The Viability of the Canadian Anti and Counter Terrorist Response in the Shadow of the Millennium

Major B.J. Brister* War Studies 538

Dr. Paul Taillon 18 November 1998

Preface

This paper was originally presented at the CDA Graduate Students' Symposium held in Ottawa Ontario in November of 1998. At that time the bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that took place the previous August were quickly fading from the public view and there was increasing attention being paid to the unknown threat of the Millennium. The threat posed by terrorism to Canadians and to their world was minimal and the mechanisms for dealing with that threat were seen as sufficient and reasonable for the time. The paper explored a number of possibilities in terms of the future evolution of the threat to Canada and postulated several different threat scenarios that Canadians and their government could face in the near future. Lastly, it provided a general blueprint for dealing with those threats should they emerge.

It is instructive to review the paper and the positions taken in it in light of the events of the last few months. The counter terrorist measures and systems that provided the Canadian response to the events of September 11 were the same ones outlined in the paper. Their validity and effectiveness has been borne out by the test of the realities we all faced on that day. The effectiveness and validity of the subsequent actions of the nation, its government, and its people can be assessed in light of the blueprint for the future put forward at the end of the paper.

Introduction

The year 2000 has been widely touted as a milestone of major change and also of impending disaster by numerous apocalyptic and messianic groups predicting the end of civilization. One area however, the use of terrorism as a coercive tool, has received little attention outside of short bursts of intense media interest following a particularly successful and tragic attack. The downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland in 1982 is one example and this was followed by several similarly large-scale attacks. One such attack was on the Manhattan Trade Centre in 1993, another involved the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a Tokyo subway in 1995, and a third used a massively destructive truck bomb in Oklahoma City in the same year. The simultaneous attacks this summer on

American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the IRA bombing in Omagh are but the latest examples of a disturbing trend of ever-increasing casualty lists resulting from terrorist attack.

Canada, to date, has been spared the massive physical and social trauma associated with the loss of a large number of its citizens or critical piece of infrastructure to a terrorist attack. How long this situation continues to exist depends largely upon the Canadian response to the evolution in the terrorist threat that is even now taking place.

The aim of this paper is the examination of the terrorist threat evolving in the shadow of the millennium, and more specifically, the threat to Canada and how it is being addressed. This examination will begin with a review of the roots of terrorism as a coercive tool, the evolution of this tool to its present form, and an analysis of the terrorist threat as it exists now and into the future. This will be followed by an assessment of the efforts of government, civil, and military agencies to develop measures intended to prevent or counter a terrorist attack as they are embodied in the National Counter Terrorism Plan. The thesis of this paper is that while the existing plans and resources dedicated to countering the terrorist threat are for the most part effective, there are some fundamental ways in which Canada's ability to protect its citizen's and infrastructure from terrorist attack can be improved upon. In order to allow the presentation of this work in a public forum, the research, analysis, and discussion of these issues have necessarily been restricted to open source material available at the time of presentation. Consequently, the issues, and conclusions put forward do not refer to or consider any information of a classified nature.

History and Nature of the Threat

Terrorism has served many masters and their purposes throughout its history. It was used as a coercive tool by the government against dissidents in the 18th century during the French Revolution, and by dissidents against the government in Tsarist Russia later in the same century. The forerunners of the modern day Militias, the "Anarchists," first appeared in the last two decades of the 19th century to oppose what they saw as excessive government interference in everyday life. In the first decades of the 20th century terrorism took on a distinctly revolutionary flavor with a number of subversive groups attempting to provide catalysts for the downfall of regimes such as the Turkish Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. This period also marked the appearance of the first instances of state-sponsored, or "shadow terrorism."

Terrorism as a tool of mass repression appeared in the 1930s and 40s. The focus of terrorist acts shifted in this period from individuals or specific groups to large indiscriminate masses of people. The revolutionary connotation to terrorism returned to join that of mass repression following the Second World War when it was used by a variety of nationalist, anti-colonial, and ethnic separatist groups well into the 1970s in the pursuit of a homeland.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the threat posed by both international and national terrorism began another evolution to a broader, less distinct phenomenon. Part of this evolution became known

as the "gray area phenomenon" and describes combinations of political, religious, and economically motivated groups cooperating with each other, each for their own purposes, in the conduct of terrorist acts. Another aspect of the evolution was the reappearance of "shadow" or state and state-sponsored terrorism of the early part of the 20th century, but this time with a bizarre twist. The tool of choice for these modern-day state-sponsored acts were a new brand of terrorist - mercenaries who would carry out the acts of violence not from a sense of political, ideological or nationalist motivation, but for profit.
  The use of surrogate warriors, mercenary or otherwise, to accomplish what has in the past required entire armies, navies, and air forces has gained impetus over the last two decades. It has even more recently been encouraged by events such as the decisive defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf war.

The end of the Cold War brought instability on a worldwide scale greater than at any time since the Second World War. The last decade of the 20th century has witnessed intense forms of nationalist, ethnic, cultural, racial, and religious pressures as a result of the disappearance of constraining discipline of the Cold War superpower rivalry. Added to this already complex grouping of terrorist motivations and objectives in the 1980s and 1990s has been a number of groups associated with religious or messianic extremism, apocalyptic beliefs, or seeking to punish or destroy the "Great Satan." Nationally, there was the reappearance of anarchist groups similar to those that existed in the early part of this century with the Christian White Supremacist groups.

Also included in the new arrivals on the terrorist landscape are a variety of "amateur" terrorists involved with single-issue causes associated with the ecology, animal rights, and abortion. These groups usually operate in small cells or sometimes even consist of a single disgruntled individual or "Lone Wolf" who has turned to violence to achieve their objectives. The number of terrorist groups has increased tenfold since 1968.

The terrorist tactic of choice has evolved from single, conclusive acts focussed on individuals with direct ties to terrorist issues, to "events of duration" in the 1960s and 1970s that included long drawn out media events such as hijacking and hostage takings. In the 1980s there was yet another shift in tactics towards "conclusive events" such as bombings and assassinations that happened too quickly to allow an effective response. The focus of the attacks since the end of the Cold War has also continued to shift from specific targets tied to the cause or issue of the terrorist to indiscriminate groups. The result of this is that while total attacks may have dropped in these last years of the 20th century, the casualties per attack have increased ten-fold, partially as a result of this trend.

In the past, conventional terrorist groups in the past had wanted "a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead," or seeking vengeance. Nowadays, in many cases, the goal of extremist groups in the present seems to be to cause the maximum amount of death and destruction to a people or system they find particularly abhorrent. Some consider mass murder a calling from God. Generally, state sponsored attacks using religious extremists or mercenary groups have been overall eight times more destructive than other attacks perpetrated by "conventionally" motivated terrorist groups.

The evolution in terrorist tactics has been matched by a shift in their targets of choice. Where government or military targets had predominated in the past, there is now a distinct preference for civilian targets, especially economic ones. This is related to the growing interdependence of national economies and their reliance on secure electronic transmission and storage of information of all kinds. As governments increase the effectiveness of their anti and counter terrorist programmes in other areas, economic and financial targets are becoming the "soft underbelly" of the Western world.

What conclusions that can be drawn from this retrospective on terrorism? The overwhelming sense of all of this is that the nature of terrorism is "...becoming more complex, more extreme, more sophisticated, more diffuse, and more transnational." How will the tools of terrorism be evolving to keep pace with its changing nature? It is unlikely that the gun or the bomb will disappear from the terrorists' inventory but there are newer weapons appearing that seem to address the terrorists needs for ever-more destructive capabilities. Two of these new weapons are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the use of Information Operations (IO).

The three most common WMD are those derived from nuclear, chemical and biological agents. The probability of the use of a nuclear device for terrorist purposes is assessed as low. It is not the possibility of mass casualties but the uncontrollable nature of the weapon that is seen as the major factor in making it an unattractive weapon alternative for the terrorist. The state or religious objectives of the attack are nullified if the effects of the weapon drift over the territory or people supporting the terrorist objectives and beliefs. A more plausible offshoot of the nuclear threat is the use of radioactive materials packed around conventional explosives to contaminate a small heavily populated area or critical infrastructure facility. This would be an attractive option for terrorists bent on blackmail or extortion.

The threat posed by biological weapons is the highest profile of the WMD threats if not the most likely to be used. Agents such as anthrax and ricin are easily manufactured using unsophisticated equipment and ingredients. The state sponsors of terrorism identified by the US State Department all have sizeable stocks of these and other agents. More importantly, biological agents can be covertly manufactured in sizeable quantities in any industrialized nation with little chance of detection. A biological attack would be among the most difficult to prevent or to detect once launched. The major obstacle to its effective and disastrous use in the future however is perfecting a means of distribution that maintains the required lethality of concentration. The use of such agents has already occurred in the Tokyo subway attack in 1993. The frequency of use may be expected to increase in the future as terrorist groups become more adept at their manufacture and use.

The use of chemical agents is the most likely of the three most commonly known WMD as they are easy to manufacture, relatively easier to control, and more familiar to the terrorists as a weapon. The basic materials for the concoction of an effective chemical weapon are readily available in most countries. To the extent that public opinion may still be a factor in the terrorist's choice of weapons, the general public has shown little outrage when such weapons were used several times in open warfare over the past decade. As with biological weapons, the use of chemical weapons is considered likely in

the future, as the weapons become more refined and controllable and as terrorists gain expertise in their use.

In addition to the exotic nuclear, biological, and chemical devices just discussed, there exists a variety of conventional weapons and means that can be employed by terrorists that will result in a level of destruction normally associated with a WMD. Indeed, the availability of conventional weapons capable of killing or maiming large numbers of people is seen as a central reason that terrorists have not so far used nuclear, biological, or chemical WMD more extensively. At last estimate there are several hundred "Stinger" Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) that have come onto the black market since the end of the war in Afghanistan. These and the more readily available Soviet-manufactured SA-7 can be used to circumvent the increasingly effective security measures at many large airports in order to bring down an airliner. The plastic explosive Semtex and others like it can be used in small quantities to create major disasters. As little as 300 grams was used to bring down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland. Syria, identified by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism, has purchased 40,000 tons. Another possibility is the use of an integral part of a modern industrial infrastructure to create the weapon of destruction. The deliberate explosion of a liquefied natural gas tanker in New York harbor by a suicide bomber in a light aircraft could create an explosion the equivalent of a 60-kiloton nuclear weapon.

Evidence of the growing threat posed by these weapons is the fact that the threshold of their use by terrorist organizations has already been crossed. The two highest profile examples are the March 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system by the *Aum Shinri Kyo*, and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre.   An informal inventory of other terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical agents reveals a total of nine incidents in the 1970s, 11 in the 1980s, and 29 in the 1990s to June 1997.

The use of WMD in the future becomes increasingly likely as the disincentives and constraints that have inhibited the use these weapons in the past disappear, defenses against the more conventional means of terrorist attack become increasingly effective, and the public becomes ever more indifferent to acts of violence. While secular groups such as the White Supremacists, eco-terrorists, animal rights and anti-abortion groups have not yet been directly linked with an inclination or ability to use WMD, some of them have been linked with plans to use biological or chemical weapons on a smaller scale.

The prevailing international mood with respect to the possibility of a WMD being effectively employed to its full destructive potential by a terrorist organization is pessimistic. A noted author and expert on terrorism, Yonah Alexander, described the 1990s and future decades as the age of "Superterrorism." This pessimism is best summed up by the comment made by both American Defense Secretary William Cohen and the Canadian Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence that "The question is no longer if this will happen, but when." The answer to the question of "when" seems to be as soon as they become more adept at their use - and they have already started practicing.

The second emerging weapon of the future is the control and manipulation of electronic information or "Information Operations" (IO). State sponsors, religious extremists, organized crime syndicates, and various anarchist-type groups are just beginning to realize the potential of this weapon. IO can be used to destroy systems or databases, to create doubt as to their reliability, to raise funds, carry out secure communications with other terrorist cells or like-minded groups, disseminate propaganda, gather intelligence for an attack, or simply to create mayhem in the industrialized world. This can all be accomplished via the Internet with complete anonymity, little risk, and few resources. Walter Laquer brings the nature of this threat into focus with his comment, " why assassinate a politician or indiscriminately kill people when an attack on the electronic switching will produce far more dramatic and lasting results?"

The magnitude of the threat posed by IO is difficult to determine for several reasons. Some of the victims, usually large financial institutions, are reluctant to reveal to the public or their clients, their vulnerability to terrorist groups. Another reason is that covert attacks on systems for reasons other than outright destruction or disruption often remain undetected. Even when such attacks are detected, unless a group claims specific responsibility for it, the attack can be attributed to problems arising from normal operations. American data indicates that 65% of penetration tests attempted on various systems succeed, and of those tests, few are detected and the victim is usually unaware of the penetration until advised of it after the fact.

Open sources on this subject indicate that governments and intelligence agencies are struggling with the problem of arriving at a valid threat assessment for the IO problem. One major obstacle in arriving at such an assessment is the pervasive nature of the problem that requires a multi-disciplinary approach to its solution. An effective assessment and solution would, at a minimum, require the skills of computer and information security specialists, subject matter experts from the various user groups (military, financial, etc), strategists, and political scientists. The general magnitude of this threat and the extent to which it has been addressed is epitomized in the statement of one British banking official when questioned on the threat posed by IO, "...it is not the biggest issue (yet) in the banking market. Hmmmmm...we're going to have to think about that. If our banking and defense systems are not secure...what is?"

The Canadian Experience

Notwithstanding the real and some would say, increasing terrorist threat to the world at large, how does the threat of terrorism affect Canada, the "peaceful kingdom?" The well-developed and sophisticated infrastructure that Canada possesses as a modern industrialized nation provides a plethora of lucrative targets. The modern communications system allows instant worldwide coverage of the attack and of the terrorists' cause. The transportation network facilitates both easy access and quick escape from the target area. The open nature of the democratic society allows for the unmonitored movement of individuals bent on mayhem. These same characteristics that make Canada an attractive target, also make it an ideal waypoint in the terrorists' journey to or from missions in other countries such as the United States, Great Britain, India or the Far East.

Thus it should not be surprising that most of the world's international terrorist groups have established operations in Canada. With the exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active in Canada than any other nation in the world. These groups have their origins in practically every significant regional, ethnic, or nationalist conflict that exists today. Canada is considered a safe and easy place for terrorist organizations to conduct to training and recruiting, fundraising and to provide a safe haven for personnel between operations. It is also ideally situated geographically and politically to provide access to operational areas such as the United States, Great Britain, Europe, or the sub-continent, and even to manage events taking place in those regions. Individuals and groups operating from Canada have been tied to the World Trade Centre bombing, the massacre of tourists in Luxor Egypt, the Al Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 1996, assassinations in India, suicide bombings in Israel, and various bombing campaigns of the Provisional IRA.

Most international terrorist organizations try not to jeopardize their safe haven in Canada by targeting Canadian citizens or property. To date most attacks by international terrorist groups have focussed on foreign targets within Canada with the intention of influencing the terrorist group's homeland government. Canada has not yet been specifically targeted for significant terrorist violence relative to the experiences of some other western democracies. This trend can however change without warning as evidenced by the Air India disaster in 1985 when 331 people were murdered using explosive devices allegedly placed on the aircraft while it was in Canada.

The present threat to Canadian security posed by domestic terrorism is assessed as low. In the past, groups such as the *Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)* and the Doukabors have fallen into this threat category. The present threat is limited to extremists in a variety of movements. These include native activists, white supremacists, right wing groups, factions on both sides of the sovereignty debate, and single-issue groups concerned with the ecology, the ethical and moral aspects of abortion, and cruelty to animals. Most of these groups are known to have received funding, training, and organizational support from similar groups based in the United States. While the threat posed by international terrorist organizations has been the main focus of police, security, intelligence, and government officials in the past, the domestic terrorist threat has become the subject of increasing attention as knowledge of their capabilities and international connections is obtained.

Given the low threat level and incidence of terrorism in Canada to date, what can be expected in the future? The future threat can be identified in three separate motivations. The first is revenge. While not the target of the initial attack, Canada may be targeted for a revenge attack as a result of an arrest, or extradition of a known terrorist. Similarly, any assistance that Canada provides to the counter terrorism efforts of other nations as a signatory to a treaty or agreement could result in Canadian citizens or property being targeted for revenge. A single act by a citizen or the government could make Canada a target for terrorist revenge or punishment.

Canada can also be targeted for terrorist attack as a result of preventative actions by other governments. Terrorists tend to be risk averse. As nations such as Israel, the United States, and Great Britain take increasingly effective measures for the protection of their citizens and property, fewer

attacks are carried out within the physical boundaries of those nations. Instead, these nations are targeted by striking at their citizens and physical assets located abroad in other countries where the security measures are not as comprehensive or thorough. Canada may become a target of opportunity similar to the manner in which Kenya and Tanzania were selected as the locale for a strike against the United States in August of 1998.

Another variation on this theme is the targeting of Canadian citizens or infrastructure simply for being allied with a particular nation such as the United States. When asked the reason for his attack on the Manhattan World Trade Centre in 1993, convicted terrorist Ramzi Ahmed Yousef stated that it was in fact an attack on Israel. Pressed further as to why he had not selected an Israeli target he replied, "... Israeli targets were too difficult to attack, if you cannot attack your enemy, you should attack the friend of your enemy." As the American anti and counter terrorism programme gains strength and effectiveness, Canada is increasingly considered by some to be a soft target relative to some other western industrialized nations. American studies indicate that the threat to US national security posed by terrorism will persist and even increase in the years to come. Given this prediction, the potential for Canada to become a target of terrorism will also persist or increase with time.

Any one of the reasons just discussed could form the basis or rationale for a terrorist attack against Canadian citizens or their property. Considered together however, they present an even more disturbing reason for an attack. Terrorist groups may perceive Canada as a relatively vulnerable ally of their sworn enemies. The advent and increasingly effective use of WMD and IO means that although the number of terrorist attacks are declining, the exact number of events becomes less relevant as the consequences of even one successful attack becomes an unacceptable price to pay for being unprepared. As a pre-eminent trading nation whose prosperity is directly liked with world stability Canada cannot afford to ignore this issue abroad. If Canadians are to maintain a position on the world stage as peace loving global citizens, the nation cannot become known as an unofficial state sponsor of terrorism. Domestically, as a sovereign nation, Canada cannot afford to let others do the job for us. With the increase in the threat level, and with both the real and political price to be paid for failure, how is Canada prepared to address the terrorist threat as the millennium approaches?

Analysis of the National Counter Terrorism Plan

The National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP), as a single document, has evolved to its present form over a period of eleven years. Initial development evolved from the Report of the Senate Commission on Terrorism and the Public Safety, through the work of the Cheriton Task Force and the Second Special Committee of the Senate. The latest in a series of ongoing efforts by the Solicitor General and government agencies at all levels have resulted in the most recent draft of the Plan being distributed for review in July of this year. The NCTP is more than just a document however. It functions as a central mechanism for the coordination of the anti and counter terrorism effort between federal agencies. It is also intended to form the basis for cooperation with other government agencies at the provincial and municipal levels. The NCTP thus represents the sum total of the plans, philosophies,

working relationships, resources, personnel, and funding dedicated to addressing the issue of terrorism at all levels of government. It is this wider understanding of the NCTP that will be examined.

The examination will, by necessity, be restricted to a limited number of issues. They are three in number and have been selected on the basis of the concerns expressed by the Senate Committees, the Cheriton Task Force, and in numerous interviews conducted in support of this paper. The issues to be discussed are the training and consequent level of preparedness of the organization to react to a terrorist attack, the extent to which the present and evolving terrorist threats have been correctly identified and effectively addressed, and the ability of the organization to detect and react in a timely fashion to changes in the nature and level of the terrorist threat to Canadian people and property.

The initial absence of a programme to train, analyze, and test the anti and counter terrorist measures for effectiveness was a major concern of both the Cheriton Task Force and the Senate Committees chaired by Senator W.M. Kelly. A programme that involved large scale periodic exercises and evaluations was put into place to address these concerns and was considered by police and government agencies at all levels to be very effective. Unfortunately the programme fell victim to the Programme Review process necessitated by government budget cutbacks in the early years of this decade. Reincarnated in a reduced form in 1996, the programme is now an event driven process that focuses on major international events for which Canada has primary anti and counter terrorist responsibilities.

The training programme as it exists today is the subject of two major concerns. The first is the infrequency of the training, especially with respect the incident and consequence management of attacks utilizing WMD. The sheer size of Canada precludes the use of a centrally located team of experts on the various terrorist threats that are deployed in the event of an attack. Instead, the nation must rely on large numbers of personnel throughout Canada who are mandated as the "first responders" to a terrorist attack, in addition to their normal day to day duties. Many of the tasks and assignments involved with responding to an attack using a WMD are similar to those that are performed by these agencies in the normal course of their daily duties. An attack using a WMD will, however, require a greater number of these agencies, with a greater commitment of resources, working together in a much closer relationship than is normally required of them. The essential factor missing from the present first response capability is seen as being the symbiosis that results from extensive joint training and the mutual knowledge of the skills and capabilities of the other participants. There have been major efforts to overcome this weakness at the municipal level, most notably by the agencies charged with first response in the National Capital Region. However, the consensus among these agencies is that additional large-scale training events, involving agencies at all levels of government, are necessary to adequately address the threat.

The second concern expressed regarding the programme is the frequency of participation in training events by all of the key personnel from the Prime Minister down to the perimeter guard. There are significant advantages to obtaining the participation of senior officials, up to and including the Prime Minister, in the major training events conducted under the auspices of the NCTP. Such events assist in

identifying shortcomings in the response, fostering a cooperative and knowledgeable working relationship among the participants, and providing the senior participants in the NCTP with first hand insight into the threat and the means by which it will be countered. The level of participation is also critical to a legitimate determination of the overall effectiveness of the plan in achieving its stated objectives of incident and consequence management.

The responses to the concerns expressed with respect to the training programme reflect the difficult realities that exist today. The funding available for training and the extent to which senior officials are available to participate in that training are both related to the perceived threat level. As stated earlier in this examination, Canada has not been directly targeted for terrorist attack and consequently the probability of attack, or threat of attack is seen as being low. Thus, the funding of the NCTP is deemed appropriate for the threat that exists at the present time. Similarly, senior officials who must prioritize their time and allocate it according to the most pressing issues of the period have set aside a relatively small amount of time with which to address the terrorist threat. When the threat of terrorist attack is seen to increase, say with the approach of a major international event for which Canada has responsibility for security and counter terrorist response, additional funding, personnel, and equipment are made available to address that increased threat. Thus it is only with a long-term increase in the threat level that the government will consider a more comprehensive reallocation of resources from other budget priorities. Similarly, it is only with such an increase in the threat level that the time allocation of the senior officials can be expected to shift in favour of responding to the terrorist threat. The key to the concern regarding the frequency and effectiveness of training is therefore the possession of an effective intelligence programme. Such a programme would provide warning of an impending attack or threat in sufficient time to allocate additional funding, resources, personnel, and equipment to efforts at prevention or to incident and consequence management.

The second area of concern regarding the NCTP is exactly how the threat is being addressed - the plan. Of major interest to Canadians is the extent to which Canada is addressing the threat posed by WMD and IO or "cyber terror." Examination of this area will involve the presentation of an accepted means of effectively addressing the threat and then a comparison of this means with the Canadian response to date.

Ehud Sprinzak, a noted author on terrorism and a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem has derived what is arguably the most realistic solution to addressing the threat posed by WMD. He advocates a programme of low cost intelligence gathering and analysis, combined with an incident and consequence management plan that utilizes existing resources at every level and can be expanded to address a higher threat if and when one is identified. Lastly, he warns against unnecessary rhetoric intended to heighten awareness of the threat. Prematurely crying "wolf" he feels, will only result in loss of credibility and effectiveness when the heightened threat does in fact materialize in the future.

Sprinzak's recommendations have merit as it is generally agreed that physical protection against chemical, biological, or nuclear terrorism is either impracticable or impossible. The cost of guarding the

citizens and infrastructure of a modern industrialized society against this threat would quickly bankrupt any nation that attempted to do so. The most important aspect of Sprinzak's response to the threat posed by WMD is the gathering and analysis of intelligence. An efficient and effective intelligence system will allow first the prevention of an attack and if not prevention, then mitigation of the attack's consequences. The importance of training and initiatives undertaken to address the threat posed by WMD and the Canadian progress to date on those measures have already been examined and this process will not be repeated here.

An assessment of the best means of addressing the threat posed by IO or "cyber terror" is by no means as straightforward as that just conducted for WMD. The government has recognized the threat and several departments and agencies are at work defining and quantifying it. Most nations of the industrialized world are in the same position as Canada however, and that is, in the process of defining the problem and determining a solution. As yet there is not a single nation, that has what is considered to be a comprehensive solution to the threat posed by IO. The most difficult aspect of the problem is coming to grips with the fact that it is such a comprehensive issue and is so unlike any other threat to the nation's security. First, the defensive mechanisms to address the other threats have been based on the fact that those threats were physical and consequently required physical measures to counter them. Second, the multidisciplinary and pervasive nature of the IO problem makes the problem itself difficult to grasp, let alone obtain an understanding of its solution.

The beginning of a solution to this dilemma is however, already beginning to appear. The anticipated difficulty with electronic data storage and transmission posed by the approach of the second millennium, known colloquially as the "Y2K problem" is providing the government with the focus upon which to allocate funding and begin formulating a plan of action. The next question then becomes how to act. The extent of the development of a Canadian IO strategy is clearly not an issue for open discussion. However, it is instructive to examine a generalized solution that has been the subject of discussion among some government experts.

The first step would involve the creation of a government-wide monitoring system that would establish the extent to which information systems were being attacked and penetrated. From this measure would flow sufficient information to define the threat and validate the expenditure of funds to neutralize it. This would be followed by measures to safeguard the systems from intrusion, and the information therein from destruction, alteration, or theft. A logical consequence of this step would be the development of penetration testing measures where critical systems in business and government were subjected to tests of their security based on the known threats determined from the monitoring system. Lastly, a government-wide or even national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) would be established as the "911" system of the electronic information infrastructure. The success of these efforts would be dependent upon the close cooperation of literally all government departments as well as the business and economic community. It may even be necessary to establish a national organization to oversee the comprehensive implementation of these measures that addressed the IO threat.

As can be seen from the forgoing examination, the threat posed by both WMD and IO has been identified and is in the process of being addressed. The importance of continued attention to both of these threats is best illustrated by the following quote from the presentation made by the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Mr. Ward Elcock, in his statement before the Special Committee on Security and Intelligence on 24 June of this year:

"Put simply, it is my view that there can be no more cost effective contribution to meeting our counter-terrorism responsibilities than to be able to develop the technologies and capabilities required to circumvent these new weapons in the terrorist arsenal. This is not a frill. This is literally about life and death."

The third and last aspect of the NCTP to be examined is the anti terrorism programme, or Canada's ability to predict, and thereafter prevent or mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. The mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is to provide advance warning to government departments and agencies about activities which may reasonably be suspected of constituting threats to the country's security. As such, this organization will be the focus of this discussion. It was the assessment of both the Cheriton Task Force and the Senate Committees in the late 1980s that a major shortcoming of the programme then in existence was poor intelligence support in the anti-terrorist function and in the counter-terrorist management of incidents.

It is now the widely held opinion that the ability of CSIS to gather, analyze, and effectively disseminate intelligence has greatly improved in the intervening period. Further, CSIS is also seen to be shifting decisively from the reactive/investigative posture of its early years to a forward-looking, analytical, approach emphasizing the "anti" or preventive aspect of its work. The organization now regularly provides high quality threat assessments that recognize the critical nature of the WMD and IO threats.

Several key officials see the primary role for CSIS in dealing with the terrorist threat of the future as identifying and targeting individuals or groups before they carry out the attack. An effective anti terrorist capability is therefore crucial to the future success of the NCTP in protecting Canadian citizens and property from terrorist attack. As has been concluded at several points in this paper already, the ability to predict when the threat of terrorist attack is increasing is critical to the early reassignment of government resources from other priorities. The only way of doing this is with an efficient and effective intelligence system.

Such a system would also benefit Canada indirectly in other areas. The provision of sound intelligence on the terrorist threat to other nations would be a relatively economical means of contributing to world stability and also of earning a louder voice in international forums. In addition, an internationally respected intelligence system would also safeguard Canadian sovereignty. Being seen to effectively address the terrorist threat ourselves will discourage our friends from attempting to do it for us from within our own borders.

The last point to be addressed is the deterrent value of having it known that Canada has recognized the threat posed by terrorism and has an effective anti and counter terrorism response in place. If terrorist organizations are generally aware of this, they may choose to look elsewhere for a more lucrative target, one that will provide less risk and greater results. A noted author on terrorism, Brian Jenkins, states the case quite succinctly in his comment, "As we deal effectively with certain tactics, certain weapons, the terrorists do innovate just enough to obviate our security measures. They either *switch to softer targets* (sic), or they may innovate tactically, or they may innovate with weapons."

Summary and Conclusion

The analysis and conclusions presented in this paper are based on a comprehensive selection of the open source material presently available. A great deal of classified information on the subject of terrorism does of course exist. While this information would undoubtedly provide a more detailed insight into the issues that have been presented, it is unlikely to change the basic conclusions regarding those issues. Consequently, it is critical that the material presented here be considered carefully and not simply dismissed as superficial or irrelevant on the basis of its unclassified roots.

The world can be expected to remain an unstable environment as the second millennium approaches. The proliferation of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy by some states and as a weapon of the weak shows no sign of disappearing. The trend by various extremist groups and mercenaries towards acts of increasing violence is clearly established. The capabilities of terrorist groups to employ WMD and IO resources has also been ably demonstrated and is expected to become increasingly effective in achieving their goals in the future.

Canadian citizens and property have so far not been targeted for terrorist attack in the to the same degree as have nations such as Israel, Great Britain, or the United States. The terrorist threat to the peace and security of Canada is a limited one. It is confined, at the present time, to isolated acts on a small scale perpetrated by international groups focussed on homeland issues and national groups or individuals attempting to influence social issues within Canada. While most major international terrorist organizations are present in Canada, they have chosen not to conduct operations of any significance or direct danger to Canada or Canadians to date. Even though the threat to Canada and Canadians is low at the present time however, the nation must be prepared to play a role in the promotion of world peace and stability. It must also be prepared to react decisively to protect its citizens and property should the threat posed by terrorism increase for any reason.

The NCTP is funded and organized to effectively address a threat level that is low relative to other democracies that have been directly targeted for terrorist attack. The frequency and extent of the training conducted at all levels to counter terrorist attacks while not at the same levels as previous years, is event-oriented and addresses specific threats to Canadian peace and security.

Initiatives such as those undertaken by the national Capital Region First Responders Committee are ensuring that the personnel and resources devoted to the NCTP are employed in the best manner possible. The ability of the nation to react effectively beyond the current threat level however is dependent upon the existence of an effective anti terrorist capability to provide forewarning of an attack in sufficient time to either prevent the attack or to augment the incident and consequence management resources currently assigned.

The evolving threats posed by WMD and IO have been identified. Defending against these threats is extremely difficult. Most efforts to date have focussed on incident and consequence management of an attack using these weapons. As indicated previously, the best defense against such attacks is prevention. This requires an effective anti terrorist programme based on the gathering and analysis of intelligence.

Thus the key aspect of the NCTP is the ability to provide forewarning through an effective system of gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Given the growing costs of a successful terrorist attack, the present CSIS focus on prevention and forewarning is both appropriate and necessary.

The conclusion that may be drawn from this examination is that Canada does have a viable anti and counter terrorist response that addresses the threat as it exists today. Its continued viability however is dependent upon an effective and ongoing assessment of and reaction to the terrorist threat as it evolves in the shadow of the millennium. Can Canada ever hope to ultimately overcome this threat to its peace and security? Possibly the most accurate assessment of the nature of the terrorist phenomena was given by one American official when he said, "That's the frustrating thing about terrorism, it's a race, and there's no finish line."

Although there exist in excess of 100 separate definitions of terrorism, none of them are generally accepted by the community of scholars and professionals in the field itself (see Hoffman). The tendency in the attempts to define this phenomenon has quite naturally been to be very specific in stating what does and does not constitute terrorism. As this approach has not proven successful or effective, a less specific definition will be used here. For the purposes of this paper terrorism will be defined as any act intended to influence the behavior of others through the creation of a climate of fear. The motivations, or underlying causes of the act are considered irrelevant be they criminal, political, religious, nationalist, revolutionary, apocalyptic, messianic, or related to ecology, animal rights, left or wing extremism, or the abortion issues. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Cassell Group, 1998), 39.

For the purposes of this paper a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is defined as: A weapon that is capable of killing the same number of people as hundreds to thousands of conventional high explosive or incendiary devices. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, August, 1993), 46.

The September 1983 Air India bombing, while suspected of originating in Canada, has not been conclusively proven, and in any event took place in international airspace, involved a multitude of nationalities, was carried out in response to a conflict originating in the Indian homeland and was intended to influence events in India. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 1997 Public Report. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1998.

It was used by the government against the people during the *Regime de la Terreur* of the French Revolution in 1793-4. In 1878, a group of Russian constitutionalists known as the *Narodnaya Volya*, or "People's Freedom" made use of terror tactics to oppose what they saw as the autocratic and oppressive rule of the Tsar. Hoffman, 16.

Opposed to the extent and influence of government, groups and individuals influenced by the anarchist philosophy carried out a series of assassinations into the second decade of the 20th century. In the United States the most memorable events of this period were the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 and the proliferation, in a foreshadowing of present day events, of a variety of "how to" or "do it yourself" manuals on the creation of violence and mayhem. Ibid., 20.

  For the purposes of this paper shadow terrorism is defined as: The covert use of terrorism in the pursuit of a specific objective held by a national or sub-national group. The initiator or sponsor of the terrorist act does not want to be specifically identified by the victim(s) or witnesses because of the possibility of retribution or public condemnation. The most famous of these acts was arguably the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June, 1914 that culminated in the carnage of the First World War. In modern times, Libya is accused of direct participation in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 104 over Lockerbie Scotland in 1984 in retaliation for the American bombing of Tripoli. Sub-national groups such as the Colombian Drug Cartels have engaged in shadow terrorism in their support of the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) to destabilize the government and thereby create an environment more conducive to their continued survival and growth. For a more detailed discussion of the history and nature of this phenomenon see Hoffman, 22 and 26-28.

  The initial practitioners of this brand of terrorism were Benito Mussolini, Adolph Hitler, and Josef Stalin. This brand of state-imposed or directed violence continued after the demise of its most famous innovators with the right-wing military dictatorships of Argentina, Chile, and Greece in the 1970s, and of El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru in the 1980s. Ibid., 25.

Nations such as Israel, Kenya, Cyprus, and Algeria all effectively employed terrorism against colonial powers in achieving their independence. The revolutionary flavor was subtly enhanced in the 1960s and 1970s with the addition of nationalist and ethnic separatist groups such as the Basque *Euskada ta Askatasuna* (ETA - Freedom for the Basque Homeland) and the Quebecois *Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ). Ibid., 26.

The most popular example of this aspect of terrorism is the collaboration between criminal organizations such as the Colombian Drug Cartels and left wing terrorist groups in attacks against western governments who were attempting to repress the lucrative international trade in illegal drugs. Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, "International Terrorism on the Eve of a New

Millennium," <u>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</u> Volume 20 Number 3 (1997): 281. See also Hoffman, 28.

For the purposes of this paper state terrorism is defined as: Covert attacks perpetrated directly by a state against another state or sub-national group for the purpose of achieving one or more objectives that are not attainable through the use of conventional methods. The objectives are not attainable conventionally either because of the overwhelming strength of the of the target state or sub-national group, or because public opposition or opinion would cause unacceptable damage to the perpetrating state's position. The United States has been accused of conducting state terrorism by means of covert operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in numerous third world countries. State sponsored terrorism is defined as terrorism carried out with the active and often clandestine support , encouragement, and assistance by a foreign government to the terrorist group. Hoffman, 23.

Terrorist mercenaries are for the most part groups who have relinquished their political/revolutionary motivations for the profit motive and include the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The ANO has a separate financial directorate to administer its investments estimated in 1988 at US $400 million. The JRA has for the most part ceased operations and retired in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon or in North Korea to live off its commissions. Medd and Goldstein, 284. See also Hoffman, 187-190.

Examples of state-sponsored terrorism include the 1972 massacre at Lod Airport by the JRA, the October 1983 simultaneous bombing of the U.S. Marine Headquarters and French Paratroop Headquarters that killed a total of 300, the destruction of Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland that killed 270 people, and the bombing of a French UTA aircraft over Chad that killed 171 people. Hoffman, 196.

Religion-based groups range from the *Islamic Jihad*, the Lebanese *Hezbollah*, or Algerian Armed Islamic group (AIG) whose objectives are the establishment of a theocracy, to mystical, transcendental, and divinely inspired groups with millenarian aims such as the Japanese *Aum Shinriko* sect. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, <u>Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence,</u> Ward Elcock, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, (Ottawa: June 24, 1998). See also Hoffman, 185 and 200.

Examples are the Idaho-based Aryan Nations and anti-government militias such as the Minnesota Patriots Council. These organizations have branch chapters located in Canada. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. "Counter-Terrorism." <u>Backgrounder Series</u>, No. 8, April 1997. Ottawa: CSIS Communications Branch 1997.

For the purposes of this paper a Lone Wolf terrorist is one who operates entirely alone without support or assistance from any other individual or organization. Hoffman, 185 and 200.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, <u>Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.</u> See also Medd and Goldstein, 281.

Events of duration are still used today by some groups even though for the most part the international community has learned to deal with this tactic effectively with the use of elite military or paramilitary units. The latest example is the defeat of the *Tupac Ameru* guerrillas in their takeover of the Japanese Embassy in Peru. Medd and Goldstein, 282.

Examples are: September 1983 Air India 747 with 329 deaths, December 1988 Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie Scotland with 270 deaths, and September 1989 UTA DC10 over Chad with 171 deaths. Ibid., 283.

484 attacks were carried out in 1991, 343 in 1992, 360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, and 278 in 1995. 29% of terrorist acts killed people in 1995. This is an increase from 17% in the 1970s and 19% in the 1980s. The number of attacks perpetrated by religious groups increased to 25% in 1995, but they accounted for 58% of the casualties. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," Backgrounder Series No. 8 April 1997, (Ottawa: CSIS Communications Branch 1997), 2. See also Medd and Goldstein, 286 and Hoffman, 200-201.

Terrorists tended in the past to operate on the principle of the use of minimum force. They found it unnecessary to kill many, if killing a few sufficed for their purposes. Their objectives were to produce an immediate dramatic effect with a handful of violent deaths. The killing of hundreds or thousands in a single act was not their style. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, (The RAND Corporation, P-7119, July 1985), 6. See also Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (The RAND Corporation, P-5541, November 1975), 6-7 and Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

While the attacks on the Manhattan World Trade Center in 1993 and Tokyo Subway in 1995 killed relatively few people, they injured 1,000 and 5,500 respectively, a massive increase in the average casualty figures per attack. The bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, involving 258 deaths and the attempted disruption of the peace process with the bombing in Omagh by the IRA may arguably be the latest example of this trend. Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October 1998. See also Medd and Goldstein, 285 and Hoffman, 189, and 196-197.

U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Publication 10535. Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA), U.S. Government Printing, April 1998.

Chinese Triads sold heroin in Russia in exchange for weapons that were subsequently sold to Islamic fundamentalists. The group responsible for the Manhattan Trade Center bombing in 1993 represented a mix of drug traffickers, criminals, and religious fundamentalists. Steven Emerson, "The Accidental Terrorist: Coping with the New, Freelance Breed of Anti-West Fanatic," Washington Post, 13 June 1993, C5. See also Medd and Goldstein, 285.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

The threat of contaminating an area of downtown Manhattan using such a device is a real one. While the theft of radioactive material has not occurred in the United States there is serious concern over the accounting for all such material in the former Soviet Union. Recently two shipments of radioactive material have been intercepted on their way to the United States. One of the shipments contained forty-five tons of radioactive material. Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October, 1998. See also Medd and Goldstein, 293.

They are Libya, Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Iran, and Iraq. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Publication 10535. Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA), U.S. Government Printing, April 1998.

Medd and Goldstein, 293.

  Chemical weapons were used by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war and were reportedly used by both Iraq and Syria in internal security operations against dissidents opposing the ruling regime. Patrick G. Marshall, "Obstacles to Bio-Chemical Disarmament," Editorial Research Reports 1:24 June (1990): 376. See also Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to Open Literature, (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995), 91.

The World Trade Center was to have been subjected to a release of potassium cyanide in the aftermath of the explosion to complete the killing of the buildings'occupants and also create casualties among the police, medical, and fire fighting personnel responding to the disaster. Medd and Goldstein, 294.

Purver, 113.

Medd and Goldstein, 299.

The objective for the World trade Centre bombing had been to topple one tower into the other and conclude the attack with the release of potassium cyanide into the rubble to complete the massacre. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Cassell Group, 1998), 196-197. See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," Backgrounder Series, No. 8, 3.

Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October 1998. This data is supported by the RAND database that classifies only 52 out of 8,000 recorded events since 1968 as being related to the use of unconventional weapons. Medd and Goldstein, 286-287. See also Hoffman, 292.

They include; fear of the uncontrollability of the agent, unpredictability of the agent, alienation of supporters on moral grounds, fear of unprecedented retribution, availability of conventional weapons, technical constraints of how to effectively deploy the weapon, and a lack of familiarity or expertise in the use of the weapon. Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October 1998.

In 1984 the Animal Liberation Front circulated a rumor that Mars candy bars were spiked with rat poison in protest of medical experiments the company was performing using animals and cost the company US 4.5 million dollars. In 1989 rumors of cyanide-laced grapes from Chile cost that country's fruit industry US 333 million dollars. Three incidents in 1995 involved secular groups ordering, obtaining, and/or stockpiling ricin the third most toxic substance in the world), bubonic plague, and *yersinia pestis.* It is believed that they were intended for small-scale attacks on government agencies or officials. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," Backgrounder Series, No. 8, 3. See also Medd and Goldstein, 284 and Hoffman, 205.

   Alexander predicts that the world will see incidents of mass destruction and casualties using radioactive, biological, or chemical weapons, far worse than even the potential of the World Trade Center bombing or the Tokyo gas attack. Medd and Goldstein, 286-287. This view is supported in an Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October 1998. See also Hoffman, 293.

Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy Fall (1998): 111. See also Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October 1998. See also Medd and Goldstein, 286-287 and Hoffman, 293.

Anarchist or millenarian groups with the objective of disrupting society can use IO as the electronic equivalent of a biological agent to run out of control throughout the industrialized world. Terrorists can use IO to cause disruptions of modern industrialized infrastructures to include basic services such as power grids, police databases, social security transfers, medical networks, transportation coordination grids, financial transaction systems, and telecommunications capabilities. Interview with an official of the Communications Security Establishment, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 October 1998. See also Dr. Andrew Rathmell, Dr Richard Overill, Lorenzo Valeri, and Dr. John Gearson, "The IW Threat from Sub-State Groups: an Interdisciplinary Approach," Partners for the 21st Century: Proceedings of the 3rd International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, (Washington: National Defence University, 1997), 169, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence, and Roger Medd and Goldstein, 291-292, and 295.

Walter Laquer, "Post-Modern Terrorism," in Foreign Affairs Vol 75, No 5 (1996): 35.

   These institutions are typically the target of attacks for the purpose of fundraising. A financial institution is usually provided with a short, but graphic demonstration by the terrorists that their system has been penetrated and then they are given a demand for money or threatened with disruption of their database. Firms are usually quite willing to pay immediately not only to preserve their system, but to prevent the general public and their customers from knowing that their information and possibly their funds are at risk. In spite of a reluctance by firms to come forward with this type of information however, a total of 40 attacks have been identified since 1993. In one month alone, in excess of 40 million English pounds was paid out in blackmail demands. This use of IO by itself provides terrorists with near limitless funding that is untraceable. Macko, Steve, ed, "The Cyber Terrorists," Emergency Net News Service Vol 2 -

156 (1994), accessed 5 August 1998, available from www.infowar.com/iwftp/enn/CYBERTERR.HTM. See also Rathmell, 169.

Interview with an official of the Communications Security Establishment, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 October, 1998.

See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1997 Public Report, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1998), 6.

Rathmell, 164.

Macko, available from www.infowar.com/iwftp/enn/CYBERTERR.HTM. See also Rathmell, 168.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence. See also Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 15.

Some of the major terrorist organizations active in Canada are; Hezbollah, other Shiite Islamic terrorist organizations, a number of Sunni Islamic extremist groups including Hammers, with ties to Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, Lebanon, and Iran, the provisional IRA, the Tamil Tigers, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and all of the major Sikh terrorist groups. These groups originate from conflicts in the Punjab, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egyptian, Algerian, and Sudanese unrest, Lebanon, Turkey, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

 Other objectives include but are not restricted to obtaining weapons and equipment, offensive and defensive intelligence surveillance, cooperating with or countering other terrorist or criminal organizations, influencing Canadian public and government opinion, and illegally obtaining Canadian travel and identification documents. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1997 Public Report, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1998), 2. See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," Backgrounder Series, No. 8, April 1997, (Ottawa: CSIS Communications Branch 1997), 4.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

Examples are: the September 1982 attempted assassination by Armenian terrorists of the Turkish Commercial Consul, Hani Gungor in Ottawa, the August 1982 assassination by Armenian terrorists of the Turkish Military attaché, Colonel Altikat, and the March 1985 murder of a private security guard by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. A visiting Punjab cabinet minister was wounded in an assassination attempt in Gold River BC, October 1991. Members of Jamaat ul Fuqra are arrested in connection with a plot to bomb a Hindu Temple, a movie theatre, and an East Indian restaurant in Toronto, and in April 1992 the Iranian Ambassador is slightly injured when members of the anti-regime

organization *Mujahedin-e-Khlaq* storm and briefly occupy the embassy. Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 2 and 6. See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," Backgrounder Series, No. 8, 4.

Terrorist incidents in Canada peaked in the 1960s, 1979-1983, and 1985-1987. Of those incidents included in the data, the overwhelming majority were carried out by international groups against the citizens or property of other nations. Additional data for the period 1987 to present is not available from open source material at the time of writing. However, world -wide trend analysis indicates the incidence of terrorism continues to decline. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1997 Public Report, 4. See also Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 7-8 and Canada, The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1989), 7.

This arises from incidents perpetrated by terrorist groups in Canada against Canadian targets in order to focus on domestic issues that can be resolved by the Canadian government. Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 2 and 6.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

This threat takes the form of the same "lone wolf" or small cell "single issue" terrorist organizations that conduct operations designed to highlight and publicize a cause such as the pro-life movement, the ecology, or animal rights activists. A 20-year-old member of the animal rights group known as the "Animal Liberation Front" faces a minimum sentence of 35 years in jail after destroying a business supplying feed and equipment to mink farms in Utah. The group is known to have more than 3,000 members. Mike Carter, . "Animal Rights Activist Convicted." Associated Press , 18 September, 1998.

The impact of domestic terrorism has waned since the surge of *FLQ* related activities in the early 1970s. The growth of single-issue groups however is sparking renewed interest and concern regarding the threat posed by acts of domestic terrorism. Two examples are; 14 October 1982 members of the group *Direct Action* bombed the Litton Industries plant in Toronto, injuring 10 and causing 3.87 million dollars damage and 11-13 July, 1995 letter bombs are sent to the Alberta Genetics Laboratory and the Mackenzie Institute. No group claimed responsibility. Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 9-10.

A case in point is the Japanese Embassy in Peru. Rumors of complicity in the attack on the embassy by the Peruvian authorities and of plans to kill the *Tupac Amero* terrorists if they had been granted safe passage on a Canadian aircraft have resulted in vows of revenge by the *MRTA*. A second example is the Canadian role in the Iran hostage crises where Canadian embassy staff was seen as aiding American citizens in their escape from Iran after militant students stormed the United States Embassy. A concrete act of revenge did in fact occur in 1982 when members of the Armenian terrorist group *ASALA* attempted to bomb the Air Canada cargo terminal in Los Angeles in reaction to the arrest of alleged Armenian terrorists in Toronto. They subsequently

bombed the Air Canada offices in Paris and Lyon France in November 1985 to publicize their demands for the release of their colleagues serving sentences in Canadian jails. Interview with senior official "B" of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Ontario, 6 October 1998. See also David Pugliese, "Elite Canadian Commando Force Planned Attack on Peru Terrorists," The Ottawa Citizen, 4 November 1998, A1 and Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 16.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

Benjamin Weiser, "2 Convicted in Plot to Blow Up N.Y. World Trade Center." The New York Times, 13 November 1997.

Interview with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November 1998.

Medd and Goldstein, 289.

Interview with official "A" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October, 1998.

If Canada is seen to be unwilling to effectively address the terrorist threat, other nations are more than willing to perform that function for us. Indeed, Canadian agencies already spend time and effort dealing with agencies and groups in other parts of the world who wish to perform this function for Canada, possibly in ways that Canadians would find unacceptable. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

Interview with official "A" of the Solicitor General Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 22 September, 1998. See also Canada, The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 57-68. See also Canada, The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 4, 12, and 20 and Canada, Interim National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, 1998.

All of the provinces have specific plans, resources, and personnel dedicated towards dealing with emergency situations be they natural, criminal, or terrorist oriented. Some provinces, Ontario for example, have specific counter terrorism plans that are designed to maximize the utility of personnel and resources already committed to law enforcement, fire fighting, medical emergencies, and natural disasters. Ontario. "Annex D: Provincial Counter Terrorism Plan (Draft)," Provincial Emergency Plan, (Toronto: August 1998), D1.

Canada. The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety.

Interview with an official of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 October, 1998. Also Interview with an official of the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency, Ottawa,

Ontario, 1 October, 1998. Also Interview with an official of the Ottawa Carleton Police Service, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October, 1998.

Interview with official "A" of the Solicitor General Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 22 September, 1998.

Interview with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November 1998. This assessment was provided by the representatives of a number of other agencies, among them, a senior official of the Department of National Defence, on 24 September 1998, another official of the Department of National Defence, on 9 October 1998, and an official "A" of the Solicitor General Canada, on 22 September 1998.

Police, fire department, medical organizations, and emergency measures groups are working together to address this multidisciplinary threat. They have formed a National Capital Region First Responders Committee that reviews the personnel, equipment, and procedures of their member agencies to determine where and how existing resources can be better employed in responding to this threat. Interview with an official of the Ottawa Carleton Police Service, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October 1998. See also Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service. Appearance of National Capital First responders Committee to the Senate of Canada Special Committee on Security and Intelligence. Ottawa: 3 September 1998.

This opinion was expressed by several professional experts over the course of interviews with an official of the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency and an official of the Ottawa Carleton Police Service on 1 October, an official of the Ontario Provincial Police on 27 October, and an official of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, on 26 September 1998.

Interview with an official of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, Kingston, Ontario, 26 September 1998. Also Interview with an official of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 October, 1998.

The terrorists will strike at the time and place of their choosing with the weapon they feel will be most effective. In order to overcome this element of surprise, the counter terrorist response must be quick, measured, and effective if the attackers are to be robbed of the initiative. The Special Operations principles of speed and repetition must be used to rob the terrorists of their advantage of surprise. This can only be achieved if the responders posses a workable plan that has been tested in all respects. The truth of these statements is found in the success of the German attack on Eben Emael Belgium on 10 May, 1940, and the Israeli attack on Entebbe, 4 July, 1976. William H. McRaven, Special Operations: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare-Theory and Practice, (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1996), 4, 29, and 333.

Interview with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November 1998.

Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy Fall (1998): 122.

Brian M. Jenkins and Alfred P. Rubin, "New Vulnerabilities and the Acquisition of New Weapons by Non-Government Groups," in Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy eds. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1978): 274.

Interview with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November 1998. Also Interviews with an official of the Communications Security Establishment, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 October 1998 and with a senior official of the Solicitor General Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 22 September, 1998.

Rathmell, 170.

Three juveniles using software obtained on the Internet perpetrated the greatest threat to American national security. Interview with an official of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October, 1998.

Interview with an official of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October, 1998. Also Interview with an official of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October, 1998.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989), Articles 12 and 13.

Canada. The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety, 11.

Interview with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November, 1998. Also Interviews with an official of the Ontario Provincial Police on 27 October, with an official of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service on 26 September, with official "B" of the Solicitor General Canada on 22 September, and with a senior official of the Department of National Defence on 24 September, 1998.

Interview with an official of the Security Intelligence Review Committee on 6 October, and with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, on 4 November 1998.

Interviews with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November, 1998 and with a senior official of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, 24 September, 1998. See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

Interview with Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November, 1998. See also Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.

Robert S. Root-Bernstein, "Infectious Terrorism," Atlantic Monthly May (1991): 50. See also Purver, 95.

As quoted in Patrick G. Marshall, "Obstacles to Bio Chemical Disarmament," Editorial Research Reports 1:24 June (1990): 376.

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* Mini-Bio Major B.J. Brister

Major Bernard J. Brister is a tactical helicopter pilot with service in squadrons across Canada and in Germany with NATO. His operational tours include stints with the United Nations in Haiti and with SFOR in Bosnia. He recently completed a Master of Arts degree in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada where the focus of his research was Irregular Warfare and Terrorism. He is presently involved with the counter terrorism effort as a member of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff's group at National Defence Headquarters.