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The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report

**Anthony H. Cordesman
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December 4, 2007

*Small boys throw stones at frogs in jest.
But, the frogs do not die in jest. The
frogs die in earnest.*

Pliny the Elder

The Real Nature of the War

- **Armed nation building, not counterinsurgency.**
- **Struggle for control of ideology, people, and territory -- not fight between opposing military forces.**
- **War of attrition that can last 15 or more years. Enemy can win if can outlast NATO and Afghan government.**
- **Controlling political and economic space more more important than tactical victory.**
- **Political and military victory must be ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and “local.”**
- **Key to success is not NATO, but creating effective Afghan governance, Afghan forces, and Afghan economy.**
- **Can't win in one country. Regional, not national struggle.**

The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

AFGHANISTAN

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~49,000

AFGHANISTAN

- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: \$21.B GDP, \$800 PCI
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

IRAQ

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~176,000

IRAQ


- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: \$87.9B GDP, \$1,900 PCI
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure

Wars for Control of Political, Ideological, and Economic Space

- **Conflict is only one element of a much broader struggle for power.**
- **Fight is for factional and ideological dominance and control of region.**
- **As in Vietnam, tactical victory can easily become irrelevant.**
 - **Engage forward or don't engage.**
 - **Embed and partner, don't "occupy"**
 - **Never try to win where you and/or local ally cannot hold.**
 - **Must establish & sustain governance, rule of law, economy.**
 - **Western style police forces cannot work; local security forces can.**
 - **Don't put bullets where you can't put dollars.**
- **Recognize are fighting long wars of attrition, and those who live there do not leave.**

“Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan are going in the right direction?”

Asia Foundation Poll



	2006	2007
Right Direction	44%	42%
Wrong Direction	21%	24%
Some in right direction, some in wrong direction	29%	25%


Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

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“Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction?”

Asia Foundation Poll




Good Security	31%	34%
Peace/end of the war	29%	16%
Disarmament	26%	5%
Reconstruction/rebuilding	21%	39%
Schools for girls have opened	16%	19%
Democracy/elections	10%	9%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007,
http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

CSIS “Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction?”

Asia Foundation Poll




	2006	2007
Bad Economy	27%	12%
No Reconstruction	22%	8%
Bad Government	22%	15%
Unemployment	22%	15%
No Progress	15%	2%
Poor Education	15%	5%
Too many foreigners are getting involved	15%	3%
Neighboring countries cause problems	14%	5%
Insecurity	6%	48%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

Afghan Perceptions of Local Violence: Nationwide and in Southwest: ABC/BBC/ARD Poll

(Percent Giving Positive Rating)

Southwest = Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar,
Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

- **Thirty-seven percent of Afghans say car bombings or suicide attacks have occurred in their area, as many report civilians hurt or killed by Taliban or al Qaeda fighters**
- **34 percent report civilian casualties caused by U.S. or NATO forces.**
- **A quarter say such casualties have occurred within the past year.**
- **In the Southwest, 60 percent report civilians killed or injured by U.S. or NATO forces,**
- **55 percent report bombing or shelling by such forces,**
- **55 percent, report civilian casualties at the hands of the Taliban, al Qaeda or foreign jihadi fighters.**
- **Reports of such violence are vastly lower in the North and Northeast.**

Afghan Views of Causes of Violence

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Please tell me if it has or has not occurred in this area? (IF HAS OCCURRED) Has happened in the past year, or longer ago than that?

11/17/07 Š Summary Table

	NET	---- Has occurred nearby ---		Has not	No opin
		Within 1 year	Longer		
a. Car bombs, suicide attacks	37	27	10	61	3
b. Snipers, crossfire	33	20	13	64	3
c. Kidnappings for ransom	37	25	12	60	3
d. Bombing or shelling by U.S., NATO or ISAF forces	29	17	12	67	4
e. Civilians killed or seriously hurt by U.S., NATO or ISAF forces	34	24	10	63	4
f. Civilians killed or seriously hurt by the Afghan army or police	23	16	7	73	4
g. Civilians killed or seriously hurt by the Taliban, Al Qaeda or foreign jihadis	40	27	13	54	5


Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Crisis in Afghan Perceptions in Southwest

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll

(Percent Giving Positive Rating)

Southwest = Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar,
Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Nearly two-thirds rate U.S. efforts negatively, confidence in local authorities down sharply and opposition to the Taliban has weakened substantially.

Twenty-three percent in the Southwest say people in their area support the Taliban, triple what it was last year, and compared to just 8 percent nationally.

A year ago 81 percent in the Southwest said the Taliban had no significant support at all in their area; now just 52 percent say so.

Preference in the Southwest for the current government rather than the Taliban has declined from 90 percent then to 77 percent.

Just 45 percent in the Southwest now support the presence of NATO forces there, down from 83 percent a year ago.

Civilian casualties blamed on NATO forces is a prime complaint.

Afghan Views of Foreign Nations and Factions

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll


Is your opinion very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

	----- Favorable -----			----- Unfavorable -----			
	NET	Very	Somewhat	NET	Somewhat	Very	op.
a. The Taliban	13	3	10	84	15	69	
b. Osama Bin Laden	9	2	7	87	11	76	
c. The United States	65	17	48	32	11	21	
d. Pakistan	19	2	17	80	16	63	
e. Great Britain	49	10	39	45	18	27	
f. Iran	52	14	38	45	20	25	
g. Germany	70	22	48	24	11	13	

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Afghan Views of Foreign Forces:


Environics Poll



Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Afghan Views of US Forces

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

- Afghans who say U.S. forces should remain in their country either until security is restored, or permanently – now 49 percent, down from 60 percent last year.
- Just 14 percent desire immediate withdrawal; most of the rest divide between a one- or two-year time frame.
- Seventeen percent of Afghans say attacks on U.S. forces can be justified.
- Rises to 26 percent in Southwest overall, peaking at 40 percent in Helmand, and about as high, 38 percent in Nangarhar, in the East.
- 28 percent among Pashtuns, vs. 10 percent among all other Afghans.

Afghan Views of Attacks on Foreign Forces

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Under current circumstances, do you think attacks against U.S. military forces in Afghanistan can be justified or cannot be justified?

	Justified	Cannot be justified	No opinion
11/17/07	17	74	8
10/19/06	13	78	9
10/18/05	30	60	10

(IF JUSTIFIED) Why do you say so? What's the main reason attacks can be justified?

	11/17/07	10/19/06
Because they are infidels/foreigners	38	41
Oppose presence of U.S. forces	22	15
Attacks on U.S. military help protect Islam	16	16
Retaliation for abuses	11	8
Attacks on U.S. military help protect Afghan independence	9	10
Other	3	5
No opinion	2	4


Do you think each of the following can be justified or cannot be justified?

	Justified	Not justified	No
a. Attacks on British, German, and other NATO or ISAF forces, apart from the Americans	17	77	
b. Attacks on Afghan police or military forces	6	91	
c. Attacks on Afghan government officials	2	94	

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

How Long Should Foreign Troops Remain?


Environics Poll



Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Are Terrorist Tactics Justified?

Environics Poll



Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Counterinsurgency/Counterterrorism are Only One Element of Success

- **Must look far beyond warfighting against insurgents:**
 - *Only local national forces can “win” and “hold” on lasting basis.*
 - *Police, paramilitary forces, and/or local security forces will be as critical from the start as local military forces.*
 - *Effective courts, crime fighting, and anti-corruption campaigns are also critical.*
 - *The local government, foreign aid workers, or both must offer key services and economic aid and opportunity.*
- **Offer embeds, partner units, local security, and aid workers. Training will never be enough.**
- **Preventing or ending civil conflict will often be equally or more critical than counterinsurgency.**
- **Building up governance and economy have same priority as military.**
- **Regional actors must be negotiated with; treated as critical element, even if critical or hostile.**

The “Whack a Mole” Syndrome


*“Win, Hold, Build” versus “Attrit,
Disperse, Leave”*

Afghan Insurgent Groups

- **Three major groups:**
 - **Taliban (5,000 permanent Tier One fighters; unknown number of part-time Tier Two fighters).**
 - **Haqqani Network (HQN),**
 - **and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)**
- **Al Qa'ida provides major support to Taliban**
- **Pakistan (“Waziristan”) is a sanctuary.**
- **Baluchistan is also major sanctuary.**
- **Pakistani government has ceded control of some areas.**
- **Part of ISI supports insurgents groups.**

Afghan Views of Taliban and Al Qa'ida


Environics Poll



Source: Environics, "2007 Survey of Afghans." October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Afghan Views of Taliban


ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Should Government Deal with Taliban

Environics Poll



Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Afghan Views of Taliban - Nationwide

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

- **Plurality of Afghans, 42 percent, say the movement has gained strength in the past year, far surpassing the 24 percent who think it's weakened.**
- **Just 13 percent of Afghans express a favorable opinion of the Taliban, essentially the same as last year .**
- **10 percent say it has a strong presence in their area, although more, 25 percent, say it has at least some presence). Afghans prefer their current government to the Taliban by 84-4 percent. (It was 91-1 in 2005.)**
- **36 percent of Afghans name the Taliban as the prime cause of violence, and an additional 22 percent cite Al Qa'ida or foreign jihadi fighters. Nineteen percent cite either U.S. or NATO forces or the U.S. government.**
- **Despite the Taliban's very negative reputation – and partly linked to perceptions of its strength – 60 percent of Afghans say the Karzai government should negotiate a settlement in which Taliban leaders would be allowed to hold political office in exchange for laying down their arms.**
- **Support for a settlement is 16 points higher among those who think the Taliban has grown stronger rather than weaker; and it peaks, at 88 percent, in its home base, Kandahar.**

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Afghan Views of Taliban Activity - Nationwide

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Are you aware of any of the following activities by the Taliban in this area?

	Yes	No	No opi
a. The delivery of night letters	26	71	3
b. Bombings	33	65	2
c. Killing individuals	34	63	2
d. Burning schools/government buildings	34	64	2
e. Fighting government or foreign troops	42	54	3
f. People giving food/money to Taliban	14	80	6

- **While Taliban activity continues, there have been reported declines in three areas – the burning of schools and government buildings (reported by 33 percent, vs. 45 percent last year), bombings (also now reported by 33 percent, compared with 43 percent) and individual killings (34 percent, vs. 42 percent).**
- **No meaningful change in the number of Afghans who report clashes between Taliban and government or foreign forces in their area, 42 percent**
 - **Broad regional differences. In the Southwest, more, 60 percent, report fighting between Taliban and government forces; so do 63 percent in the Northwest, vs. just 23 percent in the North.**
- **Sixty-nine percent of Afghans believe Pakistan, a past supporter of the Taliban, is allowing it to operate within Pakistani borders. Indeed just 19 percent of Afghans have a favorable opinion of Pakistan, almost as low as the Taliban itself (13 percent).**

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Afghan Views of Taliban - Southwest

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll


- In 2006, 57 percent in the Southwest called the Taliban the country's greatest threat; it's 36 percent in 2007.
- Fifty percent in the Southwest say they strongly oppose the presence of the Taliban; down from 72 percent last year.
- 23-point increase in perceptions in this region that the Taliban has a strong local presence, and 29-point decline in perceptions of a strong presence by the Afghan police.
- Confidence in the ability of provincial governments in the Southwest to provide security is down by 20 points; confidence in the ability of the Taliban to provide security, while still much lower, is up by 19 points.
- 29-point drop in the number who say the Taliban has "no significant support at all" in the area.
- Very unfavorable views of the Taliban have fallen from 62 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2007.
- No change in views of the strength of U.S. or NATO forces in the region. But, huge 37-point drop in the number of people who report local support for NATO forces, as well as a 20-point drop in support for U.S. forces.
- In 2006, 78 percent in the Southwest called it a good thing for the United States to have overthrown the Taliban; 59 percent say so in 2007.
- Positive ratings of overall living conditions have worsened by 20 points in the Southwest.
- Favorable opinions of Osama bin Laden have increased from 1 percent in 2006 to 15 percent in 2007

Southwest = Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007


Who Will Win?

Environics Poll



Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Why Do You Say the Afghan Government Will Win with Foreign Assistance?




	National	Kandahar
Foreign aid helps the government	43	35
Foreign aid helps the army/police	22	25
Foreign troops have advanced military technology	18	25
Because people are against Taliban	10	1
No answer	7	14

Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

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Why Do You Say Taliban Will Win Once Foreign Troops Leave?










	National	Kandahar
Army & police too weak	11	31
People support Taliban	5	12
Increase in Taliban Strength	4	17
Pakistan supports Taliban	4	-
Government economy is weak	2	-
US supports Taliban	2	-
Presence of warlords	1	-
No answer	71	40

Source: Environics, "2007 Survey of Afghans." October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.


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Enemy Elements By Area of Influence



TB presence or influence = 
HiG presence or influence = 
AQAM presence or influence = 
HQN presence or influence = 
High Criminal presence = 
(population centers excluded)
Anti-Gov Element presence or influence = 


Distance in Kilometers




Enemy Activity Snap-shot (Weeks 1 – 52 for 2005 & 2006)

01 January – 31 December (2005 & 2006)



Activity for Period		
Type of Activity	2005	2006
Suicide Attacks	27	139
School Attacks	98	129
Direct Fire *	1558	4542
Indirect Fire	599	1511
IEDs	783	1677



2005




2006



Note: Does not include land mine strikes


* Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events

UNDSS SECURITY INCIDENTS JAN 2003 TO JUL 2007



Rise in Afghan Violence: 2006 vs. 2007


Average Annual Monthly Incidents



Adapted from USCENTCOM brief. Covers first 9 months in 2007.

Trend in Afghan IEDs


Incidents by Year



Adapted from Washington Post, 9-30-07, p. A1..

Trend in Afghan Suicide Bombings


Body and Vehicle Born Incidents by Year



Adapted from UNAMA, "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001-2007," September 1, 2007 and Pou Martin Linnert. "Afghanistan Index," October 2007

Air Strikes: 2006 vs. 2007

Total 2006 versus through September 2007




Note: Does not include helicopter gunship strikes

Adapted from Jim Michaels, US Military Steps Up War Zone Airstrikes, USA Today, 10-21-2007.

Total NATO/ISAF/OEF Killed


Through November 13, 2007




Source: CNN,
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/oef.casualties/>.

NATO/ISAF/OEF Killed by Year

Through November 13, 2007




Source: <http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx> and ABC News. Civilian aid workers and development contractors come from a different source. Figures for 2007 are through October 2007




Areas where the accessibility deteriorated between May 2006 and May 2007

Areas where the accessibility improved between May 2006 and May 2007



HIGH ABDUCTION RISK MAP



UNDSS 2007 vs. 2006

- **The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007. Statistics show that although the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006, they show the same seasonal pattern.**
- **The nature of the incidents has however changed considerably since last year, with high numbers of armed clashes in the field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide.**
- **The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilian population, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community.**
- **...the more significant change in 2007 is the shift from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-style attacks. The former do still take place and as air support is often used, casualty figures are still high. On average however these clashes are fewer and smaller than in 2006.**
- **Possible reasons include the high numbers of Taliban fighters killed during summer 2007 including many mid-level and senior commanders. Another reason must be the realization that these types of attacks are futile against a modern conventionally equipped military force supported by a wide range of air assets. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also been improving throughout 2007**

Extreme Risk Areas

- **Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment classification (pink... now makes up about one third of the surface area of the country.**
- **Main areas... affected, i.e. areas where the deteriorating security situation has been assessed as an Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment thereby causing less accessibility to programs, are:**
 - **The southern and extreme northern parts of Helmand Province, most of Kandahar Province, a portion of northern Nimroz Province and most of Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces.**
 - **The rest of Paktika Province not previously colored pink.**
 - **The “Tora Bora” area of southern Nangahar Province.**
 - **The extreme northern area of Nuristan Province.**
- **Medium Risk/Unstable Environments added include parts of Farah, Badghis and Faryab Provinces.**
- **Low Risk/Permissive Environments (i.e. improved) include parts of Maydan Wardak, Badakshan (northern tip), Takhar and Baghlan Provinces.**
- ***These improved areas are insignificant when seen against the large areas which deteriorated. It is also possible that some of these “improved” areas may soon revert back to previous assessments.***

*Afghanistan
Versus
Pashtunistan*


Looking Beyond the Borders







- **Fight against Taliban and Other Islamist extremists in Afghanistan.**
- **Fighting against Taliban and other Islamist extremists in Eastern Pakistan (Waziristan and Tribal Agencies).**
- **Greater Pashtun and Ethnic/Sectarian struggles.**
- **Al Qa'ida, Bin Laden and Neo-Salafi extremist Elements; sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **Broader instability in Pakistan; Islamist struggle for control.**
- **Outside interests and influence: Iran, Russia, China, Central Asia, Narco-trafficking**

Al Qa'ida's Role

- **Major recovery and sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **Supports, but does not control Taliban.**
- **Source of funding and foreign volunteers.**
- **Significant ideological force.**
- **May help coordinate Taliban and other insurgents groups.**
- **Narcotics source of financing.**

Major AQAM Areas of Influence



- TB presence or influence = 
- HiG presence or influence = 
- AQAM presence or influence = 
- HQN presence or influence = 
- High Criminal presence = 
(population centers excluded)
- Anti-Gov Element presence or influence = 


Distance in Kilometers
0 75 150

Major Ethnic Divisions



Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity

Percent of Population and Language Speakers



Source: CIA World Factbook 2007



42%
Pashtun




8-10%
Pashtun



Swat Valley

Pakistani National Public Opinion and Support for Islamic Extremism




•Response for support of local radical Pakistani, Jihadi/extremist groups was 37-49% in favor and 24-29% opposed.

Source: Terror Free Tomorrow, "Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan," August 2007, www.TerrorFreeTomorrow.org

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Pakistani Public Opinion and Support for the War



•2% support Pakistani Army working with US forces in side Pakistan, 63% oppose..

Source: Terror Free Tomorrow, "Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan," August 2007, www.TerrorFreeTomorrow.org

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*War on Drugs
Versus
Drugs on War*

The Narco-Economy


- **Opium production up 49% in 2006; rising sharply again in 2007**
- **90%+ of global illegal opium output**
- **Opium economy 1/3 of total economic activity**
- **But, involves 4% of cultivatable areas**
- **Most districts and localities do not grow opium**
- **An estimated 13 percent of the population involved in opium poppy cultivation.**
- **Income concentrated in a few powerful players**
- **“Counternarcotics efforts have deepened the corruption and hurt the poorest.”**

Crime and Narcotics

- **Key threat to stability, government, Afghan military, police, and justice systems.**
- **Major source of corruption.**
- **Supports “warlords,” regional power centers.**
- **Important source of terrorist/insurgent financing.**
- **Overlaps with mixed areas of opposition to government.**
- **Serious religious and local backlash.**
- **Ineffective anti-narcotics and eradication programs, mixed with failure to provide incentives and development, create further problems for government, nation building, and allied forces.**
 - **US counternarcotics aid was \$1.5M in FY2001, \$63M in FY2002, \$243M in FY2004, \$462M in FY2005, \$347M in FY2006, and \$407M in FY2007 plus \$174M for alternative livelihoods.**
- **Eradication efforts had little impact in 2005, but sent a signal that more was coming and led to a major increase in drug support for Taliban in 2006-2007.**

US counternarcotics aid data from CRS, 11-2007


Figure 1: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan (ha), 1994-2007



Poul Martin Linder, Afghanistan Index, October 2007

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Figure 3: Potential opium production in Afghanistan (metric tons), 1994-2007



	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Production	3,416	2,335	2,248	2,804	2,693	4,565	3,276	185	3,400	3,600	4,200	4,100	6,100	8,200

Poul Martin Linder, Afghanistan Index, October 2007

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
Narco-Taliban?

- **Afghanistan now processes 60% of opium; \$3 billion industry in 2006.**
- **Sheik Omar reversed opposition to drugs; now emphasizes protection of local economy.**
- **Poppy area up 17% in 2007 from 165,000 to 193,000 hectares.**
- **Favorable weather raises output from 37 kg. per Ha to 42.5 kg in 2007. Production from 6100 tons to 8200 (+34%)**
- **53% of opium grown in Helmand Province. Income \$528 million in 2007.**
- **Taliban present in all 13 districts of Helmand, controls six.**
- **Taliban has 10% “usher” or tax on opium. Can raise \$30-40 million a year.**
- **As many as 60 Taliban labs in the six districts it controls.**
- **80% of farming families in Helmand grow opium; 35% of income from this one crop.**

“Opium and the Afghan Insurgency,” Jane’s terrorism and Security Monitor, September 12, 2007.


Opium Poppy Cultivation

Thousands of Hectares




Source: UN Offices on Drugs and Crime and
www.undoc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf and
 Report of Secretary General, 9-21-07.

Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2003




Source: UNODC - UNHCR, *Global Opium Survey 2003* (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ocp_monitoring.html)
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2007 (at province level)



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Opium poppy cultivation change in Afghanistan (by province), 2006 - 2007



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Eradication Supports the Taliban ? - 2006

ABC News 12/2006




Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

Eradication Supports the Taliban ? - 2007

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll 12/2007

Acceptable to Grow Opium Poppy



Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

- UN reports 34 percent increase in opium production -- 93 percent of world market.
- Center is Southwest, where U.N. says, “opium cultivation has exploded to unprecedented levels,”
- Just over half the crop produced in Helmand.
- 36 percent of Afghans call it acceptable to grow opium poppy (most, “if there is no other way to earn a living”)last year.
- In the top six opium-producing provinces, 64 percent call it acceptable; in Helmand, it’s 81 percent. Elsewhere only 27 percent, agree.
- While 84 percent say the government should take measures to kill off poppy fields, far fewer, 13 percent, support spraying herbicides. Forty-five percent are outright opposed, and another quarter are unsure about it.
- In the top-producing provinces, nearly three in 10 residents say the government should simply allow the crop to be grown. In the rest of the country, just 7 percent agree.

Governance Versus Kabulstan

Governance is Critical: “Democracy” is Just a Four Letter Word

- Legitimacy is the quality of governance perceived by local factions and individuals, not how governments are chosen.
 - *Can take years to create effective leaders, political parties, rule of law, checks and balances.*
 - *Voting by sect, ethnicity, tribe, or faction normally makes thing worse, not better.*
 - *People will accept weak or failed politics, not failed governance. Keep competence in office.*
- Creating effective central, regional, and local government is key, and local government may be easiest and most important.
- Security, services, fairness, and equity are **all** critical.
- All key factions must be given hope and opportunity as soon as possible.

Afghan Support for Central Government vs. Other Factions

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll


For each of these same groups, what would you say is its level of support among people in this area – very strong support, fairly strong support, fairly weak support, or no significant support at all?

	-----Strong-----			----Weak/None----		
	NET	Very	Fairly	NET	Weak	Non
a. The central gov't led by Hamid Karzai	81	35	46	18	14	5
b. The provincial government	72	27	45	27	20	6
c. The local police	64	24	40	35	25	10
d. Local commanders and their militias	24	4	20	73	34	39
e. The Taliban	8	2	5	88	13	75
f. Drug traffickers	7	2	6	87	15	71
g. United States or NATO or ISAF forces	52	11	42	44	22	22
h. Foreign jihadis	15	3	12	78	20	58

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

“Thinking of the national central government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities?”

Asia Foundation Poll




Very good job	25%
Somewhat good job	55%
Somewhat bad job	14%
Very bad job	3%
Don't know	3%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

Afghan Views of Government and Future

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Key Problems in National Governance

- **Anti corruption effort has "not yet delivered results and faces an uncertain future."**
- **Creating effective ministries and a civil service is making slow progress, is blocked by favoritism, and is not reaching out into the field.**
- **Work on laws needed for the 2009 and 2010 election is slow and uncertain.**
- **Efforts to create effective provincial governments are underway, but the central government still relies on "ethnic and tribal factors rather than merit to appoint provincial administrators.**
- **Many provincial governments remain weak and are not ready for the 2009 elections, and "challenges to the development, particularly in the south and southeast, are linked to increased insecurity."**

Afghan Views of Corruption

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

25% of Afghans say police or provincial government officials have demanded a bribe from them or someone they know.

For police bribes, that rises to 35 percent among men, vs. 19 percent of women, and it peaks where the central government is seen as weakest.

Afghans are more apt to report demands for bribes by police and provincial authorities than by local militia leaders (18 percent), the Afghan Army (4 percent) or the Taliban (5 percent).


Overall 72 percent of Afghans call corruption among government officials a problem in their country, little changed from 78 percent last year.

There has been a 10-point drop in the number who call it a big problem, now 45 percent; it remains to be seen whether that means it's being addressed, or people are accommodating themselves to it.

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007


“Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in Afghanistan as a whole.”

Asia Foundation Poll



Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

“State Courts are fair and trusted?”




Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.


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Key Problems in Local Governance

- **Many high threat areas have little or no civil government presence at the local level.**
- **“Humanitarian access has become a growing challenge; at least 78 districts have been rated by the UN as extremely risky, and therefore inaccessible to UN agencies. The delivery of humanitarian assistance has also become increasingly dangerous....the displacement of the population in the south owing to insecurity required the provision of...food and non-food items to at least 4,000 families...”**
- **The judicial system and rule of law are too understaffed and underpaid to cover many areas, and subject to increasing attack. The police, when present, are corrupt, passive, and ineffective.**
- **In spite of bumper harvest, “access to food has actually decreased owing to the deteriorating security situation and poor infrastructure.”**
- **The total number of children in school has increased, and the number of attacks on schools is down, but, “By June, insecurity had forced 412 of 721 schools to close in the insurgency-affected Provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand, and Zabul.” (72 did reopen by August)**

Report of the Secretary General of the UN to the General Assembly on the Situation in Afghanistan (A/62/345-S/2007/555, September 21, 2007)








Characteristics

UN PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP

(All of Afghanistan is a UN Trust Territory & is under UN administration)

The purpose of the UN Programme Accessibility Map is to provide a visual overview of the UN Programme's activities in Afghanistan. The map is divided into regions and provinces. The map is updated on a regular basis. The map is available in both English and Pashto. The map is available in both print and digital formats. The map is available in both English and Pashto. The map is available in both print and digital formats. The map is available in both English and Pashto. The map is available in both print and digital formats.



CORRECT AS AT 17 MAY 2009



- Criminality
- Terrorism
- Ethnic fracture line
- Seat of government
- Encroachment
- International presence
- Media focus

Characteristics

SR PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP
 (SR of Afghanistan is a UN Security Council Resolution)
 The purpose of this document is to provide a general overview of the SR Programme's activities and the current status of the SR Programme in Afghanistan. The SR Programme is a multi-agency effort to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. The SR Programme is a multi-agency effort to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. The SR Programme is a multi-agency effort to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.



- Factionalism
- Criminality
- Narcotics
- "Warlordism"
- Northern Alliance counter-balance to south
- Insurgent infiltration

Only Local Allies Can Win Hearts and Minds, Achieve Information Dominance


- The US can do much to justify its own position and actions, but cannot win at a broader level.
- The host country and regional actors will dominate the information battle and war of perceptions:
 - *The US and UK will never be Muslim states or be able to deal with underlying religious issues.*
 - *The nations in the Long War have their own cultural, social, and political values and they are not Western.*
 - *Western forces and spokesman will always be seen as outsiders, if not imperialists, outsiders, and occupiers.*
 - *The credibility of what local governments and security forces say, not Americans, is critical to popular support.*
 - *Local conciliation and compromise are the key to sectarian, ethnic, and other factional issues.*

Key Real World Priorities for Reform

- **Accept the near-term primacy of the need to counter religious extremism; defeat hard core violent movements.**
- ***Only Afghans ultimately can win against Afghans;***
- ***Only Islam can defeat Islamic extremism.***
- **Do act to strengthen security, government services, basic economic status at the local level, particularly in high threat areas.**
 - ***Focus on governance, and government presence and services, at local level.***
 - ***Use aid to minimize support for extremist and insurgents, and differences by sect, ethnicity, tribe, or faction.***
 - ***Make maximum use of local officials, contractors, leaders; Do not impose US standards or values.***
- **Work for longer term aid and development with strong country teams that tailor program to country; work at pace local governments and local reformers can absorb and support.**
- **Do not give primacy to politics and democracy; treat human rights, economic development, governance, rule of law as equal priorities and pursue longer term reforms on the basis of local priorities and values.**

Rushing Afghan Force Development?


ANA and ANP Build-Up



Source: [Poul Martin Linnet](#), "Afghan Index," October 2007

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Afghan Confidence in Afghan Forces



	Afghan National Army	Afghan National Police	Local Area Militias
A lot	50	42	9
Some	34	34	17
Little	8	12	19
No	4	9	43
Depends/Don't Know	4	4	12

Source: Environics, "2007 Survey of Afghans." October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

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“Public agreement and disagreement towards various statements about ANA”

Asia Foundation Poll

Statement	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people	52%	38%	7%	1%
ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained	25%	37%	26%	10%
ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	40%	37%	14%	7%
ANA helps improve the security	54%	35%	7%	3%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

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“Public’s agreement and disagreement towards various statements about ANP”

Asia Foundation Poll

Statement	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	45%	41%	11%	3%
ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained	27%	38%	23%	10%
ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	41%	36%	14%	7%
ANP helps improve the security	49%	37%	10%	3%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

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Key Problems in Afghan Security Forces - UN

- **Afghan Army has an authorized strength of 40,360, but only 22,000 are "consistently present for combat duty." The target is 70,000 troops by 2010.**
- **Police manpower ceiling has been increased from 62,000 to 82,000 but the actual impact of such measures is far from clear. "The extension of central authority and the stabilization of the country will be possible only if the Ministry of the Interior resolutely tackles corruption and improves popular perceptions of the police."**
- **Directorate of National Security singled out for investigation of arbitrary detentions, inhuman treatment, and torture of detainees.**
- **ISAF (NATO) force has increased from 18,500 in July 2006 to 39,500, with troops from 37 countries. This force, however, is evidently not strong and cohesive enough to cover both the south and east and the focus of the ISAF effort has had to shift from the south to the east.**
- **Combat operations killed over 1,000 afghan civilians between January 1st and August 31, 2007.**

Report of the Secretary General of the UN to the General Assembly on the Situation in Afghanistan (A/62/345-S/2007/555, September 21, 2007)

Key Problems in Afghan Security Forces - DoD/GAO

- **As of March 2007, “no army combat units are fully capable of operating independently.”**
- **“Less than 20%are fully capable of leading operations with Coalition support.”**
- **“No Afghan police units are capable of operating independently,”**
- **“Only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to lead operations with Coalition support.”**
- **“Although 20,400 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007...approximately 15,000 were present for duty.”**
- **“Approximately 40% of Army absences were authorized and 60% were unauthorized.”**
- **“Maintenance is insufficient and end-user accountability of distributed equipment is limited.”**

Key Problems in Afghan Security Forces - Tobias Ellwood MP

- Entire administration is seen by much of the country (particularly the old Northern Alliance) as corrupt.
- Centralised model of Government represses any tribal, ethnic, or cultural differences, rather than celebrating them. Consequently there is growing resentment that Kabul based power is now being abused.
- Although the centralised model hinders corrupt Governors from exploiting their local power base, there is little provision to reward the growing number of potentially more accountable regional leaders with responsibility or operational funding. Hence a growing level of resentment with Kabul.
- Only 27,000 soldiers of a target of 70,000 have completed training and are in active service,
- 55,000 police of a target of 62,000 have received basic training.
- Poor salaries mean unofficial check points are established everywhere allowing police patrols to demand payments for rights of passage in order to supplement their income.
- The Afghan police are seen as corrupt at all levels and unable to maintain even a basic level of law and order. Kidnapping of rich Afghans in exchange for large sums of money is now commonplace.
- The legal infrastructure to support the police is still not fully in place. In many rural areas the old girga system of reprisals against wrong-doers remains in place.

Afghan Equipment Issues

- **...efforts to equip the Afghan security forces have faced problems since their inception. In 2004 and 2005, Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged Soviet weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment.**
- **In 2006, Defense began providing the forces with U.S. equipment—an effort that faces challenges. As security has deteriorated, equipment needs have changed, and their associated costs have increased. For example, the Afghan army was initially provided with pickup trucks, ... and 9-millimeter pistols; more recently, Defense has begun providing more protective equipment, such as Humvees, and more lethal weapons, such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.**
- **Moreover, procedures to ensure that the intended recipients receive, retain, and use their equipment as intended have lagged. For example, the Defense and State Inspectors General (IG) reported that when the United States first began training the police,**
- **State’s contractor provided trainees with a one-time issue of uniforms and nonlethal equipment upon graduation. However, many students sold their equipment before they reached their duty stations, and the program was terminated.**
- **The IGs reported that most equipment is now distributed from Kabul to police units’ provincial headquarters, but hoarding equipment is reportedly a large problem, maintenance is insufficient, and end-user accountability of distributed equipment is limited.**


GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, May 2007 pp. 15

Afghan MOI & ANP: GAO Warning

- **the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for managing the country's national police force, faces a number of problems that have required reform or restructuring.**
- **According to officials from State and its police training contractor, these problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure overburdened with senior-level officers; lack of communication and control between central command and the regions, provinces, and districts; pay disparity between the army and police; and a lack of professional standards and internal discipline.**
- **According to State, the Ministry of Interior is in the process of implementing pay and rank reforms. Reforms to date include removal of over 2,000 high-ranking officers (colonel and above) and steps to make pay for rank-and-file police officers more equitable.**
- **Additional planned reforms include establishing parity between the salaries of police and military and selecting police officers based on merit rather than loyalty and local influence.**

Afghan Force Goals

Actual and Authorized Manpower



GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, p. 14

Afghan Force Goals: Real or Unreal - I

- According to Defense documents and discussions with Defense officials, the 2007 and 2008 budget requests, as well as the provision of sufficient mentors and trainers, would allow Defense and State¹ to complete the training and equipping of the ANSF by December 2008—almost a year ahead of previous plans—at which time the United States would transition its efforts to sustaining the ANSF. According to Defense progress reports from March 2007, 21,600 combat troops² and 62,500³ police officers and patrolmen and women have been trained, equipped, and assigned. Therefore, over the next 2 years,
- Defense plans to complete the training and equipping of 70,000 army personnel, including an additional 29,045 new combat troops (for a total of 50,645), and complete the establishment of an Afghan Ministry of Defense and military sustaining institutions;⁴ and
- Defense and State plan to complete the training and equipping of 82,000 police personnel—an increase of 20,000 over previous plans—including at least 19,500 new recruits, and complete the reform of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, which oversees the police.

GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, May 2007 p. 14

Afghan Force Goals: Real or Unreal - II

- **These plans are ambitious and require both the rapid expansion of efforts to train and equip new recruits and substantial improvements in the current forces' capabilities to operate independently.**
- **According to Defense progress reports from March 2007, no army combat units are fully capable of operating independently and less than 20 percent are fully capable of leading operations with coalition support.**
- **Defense reports that no Afghan police units are fully capable of operating independently and that only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to lead operations with coalition support.**
- **Moreover, according to Defense officials, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of forces on hand is less than those trained.**
- **For example, although 20,400 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007, Defense officials stated that approximately 15,000 were actually present for duty. (40% of absences with authorized; 60% were not.)**

GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, May 2007 pp. 14-15

Afghan Force Development: The Flow of Resources is Just Beginning

Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008

Dollars in millions

Assistance program	Fiscal years							Total
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 request ^a	2008 request	
Afghan army ^b	\$76.9	\$372.6	\$723.7	\$1,736.6	\$768.0	\$4,883.2	\$1,903.7	\$10,464.7
Afghan police	25.5	5.0	223.9	813.9	1,293.7	2,730.6	948.9	6,041.5
Total	\$102.4	\$377.6	\$947.6	\$2,550.5	\$2,061.7	\$7,613.8	\$2,852.6	\$16,506.2

Sources: Departments of Defense and State.

^aFiscal year 2007 includes approximately \$1.6 billion that has been appropriated and approximately \$6 billion as requested by Defense in the 2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request.

^bAfghan army includes detainee operations.

GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, May 2007 p. 13.


Afghan Force Development: Needs Beyond 2008-2009

- Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade and require continuing international assistance. If the recent administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the United States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier estimates.
- Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping the Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan would decline and the overall security situation would improve.
- However, Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a total of \$7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined.
- The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead.

*Ordinary people do not live in the
dawn of tomorrow, they live in the
noon of today.*

Afghan Views of Conditions of Life

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Afghan Economic Trends: Growth or Narco-Aid Driven Economy?

Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005

Indicator	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Gross domestic product (GDP) (billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars)	N/A	2.7	4.4	4.9	6.1	7.3
GDP growth (annual percent)	N/A	N/A	29	16	8	14
Official development assistance (ODA) (billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars)	0.2	0.4	1.4	1.7	2.3	2.8
Ratio of ODA to GDP (percent)	N/A	17	32	35	37	38

N/A = data unavailable

Source: GAO analysis of World Development Indicators data from the World Bank.

Note: GDP is based on nondrug output. GDP growth is calculated based on constant (inflation-adjusted) local currency (Afghani) values, not U.S. dollars. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants.

¹In July 2006, IMF reported that substantial shortcomings continue to affect Afghanistan's national accounts, balance of payments, monetary, and social sector data. Given the security environment in Afghanistan and the ongoing development of the statistical system's capacity, statistics presented here for context and background should not be considered completely reliable.

Aid: Dollars are As Important as Bullets

- **Need civilian partners and expertise, and aid funds.**
- **Scale of effort must suit wartime needs in dollars and time.**
- **Must provide security and embed with military. Must be able to operate even in most hostile areas.**
- **Focus and priority must be security and stability and not development until security and stability exist.**
- **Impact must be timed to deal with conflict priorities.**
- **“Feel good” and BAU efforts waste money & lives.**
- **Aid efforts must be unified internally and integrated with military operations and plans.**

Impact of Aid on Afghan Perceptions


ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Positive ratings of

	U.S. forces	Country's direction	Afghan gov't
Where aid is very effective	54%	67%	78%
Where aid is ineffective	32%	40%	44%

- Overall, 63 percent of Afghans say reconstruction in their area has been effective (although that includes far fewer, 15 percent, who call it “very” effective).
- The contrast with attitudes in Iraq is remarkable; there just 23 percent call reconstruction effective.
- Among Afghans who see reconstruction as very effective, 67 percent say their country’s headed in the right direction overall; among those who say it’s been ineffective, that drops to 40 percent.
- People who say reconstruction is going well, similarly, are 24 points more apt to rate the Afghan government positively and 24 points more apt to hold a favorable opinion of the United States.
- .


“If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government?”



More prosperous	59%	46%	34%	21%	47%	61%	52%
Less prosperous	22%	29%	38%	43%	22%	24%	29%
About as prosperous	9%	21%	19%	29%	12%	8%	11%
Absent during Taliban rule	8%	3%	7%	7%	18%	6%	8%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

“What is the biggest *civil* problem in your local area?”



Electricity	20%	27%	11%	11%	8%	16%	5%
Unemployment	8%	13%	14%	10%	25%	15%	15%
Education/Schools/literacy	5%	9%	10%	10%	13%	11%	16%
Roads	13%	9%	9%	6%	7%	11%	11%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007,
http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

Importance of various development issues

Asia Foundation Poll


Development Issue	All	Rural	Urban
Importance of roads	51%	52.9%	44.2%
Importance of water	50.8%	49.5%	55.5%
Importance of power	50.5%	50.4%	51%
Importance of education	49.1%	48.5%	51%
Importance of health care	48.6%	48.7%	48.2%

Source: Asia Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2007." October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

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
Annual Foreign Aid Per Capita

(Annual assistance over the first two years of nation-building)



Source: John Godges, "Afghanistan in the Edge," Rand Review, Summer 2007, p. 17.


Country Wide Aid As of 1-8-07



Source: ISAF Master Spread Sheet 3.5 as of 1 August 2007.

US Aid: Pre Soviet Invasion to FY2008

(In \$US Millions Including Supplementals to Date)




Military & Security Aid includes military aid, ANA & ANP aid, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, demining, CERP, Karzai & embassy security

	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	2000	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Economic	12	11	-	-	-	-	-	3.4	8.9	33	75	78	88	80	81	68	42	46	43	50	53	77	113	183	723	513	108	200	2,1	2,5	1,7
Military & Security	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	93	224	647	235	920	7,8	2,8
Total	*11.	*10.	-	-	-	-	-	*3.4	*8.9	*32.	*74.	*77.	*88.	*80.	*81.	*68.	*42.	*45.	*42.	*49.	*52.	*76.	*11	*18	*81	*73	*17	*4,3	*3,1	*10,	*4,6

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US Aid Allocation: FY2002-FY2008



Source: GAO, 30-10-07.

Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years 2002-2008, by Program Category

Dollars in millions

Program category	Fiscal years							Total ^a	Percent of total ^a
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 request	2008 request		
Roads	\$51	\$142	\$354	\$276	\$255	\$446	\$338	\$1,862	27
Power generation	3	0	77	286	61	135	203	765	11
Alternative livelihoods	3	1	5	185	121	211	121	647	9
Elections, governance, rule of law, Office of Transition Initiatives	25	42	153	103	23	124	56	526	8
Support to government of Afghanistan	41	40	103	117	60	47	62	470	7
Health and clinics	8	56	83	111	51	72	66	447	7
Education and schools	19	21	104	86	49	62	54	395	6
Food assistance	159	51	49	57	60	22	10	408	6
Economic growth	21	12	84	91	46	68	61	382	6
Agriculture	27	56	50	77	27	55	31	324	5
Provincial Reconstruction Teams	0	11	56	85	20	117	30	319	5
Internally displaced persons	108	23	10	0	0	0	0	141	2
Other ^b	7	7	45	37	5	15	16	131	2
Total	\$471	\$462	\$1,173	\$1,511	\$778	\$1,374	\$1,048	\$6,817	100

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

^aTotals may not add due to rounding.

^bIncludes water, information technology, and program support.


COUNTRYWIDE R&D ACTIVITY

As at: 1 August 2007 Compiled from Master Spreadsheet 3.0

STATUS	PRT/CIMIC		*OTHER PROJECTS	
	NO OF PROJECTS	KNOWN FUNDING	NO OF PROJECTS	KNOWN FUNDING
COMPLETED	5499	\$315,092,302	15797	\$4,048,940,958
ONGOING	2318	\$260,844,485	17265	\$4,082,854,650
PLANNED/FUNDED	357	\$15,755,260	1212	\$4,232,480,384
TOTAL	8174	\$591,692,047	34274	\$12,364,275,992

Cost unknown for 35% of projects.

*Includes multi-million dollar road, power grid and ANA construction projects.




These figures are based on information supplied to the ACSP Cell, HQ ISAF by Donors and other organisations and may not reflect the whole R&D picture. Graphic representation does not include Multi-million dollar projects.

Multi-million dollar projects are not depicted in the graphic.



Completed/Ongoing R&D by Province




Spending in High Risk Provinces

As of 1 Sep 07



Completed, Ongoing, Planned/Funded R&D by Province (\$/pers)



* Reported data captures an estimated 80% of all R&D
 * Totals do not include multi-million dollar road, power grid or ANA construction projects

as of 1 Sep 07

Can We Make Alliances Work in Real World Out of Area Cases?

Afghan Perceptions of Who Provides Security

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

How much of a presence has it in your area: A very strong presence, a fairly strong presence, a fairly weak presence or no significant presence at all.

	-----Strong-----			----Weak/None----		
	NET	Very	Fairly	NET	Weak	Non
a. The central gov't led by Hamid Karzai	74	31	43	24	18	6
b. The provincial government	70	26	43	29	24	5
c. The local police	67	28	39	32	26	6
d. Local commanders and their militias	27	5	22	70	40	31
e. The Taliban	10	3	7	86	15	71
f. Drug traffickers	11	2	9	83	21	62
g. United States or NATO or ISAF forces	50	11	39	47	26	22
h. Foreign jihadis	13	3	11	79	22	56

How confident are you in its ability to provide security and stability in your area: a very confident, somewhat confident, not so confident or not confident at all?

	---- Confident ----			----- Not confident -----		
	NET	Very	Smwhat	NET	Not so	Not at all
a. The central government led by Hamid Karzai	82	35	47	17	12	5
b. The provincial government	75	28	46	25	18	7
c. The local police	67	25	42	33	24	9
d. Local commanders and their militias	26	5	21	72	31	41
e. The Taliban	8	1	7	89	12	77
f. United States or NATO or ISAF forces	52	11	40	46	23	22
g. Foreign jihadis	12	2	10	84	21	63

Adequate Forces or Do Not Engage

- **“Force multipliers” aren’t.**
- **Technology and tactics are important but are no substitute for adequate force numbers and manpower.**
- **There is no center of gravity: “kicking a sponge to death underwater.”**
- **Boots on the ground are no substitute for brains above the boots.**
- **All successes are ultimately regional and local.**
- **High technology netcentric warfare cannot defeat informal distributed networks without victory at the political as well as military level.**
- **“Effects based operations” are shaped by political as well as military impact: Civilian perceptions, casualties, security, and collateral damage critical.**
- **IS&R and precision weapons must be coupled with HUMINT.**

Impact of NATO Strength on Afghan Perceptions

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

	Positive ratings of		
	U.S. forces	Country's direction	Afghan gov't
Where security is very good	57	62	62
Where security is very bad	14	34	41
Where U.S./NATO forces are very strong	73	65	67
Where there's weak or no U.S./NATO presence	30	47	57

- Winning support in the Afghan countryside requires being there – a problem, in that just 50 percent of Afghans say U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their area, down from 57 percent last year.
- Twice as many say such forces have no local presence at all as say they have a “very strong” presence. (There are about 26,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, compared with 162,000 in Iraq.)
- Positive ratings for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are nearly twice as high among Afghans who say their local security is “very good” as among those who say it’s bad. And the United States gets far better ratings from Afghans who say it has a “strong presence” in their area (73 percent positive), compared with those who say it has a less strong presence (52 percent positive) or a weak presence if any (among whom just 30 percent rate U.S. efforts positively).
- Indeed, among Afghans who report U.S. or allied forces in their own area, 67 percent say those forces have done a good job.
- Among Afghans who report shelling, bombing or civilian deaths in their area caused by U.S. or NATO forces, approval of U.S. efforts overall drops sharply, to 29 percent.
- Specifically in the Southwest, among people who report no civilian deaths or injuries caused by coalition forces, 64 percent say people in their area support these forces. Among those who report such casualties, that support is 30 points lower.

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Are you aware of any foreign military forces in this area who are fighting on the side of the Afghan government? IF YES Do you happen to know if they are mainly American, British, Canadian, German, Dutch, some other nationality?

----- Aware of foreign forces -----							No	No
NET	American	British	Canadian	German	Dutch	Other	No	opin.
49	31	6	3	5	1	3	34	17

(IF AWARE OF FOREIGN FORCES) What is your feeling about how these forces in this area have gone about their duties Š have they done a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or very bad job?

----- Good Job -----			----- Bad Job -----			
NET	Very	Somewhat	NET	Somewhat	Very	No opinion
67	19	48	28	17	12	4

(IF GOOD JOB) Why do you say that they are doing a GOOD job?


Security 36
 Fighting Taliban 28
 Humanitarian assistance 14
 Economic development 10
 Well behaved/well disciplined 7
 Communicate well 1
 Other 1
 No opinion 3

(IF BAD JOB) Why do you say that they are doing a BAD job?

Civilian casualties 39
 Intrusive searches 15
 Poorly behaved/poorly disciplined 11
 Too weak to help 7
 Don't communicate 4
 Fighting Taliban 3
 Poorly organized 6
 Gains are lost when they leave/
 respondent caught in the middle 3
 Other 2
 No opinion 8


Military Presence Per Capita

(Soldiers per Thousand Inhabitants in peak year)



Source: John Godges, "Afghanistan in the Edge," Rand Review, Summer 2007, p. 17.

ISAF Force & PRT Deployments




41,000 ISAF + 8,000 OEF US = 49,000

Source: NATO ISAF, September 2007.

Fighting vs. Total Forces

(ISAF Reported Manpower for 37 Nations)



Source: ISAF, Current as of September 10, 2007

ISAF & US Force Strength

- 37 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: Approx 41,000 (Includes National Support Elements)
- Remaining US Contingent: Approx 8,000 (Operation Enduring Freedom)
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km(sq)
- 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

Regional Command Capital: (Approx Strength 5,000)

- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (TU)
- KAIA (BU)

Regional Command South: (Approx Strength 10,000)

- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (UK)
- Forward Support Base KAF
- PRT KANDAHAR (CA)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (UK, DA, ES)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NL,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (US,RO)

Regional Command West: (Approx Strength 2,500)

- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (IT)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (SP)
- PRT HERAT (IT)
- PRT FARAH (US)
- PRT QALA-E-NAW (SP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LI)

Regional Command North: (Approx Strength 3,200)

- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (GE)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (GE)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (GE)
- PRT KONDUZ (GE)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HU)
- PRT MEYMANA (NO)

Regional Command East: (Approx Strength 13,900)

- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM (US)
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (US)
- PRT SHARANA (US)
- PRT KHOST (US)
- PRT METHER LAM (US)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (US)
- PRT JALALABAD (US)
- PRT GHAZNI (US)
- PRT ASADABAD (US)
- PRT BAGRAM (US)
- PRT NURISTAN (US)
- PRT WARDAK (TU)
- PRT GARDEZ (US)

National Support Elements (Approx Strength 6,400)

Source: NATO ISAF, September 2007.

*“Long War”
Versus
Armed Nation Building*

Key Self-Inflicted Wounds

- **Try to fight the war we want, rather than the war we face**
- **Seek to fight long asymmetric struggle with short term, partial and inadequate solutions.**
- **Deny true scale of civil tensions and conflict: Sectarian, ethnic, tribal, economic, and governance.**
- **Confuse counterinsurgency with much broader need for stability operations and armed nation building.**
- **Ethnocentricity: “Democracy” versus governance and local culture, and values.**
- **Underestimate resources required and under-react as crisis or conflict develops.**
- **No clear strategy for conflict termination and grand strategy**
- **Lack of unity with NATO ISAF and Coalition**
- **Deny the seriousness of the situation as it develops to own legislature, people, and ourselves.**

What We Must Do to Win

- Fully commit to stability operations and nation-building or to accepting the consequences.
- Plan and resource for long, uncertain, complex, and high resource struggles from the start.
- Accept time frames of 5-15 years and plan and resource accordingly.
- Give governance, economics, ideology, internal factions, and broad security equal priority to counterinsurgency.
- Accept the reality that democracy, “instant change” and efforts to institutionalize Western values will generally fail and be self-defeating.
- Do not fall in love with the mission, counterinsurgency.
- Do not lie to ourselves, legislature, and people.
- Develop meaningful metrics of success; make transparent.
- Never promise success; prepare for failure from the start and accept it if it occurs.

Resources Must Be Adequate

- Realistic, long-term manpower and funding plans, not early force cuts and phony FYDPs with improvised supplementals.
- Adequate active and reserve end strength to provide years of effort with reasonable rotations.
- Aid in governance, security forces, and economic aid must be adequate, prompt, and responsive. *Dollars must match bullets.*
- Legislatures must be fully prepared and informed, people made aware of risks and asked to make sacrifices.
- Civilian departments and agencies must be funded and staffed, not cannibalized or asked to self-cannibalize.
- Unrealistic dependence on allied or outside military and economic aid is pointless.
- Commit necessary resources to build regional support.

Honest, Transparent Metrics of Success or Failure

- No denial, cheerleading, counterproductive spin.
- Actual allied force capabilities, not “trained and equipped” or “in the lead.”
- Effective national, local, and regional governance, not voting.
- Aid in terms of meeting actual requirements, providing employment and opportunity.
- Security is actual security by region, town, and neighborhood; not battles won or number of killings.
- Report real world progress in conciliation; state of sectarian, ethnic, and factional tension.
- Use polls honestly to measure local and regional attitudes.

“Victory” Will Always be Relative

- **The metric is who controls population in terms of politics, governance, ideology, economy, day-to-day security, in given amounts of space -- not the tactical situation.**
- *Nothing is “won” or secure where cannot go unarmed or at night.*
- *Suppressing and dispersing serve no purpose unless followed by security, stability, popular support.*
- *Violent factional and ideological elements may survive for years -- if not indefinitely.*
- *“Broken” and “failed “ states take 10-15 years to fix.*
- *The real test of victory is a stable, functioning nation, not a clone or perfect state.*
- *50% recidivist result even in UN peacekeeping missions after 5 years.*

BACK UP SLIDES

Afghanistan: Provinces



Map No. 2854 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
October 2005

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

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Afghanistan: ISAF Force Strength

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN): The ISAF mission consists of the following 37 Nations. (The troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time)

	Albania	142		Estonia	128		Lithuania	198		Slovenia	65
	Australia	883		Finland	101		Luxemburg	9		Spain	705
	Austria	3		France	978		Netherlands	1,341		Sweden	356
	Azerbaijan	22		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	133		New Zealand	152		Switzerland	2
	Belgium	305		Germany	2,908		Iceland	9		Turkey	1,215
	Bulgaria	390		Greece	143		Norway	441		United Kingdom	6,678
	Canada	3,079		Hungary	314		Poland	943		United States	15,154
	Croatia	113		Ireland	7		Portugal	182			
	Czech Republic	231		Italy	2,573		Romania	544		ISAF	34,743
	Denmark	516		Latvia	84		Slovakia	72		National Support Elements	6,454

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

Current as of 10 Sep 2007

NATO PRTs and Support Bases in Afghanistan

