primary one is to understand the nature of this socio-political crisis, and what is at stake in it. Secondly, the study examines the issue of ivoirité. Finally, it explores the escalation of violence in this socio-political crisis and the catalogue of justifications for that violence.

It is argued that the recurrence of military coups d'état in Côte d'Ivoire signifies the delegitimisation of the modes of regulation built on the tontine system, and calls for a renewal of the political grammar and socio-political regulatory modalities around integrating principles that have yet to be devised.

Francis Akindès is a Professor of Economic Sociology at the University of Bouake (Côte d'Ivoire) and Associate Researcher at the IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, France). He has written several books in the field of the sociology of economic and political change and about public policies to reduce poverty.





Tim Kelsall

Contentious Politics, Local Governance and the Self. A Tanzanian Case Study

Research Report no. 129, ISBN: 91-7106-533-4, 75 pp, 100 SEK (appr. 10 euro)

The Governance Agenda is the framework that currently organises the West's relations with Africa. The present work is an attempt to see Governance through the lens of a contemporary, local history. The report analyses three periods of contentious politics at local level in Tanzania and two multi-party elections. It provides a window on mismanagement in local government, it examines the intervention by national and local elites in district conflicts, and it points to the difficulties ordinary people face in holding their leaders

to account.

The argument of the report is that current approaches to the study of Governance overlook an essential ingredient for its potential success: namely, the sociological conditions in which forms of collective action conducive to improved political accountability become possible at a grassroots level. The analysis aims to show that economic diversification and multiple livelihoods have given rise to a reticular social structure in which individuals find it difficult to combine to hold their leaders to account. People have fragmented identities formed in networks of social relations, which impedes the emergence of strong collective identities appropriate to effective social movements.

Tim Kelsall is Lecturer in African Politics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and Joint Editor of the *Journal African Affairs*.

Forthcoming titles

Arne Bigsten, Abebe Shimeles & Bereket Kebede (eds.)

Poverty, Income Distribution and Labour Markets in Ethiopia

ISBN: 91-7106-526-1, 200 pp, 220 SEK

Mats Lundahl

Globalization and the Southern African Economies

Research Report no. 130, 91-7106-532-6, 128 pp, 100 SEK (appr 10 euro)

Titles published by the Nordic Africa Institute can be ordered via orders@nai.uu.se

Suggested reading to Hasu's article (pp. 12–14)

Brower, S., P. Gifford and S. Rose (eds), *Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism*. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Corten, A. and R. Marshal-Fratani (eds), *Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America*. London: Hurst, 2001.

Gifford, P., *Ghana's New Christianity: Pentecostalism in a Globalising African Economy*. London: Hurst, 2004.

Maxwell, D., 'Delivered from the Spirit of Poverty?': Pentecostalism, Prosperity and Modernity in Zimbabwe. In *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 28, no. 3, 1998.

Meyer, B., 'Commodities and the Power of Prayer: Pentecostalist Attitudes towards Consumption in Contemporary Ghana.' In *Development and Change* vol 29, 1998.

www.mwakasege.org
www.tasoet.org

Mariken Vaa, a prominent Norwegian Africanist

Photo by Mai Palmberg



With Mariken Vaa's death on 20 September 2004 in Oslo the Nordic Africa Institute has lost a close friend and a very appreciated former colleague. Her life was very much connected with Africa. Already in 1963 she received a travel grant from the Institute to conduct fieldwork in Tanzania.

Mariken Vaa joined the institute in 1996 as the coordinator of the research programme 'Cities, Governance and Civil Society in Africa', and left in 2002 for her home country Norway, where she was appointed professor at the Centre for Multicultural and International Studies, Oslo University College. She was a sociologist, and made her research in West Africa, above all Mali. With an artistic and intellectual family background she was a cosmopolitan in scope, a true Nordist and a Norwegian in anchorage. We know her as a determined, frank, highly competent and democratic colleague, and we grieve her greatly.

*Management and colleagues
of the Nordic Africa Institute*

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