

## **Hiroshima's Post-conflict Reconstruction and the Importance of the Will and Capacity for Peacebuilding in Local Society**

(DRAFT: Please do not quote)

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What is the most important point in peacebuilding? Is this the amount of money available for a post-conflict society provided by the international community? Or is it the number of personnel whom the international community can deploy to a post-conflict society? Or is it the level of sophistication in the international community's most advanced doctrine of peacebuilding?

All these points are always important in peacebuilding and need to be carefully examined in any case. However, these should not be called "the most important" point in peacebuilding. It would be necessary for those who are engaged in peacebuilding activities to sharpen a clear understanding of how to prioritize various principles and policies of effective and constructive peacebuilding. Of course, our understanding will vary in accordance with the situation on the ground in each case of peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there is a set of strategic principles of peacebuilding which we always find as the most important guidelines. It is the principles of local ownership and local capacity development. This fundamental truth in peacebuilding derives from the simple observation of the fact that any kind of peacebuilding activities cannot have a sustainable impact without having a local foundation. Without those people who continue to live in the society in which we want to achieve durable peace, we would not be able to identify any doctrines or operations of peacebuilding thorough which we could develop meaningful contributions to peace.

Thus, it is always the case that the most important aspect of peacebuilding is indigenous home-grown peacebuilding activities by people living in local society. I would like to stress that if there is nobody who

wants to achieve peace in local society, it would be simply impossible to achieve peace in the society. I would like to emphasize that if there is nobody who can make efforts to sustain peace in local society, it would be simply impossible to sustain peace in the society. This plain fact must be the fundamental starting point of our theories and practices of peacebuilding. There must be the will for peacebuilding in local society. There must be the capacity for peacebuilding in local society. Outsiders can and certainly ought to encourage local residents to develop such will and capacity for peacebuilding in local society, or at least we should carefully avoid any conducts which could hamper such will and capacity.

The will and capacity for peacebuilding are the most important aspects of peacebuilding. Then we need to ask the following questions; what are the will and capacity for peacebuilding? How can we identify such will and capacity and above all, those who have such will and capacity? How can we help them further develop the will and capacity for peacebuilding? What are our peacebuilding strategies to assist such will and capacity in local society? We always set up these questions and probably continue to ask them in the entire process of peacebuilding, since there will be no final ultimate answers to these questions. But without asking these questions, we can never fully develop our understanding and our practices of peacebuilding.

## **1. The Will and Capacity for Peacebuilding in Local Society**

### **1-1 The Importance and Complexity of Domestic Ownership in Peacebuilding**

There have been so many developments and changes of doctrines, strategies and practices of peacebuilding since the beginning of the 1900s. But the fundamental principle of peacebuilding is always the same: the ownership of local society. This principle is important in the two senses.

First, the principle sets up the normative framework of peacebuilding. No matter how deeply the international community would be engaged, the contemporary world keeps the sovereign-nation-state as the

basis of constructing social order. The principle of local or domestic ownership navigates peacebuilding activities in the direction of the established normative framework of international society.

Second, the principle sets up the strategic orientation of peacebuilding. No matter how long the international community remains engaged, it is simply impossible to engage eternally for peacebuilding purposes. Those who enjoy peace as a result of successful peacebuilding and who suffer as a result of poor peacebuilding are the people living in local societies. They take primary and permanent benefits and responsibility of peacebuilding. The establishment of domestic ownership is one indispensable perspective to identify the validity of peacebuilding.

With this universal importance, however, the promotion of local ownership necessarily takes multiple faces in different societies. Various different policies must be required in various cases. Normative and strategic perspectives are required to identify appropriate policies to effectively promote local ownership for peace.

The Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations (PBC) illustrates the complexity of the issue of domestic ownership. The UN PBC highlights the importance of local ownership as one of its guiding principles<sup>1</sup>. Thus, so-called country-specific meetings of PBC invite the government of the country under consideration. But while the PBC appreciates the national government, it never forgets to create channels for the involvement of other actors in domestic society. The PBC simply does not want to be an agency to implement requests from the national government by pursuing broader balanced perspectives on peacebuilding. Therefore, it asks the national government to consult with civil society as much as possible and to show the proof that they have really done so. But there is no guideline for the PBC as regards how it should understand and facilitate the best possible relationship between the national government and civil society groups.

The principle of domestic ownership contains a set of dilemmas for those engaged in peacebuilding. What happens if there is no such a reliable national government in the immediate post-conflict stage of peacebuilding?

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<sup>1</sup> General Assembly Draft Resolution A/60/L.40, Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645 and Resolution S/RES/1646 (21 December 2005).

How can we incorporate the involvement of the national government, when it is one apparent conflict party, into a sustainable process of peacebuilding? Even if we could wait until we can find an appropriate national government in discussing peacebuilding seriously, we may still want to find the roles of opposition groups, civil society organizations, local authorities, and so on, if the need for coordination among multiples stakeholders within the national government is just taken for granted. A very simplistic application of domestic ownership is to listen to the national government. But well-designed applications of the principle of domestic ownership require nuanced and complicated approaches to develop domestic ownership.

The first sub-category of the principle of domestic ownership is the principle of national sovereignty. This externally means that each state has its own sovereign footing in relation to other sovereign states. This internally means that each state has its own national government to represent the entire nation in the international scene prior to other domestic actors. This observation signifies two points. It is highly critical how peacebuilding leads to the creation of an appropriate and reliable national government. It is also crucial to help the national government build and identify healthy relationships with other domestic actors. In other words, peacebuilding is supposed to be the process in which the national government is encouraged to develop its will and capacity to strengthen domestic governance together with other national actors. In accordance with this observation, we could identify how we should understand the time frame of the peace process and prioritize sectors of peacebuilding.

## 1-2 Peacebuilding Activities required from the Perspective of Domestic Ownership

The reason why peacebuilding needs to start discussing peace agreements lies in the above observation. Peace agreements usually contain the traditional sense of ceasefire provisions. But contemporary peace agreements do not stop at the point. They tend to include political agendas like the composition of a transitional government, the process of constitution making, the schedule for elections, etc. Are they necessary in

internationally brokered peace agreements even if we respect the principle of domestic ownership? If the need for a third-party outsider is clear in brokering peace agreements, does this not necessarily mean that peace agreements contain issues of domestic politics or even domestic constitutional affairs?

The point is that even if we respect the principle of domestic ownership, we may never say that we must comply with whatever domestic actors say. There must be a fine line between strategic modesty of the international community and constructive facilitation of domestic politics. Peace agreements ought to include political agendas which are really required to strengthen the domestic will and capacity for peace. Peace agreements ought to stipulate as the indispensable aspects of peacebuilding the process in which the society constructs the constitutional framework and the national government as its principal defender and implementer.

The election is incorporated into what we understand as the indispensable aspect of peacebuilding, since it is usually one major/single source of sufficient legitimacy for peacebuilding. In order for the process of peacebuilding as well as the agents of peacebuilding including the national government to be effective, there must be a channel to add legitimacy to them. The election is not the only such channel in theory, since we could resort to traditional customs and meetings and so on. But the election is quite often the best possible way in practice to add best possible legitimacy to the domestic process and agents of peacebuilding.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR), which is nowadays the most debated area of peacebuilding, is required for the purpose of practically strengthening the national government and, as a result, the overall capacity of governance in domestic society. The security sector is a cornerstone to prove the validity of the national governmental system and the very foundation of sustainable domestic governance. DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) as regards the national army and reforms of law enforcement agencies are the critical juncture of peacebuilding.

The judicial reform, which could be regarded as part of SSR, in fact contains a broad range of topics like the treatment of war crimes/criminals in judicial and non-judicial forms. The appropriate interpretation and management of the established legal norm in the form of the national

constitution are also contributory to enhancement of the overall capacity of governance in domestic society.

All these are important components of peacebuilding and quite often incorporated in peace agreements at the very beginning of the peace process, since effective peacebuilding based on the principle of domestic ownership requires activities to meet political reforms necessary to develop the will and capacity for peacebuilding.

## **2. The Reconstruction of Hiroshima**

I argue that while the conditions of peacebuilding differ in each case, there always exists the fundamental truth of peacebuilding that the success of peacebuilding depends upon the will and capacity of peacebuilding. While we need different approaches and priorities of peacebuilding in different cases of peacebuilding, we always have to consider the way we could develop the will and capacity for peacebuilding in local society.

I would like to argue that even the case of post-war reconstruction of Hiroshima can be mentioned to illustrate this observation. It is not because Hiroshima can be regarded as a typical example of peacebuilding and contemporary peacebuilding ought to follow the course of Hiroshima. Of course, this is not the case. But Hiroshima can still be regarded as one case of peacebuilding despite its peculiar history of the dropping of the atomic bomb. I shall present the case simply because I want to show the peculiar importance the will and capacity for peacebuilding in domestic society.

### **2-1 The Development of Hiroshima as a Military City**

It is true that Hiroshima or Japan's post-war reconstruction is a reconstruction after an international war, and not after an internal armed conflict. Thus, we may wonder whether Hiroshima is relevant to many cases of reconstruction after various internal armed conflicts in our contemporary world. It must be emphasized that Hiroshima's example must not be directly applied to other cases of reconstruction in our contemporary world. But this does not mean that we cannot see any elements in the history of Hiroshima

relevant to contemporary cases of post-conflict peacebuilding. The fact that each case of peacebuilding is distinct and different from others does not mean that we cannot see any relevance of one case to other cases. Comparison is possible, when we identify both similarities and differences. I claim that Hiroshima's reconstruction is different from any other cases of peacebuilding just as any other case of peacebuilding is different from the other cases of peacebuilding. I argue that post-war reconstruction of Hiroshima is one case of peacebuilding.

Furthermore, it is not true that Japan has not experienced any internal war. Rather, it is significant to bear in mind that post-war reconstruction of Hiroshima ought to be interpreted in the context of reconstruction after internal armed conflicts. Only if we can imagine a form of peacebuilding may continue after seven decades of political detours, post-war Hiroshima's peacebuilding can be regarded as part of such a long-term process of peacebuilding after internal armed conflicts.

Japan experienced severe internal armed conflicts in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The so-called Meiji Restoration of 1868 was such a radical reformation of entire society, Japan could not easily eradicate the structure of internal armed conflicts for a considerable period of time. The Meiji Restoration itself was a product of an internal armed conflict called "Boshin War." The Meiji government was created by the rebel forces whose members resorted to the ancient authority of the Emperor in order to abolish the feudalistic Edo Government of Shogun for the purpose of modernization of Japan in face of the threats of imperial powers from the United States and Europe. The Boshin War continued for two years until those who were loyal to the Edo Government were finally defeated at the Northern edge of Japan.

But the end of the Boshin War did not mean that Japan overcame the structure of internal armed conflicts. Those who were against or dissatisfied with the Meiji Government repeated conducted rebel wars. Even poor farmers quite often organized rebel forces. But the most prominent anti-Meiji Government forces were ex-samurais. Those samurais or feudal soldiers deprived for their privileges including their individual swords also quite often started internal armed conflicts. The final major rebel war against the Meiji Government was the Seinan War initiated by ex-feudal soldiers who gathered around Saigo Takamori. Saigo was a hero of the

Boshin War and regarded as a genuine real samurai among those who loved traditional values of samurai against the Meiji Government. The Seinan War, which took place in 1877, ten years after the Meiji Restoration, was a very major devastating war in south-western part of Japan. The Meiji Government won the war by deploying its newly created army with Western military technologies. But the history of Japan up to the time of the Seinan War shows how volatile Japan was at the beginning of its modernization. One clear political goal of the Meiji Government was to overcome this structure of internal armed conflicts in Japan. By ordering disarming and demobilizing feudal soldiers, the Government had to introducing social integration programs for ex-soldiers in order to realize domestic peace, namely for peacebuilding.

We can observe with hindsight that Japan somehow succeeded in this peacebuilding project only partially or in a crooked and short-sighted way. In order to overcome the structure of internal armed conflicts, the Meiji Government introduced radical measures to unify the nation. As a result, Japan became a highly centralized state based on the ultra-nationalistic ideology. Ultra-nationalistic Japan was a solution to the problem of the prevalence of internal armed conflicts. But it later turned out to be a bad solution. This solution led Japan to the brutal and adventurous imperial conducts and such a devastating consequence in the first half of the twentieth century. The solution was repudiated in 1945 and followed by the radical adjustment of peacebuilding with the help of the occupying powers.

Hiroshima is a local city which clearly and vividly signifies this rise and fall of Japan's peacebuilding. Hiroshima was a poor prefecture in the Meiji era. Hiroshima had the second smallest farming area per person in Japan. Hiroshima was full of jobless ex-soldiers. The regions west to Hiroshima repeatedly experienced internal wars due to the revolts of ex-soldiers. Even Yamaguchi prefecture next to Hiroshima experienced several wars after the Meiji Restoration. Hiroshima had to tackle the issue of discontented ex-soldiers in poverty most seriously among local communities of Japan.

The first governor of Hiroshima, Senda Sadaaki, loyal to the Meiji Government as a politician from Satsuma, which played a major role in the Meiji Restoration, was the man who actually tackled the issue. He had to



alleviate grievances of ex-soldiers who were deprived of privileges and dissatisfied with the Meiji Government. In order to create and give jobs to ex-soldiers in Hiroshima, namely, in order to conduct a form of “jusan” in Hiroshima, he decided to start a very gigantic seaside reclamation project by the sea. He intended to create more lands available to ex-soldiers. He physically completed the project after getting the immense amount of debts. He politically failed with the project, since the newly reclaimed area by the sea was proved to be inappropriate for cultivation. Senda was severely blamed and demoted from Hiroshima.

This failure of “DDR” in Hiroshima left a large modern port called Ujina Port. This accidental legacy changed the history of Hiroshima by accident. It was this Ujina Port that drew great attention at the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Hiroshima station was at that time the western edge of Sanyo Railroad Line directly connected to Tokyo. This means that Hiroshima station was the railroad station closest to the continent. Before the War broke out, a new short railroad between Hiroshima station and Ujina Port was constructed rapidly in 2 weeks as part of preparation for the coming war. Military personnel and materials went to the Continent for the war via Hiroshima as a result.

Hiroshima Division (later called the 5<sup>th</sup> Division) had been stationed in Hiroshima since 1873 and deployed for counteracting domestic anti-government uprisings. In 1894 to 1895 at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the Meiji Emperor came to Hiroshima and stayed to direct the military operation. Hiroshima was then a provisional capital, to which the military headquarters and the Imperial Parliament moved. Infrastructures like water facilities available still now in Hiroshima were constructed as military facilities around this time by the Emperor’s order.

Senda received a royal decoration at the time of the Sino-Japanese War for the achievement of the construction of Ujina Port. As many military facilities and military railroads were constructed and Hiroshima flourished as a “military city,” the Hiroshima City Parliament later resolved to give Senda the considerable amount of honorarium.

The intervention force was sent to China in 1900 from Ujina Port. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Hiroshima became a gathering point for tens of thousand of army officers and military horses

and a supply base of the military. World War I and following wars continued to add new military histories and facilities to Hiroshima. As a result, the population exploded and modernization of the city rapidly advanced. Hiroshima's heavy industries further developed during the Second World War and eventually the Second Military Headquarters as well as the Chugoku Inspector-General Office were stationed in Hiroshima in order to prepare for "the major battle on the main land." Hiroshima was recognized as the center of West Japan under the emergency state of total mobilization of the Japanese.

Hiroshima at the time of 1945 was a "military city" that contained many important military facilities in addition to military-supplying industrial factories like Mitsubishi Shibuidling. Furthermore, Edajima island off the coast of Ujina hosted the navy elite academy. Kure, around 20 km from Hiroshima, was also known for a military port and navy factories. The famous giant warship, Yamato, was constructed in Kure.

The failure of the "reintegration" project (reclamation and construction of Ujina Port), which is "R" of DDR in the words of contemporary peacebuilding, accidentally cultivated the way for Hiroshima to become the "military city" in unexpected ways. It is true that the development of military industries stimulated local economy, while this accidental development does not truly solve the original R problem and create a long-term sustainable foundation for peacebuilding.

Behind this development of Hiroshima as a "military city," there was a crooked dual economic structure of heavy military industries and rural poverty. Hiroshima was known for the highest number of immigrants among Japanese prefectures. After the Excluding Japanese Immigrants Act was enacted in 1924 in the United States, immigrants from Hiroshima moved to Brazil or colonial territories of Taiwan, Korea and Northern China as public servants, teachers, merchants, and so on. We can easily say with hindsight that the peacebuilding solution after 1894 in Hiroshima was not sustainable. Japanese domestic peace established after the Meiji era was not a long-term peace with a sustainable social foundation. But it was after the total devastation in the Second World War that people in imperial Japan finally realized the point.

## 2-2 A-bomb Destruction and the Will to Reconstruction

It was rather strange that such a military city as Hiroshima had not been attacked until August 6, 1945. The fact was that the United States refrained from attacking potential targets by conventional weapons in order to study the impact of the atomic bomb later.

The atomic bomb killed around 140,000 people directly in the year, and more in the following years. The central part of Hiroshima was completely destroyed. The area of the radius 500 meters instantly disappeared. 92 % of the city area was burnt and 40 % was ruined. Many who survived initially could not escape from the burning city. Many others who managed to escape from fire eventually died in suburban areas, since they could not receive appropriate medical treatments.

The office building of Hiroshima Prefecture was burnt completely, so the office moved to a half-burnt temple in a suburban area. Prefecture staff asked neighboring towns and villages for medical and food supplies. But it was too difficult even to communicate with those outside of Hiroshima. The office building of Hiroshima City was also almost burnt down, and many office staff died including the mayor. 50 emergency medical points were created for around 150,000 people who managed to escape from the central part of Hiroshima. But it was not possible to supply water, let alone medicine. Since the military headquarters was completely destroyed, the army maritime division at Ujina port had to go to the central part of Hiroshima for aid activities. But they could not handle such a serious tragedy.<sup>2</sup>

It could be asserted that pre-war Hiroshima was the symbol of the ultra-nationalistic character of imperial Japan. The word “madoutekure” many a time left by those who were dying to those who eventually survived in burning Hiroshima is said to have a connotation of revenge. As early as on August 7 a “military city” established the “Hiroshima Security Headquarters” under the command of an army vice admiral, which ordered that medical services for the victims, disposal of dead bodies and restoration of main roads be completed in 3 days. Aiming to recover

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<sup>2</sup> Those who went to the central part of Hiroshima shortly after the bombing suffered from radiation damage later.

military capability as soon as possible, it never stopped working overnight to repair transportation, communication facilities, light electricity, and so on.

Nevertheless, it was obvious in reality that the atomic bomb completely destroyed the functions of Hiroshima as a “military city.” Because the war itself ended less than 10 days after the bombing, Hiroshima was destined to abandon its identity as a “military city” since the time of the Meiji era. The atomic bomb destroyed the military city Hiroshima physically as well as psychologically.

There was a rumor that there would be no grass or flower for 75 years in Hiroshima due to radioactivity. Immediately after the Second World War, the often-raised question was whether reconstruction of Hiroshima was possible in the first place or even if so, whether it was worth doing. For instance, in 1946 on the occasion of the conference on reconstruction of Hiroshima organized by the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, a vice-mayor of Kure City remarked: “I wish you to keep the ruined area swept by the flames as the commemorating graveyard for the maintenance of eternal world peace. I wonder if it is appropriate to construct a town on the land where so many people were killed. New Hiroshima will not necessarily come back to the original place of Hiroshima.”

Anticipating this kind of opinion, as early as September 5, 1945, the influential local newspaper, Chugoku Shimbun, issued the editorial to say that “all of us, homeland-lovers, are so angry at the people who are not shamed to proclaim such an irresponsible opinion that the ruined city of Hiroshima is a war memorial and ought to be preserved eternally as a complete ruin.”<sup>3</sup> This editorial concluded that “in order to establish a powerful great Hiroshima in the future, we shall never mind a certain decrease of the number of leukocytes and falling down in the middle of our reconstruction, so that we will guard the land of our ancestors with strong determination.”

Behind the scene of reconstruction of the ruined city of Hiroshima there was such a strong will to reconstruction. For those who survived in Hiroshima, the destroyed “military city” in the age after the unconditional

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<sup>3</sup> Quoted in *New History of Hiroshima*, History Volume, p. 46.

surrender, it was only through reconstruction, certainly not through war, on the land of their ancestors that they could show their strong will power to the outside world.

The office of Hiroshima Prefecture lost many of their buildings and staff, but continued to work with staff from branch offices. A small number of staff of the City of Hiroshima also worked hard for food distribution, issuance of sufferance certificates, disposal of dead bodies and bones, and so on. It was on August 21 that the chairs of local community committees gathered at the ruined city hall and received the notice of the beginning of a peacetime system including the transformation of military supplies to private ones, disbandment of national volunteer troops, demobilization of students, and so on. As the amount of distributed food was limited and the prices of food at black markets were high, survivors faced starvation. The City staff was only able to encourage private farming by distributing vegetable seeds and hold gatherings for tasting wild grass.

According to the pre-war system, the city planning section of Hiroshima Prefecture under the guidance of the Ministry of Interior was responsible for city planning. Thus, this section initiated reconstruction plans for Hiroshima.<sup>4</sup> But the City of Hiroshima should lead reconstruction planning, as GHQ sought to disband the Ministry of Interior. The City office established the department for reconstruction in January 1946 by allocating 1 chamber, 2 division, and 7 sections. In February the Council of Reconstruction of Hiroshima City was established as an advisory board of the mayor, in which 26 members with various backgrounds discussed plans for reconstruction. Lieutenant Montgomery, who was among 10,000 occupation troops stationed in Kure, participated in the Council as the “reconstruction advisor.”<sup>5</sup> The Prefecture of Hiroshima in December 1945 and the City of Hiroshima in January 1947 set up “reconstruction offices” respectively, while the Prefecture’s office covered the Eastern part of the

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<sup>4</sup> At the national level, the House of Reconstruction for Wartime Damage was established in November 1945. In December the same year, the cabinet sanctioned the Basic Principles of Reconstruction Plans for Areas of Wartime Damage. Hiroshima Prefecture had to reconstruct Fukuyama and Kure in addition to Hiroshima.

<sup>5</sup> After Montgomery went home soon, the position remained vacant for a long time.

ruined area and the City's office covered the Western part.

Satoshi Nagashima, Director of the Department for Reconstruction of the City of Hiroshima submitted an ambitious and futuristic plan for constructing large main roads. The idea of constructing a 100 meter road was proposed for the purpose of job creation as well. Shinzo Hamai, City officer who was elected to be the mayor in 1947, took the role of establishing the course of reconstruction by saying that "the goal of reconstruction of Hiroshima is to create a peaceful, beautiful and international city." Yet, the progress of reconstruction was so slow, since the City's budget for reconstruction was then only 56 million Japanese yen despite the estimate that it would require 2.3 billion yen. The involvement of the national government was expected, which was difficult without new legislation.

Though the limitation on citizens' inflow was not deregulated until October, 1945, citizens had begun reconstruction individually. Hiroshima Prefecture and Hiroshima City started constructing residential houses through the residence corporation, but they could not proceed due to shortage of lumber. Only 392 houses were finally built in 1946. It is said that about 5,000 houses were built by the citizens' initiatives in 6 months after the war.

In the beginning, there were serious shortage of electric power and lack of the reconstruction fund. Electric power fell into a critical condition in 1946 when industrial demands began to rise. Although the construction of new power plants was highly expected, it was only in 1949 after repeated requests to the central government that the loans were provided to construct heating and water electric power plants.

The City of Hiroshima sold education reconstruction public lottery in 1950 and sport public lottery in the following year. Overseas fund raising activities were also attempted to take advantage of a number of emigrants from Hiroshima. "Hawaiian Hiroshima War Damage Relief Association" was organized and about 48,000 dollars were raised in Hawaii. 20,000 dollars were sent again, and they were used for widows' home, handicapped persons' facilities and elementary school buildings and so on.

More than 80% of all factories in Hiroshima city were small and medium-sized enterprises, which met critical conditions by inflation and the

so-called “Dodge Line.”<sup>6</sup> The national government established the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in 1948 and People’s Finance Corporation was founded to provide the loan of the small long-term business funds to small and medium-sized enterprises. It established its branch house in Hiroshima in 1949 and then, applications rushed in. Against a fund of 25,000,000 yen which was assigned to Hiroshima, there were 1,695 applications for 142,326,000 yen. Hiroshima Prefecture coped with this and started “Hiroshima Prefecture Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Small Loan System.” Hiroshima City began “Hiroshima City Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Promotion Special Loan.” This provided up to 200,000 yen for 2 months. Small and medium-sized enterprises were further promoted and Hiroshima City commerce and industry information bureau was established in the municipal office in 1949. Various joint small and medium sized enterprise associations were organized for the improvement in technology, the improvement of the management efficiency and the investigation research about the commodity market.

In 1949 Hiroshima City began the relief work for the unemployed in war damage reconstruction areas such as city area cleaning arrangements and maintenance of streets, parks and school playgrounds. About 100,000 people participated, which promoted war damage reconstruction businesses. But most demobilized soldiers could not find jobs in town, and thus went to villages.

Half of the machine tool industry, thermal power plant, chemical industry and all of 3/4 of the steel production capacity and the army production capacity, shipbuilding ability, light metal production capacity were removed for compensation by GHQ’s “compensation designation.” The designated factories shifted to produce new models of woodwork machines and farming machines. In 1948 the occupation policy changed and only the army facilities were decided to be removed. The shipbuilding industry and the machine industry came to begin to put productive activities in orbit.

Hiroshima’s industry came back to life after the Korean War Special Procurement. The amount of military procurement order inside Hiroshima Prefecture was about 400,000,000 yen in 4 months and about 1,256,000,000

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<sup>6</sup> As for the Dodge Line, see Unit 2 of this Module.

yen in one year until June, 1951. The amount of shipping increased drastically with the manufacturing industry, which had been a war industry during World War II. For example, the Japan Steelmaking Hiroshima factory took the order of “100,000 car (7,000,000 yen) for the military procurement” with the outbreak of the Korean War. The deficit until 1950 changed to the surplus in 1951. Mihara Vehicles Factory of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. received orders of freight cars and tank cars for South Korea and as a result dissolved the deficit of 2,000,000 yen every month.

“Hiroshima City Factory Establishment Regulations” were enacted in 1951. Hiroshima City provided bounties to attract more small and medium-sized enterprises.

## 2-3 Identity-led Type Peacebuilding

When the City of Hiroshima asked for help from GHQ for the first time in 1946, MacArthur rejected the request, saying that he could not accept all the requests from all the cities suffering from war damage. The first elected Mayor of Hiroshima, Hamai Shinzo, thus had to come up with a new idea to boost political leverage. When Mayor Hamai requested help in 1949, he explained what he wanted was not material and technological aid. He asked GHQ to allow for the idea of the “peace city” and sanction the draft of the Hiroshima Peace City Act. Then MacArthur offered his support. At the time of the beginning of the Cold War, anything relating to “Hiroshima” and “peace” was politically sensitive. Still, MacArthur supported the idea of making Hiroshima a “peace memorial city.” It was probably because he wanted to reconstruct Hiroshima as a peace city, rather than as a resentful bombed city.

Mayor Hamai also appealed the significance of making Hiroshima “an international peace memorial city” to members of the national Diet.<sup>7</sup> He

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<sup>7</sup> In the discussions on the “Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act,” the idea of “commemorating peace” in Hiroshima was born. This was based on the understanding that the bombing of Hiroshima was the decisive moment for the end of World War II. This was the explanation in the Lower House by the Diet Member Hisao Yamamoto, who proposed the



presented the vision of Hiroshima becoming an international sightseeing city as “Geneva in the new age.” He emphasized that his idea was so significant for the world and for Japan. As a result, the Diet unanimously passed the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act in 1949. The region specific legislation required a referendum and more than 90 % of the voters supported it.

The Act enabled the City to obtain ex-military sites for free and sell them for financing reconstruction programs. The Act also encouraged the financial support of the national government.

Article 1 of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act proclaims that “the goal of the Act is to construct the city of Hiroshima as a peace memorial city which is the symbol of the ideal to faithfully realize eternal peace.” This idea was the very factor of the legislation of the Construction Act pursued by Mayor Hamai.

The reason why Hamai emphasized the possibility of Hiroshima becoming a “sightseeing city” was the reality that simple restoration of pre-war Hiroshima was not an option. It was impossible to restore a “military city” in post-war Japan, and thus new foundations were necessary.

The concept of “peace memorial city,” which was promulgated by Hamai, sanctioned by MacArthur, and enacted by a national law, characterizes the post-war history of Hiroshima. It was this concept which founded a basis for reconstruction of Hiroshima. Hamai held the Hiroshima Peace festival<sup>8</sup> on August 6, 1947 and read the first “Peace Declaration” to “establish the ideal of world peace by eternally abandoning war.”<sup>9</sup> MacArthur sent a favorable message to the festival, namely, supported the attempt to record Hiroshima as a memory for peace. According to Hamai, “the fundamental question is what kind of city we are going to make out of a former military city....We have decided upon the development plan of a cultural city.” As early as December 1945 Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, Tsuneo Kusunose, expressed a similar idea. He said; “I would

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Construction Act. See New Hiroshima History, Document Version, p. 241.

<sup>8</sup> In the previous year, the gathering for Citizens’ Peace Reconstruction was organized by the Association of Cities and Towns of Hiroshima to commemorate the first anniversary of the dropping of the a-bomb.

<sup>9</sup> From 1947 up to now, except 1950, the mayors of Hiroshima continued to issue annual Peace Declarations on August 6.

like to ask for donations for reconstruction from all over the world in order to make Hiroshima the memorial city for peace which brought an end to the war. I want to make Hiroshima an eternally neutral major cultural city, which is also a center point of the great Setonaikai-sea sightseeing area.”

The idea of transforming Hiroshima into a cultural city for peace seemed to be widely supported. This new identity of the former “military city” Hiroshima, however, indicates a rather unclear relationship between “Hiroshima” and “peace.” It does not seem that GHQ, the government of Japan, the local government of Hiroshima, and citizens in Hiroshima shared the same understanding of the concrete relevance of Hiroshima to peace. At the time of the first peace festival, in front of attendants from GHQ, Mayor Hamai read the message that “a lucky fact in many unlucky things was the bombing of Hiroshima ushering in the end of the miserable war.” He concluded the first Peace Declaration by saying that “we declare peace this way.” It is not the case that the historical understanding of the atomic bomb as an usher of peace was shared by ordinary citizens in Hiroshima shortly after the bombing. They would felt it difficult that there was peace to be declared in the ruined city of Hiroshima. The continuous holding of Citizens’ Gathering for Peace Reconstruction was rather a proof that the peace festival organized by local governments did not exactly express the complex feeling of ordinary citizens.<sup>10</sup>

In August 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Japanese authorities as well as GHQ were very cautious even about the

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<sup>10</sup> The number of the participants in the peace ceremony was between 1,000 and 3,000. But it is said that around 70,000 people attended other amusing events on the day of the peace festival. On the other hand, according to the opinion polls conducted in 1950, 67% of the a-bomb survivors thought the peace festival needed to be changed for the reasons that there too much of “merrymaking” (67%); that the festival was too formal relevant to a limited number of people (14%) and that it was waste of money (14%). Namely, the citizens of Hiroshima were in those days divided into a group of people who enjoyed “merrymaking,” another group to “religiously console the dead,” and the other group who had the “second May Day” organized by labor unions. The expansion of the elements of “consolation” in the 1950s was criticized around the time of the “Ampo Struggle (against the US-Japan Security Alliance)” of 1960. The tension between the elements of “consolation” and “peace movement” was the major factor to continuously change the nature of peace ceremonies in Hiroshima.

peace festival, which was eventually cancelled. Other gatherings were cancelled as well.

In 1951 the Peace Memorial Ceremony was conducted on August 6, and in 1952 it was again renamed the “Spirit Consolation Ceremony and Peace Memorial Ceremony.” This means that a “spirit consolation” ceremony became possible only after Japan’s restoration of sovereignty. The idea of commemorating peace achieved by the dropping of the atomic bomb disappeared from the ceremony. Then, the number of attendants rose from a few thousand to tens of thousand. The government of Japan began to delegate Prime Minister’s representatives at the ministerial level. In 1968 the title finally changed to “the Ceremony to Console the Atomic Bomb Victims and the Ceremony to Pray for Peace.” Up to this time, the new identity of Hiroshima as a “peace city” was solidly established and recognized as an overlap of Japan’s new identity of a “peace nation.”

The overlap of identity did not mean the same concrete policies at all. From around the late 1960s it became common that the Peace Declarations referred to ongoing political affairs like the Vietnam War. Instead of commemorating peace, the mayors began to discuss threats to peace and criticize nuclear powers including the United States.

In the process of reconstruction, the first priority was put upon the new identity of a “peace city,” all the more because Hiroshima had been a “military city.” Later, after the restoration of sovereignty, the elements of spiritual consolation were introduced, and the issue of peace could be discussed in concrete terms. Then, the perspective of “commemoration of peace” developed into the perspective of “praying for peace.”

Now in our contemporary time, as the need for international cooperation is widely shared, there appeared many further attempts to reshape the identity. The City of Hiroshima helps *hibakusha* to testify in various forms and also to contribute to anti-nuclear movements. The Prefecture of Hiroshima presents its “peace contribution activities” as the pillar of their peace contribution. Again, Hiroshima’s attempt to develop the identity of a “peace city” coincides with Japan’s attempt to develop the identity of a “peace nation” by strengthening the aspects of international cooperation.

The method of recording the memory of the atomic bomb was important, not only because of the need to express the feeling of consolation to the dead, but also because of recognition of the history of Hiroshima as a source of its new identity. If the atomic bomb was forgotten or recorded only as a memory of hatred and misery, a new “peace city” of Hiroshima would not be able to advance reconstruction.

In order to make an official and positive record of the memory of the atomic bomb, first, a symbolic place for the “peace memorial city” was constructed and, next, recorded contents of memories were enriched. After the enactment of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act, the national government also established a council to discuss policies on the “peace memorial city.” Among others, the Special Committee on Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction made a number of important proposals concerning the Peace Memorial Park and other items in its Report submitted in 1951.

The idea of constructing a symbolic park in the ruined city had been discussed in many ways. Especially after the enactment of the Construction Act, the plan of creating a large park came to be understood in the context of the “peace memorial city.” A park near the hypocenter was needed to create an official center for the memory of the atomic bomb. There had to be one place where survivors, outsiders and newcomers could all find what the bombing was about and what it would mean. Otherwise, the city would not be understood to have one meaning like “peace.”

As a result of a competition, the plan of Kenzo Tange, advisor of the House of Reconstruction for Wartime Damage, was adopted, and the Peace Memorial Park was constructed with the assistance of the national government at as much as two thirds of the total budget. According to Tange, the Park is a “factory to create peace” that harmonizes “practical functions” and “spiritual symbols.” One expression of this idea was to make an invisible straight line linking the atomic bomb dorm with the consolation monument in the very middle of the Park. A collective grave to bury unidentified bones was also incorporated into the Park. The Peace Memorial Museum as the center for information on the atomic bomb was located in the Park. The Reconstruction Exhibition of 1958 started the use of the Park to send symbolic messages to the outside world from Hiroshima. The

International Conference Hall is always the best place to hold symbolic conferences like the international conference of the Mayors for Peace. Annual peace praying ceremonies always take place in the Park. Now, the status of the Peace Memorial Park is unsurpassed. It has an indispensable role to give a visible image to the policy of reconstructing Hiroshima as the “peace memorial city.”

#### 2-4 Post-war Development Planning by Local Authorities

After the enactment of the Peace Memorial City Construction Law in 1949, Hiroshima still needed a more economy oriented plan. In 1949 the Office of Hiroshima Prefecture through its General Development Committee issued “the 5 Year Plan of Industrial Reconstruction.” There were there principles or guidelines in the Plan; promotion of middle or large size industries; inviting industrial power in other areas, and consolidation or “rationalization” of middle- and small size companies.

This initiative stimulated the City of Hiroshima Office, which was also encouraged by the enactment of the Peace Memorial City Construction Law in the same year. The City Office issued the “5 Year Provisional Plan of Reconstructing Industries in Hiroshima City” and proposed to concentrate on chemistry, machinery, ceramics and textiles industries so that the weakened industrial power in Hiroshima could be revitalized effectively.

Before 1949 there were doubts about the validity of reconstruction of Hiroshima itself. But with the enactment of the Construction Law, the reconstruction was a given course. The question was no longer whether Hiroshima could or ought to be reconstructed; it was how to do it.

The City’s “Provisional Plan” identified two major conditions to elaborate upon the further revision of the development plan. First, considering the development of ceramic and light industries in Asian countries, Hiroshima should aim to strengthen export industries in chemistry and machinery industries. Second, Hiroshima should invite companies from other areas and promote new plants in chemistry, basic materials, textiles, shipbuilding, mechanic equipments, ceramics, manufacturing cans, foods and medicines, and the development of

infrastructures on electronic and coal powers. The Plan's basic orientation was the belief that Japanese economy ought to industrialize itself more, which was advocated in the reconstruction plan of the central government. There were only two plants that had more than 500 employees in the city of Hiroshima. The average number of workers in each plant was 8 (2,338 plants and 19,847 workers). Hiroshima needed to strengthen its industrial basis.

The Plan put up rather ambitious targets like raising the total production from 4.5 billion Japanese yen in the year 1948 to 15 billion yen in the year 1953. With the economic boom as a result of the Korean War, this target was more or less achieved in 1953. Although the chemistry industry did not perform quite well as the City had expected before, manufacturing food products and wooden products went beyond the planed target. While the Korea War Boom gave Japan a significant economic boost and Hiroshima was not an exception. However, manufacturing industries in some important sectors in Hiroshima were too weak to comply with the planned target.

Local authorities then made further efforts to promote new industries by encouraging modernizing management systems, organizing cooperative associations, financing middle- and small-size companies, "rationalization" by technological improvements.

In 1951 new Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, Hiroo Ohara proposed the idea of "Production Prefecture" in opposition to "consumption prefecture." He set the numerical target as follows; raising the gross income in the prefecture from 66.8 billion yen in 1950 to 100 billion yen by 1956 and the average income per person from 32,087 yen in 1950 to 45,759 yen by 1956. In order to achieve this target, he highlighted four areas; 1) promotion of agriculture, forestry and fishery; 2) promotion of commerce; 3) strengthening transport systems; 4) control/development of mountains and rivers. The most important area was promotion of commerce. In order to promote commerce, the prefecture tried to 1) promote electronic power, 2) supply water for industries, 3) cultivate lands for industrial plants; 4) construct infrastructures for transport, 5) reconstruct devastated cities and 6) construct houses. In particular, the prefecture help middle- and small-size companies 1) strengthen their organizational structures, 2) obtain

smooth financing, 3) receive institutional company assessment, 4) make improvement in technologies, 5) promote special products. As regards larger companies, the prefecture intended to invite new companies to Hiroshima.

Despite the disappointing results as regards the target figure of construction of infrastructures, the main targets for the gross and average incomes set up by the governor was almost met by 1956. But then it became apparent that the economic development depended upon the advance of manufacturing industries, with the comparatively rapid growth in the sector. So the prefecture extended the period of implementing the “Production Prefecture” plan for two more years in order to strengthen infrastructure foundations for manufacturing industries.

Mistubishi Shipbuilding Company revitalized itself during the Korean War, but later, experienced stagnation. Mistusishi then extended its associated branch plants in turbines, steel, chemistry (cement), and textiles. At some point the Mitsubishi-related textile company succeeded in acquiring orders from Yugoslavia despite harsh competition with companies in West Germany, France and Switzerland.

Toyo Industrial Company was engaged in war-time economy and expanded its size for manufacturing weapons, which ended with the war. After the massive lay-off, Toyo transformed its system to manufacturing small guns to manufacturing mini-trucks (three wheel trucks). After some initial difficulties, Toyo became the top company in Japan in manufacturing three wheel trucks in 1947. Toyo succeeded in developing its original style rock drills in 1948 and became the top company in the rock drill production as well. Toyo launched production of mini-four-wheel trucks in 1950, which turned out to be unsuccessful in competition with other major companies in Japan.

Needle production industry was prosperous in pre-war Japan. While its plants were completely destroyed by the atomic bomb, there was a revival of needle production after the war. With the end of the Korean War Boom, the industry experienced serious stagnation. Needle manufacturers then formed a joint production system to export needles to India/Pakistan in order to secure a reasonable basis for the industry in Hiroshima.

Production of canned food was one major industry in Hiroshima and experienced the Korean War Boom. But it fell into serious stagnation later. Oyster farming was another important industry in Hiroshima and continued to be ranked as top in Japan after 1953.

In response to the central government's policy to promote banks, Hiroshima Bank, Hiroshima Mutual Bank (for small and medium size companies) and Hiroshima Credit Associations were established. They grew up by financing promising companies in Hiroshima and contributed to the growth of local economy. The local banking network symbolized the economic reconstruction of the local economy of Hiroshima.

## 2-5 Problems in the Process of Reconstruction

It is worth noting that the Peace Memorial Park has been supported by the people in Hiroshima struggling to make ends meet every day. The atomic bomb destroyed the area around the hypocenter covering *Nakajima*, today's site of the Park. However, this does not mean that the bombing extinguished land ownership over the site. *Nakajima* area used to be a highly developed commercial district. So landowners were generally not satisfied with the idea of constructing a large park in *Nakajima*. What is complex was the fact that until the time the construction of the Park started, legal and illegal barracks had already been set up on the ruined site. Even when landowners were persuaded to sell their lands at appropriate prices, the construction of the Park inevitably created the issue of forced removal of the people living in the district, most of whom did not have stable means to live. The same applied to the construction of the 100 meter road or the "Peace Boulevard" (formal name after the enactment of the Construction Act). The process of reconstruction sometimes created disputes especially regarding use of land.

Those who lost home but continued to live in Hiroshima tended to construct temporary barracks in the ruined area. This resulted in the appearance of many a-bomb slums in Hiroshima. Especially, Motomachi to the North of the Peace Memorial Park contained around 20,000 survivors of the war. The riverbed housed 900 barracks and constituted a major a-bomb slum. Because of its history as the reverse side of the "peace memorial city," it was said that Hiroshima's post-war period would not be over



without improvement of Motomachi.<sup>11</sup>

The Chuo Park area in Motomachi was a military site in the pre-war time and it was originally part of development planning of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Construction Act. While development of this area remained untouched, the number of illegal residents was increasing and their presence could not be ignored. Thus, in 1957, it was decided that a part of the Chuo Park should be a residential area. In line with this decision, it was only after the late 1960s that the a-bomb slum barracks began to be removed. The development project for Motomachi continued until 1978 and those who had lived in Motomachi were gradually allocated new apartment rooms for the construction period.

Compensations to victims and social security to the victims were controversial issues still now. There are some court disputes still now as regards the treatment and the legal status of non-Japanese survivors in particular.

Education is the vital issue of reconstruction in the sense that it deals with mental development of the future social stakeholders. Reconstruction of Hiroshima in the education sector faced difficulty in both hardware and software. The atomic bomb destroyed most schools in Hiroshima City and almost 80 % of educational facilities became dysfunctional. It is estimated that one fourth of the students in the city were killed. The number of so-called a-bomb orphans reached around 4,000 or 5,000.<sup>12</sup>

As there was no expectation of public support, most school started classes at student-made barracks or “blue-sky classroom” in September or October 1945 with almost no equipment or stationeries. Actual classes were quite limited, since student spent most time for physical reconstruction efforts.

The initial main task for the local government was to prevent

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<sup>11</sup> There were many a-bomb slums at riverbeds in Hiroshima. In Fukushimacho and Minamikannonmachi, there were a-bomb slums of Korean survivors. The Ministry of Construction, the City of Hiroshima and the Prefecture of Hiroshima negotiated with residents by offering alternative residential sites, and so on.

<sup>12</sup> Due to radioactive disorder, only 1,500 children out of them were able to live for decades.

infectious diseases from spreading by improving sanitary situations. The percentage of the budget for the education sector was around 15 %, while the City received 6 % of the subsidy for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act for education.

Even under such a circumstance of physical difficulty, many teachers tried to develop what is now called “peace education,” which aimed to convey the experience of the atomic bomb to children for the purpose of peace. For instance, some teachers’ unions became active and responded to the international movement for nuclear abolition by attempting to publish the stories of survivors or *hibakusha*. But this kind of move was oppressed by the Commission of Education under the supervision of GHQ.

During the occupation period, the thorough “press code” was imposed by GHQ and it was almost impossible to publish books on miseries caused by the atomic bomb. In this sense it was not strange for teachers promoting “peace education” to face political difficulty. But what is more serious is the confrontation between the authorities and teachers’ unions continued well after Japan’s restoration of sovereignty.

Hiroshima’s “peace education” attracted not only the local population but also those from the outside who were interested in peace movements or anti-nuclear movements. Many teachers were *hybakusha* themselves, and opportunities to meet with *hybakusha* were prioritized in peace education. There were many *hybakusha* who did not hesitate to give “testimonies” at school children in Hiroshima as well as visiting students from the outside. From the 1960s onward as peace movements and anti-nuclear movements continued to spread domestically and internationally, “peace education” immersed itself into many sections of the educational sector. It is also true that serious ideological divisions among peace movement campaigners and *hybakusha* organizations indirectly affected and weakened “peace education” as well.

### **3. Hiroshima as an Example of Peacebuilding**

The history of Hiroshima shows a story of peacebuilding of a local city in Japan. After the Meiji Restoration the people in Hiroshima struggled to establish a sustainable social foundation for peace. Accidental incidents

seemed to have given them a direction of development. The development in Japan was a crooked one which resulted in the dual economic structure and ultra-nationalism. Peacebuilding by people in Hiroshima was not fully realized in the form of a military city.

The atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima physically as well spiritually. People in Hiroshima lacked not only a physical foundation, but also a spiritual foundation for reconstruction. With the rejection by General MacArthur, leaders in public authorities had to come up with a new idea to fill in the physical as well as spiritual vacuums. The new idea ought to correct the crooked social foundation. Post-war reconstruction of Hiroshima can thus be regarded as part of the long process of peacebuilding.

After the Second World War, Hiroshima had no reliable source of funding. The idea of the Peace Memorial City was an attempt to exhaust the assistance from the outside world with the initiative of Hiroshima. At the same time some home-grown systems like the local financial system were developed in order to compensate for the limit of external help.

Peacebuilding in Hiroshima in the post-war period highlights two things. First, there must be the people in local society who devote themselves to peacebuilding. The vision to attract external assistance helps local residents convinced of the possibility of reconstruction. Is it really possible to reconstruct this devastated city? Is it really going to happen? People in Hiroshima gradually began to say “yes” in accordance with the development of reconstruction of the Peace Memorial City. Second, there must be the capacity to design the course of peacebuilding in local society. The vision to strengthen the plan of reconstruction helps local residents obtain the sense of direction of reconstruction. Where does this reconstruction lead us? What is going to happen if we invest so much for reconstruction? People in Hiroshima are now able to indicate the course of reconstruction by the vision of the Peace Memorial City. The peacebuilding project is now organized in accordance with the future vision of Hiroshima.

In 1945 Hiroshima lost almost everything. The people in Hiroshima had to wait until a certain level of reconstruction is realized. But it is evident that in the process of peacebuilding, the will and capacity of local society can fully compensate for lack of coordination. Hiroshima may be a special case, but not an exceptional case.