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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 67-2-279
TITLE:             Brezhnev on Cultural Affairs
BY:                G. V. D.
DATE:              1971-4-1
COUNTRY:           Soviet Union
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Culture

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RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

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This material was prepared for the use of the
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USSR: Culture
1 April 1971

BREZHNEV ON CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Summary: The portions of Brezhnev's speech at
the 24th CPSU Congress dealing with cultural
affairs are a restatement of the "middle-of-
the road" position that has been a hallmark of the
general Party line thus far, Balancing criticism
of liberal tendencies with a warning to dogmatic
elements, it appears the regime is not prepared
to tolerate experimentation in either direction.
As could be expected, the primary emphasis is
still on ideological control, with the secret
police serving as an important guardian of
ideological purity.

Since Brezhnev's presentation of the Central Committee
report at the 23rd CPSU Congress five years ago, many of the
practices of the Stalin era have come under increasing criticism
"from below," with a corresponding attempt by many Party and
government agencies at all levels to contain or suppress this
tendency. The phenomena of dissent, trials and demonstrations
have now become part of Soviet life, publicized by means of
samizdat. While reluctant to draw attention to this fact,
official publications have had to admit to the existence of
such unorthodox tendencies among "individual members" of
Soviet society. At the end of last year, it was even found
necessary to publish an authoritative article in Pravda
(17 December 1970) criticizing dissidents by name.

[page 2]

In keeping with the regime's predisposition toward
controlling rather than allowing the free interplay of ideas,
it is not surprising that Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Party
Congress contains virtually no proposals that hint at a
liberalization of the present attitude toward the creative
elements in society. Simultaneously, however, there is also
a certain degree of restraint from either the crude attacks
against the liberal intelligentsia such as those that have
characterized the speeches of Pyotr Shelest, a dogmatic
member of the Politburo, or from an overt "rehabilitation" of
Stalin and his methods. [1]

Without referring to any persons by name, Brezhnev
censures those who gravitate in either direction. The first
to be criticized, perhaps an indication of his order of
priorities, are those "who have sought to reduce the diversity
of present-day Soviet reality to problems that have
irreversibly receded into the past as a result of the work
done by the Party to surmount the consequences of the
personality cult," undoubtedly a reference to Solzhenitsyn
and other members of the intelligentsia who consider it
necessary to re-examine the Stalinist past, examine its causes,
and prevent its reoccurrence in the future. On the other
hand, Brezhnev also takes exception to those extremist
writers "who are trying to whitewash the phenomena of the
past which the Party has decisively and principally criticized."
In a section of his speech dealing with foreign policy, Brezhnev
refuses to agree to a Chinese demand that "the line of the
20th Congress," famous for Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing
Stalin, be rejected. Indirectly, therefore, a decision has
been taken against the formal rehabilitation, or
"white-washing," of the Stalin era. Both, according to Brezhnev, are
"attempts to belittle the significance of that which has already
been accomplished by the Party and the people... The Party
and the people have not and will not be reconciled with attempts,
no matter from which side they originate, to blunt our ideological
armament, to soil our banner. If a writer slanders Soviet
reality, if he assists our ideological enemies in their
struggle against socialism, then they deserve only one
thing -- public scorn." Hence, he clearly equates further
attempts, not sanctioned by the regime, either to expose more
fully the crimes committed during Stalin's rule or to exhume
the man and his policies, with "slander" against "Soviet reality" --
a crime punishable under existing Soviet law.

From subsequent remarks, it is apparent that Brezhnev
would prefer that the embarrassing episodes of the past be
entirely disregarded as subjects for further discussion.

[page 3]

Conveniently, he sweeps critical issues aside by affirming,
without elaboration, that the shortcomings of the past have
already been adequately analyzed and surmounted. "The
experience of the last few years has convincingly confirmed
that the overcoming of the vestiges of the cult of personality
[Stalinism] and likewise the subjectivist errors [Khrushchev-ism]
have beneficially influenced the general political, and first of
all, the ideological situation in the country." Without
resolving the question, Brezhnev would like to dismiss it
by dictate, yet the question of Stalin and the anxiety felt
by many persons over what they perceive to be a gradual
re-emergence of Stalinist methods continues to exist as a major
theme in samizdat that reaches the West. Significant in this
regard is the text of an open letter reportedly sent by the
well-known dissident Pyotr Yakir to the 24th Congress in
which he warns against "the reappearance of Stalinism in the
political, social and cultural life of our country... For
the last few years a dangerous tendency towards the rebirth
of Stalinist methods of government has become apparent in
culture, artistic and historical literature and memoirs, and
towards the rehabilitation of Stalin himself, one of the
biggest criminals of the 20th century." [2] Far from
diminishing as a topic of concern, Yakir reportedly states
that alarm at this tendency is felt by "a huge, if not
overwhelming, part of our creative, scientific and technical
intelligentsia."

While not elaborating on the existence of ideas
independent of and frequently contrary to the Party line,
Brezhnev's emphasis on the need for continued ideological
vigilance is tantamount to an admission that heterodox notions
have not been eradicated. The Soviet citizen, according to
Brezhnev, lives "in a situation of an unflagging ideological
war" which is being conducted against the socialist world by
"imperialist propaganda." "All methods affecting the mind
that are at the disposal of the bourgeoisie -- the press,
films, radio -- are mobilized in order to mislead people,
in order to inculcate a feeling that life under capitalism
is almost paradise, in order to slander socialism. The
airwaves are literally saturated with all kinds of
fabrications about life in our country and in the fraternal
socialist countries." The youth of the Soviet Union continue
to be among those, according to Brezhnev, who still require
ideological regimentation. "It is our duty ... to direct the
ideological education of youth, to do everything in order that
they properly continue the work of their fathers, the work of

[page 4]

the great Lenin." Although Stalin's use of mass terror
is not likely to be reimposed, it appears that the
administrative methods of the secret police will continue
to be applied, although in a somewhat restrained and selective
fashion, as a means of opposing conflicting ideas. Brezhnev
admitted that police agencies will continue to serve the
function of guarding ideological purity. "In the conditions
of a continuing subversive activity of imperialism, the organs
of state security play an important role. During the period
under review, their ranks were strengthened by politically
mature cadres. The Party consistently educates these agencies
in the spirit of the Leninist principles of the strict
adherence to socialist law, in the spirit of unflagging
vigilance in the struggle to guard Soviet society from the
activities of harmful elements, from the intrigues of imperialize
intelligence agencies." The perpetuation of such a system
casts doubt on the veracity of Brezhnev's assurance that "each
Soviet person, apparently, senses an improvement in the moral
atmosphere in our Party and in our society."

G.v.D.

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(1) See RFE Research report #0953, "Lessons of the 24th
Ukrainian Party Congress," 29 March 1971.

(2) Reuter/UPI, DPA, 29 March 1971.

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