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Summary of the 2010 NPT final outcome document
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Feature article from the NPT News in Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the
2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Final Edition | Tuesday, 1 June 2010

Complete PDF of this edition

The outcome document is 28 pages long and includes two parts, a review of the operation of the Treaty and recommendations for follow-on actions. The review section goes through the Treaty paragraph by paragraph, reaffirms previous decisions, and recalls significant developments and events that have taken place since the last outcome document in 2000. Below, the document is summarized by topic.

Nuclear disarmament

The unequivocal undertaking
The Conference reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking of the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Conference also resolves that NWS should implement this unequivocal undertaking through further efforts to reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed.

Nuclear Weapons Convention
The Conference notes the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal to inter alia consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention and affirms that the final phase of a nuclear disarmament process should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of states parties believe should include specified timelines.

Security policies
The Conference notes the need for further progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and welcomes the reductions announced by some NWS in the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrine. The Conference calls upon NWS to promptly engage to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies. The Conference also calls upon NWS to promptly engage to discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons, and lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war, and contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament.

The Conference affirms the need for all NWS to reduce and eliminate all type of nuclear weapons and encourages those with largest arsenals to lead such efforts. The Conference resolves that the US and Russia commit to seek the early entry into force of the new START. The Conference calls upon NWS to promptly engage in rapidly moving toward an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons.

The Conference recognises the legitimate interest of NNWS in the constraining by the NWS of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

Operational status
The Conference recognises that reductions of operational status contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Conference also calls upon NWS to promptly engage in considering the legitimate interest of NNWS in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

Consequences and legality of nuclear weapons
The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. The Conference reaffirms the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. The Conference also calls upon NWS to promptly engage in reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons and notes the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons from 1996.

Nuclear testing
The Conference calls on all states to refrain from any action which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT pending its entry into force, in particular as regards to the development of new types of nuclear weapons. States parties commit to refrain from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies. The Conference welcomes the latest ratifications, and expressions of intention to ratify the CTBT by states. The Conference resolves that all NWS undertake to ratify the CTBT and that the CTBTO Preparatory Commission is to be encouraged to fully develop the CTBT verification regime.

Fissile material
The Conference welcomes the declared moratoria by some NWS on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Conference also reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and calls upon the CD to immediately begin such negotiations in accordance with the Shannon mandate. The Conference resolves that the NWS are encouraged to commit to declare to the IAEA all fissile material no longer required for military purposes and to place such material under IAEA safeguards. The Conference also resolves that all states are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material no longer required for military purposes. The Conference also encourages all states to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion of production facilities for fissile material used for nuclear weapons.

The Conference notes the regular reports submitted by parties, as decided at previous Review Conferences. The Conference calls upon NWS to report the undertakings in Action 5 to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, while the Review Conference in 2015 will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of Article VI. The Conference resolves that all states parties should submit regular reports on the implementation of the action plan on disarmament, article VI and the 13 practical steps from 2000, by recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1996. The Conference also resolves that as a confidence-building measure, the NWS are encouraged to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals.

Security assurances and NWFZs

Security assurances
The Conference resolves that all NWS commit to fully respect their existing commitments to security assurances, and those who have not yet done so are encouraged to extend such assurances to NNWS parties to the NPT. The NWS are also encouraged to review any reservations made to the negative security assurances under the protocols of NWFZ treaties.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)
The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Pelindaba and Central Asian NWFZ treaties, as well as the ratification by some NWS of relevant NWFZ treaty protocols. The Conference also welcomes Mongolia’s declaration of its nuclear weapon free status and supports measures to consolidate and strengthen such status. The Conference calls on NWS to bring into effect the security assurances provided by NWFZ treaties and their protocols. The Conference also notes the first and second meeting of states parties to NWFZ and acknowledges the initiative to hold such a meeting in the framework of the forthcoming Review Conferences of the NPT.


IAEA safeguards
The Conference welcomed that 166 states have brought into force the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and recognized that these safeguards are a fundamental component of the non-proliferation regime. The Conference urges the remaining 18 states parties to bring such comprehensive safeguards agreement into force.

Additional protocol
The Conference welcomes that 133 additional protocols have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and that such protocols are currently being implemented in 102 states. The Conference notes that the implementation of the additional protocol increases the confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and further notes that “numerous states were of the view that those measures have been introduced as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system” and encourages all states parties to conclude and bring into force such additional protocol. The Conference also notes that while it is a sovereign decision to conclude an additional protocol, once in force, it is a legal obligation. The Conference also stresses the importance of confidentiality regarding information related to implementation of safeguards. The Conference also calls for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the NWS. The Conference recommends that the IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly.

Export controls
The Conference recognises that national rules for export of nuclear material are necessary to ensure commitments in line with article I, II, and III of the Treaty, while fully respecting article IV. The Conference also notes that numerous states underline that effective and transparent export controls are important to facilitating trade of peaceful nuclear material, which, according to those numerous states, depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation. The Conference urges all states parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises and urges states to make use of multilateral guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls. The Conference also encourages states to consider whether a recipient state has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

Nuclear energy

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
The Conference reaffirms the right of all states parties to the fullest possible exchange of measures for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. It also reaffirms that preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty, taking into account in particular, the needs of developing countries. The Conference encourages states to further develop a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors.

Nuclear safety and security
The Conference notes the “paramount importance” of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and welcomes the adoption of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourages all states to become a party to it. The Conference also encourages all parties to become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Conference acknowledges that while nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities, the IAEA should play the key role in development of standards, guidance and best practice conventions. The Conference encourages all states to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. The Conference also notes the entry into force of the 2007 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010 and calls upon all states parties to improve their national capabilities to stop illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories. The Conference recognizes the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy, as well as the important issue of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste in a sustainable manner. Nuclear fuel suppliers are encouraged to work with and assist recipient states in the safe and secure management of spent fuel. The Conference also considers attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous implications, and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force. The Conference notes that a majority of states parties suggested a legally-binding instrument to be considered in this regard.

The Conference welcomes the efforts by states parties on a voluntary basis to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. It also recognizes the importance of applying best practice and basic principles in mining and processing, including those related to environmental management of uranium mining.

IAEA technical cooperation
The Conference notes that IAEA technical cooperation activities contribute to improvement of many areas, such as the helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and welcomes the contributions already pledged by countries or groups of countries in support of such IAEA activities. The Conference calls upon all states parties to continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation programme and make every effort to ensure that the funding for such programme are sufficient, assured and predictable.

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle
The Conference notes the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium in Russia for the use of IAEA Member States, and calls upon states to continue to discuss further possibilities to create voluntary multilateral mechanisms for assurance of fuel supply as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle.

Regional issues

Middle East
The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognises that efforts in this regard contribute to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ). In order to implement the 1995 resolution, the Conference calls upon the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the states of the region, to convene a Conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East WMDFZ. The Conference also calls upon the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the states of the region, to appoint a facilitator to support the implementation of the 1995 resolution and undertake preparations for the 2012 conference. This facilitator will also report to the NPT Review Conference in 2015 and its Preparatory Committees. The UN Secretary-General and the relevant states are also asked to designate a host country for the 2012 conference. The Conference emphasises the requirement of maintaining parallel progress in the process leading to achieving total and complete elimination of all WMD in the region.

The Conference condemns with strongest possible terms the nuclear test explosions of the DPRK and recalls that it cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon state. The Conference also affirms that the nuclear programme in DPRK constitutes a threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and to the entire international community. The Conference strongly urges the DPRK to fulfil its commitments under the Six Party Talks and urge it to return to the Treaty and its adherence to IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirms its firm support for the Six Party Talks and remains determined to achieve resolution to the issues through diplomatic means.

South Asia
The Conference urges Pakistan and India to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The Conference also urges these two countries to strengthen their export controls for material and technology that can be used for nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Other issues

Strengthening the review process
The Conference recommends that a dedicated staff officer should be added to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to support the Treaty’s review cycle. The Conference also encourages past and incumbent Chairs to be available for consultations by the incoming Chairs.

The Conference notes the released number of nuclear weapons in inventories of some NWS and encourages all NWS to provide additional transparency in this regard. The Conference also calls upon NWS to promptly engage to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

The Conference reaffirms that the responses to concerns of compliance should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the UN Charter. The Conference also notes the concerns expressed by numerous parties on non-compliance of the Treaty by states parties, as well as their calls on those states non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations. The Conference underscores the importance in complying with non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity, and the authority of the safeguards system. The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and member states respective legal obligation.

The Conference remains convinced that universality of the Treaty is the goal and calls upon all states non-parties to the Treaty—India, Pakistan, and Israel—to accede to it without further delay. The Conference reaffirms that achieving universality is essential to regional and international peace and security. The Conference also reaffirms that new supply arrangements for transfers of fissionable material should require as a necessary precondition acceptance of full scope safeguards and international legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. The Conference also calls upon all states parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms the national sovereign right to withdraw from the Treaty, but reaffirms the conditions for such notifications. The Conference also underscores that a withdrawing party is still responsible for violations of the NPT committed before the withdrawal. The Conference notes that numerous states were of the view that states parties should undertake consultations, as well as regional diplomatic initiatives, in the case of withdrawal.


Conference on Disarmament (CD)
The Conference expresses deep concern that after more than a decade, the CD has been unable to commence negotiations and urges it to begin work without delay. The Conference calls upon the CD to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive, and balanced programme of work. The Conference also calls upon the CD to begin discussions on effective international arrangements for security assurances and negotiations on a FMCT based on the Shannon mandate. The Conference also invites the UN Secretary-General to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the CD.

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