CHAPTER TWENTY ONE

Pressure Groups and Policy Networks

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter analyses the relationship between the state and civil society. First, it examines the role of pressure groups within the British political system before presenting a set of typologies classifying different types of pressure groups. The policy networks approach is then explored as a meso-level tool of analysis linking macro-theories of the state to more specific micro-policy decisions. The chapter then analyses the changing relationship between government and pressure groups from 1979 to the present. The chapter concludes by arguing that network analysis on its own is inadequate and should be applied to broader macro-theories of the state, in order to provide a richer explanatory analysis of political phenomena in British politics.

Introduction

If people in Britain were free to influence the Government only at general elections, then Rousseau's 18th-century gibe about the British being slaves between elections, might still have some validity. But during the last century, two major channels for representing popular opinion have evolved. The first is the Party electoral one, in which a person votes for a Party as a member of a territorial constituency, and the second is the interest group-functional one, in which a person joins a group consisting of people who have shared attitudes or occupations. Most individuals possess both a vote and belong to a group. But whereas a vote can only be used periodically, perhaps every four years or so in the case of general elections, pressure groups allow citizens a continuous opportunity to try and influence policy in particular areas. This underpins one of the basic principles of contemporary liberal democracy—the freedom to associate. Pressure groups are one of the fundamental components of the British political process providing a key medium through which civil society can engage in political discourse and engagement. In particular, while the basic role of political Parties in a democracy is to seek to attain power, the aim of pressure groups is to influence power, or, more particularly, the making of public policy (see Politics in Focus 21.1).

In this chapter we explore the role of pressure groups as a fundamental component of civil society. Underpinning any analysis of pressure groups is the extent to which they can influence both the political decision-making process and, in turn, affect the making of public policy. In order to understand this crucial interaction between core policy-makers (be it at the local, national or supra-national level) and executive and pressure groups, we examine different typologies used in political science to characterise the role and impact of pressure groups. Here, we suggest that the 'insider/outsider' framework offers the most analytical sophisticated approach for addressing the key issue of pressure group influence on centres of political power. We then look more specifically at the policy-network approach which can be understood as a 'meso-level' tool for exploring the various degrees of influence different types of pressure groups exert across different policy areas. Finally, we consider the crucial relationship between the policy-network approach and macro-state theory. As we see below, different types of networks have implications for our understanding of the broader nature of political power in the British political system. Here, it is crucial to recognise that Marxist and elitist models of the British state embrace a different understanding of the nature of policy networks than that which pluralist accounts would offer.

Interest groups and democracy

The role of interest groups in a liberal democracy can appear somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, between general elections, they can offer a vital channel of political expression between government and society. Yet, alternatively, they can be associated with

POLITICS IN FOCUS 21.1
Key concepts: interest groups

Pressure group A generic term for any kind of group seeking to influence the Government to adopt or change particular policies.

Types of group
— **promotional**: advocating a cause, eg Child Poverty Action or Fathers-4-Justice
— **interest**: representing those engaged in a particular sector, eg trade unions, Automobile Association, British Medical Association
— **peak**: representing a set of interests, eg TUC
— **episodic**: these spring up to pursue a particular project, eg a proposed site for nuclear waste or the Countryside Alliance.

'Insider group' A group with direct access to the corridors of power, eg National Farmers' Union and the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

'Outsider Group' A group which does not have access to the key policy-makers in the core executive. This is because such a group explicitly chooses not to attain such status, or because the core executive chooses not to engage in any form of dialogue eg Black Flag, Reclaim the Streets.

Polyarchy A term coined by Robert Dahl (an American political scientist) to denote a benign political system in which competing groups exert checks and balances and thereby ensure stability and political freedom. Broadly similar to *pluralism*.

Clientelism Close identity of interest between a government department and client group.

Corporatism Pressure groups incorporated inside the governmental process, economic policy.

Tripartism A form of corporatism associated with Britain in the 1970s when much economic policy was the outcome of negotiations between the Government, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).

sectionalism and the possible exercise of sanctions, which appear to be inimical to ideas of reasoned discussion and the general welfare.

The first major study of pressure groups in Britain was S E Finer's *Anonymous Empire*, published in 1958. It demonstrated the existence and operation of such groups within the political Parties and Parliament and how they influence policy. Finer concluded that the groups were (as far as the general public was concerned) faceless, voiceless, and unidentifiable—in brief, anonymous. Yet in practice, liberal democracy should also allow for checks on government and limits to majority rule. The opportunity for pressure groups to operate in the political arena depends, therefore, on the existence of such freedoms as those of association, assembly, and speech, and on the acknowledged legitimacy of viewpoints different from those of the Government. Recognition and toleration of the diversity of interests in society are necessary conditions for pressure-group activity.

In Britain today, more than half the adult population are members of at least one organisation (this can range from Amnesty International to the Women's Institute) and many

POLITICS IN FOCUS 21.2
The rise of pressure groups and the decline of mass political parties

One of the features of British society as it evolved in the post-1945 era, is that it has become much less homogenous. Greater diversification in race, class, culture, leisure, work, etc reflect the development of a much more heterogeneous and diverse peoples. This has challenged the more traditional analysis of British society and politics based on a crude dividing line between capital and labour. For political science, in order to analyse many contemporary political issues, class is no longer the main determinant of political attitudes and what people expect of government. Other fault lines have appeared between, for example:

- the educated and knowledge rich and the knowledge poor;
- those that are IT literate, as opposed to those who are electronically disenfranchised;
- those who feel secure and embrace change and those who feel threatened by change;
- those who want maximum freedom for the individual to pursue their own interests and those who desire a society where communities are encouraged to co-operate together to enhance social capital (see Gibbins and Reimer 1999).

These trends have made the task of mainstream, mass political Parties that much more difficult. For many, the concept of mass political Parties is no longer regarded as the best means by which a person in society can express his opinions or channel a multiplicity of demands. Indeed, in the second half of the 20th century, the rise of single-issue pressure groups became a key feature of society. Increasingly, individuals have come to regard pressure group activity, rather than Party political membership, as a more effective means of having a direct impact on a political issue or debate. In particular, mass political Parties are increasingly portrayed as being no longer able to voice the concerns and sentiments of an increasingly diverse society.

Thus, at the start of the 21st century, it is argued that the failure of political Parties to meet the complexity of demands placed upon them by an increasingly complex and socially diverse electorate has been reflected in a steady decline in Party membership and low turnouts at general elections. Conversely, there has been an exponential rise in both the number and membership of pressure groups, as individuals have come to regard pressure groups as a more effective channel for political expression. Post-modernists argue this trend indicates that we now live in an era in which traditional forms of political practice based on mass political Parties are in terminal decline, and a new form of politics is now developing (see Chapter 23).

belong to a number of groups (The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds has more members than all of the British political Parties put together!). They also belong to other communities of interests based on one's identity which can include homeownership, employment status, students, gender, shareowners, urban or rural dwellers, homosexuals, ethnicity, parents, pensioners, car owners, and so on, even though these interests might not be formally organised. In contrast to the opportunities provided by groups for representing specific interests, voting at a general election may not be particularly effective for

expressing and weighing individual views on the issues. Elections provide a rough and ready verdict on the policy packages of the parties, while groups supplement and qualify the representational role of the election by providing for the expression of views on specific issues. Indeed, one of the contemporary debates in British politics and elsewhere is to explain the decline in both voter turnout and Party membership. One compelling argument is that we now live in a much more complex, diverse society with numerous competing interests compared to say 40 years ago and this has problematised the way in which political Parties can offer a broad package of policies that have a widespread appeal (see Politics in Focus 21.2 and Chapter 22).

The role of pressure groups and political Parties

In so far as groups are voluntary associations, containing like-minded members, and attempt to influence policy, they partially resemble political parties. But Parties differ from groups in three important respects (see also Politics in Focus 21.3):

- Parties run candidates at general elections and try to capture political office directly. Although some groups support candidates for a political Party at elections, only the trade unions sponsor candidates on a considerable scale.

- Parties, as would-be governors, develop comprehensive programmes of policies to appeal to a majority of the electorate: in doing so they have to aggregate and strike a balance between the demands of various interests. Groups, by contrast, seek to articulate a sectional interest—even though they may find it good tactics to present it as identical to the public interest.

- A Party in government has to accept responsibility for coordinating and implementing a wide range of policies, whereas a group seeks to influence the policy-makers in the area that concerns it.

Critics may reasonably propose qualifications to the above distinctions. Such Parties as the Greens or the UK Independence Party have more in common with pressure groups—mainly interested in a single issue—although they operate as a political party. Elsewhere, in both the 2001 and 2005 General Elections, Dr Richard Taylor, a retired consultant physician successfully won the Worcester seat of Wyre Forest on an independent platform—the Kidderminster Hospital and Health Concern (KHHC)—over the sole issue of the closure of Kidderminster Hospital. The media dubbed the doctor 'the man in the white coat', a reference to the mantle he had inherited from the journalist Martin Bell, the original 'man in the white suit' who for one term in 1997 was elected MP for Tatton over the single issue of sleaze in politics. But the broad distinction is still useful: the political Party seeks office, general influence, and, ultimately, responsibility; the interest group primarily seeks access to decision-makers and to exercise sectional influence.

POLITICS IN FOCUS 21.3
Theory and practice: pressure groups

Theory Pressure groups remedy the shortcomings of representative democracy:
- they permit a continuous dialogue between government and the governed
- they provide opportunities for political participation
- they provide government with information and expertise
- they articulate and defend minority interests
- they act as a check on abuse of government power
- they compete with one another to influence policy outcomes

Practice
- not all groups have equal access
- resources and leverage vary between groups
- clientelism may arise and be detrimental to national interest

The growth and impact of pressure groups

Reasons for the growth of group activity in the last century are not hard to find. As we saw in Chapter 3, the role of government shifted from that of a 'night watchman' to one in which its functions dramatically grew as an employer, economic decision-maker, taxer, regulator, and distributor of benefits. One effect has been the increasing impact of government on many areas of life. This has politicised more and more human activity, while at the same time making government more dependent on an array of groups for co-operation and compliance. Without continuous consultation and co-operation between groups and government departments, the formulation and implementation of policy would grind to a halt or at least become more difficult. The nature of the relation between government and groups can, more often than not, be understand in terms of co-dependence—they need each other in order to achieve their goals (see below). Here, governments prefer to negotiate with authoritative and representative spokespeople for interests. Ministers may have policies for housing or education but they do not build houses, set mortgage rates, recruit teachers, or build schools. The policies of government consist of initiatives, resources, and decisions, which they hope will lead groups and other decision-makers to behave in desirable ways. In this type of relationship, co-operation is more usual than conflict.

Classifying pressure groups

Following Finer's (1958) original study into pressure groups there have been a number of attempts to create a typology of pressure groups. We may distinguish three types of groups that try to influence government without themselves holding office.

Promotional, cause or attitude groups

These types of groups advocate a cause and their potential membership is, in theory, coextensive with the entire population (see Stewart 1958). Among such groups are the Abortion Law Reform Association and the Howard League for Penal Reform. We might also include the 'think-tanks' that have emerged in recent years, promoting ideas and policies, for example, from the New Right—the free market Adam Smith Institute and Institute of Economic Affairs, whilst from the Centre Left—DEMOS or the Institute for Public Policy Research.

Sectional/interest groups

These groups are usually based on an occupation or economic interest, like professional organisations, trade unions, and business groups. Their role is to represent the interests of that section and membership is often restricted to that section only (see Jordan and Richardson 1987). Such groups might include, for example, the British Medical Association (BMA) as the voice of the medical profession representing doctors, or the National Farmers Union (NFU) representing farmers.

The distinction between the two groups is not always clear-cut. Some promotional groups may contain supporters who have an economic interest in the cause, and interest groups try as a rule to link their campaign with a wider cause, for example, the Countryside Alliance aver that a ban on fox hunting will have a widespread residual impact on both the countryside and rural communities. Because promotional groups have few tangible rewards to offer their supporters and few sanctions to wield, they appear to be weaker than interest groups. More importantly, neither of these two categorisations is particularly helpful in analysing the influence that groups may wield. If, at the heart of the debate on pressure groups lies the question, how variable is the nature of their power and concomitantly influence, then a more useful distinction can be made between insider and outsider groups.

Insider/outsider groups

This is the most enduring categorisation of pressure groups. Grant (2000) observes that insider groups enjoy legitimacy from government and are consulted on regular basis, while outsider groups either do not want to or have been unable to establish a consultative role with government, or have yet to gain recognition (see Politics in Focus 21.4). The chances of a group gaining access to the relevant department or decision-makers depend on various factors, but most importantly this is conditioned by the resources it commands and to what extent government is dependent on those resources. The two most important resources a group can possess are—expertise/knowledge and veto power:

(1) Expertise: Many insider groups tend to be experts in their field, for example doctors in the field of health care. They tend to have a monopoly over knowledge in a particular area and so Whitehall is almost wholly dependent on them for access to

POLITICS IN FOCUS 21.4
Insider status

In 1989 Wyn Grant categorised groups as 'insider' and 'outsider' (*Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain* (London: Philip Allan, 1989). For further discussion on this, see Wyn Grant's follow-up study, *Pressure Groups and British Politics* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

What is an insider group? A group having direct and regular access to the Government department responsible for its particular policy sector.
Why do groups seek to become insiders? In Britain's centralised system of government groups enjoying direct access to Whitehall, where detailed policy is drawn up, have the best chance of influencing policy outcomes.
How do groups become insiders? They have information and expertise the Government needs
  — they speak with authority for their sector and have a high density of membership
  — they have leverage/sanctions
  — their aims are compatible with the policy agenda of the Government of the day
Do all groups seek to become insiders? No, it brings constraints on a group's freedom of speech and activity and may involve an expectation of consultation in exchange for the group delivering members' co-operation in the policy that results. In short, constraints are the informal 'rules of the game' (see below).

this knowledge when making policy in the relevant field. This is a vital resource as it conditions a department's reliance on a group for good-quality information and administrative cooperation, as well as functional indispensability.

(2) Veto Power: A group's authority is enhanced where it is representative or has a high-density membership, that is, a high proportion of actual to potential members, as in the case of the National Farmers Union. Only farmers can implement farming policy which results in the National Farmers Union enjoying a powerful insider status, so it is potentially in a position to turn round to government and refuse to implement a particular farming policy it disagrees with. The key word here is compliance, which is vital if legislation is to be effective. Governments recognise the importance of compliance and so they are willing to listen to interest groups who can command an effective veto and are therefore capable of ensuring non-compliance of policy.

Other characteristics expected of an insider group include a reputation for discretion, responsibility, and confidentiality. Insider groups are likely to have regular access to the department and exchange information—something which is unlikely to take place without mutual trust. A group's adherence to norms of 'responsible behaviour' or 'rules of the game'—are its leaders reliable to deal with, will they keep confidences, will they avoid controversy, etc—increases the likelihood of its access. Outsiders have few rights of access because they have not established trust and/or have little relevant information to provide. For example, in recent years, the now annual May Day anti-globalisation protests have involved a rainbow alliance of groups including the anarchist organisation Black Flag,

Class War Federation, the republican group Movement Against the Monarchy (MA'M), as well as more disparate organisations such as Reclaim the Streets. None of these groups either wish to be, or are likely to be consulted by governments who view them with deep distrust. Elsewhere, the Howard League for Penal Reform has access to the Home Office; RAP (Radical Alternatives to Prisons), which favours the abolition of prison, does not. Arms manufacturers have long had access to Ministry of Defence officials, but the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) does not. It is easy to see how, over time, civil servants in a department and group leaders may come to share a similar outlook about 'sensible' (*sic*) policies.

Although the insider/outsider typology remains the dominant approach for classifying pressure groups, its usefulness has recently come under challenge. In some policy areas, insiders greatly outnumber outsiders and achieving consultative status for example, serving on a departmental advisory committee may signify that the group has been incorporated or been 'tamed' by Whitehall. Elsewhere, some critics have argued that, in view of the large numbers involved, one needs to identify *core* insider groups from others (Maloney, Jordon, and McLaughlin 1994; Grant 2000). Nevertheless, the utility of the insider/outsider approach is in its implicit recognition of the influence that different groups either do or do not wield. This leads then to the question—what tools are available for measuring the politics of influence exerted by pressure groups? Here, we can turn to the policy networks approach, which in the last two decades has become one of the most dominant methodologies used in political science for analysing political power and the impact of pressure groups.

The policy network approach

One of the tasks of political science is to explain why certain policy outcomes occur and which actors are responsible for shaping a particular policy. Yet, this is no simple task, for as has already been observed in Chapter 3, the British political system can be broadly characterised as closed, elitist and secretive (see Marsh, Richards and Smith 2003). Even in the light of the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act in 2000, the Official Secrets Act still ensures that information and minutes concerning key discussions involving ministers, civil servants and other interested Parties in the formulation of policy are not readily available for analysis. To overcome this problem, the policy network approach is one means by which we can attempt to analyse the relationship between the state and pressure groups.

What is the policy network approach?

The policy network approach is more flexible than broader theories about the state, as it is concerned with explaining behaviour within particular sections of the state or particular policy areas. Therefore, it can account for variations in pressure group/government relations that exist over a range of policy areas. This overcomes one of the problems of traditional macro-theories of the state which, by attempting to analyse the state in its

totality (holistically), tend to regard state institutions as fixed or monolithic phenomena. Policy networks provide a mechanism for assessing various conflicts within state institutions and between pressure groups and its focus of analysis is on a particular policy area. By examining the ongoing relationship between government and pressure groups, network analysis can be seen as a useful way of linking micro-levels of analysis pitched at the level of a particular policy decision to macro-level analysis concerned with power in society. Therefore, the network approach argues for the need to disaggregate (or break-down) policy analysis across different functions in order to provide a more satisfactory understanding of state action. In so doing, the policy-network approach can be regarded as being a multi-level tool of analysis, in that having disaggregated, policy networks can then be applied to macro-theories of the state in order to explain the types of relationships between state actors and pressure groups.

The evolution of network analysis

Since the mid-1960s, US political scientists have accepted the notion that policy-making occurs in subsystems. Originally, these subsystems in the US were referred to as 'iron triangles' as they involved three actors: an administrative agency; a congressional subcommittee; a pressure group. Policy was seen to be developed within a tightly knit relationship between the three—hence the phrase an 'iron triangle'. So, policy networks and their importance for understanding pressure group/government relations derived out of this notion of sub-government in the US.

Heclo and Wildavsky

This was a theme developed in Britain by Heclo & Wildavsky's (1974) *The Private Government of Public Money*, a longitudinal study of the Treasury, which led the authors to argue that Whitehall was best understood as a 'village-like community'. Policy was made within this community, by a limited number of actors who regularly interact and have shared values.

Richardson & Jordan

Richardson & Jordan (1979) *Governing Under Pressure* first introduced the notion of a policy community as the key to understanding policy-making in liberal democracies. They regarded policy-making in Britain as taking place within subsystems in which government agencies and pressure groups interact. From this, the notion of policy networks was developed as a means of understanding the relationship between pressure groups and the state. Richardson and Jordan were reacting to what they saw as a problem within macro-state theory, in that it was too monolithic and inflexible to explain individual policy outcomes. Instead, they emphasised the need to disaggregate, arguing that there are many divisions in government and society is fragmented and diffuse.

Rhodes

Networks exist where there is some form of an exchange of resources between the state and pressure groups. This can range from a limited exchange of information to the institutionalisation of a particular group in the policy process. Rhodes' (1981) work

emphasises the structural relationships between political institutions as the key terrain of analysis, rather than the interpersonal relations within those institutions. He developed a model that was drawn from a study of relations between central and local government. His framework was based on a theory of power-dependency based on five propositions:

• Any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for resources.

• In order to achieve their goals, the organisations have to exchange resources.

• Although decision-making within the organisation is constrained by other organisations, the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought.

• The dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange.

• Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative power potential of interacting organisations. This relative power potential is a product of the resources of each organisation, of the rules of the game and of the process of exchange between organisations.

In this model, centre-local relations are seen as a 'game' in which both sets of participants are jockeying for position. Each deploys its resources, be they organisational, financial, political, etc to maximise their influence over the outcome. One of the problems with this original power-dependency model was that it failed to distinguish clearly between micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. So, in a latter version, Rhodes (1986) defines a policy network as a cluster or complex of organisations connected to one another by resource dependencies. He distinguished between five types of networks which range along a continuum from at one end tight policy communities to the other end of loosely integrated issue networks. These different types of networks are distinguished by their membership and the distribution of resources between members (see Politics in Focus 21.5).

Marsh and Rhodes

More latterly, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) advanced the network debate by treating policy communities, policy networks and issue networks as types of relationships between interest groups and government. Their approach and the typology they create treats policy networks as a generic term. They argue networks can vary along a continuum according to the closeness of relationships within the network. So, policy communities located at one pole involve tightly bound relationships, while issue networks at the opposing pole involve much looser group interaction (see Table 21.1).

Policy community

If we turn first to a policy community, than the characteristics associated with this type of network would include:

• Limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded

• Frequent and high quality interaction between all members of the community on all matters related to the policy issue

POLITICS IN FOCUS 21.5
The Rhodes policy network continuum

Policy Communities are characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of a restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities and insulation from both other networks and the public more generally. The network is tightly integrated with a high level of vertical interdependence but limited horizontal expression. The policy community will be continuously involved in policy-making on a daily basis, it will set the rules of the game (which you need to abide by or participation will be refused) and it also controls membership ie acts as a gatekeeper. Policy communities are normally based on major functional interests in government, eg agriculture or policing.

Professional Networks are characterised by the pre-eminence of one particular class of participant in policy-making—the professions. The most frequently cited example of a professional network is the NHS, where one large professional body ie the BMA largely determines policy outcomes. These networks express the interests of a particular profession and have a substantial degree of vertical interdependence and are insulated against other networks

Intergovernmental Networks are based on the representative organisations of local authorities. Their characteristics include topocratic membership, an extensive array of interests encompassing all local authority services, limited vertical interdependence as they do not have service delivery responsibilities, but extensive horizontal articulation or, an ability to penetrate many other networks.

Producer Networks are distinguished by the prominent role of economic interests in policy-making. They have fluctuating membership, there is only limited interdependence among the economic interests and the networks are not usually stable.

Issue Networks have a large number of participants and there is a limited degree of interdependence. Stability and continuity are rare and the structure tends to be atomistic.

(see Rhodes 1986, Ch. 2)

- Consistency in values, membership and policy outcomes
- Consensus with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences shared by all participants
- All members have resources, so the links between them are exchange relationships, interaction involves bargaining between members with resources
- There is a balance of power, not necessarily one in which all members are equal, but where all members are co-dependent and involved in a positive-sum game.

A good example of a policy community can be found if we look at agriculture policy in the course of the last 50 years or so. After 1945, the Attlee Government and successive Governments since have been committed to sustaining high levels of food production on the premise the country needed to be in a position to be able to feed itself. At the

same time, the dominant pressure group in this policy area has been the National Farmers Unions (NFU), who clearly saw it as in their own interests to support this policy position as it ensured continued and guaranteed work for its members and that, at times when the industry faced problems, Governments were willing to bail it out. Thus, after 1945, a tight policy community was established between the NFU and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) that was constant over time and the two members shared similar interests. The only substantial change to this policy community occurred in 1973 when Britain entered the European Economic Community (EEC). Yet, the interest of the EEC in the area of farming was to subsidise agriculture production in the shape of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Thus, while a new member entered the policy community, the interests of the members remained predominantly the same and so the new member was easily absorbed. It is only in the last two decades that the policy community has come under stress with the increasing rise in the power and influence of supermarkets, as well as consumer affair associations, environmentalists and the shocks caused by food scandals such as salmonella in eggs, BSE or foot and mouth. Indeed, in the aftermath of the foot and mouth crisis, the present Labour Government abolished MAFF, arguing it had developed an unhealthy client relationship with the NFU. It its place, a new Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs was created in 2001.

Issue networks

At the other end of the continuum is an issue network. The characteristics associated with this type of policy network include:

- many participants
- fluctuating membership and access for the various members
- limited consensus and ever-present conflict
- interaction is based on consultation rather than negotiation or bargaining
- an unequal power relationship in which many participants may have few resources and little access and power is predominantly a zero-sum game.

A recent example of an issue network can be seen in the policy pursued by the Labour Government to ban fox hunting which passed into law in February 2005. The original policy contained in Labour's 1997 election manifesto stated that: 'We will ensure greater protection for wildlife. We have advocated new measures to promote animal welfare, including a free vote in Parliament on whether hunting with hounds should be banned'. Yet, ever since, the policy has proved constantly problematic to the Government. First, on 3 July 1998 the Labour MP Michael Foster's Wild Mammals (Hunting with Dogs) Bill was blocked in the Commons, and has subsequently been voted down by the Lords on three occasions, which finally resulted in the Government resorting to the use of the Parliament Act in order to ensure the passage of the bill into law in 2004.

The issue of fox hunting has proved highly contentious, most obviously because it is a policy on which little common ground can be found between the opposing sides. The ban

on fox hunting can be referred to as a single issue, and it can be characterised as involving two diametrically opposed groups of supporters. On the one side there is the Countryside Alliance formed in March 1997, in anticipation of the proposed ban on hunting. The Countryside Alliance is, formally, an amalgamation of three groups: the British Field Sports Society, the Countryside Movement and the Countryside Business Group. It perceives its role as fighting to protect what it regards as a traditional, rural way of life that is being threatened by an insensitive, ignorant, metropolitan political elite. Opposing this group is a wide array of animal welfare groups including the Campaign for the Protection of Hunted Animals and the League Against Cruel Sports, which regards the killing of foxes by hunting as an inhumane act. Clearly, the issue of a ban provides little room for consensus (despite the attempts by the Middle Way Group to establish a cross-party group of MPs to seek a workable resolution to the debate about hunting with hounds). Unlike a policy community, where the members have similar/shared goals or interests, in this case, the nature of group participation is predominantly conflictual and power should be understood as a zero-sum game based on the notion that there are those that will win over the issue and those that will lose.

TABLE 21.1

The characteristics of the policy network spectrum

	Dimension	Issue Network	Policy Community
1: Membership	Number of Participants	Many	Limited
	Type of Interest	Wide range	Economic/Professional
2: Integration	Frequency of Interaction	Contact fluctuates	Frequent, high quality
	Continuity	Fluctuating access	Membership and values stable
	Consensus	Variety of views	Shared basic values
3: Resources	Distribution of resources within network	Often groups have few resources	All participants have resources to exchange
	Distribution of resources within participating organisation	Varied and variable distribution	Hierarchical
4: Power	Nature of power	Unequal power, zero-sum	Power is positive sum

Adapted from Marsh and Rhodes (1992).

The changing nature of policy networks

The post-war period saw the development of a range of policy networks in different policy areas such as agriculture, education, energy, transport and health. The development of these networks were a direct response to the growth of the modern state and the need to intervene in society without developing an enormous and overbearing state bureaucracy. Thus, these networks had considerable advantages for government:

- They created mechanisms for government intervention.
- They simplified the policy process by excluding groups that do not accept the basic values of the policy sector.
- It makes policy-making more predictable. Within a particular policy community, there is a range of solutions possible. For example, in the health policy community, a solution to the problem of health policy was to charge patients.

Nevertheless, different governments have adopted a variety of responses to both networks and the role pressure groups and, in particular, they are not always regarded in an uncritical light.

Thatcherism and pressure groups

With the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979 there was more conflict between interest groups, largely in the public sector, and the Conservative Government than at any other period in the post-war era. As we saw in Chapter 4, the New Right and Thatcherite Conservatives were often suspicious of pressure groups blaming them for overload and exponential state expansion. Most notably, one of the stated aims of Thatcherism was to 'tame the enemy within' (trade unions) which it regarded as one of the key Parties responsible for Britain's economic decline (see Politics in Focus 21.6). Interest groups were seen as protecting special interests and, thus, opposed to attempts to extend the market and limit the role of government. Thatcherites accepted the notion that Britain was a corporate society and they saw that as one of the key factors in accounting for Britain's decline. What the Thatcher Government wanted to do was re-establish a direct link between individual voters and a sovereign Parliament rather than work through group representation. The Conservative position was that government, not pressure groups, ran the country (Judge 1993). Richardson (2000: 1010) observes that Thatcher and her ministers:

> ...had their own ideas, policy frames and policy preferences...and relatively few of the new policy ideas emanated from the plethora of embedded policy communities around Whitehall that had grown up in the post-war years.

POLITICS IN FOCUS 21.6
Thatcherism and trade unions—taming the enemy within

It is generally accepted that British trade unionism as a political force has been in decline since 1979. This has been illustrated in a number of ways: a decline in the unions policy-making role, or 'no more beer and sandwiches at No 10'. Mitchell (1987) and Marsh (1992) demonstrate that trade unions have experienced an increasing marginalisation from the British policy-making process since the 1980s. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Conservatives abolished a number of tripartite bodies which had previously given unions a role in government policy-making; and the decline in the number of strikes; and a decline in union membership which in 1997 reached its lowest level since 1945.

There are two broad competing explanations for the decline of trade unions as a political force: the first argues that the decline was a direct result of the extensive legislative programme of trade union reform introduced by the Conservative Administration. The Thatcher Government introduced six Industrial Relations Acts that curtailed the rights and powers of trade unions. These were followed by two further Acts under the Major Government. Most commentators accept that the last Conservative Administration presided over a substantial weakening of the legal position of trade unions; the second suggests that the decline of the unions after 1979 was more a result of the autonomous changes in the structure of international economic markets. In so doing, this argument downgrades the real impact of Thatcherism. Instead, the decline of the unions can be explained by the changing nature of employment in the workplace. In particular, three changes are stressed: de-industrialisation which refers to the decline in size and importance of the British manufacturing sector since 1979, and the rise in importance of the services sector (retailing, leisure, information/technology, etc). This argument stresses the decline of full-time, permanent, manual work and conversely, the rise of part-time, temporary, non-manual work. British trade unions have been traditionally heavily represented in manual occupations eg manufacturing industry. It was these industries which contracted most in the '80s and, as a consequence, union membership suffered; greater flexibilisation which refers to: employees becoming more flexible in the job market through a switch from long-term to short-term contracts. This process has undermined the practice of free collective bargaining, whereby, traditionally, wage levels are decided by unions and employers at the national level, and applied uniformly across the industry. Now, increasingly, the notion of personal contracts and local pay bargaining operates. This process has been strengthened by the increase of sub-contracting in the public sector, where firms compete against each other for short-term contracts to provide government services at both the national and the local level; finally, there has been a process of 'Japanisation' which refers to the increasing trend of firms from Japan (and SE Asia more generally) either agreeing to create new plants and investment in Britain, or taking over existing British firms, but, only on the basis of a Single Union Agreements (SUA), that is, Japanese firms agree to invest in Britain in return for an agreement that they will only have to recognise one union at the plants they create or take over. Moreover, that union must also agree to sign a no-strike agreement. The consequences for union power are pretty obvious here.

Consequently, there was an attempt to reduce the role of groups and undermine existing policy networks. The Thatcherite approach towards pressure groups was therefore conditioned by a number of factors:

(1) The Thatcher Government made no secret of its wish to change the direction of policy in much of the public sector. Groups which had an interest in the status quo were therefore likely to be offended.

(2) Ministers wished to constrain the growth of public spending on many services and to reduce state subsidies; again, it was not surprising that interests dependent on such expenditure, notably on health, social welfare, education, and local government, complained. The Major and Blair Governments have continued with policies designed to encourage market disciplines and competition as spurs to efficiency in the public sector.

(3) Ministers, finally, took seriously claims that the authority and autonomy of an elected government should not be compromised by bargains with sectional interests, particularly the trade unions.

A theme running through the period was a general distrust of producer interest groups, particularly in the public sector. Ministers complained that there was too often an 'unholy alliance' between a department and its client interest group. Interest groups and bureaucrats were, allegedly, interested in maximising their own advantages—in the form of autonomy, salaries, and conditions of work—rather than responding to the consumers of their services. A more elaborate statement of this case is made by Mancur Olson (1982), who has claimed that interest groups ('distributional coalitions') use their power to resist change and slow down innovative policies; their veto power produces an 'institutional sclerosis'. In Germany and Japan, by contrast, the interests were either smashed or severely weakened by the rise of totalitarian governments or defeat in the war, and both countries have enjoyed post-war economic regeneration. Olson claims that the collapse of the regimes destroyed many tradition-bound forces. Innovation was helped by a fresh start. In the case of Britain, the continuity of the regime allowed the interests to become entrenched. Much of this analysis was implicitly accepted by Thatcherites.

The influence and formal powers of two other major interests, local government and trade unions (see Politics in Focus 21.6), have been severely curtailed in the past two decades. Some commentators might point to the partisan factor at work here—Labour-supporting trade unions and left-wing local authorities. But the Conservative Administration also confronted the middle-class professional groups. The claims to self-regulation and possession of professional expertise by lawyers, doctors, and teachers were challenged by Thatcherism. These groups claimed to be the expert judges of what is a 'good' service, be it legal advice, health care, or education. Schoolteachers found that their pay-bargaining machinery was scrapped, and a core curriculum, national testing of pupils, and a contract of service imposed on them. University teachers lost tenure and the quality of their teaching and research is regularly assessed by independent bodies. In 1989 the doctors had new contracts imposed on them by the Ministry of Health. These limited their budgets and linked a greater part of their pay to the number of patients they treated. In much of the public sector there was a new emphasis on audit performance, pay and value for money. Not all of the measures enhanced the power of central government. Some of

the changes gave more power to the professions, for example, ballots for trade union members, schools opting out of local authority control and managing their own budgets, hospitals and GPs controlling their own funds.

The pace of change continued under the Major Government, whether it was the Citizens' Charter promoting greater power for consumers over the deliverers of public services, or the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act. When analysing the Conservative Administration's approach to pressure groups, it can be argued it challenged pressure groups in a number of ways:

- It shifted the terms of political debate. As we saw in Chapter 3, a key element of the modern state was the assumption that the state resolved problems and delivered public goods. As the British state is not a totalitarian state, it often had to deliver policies in consultation, or with the assistance, of groups. Thatcherism attempted to change the debate so that the Government was not always seen as the source of problems or solutions. For the Conservatives, solutions could be derived from the market and groups were seen as often distorting the market. Therefore, by shifting the emphasis of public goods away from the state, groups did not need to be involved in the policy process.

- It challenged intermediate and corporate institutions. New Right ideology led the Conservatives to believe in the direct contract between the voter and government and that intermediate organisations such as pressure groups, churches, local authorities, should not have a role in making policy. Therefore, they were committed either to abolishing them or reducing their power. According to Gamble (1994):

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Legitimacy is withdrawn from voluntary institutions like trade
unions and from public institutions like the BBC, the universities
and state education systems, nationalised industries and local
Government, until they have reformed themselves or been reformed
from outside. A whole range of what we see as corporatist
intermediate institutions, such as the National Economic Development
Council, the Manpower Services Commission and Wages Council, were
abolished by the Thatcher and Major governments.
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- The privileging of new interests. Whilst being suspicious of many interest groups, such as trade unions and professional groups associated with the establishment of the welfare state, the Thatcher and Major Governments gave access to a different range of groups. For instance, whilst in the 1970s it was the CBI that had good relations with government, after 1979, the Thatcher Administration was more open to the advice of the more neo-liberal Institute of Directors.

- The Conservative Administration also depended more on ideological think-tanks for policy advice rather than interest groups. In policy developments such as the community charge and welfare reform, think-tanks were very influential and, in particular, they could be used to 'fly kites'. Here, the Conservative Government would use right-wing

thinks-tanks to suggest a radical reform and, then gauge the reaction or get voters use to the idea before the Government proposed and developed the policy (see Cockett 1995, Hay 1996, Kandiah and Seldon 1996a, 1996b).

The Conservatives were also direct in the way they confronted some of the established policy networks. The Thatcherite view was that changing policy often required changing the role of groups in the policy process. Therefore the Conservatives explicitly attempted to break up policy networks in education, health, local government and energy which were seen as major, conservative forces stalling attempts to change policy. In a number of cases, the Conservatives tried to by-pass the networks either by creating different networks or by over-riding them. So for example, in education, there was a conscious move to shift decision-making away from the network through creating more direct relationships between the Secretary of State and schools. In health, an alternative network was created to look at reform of the NHS and in energy, privatisation destroyed the networks established for an energy policy based on publicly owned industries. Elsewhere, Dudley and Richardson (1996) have highlighted how the growing opposition to roads (coupled to Treasury opposition to rising costs) led to the loss of power of the pro-roads lobby within the transport policy community.

The Blair Administration and pressure groups

The Blair Administration has gone further in the laying down of targets for the public services. The Government has found itself at odds with various interests, including consumer and environmental lobbies (over genetically modified foods), the Countryside Alliance (over fox-hunting and rural decline), and the Campaign for Freedom of Information (because of disappointment over Labour legislation). However, according to Marsh et al (2001), since Labour's 1997 electoral victory, there is little doubt that there has been both a major increase in pressure group consultation and a change in which groups are being consulted. The Labour Government has different policy objectives and is more committed to consultation. However, at the same time, it has debts to pay to the groups that serviced and advised it in opposition; so increased consultation with such groups is unsurprising. Part of the current exchange relationship involves access in return for services rendered in the past.

There are two important points to make concerning New Labour and interest groups. First, that Labour has probably had much better contacts with business than any previous Labour Government. Since the early 1990s, Labour has been cultivating links with business in order to change the perception that Labour is an anti-business Party. Blair has explicitly stated that he does not wish to punish wealth creation and has been willing to place business people such as Geoffrey Robinson and David Simon into key places in his administration (see Cohen 1999, Walden 2001, Kavanagh and Richards 2002, Cohen 2003). In addition, in an attempt to reduce reliance on the trade unions, the Government has attempted to encourage businesses to make donations to the Government. Whilst we could not suggest that this buys influence, it clearly gives access. In the case of the Bernie Eccleston affair, the Labour Party received £1 million from the owner of Formula One racing just prior to the 1997 election. Once in government, there was a change in position on banning tobacco sponsorship of Formula One, but of course there is no direct indication of a connection between the two events (see Naughtie 2001, Rawnsley 2001, Toynbee and Walker 2001, Cohen 2003).

Second, whilst Labour was open to pressure groups early on in their first term, it increasingly became more immune to their influence. Once the Government was established and developed new lines of policy advice from officials and task forces, the need for pressure groups diminished. Events, such as protests against changes in disability benefits (1999), the fuel protests (2001), the ban on fox hunting (2003–5) and changes to the funding of higher education and student fees (2004) often make the Government less willing to listen to interest groups. In addition, the Government was wary about re-establishing the types of relationships that Labour had with the trade unions in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1997 election campaign, Blair stated:

> We will not be held to ransom by the unions...We will stand up to strikes. We will not cave in to unrealistic pay demands from any one...Unions have no special role in our election campaign, just as they will get no special favours in a Labour Government (Quoted in Ludlam 2001: 115).

Since 1997, the Labour Government has had an uneasy relationship with the unions and there has clearly been no return to the days of the 1970s when trade union leaders were involved in almost daily discussions with the Government over national economic policy. Yet, since the early 1990s, the response of the unions to both the Thatcherite reforms and the lukewarm relationship with New labour has been broadly pragmatic and is captured in what is referred to as 'New Unionism'. The unions, under the recent stewardship of John Monks, and since 2003 Brendan Barber, General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, adapted to 18 years of Conservative attacks by embracing a 'new realism' in which the unions: recognise they no longer deserve special favours; are willing to work with any mainstream political Party; and are prepared to create a new partnership with employer groups such as the CBI and the Institute of Directors. Finally, the unions now often by-pass Westminster/Whitehall completely, as they increasingly opt to use the European route as an alternative corridor of power for reasserting themselves on the political stage. This is indicative of the changing era of governance explored in Chapter 3.

Policy networks and macro-theories of the state

As we saw in Chapter 4, general theories of the state have received much criticism for the way in which they tended to regard the state as monolithic. The benefit of the policy network approach is that it is a concept which provides a link between individual studies of specific policy outcomes and broader macro theorie of the state. Yet, at the same time, network analysis can be seen as an attempt to put life back into macro-theories of the state. Indeed, on their own, the policy network approach has only limited analytical use. Network analysis requires application to the broader macro-theories of the state, in order to explain

the sorts of relationships that develop within networks. For example, why in the post-war period has the NFU dominated the agricultural network? Network analysis on its own struggles to address such questions. What needs to be stressed here is that network analysis needs traditional state theory in order to be of explanatory value. For example:

(1) Marxists would regard the majority of policy networks as being closed policy communities dominated by the interests of capital eg the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the City and the Institute of Directors (IoD) have a dominant position within a closed economic policy network. Here, the view is that power is concentrated in the hands of a narrow range of organisations operating in the interests of capital.

(2) Similarly, elitists would see networks as closed and dominated by a clique of social elites with prominent state roles in life that rule in their own interests. Again, power is concentrated in the hands of a narrow range of individuals/groups, which impose their own value-set upon society.

(3) Pluralists would argue that policy networks are continually breaking down into issue networks making it increasingly difficult for any one actor to dominate a particular sector. For pluralists, power in the British political system is dispersed and as such, they rejected the notion that policy communities exist because of the intensity of pressure group competition.

Conclusion

The claim that Britain is a pluralist political system rests on the belief that several autonomous groups are involved in policy-making and that no group dominates the process. The late R T McKenzie defended groups as an ancillary form of representation, enabling voters to convey more specific views to the Government than can be represented by broad Party programmes at general elections every four to five years. Democracy, he claimed, includes the: 'right to advise, cajole, and warn [the authorities] regarding the policies they should adopt' (1974: 280). Others suggest that a kind of free market operates and prevents one set of interests being dominant for too long: the government's fear of public opinion, the existence or likely emergence of rival or counter-groups, and certain general 'rules of the game' combine to produce over time a rough balance of power among interests. Because citizens are members of different groups and have different loyalties they do not become too closely attached to one interest.

Marxist and elitists, however, make two contrary arguments. One is that interests differ in their organisational strength, resources, leverage over society, and access to decision-makers. The group system, in other words, is biased in favour of some interests and against others. The minority who benefit from a policy may be better organised and more articulate than the larger number of non-beneficiaries, for example, the taxpayers. Another matter of concern is the definition and defence of the public interest amid all the sectional pressures. Is the Government able to pursue a coherent, long-term set of policies, or does it reflect the balance of pressure-group forces?

What the policy network approach provides is a useful, empirically-based methodology for assessing the role of pressure groups in the British political system. It is best to understand network analysis as a tool for enhancing our understanding of macro-theories of the state. Network analysis is not a theory in its own right. Furthermore, no single view of networks should be taken. State and interest group relations are highly variable both over time and space. Interests that dominate one network can vary and change and so they need to be understood in a political and historical context. So, as a tool of analysis, it is important to stress that policy networks should be used in conjunction with a range of macro-theories of the state when trying to explain the nature of power in the British political system and the influence of pressure groups.

KEY POINTS

- Interest groups extend opportunities for participation in the state and provide a channel for continuous communications between government and those affected by government policy.

- The growth of group activity accompanied the rise of the interventionist state after 1945. Governments depend upon the expertise of groups, but at the same time governments impinge more extensively on citizens' lives and this prompts citizens to seek to influence the nature of such intervention.

- There are different types of groups, including: promotional groups which advocate a cause; interest groups which are usually based on economic interests; and peak groups which articulate the views of a set of interests.

- The effectiveness of a group at any particular time will depend upon such factors as: the compatibility of its aims with the programme of the Government of the day; the prevailing climate of opinion; and the degree of support for the group's demands.

- The policy network approach is a meso-level tool for analysing the role of pressure groups in different policy areas.

- The Marsh and Rhodes continuum based on issue networks and policy communities is a useful means of conceptualising the array of different types of networks that exist.

- Thatcherism rejected the policies of the post-war consensus and the consensual style of policy-making which reduced the Government's authority and restricted the Government's role to that of being negotiator with, or referee between, competing interests.

- The Blair Government has been less conflictual in its attitude towards pressure groups and has been willing to develop much closer relations with business than previous Labour Governments.

- Policy networks on their own are an insufficient tool for analysing political power and they need to be applied to macro-theories of the state.

KEY QUESTIONS

(1) Do interest groups enhance democracy?

(2) Interest groups are a mixed blessing. Discuss.

(3) Why have Conservative Governments since 1979 been more successful than their predecessors in altering the legal position of trade unions?

(4) Why are some pressure groups more powerful than others?

(5) How does the policy network approach enhance macro-state theory?

(6) 'All citizens have an equal opportunity to influence public policy through interest-group activity.' Discuss.

(7) How has New Labour's approach to interest groups differed from that of the last Conservative Administration?

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

Nearly every major pressure group now has a website. Some examples include: http://www.foe.co.uk/
http://www.charter88.org.uk
http://www.anl.org.uk/campaigns.htm
http://www.amnesty.org/
http://www.tuc.org.uk/
A useful one for looking at the work of new social movements at a global level is http://www.protest.net/. Also useful is the Reclaim the Streets site: http://www.gn.apc.org/rts/ and the Make Poverty History site: http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/. There are also sites for voluntary groups: http://

www.oneworld.net/. For a comparative analysis of social capital see http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/index.html?catalog9_o.html. For an examination of civil society see http://www.civitas.org.uk/, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/. For a very useful site on encouraging participation at the local level see http://www.urbanwebsolutions.com/planning/ and for an example of a participatory organisation see http://www.napp.org.uk/. Examples of radical groups found beyond mainstream policy networks see: http://flag.blackened.net/blackflag/, http://www.londonclasswar.org/ and http://members.lycos.co.uk/moveagainstmon/.

FURTHER READING

On pressure groups see: S Finer, *Anonymous Empire* (London: Pall Mall, 1958), K Middlemas, *Politics in Industrial Society* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), W. Grant, *Business and Politics in Britain* (2nd edn) (London: Macmillan, 1993) D Marsh, *The New Politics of British Trade Unions and the Thatcher Legacy* (London: Macmillan, 1992), Grant, W *Pressure Groups and British Politics* (London: Macmillan, 2000), Jordan, G and Maloney, W (1997) *The Protest Business* Manchester: Manchester University Press and Joyce, P (2002) *The Politics of Protest* Basingstoke: Palgrave. On policy networks see

Heclo, H and Wildavsky, A (1974) *The Private Government of Public Money*, London: Macmillan, Jordan, G and Richardson, J (1987) *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain* Oxford: Clarendon Press, Rhodes, RAW (1981) *Control and Power in Central-Local Relations* Aldershot: Gower, Rhodes, RAW (1986) *The National World of Local Government* London: Allen and Unwin, Marsh, D and Rhodes, RAW (1992) *Policy Networks in British Government* Oxford: Clarendon Press and Richardson, JJ (2000) 'Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change', *Political Studies*, 48, pp 1006–25.

CHRONOLOGY

Pressure groups and political power in Britain 1787–2005

1787   The Abolition Society, one of the earliest promotional pressure groups, was founded by William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson, succeeded in abolishing slavery by 1807

PART TWO Institutions and Processes

1839	Anti-Corn Law League
1903	Women's Social and Political Union, pressing for votes for women
1945	Enormous increase in interest-group activity accompanied the rise of the interventionist Welfare State
1962	National Economic Development Council ('Neddy' or NEDC) created as a forum for tripartite discussions on the economy
1965	Confederation of British Industry (CBI) formed
1974	Heath calls 'Who Governs?' election
1975	Health and Safety Commission created. Labour minority government makes Social Contract with the unions
1976	Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) created
1978	Winter of Discontent—many local services paralysed by unions
1979	Mrs Thatcher introduces a less consensual political culture
1984-85	The Miner's Strike
1988	Edwina Currie resigns her position as junior Health Minister after offending egg producers and the National Farmers Union by claiming that almost all egg production was infected by salmonella
1990	Widespread anti-poll tax demonstrations
1992	NEDC abolished
1995	Animal rights demonstrations against the export of live animals
1998	Countryside Alliance demonstration in London
1999	Protests against changes in disability benefits
2001	Fuel Protests
2003	Anti-war demonstrations against military action in Iraq and another Countryside Alliance demonstration in London.
2004	Demonstrations in London against changes to the funding of higher education and student fees.
2005	Demonstrations against the G8 group meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland and the Live 8 concerts across the world.

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