

F R E E D O M A N D T I M E

A Study in Some Recent
Contributions to the Problem

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At the hands of philosophy, the phenomenon of freedom has by no means enjoyed a uniform treatment. One has only to recall the divergent views which have been held from time to time in the history of thought; for example, Augustine's life-long struggle with the problem, beginning with the moral freedom of De Libero Arbitrio and ending with the strongly predestinarian tone of the anti-Pelagian writings; Spinoza's (and Hegel's) view of freedom as the understanding of necessity; Kant's conception of freedom as moral autonomy; Schelling's idea of freedom as the opposite of necessity; and Bertrand Russell's theory of a universal determinism which excludes freedom. Such diversity of opinion suggests something elusive about the phenomenon under consideration, something which might well provide an object of further investigation.

Can such an investigation find any particular encouragement in the peculiar historical situation in which it stands? Does the middle of the twentieth century provide in any sense a privileged point of vantage from which to approach the problem? In one sense, at least, this question can be answered affirmatively. For we are living

in a period when, more than ever before in its history, philosophy has been preoccupied with the problem of time. Beginning perhaps with Hegel's conception of time as the mode of the self-development of the Absolute, and under the powerful impetus of the theory of evolution, the emphasis on time in recent thought has become more and more evident, issuing finally in the process philosophies of the present day. It is this enhanced time-consciousness which the present study intends to apply to its re-examination of the problem of freedom.

In so far as recent thinkers have dealt with this subject, their treatment has necessarily been more "temporal" than that of their predecessors. Selecting from the current century three philosophers of different nationality, the present writer proposes to analyze the relation of freedom to time in the thought of each. In contrast to most previous treatises on the subject, however, and certainly in contrast to the three men herein discussed, the point of view from which the investigation will draw its conclusions will have the following peculiarity: instead of attempting to fit the phenomenon of freedom into a preconceived metaphysical framework, it will take departure from freedom as concrete fact, as experienced datum, and then inquire what the implications of such a fact are. Beginning with a description of freedom, it will raise the question: if this is a fact, then what

else must also be true? Concentrating on the relation between freedom and time, it will ask specifically the following questions: First, can freedom have any meaning apart from time? Is it possible to maintain that true freedom involves an escape from time? Second, can it be accounted for on the basis of time alone, without any trans-temporal reference? Can the free agent be purely a creature of temporal process? These are the principal questions which will be raised, and to which an answer will be suggested.

A - DEFINITIONS

Some of the terms to be used in the course of the investigation are controversial, in the sense that there is no unanimity regarding their precise meaning. The present purpose is not so much to insist upon the rightness of definitions as to make perfectly clear the sense in which these words will be used herein. Inevitably, this implies a certain bias in favor of the meanings here proposed. In so far as they are defended at all, it will be by implication throughout the subsequent treatment, which will offer both support for them and raise difficulties with respect to variant definitions. The purpose of the study, however, is not to establish the validity of its definitions. It is, rather, to start with plausible definitions and to show what follows if they are accepted. If this is done successfully, then the conclusions reached will be refutable only on the basis of new definitions.

Time, Determinism, and Indeterminism

Time. Philosophical dictionaries in English, German, and French speak of time in terms of succession, Nacheinander, antérieur et postérieur. Fortunately, the present purpose does not require a more specific description; it does not demand a decision as to whether, as Newton held, time is that which flows from past to future, regardless of any external reference, or whether, as Leibnitz and his successors have held, time is the correlate of space and of events. It suffices to designate time as succession, in terms of before-and-after.

If time is thus delimited, from what can it be distinguished? What is "non-temporal"? The answer is the same as it was for Plato and Aristotle: the immutable. This word, however, is merely negative: "non-mutable." In an effort to supply the connotation of some kind of content in the idea of the non-temporal, the word "eternal" has often been used. Similarly, in addition to the word "eternal," the present essay will refer to the "trans-temporal" with the same intention. Here again, however, it is important to specify that the discussion will not hinge upon whether or not any content is given to the non-temporal. What is meant

by "trans-temporal" is "at least immutable, and possibly more."¹

It will be argued throughout that the logical distinction between mutable and immutable must be maintained, that neither is logically reducible to the other. If this is denied, then indeed the entire undertaking is jeopardized. But, as Plato argued in his discussion of the "same" and the "other," the denial of this irreducible logical distinction threatens the whole possibility of thought and of communication with collapse. If all is variable, and nothing remains the same, then there is no fixed point of reference, no "bureau of weights and standards," against which the meanings of words can be tested, so that "red" does not mean "green" tomorrow. And likewise, if there are to be such stable reference points, they can discharge their function only in contradistinction to the mutable.

Determinism. "Determinism" will be used to refer to the theory that every temporal event has an antecedent cause from which it follows of necessity, so that in principle if sufficient data were known, the entire future course of the

¹A question which lies outside the scope of the present study, but which it will raise by implication, is: As applied to the phenomenon of freedom, is it sufficient for the "non-temporal" to mean simply "spatial," as distinct from "temporal"? Or should it be more properly designated as "non-spatio-temporal"? The present study has not found it necessary, for its own purposes, to distinguish between these two possible meanings, though perhaps it will lay the groundwork for a future investigation of this question.

universe and of human history could be predicted.

Indeterminism. "Indeterminism" will refer to what might be called the opposite of determinism. As applied to the actions of so-called free agents, it would hold that at least some of these acts are not caused by an antecedent. They are contingent, in the sense that they are not causally necessary.

On the basis simply of time, determinism, and indeterminism, in the sense just indicated, it is possible to anticipate a priori the direction which the investigation will take. In the first place, neither determinism nor indeterminism is what is meant by freedom (in the sense to be indicated below). And yet it would be premature to say that either of the two altogether contravenes freedom. Rather, each partially excludes freedom, on the one hand, and yet has something in common with it, on the other. Determinism, for instance, precludes freedom, in so far as it postulates complete predictability of human actions; but in so far as it incorporates the notion of causation it resembles freedom, for freedom demands a causal relation between the agent and his act. Conversely, indeterminism lends itself to freedom in so far as it emphatically excludes the prediction of human actions; but at the same time it is at variance with freedom in admitting no causal relation between agent and act. From these few observations, one might expect to have to look beyond both indeterminism and determinism in order to discover freedom.

But where is one to look? An answer is suggested by the fact that, in the second place, determinism and indeterminism appear to exhaust the possibilities as long as the problem of the relation of the agent to his actions is considered within the framework of time alone. For on the basis of temporal succession, either the subsequent event is determined by its antecedent, or it is not. But if neither of these two alternatives is what is meant by freedom, and if nothing more than these two can be accounted for on a purely temporal basis,¹ then might one not well conclude that the search for freedom would be forced to speak in terms of the trans-temporal? This is the suspicion to which one is led by a consideration of the problem a priori. The main body of the subsequent analysis will examine three philosophers to discover the extent to which this anticipation is corroborated.

Freedom as Self-Determination

Prior to the specification of the sense in which "freedom" will be used in the present study, it is well to recall the wide variety of meanings which have been attached to it.² None of the three writers to be examined herein uses it in one consistent way, and it is by no means herewith

¹Kant also believed that, on the basis of time alone, determinism and indeterminism, or caprice, were the only two possibilities. See the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1933), p. 227.

²See, for example, McTaggart, J. M. E., Some Dogmas of Religion (London: Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1930), ch. v.

suggested that one and only one meaning is legitimate. The term "freedom" as used herein applies to a complex phenomenon involving the relation of the agent to his act, and must be further analyzed before its significance can be taken for granted. It is perhaps worth repeating that whereas most philosophies deal with freedom by trying to fit it into a preconceived metaphysical scheme, the present procedure will be rather to begin with the complex fact of freedom and inquire what implications follow from it.

Precisely what is the concrete phenomenon from which the present study will take departure? Perhaps the most typical "laboratory specimen" can be observed in the case of the law, or rather, the presuppositions upon which laws rest. In practice and in theory, the law distinguishes sharply between insane and "normal" men. What constitutes this difference before the law? The answer to this question includes freedom as herein understood. Further analysis of what the law assumes about normal human beings as opposed to the insane will permit a more exact determination of this freedom.

When a man goes berserk in New Jersey and begins publicly to shoot people at random, his plea of insanity is upheld and he is not punished. He is not "responsible," because he did not act freely, in the sense here intended. An inquiry into what is entailed in the concept of responsibility will illumine what is meant by freedom. First, in order to be responsible, a man must have intended to do what

he did, in the sense of deliberately choosing¹ between two or more courses of action, while in possession of normally functioning powers of reason. And second, he must be the same self when he faces the judge as when he committed the crime; without self-identity, the judge might just as well hale any passer-by into court to stand trial.² Unless these two conditions of deliberate choice and self-identity are fulfilled, a man is not responsible. If a driver unintentionally runs over a pedestrian, he is not responsible (assuming that he was observing the proper precautions). If a schizophrenic commits a crime, he is not punished for his self-identity is in doubt.

A question immediately arises concerning the reality of choice involved. Does not the mere fact of law reduce choice to a merely nominal status? Does not the law in fact try to persuade me that the consequences of breaking it will be so unattractive that I will in effect have "no choice" but to observe it? This argument is refuted in actual fact every time the law is wilfully broken. And yet it does retain its force in pointing up the tyrannical nature of the "thou shalt not" contained in every law. If this is

¹C. D. Broad develops this point in Determinism, Indeterminism, and Voluntarism (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 11.

²For further discussion of the relation of self-identity to freedom, see the appendix to chapter ii. See also F. H. Bradley's strong argument for the necessity of self-identity to responsibility in Ethical Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), ch. i.

freedom, then it is a burdensome and repressive one. This complaint, however, merely reveals the limited, even artificial nature of the "laboratory specimen". Like so many such specimens, its restricted nature permitted a more unobstructed insight into the kind of freedom under consideration, but at the same time ought not to blind one to the "higher" levels where externally imposed law no longer applies.

At the level of law, freedom is indeed at a minimum. For most people at most times, the "choice" whether or not to defy the law is scarcely a live option (though even where arrest is certain, there are always people who decide they would rather pay the penalty than forego the forbidden act; laws presuppose this in establishing penalties). Within the broad limits set by the law, freedom can operate at a "higher" level--higher in the sense that the compulsion of the law is replaced by conventions and mores (though these may in some cases prove even more inviolate than law), and at the highest level by values which the agent himself chooses. In this realm the individual ordinarily has more intense personal concern; it could therefore be called in a sense the realm of the most important exercise of freedom. It includes what a man believes to be worthwhile, his values, whether they be money, power, knowledge, virtue, and so forth. These will largely govern the quality of his life, the goals he cherishes. Man's choices at this level are not dictated

by external authority; rather, they are made in accordance with values which he is free to reject, at least to a considerable extent.¹

At this point, the advantage of beginning the description at the low level of law becomes apparent. If one should begin at the highest level, the temptation might be to ignore the role of still another factor in the making of choices: that of valuation. Should one overlook the fact that decisions are made by referring alternative courses of possible action to the values which the agent has adopted, one might conclude that on the lower level, law excludes freedom altogether, while on the higher, the individual simply reacts spontaneously, without constraint. Where this conclusion is drawn, as will be abundantly illustrated below, the stage is set for the attempt to reduce freedom partly to determinism, partly to indeterminism; that is, the constraint of the law is regarded as the denial of freedom, as the effort to determine the course of human actions, and freedom itself is correspondingly identified with the lack of constraint; that is, with indeterminism.

¹The picture here presented deliberately leaves out of account the increasingly acknowledged role of unconscious drives, not at all because their importance is minimized, but because they contravene freedom. They are, as psychologists say, "compulsive." Where there is a radical dislocation between them and conscious motives, they may override freedom. This suggests a correlation between consciousness and freedom, implied above and developed more fully below.

When a beginning was made at the level of law, on the other hand, it was seen that both levels belong to the same fundamental phenomenon. At the "higher" level, the external authority of law was replaced (not simply expunged) by the individual's own values; and even on the lower level, these same values can and do fly in the face of the law every time a deliberate crime is committed (barring extenuating circumstances). These relatively few cases testify that even in the majority, where the law is obeyed, it frequently receives deference only after the individual has decided that it is preferable not to pay a penalty. The conclusion is that, repressive though the law may be,¹ it presupposes, rather than precludes, freedom; and that on the "higher" levels, though not directly under law, the individual is nonetheless responsible. He makes decisions in accordance with values.²

The foregoing remarks have prepared the way for an inclusive statement of the sense in which the word "freedom" will be understood herein. A complex phenomenon consisting of several factors, it may be designated as that capacity of

¹Is not the principal justification of law in general that it (ideally!) provides a stable framework within which the "higher" level of freedom can operate, safeguarded both from chaos and from the enslavement of some members of the community by others?

²The question arises, by what principle of selection does one choose values in the first instance? The answer leads to an infinite regress beyond the scope of the present study, though perhaps not irrelevant to the problem as a whole. Possibly the difficulty of arriving at a "first value" is what prompts some people to advocate extending the sphere of law to cover every aspect of life. Such pharisaism pays for the certainty it achieves by suffocating freedom at its most important level.

man whereby he acts responsibly, in accordance with decision based upon valuation, while remaining in some sense the same subject throughout the process. If freedom in this sense is called "self-determination," one additional aspect of the matter becomes more explicit; namely, the presumed causal relation between agent and act. Though heredity and environment may profoundly affect everything I do, nevertheless those forces of which a given act is the resultant must include my own volition, if the act is to be called free.

Based as it is upon the analysis of a phenomenon of everyday life, this definition draws strength from the fact that upon anyone who repudiates it there falls the onus of convincing mankind of the folly of the assumptions upon which human relations rest. To deny the reality of freedom thus defined is to assert that the very conception of law is based upon a gross misunderstanding, for the freedom which it presupposes is illusory. To try to convince mankind of this would be a more than Herculean undertaking. Furthermore, anyone who seriously believed this would be saddled with a second difficulty: that of himself acting as though he were not free. In so far as such an attempt required an effort of will and decision, it too would presuppose the very freedom it denied. In short, the above definition of freedom as experienced fact rests upon the suspicion that the common practice of humanity derives from a shrewd common sense which may intuitively understand human nature better

than rarefied speculative subtleties.

Further Anticipation

In the brief discussion of determinism and indeterminism, it was held a) that neither is wholly compatible with freedom, and that b) on the basis of time alone, there is no alternative to these two possibilities. This led to the a priori inference that if there is such a thing as freedom it will require at least in part a trans-temporal basis. As a result of the analysis of freedom just concluded, we are in a position to corroborate this inference with three more positive pieces of evidence. In the first place, freedom requires that the self retain its identity, that it remain the same; but according to the definition of time, everything temporal is characterized by change; therefore, if the self is to remain the same, it cannot be altogether temporal. In the second place, the values which enter into decision constitute "fixed stars" by which the self steers its course; in so far as they remain valid independently of flux, they require a trans-temporal reference. In the third place, the problem of causation requires a similar conclusion. For freedom demands a causal relation between agent and act; but if, as in the case of determinism, every event is determined by an anterior cause, then every event is in principle predictable, and freedom is precluded. This is clearly recognized by Professor C.D. Broad in Determinism, Indeterminism,

and Voluntarism,¹ in which he states that on the one hand, freedom requires a causal relation between agent and act, but that on the other hand, if every event has an antecedent cause, freedom is precluded. This situation necessitates a choice between one of the following two conclusions: either freedom does not exist, or it requires a trans-temporal reference, so that a given act of willing could be initiated in time by a "cause"² which was not anterior to it. The former conclusion is drawn by Professor Broad (indeed, it is apparently the only alternative seen by him) when he pronounces freedom a "delusive notion".³ The latter conclusion, postulating a cause which is not anterior and therefore non-temporal, strongly suggests Kant's idea of the self as "uncaused cause" or "unconditioned condition."⁴ Kant saw

¹C. D. Broad, Determinism, Indeterminism, and Voluntarism (Cambridge University Press, 1934).

²If causality is properly speaking a strictly temporal category, then it is used in this context in a necessarily analogical sense.

³Op. cit., p. 48.

⁴See the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1933), pp. 475 f., 478.

that if causation is confined to the temporal series of antecedent-and-consequent,¹ freedom is impossible, and that a non-temporal self is demanded as "first cause" if freedom does in fact exist.

At one important point, however, the present analysis diverges from Kant's position. For him, the realm of time is subject to complete causal determinism; the self can therefore be free only in so far as it is non-temporal. This view immediately prompts the question, if freedom is exclusively non-temporal, how can it have any bearing upon the world of actions? There can be no doubt but that Kant considered freedom to have an effect within the phenomenal world; the question concerns whether or not this is possible on the basis of his own metaphysic. If everything in the temporal world is determined by a prior cause, how can the "freedom" of the non-temporal self be exercised? Kant's famous reply is that regarded from one point of view, temporal events

¹Kant, of course, saw that many causes are in fact simultaneous with their effects, rather than anterior to them, such as the ball which produces the concave impression in the cushion. He insists, however, that even though cause and effect may actually occur simultaneously, nevertheless the former is temporally prior to the latter. He is able to maintain this without a contradiction by distinguishing between the lapse of time and the order of time. Though there may be no lapse of time between cause and effect, still the former is always prior in the order of time. He substantiates this by pointing out that there might be a concave impression in the cushion without a ball, but there could never be a ball unaccompanied by the impression. See op. cit., pp. 227 f. (the "second analogy"). For further correlation of succession with causation, see pp. 225-7, 232 f.

are indeed determined, but from the noumenal point of view, they may be free. Does this solution preserve freedom, in the sense defined above? The simplest test can be applied by asking the following question: Suppose this noumenal freedom or noumenal causality to be suspended; could the course of temporal events conceivably turn out any differently? Suppose noumenal freedom to be re-introduced; can this possibly affect the course which events must follow? The answer can only be that since temporal events are subject to determinism, they will happen exactly the same, whether noumenal freedom is presupposed or not.

On the present writer's definition, this is emphatically insufficient; it stands or falls upon the supposition that human freedom can radically alter the course which events would have taken without it. That is, the free self, though it may indeed require a trans-temporal reference, cannot be sealed off from the temporal world. For freedom is a correlate of action; action involves change; and change, in turn, is a temporal term. Kant's difficulty is illustrated at precisely this point, when he speaks of the "timeless activity" of the free self¹--a phrase of extremely

¹See op. cit., p. 469.

dubious meaning, if not actually a contradiction in terms.¹ Nevertheless, he had an excellent reason for making an absolute separation between the temporal and the noumenal aspect of selfhood--the best reason, perhaps, which a philosopher can have: namely, the avoidance of a logical contradiction. For Kant agrees that the two terms "temporal" and "non-temporal" are logically incompatible; there is no possibility of reducing the one to the other. In order to

¹H. J. Paton concedes this point in The Categorical Imperative (Chicago University Press, 1948), pp. 269, 274. If it is agreed that activity is inconceivable apart from change, then "timeless activity" would involve "timeless change"; i. e., change which had no reference to before and after--an improbable conception. Kant strove to meet this problem of how there could be "timeless activity," or "timeless change," by drawing a distinction between change and alteration: alteration, he held, applies only to substance, while change is the way in which alteration is perceived by us in space and time. (See op. cit., the "first analogy.") Change, in the sense of coming to be and passing away, does not occur in substance; it is merely the mode in which alteration appears under the form of temporal succession. On the basis of this distinction, "timeless activity" would involve not change, but alteration.

This distinction between change and alteration, however, is open to one grave objection. If alteration has nothing to do with time, then what can be said about it? In virtue of what property does it deserve the name "alteration," instead of some other name? Any attempt further to determine it seems bound to fall back on some reference to time. Kant himself recognizes this difficulty when he observes that the distinction between alteration and change "may seem a somewhat paradoxical expression" (op. cit., p. 216). One is constrained to add that not only does it seem so, but that the onus of showing why in fact it is not, has surely not been discharged. In the absence of any substantial evidence to the contrary, one is obliged to conclude that it actually is paradoxical. In that case, if Kant's distinction really is paradoxical, and not just apparently so, then it in fact comes closer simply to stating the problem than to solving it.

avoid predicating both these adjectives of one subject, he was obliged to maintain his familiar, absolute distinction between the agent under the aspect of time, and under the aspect of noumenal, free self.

The present analysis agrees with Kant in finding a) that freedom requires a trans-temporal reference, and b) that it is a correlate of action. Instead, however, of electing to separate in fact what are so rigorously distinguished by logic, and so to be driven with Kant to speak of timeless activity, the writer submits another alternative: Might it not be that an adequate account of the free agent requires the application to the same subject of both adjectives, "temporal" and "non-temporal"? Though divorced forever by logic, might they not in fact occur inseparably, like the taste and color of salt? On the basis of preliminary, largely a priori analysis, this does appear to be the conclusion demanded by the phenomenon of freedom. Whether or not there is wider, a posteriori evidence for this tentative suggestion is an open question. In the case of three recent philosophers, the subsequent analysis will examine whether or not they are able to account for freedom on any other basis.

B - PLAN OF INVESTIGATION

The foregoing remarks laid down a working definition of freedom, and then proceeded to draw some inferences con-

cerning the relation of this freedom to time. Specifically, it was suggested that freedom is a temporal, and at the same time a non-temporal, phenomenon. Logically dubious in the extreme, such a descriptive statement about experienced fact can scarcely be accepted lightly, but rather requires even more than a normal amount of corroboration. As a means of testing it, the present writer proposes to examine three recent philosophers with an eye to finding out whether they are able to account for freedom in any other way, and to what extent they are in fact forced to acknowledge the existence of a situation which must be simultaneously designated as both "temporal" and "non-temporal."

Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev

As the emphasis on time gathered momentum in the philosophy of the past one hundred and fifty years, it was inevitable that some thinkers should consider it in relation to freedom. Of these, three of different nationalities have been selected from the present century as having devoted special study to this particular problem: Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, and Nicolas Berdyaev.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941). No name is more closely associated with the growing importance of time in recent thought than that of Henri Bergson. Whether or not his distinction between duration and clock time be accepted, the subjective and creative aspect of time to which he called attention can never again be ignored. But though time

received by far the greater emphasis in his philosophy, nevertheless there is some ground for thinking that he may have been led to it as a consequence of his preoccupation with another problem; namely, freedom. His Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience, in which the doctrine of durée first appeared, was published with the express intention of refuting the mechanistic determinism then (1889) enjoying a wide vogue. Significantly, its title in English translation is Time and Free Will, which indicates something of the book's purpose and method: to champion the cause of freedom in the face of the reigning determinism by reconsidering it in its relation to time.

Martin Heidegger (1889-). If recent thought as a whole has paid special attention to the problem of time, one contemporary trend in particular has become associated with freedom: namely, Existentialism. Of all the watchwords of this philosophical movement, perhaps none receives more stress than freedom. Whether, as with Sartre, all norms are denied in the name of liberty; whether, as with Jaspers, the act of decision-in-situation is held to transcend all ratiocination; or whether, as with Heidegger, one achieves authenticity by the choice of oneself,--in every case the stress is upon freedom to such an extent that Marjorie Grene can entitle her book on Existentialism Dreadful Freedom. Of all the contemporary Existentialists, one in particular has devoted special attention not only to freedom but to

time as well, entitling his major work Being and Time. The present inquiry could therefore scarcely avoid an examination of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948). Such a many-sided thinker as Nicolas Berdyaev can probably never be satisfactorily "classified." Whether he is called Existentialist or idealist, however, his preoccupation with the subject of the present study is indicated not only by the recurrence of such words as "destiny," "history," and "freedom" in the titles of his books, but also by his own explicit acknowledgment that "time and freedom are the fundamental and most painful of metaphysical problems."¹ What is more, he appreciates both Bergson and Heidegger as the two philosophers who have contributed most to the subject in the twentieth century,² referring frequently to them throughout his works. For these reasons, the present study culminates naturally with a consideration of this Russian expatriate philosopher.

¹N. Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, trans. Natalie Duddington (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948), p. 145 (designated below as DM).

²N. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, trans. George Reavey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 129; Slavery and Freedom, trans. R. M. French (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), p. 257 (designated below as SS and SF, respectively).

Five Possible Alternatives

On the basis of the foregoing delimitation of the premises and scope of the present inquiry, it is possible to fill in the general lines which the ensuing analysis will take. In the first place, in order that there may be freedom, the following set of conditions must be fulfilled: there must be an enduring self whose identity is preserved throughout change, and whose relation to its acts is in effect causal; acts must be at least partially the result of a conscious choice between alternatives; and this choice must discriminate on the basis of values (that is, on the basis of what appears to the subject to be "better"). In the second place, as already indicated, the treatment of freedom will partly depend upon the relation of time to the trans-temporal (or, for the sake of brevity, to "eternity", though no connotations other than mere changelessness need be attributed to the word). In the philosophers under consideration, there occur five possible conceptions of this relation: first, time is regarded as primordial to eternity; second, eternity is held to be primordial to time; third, the two are coeval; fourth, the logical distinction between the two is obscured; and fifth, the mutual interpenetration of the two is asserted in spite of their logical incompatibility. Reduced to its simplest, the procedure will be to examine the extent to which each of these five alternatives is able to provide a basis for the several ingredients of freedom.

The first alternative is the dominant one in both Bergson and Berdyaev, and is prominent in Heidegger. A distinction is made between subjective and objective time, the latter subject to determinism, the former not. This inner time is optimistically seized upon as the great, dynamic guarantor of freedom, as against an oppressive, static eternity, which is conceived merely as the degeneration of subjective time. But although it does thus affirm the temporal character of freedom, this view is forced to relegate permanence to the status of non desideratum, as hostile to freedom, and in so doing precludes self identity and values. In short, it establishes indeterminism.

The second alternative, found in both Heidegger and Berdyaev, reverses the first and places eternity above time. It is thus able to account for an enduring self and for values, but at a price. Maintaining as it does that time represents a lapse from eternity, it is inclined to hold that whatever contingency may characterize time is an irrational deviation from the static perfection which the temporal should strive to imitate. On this view, freedom is a deplorable phenomenon which should make itself as inconspicuous as possible by subjecting itself completely to law.¹

¹This leads to the theological problem of the relation of freedom to grace, of whether man is actually free in the sense that he can "condition" the unconditioned God. This problem lies beyond the scope of the present essay.

It should, in fact, strive to liquidate itself. Pressed to account for the existence of freedom in the first place, proponents of this position are driven to regard freedom merely as the understanding of necessity.

Like the first two alternatives, the third also maintains the rigorous logical distinction between eternity and time. Recognizing the difficulties of accounting for freedom on the basis of either of them, it regards time and eternity as coeval, instead of taking one or the other as prior. Recognizing that elements of both determinism and indeterminism enter into freedom, it seeks to establish the phenomenon by juxtaposing time, as the source of vitality and indeterminism, and eternity, as the source of permanence and determinism. The resulting synthetic facsimile, however, turns out to be merely time-plus-eternity, rather than freedom, though both Heidegger and Berdyaev are tempted to try this expedient.

Whereas the first three alternatives hold time and eternity rigorously apart, in accordance with the demands of logic, the fourth, owing to their failure to establish freedom, attempts to circumvent the difficulties by obscuring this distinction. It wishes to say, "Time is not so different from eternity after all. The two are quite compatible." Admittedly this is a question which cannot be settled by fiat, but, as already indicated, the present study takes its

stand upon the Platonic tradition¹ that if the distinction between sameness (that is, eternity) and change (that is, time) is not maintained, then words lose their meaning. That all three of the philosophers under consideration agree with this position is perhaps best indicated by the fact that only Berdyaev resorts to this alternative, and then only under the exigencies of argument.

Finally, there is the fifth way, which, while upholding the logical distinction between time and eternity, concludes that the experienced fact of freedom requires that what logic holds apart be joined in fact; that is, that a free agent can be accounted for only as the locus of interpenetration of the temporal and eternal. Though this is a conclusion which philosophy has been loathe to draw, it is precisely the one which was anticipated in the foregoing analysis as the necessary pre-condition of freedom. It is therefore especially interesting to find that Berdyaev, after running the gamut of the other four possibilities, does sometimes suggest in isolated passages that a free agent must be described as an "intersection" of time and eternity. This is the conclusion which the ensuing analysis seeks to test as against the other four alternatives.

¹See, for example, the Sophist, #253.

CHAPTER II

HENRI BERGSON

Of the three philosophers examined herein, Henri Bergson adheres most consistently to one single view of the relation of freedom and time. For the present purpose, this means that his thought not only offers the least difficulty, but also provides the case study par excellence for the attempt to account for freedom in terms of time alone, without any trans-temporal reference. For him, permanence is the negation of freedom, and eternity represents merely the static and lifeless, as opposed to the dynamic creativity of freedom.

In analysis of such a position, the crucial questions will be: Is it possible to hold this view without forfeiting freedom to indeterminism? Or, in order to avoid this pitfall, is it necessary to make implicit appeal to the very principle one decries; that is, to a non-temporal element within freedom which would both supply decision with a structural element and also provide for a self-identical agent? And finally, to what extent is it possible unconsciously to profit from the use of the word "freedom," with its connotation of responsibility, to designate a phenomenon which in

fact does not rise above indeterminism? These are questions whose answers will be sought in an analysis of Bergson's philosophy.

A - BERGSON AS CHAMPION OF FREEDOM

Confronted by the ascendancy of mechanistic determinism toward the close of the nineteenth century, Bergson saw that if it was to be challenged at all, it must be on the basis of its view of time. Whereas it maintained that time could neither be conceived nor experienced apart from the categories of cause and effect, his great insight was that in principle temporal events need not be derivable from an antecedent cause. Developing this theme and vastly extending its application, he established a new concept of time which enabled him to refute determinism, and upon which he based his whole philosophy.

The Two Kinds of Time

The word "time," he maintained, is applied in two crucially different senses, the one objective, the other subjective. Objective time is what we ordinarily think of as clock time; that is, measurable, because divisible into discrete units, as minutes and seconds. In order to conceive time in such a way, we necessarily think of it as extended,

like a line in space. Now it is just this "spatialization" of time which Bergson undertakes to expose as a purely artificial abstraction, an illusory and even vicious construct of the mental process: illusory, because it represents a distortion and even a degradation of "real" time, of the durée réelle which has become inseparable from the name of Bergson; and even vicious, because it is precisely on the basis of this artificial, spatialized time that the determinists make their case against freedom. Bergson readily grants that if time be considered exclusively in this sense, then the position of mechanism is unassailable.

But, he argues, a serious scrutiny of the 'immediate data of consciousness' reveals a different sort of time, one which, combining heterogeneity of content within an indivisible unity, can be neither measured nor conceptualized. Apprehending it not intellectually but intuitively, one recognizes it as dynamic, fluid, creative, as continually productive of the absolutely new. With this inner time, this absolute Becoming, Bergson replaces Being as the "really real," thus inverting the assumption both of classical and of much modern philosophy that change is a degradation of immutability, that Being has the primacy over Becoming. On the contrary, he asserts, a merely static state, if it exists at all,¹ is but a negative

¹It remains a question in Bergson's philosophy whether or not the absolutely inert exists. At times, it appears to be merely a limiting concept, applicable to the hypothetical limit of one vast continuum of life; but at other times he speaks of matter and of the static in general as in absolute opposition to the creative impetus of the élan vital.

state, a degradation or a lapse from the primordial vital impetus (élan vital). Conceptual thought, however, demanding as it does nice distinctions and permanent structures, inevitably applies the touch of death to the living durée when it tries to analyze it. The dynamic, vibrant reality slips through the net of intellectual concepts. When the mind tries to analyze duration, characterized by flux, novelty, motion, and multiple interpenetration, it is doomed by the very nature of its own tools to arrive at mere discrete instants, repetition, determinate positions, and disassociated objects. In short, it corrupts durée réelle into that bare, impoverished abstraction:-- clock time. Only on the basis of this dead counterfeit is mechanism at all possible, and only on such artificial ground can determinism pretend to unseat freedom.

Refutation of Determinism

By shifting the problem of freedom from the realm of time-as-measured to that of time-as-experienced, Bergson cuts the ground from under those who would enclose the human spirit in a mechanistic system. Their mistake, he says, is to apply the spatialized time of intellectual abstraction to the unextended realm of immediate consciousness:

In whatever way, in a word, freedom is viewed, it cannot be denied except on condition of identifying time with space; it cannot be defined except on condition of demanding that space should adequately represent time; it cannot be argued about in one sense or the other except on condition of previously confusing succession and simultaneity. All determinism will thus

be refuted by experience, but every attempt to define freedom will open the way to determinism.¹

Definitions, as products of the intellect, attempt to solidify the flux, to distil out of it a permanent structure. The effort to define any constituent of durée is therefore a contradiction in itself; specifically, the attempt to define freedom is fatal to freedom, which is incalculable:

Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs. This relation is indefinable, just because we are free. For we can analyze a thing, but not a process; we can break up intensity, but not duration. Or, if we persist in analyzing it, we unconsciously transform the process into a thing and duration into extensity. By the very fact of breaking up concrete time we set out its moments in homogeneous space; in place of the doing we put the already done; and, as we have begun, so to speak, by stereotyping the activity of the self, we see spontaneity settle down into inertia and freedom into necessity. Thus, any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism.²

For a number of reasons, says Bergson, determinism applies to the extended, but cannot apply to durée. In the first place, according to him, a closed system of cause and effect demands in principle that any particular process be reversible, just as chemical reactions are in theory reversible.³ The law of conservation can only be intelligibly

¹See Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1910), p. 230. Designated below by the abbreviation TF.

²Ibid., pp. 219 f.

³The second law of thermodynamics calls this supposed reversibility into question, as do recent investigations in other natural sciences.

applied to a system of which the points, after moving, return to their former positions.¹ But in the realm of consciousness, the hypothesis of reversibility would involve turning the time process backwards--an idea which, if not altogether absurd, is practically meaningless in the sphere of conscious states.² Though borrowed from the specious realm of 'spatialized' time, the saying "You cannot turn back the clock" applies equally to durée. As against the mutual convertibility of the units of a purely mechanistic process, the durational flow is strictly one way. This is the first blow which Bergson strikes for freedom.

A second prerequisite of determinism which does not apply to duration is that of repeatability. Whereas a mechanistic system demands that the same causes produce the same effects, two states of consciousness, in the very nature of the case, can never be the same, even within a given individual. To establish this point, Bergson calls on the faculty of memory. Even the simplest act, he argues, such as raising one's arm, is never exactly repeatable, because in every case the state of consciousness accompanying the second act will contain the memory of the first, and hence can never duplicate the first.³ To speak of the same causes producing

¹TF, p. 152.

²See ibid., p. 153.

³See ibid., p. 199.

the same effects is consequently to confine oneself to the extended world of clock time as against the sphere of durée, where the impossibility of repetition precludes the cause-and-effect pattern on which determinism depends.¹

Furthermore, in contrast to the predictability of physical phenomena, conscious states are never foreseeable. For prediction depends upon past observation of the relation between constants, and upon the assumption of its future recurrence. In the case of duration, however, there are neither constants, since durée is change, nor is there recurrence, since repetition is impossible. Hence the realm of conscious states allows neither of predictability nor of its correlate--determinism.²

Bergson thus precludes determinism by making three negative assertions about durée: it is irreversible, unrepeatable, and unforeseeable. On the positive side, he is chiefly concerned to stress its novelty, and hence its creativity. Through its vital impetus the new is continually brought into being. As the inexhaustible ground of novelty, it cannot be comprehended within any philosophical system for reason, as Bergson observes, hates novelty:

¹See ibid., p. 202f.

²See Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1911), p.123. Designated below by the abbreviation CE.

Precisely because it is always trying to reconstitute, and to reconstitute with what is already given, the intellect lets what is new in each moment of a history escape. It does not admit the unforeseeable. It rejects all creation.¹

The incompatibility of human freedom with a completely conceptualized world-view is a point which he repeatedly makes. It may well be reckoned as one of his primary contributions to have argued so conclusively that whether it be a philosophical or a mechanical system, in either case it is a closed system, and as such cannot permit the operation of creative freedom:

All the repugnance which philosophers manifest toward this (intuitive) manner of regarding things comes from this, that the logical work of the intellect represents to their eyes a positive spiritual effort. But, if we understand by spirituality a progress to ever new creations, to conclusions incommensurable with the premises and indeterminable by relation to them, we must say of an idea that moves among relations of necessary determination, through premises which contain their conclusion in advance, that it follows the inverse direction, that of materiality.²

Not only does deductive reasoning fall under this indictment, but induction, too, in so far as it rests on the belief that the same effects follow the same causes, is equally fatal to freedom if its application is extended beyond the one sphere to which it is proper, the material,³ (that is, the spatial).

¹Ibid., p. 172.

²Ibid., p. 224.

³Ibid., p. 225.

Remaining Questions

In this way, Bergson's case against determinism proceeds on the basis of his fundamental distinction of the two kinds of time, the one conceived as extended by an artificial intellectual abstraction, the other only intuited as a dynamic and heterogeneous unity. Of the three prerequisites of determinism (reversibility, repeatability, predictability), all are confined to the realm of clock time, and all are likewise excluded from durée. Reasoning, too, in so far as it must presuppose either logical or causal necessity, applies only to the former realm, which indeed is its own product.

Bergson has thus shown upon what conditions determinism is based, and that none of these conditions pertains to durée. Durée itself, on the other hand, as the continual creation of the new, affords the basis for asserting an alternative to determinism. But one critical question remains: Precisely what is it that can now be asserted? Bergson does not doubt that he has established freedom itself in establishing that "duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new."¹ But is novelty by itself a sufficient basis for the assertion of freedom? Or does mere novelty restrict one simply to indeterminism? If so, is Bergson content to equate indeterminism with freedom, or does he also attempt to establish within durée some additional prerequisites of what has been

¹Ibid., p. 11.

defined above as true freedom? These are the questions which must be put in the following pages.

B - SUGGESTIONS THAT FREEDOM IS
MORE THAN MERE NOVELTY

Regarding the nature of time as fundamental to the problem of freedom, Bergson restricts determinism to the only realm where it can have any meaning: the realm of repetition, reversibility, predictability, of logical and causal necessity--in short, of clock time. The question of freedom is thereby transposed to its proper sphere; that of dynamic creativity, of change, of the ever new--in short, of duree. Before the victory over determinism be celebrated, however, it is necessary to ask: if nothing more can be predicated of duree than sheer novelty, has true freedom been established after all? If the novel be utterly capricious, can it serve as a ground of freedom? This is the point upon which Bergson's conception of freedom hangs; though he never raises it explicitly, he makes a multitude of statements which bear directly upon it, and which illustrate his own difficulty with this very question.

Hints of True Freedom

Here and there in Bergson's works there occur passages which suggest either directly or obliquely that something more than mere novelty is involved in the fact of

freedom. For example, although he has confined cause-and-effect in the ordinary sense to the realm of the extended, he nevertheless seems unwilling explicitly to deny any relation between agent and act: "Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs."¹ The existence of any such relation at all might suffice to eliminate pure caprice, since the act would to some degree be conditioned by the agent. If, however, the relation were merely that of "drag" or inertia on the part of the agent, then it would hardly constitute a basis for asserting freedom. Bergson himself is fond of insisting that the moment we define this relation between agent and act, we have already killed freedom by putting it into the straightjacket of rational form.² At one point, however, he appears to sense that if freedom is to retain its correlate of responsibility, if the agent is in any way implicated in his act, then the relation between the two must be further identified, even if analogically, as causal:

If the causal relation still holds good in the realm of inner states, it cannot resemble in any way what we call causality in nature....A deep-seated inner cause produces its effect once for all and will never reproduce it.³

Negative though this statement is, at least it does not exclude the kind of relation between agent and act which true freedom posits; that is, a relation which is in some sense causal.

¹TF, p. 219.

²Ibid., pp. 219, 230.

³Ibid., p. 200f.

In other contexts, Bergson speaks of the "conscious effort" of the agent, especially on the part of him who "by an act of will" restores his original contact with the élan vital.¹ This attitude of intuition always calls for effort,² and those who are capable of it are designated 'geniuses of the will'.³ To such men, at least, one might well ascribe true freedom, since 'effort' implies the power of the individual to initiate and direct his actions.⁴ In this case, the individual's status is certainly more than that of mere flotsam riding the surge of the vital impetus.

The foregoing suggests that Bergson may have genuine self-determination in mind when he speaks of freedom, and indeed he asserts as much in Time and Free Will.⁵ Every act, he says, is the outward expression of the entire self, since the self alone is its author.⁶ With this statement Bergson

¹See CE, p. 204.

²Cf., e.g., Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. H. Carter (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935), p. 31. Designated below by the abbreviation CE.

³See Ibid., p. 49.

⁴Whether or not purpose is to be included in the notion of effort remains a question, and a significant one; for purpose implies more reasoning than Bergson generally admits in intuition. The implications of this for freedom are treated below.

⁵See TF, p. 165.

⁶See ibid., p. 165 f.

reinforces one already-mentioned component of freedom, and makes a second explicit. He reinforces the idea of a causal connection between the self and its act, for 'self-determination' is precisely the word for such a relation; and he makes explicit another of the prerequisites of freedom: a self which retains its identity over and above the process in which it is involved, and which is reciprocally related to its actions:

What we do depends on what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are, to a certain extent, what we do, and that we are creating ourselves continually.¹

The existence of a self which retains its identity in the midst of process, which is effective in process though also affected by it--this self, as indicated above, is basic to true freedom. Having affirmed its existence, Bergson appears justified in giving a negative answer to the question of whether or not caprice can be equated with freedom. He insists that he "does not mean that free action is capricious, unreasonable action."²

Just at this point, however, a further query arises: Does durée afford a basis for positing a self which retains its identity? Though the grammatical difference may appear negligible, there is all the difference in the world between the two statements, "The self endures," and "The self is duration." In the former case, the self retains its identity

¹CE, p. 7.

²Ibid., p. 50.

throughout change; in the latter, the self is reduced to change. Judging from the context, it is not clear that Bergson ever distinguished between these crucially different statements. For example, in the first of the two passages just cited, he asserts both that we do what we are, and are what we do. This clearly involves a reciprocal relation between the self-identical subject and his actions. On the one hand, the self is expressed in its actions; on the other, it is created by its actions. Only half a page later, however, and apparently quite unconsciously, Bergson makes another statement which, though similar, actually reduces this complex, reciprocal relationship to one-half of its former self--the half expressed by, "We are what we do":

For a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.¹

The subtle difference between this sentence and the previous one is crucial for the problem at hand: in the first case, the self endured; in the second, change is absolute, and on this basis it is possible to speak of "oneself" only in a highly metaphorical sense. Strictly speaking, he who makes change ultimate must agree with Hume that the self vanishes.

In the passages which suggest true freedom, Bergson implies an enduring self with a determining relation to its actions. But can durée as he describes it support such an

¹Ibid., p. 8.

implication? Or is he being truer to his own metaphysic when, as in the foregoing citation, he confines the real to the changing, and thus subtly reduces the self to a metaphor? The answer to this question will depend upon whether, for Bergson, Becoming really is absolute, or whether flux is ultimately transcended. In the latter case, one might speak of a genuine self, one which maintained its identity throughout change. In the former case, however, it would be impossible to speak of the "same" self persisting throughout change, since change is all there is. And when it is recalled that change requires time, the problem of freedom, in so far as it raises the question of an enduring self, is once again correlated with the problem of time.

Correlative Hints of Time-Transcendence

The attempt has been made thus far to show that Bergson is not content to equate freedom with mere capricious novelty, and that he occasionally goes beyond such a position by suggesting an enduring self able to influence its own acts in a way which is in some sense causal. But this very suggestion will have its bearing on Bergson's theory of time, for if there is to be a self which retains its identity throughout change, then sheer succession cannot be ultimate. And since for Bergson the ultimate is his durée réelle, the crucial question is: does an analysis of durée yield anything more than pure transience? Does durée differ from clock time merely in the kind of change which characterizes

it, or does it also actually transcend succession altogether? In the latter case, the kind of self essential to responsible freedom could be posited, but in the former, such a self would have to be abandoned. For the present purpose, therefore, the next step is to examine durée more closely, to determine which of these two cases applies.

Since Bergson does refer occasionally to an enduring self, one would expect accordingly to encounter corresponding indications that durée is to be described not exclusively in terms of change, but partly also as that which transcends change,¹ in order that an enduring self may be metaphysically possible. Change itself is inseparable from the temporal flow; in fact, it is analyzable into the two temporal categories of "before" and "after," of antecedent and subsequent. The question is, then, is durée to be completely described in terms of before-and-after, or is it to some extent beyond these categories?

Bergson's chief concern is to establish the difference between real duration and its extended symbol, clock time. Hence when he deals with the question of determinism, he is at pains to show that the whole determinist argument rests on the conception of time as extended, and in so doing is rather apt to emphasize that durée is succession!²

Surprising as this is, it is due to his view that

¹The usual adjective "trans-temporal" might be confusing here, owing to the two possible meanings of "time" for Bergson.

²Cf., e.g., TF, pp. 177-183.

the 'spatialization' of time really tends to destroy its proper character of undivided succession by breaking it up into discrete instants. For him, the essential nature of durée is the inseparability of the "radically heterogeneous" states to which it continually gives birth. His logic therefore is: Spatialized time is the realm of determinism;¹ its decisive characteristic is divisibility into separate instants; therefore, in order to escape determinism, it is necessary to insist on durée as an indivisible multiplicity; that is, as continuous change, as pure Becoming. His method of opposing determinism, therefore, denies the very thing which responsible freedom demands; that is, in his insistence on pure change he eliminates any element of time-transcendence; but without time-transcendence there can be no self-identical subject; and without such a subject, responsible freedom loses its meaning.

This dilemma of Bergson's will be developed more fully shortly. For the moment, mention might be made of some statements which imply a trans-temporal element in durée, in spite of his predominant insistence that it is pure succession. A striking example is his claim that, contrary to the extended world, where the consequent follows necessarily from its antecedent, in the realm of durée there may be a reciprocal causality between two successive psychic states. His experimental illustration is that of an interrupted conversation

¹See ibid., p. 190.

between two friends. At the end of the interruption, both happen to be thinking of the same thing, and it is presumed that in the mind of each a causal chain has been operative which can be traced back to the last words prior to the interruption. When, however, each of the two recalls the intervening ideas in the chain, it is found that the series leads back by a different route to a different point in the preceding conversation! Bergson does not hesitate to make the following interpretation:

What are we to conclude from this, if not that this common idea is due to an unknown cause...and that, in order to justify its emergence, it has called forth a series of antecedents which explain it and seem to be its cause, but are really its effect?¹

Similar to this is the case of the patient who carries out in his normal state an absurd order given to him while he is under hypnosis, and who then tries to explain his act as the logical result of his immediately preceding conscious states. Here again "it is the future act which determined, by a kind of attraction, the whole series of psychic states of which it is to be the natural consequence."² From these two empirical data Bergson concludes:

The (psychic) form just come into existence (although, when once produced, it may be regarded as an effect determined by its causes) could never have been foreseen... because the causes here, unique in their kind, are part of the effect, have come into existence with it, and are determined by it as much as they determine it.³

¹Ibid., p. 156 f. (my italics).

²Ibid., p. 157

³CE, p. 172 f.

If, in the realm of consciousness, antecedent and subsequent determine each other reciprocally, is this possible solely on the basis of sheer succession? Or must succession be transcended? The answer would seem clear: Whereas the antecedent could effect a remote subsequent by means of the kind of causal sequence familiar in the external world, the reverse would not be possible. In order for the subsequent to determine the antecedent, one of two conditions would be necessary: 1) the temporal flow would have to be reversed, so that an inverse causal series could be set up; this is dismissed by Bergson as a purely academic question, and not to be taken seriously.¹ Or 2) the antecedent and subsequent would have to be contemporaneous, in order that the latter might determine the former; that is, if the psychic state of the present moment is affected by the state which will occur five minutes hence, then clearly this second state must in some sense already exist--otherwise it could not determine the first. The two states must therefore exist in two orders: the one in which they are "before" and "after" relative to each other, and the one in which they are simultaneous with each other. In other words, if the consequent is to influence the antecedent, as Bergson would have it, then succession must be transcended, and an analysis of durée will yield more than sheer transience.

¹See TF, p. 102.

The problem is to reconcile such an account of durée with the account which plays the predominant role in Bergson's works, which emphasizes that duration is pure succession. A partial reconciliation is attempted when it is suggested that the mind retains the entire past, though largely at an unconscious level,¹ so that the past is assured a real existence after it has occurred (though this existence is "virtual," of a kind proper to things of the spirit).² Such a scheme would indeed allow the co-existence of antecedent and subsequent, but only after the subsequent had come into being. But then it would be too late for the purpose at hand: for what was sought was a reciprocal relationship, but obviously the subsequent cannot determine the antecedent if it does not yet exist. Co-existence only begins when the interval separating the two has elapsed, and by that time the antecedent is beyond determining. The only other alternative would be to say that the effect of the subsequent was retroactive, and that would involve altering the past.

Nor does it help to say that the future affects the past by anticipation, as, for example, my earliest appointment in the morning will determine where I set my alarm clock

¹See Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy M. Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., Ltd., 1911), pp. 191, 232. Designated below by the abbreviation MM.

²Ibid., p. 322.

tonight. For the very nature of durée consists in its being wholly unpredictable--otherwise it would not be productive of the absolutely new. Anticipation belongs to the realm of clock time; in the present instance, alarm clock time.

It seems that the present discussion has stumbled upon one of those critical points in the career of a philosopher at which his own "intuition" is at war with his philosophical construction. This is generally the case when what he says explicitly is not in keeping with the implications of statements made in other contexts. Specifically, the last few pages have mentioned several Bergsonian conceptions which clearly imply time-transcendence, such as an enduring subject and the determination of antecedent by subsequent. But doubt has been raised as to whether this implication harmonizes with his direct statements about durée, and this is the question which must be investigated shortly.

A final observation may be made, however, on Bergson's direct references to the word which is frequently used to indicate time-transcendence: eternity. Here he directly faces the question, and his conflicting remarks are instructive. On the one hand, he is sharply critical of the timeless eternity of philosophy as a dead abstraction, as

...an immobile substratum of that which is moving, as some intemporal essence of time;...an eternity of death, since it is nothing else than the movement emptied of the mobility which made its life.¹

¹See Henri Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. E. T. Hulme (New York: H. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), p. 60. Designated below by the abbreviation IM.

This certainly seems to deny the transcendence of time. And yet, on the other hand, he is reluctant to abandon the concept of eternity altogether, and tries to retain it with a different meaning. It is, he says, the opposite of matter; where matter is the dispersion of the pulsations with which duration vibrates, eternity is now durée at its maximum intensity and concentration, "a living, and therefore still moving eternity."¹ The question of whether succession is transcended may thus appear to have been answered affirmatively by the use of the word "eternity," but in fact Bergson's eternity, qua moving, has not got beyond succession. His use of the word may be taken as symbolic of his struggle to reconcile his intuition of the necessity for time-transcendence with his predominant conception of durée as pure change. It may even represent an unconscious attempt to have it both ways, to maintain responsible freedom in a total framework which excludes it.

Transition To Section C:

Bergson's Attitude to Logical Contradiction

It is time to say directly what has been suggested in the foregoing analysis: If, in order to establish true freedom, it should be necessary to attribute a measure of time-transcendence to durée, the result would be a logical contra-

¹Ibid., p. 63 f.

diction. For, as the Greeks never tired of insisting, between the mutable and the immutable there can be no logical reconciliation. If, therefore, one should predicate of durée both mutability and immutability, one would be asserting a contradiction. Nor would it avail to try to avoid the issue in the Aristotelian manner by saying that the words are used in different senses; Bergson has precluded that possibility by establishing the indivisibility of durée; what is predicated of it applies to it as a whole. It cannot be separated into mutable and immutable parts.

What, then, is Bergson's attitude toward logical contradiction? Would he be prepared to sacrifice logical consistency to the testimony of his "true empiricism"? If, as has been suggested, the fact of freedom were to involve a paradoxical relation to time, would his own philosophical presuppositions be able to accommodate such a situation? When speaking of durée, he sometimes does appear prepared to describe it by means of paradox. The heterogeneous unity of conscious states, their mutual interpenetration, is held to defy logical analysis.¹ Their overlapping continuity cannot be resolved into the categories of clear and distinct thought. But if this be true, then how can duration be spoken of at all? At times, Bergson appears on the verge of answering this question negatively:

¹See, e.g., TF, p. 136; CE, pp. 170, 187.

The inner life is all this at once: variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of direction. It cannot be represented by images. But it is even less possible to represent it by concepts, that is, by abstract, general or simple ideas.¹

Attempts to do so only distort the intuition by which one experiences duration. In order to avoid such distortion, "metaphysics is the science which claims to dispense with symbols."² But words are symbols, and in order that the book may not come to a premature end, it is necessary after all to speak about durée. Faced with the necessity of expressing conceptually an experienced datum to which concepts cannot do justice, Bergson at times inclines toward paradox as the most adequate expression of the content of intuition, as when he speaks of the self as a "multiple unity."³ In the following two citations, moreover, he explicitly develops a case for the methodological use of paradox as a means of speaking about durée:

If I seek to analyze duration...that is, to resolve it into ready-made concepts....I am compelled, by the very nature of the concepts of analysis, to take two opposing views of duration in general, with which I then attempt to reconstruct it. This combination, which will have, moreover, something miraculous about it...since one does not understand how two contraries would ever meet each other..., can present neither a diversity of degrees nor a variety of forms; like all miracles, it is or it is not. I shall have to say, for example, that there is on the one hand a multiplicity of successive states of consciousness, and on the other a unity which binds them together. Duration will be the "synthesis" of this unity

¹IM, p. 15.

²See, e.g., ibid., p. 9, where "symbol" refers to words, as well as to mathematics.

³See, e.g., ibid., pp. 23, 38, 39.

and this multiplicity, a mysterious operation which takes place in darkness, and in regard to which, I repeat, one does not see how it would admit of shades or of degrees.¹

I am then (we must adopt the language of the understanding, since only the understanding has a language) a unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is oneI enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity that I find at the base of my own self.²

In all these contexts, Bergson makes it plain that if one is to speak of duration at all, it must be done in terms of paradox--the very paradox, indeed, which has plagued Western philosophy since its beginning: the unity of the one and the many. The attempt to conceptualize duration "always comes in the end to the same indefinable combination of the many and the one."³

The question which gave rise to the foregoing citations was: if, in order to account for freedom, it should be necessary to make a paradoxical statement about durée, would Bergson be willing to violate the canons of logic to this extent? These passages apparently point to an affirmative answer. But one small but critical point still remains

¹Ibid., p. 57.

²CE, p. 272.

³IM, p. 59. The word "paradox" will be used throughout in its broader sense of "antinomy", rather than its more technical application to propositions like "All Cretans are liars."

to be established. The original query was: would Bergson, for the sake of freedom, predicate of durée both succession and time-transcendence? The above quotations assert multiplicity-in-unity, but not this second paradox. Since in principle there is no great difference between maintaining the one paradox or the other, provided only that the data of experience demand it, and since the fact of freedom appears to demand the second, one would expect Bergson to follow his own lead and say that durée is both temporal and trans-temporal. But this is precisely what his metaphysics forbids him to do. For him, the non-temporal is static, lifeless; it has no place in durée, which is life itself. And therefore, although in principle he admits the necessity of speaking of durée in contradictory terms, he cannot extend this principle to cover both temporality and time-transcendence.

When, in fact, Bergson occasionally mentions the notion of a self which both is in time and transcends time, he rejects it precisely on the ground that it is self-contradictory! The idea of being "at once both in and out of time" is an "appalling contradiction."¹ Indeed, one of the principal points in his extensive indictment of clock time is precisely that it constitutes just such a contradiction, and is therefore neither fish nor fowl, an artificial mental construct, an illusion:

Thus, by a real process of endomosis, we get the mixed idea of a measurable time, which is space in so far

¹CE, p. 372.

as it is homogeneity, and duration in so far as it is succession, that is to say, at bottom, the contradictory idea of succession in simultaneity.¹

The refusal to admit time-transcendence into durée is of the greatest significance for the present purpose. It means that the treatment of freedom will have to be confined to time, notwithstanding the hints to the contrary which have crept into the discussion in spite of Bergson's own direct pronouncements--and perhaps even because of his own intuitive feeling for the matter. Whereas Section B had discussed these hints and their significance, Section C will show how thoroughly Bergson does restrict duration to sheer succession, and how fateful this is for responsible freedom.

C - NOVELTY THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF DURATION AND OF FREEDOM

Having poured so much of his energies into the refutation of determinism, Bergson would be shocked at the suggestion that his philosophy is incompatible with freedom. Once rid of the shackles of mechanism, is not man ipso facto free? Such a question rests on the assumption of only two alternatives: determinism and its opposite. Refute the

¹TF, p. 228. It is worth noting that Bergson seldom troubles to distinguish between timelessness and simultaneity. An indication of this is his consistent use of the two words "instantaneous" and "simultaneous" interchangeably. He generally uses "simultaneous" where the clear meaning is rather "instantaneous."

former and you thereby establish the latter. This is the very presupposition that Bergson makes¹ (possibly owing to the polemical nature of his argument), and one which rests on a venerable philosophical lineage. Its earliest precise formulation is Aristotle's law of the excluded middle, which might also be called "the law of only two alternatives." "Is this object colorless? No. Then it is colored." In such a context, the law works. But is it equally applicable to freedom, in the following manner: "Are all a man's acts subject to mechanistic determinism? No. Then he is free"? Actually, as perhaps Aristotle himself would concede, such reasoning establishes only one thing: that man's actions are not wholly subject to mechanistic determinism. The distinction between indeterminism and freedom it completely overlooks.

Taken by themselves, the examples adduced above to show that Bergson considers freedom as more than novelty, and duration as more than succession, comprise a convincing list. Actually, however, they had to be gleaned at some pains from the various texts, in order to highlight the crucial issue which is generally hidden beneath the surface of his argument, and which only occasionally finds expression through them. For every one such citation, however, there are a dozen to the contrary, and it now remains to examine some of these in the attempt to show that, consistently with his metaphysic, Bergson is able to establish, not the responsible freedom

¹See, e.g., MM, p. 325, where freedom and determinism are opposed.

which now and again finds expression in some of his more unguarded utterances, but finally only indeterminism. Before this could be done, it was necessary to protect one's flank by raising the question: Does the discrepancy in question represent a real inconsistency in his thought, or simply a methodological employment of paradox? In the immediately preceding pages it was seen that although the second of these alternatives is occasionally entertained as a possibility, by far the greater emphasis, especially in his later thought, is placed upon the first. To the consequences of this the following pages now turn.

Duration Confined to Succession

In the Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson likens durée to the solar spectrum, with this important difference: the spectrum is conceived, not as simply given, but as continually expanding in one direction and producing new colors in endless succession. The clear implication is that the colors are preserved, that the process is cumulative. It would seem that durée possesses, in addition to its dynamic quality, an aspect of permanence as well. In Creative Evolution, however, his metaphor has changed to that of a rocket, for durée has lost its static element. Instead, it is likened only to the onrushing rocket itself, the falling cinders constituting merely the dead past and having no part in durée. Why should it be that, especially in his earlier works, there are strong suggestions of permanence as integral to durée, whereas sub-

sequently the aspect of pure change predominates so overwhelmingly?

It would be overstating the case to say that the emphasis on this static element occurs only in the earlier writings, and progressively disappears in a strictly chronological order; actually, even his latest writings contain traces of it. For the purpose of understanding the problem involved, however, it may provide some clarification to present it in a chronological (if somewhat oversimplified) fashion. A convenient starting point is Bergson's statement in Matter and Memory (first published in 1896), in which he gives explicit expression to the position reached at the conclusion of the present essay:

A moving continuity is given to us, in which everything changes and yet remains: whence comes it that we dissociate the two terms, permanence and change, and then represent permanence by bodies and change by homogeneous movements in space?¹

At this point, and perhaps here alone, he does actually assert the unity of opposites, not in terms of unity and multiplicity, as mentioned above, but in terms of permanence and change. Here experience flies in the face of logic, and asserts the unity of what reason holds asunder. In fact, whenever logic arrogates to itself the primacy over experience, and dictates in advance what is and is not possible, then the basic truth of the unity of opposites is obscured. And it is just this tendency on the part of intellect, he thinks, which prevented the reality of durée from being recognized in the past:

But our understanding, of which the function is to set up logical distinctions, and consequently clean-cut

¹MM, p. 260 (first italics mine).

oppositions...creates thereby the opposition which it afterwards contemplates amazed.¹

In spite of this clear warning against permitting the intellect to preclude in advance the possibility of a realized contradiction, the immediately preceding pages have shown that this is precisely the temptation to which Bergson himself succumbs in his treatment of duree. Though he himself asserts that to try to get beyond the antinomy is fatal to the reality he is describing, nevertheless it is true that his philosophy as a whole can be thought of without much distortion as a progressive capitulation to just this tendency to consign all static elements to extension, all dynamic elements to durée. And since these two are logically incompatible, he is driven finally to interpret durée exclusively in terms of one of them alone: pure change.

An indication of the ways in which this tendency is manifest can be obtained by a brief comparison of some of his earlier statements with his more mature position (though it should be repeated once again that there are anticipations of the latter in his early works, as well as recollections of the former in his later writings). To begin with, the process of separating out the static and dynamic elements, so strongly warned against in the two foregoing citations from Matter and Memory, is actually carried out by Bergson in this same book. However, though

¹MM, p. 327; see also p. 190.

they are separated, the further process of subordinating the latter to the former has not yet fully occurred. Rather, the two tend to be regarded as mutually complementary, each indispensable to the other.¹ There is, moreover, an even more remarkable difference in the conception of spirit from that of his later books. Whereas in his more mature works spirit is associated with the dynamic flow of durée, in this book both duration and spirit belong more to the realm of dream, of the past, of memory.² And whereas one generally thinks of Bergson as correlating spirit with action and with the present moment, in contrast with inert matter, in this context it is rather matter which correlates with the present and with vitality. Indeed, the dream world of the spirit requires vitalization by contact with the material world in the present moment:

But the truth is that our present should not be defined as that which is more intense: it is that which acts on us and which makes us act, it is sensory and it is motor; ...our present is, above all, the state of our body. Our past, on the contrary, is that which acts no longer, but which might act, and will act by inserting itself into a present sensation of which it borrows the vitality.³

For, that a recollection should reappear in consciousness, it is necessary that it should descend from

¹See MM, p. 323.

²See, e.g., MM, pp. 81, 235, 294, 313, 320, 322.

³MM, p. 320 (my italics); see also pp. 176, 185.

the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action is taking place. In other words, it is from the present that comes the appeal to which the memory responds, and it is from the sensory-motor elements of present action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.¹

In other words, memory, which subsequently gives way in Bergson's philosophy to durée, far from representing an élan vital, actually has to do, not with the present, but with the past.² Apart from an energizing contact with matter, it remains a static reservoir of impressions passed on to it by perception.

Thus far we have witnessed only the separation of static and dynamic elements of freedom. Having once wrested the two apart, however, Bergson finds it impossible to remain in such a pronounced dualism of equi-valent principles. One must be subordinated to the other. And since he has already shown (in Time and Free Will) that the static taken by itself leads to determinism, what is more natural than to stress more and more the dynamic aspect of spirit, to supplant memory with durée, and ultimately to reduce durée to pure succession? That this is in fact done throughout most of his writings (both early and late) is sufficiently evident to render undue insistence superfluous. Suffice it to recall some of his more decisive statements on the subject, without laboring the point. It would be no exaggeration to say that the crux of the distinction between durée and clock time consists precisely

¹MM, p. 197.

²See MM, pp. 181-185.

in this, that the former is simply more temporal than the latter. Even in Matter and Memory duration is said to involve a "before and an after,"¹ and in Creative Evolution it is described as "not non-temporal."² It is by no means temporal sequence as such to which he objects, but only to its spatialization into clock time, on the ground that the latter represents a degenerated, impure sequence. "Succession, or continuity of interpenetration in time," he says, "is irreducible to a mere instantaneous juxtaposition in space."³ This is made perfectly clear in the following reference:

Thus in consciousness we find states which succeed, without being distinguished from one another; and in space simultaneities which, without succeeding, are distinguished from one another....Outside us, mutual externality without succession; within us, succession without mutual externality.⁴

Having identified durée with succession, Bergson can make the momentous metaphysical pronouncement: "Reality is mobility...only changing states exist."⁵

Having begun by according to permanence an integral, even predominant role in freedom and spirit, under the concept of memory, Bergson first separates it from the element

¹MM, p. 268.

²CE, p. 383.

³CE, p. 360.

⁴TF, p. 227 (my italics).

⁵IM, p. 65; cf. also CE, p. 330.

of change, and then is finally driven by the logical contradiction between the two to banish it altogether. Although this gradual elimination of the permanent may be said in general to follow a chronological sequence, it nevertheless remains true that even in his latest writings there are echoes of his reluctance to abandon the static element altogether. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the change which his thought does undergo are some metaphors he uses to illustrate what he means by durée. In Matter and Memory, where he is interested primarily in spirit as the unconscious retention of past experiences, he declares that we never perceive the present at all, but only the past:

Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.¹

But in Creative Evolution, where the emphasis has shifted to durée as the pulsating present, he employs an almost identical figure to describe, not durée, but the lifeless clock time! This is the metaphor of the carriage, in which it is said that to live in clock time is like looking out the rear of a moving carriage, seeing only that which has been, whereas to live in durée is to be in vital touch with that which is constantly coming to be. The difference between these two analogies is simply a measure of the extent to which the element of change has eliminated that of permanence. In the

¹MM, p. 194.

one case, the stress was on spirit as memory; but in the second, the element of permanence involved in memory has been seen to conflict with that of change, with the result that the former has given way to the latter. The simile which best fits durée is now that of a hypothetical one-dimensional creature, a geometrical line growing at one end, and conscious only at the never-stationary point of continual growth. Behind this point, the lengthening remainder of the line is static, to be sure, and precisely because of this it has no part in consciousness, but belongs to clock time and to the extended world. In Matter and Memory, by contrast, consciousness was indicated by the moving point of intersection of two perpendicular lines, a figure which clearly indicates the transcendence of time as integral to consciousness.¹ But here, on the one-dimensional analogy, such a transcendence is no longer possible. All is change.

Nevertheless a certain ambivalence regarding the presence or absence of the element of permanence in the domain of spirit persists in Bergson's philosophy. Perhaps one reason for this is the use of the word "duration" itself, for it surely connotes the endurance, the persistence, the permanence of something rather than a state of pure flux, in which sheer transience prevails. And yet, in spite of this connotation, Bergson makes it abundantly clear, as shown above, that what he really intends (in most cases) is precisely such a state.

¹See MM, p. 184.

The confusion resulting from this double connotation of the word "duration" can be observed in the works of two of Bergson's English expositors: H. Wildon Carr, a warm supporter, and J. M'Kellar Stewart, a sympathetic critic. Anxious as he is to present Bergson's philosophy in a favorable light, Carr cannot help revealing (though apparently unconsciously) this fundamental ambiguity which surrounds durée. When he correlates it with memory, he grants that it refers not to the present at all, but to the past:

...in our picture of pure memory we imagine a line stretching out behind us in the past, and in this past all the events that have made up our experience lie in their order of succession....The act of remembering seems the discerning of that which lies behind us receding in time. So we may say that pure perception exists wholly in the present, pure memory wholly in the past.¹

In these contexts, the cumulative aspect of durée is undeniable. It involves the retention of the past: "Consciousness is a tension, holding the past in the present experience...."² When, however, Carr considers durée in relation to the élan vital, the picture changes, just as it does in Bergson himself, with the result that the past no longer belongs to durée at all, but to the dead world of extension. And conversely, durée refers in these passages to the present moment. The cumulative, retentive element has been replaced by unqualified change, which is now regarded as "original and

¹H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy of Change (London: The Macmillan Company, 1914), p. 114.

²Ibid., p. 146.

ultimate".¹ This is made perfectly clear in the following citation:

In physical causality we postulate an underlying identity which is the negation of change; in psychical causality the identity is change itself, the reality is duration, and not something which endures without changing.²

Once this step has been taken, once the retentive element in durée has been sacrificed to ultimate change, the kind of freedom which can be based upon durée is subject to some major qualifications. As Carr himself grants, in a way which anticipates the course of the present chapter, freedom acquires a "new meaning".³ It must be described simply as "freedom from"--freedom from causality:

And yet, notwithstanding the enthronement in our minds of this logical principle of sufficient reason, which seems to reduce all such notions as chance, contingency, spontaneity into mere names for particular ignorance, we are quite unable to convince ourselves that freedom from the law of causality, real spontaneity, is not, and cannot be, a fact. The conviction that there may be chance, or freedom from mechanical determination, and free will, or freedom from the psychical determination of motives, rests partly on...an immediate datum of conscious experience.⁴

The kind of "freedom" thus established corresponds, indeed, not to what has been described herein as "self-determination", but rather to indeterminism, definable solely in terms of spontaneity and novelty.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 198.

⁴Ibid., p. 200.

²Ibid., p. 209 (my italics). ⁵See ibid., pp. 198, 201.

³Ibid., p. 198.

Stewart, on the other hand, applies his criticism of Bergson precisely at this point of unresolved tension between the tendency to include an element of permanence in durée, on the one hand, and to eliminate it altogether, on the other. While doing full justice to those passages in Bergson's works which do emphasize the cumulative aspect, he leaves no doubt that the preponderant emphasis is on the opposite side:

Hence the dualism which runs through his (Bergson's) thought. He has first isolated from concrete reality the aspect of permanence or homogeneity, and has erected that into a self-sufficient existent reality. The next step was to treat in the same way the appearance which reality presents when its spatial characteristic disappears, and to call this fluid mass, from which all permanence and homogeneity is abstracted, time.¹

In his demonstration that when durée is so conceived, it excludes the cumulative aspect which is occasionally ascribed to it, Stewart cites Bergson's own statement that "durée is not an increasing quantity".² With duration thus restricted to change, minus any element of permanence, Stewart concludes, in a way which again anticipates the trend of the present chapter, that true freedom is no longer possible. The formula "duration>equals=succession=equals=freedom", he argues, establishes not freedom at all, in the sense of self-determination, but merely indeterminism.

¹J. M'Kellar Stewart, A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy (London: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 222 (my italics).

²Ibid., p. 228.

Indeed, there remains no self to serve as subject of a free act:

In order to become aware of free activity Bergson must rise above the human self and enter into an élan which is, if not strictly external to the individual self, at least supra-personal. In plain language, this means that the nearer the approach is made to the ideal of freedom, the less human does the activity become, the more individuality is lost sight of, and at the extreme limit personality would entirely disappear in unhindered, undetermined activity, which is not yours or mine, but that of the cosmic élan....If human freedom is to be established, that can be achieved only when it is shown that man has a self-originating power of self-determination.¹

In short, Stewart calls attention to the discrepancy between those passages in which Bergson speaks of durée as applying to the past (in association with memory), and those in which he links it to the ever-changing present-- a discrepancy repeated by Carr. Although this oscillation between durée as cumulative and durée as wholly transient exists throughout his works, it has been shown that the general tendency is for the latter emphasis to gain a decisive predominance in his later works. That this predominance is not always readily apparent may be due to his use of the word "duration" itself, with its connotation of "persistence".

¹Ibid., p. 234.

This use of a word to which his explicit statements do not do full justice has proven quite misleading.

A further indication of Bergson's hesitation between the static and dynamic elements of freedom is his attitude toward action. In Matter and Memory, he frequently asserts that action is an impediment to spirit (that is, to memory):

One general conclusion follows from the first half of this book: it is that the body, always turned towards action, has for its essential function to limit, with a view to action, the life of the spirit.¹

This is in keeping with the above-noted correlation, in this early book, of memory with permanence and matter with change; moreover, there are similar passages in the later books.² But such a correlation is contrary to his main purpose, which is precisely to place energy and action in the domain of spirit. Consequently, even in Matter and Memory he makes appeal to durée as the seat of action: "The duration wherein we act is a duration wherein our states melt into each other."³ And in the later works there are abundant similar correlations of durée and action,⁴ all indicative of the predominant tendency to confine durée to the dynamic.

¹MM, p. 233 (my italics).

²See, e.g., CE, p. 213.

³MM, pp. 243f.

⁴See, e.g., CE, pp. 202, 203, 212.

Disolution of the Self

Bergson has overcome determinism; he has not distinguished between indeterminism and freedom; the remaining question therefore is: which of these two has he established? An answer to this question requires at least a partial analysis of the concept of freedom. Minimally, freedom posits a self related causally and intentionally to its acts. But it must further be asked, what is a self? And at this point the spectre of a vicious circle looms ahead. For is it possible to do justice to the concept of self without introducing freedom? Suppose, for example, that one lists the constituents of selfhood: are consciousness, rationality, and vitality sufficient? Or is it necessary to include purpose, will, and the capacity (one might better say the necessity) for making decisions? And if these last three are introduced, has not the concept of freedom been introduced with them? For purpose, will, and decision are all integral to freedom. The best indirect proof of this is that they are declared by determinists to be illusory! But the direct proof would run as follows: Freedom has been described minimally as positing a self which affects its acts causally; now the way in which it does this is to make a decision in accordance with its purposes, and to execute the decision through its will. Thus when decision, will, and purpose are introduced into an analysis of the self, there is freedom in the midst of them. This completes

the account of the curious, reciprocal relation in which freedom and selfhood stand to each other: neither can be adequately described apart from the other. An examination of freedom encounters the self; an investigation of the self discovers freedom. (See appendix for further discussion of the relation between freedom and selfhood.)

If this reciprocal relation be granted, then it will appear that freedom is possible only on the basis of selfhood, and that if the self (in the sense roughly indicated above) is destroyed, then there can be no freedom. And yet a number of philosophers have stoutly insisted on freedom while subtly undercutting the very self which is its correlate. In order to discover whether the freedom which they defend is consistent with their metaphysic as a whole, it is necessary to examine the fate of the self within their philosophy.

In Bergson's earlier works, where he maintains a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward it, the fate of the self still hangs in the balance. Subsequently, however, it is more and more eliminated from the picture. The two earlier views between which he hesitates are the following: In the first place, there is some concern (though never very great) to preserve the self-identity of the free agent.¹ This is at least possible within its context, for it is the context in which the aspect of permanence (memory) in consciousness is

¹See MM, p. 69.

stressed. Even in Time and Free Will, however, it is denied that there is a constant self,¹ and in subsequent writings the subject is dropped, and the self is scarcely mentioned. In the second place, just because there is at least the possibility of a persisting self on the basis of this element of permanence expressed in memory, there is also the possibility of protecting "freedom" from becoming a mere capricious indeterminism, for, as will be argued below, without this element there can be no true freedom, but only impulse. With this position Bergson appears to be in perfect agreement when he says:

The indetermination of acts to be accomplished requires, then, if it is not to be confounded with pure caprice, the preservation of the images perceived.²

And he goes on to add that indeterminism, in the sense of mere spontaneous impulse, is characteristic of animals,³ rather than man, who alone exercises true freedom by virtue of his special faculty of memory.⁴

As Bergson's philosophy develops, however, and as the emphasis is laid more and more upon pure transience, it becomes more and more difficult to speak of a self which persists throughout change, and consequently of a peculiarly human freedom different from mere animal impulse. Instead

¹TF, p. 15.

²MM, p. 69 (my italics).

³See MM, pp. 198, 243.

⁴See MM, p. 94.

of free agents, he tends more and more to speak of freedom in general, or of freedom of the élan vital as a whole. As individual freedom is subordinated to this over-all "freely acting Absolute," a curious by-product is observable: whereas the élan vital itself may act spontaneously, from the point of view of the individual this would be experienced as another form of determinism, since individual volition is subjected to the over-ruling growth of the whole. Such a suggestion, of course, is far from Bergson's intention, and is only mentioned as a possible implicate of his thought. Nevertheless his statements about freedom contain progressively less reference to the free will of individuals, and tend more and more to blur any distinction between freedom and durée. In fact, the two are often referred to appositively, if not interchangeably:

The hypothesis of an Absolute that acts freely, that in an eminent sense endures, would no longer raise up intellectual prejudices.¹

According to Bergson's predominant view, an ego which retains its self-identity throughout change is positively undesirable, for that is precisely the kind of self posited by determinism!² But without such a self, the concept of responsibility loses its meaning, for it presupposes that the self which commits an act is in some sense identical with the self which receives praise or blame. To be responsible is to

¹CE, p. 293 (my italics).

²See TF, p. 171 f.

have caused an act intentionally, and to be the same self after the act. But for Bergson it is change that is absolute, and to account for an enduring self on such a basis is difficult, if not impossible. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Bergson speaks of a self at all, he refers to it merely as a means, as a channel for the élan vital:

The living being is above all a thoroughfare, and...the essence of life is in the movement by which life is transmitted.¹

When the self is spoken of in this way, it is difficult to see how he can still consider freedom as a relation between the self and its act, as he did in an earlier citation.² He seems truer to his own metaphysic when he says:

Freedom must be sought in a certain shade or quality of the action itself, and not in the relation of this act to what it is not.³

Thus the more Becoming is equated with reality itself, and the more durée is reduced to pure succession, the more also do the implications of this position preclude any significant distinction between the individual and the élan vital as a whole. Likewise, the difference between freedom and time tends to disappear. Whereas his earlier book was called Time and Free Will, the later is Creative Evolution-- a subtle symbol of the way in which the self, freedom, and time all lose their identity in one another. The question

¹CE, p. 135 (my italics).

²TF, p. 219.

³TF, p. 182 f (my italics).

might well arise, how is it possible that the two concepts freedom and time, apparently so distinct, can be blended? What is it that they have in common? Bergson is quite clear on this point: the connecting link between them, and into which both tend to become absorbed, is novelty. "Time," he says, "is invention or it is nothing at all."¹ Can he say any more or less about freedom? Or is it, too, finally comprehended in terms of novelty alone?

Conscious Deliberation Decried

So much for the rather shadowy role of the self in Bergson's philosophy when he speaks of it as a whole. Even when he does not attack it directly, its status remains doubtful, at best. It becomes worse than doubtful, however, when one examines his separate treatment of the various constituents of selfhood, such as self-transcendence, reasoning, decision, purpose, and even consciousness itself. The importance of self-transcendence has been considered further in the appendix to this chapter. Suffice it to say here that it is the name given to the self's capacity for objectifying itself, and for carrying on the "dialogue" with itself which constitutes the process of deliberation. More specifically, self-transcendence is implied when freedom is conceived as self-determination, for the self must transcend itself in order to determine itself. On this point Bergson is once again in conflict with himself, for notwithstanding the

¹CE, p. 361.

endorsement of self-determination already cited,¹ the major tenor of his writings is opposed to self-transcendence. The one-dimensional analogy of durée² precludes it, and he elsewhere specifically deplures self-objectification.³ Finally, as developed further in the appendix, self-transcendence involves time-transcendence, which has already been eliminated from Bergson's philosophy.

Since for Bergson self-transcendence threatens the unity of the self, he has difficulty in retaining those mental functions which depend on it. Deliberation, decision, and choice, in so far as they imply a self not completely at one with itself, therefore tend to lose their importance. There must be no separation of urge and purpose.⁴ Our aim should be to "put our being back into our will,"⁵ so that the tension of deliberation would be overcome. But this situation of tension within oneself is not only held to be undesirable; at times he even suggests that the idea of choosing between alternatives is illusory.⁶ Here again, however, his own better judgment expresses itself in statements to the contrary. He "does not mean that free action is capricious, unreason-

¹Ibid., p. 165.

²Ibid., p. 101.

³Ibid., p. 231.

⁴See CE, p. 50; TF, p. 170.

⁵Ibid., p. 252.

⁶Cf. TF, pp. 176-180.

able action";¹ life consists in making decisions.² But choice and contingency are so closely identified³ as to suggest once again that one may honestly believe that freedom has been established, when in fact only indeterminism has. Bergson rightly correlates the capacity for choice with consciousness itself,⁴ and seems finally to vindicate true freedom when he says that the chief office of consciousness is to preside over choice.⁵ But even this becomes a doubtful concession when one considers the status of consciousness itself in his thought.

It is, indeed, so difficult to imagine human consciousness apart from continual deliberation and decision, that Bergson at times inclines toward other vitalists in the desire to retreat below the conscious level altogether. True, this inclination hardly ever becomes explicit, as it actually does, for example, when he admits that the instinct which he values so highly correlates with unconsciousness, whereas the intellect (which frequently seems to be the source of all evil) correlates with consciousness.⁶ This unconscious instinct holds the key to what intelligence is seeking.⁷

¹CE, p. 150.

⁶CE, p. 152.

²Ibid., p. 105.

⁷Ibid., p. 159.

³Ibid., p. 102.

⁴Ibid., pp. 189, 275f.

⁵HM, p. 182.

Once more, however, Bergson's utterances on the subject are not unequivocal. In other contexts, he seeks a tertium quid between intellect and instinct, and finds it in intuition, which he describes as "instinct become conscious."¹ Perhaps there is a key to his ambivalence in this case. It seems more than likely that when he speaks disparagingly of consciousness, he really means self-consciousness, with its implied duality within the self. Because this duality is evident in every act of intellectual deliberation, and because it is difficult to imagine human consciousness apart from such acts, he tends to extend his attack on the intellect to the realm of human consciousness in general. If it be assumed, however, that in all these contexts his real target is not consciousness, but self-consciousness, then his apparently contradictory statements become intelligible, and one can understand how Bergson can still maintain that even vegetables have a rudimentary consciousness,² or that life itself is consciousness.³ All these conflicting statements, then, may well justify the inference that Bergson sometimes tends to supplant the distinctively human consciousness (that is, self-consciousness) with that of the brute.⁴ In order to preserve freedom on such a basis, one

¹TS, p. 238.

²CE, p. 119.

³Ibid., pp. 91, 189.

⁴Animals are considered immune from the spatialization which kills freedom. Cf. TF, pp. 97, 127, 138, 236.

would have to argue either that animals are more free than men, or that freedom has nothing to do with consciousness.

As the foregoing discussion has already suggested, and indeed as nearly every page of his writings proclaims, it is against the intellect that Bergson unleashes his strongest attack. So as not to reiterate the obvious, suffice it to recall here that for him intellection produces the spatialization of durée, thereby degrading it;¹ that the intellect translates life into inertia;² that the understanding squeezes the life out of whatever it touches,³ and indeed transforms freedom into necessity.⁴ For that matter, nearly the whole of the Introduction to Metaphysics could be called a warning against the corruption of the real by the intellect. If the attempt is thus made to eliminate rationality from freedom, what becomes of purpose? Does it not become blind caprice? Bergson himself seems to suspect as much, and perhaps even tries to retrieve lost ground with the surprisingly inconsistent statement that consciousness is freed by the intellect,⁵ or that intellection must precede intuition.⁶ These exceptions illustrate not only the rule, but also once again Bergson's intuitive effort to retain what his philosophy has precluded.

¹See, e.g., CE, pp. 199, 213, 218, 220, 230 f.

²See ibid., p. 186.

⁵Ibid., p. 192.

³See ibid., p. 207f.

⁶See ibid., p. 92.

⁴See ibid., p. 287.

Purpose Eliminated

Finally, it remains to inquire more specifically into Bergson's treatment of purpose, or, as he calls it, finalism. If, as already indicated, the overwhelming tendency of his thought is to disparage reasoning and self-consciousness, it seems obvious that responsible freedom has given way to a kind of biological spontaneity. There is, he says, no decision or action in accordance with self-chosen ends; rather do actions merely express a deep-seated need of the organism, and only after the fact can a rational motive be read back into them.¹ But since Bergson also wishes to defend freedom, one can expect to find, as in so many of the foregoing cases, a number of conflicting remarks on the subject. Perhaps the strongest indication of his double inclination in this instance is his frequent ascription of finalism to the total life process, but not to the individual: "If there is finality in the world of life, it includes the whole of life in a single indivisible embrace."² Such a finalism can no more allow purpose to the individual than do the rationalistic systems he deplures. Indeed, Bergson himself repudiates it. In other contexts, he objects to any sort of purpose at all, because it limits and even closes the future.³ In the last analysis it is just as fatal to freedom

¹See MM, p. 303 f; CE, p. 61 f.

²CE, p. 46; cf. also p. 179 f.

³See CE, pp. 108, 110.

as is mechanism, for it tries to put the future into a straight jacket.

Toward finalism, as toward the other constituents of selfhood discussed above, Bergson is forced to be equivocal. Moreover, this is precisely what one would have expected, granted the inseparability of selfhood and freedom: not even the cleverest dialectical subtlety could be expected to uphold freedom and at the same time consistently to repudiate the self. When, therefore, the discussion of Bergson's anthropology culminates in the consideration of purpose, one is prepared to find him in a trap of his own making. On the one hand, he senses that without purpose, freedom is reduced to caprice, while on the other, he maintains that finalism is as fatal to freedom as mechanism. In short, purpose is both essential and fatal to freedom!

The present study hopes to demonstrate that this dilemma arises whenever the attempt is made to consider freedom in terms of time alone. For the moment, it remains to notice the way in which Bergson attempts to avoid this trap. He does it by using two words of ambiguous meaning; namely, "effort" and, especially, "will." The ambiguity is found in common usage, as is evident at once from a glance at Webster's Dictionary, where "voluntary" means both "done by design" and "spontaneous or unrestrained"; that is, "done either with or without purpose"! Owing to this latitude in the meaning of the word, an act can be designated

"voluntary," whether it is intentional or not. By the same token, both Immanuel Kant and Adolph Hitler can properly be called voluntarists, though the one advocated action on the basis of intelligible design, the other on the basis of "Blut und Boden." The word "will" shares this ambiguity: it is defined as "appetite" or "purpose." And although it is clear from all that has preceded that Bergson can admit only the first of these meanings, the word is often used by him in such a way as to suggest the retention of the idea of purpose, and thereby of freedom. When he speaks of the "free will," for example, one tends to think of the phrase in the Kantian sense, and only after some scrutiny does it become evident that only the appetitive sense is possible. Likewise, when speaking of the finalism of the life-process as a whole, he makes it quite clear that "Nature willed nothing at all, if we mean by will a faculty of making particular decisions."¹ Whenever finalism is spoken of, therefore, it is intended as a finalism of impulse only²--though one wonders why the word "finalism" is applied in such a way at all.

In the French language, the word volonté' (or occasionally libre arbitre) which Bergson uses is restricted to the sense of purpose. Le nouveau La Rousse Illustré' defines it as "the faculty of determining oneself to do certain acts,"

¹TS, p. 272. For further identification of will and caprice, see CE, p. 246.

²See CE, pp. 54 f, 109.

and adds:

In order that "will" in the proper sense of the word should be present, there is first necessary the conception of an end or of an alternative, and also deliberation, that is, an examination of motives and of contrary considerations.

On the basis of this definition, it is clear that Bergson takes considerable liberty in his use of the word volonté, for it is precisely the elements of decision and choice, required by the definition, which are excluded by him. The present writer was once trying to explain to a Frenchman the two distinct meanings of the English word "will." "Oh," was the reply, "then you apply 'will' in the first sense to people and in the second to animals!" Bergson has taken a word applicable only to people, volonté, and given it a content more appropriate to animals.¹

A similar ambiguity is hidden in Bergson's use of the word "effort." He speaks often of the violent effort required in order to overcome the intellectual habit of mind and achieve the intuitive grasp of durée réelle, and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion concludes with a ringing challenge to mankind to make the "extra effort" required for fulfilling the "essential function of the universe." Something in the nature of a conscious effort is here implied. And yet, in the light of the entire foregoing discussion, is it not plain that nothing of the sort is either possible or

¹In the original text of Les Données Immediates de la Conscience, volonté libre and force consciente are equated. Pp. 139 f (tenth edition).

usually intended? In actual fact, the word "effort" is well suited to obscure the real trap into which Bergson has fallen. Although it may connote the idea of will, decision, and purpose, it has been progressively deprived of the possibility of denoting such a content. On the contrary, the real meaning of the word can be no more than the appetitive definition of "will"--which, in fact, it tends to replace in Bergson's later writings. Thus, in spite of his own intentions and better judgment in the matter, Bergson is forced by the exigencies of his metaphysic to analyze the self into a bundle of biological urges, to confine purpose to mere appetite, and correspondingly to reduce freedom to a mere grunt.

Avowed Indeterminism

In order to discover whether Bergson had established freedom or only indeterminism, it was necessary first to define freedom. And since this definition introduced as the inevitable correlate of freedom the concept of the self, it was further necessary to inquire whether in fact Bergson's philosophy could account for the kind of self which could exercise will, purpose, and decision. To this question the preceding pages have given an overwhelmingly negative answer--though it was sometimes necessary to override Bergson's own apprehensive demurrals by means of his own testimony. Having followed this somewhat circuitous route to its end one now asks with justifiable impatience: What are Bergson's

own direct pronouncements on the subject? Does he corroborate directly what must be inferred from his anthropology; namely, that the effect of his position is to establish not freedom but indeterminism?

Bergson does not leave one long in doubt on that score. Not only does he assume too simply that freedom is the opposite of necessity,¹ but he also states quite frankly that what he has established is indeterminism:

The role of life is to insert some indetermination into matter. Indeterminate, i.e. unforeseeable, are the forms it creates in the course of its evolution. More and more indeterminate also, more and more free, is the activity to which these forms serve as the vehicle. A nervous system...is a veritable reservoir of indetermination.²

This statement implies what is stated more explicitly in other passages; namely, the virtual equation of indeterminism and freedom, so that Bergson can honestly hold that in proving the one, he has thereby established the other. He simply never troubled to distinguish the two.

The impetus of life, of which we are speaking, consists in a need of creation....It seizes upon this matter, which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty.³

Perhaps the clearest identification of freedom and indeterminism is contained in the following citation:

¹See MM, p. 325.

²CE, pp. 132 f (my italics). See also pp. 34, 91.

³Ibid., p. 265 (my italics).

Descartes believes in the free will of man. He superposes on the determinism of physical phenomena the indeterminism of human actions, and, consequently, on time-length a time in which there is invention, creation, true succession.¹

With the introduction of the word "succession," the entire discussion has come full circle and focuses once more on the problem of time. The consideration of Bergson's view of time suggested that if succession were absolute, then true freedom would be reduced to mere novelty. This novelty might be given colorful names, like creativity and invention, but in the absence of a creator or an inventor, such words would be used with poetic license. Strictly, they can then mean no more than novelty pure and simple. The concepts creativity and invention as such, although they do imply the overcoming of determinism, can be interpreted in terms either of indeterminism or of freedom. For the clue as to which way they are to be understood in Bergson's philosophy, they must be considered in the light of his view of time and of the self. It is hoped that this clue has by now been provided by the foregoing discussion. The following statements by Bergson himself may be adduced as a reminder:

The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.²

As soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it means creation.³

¹Ibid., p. 365; see also TF, p. 216f.

²Ibid., p. 11.

³Ibid., p. 362.

At the end of the discussion of the nature of durée, two tendencies were observed: the first was for freedom to become identified with duration itself, and the second was for the individual agent to lose his identity in the élan vital. Both these tendencies have been strengthened to the point of becoming definitive by the intervening analysis. The two citations just mentioned, for example, ascribe to durée the predicates usually applied by Bergson to freedom.¹ Furthermore, the inquiry into the role of the self revealed that the self tends to be absorbed by the vital impetus, and to express himself truly only as he unites with it. With these two facts in mind, one is now in a position to make the final connection in a three-cornered relationship: The self is indistinguishable from the élan vital; the élan vital is indistinguishable from durée; durée is indistinguishable from freedom. Thus self, durée, and freedom tend to lose their identity in one another. As Bergson himself puts it, "Consciousness is synonymous with invention and with freedom."² On this definition of freedom, it is understandable that he can believe that every organism is free--for it is free by definition. But conversely, it is most difficult to understand how responsible freedom in the proper sense could retain any status at all, for this is precisely what distinguishes man from other "organisms." In fact, nothing is left of true

¹See, e.g., CE, pp. 172f, 210, 230, 243, 252, 261f, 358-361.

²CE, p. 136f.

freedom but that release of stored energy which plays such a decisive role in Creative Evolution.¹ And indeed how could it be otherwise in a philosophy for which succession is ultimate? On such a basis, the self is reduced to pulsations, and freedom to novelty. And novelty unqualified, though it does indeed overthrow determinism, not only fails to provide for true freedom, but, when made absolute, actually precludes it. One of the enduring values of Bergson's thought is to demonstrate both these points so thoroughly.

Conclusion

Confronted by the mechanistic determinism which was enjoying the peak of its influence toward the close of the last century, Bergson saw that its entire case would stand or fall with the fact of predictability. Discover a realm of unpredictability within human consciousness, he reasoned, and the case for determinism collapses. Man's freedom, always operative in fact, will then have been restored in theory as well. Setting out to find such a realm among the "immediate data of consciousness," he did indeed establish in his durée réelle just such an area of the completely unforeseeable, the unrepeatable, the ever new.

Once in possession of this liberating datum, his philosophy depended for its subsequent development upon the way in which he would elaborate durée. At first he regarded it

¹See *ibid.*, pp. 266-270.

as a fact of experience beyond the power of logical categories to express, which had to be spoken of as an indissoluble compound of both static and dynamic elements, as permanence-in-change. He insisted that the moment logic should try to treat either of the two elements separately, it would inso facto miss the phenomenon of freedom altogether. Nor is this position exclusively confined to his earlier writings; its echoes, especially the warnings against permitting logic to dictate to reality, recur here and there throughout the later works.

Even in the beginning, however, there are anticipations of the eventual outcome of his philosophy. There are, that is, strong tendencies to do the very thing he cautions against: to separate out the static and dynamic elements, and to subordinate one to the other. Once this process had begun, there was no question which of the two would eventually predominate at the other's expense. Having already shown that the static by itself led to determinism, he naturally sets out to secure the extreme opposite; by enthroning the dynamic, he hopes to guarantee freedom against determinism.

The only question is: is the opposite of determinism really freedom? Or is it only indeterminism? The foregoing pages have undertaken to show that once durée is reduced to a state of pure succession, the consequences lead inexorably to the latter conclusion. One by one the prerequisites of responsible freedom become untenable. There can be no self, for the

self would have to retain its identity throughout change. There can be no purpose, for purpose would limit the course of the future, thereby placing a constraint upon the unrestricted creativity of the vital impetus. There can be no choice, for choice involves the very process of deliberation in which the dead hand of the intellect 'spatializes' everything it touches.

Owing perhaps to a certain awareness of the distance between what he has established, on the one hand, and responsible freedom, on the other, he continues to make occasional statements reminiscent of the early stages of his philosophy,-- chiefly in the form of simple assertions that freedom is more than mere spontaneous impulse or random caprice. In such cases, however, he is his own antagonist. The preponderant emphasis of his own thought is ranged solidly against him. The true freedom on whose behalf his own better judgment apparently pleads has been left behind at the point where he made his fateful decision to attempt to account for it in terms of temporal succession alone.

A P P E N D I X

Further Analysis of the Reciprocal
Relation between Freedom and Selfhood

Having observed the inseparability of the two concepts of freedom and selfhood, as developed briefly above, one is tempted to push the inquiry a step further and ask: What is the common link between these two? What holds them together in a polar relationship, so that neither can be understood in isolation from the other? The present study has been undertaken on the postulate that this connecting link consists in the relation of both freedom and selfhood to time. To anticipate, this relation is conceived to be an equivocal one, in the following way: on the one hand, neither self nor freedom is conceivable apart from time; yet on the other hand (and this, of course, constitutes the demonstrandum) neither can be adequately accounted for in strictly temporal terms; that is, they both imply the transcendence of time, as well as involvement in time.

If this be true, then an analysis either of freedom or of the self should finally arrive at this common terminus, which might be designated as the intersection of the temporal with the trans-temporal, of time-involvement with time-transcendence. Whether one began with freedom or with selfhood, the two routes would meet at the end. Although for the

sake of completeness, both roads should be traversed, the present inquiry must confine itself to the one which begins with freedom, hoping to argue that if freedom represents a juncture of the temporal and the trans-temporal, then so does the self which exercises freedom.

Out of natural curiosity, however, one might here attempt to sketch in the briefest way the nature of the other route, which, beginning with the self, would reach the same destination. Beginning with the triad purpose-decision-will (which were introduced during the main discussion as those aspects of selfhood which involved freedom), the first step would be to show that these three require not merely consciousness, but self-consciousness. This might best be done by citing the process of deliberation which culminates in the making of a decision, and in which the self is aware of itself as drawn in two directions at once, so that the process itself has rightly been called a dialogue with oneself. The second step would argue that self-consciousness means self-transcendence; for just as I am conscious of my body because I partially transcend it, so also must I necessarily transcend myself in order to be conscious of myself--or, as Hegel argued, the awareness of a limit implies that one is beyond the limit. The third and final step would be to show that self-transcendence involves time-transcendence, as follows: I do not transcend myself in space (only my body is spatial); nor

do I transcend myself in time (Bergson establishes this); consequently, if I transcend myself at all, and if this transcendence is neither spatial nor temporal, then it must be trans-spatio-temporal. In a word, it involves the transcendence of time, as well as involvement in time. And with this inference the route joins the alternate way which began with freedom, and both arrive at a common end: an indissoluble juncture of time with the trans-temporal.

CHAPTER III

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

If commentators on Martin Heidegger can agree on nothing else, there is one point on which they all might concur: the difficulty of his philosophy. Not only the new vocabulary which he is forced to coin, but also the abstract character of his thought, as well as its subject matter, combine to confront his reader with a formidable task. As if this were not enough, he himself has injected an additional troublesome aspect into the discussion of freedom. It will be recalled that one of the reasons for examining his philosophy was the Existentialist emphasis on freedom. However, though generally regarded as perhaps the father of the current Existentialist revival, he himself has in fact repudiated Existentialism.¹

The question at once arises, does this imply a rejection of its affirmations, including freedom itself? If so, how has the Existential philosophy of Sartre, for example, been derived in part from Heidegger? An answer to this question must probe into the structure of Heidegger's thought, to see if it really does contain "Existential" elements, and if

¹See "The Essence of Truth," trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, with Introduction by Werner Brock (London: Vision Press, Ltd., 1949), p. 335; and throughout his Brief über den Humanismus (Bern: Verlag A. Francke, 1947).

these in turn can be reconciled with the rest of his philosophy. In pursuing its own purposes in this chapter, the present study will incidentally illumine this problem of Heidegger's Existentialism. It expects to show, for example, that in many contexts Heidegger's use of words like freedom, decision, authentic, and situation, appears to admit if not indeed to require, some such interpretation as Sartre's. From the outset, however, there is another strain in Heidegger--one which makes its appearance in the early pages of Sein und Zeit and finally gains a certain ascendancy, to some extent within the same book and more completely in the later essays. This second strain takes back a great deal of what is maintained, either directly or by implication, in the first. Freedom tends to become subordinated to determinism (or, at times, to indeterminism); decision tends to become indistinguishable from understanding; and the distinction between authentic and unauthentic tends to become insignificant. This last-named tendency is reflected in Heidegger's repudiation of the emphasis on values which plays such a prominent part in Sartre's philosophy. It is as though this second strain anticipated the difficulties involved in the first--indeed, it seems already aware that L'Etre et le Neant, with its insistence that all values are "real" but subjective, must inevitably be followed by L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, with its subtle reinstatement of objective values. The development of Heidegger's philosophy consists partly in the

gradual (though never total) triumph of this second strain over the first. In this way he seeks to avoid Sartre's embarrassment concerning values, though only at the cost of attempting to suppress values altogether. And at this point the question arises, "Does he thereby suppress freedom as well?"

A - HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
CONCEIVED AS EXISTENTIALISM

In the following pages an attempt is made to abstract out of Heidegger's philosophy those elements which have lent themselves to the Existentialist movement, and upon which a genuine doctrine of freedom might be constructed. It cannot be over-emphasized that such a presentation can by no means be taken as a definitive statement of his position; on the contrary, it represents that strain of thought which is never unmixed, even in Sein und Zeit, and which Heidegger himself ultimately abandons. At the same time, it is equally true that the following résumé represents a prominent aspect of Heidegger's thought, especially in the first half of Sein und Zeit. Though it is indeed taken out of context, the context would serve rather to contradict it than merely to qualify it in such a way as to reconcile it to the whole. The subsequent sections of this chapter should demonstrate this conclusively. For present purposes, the aim is to consider those aspects of Heidegger's philosophy which lend themselves to freedom.

The Method

Following his teacher Husserl, Heidegger applies what is known technically as the "phenomenological method"--that is, the direct analysis of the given representations (Vorstellungen) of consciousness, without reference to metaphysical or ontological questions. Holding such problems in abeyance (epoché), the phenomenologist examines the structure of consciousness as he finds it, and, especially in the case of Heidegger, asks what pre-conditions are necessary in order that such data and structures should exist.¹ Where Husserl was content to leave ontological questions "in brackets," however, Heidegger announces at the outset his intention of applying the same method in order to illumine the very meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein). The point of departure for such an undertaking should be, he says, not the multitude of particular objects in the world, but rather human consciousness itself (Dasein). If there is a "window" into Being, it lies here, in the one "being" (Seiende) who can conceive of Being. The concepts of traditional philosophy are appropriate, not to Dasein (human consciousness), but to the particular objects (Vorhandene) we encounter in the world. Hence it is that in order to understand the nature of Dasein, and thereby of Being itself, Heidegger must coin a new vocabulary, appropriate to his subject.

¹An instructive explication of Husserl's method as adapted by Heidegger has been written by Gilbert Ryle in Mind, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 151, July, 1929, pp. 355-370.

The word "Dasein" itself illustrates the new shade of meaning acquired by many words in Heidegger's writings. Starting from the literal meaning, "to be there", he wrings from it the maximum of "Existential" content: the "-sein" stands for the 'participation in Being' by virtue of which Dasein can illumine the meaning of Being; the "Da-" emphasizes the localization of Dasein in all its manifestations at a particular, finite point, and the consequent limitation of its view of Being to a single, and therefore distorted, perspective. The very "Da-" through which it has being at all simultaneously dooms it to a merely private perspective on the totality of Being-as-such. Dasein thus exists in the agonizing situation of being related to Being, on the one hand, yet partially contradicting Being because of this very relatedness, on the other.

Because Dasein does stand in a relation to Being, however, it can disclose something of the nature of Being itself. As a preliminary to this investigation, Heidegger begins with an examination of what Dasein reveals about itself (this undertaking does in fact occupy the whole of Sein und Zeit). Thanks to the condition of "disclosed-ness" (Erschlossenheit), in which Dasein becomes transparent to its own nature and ultimately to Being itself, he builds his monumental work upon the structural elements of Dasein as he

sees them.¹ In so doing, one of his first departures from traditional methodology is to deny that in the case of Dasein it is possible to reduce the complex to the simple;² where the customary procedure would be to derive its several elements from one primary one, he insists that they are "gleichursprünglich"³ (equally primary). In other words Dasein is of such a nature that its various components, though they can indeed be distinguished, cannot be analyzed out and regarded separately. So thorough-going is their mutual interpenetration that each is to be understood partly in terms of its relations to the others. Such a view implies the possibility of a logic of contradiction, in which it becomes necessary to make two contradictory statements about a unity which refuses to be analyzed into simpler components. This possibility becomes fact in Heidegger's treatment of time (see below).

In maintaining this position, Heidegger is making a conscious break with the kind of analytical thinking which has to a large extent prevailed since Descartes. Specifically, the sharp separation of subject and object, which has

¹Ryle points out that under the guise of self-evident data it is possible to introduce a covert dogmatism. Op. cit., p. 369.

²See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. 6. unveränderte Auflage. (Tubingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949), pp. 53, 196. Designated below by the abbreviation SZ.

³SZ, p. 131.

dominated philosophy since the seventeenth century, is circumvented.¹ There is no longer any such thing as an isolated subject; rather, Dasein as such entails "being-in-the-world" (in-der-Welt-sein).² Without the world there would be no Dasein, and vice versa; the two are correlative. It is this 'relation-to-the-world' for which the "Da-" in "Dasein" stands. One aspect of this indissoluble relation between Dasein and world is the fact of being-with-others (mit-Anderen-sein).³ To analyze this relationship into a number of isolated, unconditioned ego-substances is entirely illegitimate. Dasein is what it is partly in terms of its relations to others.

At yet another point Heidegger departs from the heritage of Descartes: no longer is there any clear-cut separation of theory and practice. Indeed, the purely detached objectivity, so coveted for the past three centuries, is an illusion. This means that the concept of 'world' (Welt) does not simply represent the object of my knowledge; even more than this does it represent the field in which I pursue my purposes. The things which I encounter in the world I encounter, not first and foremost as objects of detached observation (Vorhandene), but as objects which will or will not

¹See SZ, p. 366.

²See ibid., section I, ch. 2.

³See ibid., section I, ch. 4.

implement my intentions (Zuhandene); that is, as tools (Zeug). A hammer, for example, is defined as something with which to drive nails; the disinterested attitude of physical science, which sees the hammer merely as an object possessing a measurable weight, composition, and dimensions, arises only as an abstraction from the former attitude.¹ There is indeed never a totally theoretic science, divorced from all application, just as there is no purely practical attitude, without some cognitive element.²

When an object is spoken of as a tool, a frame of reference is implied within which the object fulfills a specific purpose. The hammer, for example, is a tool within the context of nailing two boards together. This, in turn, fits into a larger pattern: the building of a house; and this, in its turn, is embraced in the still larger purpose of living in the house. What, then, is the largest possible frame of reference within which Dasein's never-disinterested activity takes place? It is precisely the world. And here the subjective aspect of Heidegger's thought becomes prominent: for world is defined as the totality of those relations which Dasein endows with 'meaningfulness' (Bedeutsamkeit)³--that is, which relate either positively or negatively to 'self-

¹See SZ, pp. 69; 360 f.

²See ibid., p. 69.

³See SZ, p. 67.

interest', taken in the broadest sense.¹ The world is the arena of the activity of Dasein's self-concern, for Dasein is always concerned about itself ("es geht immer um dieses selbst").² Hence the largest frame of reference, the world, is always to be described in terms of Dasein's concern for itself.³

With these introductory remarks about Heidegger's method and its application, we are in a position to examine more closely the analysis of the structure of Dasein and its constituents. It is worth emphasizing that Heidegger nowhere pretends that this analysis is demonstrative. His phenomenological method claims rather to dis-close (erschliessen) the truth by allowing what already is to become apparent. That this procedure involves a circle he readily acknowledges, maintaining only that it is not vicious,⁴ but actually quite the reverse. It is the attempt to avoid a circle which is the ruin of philosophy. Such attempts

¹A. de Waelhens, in his exhaustive study La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger (Louvain, 1942), points out that on this definition of 'world', it is in principle impossible that anything should be unintelligible, for the world is equated with meaning. See p. 70.

²As Heidegger repeats over and over again, "Dasein ist Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht" (SZ, p. 191, and throughout the book).

³"Das primäre 'Wozu' ist ein Worum-willen. Das 'Um-willen' betrifft aber immer das Sein des Daseins, dem es in seinem Sein wesenhaft um dieses Sein selbst geht." SA, p. 84.

⁴See SZ, p. 153.

fail to understand the nature of their task, for the very structure of meaning and of Dasein itself is circular.¹ The only appropriate way to investigate Dasein therefore re-quires a circle, and to eliminate it is to eliminate the fundamental structure of concern (Grundstruktur der Sorge).² Does this mean that caution is thrown to the winds, that philosophy has lost all criteria? Heidegger hastens to qualify his statement: whereas the circle cannot be avoided, it is of decisive importance to enter it properly.³ But this prompts another question: Does he not bring presuppositions of his own to his particular view of what constitutes "properly"? Again he replies that the task of the philosopher is never to apologize for his presuppositions, but to show their necessity.⁴ The question, however, persists: how can necessity be shown, once demonstrative logic is abandoned? This question is acutely raised by Heidegger's philosophy (as well as by other contemporary critics of the traditional logic). For if it be granted that there are no longer any "bare facts," but only facts-as-interpreted,⁵ then the problem of the "right" interpretation is greatly aggravated. Ultimate-

¹Ibid.

²See SZ, p. 315.

³See SZ, p. 153.

⁴See SZ, p. 310.

⁵See SZ, p. 362.

ly, Heidegger himself takes the bull by the horns and declares flatly that the danger lies not in presupposing too much, but too little.¹ It is this that seems to justify Gilbert Ryle's criticism that Heidegger's philosophy has no protection against dogmatism.

The Structure of Dasein

In the foregoing illustrations of the way in which Heidegger applies his phenomenological method, one of his principal conclusions about the nature of Dasein was anticipated. In the first place, Dasein is always "in-the-world," and never merely its detached observer. Secondly, the never-disinterested, practical activities of Dasein in the world are included in progressively larger frames of reference, each defined by some more inclusive purpose of Dasein, until the largest of all, the world itself, is reached. This ultimate context, determining the lesser ones but itself needing no authentication, is always to be described in terms of Dasein's own self-concern. If this is true, then we have one reliable frame of reference (Horizont) within which all of Dasein's activities can be understood; namely, self-concern. And this is the meaning which Heidegger gives to

¹ See SZ, p. 315.

² Op. cit., p. 369.

the word Sorge.¹ Having arrived at this concept, he can use it as the key to interpreting Dasein as a whole. All the penultimate activities of Dasein can be comprehended in terms of Sorge.² Indeed, he can even say that the very being of Dasein itself is Sorge.³

Within the total structure which is Sorge, the phenomenological analysis is able to distinguish (but never to isolate) three principal elements: conditioned-ness, comprehension, and speech (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede). These he calls "existentialia,"⁴ since they characterize the existence of Dasein as such.⁵ The first, Befindlichkeit, bears a twofold meaning, which is perhaps best conveyed by the word "conditionedness." The first of these meanings is what Heidegger calls "facticity" (Faktizität), and refers to Dasein's particularity, to its "Da-"; the second meaning refers to the emotional tone or feeling (Stimmung) arising from one's situation in-the-world. The double connotation of

¹SZ, Section I, ch. 6. Heidegger says that if his philosophy is properly understood, the word "self-concern" (Selbstsorge) is tautological (SZ, p. 193), and that this is what is meant by "Sorge." I have risked tautology for the sake of clarity.

²Sorge is the Um-willen, which contains the Um-zu, Wozu, and Dazu. SZ, p. 364.

³SZ, Section I, ch. 6.

⁴See SZ, Section I, ch. 5. "Existentialia" is Werner Brock's translation of Existentialien.

⁵In spite of Heidegger's contention that for Dasein existence is prior to essence (SZ, p. 43), Jean Wahl asks whether essence is not subtly reintroduced in the guise of Existentialia. See his A Short History of Existentialism, trans. Forrest Williams and Stanley Maron (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 21.

Befindlichkeit is illustrated by Heidegger's similar use of another word, Geworfenheit (thrown-ness).¹ By this, he indicates that Dasein finds itself "hurled" into existence, without having had any control over the particular external conditions which so largely determine it. When Dasein acknowledges this situation, instead of refusing to face it, its corresponding emotional reaction is that of anguished dread (Angst).² Befindlichkeit, then, expresses both the fact of Dasein's conditioned-ness, and the emotional "conditioning" which results.

Although "comprehension" is the literal translation of the second of the 'existentialia', there is perhaps no single English word which can do full justice to the meaning acquired by "Verstehen" in Heidegger's philosophy. Far from having a merely cognitive significance, it is always at the service of the basic self-concern already described. One is tempted to translate it as "scheming" or "the projection of enterprises." Heidegger's meaning is elaborated by the concepts project (Entwurf) and interpretation (Auslegung).³ The former refers especially to the fact that Dasein always thinks and acts in terms of its possibilities (Mög-lichkeiten): that is, of what it may become. Hence it continually makes projects for the fulfillment of these

¹See SZ, p. 175.

²See SZ, #40.

³See SZ, #31, 32.

possibilities. Interpretation is the process by which the world is constituted as a totality of meaningful relations with reference to Dasein's self-concern. More specifically it is verstehen that is able to interpret the structure of Dasein itself, as revealed in Dasein's own transparency to Being itself.

Equally primary with the other two existentialia as constituents of Sorge and of Dasein is Speech (Rede).¹ Heidegger has less to say about it than about the other two, his chief point being that speech, as communication, is the correlate of being-with-others.

Authentic and Unauthentic Existence

Thus far the account has been largely descriptive: Dasein is constituted by Sorge, with its three elements Beindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede. From the first, however, Heidegger speaks of what proves to be an exceedingly complicated factor in the understanding of Dasein, and even of Heidegger himself! Although the structure just outlined is valid for all Dasein as such, nevertheless it can exist in two alternative modes, the one authentic, the other unauthentic (eigentlich, uneigentlich). Actually, instead of "authentic", the word "proper", understood in all its connotations, more adequately expresses certain nuances of meaning contained in the German eigentlich. In the first place, it does carry the

¹See SZ, #34.

the connotation of "genuine", as when the English say, "Because of present austerity conditions, we cannot serve you a proper tea". American slang employs the word "real" in the same sense: "He is a real ballplayer". This meaning of "fulfilling objective specifications" can thus be rendered equally by "proper" and by "authentic". In the second place, however, the word eigentlich, especially as used by Heidegger, refers even more emphatically to a shade of meaning not contained in "authentic": that of "peculiarly one's own", deriving from the adjective eigen (see the Oxford German-English Dictionary). If this emphasis upon the particular were to be rendered by the word "authentic", the translation would have to be expanded into an entire phrase, such as "authentically one's own". The word "proper", however, does contain this additional meaning (see Webster's New International Dictionary, second edition). Like the French propre, from which it derives, it, too, can mean "one's own", referring not to the generic, but to the particular. Associated with this highly specific sense of "proper" is its use in the phrase "proper noun", a usage which, by coincidence, has special affinities with Heidegger's use of eigentlich. For the opposite of a proper noun is a common noun. And if "common" (in this sense) is made to correspond with uneigentlich, it conveys the same banal (alltäglich) quality which Heidegger attributes to this word. It might therefore

be argued that "proper" and "common" are more adequate translations of eigentlich and uneigentlich than are "authentic" and "unauthentic". In the interest of keeping technical jargon to a minimum, however, the latter pair of opposites will be used throughout the present essay, since they already enjoy such a wide currency.

Suffice it to note definitely that eigentlich is especially difficult to translate because of its dual connotation. On the one hand, it does imply a norm by which any act can be tested. This is its generic sense. On the other hand, however, it is highly specific: an act is "authentic" only if it is the genuine expression of my own true self, only if it is "authentically I". In so far as this test of authenticity may be applied to all actions, it may truly be called normative. But this normative quality is merely formal. The content of any "authentic" act depends strictly upon the individual agent, and may not be prescribed. This ambiguity in one of his key words reflects the ambiguity in Heidegger's philosophy as a whole, for the reader can never be quite sure whether or not the authentic mode of existence receives the author's endorsement as against the unauthentic. Even though its content be unpredictable, one might well suppose that the normative connotation of eigentlich would imply that such existence is in some way preferable or desirable.

But this is precisely what he is at great pains explicitly and repeatedly to deny.¹ And here perhaps the key question for the inquiry into Heidegger's treatment of freedom stands out in strong relief: for in spite of his insistence that neither of the two modes has any normative significance whatever, nevertheless his treatment certainly does carry a thinly veiled scorn for the unauthentic mode, and a corresponding admiration for the authentic. Marjorie Grene states that this implicitly normative attitude was even more pronounced in Heidegger's lectures.² A more detailed analysis of this problem will occur later in this study; for the present purpose a brief summary of the respective characteristics of the two modes will suffice.

a) The unauthentic mode. The very word used by Heidegger to characterize the unauthentic Dasein has powerfully derogatory connotations: Verfallen; that is, "fallen", or even "degenerated"--though he hastens to insist that this does not imply a fall from an originally higher and purer state.³ In the "verfallen" state, Dasein loses itself in the

¹For example, in SZ, pp. 176, 222, 243.

²See Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom (Chicago University Press, 1948), p. 148.

³See SZ, p. 176.

public anonymity known as "everyone": das Man.¹ Forsaking its own nature, it seeks refuge in the thousand-and-one petty details of everyday life. Hence Verfallen is described as a fall into Alltäglichkeit;² that is, into "every-day-ness," or "banality." In this condition, the basis of Dasein is still Sorge, or self-concern; but this Sorge is manifested, not authentically as concern for its own most private and most extreme possibilities, but merely as a half-frenzied, half-satiated preoccupation with mundane trivialities.

When Sorge undergoes this unauthentic modification, its three components can be expected to exhibit a correspondingly "fallen" aspect. Accordingly, Befindlichkeit, or "conditionedness," is now experienced merely as fear, which differs from the genuine Angst in always having a determinate object.³ It is as though, by means of setting up definite and specific fears, one tried to overcome the anguish of the finite creature who is called upon to fulfill infinite possibilities. This is as futile as any attempt to bridge a qualitative gap by quantitative means. It is like counting to infinity, though it may bring the illusion of contentment.⁴

Corresponding to this unauthentic manifestation of

¹Ibid.

²Alltäglichkeit is by no means consistently used in this sense. It is sometimes used as though it represented the undifferentiated Dasein, of which authentic and unauthentic existence are modes. This will become crucial in the subsequent analysis of freedom in Heidegger's thought.

³SZ, #30.

⁴See SZ, p. 177.

Befindlichkeit is the similarly verfallen understanding, or Verstehen. In this condition Dasein is no longer disclosed (erschlossen) to itself as it truly is; that is, as a being responsible to itself for the fulfilling of its own most genuine possibilities.¹ Instead, it becomes ambiguous (zweideutig)², attempting to understand itself in terms of the everyday world.³ This unauthentic understanding of itself can in turn only mean that the "projects" (Entwürfe; see above) by which it attempts to fulfill itself are badly misconceived. Instead of being true to its own most intimate and most extreme possibilities, it caters to the standards of the mass, prostituting itself to public fads and conventions. This is the condition of curiosity (Neugier) in the broadest sense. It includes all that might be comprehended under the English expression, "keeping up with the Joneses."

The third of the 'existentialia', speech (Rede) has in its turn a characteristic "fallen" manifestation in the unauthentic mode; namely, public prattle (Gerede). This is the natural correlate whenever Dasein attempts to escape from Sorge as ultimate concern by busying itself with the multitude of finite concerns of everyday life. Like the other two 'existentialia', and like Sorge as a whole, speech assumes the unauthentic mode whenever "the world is too much with us." And indeed, when is this not the case? Heidegger

¹See SZ, p. 144.

²See SZ, #37.

³See SZ, p. 146.

replies, in a way reminiscent of Nietzsche's "all too human," that it is practically always the case. Dasein exists "prima facie and mostly" (zunächst and zumeist) in the unauthentic mode.¹

b) The authentic mode. In the course of the foregoing remarks, much has already been implied concerning the authentic mode, and the succeeding section will concern itself directly with considerably more. For the present purpose a brief summary should therefore suffice. First, as to Sorge as a whole in the authentic mode: as already indicated, genuine Sorge is distinguished from the unauthentic in that it is the unlimited concern of Dasein for the responsibility of fulfilling its own indeterminate possibilities, rather than a number of particular concerns for specific objects. Corresponding to this authentic Sorge, its three constituents undergo a similar authentic modification. Befindlichkeit is now manifested as the condition of Angst--of anxious dread at being a finite creature, yet called upon to fulfill indeterminate possibilities. As such, Angst might be designated as the apprehension of Sorge as infinite, as "bottomless,"² as boundless. Likewise, when Verstehen becomes authentic, the true situation of Dasein is disclosed (erschlossen) to itself. It no longer attempts to understand itself on the basis of the world, but in terms of its own ultimate

¹See SZ, #38.

²See SZ, #40.

possibilities.¹ Henceforth its projects are based upon these. And finally, when speech (Rede) is authentic, it eschews popular gossip and retires into silence²--which, contradictory though it sounds, Heidegger declares to be a mode of speech.

Does this mean that authentic existence required withdrawal from the world, as from the source of its temptation to compromise with the banal pursuits of everyday life? Although this is precisely what Heidegger himself has done,³ and although it is in keeping with the ultimate issue of his philosophy, it must be recalled that the present section is devoted to extracting the "Existential" elements from his thought. In keeping with this trend, he replies with an emphatic "no." Since the very being of Dasein is to-be-in-the-world, any retreat into isolation would deny this structure.⁴ Hence the authentic Dasein does not retire from mundane activities; it simply has no more illusions about them. It sees them for what they are, as wholly inconsequential,⁵ and with this uncompromising insight is actually in a better position to take whatever action is required by the situation.⁶ It may continue to carry on the same outward activities as the

¹See SZ, #31, 32.

²See SZ, #34.

³See the biographical foreword in Existence and Being.

⁴See SZ, pp. 298, 320, 384.

⁵See SZ, p. 266.

⁶See SZ, p. 391.

anonymous "everyone" (das Man), but its motives will be different. Instead of burying itself in a heap of worldly chores and cares, it will perform them in a spirit of self-acceptance,¹ accepting at the same time the staggering responsibility entailed thereby. When Dasein acts in such a way, when it comes to grips with reality and makes concrete decisions without illusions, it is said to act with "Entschlossenheit"; that is, with "resolve," or with "resolute decision." Perhaps more than any other single word in Heidegger's vocabulary, this word connotes freedom; certainly it is the one which he uses most often to describe it. One of the purposes of the present essay is to follow the fate of Entschlossenheit throughout his philosophy, and to ask whether at the end the meaning of the word has not undergone a decisive change. First, however, a special section will be devoted to examining the genuine freedom which can be based upon the "Existential" elements of Heidegger's philosophy as presented thus far.

¹See SZ, p. 345.

B - FREEDOM BASED UPON THE
FOREGOING STRUCTURE

In the case of Bergson, it was noted how a prodigious effort was made on behalf of freedom, but on such a basis that a sort of capricious indeterminism was the result. Hence it is necessary to inquire in the case of Heidegger whether or not his frequent use of words like "freedom" and "decision" is justified, first simply on the basis of the foregoing structure as abstracted from Sein und Zeit, and finally within the context of his philosophy as a whole. It is with the first of these inquiries that the present section is concerned.

Is There a Real Choice?

If freedom and decision are to retain their meaning, then Dasein must really be confronted with a live option; that is, if freedom is to exercise its power of decision, there must be alternatives from which to choose. As applied to the present problem, this would require that Dasein be in a position to decide (entschliessen) for either the authentic or unauthentic existence. And this is apparently precisely what Heidegger has in mind when he states that Dasein is free for the possibility of authenticity or unauthenticity,¹ or that Dasein has the possibility of either choosing itself,

¹See SZ, pp. 43, 191, 252.

and thereby of gaining itself, or of losing itself, and thereby only appearing to gain itself.¹ It follows that there is no necessity for the unauthentic or "fallen" state.² Rather, there could be no such mode in the first place except on the basis of a prior authentic mode!

"Uneigentlichkeit hat mögliche Eigentlichkeit zum Grunde."³ Hence Dasein is in a position to retrieve itself from the "perdition" or "lost-ness" (Verlorenheit) of the "fallen" mode,⁴ and decision is therefore a real possibility. To decide for authentic existence is to exercise Entschlossenheit, and this in no merely metaphorical sense (on the basis only of the accompanying citations).

Does Authenticity Receive Implicit Sanction?

It has already been noted that Heidegger professes complete indifference toward the two modes, claiming only to describe them. And yet what has been said thus far must certainly confirm Marjorie Grene's testimony concerning his lectures: that the authentic mode is presented as decidedly superior. And if it is so presented, then it is subtly espousing a view of how free choice ought to be exercised--

¹See SZ, p. 42.

²The statements cited here will be flatly contradicted by others at a later point in the present chapter.

³SZ, p. 259; cf. also p. 42.

⁴See SZ, p. 263. As will be brought out later, this position would require a sort of "neutral ground," from which Dasein makes its choice of modes.

that is, it champions an ethic, under whatever name it may be called. What, then, is the reason why Heidegger's left hand does not seem to know what his right is about?¹ The answer to this question will have far-reaching repercussions, especially for the problem of freedom. And since it is one of the chief points which the present study seeks to establish, it may be developed as follows, in terms of the horns of a dilemma, both of which have been seen but not surmounted by contemporary Existentialism: in the first place, if ideal norms are set up, then liberty is destroyed; for I am ruled by the norms, I must conform to them. Moral maxims, says Heidegger, actually proscribe free action,² and Sartre makes even more of the same point.³ This, then, appears to be the reason why Heidegger cannot explicitly attribute any value to the authentic mode: it would press liberty into a strait-jacket. But in the second place, the fact remains that he does attribute implicit value to authenticity. Why should he do that, instead of being content to abide by the non-normative stand he has taken? Here perhaps we may look to Sartre for the answer. Choice, he says, is distinguished from

¹This question might be answered very briefly by saying that he seeks to combine an "existential" approach, with its emphasis on freedom, with a phenomenological approach, which confines itself to simple description.

²See SZ, p. 294.

³See Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Être et le Néant, 19e ed. (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1943), pp. 513, 539.

arbitrary caprice by intelligent reflection, in which the value of the object to be chosen is apprehended.¹ Without appreciation of the object, there is no free choice, but only blind impulse:²

By each of (our free acts), even when we do not intend it, we constitute a scale of universal values.³

By making both these statements, without solving the dilemma which they pose, Sartre has exposed himself to the criticism of oscillating from arbitrariness, under the dictates of the first point, to idealism, under the influence of the second. Heidegger's philosophy contains the same problem, but in far subtler guise. It takes the form of an explicit denial of normative judgments, on the one hand, coupled with an implicit evaluation, on the other. Perhaps this is one reason why Heidegger has thus far proven a tougher nut for the critic to crack.

The present section sets out to discover whether or not responsible freedom can be included within the framework of the "Existential" elements already discerned in Sein und Zeit. But the dilemma just posed by Existentialism itself appears to call the very possibility of freedom into question. On the one hand, as Nietzsche so vehemently maintained, if freedom is conceived as the freedom to conform to certain

¹See ibid., pp. 512, 513, 557.

²See ibid., pp. 527 f.

³Quoted by Paul Fouquié in Existentialism, trans. Forrest Williams and Stanley Maron (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 72, from Action, Dec. 27, 1944.

ideal norms, then non-conformity and rebellion will be the greater freedom. One is reminded of the free-thinking clergyman who, as visiting preacher at another church, just before the service was proffered a black choir-gown.

"Is this gown obligatory?" he asked.

"Not obligatory, just customary," was the answer.

"Good. If it is not obligatory, I'll wear it. But if it is, I won't."

On this basis, ideal values seem about to be read out of court altogether. But then follows Sartre's equally emphatic insistence that without appreciation of value, there is no free decision, but only arbitrary impulse. One is reminded that even Nietzsche did not eliminate values, but only "trans-valuated" them. Neither the thought of Nietzsche nor that of Sartre is able to solve this internal dilemma: no freedom with ideal values; but no freedom without the appreciation of values. In a less explicit way, Heidegger, too, carries on an unsuccessful running battle with this same problem.

Does this mean that the attempt to relate freedom to value-judgments has struck an impasse? On the basis of the several philosophies examined herein, the present paper hopes to suggest a third alternative--one which would accept the second horn of the above dilemma (that freedom necessarily appreciates), but, by means of special emphasis on time, would qualify the first (that values necessarily tyrannize

freedom). On the basis of this anticipation of a possible way of circumventing the dilemma, what is required for the present purpose of showing that in fact Heidegger does preserve the possibility of freedom within the context of those elements of his philosophy mentioned thus far? Clearly, it remains only to establish that he in fact conforms to the one horn of the dilemma which we accept: that a free decision appreciates value in the object or act of its choice.

Since this is the very proposition which Heidegger explicitly repudiates, the burden of proof to the contrary rests with those who see an implicit prizing of the authentic over the unauthentic mode. This is what makes his philosophy so slippery for the critic: the normative judgments which it indirectly implies are repeatedly and expressly disclaimed. Nevertheless, a careful scrutiny leaves little doubt of Heidegger's exaltation of authenticity and scorn for its counterpart. Some evidence for this has already been presented. More will come out indirectly in subsequent sections. For the present, the following citations will suffice:

At one point, he adapts Parmenides' poem as an illustration: The goddess of truth says, "Dasein finds itself already in truth and in untruth. The way of discovery will be achieved only in distinguishing intelligently between them, and in deciding for the former."¹ Surely this disclosure of

¹SZ, pp. 222 f.

the goddess contains, as it did for Parmenides, a "call" to choose one way and reject the other. Can the basis of such a "call" be other than a higher evaluation of the former? Is not the goddess telling Parmenides how his freedom ought to be used?

The same question may be asked when Heidegger describes the authentic mode as choosing oneself, and the unauthentic as losing it,¹ even though the anonymous "everyone" thinks he has found himself. The real issue is, what constitutes finding oneself? --for "everyone" makes the same charge against Heidegger. Can either side of the argument ever ultimately get beyond the irreducible assertion, "My way is better"?

A similarly indirect evaluation is made by Heidegger with respect to whatever is primordial (ursprünglich). His attitude toward it approaches reverence, and he considers any process of development from the source as ipso facto degeneration.² When this is linked with the statement that authenticity is primordial relative to the unauthentic mode,³ then verfallen means degenerated in a literal sense. But surely the word "degenerated" is here used to mean "relatively unworthy of free choice"; that is, a higher value is placed upon authenticity.

These instances seem to substantiate a point which Sartre has perhaps seen more clearly than Heidegger, when he

¹See SZ, p. 42.

²See SZ, p. 334.

³See SZ, pp. 206, 233, 259, 317.

says that to exist is to exercise freedom. Life consists in exercising choice.¹ And moreover, to choose is to appreciate, to evaluate.² To pretend to be unfree is to choose to do so, and to estimate such a procedure as worth while. Whereas certain passages in Sein und Zeit would agree with the first point, it is the second which Heidegger illustrates by attempting to deny it. For example, Sartre sees that even by suicide one cannot escape the necessity for making both decisions and evaluations; to commit suicide is to decide to do so, and to value such a course higher than life.³ Heidegger, however, gets caught in this very trap when he tries to exterminate value-judgments. At first content simply to suspend them, he finally says flatly that they constitute a blasphemy against Being, because they absolutize the relative.⁴ And this is just the point at which Sartre would reply, "But this is itself a normative judgment! You yourself are attributing value to Being, as against judgments of value!" The foregoing pages offer further evidence for precisely this point. Henceforth the question should be, not whether a man evaluates, but what he values.

Is there Responsibility?

On the basis of the "Existential" elements in Heidegger's philosophy, it has been shown that both choice and evaluation

¹Op. cit., p. 516

²Ibid., pp. 512, 513, 557.

³Ibid., pp. 558f.

⁴Brief über den Humanismus, p. 99.

are possible. Can the same be said for responsibility? The evidence on this point is considerably scantier, but Heidegger does at least use the terms "guilt" and "conscience". In so far as he does so, it might be maintained that he upholds responsibility, if "guilt" means "responsible for a 'bad' act", and conscience is supposed both to furnish awareness of guilt and to indicate where one's responsibilities lie. In actual fact, however, it is perhaps wiser not to make too much of this point, for Heidegger does not use the terms in this way (though perhaps he does capitalize upon the residue of their normal connotation which they retain in spite of his novel usage).

Another requirement for responsibility is that the agent retain his self-identity; that is, that there be a persistent self. Here, too, there is little evidence either way. On the one hand, he deplors the dissolution of the self in the anonymous "everyone",¹ and advocated retrieving the lost self out of the banality of everyday life.² In the main, however, he insists that he is not interested in an anthropology, seeking rather to outline the a priori conditions of any anthropology. Hence, although he does frequently refer to the self, he offers no further account of it consistent with that part of his thought which we have called "Existential".

¹See SZ, p. 128.

²See SZ, p. 268.

Conclusion

In asking whether, on the basis of these "Existential elements, freedom is possible, we have arrived at a largely affirmative answer. There is a live choice; there is appreciation of value (if only implicit); and the question of selfhood and responsibility is at least left open. On this basis, Heidegger can justifiably speak of Entschlossenheit as 'resolute decision' which comes to grips with the realities of the given moment (Augenblick)¹ and takes whatever action is required by the situation with reference to Dasein's own authentic possibilities. In such a context, Entschlossenheit is surely expressive of true freedom.

But the context changes, or rather, has been mixed from the start. The one question which was left open above, the question of selfhood, receives an answer as Heidegger analyzes further the nature of Dasein and especially its relation to time. When, after an exhaustive treatment, it is found that the very "essence" of Dasein is time, then the door slams shut upon the possibility of selfhood, and simultaneously, as will be argued below, upon most of what has been said so far to substantiate freedom.

C - TIME: THE ECSTATIC UNITY OF DASEIN

Heidegger's conception of time represents perhaps the most original and important contribution to the subject

¹See SZ, p. 338.

since Bergson. Like Bergson, he abandons the time-honored dichotomy of time-and-eternity, seeking to establish an 'ontology' of time alone, without any trans-temporal reference (though this position is somewhat modified in the later essays). Unlike Bergson, however, he does not conceive time as pure succession, but as the unity of three differentiated elements (past, present, future), none of which is reducible to the others. It is just this notion of time as "number of motion in respect of before and after,"¹ that is, as succession, which has prevented western philosophy from seeing its true nature ever since Aristotle gave it this definition.² Radical as Bergson's philosophy of time seems, Heidegger believes that at the decisive point he must be classed with Kant and Hegel as a proponent of the Aristotelian view of time as the succession of "before" and "after."³

It will be the task of the present essay to show that in abandoning any trans-temporal reference, Heidegger simultaneously cuts the ground from under the possibility of free-

¹Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 11, #219b, 1. Cited by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, p. 421.

²One must immediately except the Augustinian analysis of time. See Confessions, Bk. XI, ch. x-xxx.

³See SZ, #82. One may well ask, if time is no longer considered as succession, exactly what meaning the word is to have.

dom. Where Kierkegaard maintained both time and eternity in a situation of "dialectical tension", Heidegger confines himself to time alone and thereby lets freedom elude him. This is the justification for his rejection of the application to his philosophy of the label "Existentialism."

Temporality as the Meaning of Sorge

Throughout the first section of Sein und Zeit there are suggestions that Sorge, with its three structural elements, will eventually be related to time, in the second section. How can this transition be accomplished? If the constituent of Sorge called "conditioned-ness" (Befindlichkeit) be taken as a point of departure, it is seen that it relates primarily, though not exclusively, to the past. Its emotional "condition" is derived from the environmental "conditions" which so largely determine it. This "facticity" of Dasein--the "fact" that I am of a given nationality, geographical location, heredity, historic period--has happened to me already; it makes me feel as though I had been hurled into a world under conditions beyond my control. This is why Dasein, as conditioned (befindlich), may be said to contain the past within itself.¹

In the same way, comprehension (Verstehen) relates chiefly to the future, especially in its capacity to "project"

¹See SZ, #68 b. Heidegger attempts to show that not only Angst, the authentic mode of Befindlichkeit, but even fear, the unauthentic, relate primarily, though not exclusively, to the past.

(entwerfen). For it, as it "runs ahead in thought"¹ (vorlaufen) to Dasein's authentic or unauthentic possibilities, the future is in some sense already present. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, Dasein is in some sense already future. For one of the definitive characteristics of Dasein is "to be ahead of itself" (sich-vorweg-sein), and Heidegger attaches so much importance to it that he calls it 'existentiality' itself.²

In the present, both past and future are held together in a unity of three different elements which neither mutually exclude each other, nor are mutually reducible to one another. Thus understood, Dasein may be said to be already and to be not yet.³ In order to avoid confusion, Heidegger speaks of this tri-partite unity, not as time, but as temporality (Zeitlichkeit); and since it includes the three 'existentialia' of Sorge, he can also say that temporality is the very meaning of Sorge.⁴

Ecstatic Transcendence

The kind of unity constituted by the three "moments" of time is not the kind to which ordinary language and logic are suited. Enough has already been said to distinguish it

¹This is Werner Brock's translation of vorlaufen as Heidegger uses it.

²See SZ, #68 a.

³See SZ, p. 409.

⁴See SZ, pp. 326, 364, 436.

unmistakably from a "substance" with "accidents", or a subject in which predicates inhere. It being rather a differentiated unity, Heidegger must coin new words, and give new meanings to old ones, in order to speak about it. For present purposes, two of these are especially important: ecstasy and transcendence.

a) Ecstasy (Ekstase). The word "ecstasy" is used in the most literal sense: "a standing outside (oneself)". Instead of applying it to a subjective experience, however, he applies it to that in his philosophy which stands outside itself; namely, the three constituents of temporality: past, present, and future, which he regularly refers to as "ecstasies". In the unity of temporality, for example, the present "stands outside itself" in so far as it is to some extent already future (see above), as well as still past. Temporality, he says, is never really past (vergangen), but only has been (gewesen).¹ It is a future which has been and which renders itself present (gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft).² There is an irreducible difference between the three ecstasies, but their mutual interpenetration is so complete that it is impossible to speak of one without also speaking of all three.³ This is why they are called ec-static. The past rises out of itself into the present and future; the future "has been"

¹See SZ, p. 328.

²See SZ, p. 326.

³See SZ, p. 145.

and also "is-present"; the present binds past and future together.¹ It is not at all that the three overlap, like the successive runners in a relay race; rather, they are not to be thought of as successive at all,² but as in a state of tension (Gespanntheit) within the unity of temporality.³ This ecstatic unity combines not only the three elements of temporality, but also the three 'existentialia', binding them together and thus constituting Sorge, the very 'being' of Dasein.⁴

To deny that the three 'ecstasies' are successive would seem to take the dynamic out of time, and reduce it to a static condition, but this is the opposite of Heidegger's intention. To express his conception of the dynamic aspect, he speaks of it as continually "temporalizing itself" (sich zeitigen). This process is itself 'ecstatic', because by it the three 'ecstasies' are articulated.⁵ So strongly does this description emphasize the dynamic quality that it is

¹See SZ, #66.

²See SZ, p. 350.

³See SZ, p. 423. In an article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philip Merlan has shown the relation of Heidegger's 'ecstasies' of time to Husserl's account of consciousness as always containing within itself the "retention" of the past and the "protension" of the future. In Merlan's paraphrase, I am "shalling-be", I am "having-been", Vol. VIII, Sept., 1947, pp. 23-53.

⁴See SZ, pp. 331, 350.

⁵See SZ, p. 329.

no longer even proper to say that time is; instead, one must say, "Time temporalizes itself,"¹ or "Time is the temporalization of temporality."²

Finally, it is noteworthy that time so conceived is not endless, but comes to an end. This is because time is always somebody's time; there is no disembodied time apart from Dasein (the status of animals is not mentioned). Time is always my time (jemeinig); and my time will always end--at death.

b) Transcendence. Closely related to "ecstasy" in Heidegger's usage is the word transcendence (Transzendenz). Commentators have not always agreed as to how many senses of the word are to be found in his writings, but de Waelhens manages to bring some unity into the various usages by considering them all as aspects of Dasein's self-temporalization.⁴ The basic meaning attached to the word is that of "passing beyond," or "surpassing" (Übersteig--note the similarity to the use of "ecstasy"), which contains also that toward which and that from which the surpassing occurs, and even the process in which it occurs. In the first place, Dasein transcends itself toward the world; that is, it is transcendent by virtue of being-in-the-world, instead of an isolated subject. Second, it transcends the world in the direction of

¹See SZ, p. 328.

²See SZ, p. 331.

³Ibid.

⁴Op. cit., ch. 13, 14. This entire paragraph is based on de Waelhens' extremely helpful analysis.

of Being (that is, of intelligibility), for it has conferred meaningfulness upon the brute chaos (Grundverborgenheit) into which all objects in the world would otherwise lapse; correlative with this is the transcendence out of this primordial nothingness, which plays such a prominent role in Was ist Metaphysik? Third, Dasein transcends itself toward its own future; it is always ahead of itself. Closer scrutiny of these three kinds of transcendence reveals their relation to the 'existentialia' of Sorge and to the 'ecstasies' of temporality: the first relates to facticity (the past), the second to Verstehen as dis-covery of truth, the third to Verstehen as 'project' (future). All three are thus aspects of the process in which Dasein is constituted; that is, in which temporality temporalizes itself. As Heidegger remarks, to say that Dasein transcends is tautological.¹

Most important for the present purpose is to observe what "transcendent" does not mean for Heidegger. In one of its ordinary uses it refers to that which is beyond time and/or space, frequently in the religious sense of a "transcendent God". Such usage connotes the greater perfection of the trans-finite over the finite. But for Heidegger, the word connotes the opposite--the incompleteness of that which transcends, for it transcends toward that which it is not yet (in the case of the future), or toward that which limits it (in the case of the world). In this sense, trans-

¹Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 81 (cited by de Waelhens, op. cit., p. 248.

cendence is really the stigma of incompleteness, whether owing to Dasein's being not yet its own future possibilities, or to its requiring a reference to what is outside itself (the world).

Finally, as already implied, and as commentators have so frequently pointed out,¹ transcendence is no longer to be contrasted with immanence, but occurs strictly within the finite. It is, as Jean Wahl says, a "transcendence within immanence."²

Authentic History

When he finally correlates the three 'existentialia' of Sorge with the three 'ecstasies' of temporality,³ Heidegger contrasts the authentic and unauthentic modes with respect to past, present, and future, and ultimately outlines a philosophy of history on this basis. An authentic past consists, not in attempting to deny one's 'conditionedness', (Befindlichkeit), one's 'facticity', by unauthentically forgetting it, but in fully understanding one's relatedness, and accepting it. This acceptance is manifest in the repetition

¹Cf. Emmanuel Mounier, Existentialist Philosophies, trans. Eric Blow (London: Rockliff, Ltd., 1948), p. 124. Helmut Kuhn, in Encounter with Nothingness (Hinsdale, Illinois: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), points out the reflexive aspect of this "extending beyond oneself." For although Dasein does transcend toward the world and toward the future, the ultimate reference is back again on itself, for this is precisely the meaning of self-concern.

²Op. cit., p. 15.

³See SZ, #68.

(Wiederholung, a term adapted from Kierkegaard) of one's own past, whereby Dasein acknowledges and reaffirms its own incomplete, fragmentary, dependent existence. The authentic future is distinguished from its counterpart as follows: the unauthentic drives Dasein from immediate future to immediate future with impatient expectance (Gewärtigen), ignoring its own most intimate and most extreme possibility, whereas the authentic runs ahead in thought to precisely this possibility: death, which represents the impossibility of any further possibilities (the vital significance of death for Heidegger's philosophy will be considered below). Finally, the unauthentic present, forgetting its past and ignoring death, flits from moment to moment, having lost itself, yet under the illusion of well-being. It dares never delay, and is therefore termed aufenthaltlos ("without a stop").¹ Contrasted with this is the Augenblick (literally, "moment", but with a special significance; also adapted from Kierkegaard), an ecstatic retention of past and future² in which the resolute decision of authentic Dasein comes to grips with the situation. Whatever action is taken will depend on the relation of the given situation to Dasein's own ultimate possibility, death. Since this eventuality is at all times decisive, the future has a certain primacy over the other two 'ecstasies'.³

¹See SZ, p. 347.

²See SZ, p. 338.

³See SZ, pp. 329, 427.

As applied to history, these conceptions determine whether history itself is genuine or not.¹ A brief account of authentic history will suffice: Repetition, as applied to history, means that Dasein embraces the cultural tradition out of which it springs. Choosing the heritage (Erbe) bequeathed to it by its predecessors, it finds therein its own destiny (Schicksal)². More specifically, it chooses for repetition some hero of the past whose possibilities it decides to realize for itself.³ But the chief emphasis is not individualistic, but collective: Dasein joins with others of its own generation to fulfill the common destiny (Geschick) of their common heritage. To this end, authentic Dasein stands ready at any moment to choose its own death (the kinship to Nietzsche is obvious here). In thus "being-for-death" (sein zum Tode), Dasein acquires a super-power, which becomes especially evident in battle.⁴ It is this "eschatological neopaganism"⁵ which becomes more pronounced in the essays on Hölderlin.

¹See SZ, Section II, ch. 5.

²See SZ, p. 384.

³See SZ, p. 385.

⁴See SZ, p. 384.

⁵Helmut Kuhn so describes the essays on Hölderlin in op. cit., pp. 12, 152.

The Turning Point in Heidegger's Philosophy

Heidegger's philosophy has been presented thus far with the deliberate aim of withholding as long as possible what is certainly one of the gravest problems in his thought, as well as the decisive factor in his conception of freedom. Though present from the earliest chapters of Sein und Zeit, it is so well camouflaged that the reader is apt to discover it only in retrospect, when he re-traverses the tortuous course of the argument up to the point where the problem can be concealed no longer. This point occurs when Heidegger sets about correlating the three 'existentialia' of Sorge with the three 'ecstasies' of time. Preparatory to doing this, he recapitulates the three 'existentialia', and the startled reader encounters first, facticity; second, Existenz; and third, no longer speech at all, but -- VERFALLEN!¹ Whereas the 'fallen' condition was formerly presented as a possible mode of Dasein, it has suddenly become constitutive! Speech, which was formerly presented as the third element of Sorge,² is briefly referred to as comprising rather the totality of temporality, with special reference to the present,³ but declines in importance throughout the remainder of the book. Henceforth Verfallen is regularly listed as the third of the 'existentialia', as for example in the statement:

¹See SZ, p. 249 f.

²See SZ, #34.

³See SZ, #68 d.

The unity of the constitutive moments of Sorge, that is, of "existentiality," "facticity," and "fallen-ness," made possible the previous ontological circumscription of the structural totality of Dasein as a whole.¹

It may well be precisely owing to its conspicuousness, when once spotted, that this inconsistency has eluded so many commentators. Werner Brock, for example, is content to say, "The 'Verfallensein', though it is a movement into 'unauthenticity', is manifest in some respects in every Dasein."² Once this statement is made (and it may very probably be true to Heidegger's own position), then the difference between authenticity and unauthenticity has become blurred, has become a mere difference of perspective. And in that case, the choice between the two, upon which freedom was based, has lost its importance. This is the conclusion which the remainder of this essay hopes to substantiate. For the sake of emphasis, the following passages are cited in order to show beyond all doubt the way in which unauthenticity, or "fallen-ness," is sometimes referred to as a possible mode, and sometimes as constitutive of Dasein:

On the one hand, Verfallen definitely characterizes the unauthentic mode, with its public prattle, curiosity,

¹"Die Einheit der konstitutiven Momente der Sorge, der Existentialität, Faktizität, und Verfallenheit, ermöglichen die erste ontologische Umgrenzung der Ganzheit des Strukturganzen des Daseins." SZ, pp. 316f. Italics mine.

²Op. cit., p. 63.

and ambiguity;¹ on the other, and indeed on the very next page in Sein und Zeit, it is definitive for Dasein (eine existentielle Bedingung).² At one time, it is a possible mode;³ at another it is listed with the structural elements of Sorge.⁴ At scattered points throughout the book Heidegger repeats that Dasein is zunächst und zumeist verfallen, that is, primarily and generally;⁵ yet equally throughout the second half of Sein und Zeit he lists Verfallen as one of the constitutive elements of Dasein.⁶ At one point, Heidegger appears to consider this fundamental ambiguity himself, but in actual fact he simply gives it his blessing! This occurs toward the end of the book, where he explains why the terms zunächst und zumeist are used of the every-day state of Dasein: the gist of his remark is that zunächst refers to the fact that Dasein is always disclosed as "banal"; zumeist refers to the fact that Dasein is not always, but only as a general rule, lost in the public "everyone"!⁷ This remarkable statement goes

¹See SZ, p. 175.

²See SZ, p. 176.

³See SZ, p. 176.

⁴See SZ, p. 325.

⁵See SZ, p. 251.

⁶See SZ, pp. 284, 346.

⁷"'Zunächst' bedeutet: die Weise in der das Dasein im Miteinander der Öffentlichkeit 'offenbar' ist, mag es auch 'im Grunde' die Alltäglichkeit gerade existentiell 'überwunden' haben. 'Zumeist' bedeutet: die Weise, in der das Dasein nicht immer, aber 'in der Regel', sich für Jederman zeigt." SZ, p. 370. Does the fact that "im Grunde" and "überwunden" are in quotation marks suggest that they are to be taken metaphorically?

far toward corroborating the suggestion already made to the effect that the distinction between the two modes becomes less and less clear -- until in the end it becomes a purely formal one, and, what amounts to the same thing, wholly arbitrary.

An Illustration

In the earlier development of the structure of Dasein, the three 'existentialia' were described as neutral constituents which could assume an authentic or an unauthentic mode, and it was suggested that this neutral ground, from which Dasein chose one possibility or the other, was indispensable to freedom. When these 'existentialia' were integrated with Heidegger's conception of time, however, the neutral ground suddenly vanished, and Dasein as such was declared to be "fallen". The implications for freedom of this inconsistency will be considered subsequently. Suffice it to note for the present that if Heidegger continues to speak of freedom, it is entirely to be expected that this notion of a neutral ground from which to choose would constantly reappear, and so indeed it does, just as value judgments, though explicitly denied, were seen to be continually insinuated into the discussion. An illustration is herewith offered of this disappearance and reappearance of an evanescent middle ground with particular reference to what he calls "world time" or "public time".

Heidegger's account of time differs so drastically from what is ordinarily meant by the word that he has to say

something about ordinary time. Perhaps surprisingly, he calls it "genuine" (echte), and criticizes Bergson for regarding it as a quantitative corruption of qualitative durée.¹ In addition to this world time (Weltzeit), however, there must also be an unauthentic time, called vulgar (vulgäre Zeit). What is the distinction between these two, the one defended against Bergson's charge of degeneration, the other regarded in much the same way as the French philosopher regarded clock time? The answer to this question involves the same problem of a neutral ground. Although he begins by distinguishing sharply between the two, in the end he has predicated of the one so much of what was already attributed to the other, that the distinction between the two is extremely difficult to see. The present purpose is not so much to bring order out of the confusion as to illustrate it.

World time, or public time,² is that in which Dasein is actively engaged in following its various pursuits in the world. For it, time is always time for, in the sense of time for work, time for dinner, time for bed.³ In order to give meaning to its world at all, Dasein must be able to order it by giving dates to the various events he experiences. The principal function of world time is therefore to make it possible to date them as now, as then (future), or as at that

¹See SZ, pp. 333, 418.

²See SZ, p. 426.

³See SZ, p. 414.

time (past).¹ Without this Dasein could not give meaning to its world, and it is, in fact, generated, like the world, as an aspect of the self-temporalization of Dasein.² Since it is thus a correlate of the world, every "now" of this kind of time has its own corresponding "there".³ The reckoning of time began, in fact, with the correlation "there-now", "now-there" (this leads to an elaborate explanation of the origin of keeping time by the sun).⁴ The present therefore enjoys a certain primacy in the public time.⁵

This genuine world time, however, can become corrupted into an unauthentic vulgar time.⁶ In a manner strongly reminiscent of Bergson,⁷ Heidegger characterizes this process as mistaking the calculation for that which is calculated,⁸ with the result that world time becomes spatialized.⁹ This happens because Dasein forgets that every "now" is correlated with a particular place and a particular concern, that every

¹See SZ, p. 407.

²See SZ, pp. 419f.

³See SZ, p. 408.

⁴See SZ, pp. 415ff.

⁵See SZ, pp. 354, 403, 408.

⁶See SZ, pp. 422, 424, 426.

⁷Jean Wahl does not hesitate to say that Heidegger is ultimately reduced to a conception of true time and spurious time very like that of Bergson. Op. cit., p. 22.

⁸See SZ, pp. 412, 416.

⁹See SZ, pp. 335, 411, 423.

"now" is a "now-there" and a "time-for".¹ All moments of time are thereby reduced to a common level (nivelliert),² and time is conceived as an endless flow of identical "now's"; as such, it is termed "now-time" (Jetztzeit),³ and is responsible for the spurious notion of eternity as a timeless moment.⁴ Thus reduced to mere succession, vulgar time is no longer capable of giving dates or meaning to events within the world,⁵ and is therefore asserted to be unauthentic and "fallen".⁶

This discussion of Heidegger's distinction between the two kinds of time (each different from 'temporality' as already described) is intended primarily to illustrate one point: the constant oscillation in his philosophy between a middle ground (in this case, world time) out of which either authenticity or unauthenticity might develop, and, on the other hand, the tendency to define Dasein as such as unauthentic. Concomitant with this trend is the obscuring of the difference between the two modes. Our thesis is that if "authentic" and "unauthentic" are to retain their meaning, there must be some sort of prius from whose point of vantage Dasein chooses the

¹See SZ, p. 422.

²See SZ, p. 424.

³See SZ, pp. 422, 427.

⁴See SZ, p. 427, note.

⁵See SZ, p. 422.

⁶See SZ, pp. 422, 424, 426.

one mode or the other. But on the basis of Heidegger's refusal to transcend temporality, no such vantage point is available. The result is that the distinction between the two modes does in fact become obscured, while the appearance of a neutral ground is from time to time maintained. The evidence for this in the present case is as follows:

The above treatment endeavored as far as possible to preserve a distinction between the two kinds of time, but nevertheless, at least two difficulties emerge, even within this artificially clarified presentation: In the first place, in world time the present is primary; yet vulgar time is known as "now-time." Secondly, the former dates events by relating them to past, present, and future, while the latter consists "merely" in the succession of before and after. In each of these two cases, it becomes extremely difficult to discern the difference between the two kinds of time, and the difficulty amounts to impossibility when it is said that datability depends upon the notion of before-and-after,¹ and that meaningfulness depends upon the "now-structure."² Datability and meaningfulness apply to world time, but before-and-after and the "now-structure" apply to vulgar time! The confusion is exacerbated when it is recalled that world time is "public", though not "fallen"; in general, however, "public" means pre-

¹See SZ, pp. 406, 407.

²See SZ, p. 422.

cisely "fallen"¹--as when Heidegger speaks of vulgar time itself as public!² Elsewhere he states that world time is a correlate of Dasein's "thrown-ness" (Geworfenheit); now, as will be brought out below, Heidegger is ultimately reduced to equating the "fallen" state with the facticity or "thrown-ness" of Dasein. In this particular context, however, as he is anxious to distinguish world time from vulgar time, he speaks of it as "'authentic' public time"--with "authentic" in quotation marks!³ This utter confusion is worse confounded when he states at one point that world time arises from Dasein's preoccupation with the world⁴ (which was earlier characterized as unauthentic!), and at another that vulgar time has the same origin!⁵ Similarly, he deplores at one time the prevalence of vulgar time since Aristotle's definition,⁶ and at another states that although it indeed belongs to the everyday mode, it has its own proper place.⁷ If this be true, then what is left of world time? Has it not in fact been absorbed?

The foregoing citations have been designed to show conclusively that, whether consciously or otherwise, Heidegger's philosophy represents an attempt to have it both ways. On the one hand, he maintains to the end a formal distinction between world time and vulgar time. But on closer examination the distinction vanishes. In the following section it will be

¹See SZ, p. 175.

⁵See SZ, p. 422.

²See SZ, p. 425.

⁶See SZ, p. 421.

³See SZ, p. 412.

⁷See SZ, p. 426.

⁴See SZ, p. 407.

further emphasized that in a similar way a formal distinction is made between the unauthentic mode and the neutral ground out of which it can develop, but that in fact this distinction is obscured. And moreover, when this occurs, freedom no longer has any vantage point from which to choose, with the result that the distinction between the two modes themselves becomes a merely formal one. And on such a basis, authenticity will be reduced merely to the recognition of one's "fallen-ness". Of this parody of freedom there is already a hint in the discussion of world time, when Heidegger says that "vulgar time knows only world time."¹ Might not this imply that world time knows of another kind of time, namely temporality, and that the difference between world time and public time simply consists in this knowledge? The following section will attempt to show that this is in fact the interpretation required when the distinction between the two modes becomes obscured.

D - FREEDOM UNDERMINED

In the previous section it was suggested that the fate of freedom, hanging in the balance from the beginning of Sein und Zeit, is finally sealed when Heidegger attempts to relate it to his theory of time. The failure of this attempt was

¹See SZ, p. 427.

signalized by the necessity of regarding unauthenticity, not merely as an option, but as constitutive of Dasein. The time has now come to relate this fundamental ambiguity with an equally important ambivalence mentioned earlier; namely, the fact that any normative connotation in the word "authentic" is vigorously denied, yet definitely implied. It can now be seen that both these ambiguities belong together:

1) If an evaluative judgment is placed upon the two modes, as by implication it certainly is, then this can only mean that, as Heidegger so often says, Dasein is free to choose one or the other. But if this is the case, then it will not do to say that Dasein as such is unauthentic. It chooses the "fallen" state.

2) If, on the other hand, Heidegger be taken at face value, and the two modes regarded merely as descriptions, then Heidegger can indeed say that unauthenticity is constitutive; but if Dasein as such is "fallen," then what about the authentic state? Has it any relevance? In the face of such a question, there are two possible answers, each equally fatal to freedom:

a) It is possible to blur the distinction between the two modes; or

b) It is possible to regard the authentic as simply the recognition of the unauthentic.

As has been suggested, and will be further substantiated, Heidegger resorts to both these answers.

3) Heidegger's philosophy consists to a considerable extent of an intricate interweaving of the two mutually exclusive alternatives just listed as (1) and (2). Since one permits freedom and the other does not, an investigation like the present one is confronted with the endless task of sifting the elements belonging to one strand from those pertinent to the other. Symptomatic of Heidegger's protean propensities is the alternate disappearance and recurrence of what has already been referred to as a neutral ground on the basis of which Dasein becomes authentic or otherwise. It is at once apparent that some such ground will be a necessary correlate of alternative number (1) above, in which a) normative value is attributed to authenticity, and b) the two modes are possibilities, not constituents, of Dasein. For if Dasein becomes authentic (or unauthentic) on the basis of choice, there must be something logically prior to either mode, something which makes the choice and which becomes (even if in fact this prius is never found in abstraction from one of the two modes, as a chameleon is always either brown or green).

(Parenthetically, it can be noted here that the analogy of the chameleon introduces still another complication in the problem of freedom. For on such a basis the colors, since no longer taken as constitutive of the lizard, but only incidental, thenceforth lose their importance. The distinction between them is maintained, but its importance disappears. This is what lies behind the logician's perennial disparage-

ment of normative judgments: "That which chooses," he says, "is prior to that which is chosen." Reduced to its simplest terms, this statement reads, "Becoming presupposes Being." This is why ethics has seldom fared well at the hands of logicians. Heidegger, however, has precluded this particular position in Sein und Zeit by breaking with the traditional logic, with its notion of a substantial subject,¹ and suggesting that Being itself is to be comprehended in terms of temporality. This highly original approach, however, leads to so many difficulties that in the later essays he points the way back to something resembling the old idealist view, in which the two modes are to be distinguished, but emphatically not in any normative sense).

Returning to the main point of paragraph number (3), it remains to be said that any sort of neutral ground, while demanded by paragraph (1), is precluded by (2). For if Dasein as such is "fallen," then it is not neutral. Consequently, as Heidegger oscillates between the position of (1) and that of (2), the neutral ground will alternately recur and disappear. This has already been shown to be the case in the discussion of world time and vulgar time. Some additional illustrations are herewith adduced in order to emphasize the point.

¹See SZ, #64.

The Evanescent Middle Ground

Enough has perhaps been said about the significance of what would seem to be an attempt on Heidegger's part to have the best of both worlds, when he sometimes speaks of Dasein as choosing one of the two modes from a basis prior to each, and at other times regards Dasein itself as unauthentic. Suffice it here to adduce a few further illustrations to corroborate this ambiguity as already discovered in the discussion of world time and vulgar time. Nowhere is this ambivalence more obvious than in paragraph #38 of Sein und Zeit, where he discusses the relation between unauthenticity, on the one hand, and the very nature of Dasein as being-in-the-world, on the other. It becomes clear that such a discussion is bound to encounter an insoluble problem: for in describing the "fallen" mode, he insisted that it meant being preoccupied with the world; but if the very nature of Dasein is being-in-the-world, then it would seem that such preoccupation is precisely an affirmation of what Dasein authentically is, and conversely, that to decry such preoccupation is to misunderstand the nature of Dasein. As will be brought out below, Heidegger actually does fall into his own trap by frequently attributing the hallmarks of one mode to its counterpart, so that a characteristic like Angst is sometimes declared to be authentic, sometimes unauthentic. The present concern, however, is to emphasize another aspect of his dilemma; namely, the fact that in a circuitous way he has

defined both Dasein itself and the "fallen" mode in a way which leads to their hopeless confusion, if not indeed their actual identification with each other.

Heidegger himself explicitly recognizes the question of a neutral ground of which the two modes are modifications, which partakes of the given mode without being identified with it:

Nevertheless the appearance will doubtless remain that being-in-the-world functions merely as the framework within which Dasein's possible relations with the world run their course without essentially touching the framework itself. This supposed "framework," however, itself shares in the particular mode of Dasein. An existential mode of being-in-the-world is recorded in the phenomenon of "fallen-ness."¹

With this position the standpoint of the present essay is in entire accord. A free agent must be described in terms of a 'framework' which, though fundamentally affected by his decisions and choices, yet partially transcends them.² Traditional metaphysics has frequently fulfilled the latter condition only; that is, has considered the substantial self as essentially unaffected by decisions in time. In repudiating this position, Heidegger has simultaneously confined himself to the former of the two conditions. For the two modes are temporal phenomena--and beyond temporality there is nothing.³

¹SZ, p. 176.

²It will be recalled that for Heidegger transcendence occurs within time. Temporality itself is not transcended.

³This position is modified in the later essays.

There is therefore no possibility of a 'framework' which 'shares in' temporal phenomena. There are only temporal phenomena themselves. It can now be recognized that two different strands of Heidegger's thought converge upon the elimination of a 'framework' or neutral ground: first, it is metaphysically impossible to transcend temporal phenomena; and second, he himself ultimately regards being-in-the-world as a curse. For both these reasons (each to be more fully elaborated below) the 'framework' tends to drop out, and being-in-the-world as such is declared to be "fallen."

This ambivalent attitude toward the neutral ground is nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in Heidegger's use of the word Alltaglichkeit ("every-day-ness," "banality"), which in fact is used to cover both the 'framework' and the "fallen" mode. That such a usage leads to hopeless confusion goes without saying; it also gives the illusion of establishing a genuine neutral ground in some contexts, and in others of making the identification of unauthenticity and Dasein's nature itself which is required by Dasein's failure to transcend temporality.¹ Thus in one context Heidegger says that Alltaglichkeit is undifferentiated; that is, it is taken without regard to either mode.² But on the very next page he curiously alters this conception by saying that Alltaglichkeit contains

¹Sein und Zeit, paragraphs #9 and #71, are especially relevant.

²See SZ, p. 43.

the structure of Dasein in the unauthentic mode.¹ Similarly, Dasein is usually spoken of as primarily and generally (zunächst and zumeist) alltäglich, as well as zunächst und zumeist verfallen. Elsewhere it is stated that Alltäglichkeit can never be dissolved (this is consonant with interpreting it as a 'framework'), but that it can be "mastered" in the Augenblick (although the Augenblick is regularly said to "master" the unauthentic mode). This same ambiguity is further illustrated by speaking of verfallende Alltäglichkeit:² the participle can either be taken definitively, as in "blue sky," or incidentally, as in "cold water." Finally, it is stated that Alltäglichkeit is a "manner of being" (what is this but a mode?) which belongs to "public obviousness" (öffentliche Offenbarkeit).³ But this same public character describes the unauthentic mode!⁴

It is becoming patent that several words are used interchangeably to mean now one thing, now another.⁵ Geworfenheit, for example, is generally used to make more

¹See SZ, p. 44.

²For example, see SZ, p. 179.

³See SZ, p. 371.

⁴See SZ, p. 175.

⁵Particularly illustrative of this point are the two words (difficult to translate) gewärtigen and gegenwärtigen. The former is declared to be authentic (p. 363), neutral (p. 409), and unauthentic (pp. 337, 343). The latter is likewise authentic (p. 326), neutral (p. 409), and unauthentic (p. 338). When Werner Brock speaks of gegenwärtigen as authentic (op. cit., p. 94) and also as unauthentic (p. 97), he is being entirely true to the text of Sein und Zeit.

vivid Dasein's feeling of having been "hurled" into the world. As such, it is an aspect of Befindlichkeit, and should be constitutive of Dasein. Indeed, it is once specifically designated as neutral with regard to the two modes, and is contrasted with the unauthentic Abkehr (withdrawal).¹ But nothing more is said about Abkehr, and Geworfenheit itself is elsewhere equivalent to the unauthentic mode.²

Distinction between the Modes Obscured

The preceding analysis has attempted to show the convergence of two strands of Heidegger's thought upon the same point. On the one hand, the failure to transcend temporality, on the other, the tendency to equate unauthenticity with being-in-the-world -- both these elements of his thought combine to preclude in fact what is sometimes claimed in name; namely, a neutral ground or framework of which the modes are modifications, and from which they are chosen. Once this occurs, as indicated above, three possibilities are open: 1) the distinction between the modes becomes blurred; 2) unauthenticity becomes definitive, with authenticity the mere awareness of the fallen state; 3) the distinction between the modes is maintained, but loses all

¹See SZ, p. 136.

²See SZ, p. 179.

importance. Heidegger resorts to all three of these possibilities, the first of which is discussed immediately below, the second in the following sub-section, and the third in the final section of the chapter.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of how the distinction between the two modes becomes obscured is Heidegger's own statement:

Unauthentic, however, in no way means "not authentic", as though Dasein could in this mode go without its own being altogether.¹

In view of this admission, it is not surprising that several characteristics of one mode should be applied as well to the other. An outstanding example is Angst ("anxious dread", another Kierkegaardian adaptation), which in most contexts is the authentic reaction to being-in-the-world, especially in Was ist Metaphysik? It is in dread that Nothingness is revealed,² and "only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is what-is as such revealed in all its original overtones The essence of nothing as original nihilation lies in this: that it alone brings Dasein face to face with what-is as such."³ Such dread is an experience of uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit), of "bottomless hovering" (bodenloses

¹"Un- und nichteigentlich bedeutet aber keineswegs 'eigentlich nicht', als ginge das Dasein mit diesem Seinsmodus überhaupt seines Seins verlustig." SZ, p. 176.

²See "What is Metaphysics?", in Existence and Being, p. 368.

³Ibid., p. 369.

Schweben).¹ Yet precisely these same two experiences are elsewhere attributed to the unauthentic mode² (though as a rule unauthenticity is characterized by complacency and indifference).³ This ambivalence explains why according to Jean Wahl, Heidegger's 'resolute decision' (Entschlossenheit) "can and must triumph over this experience" (that is, of Angst);⁴ whereas according to de Waelhens, the exact opposite is true: Entschlossenheit consists precisely in accepting Angst.⁵

Similar contradictions occur with regard to other characteristics of the two modes. The unauthentic, for example, is at one time beunruhigt,⁶ at another beruhigend⁷ (that is, "disquieted" and "soothing", respectively). Again, the authentic Dasein is at one time isolated,⁸ at another in harmonious relations with others.⁹ Likewise is Fürsorge (concern for others) sometimes overcome in the au-

¹See ibid., p. 366.

²See SZ, pp. 177f; also the Brief über den Humanismus, p. 86.

³See SZ, pp. 43, 254f.

⁴Op. cit., p. 22.

⁵See op. cit., p. 170.

⁶See SZ, p. 126.

⁷See SZ, p. 177.

⁸See SZ, p. 323.

⁹See SZ, p. 298.

thentic mode,¹ sometimes not.² Finally, speech is declared to be the very "house of Being,"³ whereas elsewhere it is silence which is authentic.⁴

Heidegger, however, is not without a means of protection against the charge of self-contradiction. As regards silence, for example, he says it is a mode of speech!⁵ Likewise, complacency is a mode of uncanniness;⁶ isolation is a mode of being with others;⁷ concern for others means severing relations with them.⁸ Leaving aside the question of whether a logic of contradiction is possible, one is constrained to say that at any rate Heidegger has not developed one, and that his ambiguous use of the same terms to describe both the authentic and unauthentic modes serves to obliterate the distinction between them, and thereby to make the choice of modes irrelevant. He cannot really glorify Entschlossenheit if there is no real difference between them.

The same ambivalence persists regarding the relative

¹See SZ, p. 266.

²See SZ, p. 263. Fürsorge is also said to be neutral, p. 122.

³See the "Brief über den Humanismus," p. 53.

⁴See SZ, #34.

⁵Ibid.

⁶See SZ, p. 189.

⁷See SZ, p. 188. Hence Dasein's structure can be both with-others and isolated (p. 295).

⁸See SZ, p. 122.

primordially of the modes. At times they are equally primordial (see final section), at times the authentic is more so, and at times the unauthentic. Thus he can say that the original comprehension of Being (Seinsverständnis) is distorted by the "fallen" mode;¹ the authentic mode is primordial;² "unauthenticity is based upon authenticity;"³ the unauthentic is a modification of the authentic mode.⁴ But in Sein und Zeit, at least, far greater emphasis is to the opposite effect; that is, that Dasein is essentially "fallen".

Dasein essentially Unauthentic

Not only does Heidegger prefer to regard Dasein as essentially unauthentic, but also the contexts in which he does this are among those which most strongly imply a negative evaluation of this mode.

This permanent breaking away from the very authenticity which it always simulates, together with the lapse into 'everyone', characterizes the agitation of 'fallen-ness' as a swirling vortex. 'Fallen-ness' does not only determine the being-in-the-world existentially. The vortex reveals at the same time the character of 'thrown-ness' (Geworfenheit) as thrust and as agitation, which can intrude upon Dasein in its conditionedness (Befindlichkeit). This 'thrown-ness', though a fact, is neither completed nor isolated. It is because of this facticity that Dasein, as long as it is what it is, remains in this thrust and is sucked into the unauthenticity of 'everyone'. 'Thrown-ness',

¹See SZ, p. 206.

²See SZ, p. 233.

³SZ, p. 259.

⁴See SZ, p. 317.

in which facticity becomes phenomenologically observable, belongs to Dasein, which in its very being is concerned about it. Dasein exists factually.¹

This single paragraph contains the basis of Heidegger's dominant attitude in Sein und Zeit; namely, that it is Dasein's facticity that is responsible for the unauthentic mode. In the traditional parlance, it is particularity that is man's curse, for particularity involves relatedness, incompleteness, dependence. It is these which he regards as man's guilt -- a word which, though he denies any normative connotation to it,² would surely not have been used except for the purpose of disparaging Dasein as such. Here Heidegger, in spite of his anti-rational bias, reveals his dependence upon the older metaphysics, and in particular upon Spinoza. For this negative evaluation of relatedness, incompleteness, and dependence, is simply a subtle transposition into the normative realm of Spinoza's terse dictum: "Determination is negation." It is indeed precisely negation which for Heidegger is the essence of Dasein's guilt. This is, however, no mere logical negation. Rather it is the pre-condition of there being such a thing as negation.³ It is a hypostasized Nothingness, and as such is positive.⁴

¹SZ, p. 178f.

²See SZ, p. 286.

³See "What is Metaphysics?" in Existence and Being, p.372.

⁴See ibid.; also SZ, p. 279.

Now Dasein itself is shot through and through with Nothingness, for it is factual, and as such is determinate; it therefore, since determination is negation, partakes of Nothingness. Furthermore, since Dasein is temporal, it has an element of "not yet" about it. This "not yet" constitutes a further stigma of Non-Being in the heart of Dasein. Finally, in so far as Dasein makes decisions, it necessarily excludes that which it does not choose. Hence freedom too is constituted by negativity and Nothingness.¹ As Heidegger says, "Without the original manifest character of Nothing there is no self-hood and no freedom."² Since temporality, facticity, and freedom are all infected with Nothingness, his estimate of Dasein as such is correspondingly low:

In the structure of "thrown-ness," as well as in the "project," there lies an essential Nothingness. And it is the ground of the possibility of the Nothingness of the unauthentic Dasein in the "fallen" mode, in which in fact it always is already. Sorge itself is in its essence shot through and through with Nothingness. Accordingly, this is the meaning of Sorge (which, as a 'project' which has been hurled into existence, constitutes the true nature of Dasein): To be the null ground of a Nothingness. And that in turn means: Dasein as such is guilty, provided that the formal existential determination of guilt as being the ground of a Nothingness prevails, as it should.³

This single paragraph makes both the points which it

¹See SZ, p. 285.

²What is Metaphysics?, p. 370. This is an embryonic expression of the 'neontic' view of freedom developed by Berdyaev.

³SZ, p. 285.

is the present purpose to emphasize. First, Dasein is essentially unauthentic, because permeated with Nothingness. And second, an evaluative judgment is placed upon this fact: Dasein is guilty. However much it is professed that "guilt" is not meant in this sense, the fact remains that the word in that case is entirely superfluous. If it were really used in an objective, descriptive sense, then it would suffice simply to describe Dasein as riddled with Nothingness, and leave it at that. But when this purely "objective" fact is characterized as guilt, then something new has been added: the fact has been interpreted to the shame of Dasein; a negative evaluation has been placed upon it.

Heidegger's view is here open to the same criticism as literal interpretations of the Christian doctrine of original sin. If "original" is understood as "constitutive", then sin loses its meaning. Heidegger appears to recognize the strength of this argument; otherwise, why is he at such pains in other contexts to insist that unauthenticity is chosen by Dasein? But when it finally becomes clear exactly what is meant by "unauthentic", namely, permeation by Nothingness, then the appearance of choice can no longer be maintained, for Dasein is constituted by Nothingness. Thus we have at long last arrived at the reason for the sudden insertion of Verfallen as one of the 'existentialia': Dasein, being fraught with Nothingness, is therefore unauthentic in its very nature -- though the appearance of choice may still

be maintained by the use of the word "guilt". Dasein is "essentially", in the very "ground of its being," guilty.¹

The voice of conscience, instead of calling man to his duty, calls Dasein to the understanding of its own Nothingness; that is, of its guilt.² When Entschlossenheit is considered in these terms, it is transformed into simple intellection, in contrast to the dynamic and decisive character it had earlier acquired.

Values Disparaged

As indicated above, Heidegger pronounces a negative judgment on dependence, incompleteness, and relatedness. In fact, all three of these terms can be reduced to the single one, relatedness. And if relatedness in turn be rendered as conditionedness, then Heidegger's low opinion of Dasein-as-related is seen to derive from the ancient metaphysical bias on behalf of the Unconditioned, as against the conditioned. Hence in regarding Dasein itself as unauthentic, 'fallen,' and guilty, he is pronouncing judgment on the relative as such.

On this basis, it is clear that he can have no use for values in the ethical sense, for they make relative distinctions. Hence he finds ethics merely a narrow dogmatism,³

¹See SZ, p. 286.

²See SZ, p. 287.

³See SZ, p. 316.

for its values attach men to beings, rather than to Being.¹ He himself is indifferent to purpose,² since it merely distinguishes between relatives. Helmut Kuhn even quotes a letter from Heidegger to Karl Löwith in which Heidegger explicitly denies any interest in whether the results of his absolute pursuits should be creative or destructive.³ Speaking of this refusal to take relative distinctions seriously, Jean Wahl states flatly that Heidegger has no ethics at all.⁴

But there is another and perhaps more penetrating sense in which Sartre is even more correct than Wahl; namely, when he states that it is impossible not to act in some sense of the word, and that every act implies value judgments (see above). For Heidegger does not simply distinguish between the absolute and the relative; he places a judgment of value upon the former as against the latter! Thus even he is forced to say that ethics is "thinking the truth of Being",⁵ and that mere value judgments constitute a "blasphemy" against Being.⁶ Under the guise of rejecting all value judgments in the name

¹See the Brief über den Humanismus, p. 99.

²See SZ, p. 383.

³Op. cit., p. 106.

⁴Op. cit., p. 27.

⁵See the Brief über den Humanismus, p. 109.

⁶See ibid., p. 99

of the Absolute, he subtly introduces value judgments of his own, with this significant difference: embroiled as he is in the world of decisions, he cannot avoid making them; but when he does make them, it is in the name of Being itself! Once the philosopher has logically demonstrated the worthlessness of everything relative, it seems to give him a sort of "philosopher's license" to behave with the authority of the Absolute in a world of relativities. Such a treatment of values has a twofold effect on freedom: a) the denial of values tends to militate against freedom, in so far as the grounds for choosing a "better" or a "worse" course of action are undercut; b) but at the same time an impetus is given for a titanic irresponsibility, for although one cannot escape the relative world and its decisions, one is tempted to try to represent the Absolute within this world by ignoring all relative values. Responsibility is itself a relation, and as such must be sacrificed to Being.

The Fate of the Self

In spite of what was said in the first section regarding suggestions of true selfhood in Heidegger, nevertheless the subsequent remarks must have carried the strongest implications to the contrary. For one thing, Dasein is always neuter--and most appropriately so, since it is described simply as "that which temporalizes itself in the

unity of the three ecstasies."¹ It is therefore not surprising that Heidegger abandons as unnecessary such words as "person," "spirit," "subject," "soul," and "consciousness."² Even the word "I" is abandoned; to use it is a mark of unauthenticity.³ In the authentic experience of Angst, all personal characteristics vanish: "It is not 'you' or 'I' that has this uncanny feeling, but 'one'." In the trepidation of this suspense, where there is nothing to hold on to, pure Da-sein is all that remains."⁴ In this authentic experience, man is changed into his Dasein!⁵ In so far as selfhood involves any individualizing characteristics, it is thus eliminated in the authentic mode. But just at this point Heidegger introduces another verbal ambiguity, using a traditional word with such a different meaning that the older connotations it retains are really contradicted by its content: for he states that only in authentic Angst is there a true self!⁶ What "self" may mean, after all that he has subtracted from it, is difficult to determine.

¹SZ, p. 307.

²See SZ, p. 46, note.

³See SZ, #64.

⁴What is Metaphysics?, p. 367. One wonders how this "one" differs from the anonymous "everyone" of the unauthentic mode!

⁵Ibid.

⁶See SZ, p. 323.

Can this "self" be said in any sense to transcend time? As already indicated, transcendence in this traditional sense is explicitly rejected.¹ It would, however, be too simple to say that because Dasein is temporality, it is time. For temporality, in Heidegger's usage, includes the idea of producing time, so that he can hold that Dasein "temporalizes itself." Might not that which produces time be regarded as in some sense beyond time? In actual fact, this is the very line which Heidegger takes in some of his later writings, but in Sein und Zeit, and for his thought generally, Dasein "temporalizes itself" without any trans-temporal basis. Certainly there is no self-identity (Selbstständigkeit) in the sense of a subject which endures throughout change. Rather "self-identity" consists in the resolute decision which runs forward in thought to Dasein's own most intimate and extreme possibilities.² This is the meaning of the famous statement, "The substance of Dasein is Existence."³ In traditional philosophy, the identity of the self was accounted for by postulating an "I-substance"; in denying this position, Heidegger says simply that the only thing that endures is change. And since change always involves a "not

¹See SZ, p. 49.

²See SZ, p. 322.

³See SZ, pp. 65, 117, 212, 314. Heidegger insists that in making this statement definitive for Existentialism, Sartre has completely misunderstood him. See the Brief über den Humanismus, pp. 68, 70.

yet", the "self", such as it is, is grounded in Nothingness.¹ Whatever shreds of selfhood may be gleaned from such an analysis, it is to be expected that on this basis Heidegger would proclaim in his discussion with the Humanists that man is of no importance.²

E - TRANSITION

The preceding section has attempted to show how one after another the prerequisites of freedom are eliminated from what at first appeared to be a promising picture of Dasein as free agent. Heidegger's failure to transcend time, plus his low evaluation of the conditions of finitude, conspire to: a) eliminate any possible middle ground from which a free choice could be made; b) obscure the distinction between the two modes which Dasein ostensibly "chooses"; c) eliminate values, and therewith the motives governing a free choice properly so called; d) reduce the modes to constituents of Dasein, instead of objects of choice; and e) strip the self of all recognizable characteristics (though the word "self", like the word "freedom", is retained). Once these prerequisites of freedom have been so thoroughly undercut, we can expect that when Heidegger speaks of freedom, his

¹See What is Metaphysics?, p. 370.

²See the Brief "über den Humanismus, p. 79.

real meaning will rather be some substitute for it. In actual fact, as will be brought out in the final section, he does not confine himself to one such substitute, but resorts to at least three. Preparatory to an inquiry into what these are, the present section, by indicating the basis upon which they are constructed, is transitional to the final one.

Freedom a Curse

If Dasein, because of its particularity and relatedness, is as such guilty, it follows that freedom, too, could not exist but for the very conditions which Heidegger calls guilt. For freedom always makes relative distinctions: it chooses this relative to that. In fact, the same may be said of consciousness itself. Simply in virtue of awareness alone, it is already related. To be aware is to be aware of something; that is, to be in relation to it. Now since Dasein is aware of Being-as-a-whole, it must stand outside Being in order thus to be related to it. But what can lie outside Being? The answer is, "Nothing", with a capital "N". Therefore, in order to be conscious and free, Dasein must be "projected into Nothing":

Da-sein means being projected into Nothing. Projecting into Nothing, Da-sein is already beyond what-is-in-totality. This "being beyond" what-is we call Transcendence. Were Da-sein not, in its essential basis, transcendent, that is to say, were it not projected from the start into Nothing, it could never relate to what-is, hence could have no self-relationship. Without the original manifest character of

Nothing there is no self-hood and no freedom.¹

Man's Da-sein can only relate to what-is by projecting into Nothing.²

Freedom, together with self-consciousness, is thus the consequence of the rift of transcendence which separates Dasein from Being, and which at the same time "rivets"³ it to a particular, relative aspect of Being. The metaphysical process in which all this occurs has already been described. It is what Heidegger calls self-temporalization, and can now be recognized as a combination of Being and Nothingness. In so far as it "is", it partakes of Being. But in so far as it is "not yet", it partakes of Nothingness.⁴ This agonizing "ex-sistence" between two worlds places Dasein under an impossible necessity: that of being the ground of its own being. This it can never do, since it finds itself already "hurled" into existence.⁵

¹What is Metaphysics?, p. 370.

²Ibid., p. 379. The correlation in Heidegger of finitude, guilt, freedom, and consciousness is especially emphasized by Ralph Harper and Guido Ruggerio, the former in his Existentialism (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 81 f, the latter in his Existentialism, (New York: Social Science Publishers, 1948), p. 83.

³De Waelhens regularly uses the word "rivet" to describe Dasein's relation to Being. See e.g., op. cit., p. 203.

⁴Jean Wahl points out the similarity between this position and Hegel's view that Becoming is a combination of Being and Non-Being. Op. cit., p. 13.

⁵See SZ, p. 284.

Faced with this intolerable situation, produced by the rift of transcendence which separates Dasein from its ground and from itself, it is small wonder that freedom is now characterized as freedom for death,¹ that Dasein's continual acts of choice are the same as to die from moment to moment.²

Being-toward-Death

Dasein is permeated with the Nothingness into which it projects. Finding itself already hurled into the world, it contains ipso facto its own Nothingness within itself.³ No matter how Dasein may try to evade this, there is one stark fact which unmistakably reveals it: death.⁴ Nor is death something which can safely be postponed until "later"; rather, in the authentic understanding of its own nullity does Dasein die at every moment.⁵ On this basis it is possible to characterize the very nature of Dasein as being-toward-death (Sein zum Tode). As such, it may be equated with Sorge itself,⁶ and even articulated into aspects corresponding to the three 'existentialia'.

If Dasein, or Sorge, is equivalent to being-toward-death, then, as one would expect, there is an authentic and

¹See SZ, p. 266.

²See SZ, p. 259.

³See SZ, pp. 284, 306.

⁴See SZ, p. 306.

⁵See SZ, pp. 259, 306.

⁶See SZ, pp. 259, 329.

and unauthentic mode thereof. The latter simply flees from death,¹ and tries to forget it by ascribing it to the anonymous "everyone," without the courage ever to say, "I die." In the resolute decision characteristic of authenticity, however, there is silent, anguished acceptance of one's own guilt; a readiness for the dread occasioned by Nothingness; and a constant running ahead in thought to one's own death.²

As has been frequently observed already, any suggestion that authenticity can and should be chosen instead of its opposite necessarily implies a higher evaluation of the former. In analyzing Heidegger's view of authenticity as just described, it should therefore be possible to determine more conclusively which particular value judgments are responsible for his evaluating being-toward-death so highly. And in fact, they turn out to be the same as those already mentioned: complete-ness, independence, unrelatedness. These are all denied in the fact of Dasein's possibilities, which are, in fact, the expression of Dasein's temporality altogether: Dasein is not complete until the future, is dependent upon the future (as well as upon the past), and is related to the future (and to the past). As long as Dasein has possibilities, it stands in this multiple, intolerable relatedness. This explains the otherwise enigmatic description of death as the "possibility of impossibility" (Möglichkeit der Unmöglichkeit), that is, as

¹See SZ, p. 264.

²See SZ, pp. 297, 301, 305, 382.

the one possibility which would put an end to all others, which would render them finally "impossible."¹ By running forward in thought to death, Dasein allows the threat of this final possibility to dangle over all intermediate possibilities at every moment.

Dasein has possibilities only because it is shot through with the stigma of Nothingness, which causes it to be related, dependent, incomplete. Therefore the possibility of death is the possibility of overcoming the anguished existence of authentic Dasein; it is at last revealed as the content of what has so often been referred to as Dasein's own most intimate and most extreme possibility (eigenste und "ausserste Möglichkeit).² Why this is so can be indicated under three headings:

a) Death unrelated. Death is absolute and final. Putting an end to all relations, it is itself unrelated. For this reason it is a desideratum.³

b) Death overcomes incompleteness by anticipation. When Hegel said, "The truth is the whole," he articulated one of philosophy's principal compulsions, not least Heidegger's. Completeness, like unrelatedness, is for him a positive value. And Dasein, as temporality, is never complete, is

¹Another similarity to Hegel can be detected if it is recalled that possibility contains negation. Death as absolute possibility could then function as a negation of the negation.

²See SZ, pp. 250, 330. ³See SZ, pp. 250, 307.

always "not yet"--until death. The chapter on death in Sein und Zeit is entitled, "The possibility of Dasein's being complete" ("Das mögliche Ganzsein des Daseins"), and concludes that by continually running forward in thought to death, Dasein anticipates all intermediate possibilities and lives in the constant possibility of death at any moment.¹

c) Death overcomes dependence and uncertainty. Finally, death is also the means of overcoming the third of Dasein's anguishing conditions, dependence. For although I can never be the ground of my own being, I can at least be the ground of my own death.² Though dependent for my life on circumstances beyond my control, I can with resolute decision insure that death does not overtake me by surprise or against my will, by constantly facing up to it and resolutely willing it. I choose it before it chooses me (once more the Nietzschean overtones are apparent). Moreover, the independence achieved in the authentic being-toward-death has its epistemological correlate: so long as my fate is in any way dependent upon conditions outside myself, I can never be altogether certain about its outcome. Once I have chosen death, however, doubt and uncertainty are overcome. Whereas the unauthentic "everyone" deliberately remains uncertain of his own death by putting off the thought of it, authentic Dasein

¹SZ, #65, 68.

²See SZ, p. 306.

lives in the full certainty of its own end by appropriating death at every moment.¹ To be sure, the date remains undetermined, but that, like the "intermediate possibilities," is a relative and unimportant matter. There is absolute certainty about the absolute possibility--death.²

Being and Non-Being

So much for being-toward-death and its triumph over the three aspects of existence regarded by Heidegger as intolerable.³ The question remains, is it merely formal, or can some further determinateness be ascribed to it? Can anything be said about being-toward-death other than simply itself? Specifically, what becomes of freedom under the conditions of being-for-death? The answer to this question must take into consideration a fourth value implicit in the thought of Heidegger and indeed of most philosophers. Thus far independence, unrelatedness, and totality have been mentioned, but there is another,--one concerning which philosophy seems bound to take sides, and about which it has by no means been unanimous. It is the question of whether Being or Non-Being is prior. In analyzing this problem, the philosopher soon strikes a dilemma:

¹See SZ, p. 308.

²See SZ, pp. 258, 308.

³Whereas for Kierkegaard these conditions of finitude only become intolerable as a result of sin, for Heidegger they are unbearable as such. This is the consequence of his abandonment of Kierkegaard's concept of eternity, which both makes sin possible and also can redeem it. See The Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1944), especially p. 123: "Thus sin is potentiated weakness or potentiated defiance: sin is the potentiation of despair."

a) Being must be rational--since it is the reason which conceives it in the first place.

b) But, if rational, it must conform to the principles of reason; and if it conforms, then it must have limits. Hence Parmenides did not hesitate to set a limit to Being.

c) But Melissus asks the following question of Parmenides: What is beyond the limit? There can be only one answer: Non-Being--which does not exist, ex hypothesi. Therefore, according to Melissus, Being is without limit.

d) To which Parmenides would reply: What is without limit is without intelligibility. But Being is intelligible, ex hypothesi. Therefore what you have described is not Being, but Non-Being.

Confronted with this dilemma, Heidegger, following the lead of certain trends in mysticism, elects to hypostasize Non-Being. The logic of such a choice is clear: As the dilemma is set up, the philosopher is compelled either to deny that Being is rational (and therefore limited), or to postulate the reality of Non-Being. Qua philosopher, however, he is committed to the postulate that Being is intelligible. "There is only Being in so far as there is truth....Being and truth are coeval (gleichursprünglich)."¹ Therefore he takes the only remaining alternative: he hypostasizes Non-Being. It is positive,² he says, the pre-condition of logical contradiction.³ Indeed every negation is an affirmation--of

¹SZ, 230.

²See SZ, p. 279.

³See What is Metaphysics?, pp. 361, 372.

Nothingness.¹

Having made this choice, he has another problem on his hands. Is he finally to rest with an ultimate dichotomy of Being and Nothingness? Or is one more primordial than the other? Upon the answer to this question the treatment of freedom will depend, for value will be placed upon the more primordial. When this happens, Sartre will have won his point, for man cannot escape action, nor the choice which dictates action, nor the appreciation of the end of action, which governs the choice. For Heidegger, value will be given to what is primordial, and freedom will be correspondingly affected. As elsewhere, however, Heidegger wavers between all three of the possible alternatives, and the status of freedom is correspondingly complex.

F - SUBSTITUTES FOR FREEDOM

In the discussion of Being and Non-Being it has become apparent that whereas earlier temporality was ultimate, it now seems that both Being and Nothingness partially transcend time.² Might it conceivably be that Heidegger is forced to transcend time precisely because of the manifold difficulties encountered on the basis of immanence, especially where free-

¹See the Brief über den Humanismus, p. 112.

²Jean Wahl has called this "transcendence," according to a comment by de Waelhens, op. cit., p. 360.

dom is concerned? Be that as it may, the shift of emphasis toward transcendence, especially pronounced in his later works, does not so much break sharply with his earlier thought as it simply brings to fruition certain elements which were there from the first, however inconsistently. For this reason, much that might have been said earlier about the fate of freedom at Heidegger's hands can be included in the present section, even though some of the citations will be drawn from the passages in Sein und Zeit, in which temporality is still considered ultimate. The attempt is made herewith to show that, whether earlier or later, Heidegger's substitutes for freedom can ultimately be traced to the relative value he attaches to Being and Non-Being.

Being Prior to Non-Being:
Freedom as Understanding

Typical of the dynamic aspect of Heidegger's philosophy is his attribution to Nothingness of an activity: it nihilates (nichtet). But in some contexts, this activity is said to take place within Being;¹ that is, it is included under the concept of Being. This primacy of Being has its correlate in the realm of intelligibility and truth. Dasein, for example, is said to "ex-sist," which means to "stand in the light of Being."² As ex-sistent, Dasein is the "shepherd of Being."³

¹See What is Metaphysics?, p. 370.

²See the Brief "uber den Humanismus, pp. 67, 68, 101.

³See ibid., p. 90.

If Being is prior to Non-Being, then truth is prior to error, and error is merely distorted truth,¹(since Being correlates with truth). Similarly, forgetting depends upon remembering, so that even fear, though authentic, merely forgets the authentic Angst.² The "fallen" mode itself is simply the forgetting of Being for individual beings.³ And, as is so often the case where rationality is decisive, a frank determinism is sometimes espoused, as in the quotation from Oedipus at the end of What is Metaphysics?: "All this is determined."

a) Freedom becomes understanding. If intelligibility is thus regarded as ultimate, the consequence for freedom is just what it generally is in a rationalist scheme: the recognition of necessity. Practice itself is spurned, for the thought of Being is prior to and transcends all practice.⁴ Freedom separated from practice, which is all that is possible upon the basis now under discussion, is so foreign to what is usually meant by "freedom" that Heidegger once more uses an old word with a new content, with what justification, one may well wonder:

Freedom is not what common sense is content to let pass under that name: the random ability to do as we please, to go this way or that in our choice....Nor, on the other hand, is freedom a mere readiness to do some-

¹See SZ, p. 62.

²See SZ, p. 342.

³See the Brief "über den Humanismus, p. 78.

⁴Ibid., pp. 111, 115.

thing requisite and necessary....Over and above all this...freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-is-as-such.¹

Ex-sistence, grounded in truth as freedom, is nothing less than exposition into the revealed nature of what-is as such.²

b) Entschlossenheit becomes an epistemological term. When freedom is thus understood in terms of intellection, the resolute decision which earlier seemed to be an expression of genuine freedom is now reduced to the understanding and acceptance of one's own "fallen-ness" and guilt.³ Authenticity becomes the understanding of one's own essential unauthenticity! Once the ground of true freedom has been undercut, Heidegger can only say that authentic choice is the same as to understand the call of conscience, to understand oneself as being-toward-death.⁴ Entschlossenheit runs forward in thought to death.

What Heidegger really means when he uses the word "decision" thus turns out to be merely a perspective upon Dasein's fallen situation. As de Waelhens notes, Entschlossenheit is subtly transformed into an epistemological term,⁵

¹On the Essence of Truth, p. 334.

²Ibid., p. 335.

³See SZ, pp. 288, 305, 307, 325, 384. This conception of authenticity as the acknowledgment of one's own Nothingness is closely paralleled by some versions of the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith, in which there is a suspicion that the vehement proclamation of man's unworthiness somehow serves to justify the theologian himself.

⁴See op. cit., p. 171.

scarcely distinguishable from Erschlossenheit, which signifies Dasein's transparency to Being as the pre-condition of knowledge. Heidegger himself dispells all doubt on this score: "Entschlossenheit is a distinguished mode of Erschlossenheit."¹

Being and Non-Being Coeval:
Freedom Suspended

Once the metaphysical basis for freedom has been eliminated (in this case, time-transcendence), it is to be expected that where the word "freedom" is retained at all, it will in reality be applied to some substitute for freedom. In Heidegger's thought, the particular substitute varies with the relative value placed upon Being relative to Non-Being. As has just been shown, when Being, as correlative with intelligibility, is considered ultimate, then freedom and decision are reduced to epistemological terms. But Being does not always enjoy this primacy in Heidegger's thought. As "Nothingness" lies beyond the limit of Being, it must be at least as primordial as Being itself. But as it stands, this statement leaves the philosopher with an ultimate duality, whereas his whole enterprise is devoted to unifying the cosmos. Hence he takes one further step to the totality embracing both Being and Non-Being (though it is difficult to see how two incompatibles can logically be so subsumed). Granted this dubious subsumption, then it must be true that Being and Non-Being were not so mutually exclusive as had been

¹SZ, p. 297. Cf. also pp. 331, 335, 336.

supposed, that they do not really differ in essence. At most, they simply balance one another in expressing the two aspects of what-is-in-totality. It is in this mood that he can say that "Nothing...reveals itself as integral to the Being of what-is,"¹ or can endorse Hegel's proposition that "pure Being and pure Nothing are one and the same."² These two statements may suggest that his dilemma is still unsolved; for if they really are one and the same, then there is no need to retain two apparently opposite designations for what is the same, or even to speak of the one as distinct from the other. Unwilling to accept this state of affairs, he is simply left with the problem of the sameness and yet the difference between Being and Non-Being, as illustrated vividly in the following passage:

Yet this "Nothing" functions as Being. It would be premature to stop thinking at this point and adopt the facile explanation that Nothing is merely the nugatory, equating it with the non-existent (das Wesenlose). Instead of giving way to such precipitous and empty ingenuity and abandoning Nothing in all its mysterious multiplicity of meanings, we should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which₃ gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself.

When a word is thus used to mean its opposite, a breakdown in communications is in prospect. This is brought into sharper focus when the problem is considered on the epistemological

¹What is Metaphysics?, p. 377.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 384f.

level. For if truth and untruth (corresponding to Being and Non-Being) can be subsumed under the same totality, then they are not ultimately mutually exclusive, and Heidegger is bound to say, "Untruth must derive from the essence of truth."¹ For Dasein, neither truth nor its opposite is primary. Rather, Dasein stands gleichursprünglich in truth and untruth.² Its epistemological function is therefore simply that of "letting-be" what already is,³ (and here "is" refers, not to Being, but to the totality composed of Being and Non-Being, an indeterminate and indeterminable reality).⁴ This letting-be simultaneously discloses not only truth, but untruth, and for the following reason: In so far as it discloses anything, it discloses truth; but in so far as it stands in a relation to that which it discloses, this very disclosure obscures the totality of what is. Hence letting-be simultaneously reveals and conceals the totality:

Precisely because "letting-be" always, in each case, lets each thing be in its proper relationship and thus reveals it, it immediately conceals what-is in totality (verbirgt es das Seiende im Ganzen). "Letting things be" is at once a concealment (Verbergen).⁵

This double process of revelation and dissimulation, whereby Dasein simultaneously reveals and conceals what-is-in totality, he calls "in-sistent ex-sistence,"⁶ meaning that

¹On the Essence of Truth, p. 337; cf. p. 347.

²See SZ, pp. 132, 226.

³See On the Essence of Truth, pp. 333ff.

⁴See ibid., p. 340. ⁵Ibid., p. 340. ⁶See ibid., p. 344.

as ex-sistent, Dasein stands outside and reveals the truth of Being, but as in-sistent, it is related to Being at a particular point and thus "insists" upon its own peculiar perspective at the expense of the Whole. But this concealment is itself as important a part of Totality as is truth.

a) Freedom put in brackets. When the attempt is made to put truth and untruth on a par, and to evaluate neither higher than the other, then one thing above all others is to be deplored: namely, to discriminate! For discrimination falsely posits a ground of preference, whereas in fact truth and untruth are equally constituent of totality. Consequently, though the word "freedom" is maintained, it is purged of any element of choice, and becomes the freedom to relinquish any particular decision.¹ In fact, freedom itself is identified with the letting-be of what is!² The Stoic abstention advocated here, though not so stated in Sein und Zeit, is strongly suggested therein by the phrase "freedom for death"; that is, freedom to be rid of freedom. Reverting to Husserl's terminology, this suspension of choice might be called an "epoche" of freedom, on the basis of which Heidegger carries on a campaign against the "will to will" in What is Metaphysics?³

b) No ground of decision. Since truth and untruth are equipollent, there is indeed no ground for making a resolute

¹See SZ, p. 391.

²See On the Essence of Truth, pp. 333 ff.

³See p. 381.

decision. Untruth is authentic, as well as truth.¹ In such a case, is there anything unauthentic? Only one unauthentic possibility remains: namely, to act as though anything were relatively more authentic, to discriminate between courses of action; that is--to exercise freedom! Freedom must be placed in brackets.

Here again, of course, it is Sartre who has the last word, for freedom can be held in suspension only by an act of freedom. The will to will can be opposed only by the will not to will, and Sartre would point out the normative language Heidegger uses in declaring that this is what "should" be done.

Non-Being Prior to Being:
Freedom as Nihilism

Evidently the view that Being and Non-Being are coeval leads to a hopeless confusion of terminology, with the result that the totality-of-all-that-is sometimes goes by the name of "Being." There is, accordingly, one final alternative: to regard Non-Being as primordial. Perhaps the preceding pages have carried a suggestion of the attitude so strongly implied throughout most of Heidegger's writings: a perverse fascination with Nothingness, amounting at times to adoration. For Being has been characterized as limited, that is, as finite, whereas Nothingness is unlimited, infinite.² Surely the infinite

¹See On the Essence of Truth, p. 340.

²See What is Metaphysics?, pp. 379f.

takes precedence over the finite. Moreover, this precedence is also revealed by the terms of Heidegger's own method of investigation: he set out to build a fundamental ontology on the basis of what he could find out about Dasein, and Dasein turned out to be grounded in Nothingness.¹ What is more to be expected than that the consequent ontology should turn out to be a "meontology"? Since Dasein is grounded in dissimulation and Nothingness, therefore, on the basis of Heidegger's method, untruth as such is prior to truth,² and Non-Being enjoys the primacy over mere Being.

a) Freedom becomes stark self-assertion. One might well inquire of Heidegger, "If Dasein exists in the anguished condition of being-toward-death, then why is not suicide the obvious answer to this predicament?" This question is never answered, but immediate suicide clearly is not his intention. What, then, of the man who lives poised upon the brink of death at any moment? By so living, he holds himself unrelated to anything outside himself as far as this ultimate possibility is concerned. He is neither committed nor responsible to anything or any one. At the same time, it must be recalled that he lives in the intolerable tension caused by an impossible necessity: the necessity of being his own ground, which he can never be.³ These two conditions taken together provide

¹See ibid., p. 370; SZ, pp. 305 ff.

²See On the Essence of Truth, pp. 347 f.

³See SZ, p. 284.

a dangerously explosive situation: total uncommitment plus intolerable tension. Given such a situation, is not a detonation in the offing? And when it comes, will it not ipso facto constitute an act of obeisance to the great god Nothingness, whose only activity is to nihilate?

b) Entschlossenheit as cataclysmic Götterdämmerung.

In keeping with this tendency, Entschlossenheit is said to consist precisely in remaining free at all times for the assertion of one's own most extreme possibility,¹ committed by no ties or responsibilities. How will this work itself out in practice? What will happen when Dasein listens to the call of conscience? Formerly, conscience merely called Dasein to accept its guilt; but under the influence of the fascination of Nothingness, a sudden change occurs: Conscience calls man to become guilty!² Why? Because it is in deeds of harshness and grimness that Dasein becomes aware of Nothingness! In the experience of harsh conflict, violent loathing, merciless interdict, and bitter renunciation Dasein achieves the authentic awareness of Non-Being.³ This means the abandonment of conscience in the ordinary sense, and with it the elimination of responsibility. For if conscience involves obligation to another, Dasein cannot be fully responsible to itself.⁴ As

¹See SZ, p. 308.

²See SZ, pp. 287, 288.

³See What is Metaphysics?, p. 373.

⁴See SZ, p. 288.

Heidegger himself says, to have a conscience is to be essentially without a conscience, and this is the only possibility of being "good", in the existential sense of the word.¹

With this the scale of values has come full circle to the transvaluation which Nietzsche gave them. Under the cry of "fair is foul, and foul is fair," Nothingness holds out its own peculiar reward to those who have the courage to embrace the gruesome. Not only do they acquire a super-power from hurling themselves into death² (thereby cancelling in some degree the fact of their being hurled into an unwelcome existence), but they are promised a special glimpse of the nihilation they serve:

The clear courage for essential dread guarantees that most mysterious of all possibilities: the experience of Being. For hard by essential dread, in the terror of the abyss, there dwells awe.³

(Unfortunately for the purpose of illustration, this is one of the passages in which Being is used to cover the totality of Being and Non-Being, which is clearly indicated even in these two sentences.)

The apparent double loyalty of Dasein to self and to Nothingness can be reduced to one and the same thing, for Dasein itself is grounded in Nothingness. To nihilate and to dissimulate, to "dedicate untruth to oneself,"⁴ is therefore

¹See SZ, p. 288.

²See SZ, p. 384.

³What is Metaphysics?, p. 387.

⁴SZ, p. 299.

to affirm self and Nothingness at the same time. The call to sacrifice with which What is Metaphysics? concludes,¹ calling for the sacrifice of man and of all beings to Being-as-totality, resembles not at all the laying down of a man's life for his friends, but rather the orgiastic immolation of humanity itself to the bottomless abyss of Nothingness.

Conclusion

In the preceding discussion, the term "Non-Being" was introduced as a fourth, in addition to relatedness, incompleteness, and incertain dependence, concerning which evaluative judgments might be made. The three substitutes for freedom were then developed in accordance with the way in which Non-Being was regarded. The time has now come, however, to make three points fundamental to the present discussion: a) that Non-Being is not really a fourth term besides the three others, but is actually only a more embracing concept which includes them; and b) that both it and the three subsumed under it are intimately related to time, so that c) the three substitutes for freedom all depend partly upon the attitude toward time.

a) Non-Being the inclusive term for the irrational. As already indicated, Heidegger subscribes to the view that philosophy is based upon the presupposition that "thought and Being are one." For thought differs from fantasy precisely in that it has for its object that which truly is. If the entire philosophical enterprise is to be accorded a chance of

¹What is Metaphysics?, pp. 389 ff.

success, however, then there must be the possibility of certainty, so as to distinguish true thought from false. But such certainty is not possible as long as thought is separate from its object, for then one could always ask, "How do you know?" This question can finally only receive a completely certain answer if there is no longer any cleavage, any distinction between thought and its object, if there is an identity which offers immediate certainty.

Thus is the unity of thought and Being demanded as the presupposition of philosophy. The structure of thought correlates with the structure of Being, and conversely, the irrational is consigned to Non-Being. How does this apply to the present purpose of showing the correlation of incompleteness, relatedness, and dependence with Non-Being? The answer is at hand: the demands of reason are ultimately for unity, wholeness, self-dependence, and especially unconditionedness or unrelatedness.¹ Their opposites, accordingly, partake of the irrational, and in so far as they do so, are permeated with Non-Being.

b) Time the seat of the irrational for Heidegger. What is the seat of the irrational? It might be answered that whereas the Greeks were more preoccupied with matter as that which could only imperfectly receive form, Heidegger shifts the emphasis to time as the condition of relatedness, uncertain dependence, and incompleteness. First, as long

¹F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), is an exhaustive development of this point.

as there is time there will be relatedness, for the three "ecstasies," as the name implies, stand outside each other, that is, are related to each other. Similarly the temporal existent is always related to his past and future, to such an extent that Dasein sometimes seems almost on the point of being pulled apart by this tension. Second, and not unlike the first point, Dasein is dependent as long as it is in time. It finds itself "hurled" into its temporal situation, unable to be the ground of its own being. Furthermore, the uncertainty attaching to this dependence is heightened by the fact of the future. The future is never completely within Dasein's control, and to that extent inevitably looms as a question mark. Third, and most obvious, time is par excellence the seat of incompleteness. It is always "not yet."

The foregoing analysis showed how all that was implied in Sein und Zeit about freedom and decision suffered two fatal blows when Dasein was described simply as temporality. In the first place, Dasein's failure to transcend temporality leaves it without a poû stô from which to choose, and in the second, the fallen mode was equated with temporality itself. It was shown how true freedom was thus precluded, and how in its stead there were offered three possible substitutes, depending upon the way in which Non-Being was regarded. What has now come to light is that all that was said above about Non-Being and its relation to freedom applies to time as the seat of the irrational and of Non-Being.

c) Substitutes for freedom recapitulated with reference to time. In the absence of the metaphysical basis for true freedom, three substitutes were discovered. First: By branding temporality as such as guilty, Heidegger appears to avoid even the necessity for freedom, since (though it be indeed by fiat) he has installed guilt without appeal to choice. Time, as seat of relatedness, dependence, and incompleteness, is a curse, but there is one means of consolation: the recognition of the hopeless, frustrating, agonizing character of existence, the resolute acceptance of one's guilt, and the impassive expectation of death at any moment. This understanding of necessity he calls freedom (like the "metaphysical freedom" of philosophers like Spinoza and Hegel). This position might seem to demand a point beyond time from which the detached thinker contemplates its inevitable absurdities, but Heidegger has very little metaphysical provision for such a point. His philosopher is not so much serenely detached from the anguish of existence as he is resigned to acknowledge and to endure it.

Second: To object that there is no freedom of choice is to misunderstand, for freedom has not been taken as a value, but rather those very things which exclude freedom. For one thing, freedom increases uncertainty, inasmuch as it is in opposition to determinism and predictability. Furthermore, by choosing it makes relative distinctions; in so far as it chooses, it rejects; that is, it is the servant of

incompleteness. Finally, in so far as it has responsibility as its correlate it seeks to relate Dasein to what is outside itself. In short, freedom involves the three qualities upon which a negative judgment has been placed, which belong to Non-Being. Thus, freedom, even if it were possible, would by no means be desirable. Rather, it would be playing directly into the hands of time by fostering just those elements which constitute the stigma of time. Freedom is therefore better suspended.

Third: Neither of the first two positions can stand. The first demands a greater degree of time-transcendence than Heidegger can provide (or if, as in the later writings, he does insist on it, it still is a far cry from freedom since it seeks to abandon time altogether). The second is forced to recognize that man is constituted by freedom; that is, he can never be unfree, and even the attempt to suspend freedom depends upon a decision and an act of will to do so. The plain situation is that man is caught in the clutches of freedom, he is under the necessity of choosing and deciding. But in so doing, he is forced to involve himself in precisely those qualities which are intolerable to him: relatedness, uncertainty, dependence, incompleteness. It appears that he has been made the victim of a pernicious conspiracy whereby he is not only bound to the anguishing conditions of temporality, but in addition is actually forced to aggravate those same conditions by the necessity of exercising freedom. There

appears but one way out: with the desperate courage of a doomed man to turn this accursed freedom against itself, to use it to destroy the conditions which make it possible; namely, time! Resentful spite against the partial negations of time would thus take vengeance in total negation: of death. For death is the end of Dasein's time, and the end of time is the liberation from--freedom.

CHAPTER IV

NICOLAS BERDYAEV

In addition to the remarks already made regarding the relevance of Nicolas Berdyaev's philosophy to the problem of freedom and time, there is a special way in which his thought lends itself to the purpose at hand; namely, his primary concern, not so much with rigid consistency, as with illuminating every facet of the problem. The introduction to Slavery and Freedom, entitled "Concerning Inconsistencies in My Thought," explains his intention to analyze as exhaustively as possible the various philosophical problems as they present themselves, without the obligation of forcing them into a coherent system. Such a method has special advantages for the problem under discussion, for, as already suggested, it apparently defies logical consistency. If this indeed be the case, then one might well hope for some insights from a method like Berdyaev's beyond those obtainable from a narrowly systematic treatment. Both the deliberate paradoxes and the unintentional contradictions which characterize his thought may thus be regarded, not so much as a reproach to the philosopher, but rather as an exposure of the pitfalls to which a too simply consistent treatment is subject, as well as a delineation of the various aspects of the problem which

a future, more systematic approach must not overlook.

A - GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

Granted that Berdyaev's philosophy is consciously unsystematic, the problem arises as to how it is to be treated in an intelligible way. A simple exposition of the content of his books runs the danger either of attempting to wring from the material a unity which is not there, or of simply presenting a chaotic mass of observations at variance with one another. As a means of avoiding both of these methods, the present writer has attempted to consider Berdyaev under four or five general principles, none of which is entirely reducible to the others, and each of which is apt to be in partial conflict with the others. The following pages will seek to show that Berdyaev's views of freedom and time vary according to the particular principle which happens to dominate his thinking at the moment. This chapter is therefore divided into sections according to the following basic conceptions: 1) the Dionysian principle of dynamic, irrational energy, without which freedom becomes necessity; 2) the Apollonian or rational principle of order, form, coherence, and intelligibility, without which freedom becomes blind impulse; 3) the obvious principle of an ultimate duality between the first two; and 4) another expedient, possibly born of desperation, which obscures the distinction between these two, thereby falling into some confusing

ambiguities. In addition to these four, there is moreover still another position to which Berdyaev is driven by the impossibility of relating freedom and time on the basis of any of the first four; this fifth "principle", though nowhere explicitly stated, can be inferred from isolated statements throughout his works, and is so pregnant with suggestions that an exposition of it will be reserved for the concluding chapter of this essay.

Apollonian and Dionysian

Berdyaev's dependence on German philosophy is illustrated by his adoption of the twin concepts of "Apollonian" and "Dionysian," first introduced by Schelling and developed by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. The ambiguous relation of these two principles to the problem of freedom and time has occupied many of the foregoing pages: on the one hand, if the principle of harmony and order predominates, then freedom is reduced to mere conformity with an overall pattern, losing the quality of liberty altogether and actually aiming at its own extinction, since it exists only as a result of a deviation from the ideal order to which it must conform; on the other hand, if the principle of irrational energy predominates, in defiance of all rational limits, then, as so clearly demonstrated in the case of Bergson, freedom is reduced to impulse, and a man is no more responsible than a dog. So much for the bearing of the Apollonian and Dionysian upon freedom; what, then, of their bearing on time? The

answer to this question is not far to seek; for may it not be said that together they constitute the problem of time, in the sense that the one represents immutability, the other mutability? The Apollonian, on the one hand, represents the eternal principles of rational coherence independent of all flux; the Dionysian, on the other, signifying boundless, dynamic energy, is opposed to the static, and presupposes mutability, process--time! One aspect of the opposition between these twin concepts may thus be thought of as the opposition between time and eternity. If freedom can be understood neither in terms of the Apollonian nor of the Dionysian exclusively, this means, among other things, that it can be comprehended neither apart from time nor in wholly temporal terms.

Berdyayev himself is quite clear at times that neither the Apollonian nor the Dionysian by itself is adequate to account for freedom. Against the former he says:

The world order, the harmony of the whole, etc., can have no existential meaning. It is the realm of determination to which freedom is always in opposition.¹

Likewise against an unbridled spontaneity he insists that freedom is not vitalism or unlimited license but "subjection to the Truth."² Recognizing the impasse that awaits any attempt to base freedom upon either of these two concepts,

¹SF, p. 87.

²SF, p. 80.

Berdyayev seeks a solution to the dilemma by attempting to subsume them both under a higher, ultimate category. Duality, he says, is not ultimate,¹ and his means of overcoming it is what he calls the "apophatic" method. Before considering this method in detail, however, it is well to recall that included in the opposition of form and vitality which he wishes to resolve there is also the opposition of eternity and time, of the immutable and the mutable. Is it likely that the two members of this pair could ever be reduced to a common ground? Certainly in the history of thought it has been the rule for the two to be rigidly opposed, for the partisans of one to relegate the other to a lesser order of reality, if not altogether to illusion. Prima facie, a logical reconciliation of the immutable with the mutable appears most unlikely. Does the attempt succeed, or does it turn out to be a subtle bit of sleight of hand?

The Apophatic Method

In order to overcome the duality of form and vitality, Berdyayev has recourse to the time-honored technique of mysticism, both Oriental and Western, the via negativa, or apophatic method (from the Greek apophasis, meaning "negation"). Taking its departure from the principles of reason and logic, apophatics professes to arrive by means of logic at a position amenable to the irrational, and thus to

¹See Nicolas Berdyayev, Spirit and Reality, trans. George Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1939), p. 127. Designated below by the abbreviation SR.

discover a common ground prior to both Apollonian and Dionysian. The actual point of departure from which this method proceeds is the recognition that every affirmation about an object is at the same time a negation. If I affirm that the book is red, I implicitly deny that it is green. Likewise, with reference to ultimate reality, if I affirm its completeness, I deny its capacity for creative novelty; if I affirm its creativeness, I deny its destructiveness; in short, any predicative concept is a limiting concept, restricting reality to what lies within its limits and denying to it all that lies beyond. As Spinoza's terse dictum puts it, "Determination is negation."

The question arises, can anything be denied to ultimate reality, or must it include all that is? This is the same question that arose in connection with Heidegger's philosophy, and which was discussed in terms of Parmenides and Melissus. It can be put in a slightly different way: Is perfection to be conceived as limited, or as unlimited? Berdyaev describes the two alternate answers to this question as follows:

Classical objectivity is the attainment of perfection in the finite, it is a sort of triumph over the formless infinite. It was not by chance that the Greeks associated perfection with finitude and were afraid of the infinite as chaos. Romanticism, on the other hand, . . . is bent upon the infinite; it does not believe in the attainment of perfection in the finite.¹

¹See Nicolas Berdyaev, The Divine and the Human, trans. R. M. French (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1949), p. 142. Designated below by the abbreviation DH.

In its answer to the question thus put, apophatics sides with the infinite. Reality, it holds, must include everything. Perfection cannot be limited.¹ Having decided in favor of the infinite, one then faces the problem of how to speak of it; for if every affirmation involves a negation as well, then it follows that no affirmation can be made about it. The only remaining alternative is that from which the method takes its name: the way of negation. In order to avoid the limitation which every affirmation involves, one repudiates the affirmation by making only negative statements after the manner of the Upanishadic "not this, not this." The only statements which apply to ultimate reality are negative, and as the end result of the process of consistent negation one arrives at the final, total negation: the concept of Non-Being. Affirmative, or cataphatic, statements apply only to Being; prior to it and more fundamental is its infinite ground, Non-Being.

Before scrutinizing more closely the way in which Non-Being is said to comprise the common ground of both the Apollonian and Dionysian, one may note a certain peculiarity in the argument as developed thus far; namely: The reason for adopting the via negativa lay in the fact that every affirmation contains a negation. What was

¹Strictly speaking, in order truly to remove all limitations from reality, would it not be more fitting to call it both finite and infinite? This is in fact the position to which Berdyaev is eventually driven (though seldom explicitly) by the insufficiency of all other possibilities, as will be urged below.

sought was a means of avoiding the negation thus implied. But a second look at the method adopted reveals a curious kind of reasoning, for is it not true that the method adopted in order to avoid a partial negation consisted precisely in the making of an unmixed negation? It may indeed be true that determination is negation, but can anyone doubt that negation is negation? By adopting the via negativa its exponents appear to have got themselves out of the frying pan of mixed negation into the fire of negation pure and simple. Seeking to avoid any part of it, they finally embrace it totally as the hypostasized Non-Being. Having taken notice of this contradiction at the heart of the apophatic method, one may proceed with some caution to an examination of its claim to overcome the duality of Apollonian and Dionysian.

Non-Being as the Ground of Apollonian and Dionysian

In Non-Being apophatics claims to have discovered a coincidentia oppositorum, a common ground of both form and vitality. In the first place, Non-Being can definitely trace its lineage to an Apollonian ancestry, for it was reason which recognized in every positive concept the imposition of a limit and demanded its removal. Though apophatics does demand the suspension of thought as a result of its renunciation of concepts, nevertheless this demand is made by thought itself. Berdyaev is quite insistent on this point:

But there has been an attempt in the history of human thought, in the history of intellectualist mysticism, to transcend the limits of thought within the limits of thought itself. No greater testimony to the power of thought exists than this attempt at self-limitation, this

attempt to transcend its own limits, this docta ignorantia, as Nicolas of Cusa defined it. I have in mind, of course, apophatic theosophy.¹

Before examining the relation of Non-Being to the Dionysian, it should be noted that this Nothing as the product of subtraction has no content. It is the perfect void.

In the second place, Non-Being also has certain aspects in common with the Dionysian. Having removed all concepts as limiting, it cannot be grasped by the principles of reason. It too is formless, infinite, irrational. Before it can rightly be called the ground of the Dionysian, however, it must meet one more requirement: it must also be the source of dynamic power. And this is the critical point in the development of apophatics. Until now Non-Being has been merely nothing. But when its relation to the Dionysian is considered, suddenly--presto! the erstwhile empty void² has become what the mystics call the abyss,² a bottomless source of unlimited, creative energy. In that moment the connection of Apollonian and Dionysian via Non-Being has apparently been completed. Non-Being has been shown to be the logically derived source of dynamic power.

¹SR, p. 123 f.

²The terms "void" and "abyss", though often used interchangeably, will be employed consistently to express the distinction indicated above, according as Non-Being is regarded as empty or as full of power.

There is, however, as already suggested, a suspicious link in the chain of the argument; namely, the point at which Non-Being as devoid of all content suddenly passes over into Non-Being possessing infinite content, where Nothing becomes Nothingness, or, in the terminology of this study, where the void becomes the abyss. Is this transition in any sense legitimate? Is it possible to pass from static emptiness to dynamic pleroma in a continuous transition? The answer becomes clear when the starting point of the discussion is recalled. The apophatic method began by recognizing the opposition between the immutable and the mutable, and professed to be able to find a common ground of both. In actual fact, however, the subtle change that occurs when Non-Being-as-static-void passes over into Non-Being-as-dynamic-abyss is precisely the transition from the immutable to the mutable, from the changeless to time. Dynamism implies process, temporal process. Thus it is revealed that the shift from void to abyss is just as radical as a switch from Apollonian to Dionysian would be, the chief difference being that in the former case the change is hidden behind the one word "Non-Being," which applies equally to void and to abyss. This one term, indeed, appears to have been the source of endless confusion, deceiving philosophers in the manner of an optical illusion: as often as the eyes blink, it is seen alternately, now in one of its aspects, now in the other. In one of its aspects it is primarily Apollonian,

in the other, essentially Dionysian. The appearance of a common ground between the two is accomplished not so much in fact as in the twinkling of an eye.

By now it has become apparent that the same confusion attends the word "Non-Being" as was discovered in the case of Heidegger. Behind this word lurks a continually shifting meaning. At times it wears the mask of Apollo, at times that of Dionysius; sometimes it is the void, sometimes it is the abyss. In still other passages it once again insists on its claim to overcome the distinction between the two, thereby falling into patent ambiguities; and finally, it occasionally yields the field to an acknowledged dualism of two ultimate and irresolvable principles. In the ensuing sections of this paper, these four alternatives are treated separately, with a double conclusion: first, that the relation of freedom to time cannot be satisfactorily accounted for on the basis of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, and second, that the apophatic method overcomes this duality in name only.

Finitude Depreciated

Prior to a detailed examination of the extent to which Berdyaev's philosophy does in fact illustrate the thesis here presented in theory, a few further observations on his thought in general are perhaps in order. Foremost among these is his continual assault upon the objective world. "It is the formation of a world of objects which is

the source of all the misfortunes of man,"¹ he asserts, and a large part of his writings is devoted to elaborations of this theme. More than once, for example, he endorses Kant's dualism of phenomenal and noumenal,² and makes it plain that in his campaign against the objective he is denouncing the world of space and time: "The temporal and spatial materialization of existence is an objective process; for the objective world is essentially temporal and spatial."³ In other words, finitude as such is repudiated: "Objectification, creating the illusion of an objective spirit subordinating spirit to law, puts an end to infinity."⁴

It has already been sufficiently emphasized that this attack on the finite is part and parcel of the Dionysian principle, with its urge to burst all limits. But is it possible that the Apollonian, too, though it represents the principle of limit, can in some way be opposed to the finite? This question requires a two-fold answer: in the first place, in so far as the Apollonian principle proceeds, on the basis of its own maxim that determination is negation, to its own self-denial in what has been designated herein as the void, then one may indeed say that it ultimately drives beyond

¹DH, p. 197f.

²See SR, pp. 8, 17; SF, p. 11.

³SS, p. 137.

⁴SR, p. 51.

the limits of the finite. As already suggested, however, the void itself is an impossible resting place, being utterly devoid of content. From such a position one of two alternatives are de rigueur: one must either make the entirely dubious transition from the void to the abyss (with what justification has already been discussed), or else retrace one's steps from the void and return to the use of concepts. Berdyaev's frequent reliance upon Apollonian concepts, as will be demonstrated in the following pages, may be interpreted in part as just such a refusal to convert the "void" into the "abyss," as a retreat to the realm of concepts (though even more often, of course, he is betrayed into the opposite course). In the second place, the Apollonian itself is by no means at home in the spatio-temporal world. It was in the name of the 'ideas' that Plato turned away from the world. Why does reason flee the world? Primarily for two reasons: because matter (or the object, in Berdyaev's terminology) as such is only imperfectly receptive to rational form, and because everything in the world is transient, whereas the truths of reason are eternal. Limit, for which the Apollonian stands, requires a fixed boundary; but in the shifting sands of an endless temporal process, all is in perpetual flux. There is nothing stable which might serve as a limit. Thus the Apollonian, even after it resurrects itself out of the void, counsels withdrawal from the world, and especially from the ravages of time.

The revolt against finitude on the part of the Dionysian is largely similar, but with one significant difference. In its thrust beyond all limits, it, too, finds in the object a source of irritation, since the object is a potential obstacle to its expanding energy. Indeed, space itself, as external to the source of power, constitutes a potential challenge to it. Therefore, from the side of the Dionysian, it is the external and extended which is anathema (compare Bergson), whereas the Apollonian is far less troubled by extension, resorting frequently to spatial metaphors. And conversely, while for the Apollonian time was a curse, the Dionysian cannot really do without it, since dynamism is inconceivable apart from time. For this reason, as will be brought out below, it is necessary for Berdyaev, after his uncompromising renunciation of time, to reintroduce it under the name of "existential time." If the foregoing remarks are correct, then it can be expected that finitude in certain of its aspects will come under attack both from the side of the rational and from the vital, though the specific nature of the assault will vary accordingly.

A corollary to the hostile attitude toward finitude is a similar antipathy to the subject-object structure of the world as we know it. From the Apollonian point of view, this structure represents the old problem of the one and the many; if reason begins with plurality, it can

never resolve it into unity, either epistemologically or metaphysically; it becomes enmeshed in the hopeless problem of relations. Likewise from the Dionysian point of view, the existence of the object is a potential obstacle to the free expression of creative energy. From both sides of the question, therefore, Berdyaev can say,

The antithesis between subject and object is not basic in the religious life, and it vanishes altogether in the inner depths of spiritual experience.¹

As already suggested, what really constitutes the problem for Berdyaev is the separate existence of the object over against the subject. That being the case, his obvious strategy consists in the absorption of the object by the subject:

In the spiritual life, however, there are neither objects of knowledge nor of faith, because here there is possession, an interior rapprochement, a kinship with the object perceived (sic), an absorption of the object at the very deepest levels....In the spiritual life there is, in the gnoseological sense of the word, neither object nor knowing subject.

....Spiritual experience is precisely the escape from a state in which objects are everywhere extrinsically opposed to one another.²

Though this absorption of the object is elsewhere denied,³

¹See Nicolas Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit, trans. Oliver F. Clarke, 4th ed. (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1948), p. 91. Designated below by the abbreviation FS.

²FS, p. 25 (my italics); see also pp. 26, 55, 56, 90, 91, 267; DM, p. 291; SS p. 48.

³See SS, p. 55.

in his later writings Berdyaev insists more and more that "it is expressly in subjectivity and not in objectivity that primary reality is found."¹ Though he nowhere says it in so many words, this strongly implies that the subject-object cleavage is overcome simply by subtracting whatever elements of the objective cannot be absorbed.

From the antagonism to the subject-object relation it follows that consciousness itself is a deplorable phenomenon, since it presupposes the subject-object relation:²

But is not all consciousness unhappy? Consciousness always presupposes division, a falling apart into subject and object and a painful dependence upon the object.³

Consciousness is always dichotomy and disruption; it presupposes an opposition between subject and object that always involves unhappiness.⁴

From the Apollonian standpoint, of course, consciousness cannot be dispensed with; hence the many points at which Berdyaev's books depend upon conceptual thought may be taken as indications of the inevitable recrudescence of the Apollonian.

It has been the concern of this section to present briefly the logic of Berdyaev's approach to the problem of

¹SP, p. 116; see also p. 207; DH, p. vi. The more the object is declared to be unreal, as it is in numerous passages, the more the diatribe against objectivity turns out to be a tilting at windmills.

²See DM, p. 13.

³DH, p. 72. Berdyaev recognizes that the conception of the unhappy consciousness can be traced back to Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, IV, B, 3.

⁴DH, p. 198.

the relation between freedom and time, in order to provide some preparation for the interpretation of the ensuing analysis. The following pages will attempt to demonstrate more fully what has here been suggested: that the effort to resolve the Apollonian and Dionysian into a common ground lapses invariably into the original dichotomy, and that neither member of the duality is able to account for freedom by itself.

B - THE DIONYSIAN PREDOMINANT: MEONTIC FREEDOM

Having endeavored in the preceding analysis to anticipate the varying positions to which Berdyaev would be led by his underlying presuppositions, the present study now proceeds to the verification and amplification of the conclusions tentatively reached. In this section it will consider those aspects of his thought in which the Dionysian holds the primacy over the Apollonian, and especially one of his most characteristic concepts, that of meontic freedom. As suggested by the word "meontic" (from the Greek me on, meaning "Non-Being"), he holds that freedom is derived from, or at times even equated with, Non-Being (considered under the aspect of abyss, as distinct from void).

Berdyaev's Conception of Freedom

Whether or not freedom can be as nearly identified with Non-Being as Berdyaev would like depends in part upon one's conception of freedom. It is therefore worthwhile noting the view of freedom which he presupposes, and which enables him to link freedom directly to Non-Being. First of all, he is even more outspoken than Bergson or Heidegger in his insistence that ideal norms, values, and standards are fatal to freedom:

The problem of the relation between freedom and values is even more troublesome. It may be said that man in his freedom is confronted with ideal norms or values which he has to realize; his failure to do so is an evil. This is the usual point of view. Man is free to realize the good or the values which stand above him as forever laid down by God, forming an ideal normative world, but he is not free to create the good, to produce values. The scholastic conception of free will comes precisely to this, that man can and must fulfill the law of goodness, and if he fails to do so, it is his own fault and he is punished. This choice between good and evil is forced upon him from without. Freedom of will is not a source of creativeness, but of responsibility and possible punishment.¹

According to the traditional interpretation, freedom of will is in no sense creative, and instead of liberating man keeps him in perpetual fear. It humiliates man rather than exalts him; he...can only accept or reject what is given him from without. Indeed,...freedom of will, confronted forever with the terrifying necessity of choosing between alternatives externally imposed upon it from above, represses and enslaves man;...man is free when he need not choose.²

Upon this view of the matter, it is only natural that he should conclude that "all normative theories of

¹DM, p. 43.

²DM, p. 80.

ethics are tyrannical."¹ Specifically, the values of order, harmony, and unity, so frequently regarded as basic to ethical theory, are rejected as imposing determination upon freedom from without:

The world order, the harmony of the whole, etc., can have no existential meaning. It is the realm of determination to which freedom is always in opposition.²

The very idea of unity is false and enslaving in its consequences.³

For the same reason the idea of purpose is also hostile to freedom, since it imposes an end toward which man must move, thereby forcing his creative impulses into the strait-jacket of a predetermined course:

The teleological point of view, combined with the doctrine of free will, may be formulated as follows: man must subordinate his life to the supreme end placed before him and make all his lower aims subservient to the highest good. Such a conception, though greatly prevalent, ... results in a slavish morality. The teleological point of view, dating back to Aristotle, must be abandoned altogether.⁴

Finitude Fatal to Freedom

If ideal values, norms, standards, and ends are thus ruled out as restraints on freedom, what does this imply about the nature of freedom itself? Is it not evident that freedom is conceived as the absence of determinism, of limits, of restrictions of any sort? And does

¹DM, p. 16.

³SF, p. 91.

²SF, p. 87.

⁴DM, p. 80.

this talk of the absence of limits not have a familiar ring? Does it not express precisely the same principle which led the way from the conceptual, the Apollonian, to the void of Non-Being, under the maxim 'determination is negation'? This path from the rational to Non-Being was the path away from finitude. Accordingly, if the present interpretation is correct, Berdyaev will also regard finitude as inimical to freedom. And in actual fact, as expressly stated in all his books, this is precisely the case. The constant polemic against finitude, or, as he calls it, objectivization, is carried on partly in the name of freedom:

This world is the world of objectivization, of determinism, of alienation, of hostility, of law. While the other world is the world of spirituality, of freedom, love, kinship.¹

Similarly, nature, which is used interchangeably with "objectivization" to represent finitude,² is held to be the contradiction of freedom.³

The general objection against finitude, that as limited it places restrictions on freedom, can be made more specific. Matter, for example, is everywhere referred to as intractable, impenetrable, resistant, and as such it curtails freedom to such an extent that it may even be

¹SF, p. 254 (my italics). See also pp. 11, 27, 126.

²See SF, pp. 94, 100.

³See SF, pp. 94, 100; DH, pp. 128, 130.

equated with necessity.¹ Furthermore, the plurality and dividedness which characterize finitude are equally limiting to freedom.² This dividedness is especially acute in human consciousness, which could not function and would not even exist without making distinctions. On account of these distinctions which exist on the conscious, finite level, freedom, when under the rule of consciousness, is reduced to making choices. But every choice by its very nature excludes the unchosen alternative, and such exclusion is a negation of freedom. Selectivity and discrimination must therefore be rejected as products of finitude and consciousness, inimical to freedom.³

This rejection of discrimination can be carried still further and applied to the distinction between good and evil.

Discrimination and valuation presuppose dividedness and loss of wholeness. Herein lies the fundamental paradox of ethics: the moral good has a bad origin and its bad origin pursues it like a curse.⁴

Therefore the distinction between good and evil cannot be ultimate, and Berdyaev finds that "in its inmost being

¹See FS, pp. 31, 84, 86, 121 ff.; SF, p. 96; DM, pp. 219, 227.

²See SF, p. 248.

³See FS, p. 101 f.

⁴DM, p. 84. Berdyaev apparently does not realize that his condemnation of ethical evaluations is dependent on just such an evaluation, for his negative judgment is based upon the presupposition that distinction as such is "bad."

reality is neither good nor evil";¹ "only that which is 'beyond good and evil' is real."²

Finitude has thus been exposed as hostile to freedom because it limits it: as resistance, as plurality, as conscious discrimination, as evaluation, as choice--in all these respects it opposes freedom, which must therefore be sought outside the finite sphere. But these reasons for abandoning finitude are reasons which have been encountered before in this essay. They were precisely the grounds on which reason, taking 'determination is negation' as its motto, drove beyond the limitations of conceptual thought and lost itself in the void. In the earlier case, reason proceeded by a process of subtraction until nothing was left but pure emptiness. In the present case, there has been a similar subtraction of everything that might stand over against freedom, so that one might very well inquire whether anything remains of freedom but a void. In fact, the close analogy between the two cases strongly suggests that Berdyaev's whole conception of freedom is derived from the same rational principle as was Non-Being. This suspicion is emphatically confirmed by Berdyaev himself when he states,

Freedom exposes the limitations of every kind of rational thought; it appears irrational, abysmal, without foundations, inexplicable, non-objectifiable.³

¹DM, p. 18; see also pp. 15, 287.

²DM, p. 18; see also pp. 32, 35, 39.

³SR, p. 105.

Might not this statement just as well read, "Freedom exposes that determination is negation"?

Freedom has been reduced to the complete absence of determination. As such, it is indistinguishable from the void. But the void cannot supply the quality of creative energy which is bound up with Berdyaev's conception of freedom. For the injection of the dynamic element, a wave of the magic wand is required in order to transform the void into the abyss.

Abysmal Non-Being as Source of Freedom

On the basis of the foregoing account, it becomes increasingly evident that the requirements of freedom closely parallel the description of Non-Being. Freedom must be free from the domination of conceptual thought, even from consciousness. This in itself points to Non-Being, for metaphysics since Parmenides has generally tended to equate thought and Being. If, then, freedom defies thought, it must derive from Non-Being. In Berdyaev's own words:

Freedom exercises a primacy over Being, which is merely an objectified state, an arrested freedom shaped by mental concepts. By way of contrast, freedom is an apophatic state.¹

It will be recalled that Non-Being is also apophatic, that it, like freedom, is also prior to good and evil, prior to Being.

¹SR, p. 128 (my italics).

Up to this point, the present treatment has deliberately kept separate the consideration of Non-Being and of freedom, in order to demonstrate their derivation from a common principle. If this has been done successfully, then it will come as no surprise to introduce some of the classic statements in which Berdyaev speaks of the two in such a way as even to suggest their identity:

Every objectivized system of intellectualistic philosophy is a system of determinism. It derives freedom from Being. Freedom appears as determined Being; that is, in the last resort, freedom is the offspring of necessity. Being appears as ideal necessity; no break-through is possible in it.... But freedom cannot be derived from Being; freedom is rooted in nothing, in baselessness, in Non-Being, if we use ontological terminology. Freedom is without foundation; it is not determined by Being nor born of it.¹

Freedom is Nothing, in the sense that it is not one of the realities of the natural world....²

It is necessary to concede the existence of an uncreated freedom which precedes Being and is submerged in the irrational sphere, in what Boehme calls the Ungrund....³

Freedom springs from an abysmal, pre-existential source....⁴

Freedom exposes the limitations of every kind of rational thought; it appears irrational, abysmal, without foundations, inexplicable, non-objectifiable....Jacob Boehme's Ungrund is that very freedom.⁵

¹SF, p. 76.

²DH, p. v.

³DH, p. 90.

⁴DM, p. 297.

⁵SR, p. 105.

Freedom and Non-Being are thus intimately conjoined-- whether in a holy or an unholy alliance remains to be seen.

Is the meontic freedom so derived related to Non-Being as void, or as abyss? Granted that it is prior to choice, limitless,¹ infinite,² is it characterized by the static emptiness of the former, or by the unconditioned power of the latter? The answer is predictable: since freedom concerns action, it requires the dynamic. Hence Berdyaev refers frequently to

...the dynamism, the freedom, and the irrational principles of vital activity, which break through all limitations and determine the historical process.... Historical reality implies the existence of an irrational principle which makes dynamism possible.... We should think of this irrational principle...ontologically as the sine qua non of freedom and dynamism.³

Freedom is to be found in the chaotic, unprincipled surge which wells up out of the abyss of Non-Being, in which "there are breaks, fractions, abysses, paradoxes."⁴ If God is thought of as bestowing harmony upon chaos, then this meontic freedom is mightier than God himself, for it can shatter any attempt to impose order upon it!

¹See FS, pp. 119, 156, 165.

²See FS, p. 128.

³See Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, trans. George Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1936), p. 36. Designated below by the abbreviation MH.

⁴SF, p. 76.

There is in the very origin of the world an irrational freedom which is grounded in the void, in that abyss from which the dark stream of life issues forth and in which every sort of possibility is latent....Apart from the dark abyss of chaos there would be neither life nor liberty....The dwelling-place of freedom is the abyss of darkness and Nothingness....Freedom is not created because it is not a part of nature; it is prior to the world and has its origin in the primal void. God is all-powerful in relation to Being but not in relation to Nothingness and to freedom....¹

Freedom is not created by God: it is rooted in the Nothing, in the Ungrund, from all eternity. Freedom is not determined by God; it is a part of the Nothing, out of which God created the world....God the creator is all-powerful over Being, over the created world, but he has no power over Non-Being, over the uncreated freedom which is impenetrable to him.²

These references make it clear that meontic freedom has been reached by two steps under the guise of one. First, by removing all determinations and restrictions, freedom was reduced to the apophatic void. But second, and only implicitly, the transition has been made to Non-Being as abyss, the undifferentiated source of energy. At one solitary point

¹FS, p. 160. It is significant that in this passage Berdyaev uses the terms 'void' and 'abyss' interchangeably. This illustrates a) his failure to make the explicit distinction drawn above, b) his apparently unconscious dependence upon both meanings of "Non-Being"; and c) his consequent tendency to shift implicitly from one meaning to the other in accordance with the exigencies of the argument, as will be illustrated below. Suffice it to cite here a passage in which only the dynamic meaning of Non-Being is retained: "The supremacy of freedom over Being is also the supremacy of spirit over Being. Being is static, spirit is dynamic; spirit is not Being" (SF, p. 76). Here Non-Being-as-void is entirely overlooked, though it was by way of negation that freedom was first declared to be meontic.

²DM, p. 25.

Berdyaev does actually betray this covert transition, when he refers to "freedom which is both the void and infinite power."¹ Once the transition is made, the question arises: Does any distinction remain between this meontic freedom and a sort of cosmic Dionysian principle? Is it in fact very different from Bergson's élan vital?

Time Ultimate

If the two most comprehensive concepts which one has are the Apollonian and Dionysian, then freedom must be interpreted in terms of either one or the other. If in terms of the former, then freedom becomes mere conformity to an externally imposed pattern; this is Berdyaev's constant complaint against Thomism. But if in terms of the latter, if the Dionysian is given priority over the Apollonian, then there are far-reaching consequences, not only for freedom, as already indicated, but for the correlative aspects of the problem which this study must consider--specifically, for the conception of time.

If abysmal Non-Being is dynamic, while Being is static; and if, for the sake of freedom, Non-Being is given

¹FS, p. 179.

²See SF, p. 258; SS, pp. 129, 151.

the primacy over Being; then, contrary to so much metaphysical speculation both Oriental and Occidental, not eternity, but time is ultimate. For dynamics involves change, and change, as Berdyaev agrees, involves time. The creativity which is for him such an essential part of freedom is thoroughly bound up with time.¹ Consequently he condemns the devaluation of time by mystics and idealists,² insisting that spirit, which is for him the most precious reality, is best characterized as "creative becoming."³

As already observed in the case of Bergson and Heidegger, the implications of regarding time as ultimate are drastic indeed. Perhaps it is owing to apprehension about this that Berdyaev seems to pause on the threshold, to try to make some compromise with eternity, when he asks, "Is change a betrayal of eternity?"⁴ But the logical difficulties in such a question are insuperable. If change can be confused with the changeless, then logic breaks down. Hence he is ultimately forced to concede that, on the basis of his own presuppositions, the temporal must be the ground of the eternal,⁵ just as Non-Being is the ground of Being.

¹See SF, p. 258; SS, pp. 129, 151.

²See SS, p. 131.

³See FS, p. 4.

⁴See SS, p. 4

⁵See MH, p. 68.

For if Non-Being is dynamic, it must be temporal.

At this point in the discussion one comes face to face with one of the knottiest and most curious problems of all. On the one hand, Non-Being was held to be limitless and infinite; on the other hand, it has now been revealed as temporal--but time, together with space, has generally been regarded as one of the chief constituents of finitude! This would seem to indicate that whenever the transition is made from the static void to the dynamic abyss, pari passu the shift has also been made from infinite to finite.¹ In so far as Berdyaev still wishes to claim both dynamism and infinitude for his Non-Being, he is clearly faced with an intricate problem.

He attempts to find a solution in what he calls "existential time," as distinct from cosmic and historical time.² Cosmic time, as the name implies, is the time of the seasons, the years, the planetary revolutions; historical time is that of the clock, the calendar, of epochs such as anne domini; and existential time is often described in terms strikingly similar to Bergson's durée. Whereas the first two kinds of time, being objective (Bergson would say "extended"), comprise the realm of determinism,³ the third,

¹The situation is complicated still further when it is recalled that, in fact, time itself is "infinite" in the sense of "endless."

²See SF, pp. 257 ff. ³See DM, p. 146.

being inward, intensive, and subjective,¹ is wholly undetermined.² But though it may, like durée, serve the purpose of escaping the supposed determinism of extended time, it still does not avoid the problem of how Non-Being can be at once apophatic and temporal. For existential time is acknowledged as the necessary correlate of dynamism, of change, of the events of the "meta-history" which plays such a prominent role in Berdyaev's thought.³ Consequently, if Non-Being is to be conceived strictly apophatically, it must be as void, not as abyss, for the abyss is temporal. In the interest of freedom, however, the dynamism of the abyss is required. In so far, therefore, as Berdyaev adheres to his doctrine of meontic freedom, he must maintain the ultimacy of the abyss--and with it, of time.

Abortive Attempt to Transcend Valuation

When Non-Being is regarded as prior to Being, there are ramifications not only as regards time, as indicated above, but also in the realm of evaluation. Indeed, it is precisely at this point that one of the crucial issues of the present study is encountered; namely, the impossibility of escaping value judgments. On the one hand, as already noted, Non-Being, since it is unlimited, is beyond all distinctions, for to distinguish is to discern a boundary,

¹See SF, pp. 260 f.

²See SS, pp. 144, 150 f.

³See SF, p. 262; MH, ch. iii, iv.

that is, to limit; this means that in Non-Being there is no distinction between good and evil--in other words, no evaluation. But on the other hand, Berdyaev cannot avoid making some very definite evaluative statements, so that what he has denied he in fact implies. To an examination of the nature of these evaluations attention is now directed.

Perhaps there is no better beginning than to point out the subtle presupposition which has dominated the entire discussion: that the infinite ought to be chosen instead of the finite, that it is valued more highly. This tacit assumption becomes more directly apparent when Berdyaev characterizes sin itself as "attraction to the finite,"¹ and speaks of limitation as evil in itself;² and conversely, when he designates the overcoming of all limitation as the aim of spiritual activity.³ Such a view contrasts sharply with that of Aristotle, for example, who regarded perfection as unchanging self-sufficiency, since that which changes is not yet perfect. For Berdyaev, however, that which is already 'perfect' has reached a limit, and the limited can never be perfect for him. He therefore declares immobile

¹See FS, pp. 46, 57, 103.

²See MH, p. 192; FS, pp. 312, 337; DH, p. 46; SR, p. 177.

³See FS, p. 115.

self-sufficiency to be limited and imperfect,¹ and concludes that perfection itself is apophatic; like Non-Being, it is infinite, creative dynamism.²

Once perfection is described in such terms, one wonders how it will differ from Bergson's view, if at all. Like the French philosopher, he is reduced to arguing that energy itself is good:

The good must be conceived of in terms of energy and not of purpose. The thing that matters most is the realization of creative energy and not the ideal normative end.³

And again:

The moral good is not a goal but an inner force which lights up man's life from within. The important thing is the source from which activity springs and not the end towards which it is directed.⁴

Furthermore, this energy as such is regarded as creative, just as is Bergson's élan vital.⁵ On this basis, Berdyaev's "ethics of creativity"⁶ closely parallels the "second source of morality and religion,"⁷ since "value is creative activity";⁸

¹See DH, p. 47.

²See DM, pp. 288 f.

³See DH, p. 144.

⁴See DM, p. 80; see also pp. 16, 43, 145.

⁵See DM, pp. 133, 145.

⁶See DM, II, ch. iii.

⁷Berdyaev himself calls attention to the similarity between his ethics and Bergson's; see SS, pp. 123 n., 182.

⁸See DH, p. 12.

that is, creativity conceived as pure energy needs no other justification. It is self-justifying, because it expresses the indomitable urge to shatter the bonds of finitude in the name of the infinite.¹ Finally, the similarity to Bergson can be pushed one step further, and perhaps even epitomized, by Berdyaev's statement that the chief characteristic of creativity is novelty. Whatever is new is the product of creativity, and the creative always brings forth the new out of the depths of the abyss of Non-Being:

The absolutely new arises through creativeness alone, i.e., through freedom which has its roots in Non-Being. Creation means transition from Non-Being to Being through a free act....Primeval meonic freedom can alone provide an explanation of creativeness.²

Creativeness is always...the making of something new that had not existed in the world before. The problem of creativeness is the problem as to whether something completely new is really possible.... Creation is the greatest mystery of life, the mystery of the appearance of something new that had never existed before and is not deduced from, or generated by, anything. Creativeness presupposes Non-Being,... which is the source of the primeval, pre-cosmic, pre-existent freedom in man....Creativeness can only spring from fathomless freedom, for such freedom alone can give rise to the new, to what had never existed before.³

¹See MH, p. 202; SF, pp. 126, 312.

²DM, p. 33. For some reason, the spelling "m-e-o-n-i-c" is consistently used in the translations of Berdyaev's works. But since the word "ontic" is already in current usage, the present writer has chosen to spell its counterpart "m-e-o-n-t-i-c" (Cf. the French méontique).

³DM, p. 126 f.

Creativity is thus seen to be the correlate of meontic freedom, definable in terms of energy and novelty, and a self-authenticating value in itself. As in Bergson's case, this equating of energy and novelty with value has the effect of removing any principle of discrimination between possible actions. Even if one tried the dubious expedient of preferring one action to another on the ground that it was "newer" or "more energetic," this would still amount to saying that it was for that reason better. But such a thing is far from Berdyaev's intent. His aim from the outset was to get beyond the distinction between better and worse, and he reiterates emphatically that creativity is beyond good and evil.¹ On the basis of this position he is perfectly consistent in saying that "every act is a creative act."² It may appear superficially that he has thereby succeeded in excluding all distinctions, especially normative distinctions. A second look, however, reveals that this is by no means the case, that in fact the very effort to suppress such distinctions actually presupposes and depends upon a prior distinction of precisely this nature. In short, what Berdyaev's explicit denial is logically dependent upon is what he already presupposes.

The pressing question which immediately arises is: upon what prior judgment of value does his position depend?

¹See DM, pp. 42, 130 f.

²SF, p. 24.

The obvious answer is that he evaluates creativity, novelty, and energy higher than their opposites. But this is not the bottom of the matter. For creativity, novelty, and energy are derivative, the value placed upon them is the result of the initial assumption that not to make distinctions of value is better than to do so, that not to discriminate is better than to discriminate. In other words, to suppress value judgments is precisely to make such a judgment against them; the opposition to such discriminations itself presupposes a prior discrimination on behalf of non-differentiation.

Transvaluation of Values

The preceding analysis has attempted to show that the attempt to go beyond all distinctions of value is itself dependent upon a prior value judgment; that is, it contradicts itself. This means that it can never be a question of whether valuation occurs, but only of what the criterion of value is. When this fact is ignored, when the attempt is made, as it is by Berdyaev, to reach a level beyond such distinctions, then a curious nemesis lies in wait: for in the attempt to avoid any valuation at all, it develops that in actual fact Berdyaev has achieved only a transvaluation of values in the Nietzschean sense--he has succeeded only in making evil good, and vice versa. And here the analogy with Bergson gives way to a comparison with Heidegger. Where Bergson restricted the idea of Non-Being to what has been termed

herein as the void, and then banished it as illusory,¹ both Heidegger and Berdyaev retain Non-Being, sometimes giving it a content suggesting the élan vital, and sometimes confining it to the void. Whether or not the logic of Bergson's position would ultimately result in a similar transvaluation is beyond the scope of this essay to inquire. But both Heidegger and Berdyaev, in regarding Non-Being as ultimate, try to get beyond the distinction between fair and foul--and in so doing they end by implying and even stating that "fair is foul, and foul is fair."

That this is so in Heidegger's case has already been shown. In Berdyaev's, the whole process by which it occurs is elaborated in far greater detail, and can consequently be studied even more fruitfully. From at least three separate points, the often implicit judgment of value from which Berdyaev launches his attack on valuation moves along three converging lines to one final conclusion: that evil is "better" than good. First: owing to his uncompromising aversion to the objective world and to finitude, he concludes that the good must be directly contrary to everything in this world: "Christianity calls us to follow the line of the greatest resistance to the world."² "The Gospel is opposed not only to evil but to what men consider good."³ Second: by regarding limit as evil, he is driven

¹See Creative Evolution, pp. 291 f.

²DM, p. 115.

³DM, p. 123.

to say that perfection is evil; for that which is perfect is complete, and as such it has reached its limit. The creativity which he values so highly therefore demands imperfection as its correlate: "Creativeness is bound up with imperfection, and perfection may be unfavorable to it."¹

Third: if morality as such is bad, then non-morality must be good. The person who ignores value judgments is in reality following a higher value! This is what he refers to under the deceptive name of "creative" or "personalistic" ethics:

Personalist ethics signify just that going out from the "common" which Kierkegaard and Shestov consider a break with ethics....The personalistic transvaluation of values regards as immoral everything which is defined exclusively by its relation to the "common"...to society, the nation, the state, an abstract idea, abstract goodness, moral and logical law...and not to concrete man in his existence. Those who are no longer under the law of the "common", it is they who are the really moral people; while those who are subject to the law of the "common" and determined by the social routine of daily life, they are the immoral people. Such people as Kierkegaard are the victims of the old anti-personalist ethics...."²

All three of the foregoing lines of approach can be summarized briefly as follows: all limits are bad; the good imposes a limit--there is a "thou shalt not" implied in every conception of the good; therefore the only real 'good' is that which sets no limit; namely, evil! Furthermore, it is precisely that which knows no limit that is the foundation of Berdyaev's thought; that is, Non-Being! Thus does

¹DM, p. 131.

²SF, pp. 43 f (my italics).

evil turn out to be fundamental to reality, constitutive of that from which all else derives. In his own words "Evil is thus the motive force behind the life of the universe."¹ "Evil is a return to the state of pure power."²

If the primordial Non-Being is the source of evil, then there are consequences with regard to freedom, since freedom is "meontic":

The source of evil is...in the unfathomable rationality of freedom, in pure possibility, in the forces concealed within that dark void which precedes all positive determination of being.³

By taking this step he makes a subtle but highly significant departure from the traditional Christian view. For him, evil is no longer that which corrupts freedom, but rather a necessary constituent of freedom itself: "There is no freedom without the freedom of evil."⁴ Indeed, the devil himself

¹FS, p. 185.

²FS, p. 165.

³FS, p. 165.

⁴DH, p. 92. In spite of Berdyaev's constant insistence that in order to be true to reality he must defy the laws of reason and frankly face paradoxes and contradictions, his correlation of freedom and evil betrays a wholly intellectual approach to the whole subject. His fundamental concern, as he often admits, is theodicy-- the rational explanation of evil (see FS, pp. 119, 132, 160; DM, pp. 54, 278, 293). The chief function of meontic freedom is to supply the explanation of evil: "God is all-powerful in relation to Being, but not in relation to Nothingness and to freedom; and that is why evil exists." FS, p.160.

is simply the "manifestation of irrational freedom."¹

Having thus embraced evil, Berdyaev makes statements as nihilistic as Heidegger's. There is, he says, an element of savagery and barbarism in the creative act.² Evil is not the path to hell, but to heaven;³ it is the way to the knowledge of God.⁴ Hence guilt is a noble experience.⁵ Rebellion against God is man's glory.⁶ The world should be destroyed.⁷ With these references the present argument rests its case, hoping to have shown that if one seriously attempts to deny value judgments altogether, one ends by exalting evil.

The Meontic Self

The consequences of Berdyaev's decision to regard abysmal Non-Being as ultimate can be observed in still another realm; that of selfhood. What must be the nature of the free agent if he is to exercise meontic freedom? The word which he uses to designate the self in so far as it is

¹See FS, p. 163.

²See SF, p. 123.

³See DH, pp. 90 f.; for further references to evil as a means to good, see FS, pp. 184 f., 310; DM, pp. 38, 41, 297; SR, p. 112; DH, p. 91.

⁴See DH, p. 95.

⁵See DM, p. 115.

⁶See DM, p. 28.

⁷See SF, p. 95.

free, is "spirit";¹ hence whatever is said about spirit may be taken as applying to the self in its freedom. Indeed, as he frequently reiterates, spirit is freedom.² If this is the case, then one would expect to find statements made about spirit or about the free self similar to those made about freedom. And in fact one does not have to look far in order to find such statements: spirit, like freedom, is unlimited³ and infinite;⁴ it is energy, dynamism,⁵ and creativity.⁶ This identification of spirit and freedom is carried one step further when it is flatly said that spirit is the source of evil.⁷

If spirit and freedom are to be thus closely identified, it follows that the former, like the latter, must also be "meontic," that the self is fraught with Non-Being, just as it is in Heidegger. This is abundantly confirmed by Berdyaev:

It would be an error to identify spirit and Being. Spirit is freedom, creativeness. Spirit exercises a

¹Berdyaev generally maintains that the self has or acquires spirit, rather than is spirit. See SR, p. 154; DH, p. 128. Though beyond the scope of the present study, the problem does arise; how can the self acquire spirit if it does not already have it in some degree in the first place?

²See DM, pp. 31, 219; SR, pp. 17, 32, 34, 128, 154; DH, pp. 130, 193.

³See SR, pp. 46, 50, 175.

⁴See SR, pp. 65, 111, 176.

⁵See SR, pp. 33, 46, 172.

⁶See SR, pp. 34, 154.

⁷See SR, pp. 73, 104; SF, p. 249; FS, pp. 160-170, 284.

primacy over Being, the primacy of freedom.¹

Spirit, which is neither nature nor substance, is not even Being, since freedom is not Being.²

Man's fear of God is his fear of himself,³ of the yawning abyss of Non-Being in his own nature.

If the self is free in so far as it is meontic, then it follows that consciousness, far from being essential to the exercise of freedom, is a positive detriment. For not only is consciousness selective⁴ (that is, it limits by excluding), but it also presupposes the distinction between subject and object⁵ which, according to Berdyaev, is hostile to freedom. Consciousness is therefore not of the spirit;⁶ it does violence to creativeness;⁷ in fact, it is a "poison"⁸ which enslaves man to the objective world.⁹

If consciousness is taken away from freedom, can there be any such thing as responsibility? It is difficult to see how there could, but for Berdyaev this is not even a desideratum. Responsibility is a category belonging merely to the finite realm, rather than to the realm of

¹SR, p. 32.

²SR, p. 155.

³DM, p. 41.

⁴See FS, pp. 101 f.

⁵See DM, p. 13.

⁶See DM, p. 78.

⁷See DM, p. 76.

⁸See DM, p. 292.

⁹See DH, p. 198. The "super-consciousness" to which Berdyaev sometimes refers is in fact indistinguishable from subconsciousness.

spirit and freedom, just as freedom in the sense of choice really enslaves man to his principle of selection:

The religious and spiritual problem of freedom must not be confused with the question of free will. Freedom has its foundations not in the will but in the spirit....When men seek for proof of the existence of free will the true pathos of freedom is entirely overlooked. For the motive behind such attempts has been the desire to establish the moral responsibility of man....¹

If responsibility is abandoned, then it is no longer important to retain self-identity, in the sense that for purposes of responsibility I am today the same person who mailed a letter yesterday. Consequently Berdyaev is quite content to say:

The existence of personality presupposes interruption; it is inexplicable by any sort of uninterrupted; it is inexplicable by any sort of uninterrupted continuity.²

Here Berdyaev's position is similar to Bergson's. For both, the enduring is the static, and is therefore inimical to freedom. In full consistency with this principle, then, they both must concentrate exclusively on the dynamic, and in so doing they sacrifice any possible point of vantage beyond time from which the free agent makes decisions within time, and to which he relates them in order that they may have meaning. In short, the self does not transcend time. Although Berdyaev frequently refers to "transcension" as a characteristic of spirit,

¹FS, pp. 117 f (my italics); see also p. 119; DM, pp. 43 f.

²SF, p. 21.

it means no more for him than "infinite aspiration."¹

As he himself testifies, he uses the word in the same sense as Heidegger.²

Freedom Reduced to Indeterminism

Throughout the preceding analysis the intention has been to answer the question: what are the consequences for the various aspects of the problem of freedom when abysmal, dynamic Non-Being is regarded as ultimate? In conclusion it remains only to inquire: when all the foregoing data are taken into account, what sort of "freedom" remains? Actually, the answer to this question has been implied from the outset, becoming more and more evident as the argument proceeded. A brief recapitulation at this juncture should therefore suffice to render it wholly explicit.

The starting point of the discussion was Berdyaev's decision to regard Non-Being as ultimate, conceived under the aspect of dynamic abyss, and his virtual identification of freedom with just this Nothingness. Illustrations were then adduced to show that if this abyss is taken as ultimate, then so also is time. For it is above all else dynamic, as opposed to static, and if dynamic, then temporal (and, one may add parenthetically, if temporal, then scarcely infinite). Once it is established that time is of the essence of Non-

¹See DH, p. 45.

²See DH, p. 45.

Being, and that freedom is meontic, then the fate of freedom follows as inexorably as in the case of Bergson. It can be spoken of only in terms of novelty and energy. Essentially it is no more than "freedom from"..., that is, from any limitation or determination. Like Non-Being, it is arrived at by a process of subtraction. "According to our definition," says Berdyaev, "spirit is free from determinism."¹

If time is taken as ultimate, then it is no longer possible for the self as free agent to transcend time--nor, on Berdyaev's definition of freedom, is it necessary or desirable. The consequences of this position, radical though they be, are quite acceptable to him: there is no enduring self which remains the same throughout change; there is consequently no responsible self; and finally consciousness itself is decried, since it is always selective, and in selecting it excludes and limits. Moreover, to choose in accordance with a selective principle is not freedom at all; rather, it enslaves the self to the criterion of choice.

As the evidence accumulates, it becomes apparent that for Berdyaev there are fundamentally only two alternatives, determinism and indeterminism, the one corresponding to the Apollonian, the other to the Dionysian. He speaks of "the dualism of freedom and necessity,"² and refers to

¹SR, p. 159 (my italics); see also p. 176.

²DH, p. 128; see also p. 177; SF, p. 79.

the dichotomy of "freedom and impulse" on the one hand, as against "determinism and causality" on the other.¹

The third alternative of self-determination simply eludes analysis in terms of either Apollonian or Dionysian. The so-called free agent cannot be comprehended as self-determining in such terms; instead, he is said to be a "rupture of causal relations."² Given only the two possibilities, determinism and indeterminism, Berdyaev prefers to describe freedom in terms of the latter. In carrying this decision through consistently, he cannot stop short of saying that freedom is the absence of all determination; that is, it is meontic. But in the last analysis meontic freedom stands revealed as Dionysian indeterminism.

C - THE APOLLONIAN PREDOMINANT: TIME DISPARAGED

The preceding section, in which the doctrine of meontic freedom is central, represents by far the major emphasis in Berdyaev's thought. If consistency had been his chief aim, possibly there would be nothing more to add concerning the relation of freedom and time in his philosophy. It will be recalled, however, that one of the reasons why his works are so fruitful lies in his determination to do

¹See SS, p. 144.

²SF, p. 95; see also SS, p. 139.

justice to all aspects of a problem, even at the price of logical consistency. This being so, he is not prevented from recognizing the extremely precarious status of freedom when it is based upon the Dionysian (that is, when it loses a trans-temporal reference), and from trying to remedy the situation. The remainder of the present chapter is devoted to a consideration of the various remedies he attempts.

In the present section, the first and most obvious alternative is examined; namely, the attempt to regard the Apollonian as ultimate. Such an endeavor stands in such striking contrast to all that was earlier¹ said about the

¹The word "earlier" in this context refers, not to any chronological development in Berdyaev's own writings, but simply to those elements in all his writings which have been collected and presented in an earlier part of the present study. The reader is therefore asked especially to bear in mind the strictly qualified sense in which the words "earlier" and "former" will be used in the following pages to refer to the "Dionysian" emphasis in Berdyaev's thought, presented in the "earlier" part of the present chapter.

The further question naturally arises, to what extent has there been development in Berdyaev's thought? Is it in any sense true that the Dionysian passages are earlier, not merely in order of presentation herein, but also chronologically, in the evolution of his philosophy itself? In an effort to answer this question, the following table has been prepared. Down the left-hand column it lists the books in the order of original publication, and opposite each, across the page to the right, it tabulates the number of references made in the present essay to each of the five different strands of his thought; namely, the Dionysian, in which the dynamic predominates; the Apollonian, in which the static predominates; the dualistic, in which the two are represented as coeval; the ambiguous passages, in which

primacy of the irrational that one can well anticipate the result: a series of statements in direct contradiction to much of what had seemed essential to meontic freedom. Although these contradictions might have been more dramatically presented by ranging them side by side with their counterparts in the preceding section, nevertheless, for the sake of a more systematic treatment, they are here adduced as an independent and more or less self-consistent whole, all derivative from the one basic presupposition of the ultimacy of the Apollonian. To appreciate the full weight of the contrast, the reader is asked to bear in mind

the two are not clearly distinguished; and finally, those contexts in which, at the cost of logic, the necessary presupposition of freedom is held to be neither the static alone, nor the dynamic alone, but permanence-in-change. The results indicate rather emphatically that, whereas there may be some fluctuation in emphasis from one book to another, there is no ground for seeing any significant development in Berdyaev's thought at the points with which the present study is concerned.

	Dion- ysian	Apol- lonian	Dual- istic	Ambi- guous	Permanence- in-change
MH (1923)	5	6	4	1	2
FS (1926)	28	13	4	4	5
DM (1931)	44	31	13	10	7
SS (1934)	11	18	1	5	8
SR (1937)	24	10	8	2	5
SF (1940)	29	17	6	4	11
DH (1947)	18	15	3	6	4

the development of the preceding section under the aegis of the Dionysian.

Valuation Restored

If, as was formerly the case, novelty and energy are held to be self-justifying, then there remains no criterion against chaos. A tangled mass of luxuriant jungle growth would seem to fulfill both specifications quite well. The sheer irrationality which was praised so highly suddenly appears as a threat to all structure and meaning, and the high estimate of meontic freedom turns out to be an endorsement of destruction. Reacting to this danger, Berdyaev resorts to the only alternative available in his dichotomized world-view: the Apollonian principle of rationality, form, order. In order to avoid the confusion, meaninglessness, and destruction involved in the earlier view, it becomes necessary to establish some fixed point or frame of reference in relation to which the meaning of dynamic process can be discerned. Accordingly, even though against his will, he is forced to speak of an "eternal order"¹ and a "world of intelligible essences,"² in the best idealist tradition. In so doing he reinstates the rational principle.

The chief function of the intellect in relation to freedom consists in making value judgments. Consequently,

¹SS, p. 199.

²FS, p. 353.

once the Apollonian principle has been restored, one might expect that, in spite of all that was said earlier about the fatal effect of value judgments on freedom, they too would reappear in this context. It is only a partial surprise therefore when he declares that value is essential to meaning,¹ and speaks of a realm of "eternal values":

The idea of the existence of eternal principles of life...has a positive significance when freedom, justice, the brotherhood of men, the supreme value of human personality as that which must not be turned into a means to an end, are acknowledged as eternal principles.²

One of the characteristic words in his philosophical vocabulary is "axiological," meaning "pertaining to value(s)," which he applies frequently at the very points where values were formerly held to be fatal to freedom. For example, whereas spirit was formerly spoken of as vitality and as the creator of novelty, it now develops that "spirit is axiological";³ that is, it is preeminently concerned with values.

The effect of this reinstatement of valuation is drastically to modify the unqualified endorsement which, under the Dionysian point of view, was accorded to ecstasy, novelty, infinity, and creativity. Whereas these four

¹See DH, p. 12.

²SF, p. 110; see also DM, pp. 136 f., 140, 155, 158, 263.

³SR, p. 39.

were formerly regarded as self-justifying, they are no longer held to be good in themselves. For example, there is both a desirable and an undesirable ecstasy;¹ novelty can be either "good" or "bad";² creativeness, too, is not always good, but may be evil;³ and infinity itself is no longer simply desirable as such; rather, the Apollonian principle is necessary to distinguish the higher and lower elements within infinity.⁴

One of the functions of values in relation to freedom is the establishment of purpose. In spite of the fact that it was earlier held that purpose imposed a determination upon freedom, and was therefore to be deprecated, the destructive and chaotic implications of such a consistently Dionysian interpretation compel a compromise:

Liberation cannot result in inner emptiness...it is not merely liberation from something but also liberation for the sake of something. And this "for the sake of" is creativeness.. Creativeness cannot be aimless and objectless.⁵

The realization of ideal ends, formerly considered to be the enslavement of freedom, now becomes essential: "To be oneself means to realize God's idea of oneself. That is the essence of personality as the highest value."⁶ Though

¹See SF, p. 253.

²See DH, p. 55.

²See DM, p. 131.

⁴See FS, p. 228.

⁵DM, p. 147.

⁶DM, p. 134; see also p. 286.

ostensibly banished from the realm of spirit and freedom, teleology has thus reentered by the back door.

Finally, while it was formerly held that the spiritual world was the world of free, creative energy, as against the rigid limits of reason and of the natural world, it has now become necessary to maintain the opposite: "But while power is a natural category, truth is a spiritual category."¹ This reversal gives the primacy to truth over energy, and leads to a repudiation of Bergsonian vitalism, even though it was exceedingly difficult to distinguish meontic freedom from just such a vitalism.²

The Rational Values

In order to save freedom from being reduced to blind impulse, it was found necessary to reinstate valuation. It must now be asked, what are the values supplied by the Apollonian principle? The answer need cause no surprise; they are the values traditionally propounded by rationalist philosophy: simplicity, wholeness, harmony:

The goal is the attainment of wholeness, the overcoming of disruption, the surmounting of false antinomies.....³

A whole, and a unity, can be sought only in spirit which is not alienated from itself and not objectivized.⁴

¹FS, p. 91.

²See SR, p. 131; SF, p. 80; FS, pp. 34, 37.

³DH, p. 199.

⁴SF, p. 98.

Spirit introduces the qualities of wholeness, unity, and design into man's...life.¹

The ontological justification of asceticism is its achievement of simplicity or wholeness, of freedom from complexity or disintegration.²

These are, of course, precisely the values which were intolerable to meontic freedom with its discontinuity and incompleteness. What formerly was anathema has now become the desideratum. Conversely, from the Apollonian point of view, what was formerly considered desirable is now rejected: "Sin is dividedness, a state of deficiency, incompleteness, dissociation...."³ Whereas formerly any sort of order was regarded as a restriction of freedom, and therefore undesirable, now it is stated that evil is precisely the upsetting of harmony.⁴

From this position a curious consequence follows, based upon the following logic: Thought must be thought of something; therefore, in Parmenides' words, thought correlates with Being; but thought is impossible without rational structure; therefore Being has this structure, and everything that is, is intelligible; a thing possesses being in so far as it possesses form; but form has already been proclaimed as the criterion of value, from the Apollonian point

¹SR, p. 39.

²SR, p. 92.

³DH, p. 90.

⁴See FS, p. 168.

of view; therefore the conclusion is that in so far as anything exists at all, it possesses structure, and is to that extent good. In other words, in so far as a thing exists, it is good.¹ This leads to the principal point of contrast with meontic freedom. For if being is goodness, then it follows that evil is non-existent, is--non-being!² "Evil is evil solely because it is falsehood, untruth, non-being."³ Here there comes to light the utter confusion which lurks within the word "non-being." Whereas before it was regarded as the primary reality, prior even to Being, it is here introduced in the sense of "inconsequential, possessing no reality":

Now the most complete victory over evil comes through the conviction of its emptiness and vanity--in a word, of its non-being....Evil is non-being, but non-existence is the last extremity of boredom, emptiness, and impotence....The evil which is regarded as powerful and enticing is an evil yet unconquered which will remain invincible as long as it is so regarded. Only the knowledge of its absolute tedium and emptiness can give us the victory over it.⁴

By means of using the same word with an entirely different meaning in each case, the semblance of a certain consistency between these Apollonian passages and the earlier, Dionysian ones is maintained. For in both cases,

¹See FS, p. 160.

²The spelling of this word with capital letters is reserved for those contexts in which definite reality is attributed to it, as in the case of meontic freedom.

³DM, p. 166.

⁴FS, p. 183.

non-being was said to be evil. That this consistency is only apparent, however, is quite clear as soon as it is recalled that in the former case, the evil Non-Being was primordial even to Being, and that this led to a transvaluation of values in which evil was "better" than good. In the present case, though evil is still non-being, it is for that very reason not to be taken seriously:

No evil passion pursued to the end has any positive content. All evil consumes itself. Its nothingness is laid bare by its own inner course of development. Evil is the sphere of phantasy....¹

The kingdom of the devil is not reality but non-being, the realm of dark meonic freedom, the illusory subjective realm.²

Formerly the basic reality, non-being (as well as evil) has now become illusory, and Berdyaev actually takes Heidegger to task for taking Non-Being as the basis of his philosophy.³

The foregoing analysis has prepared for a statement of one of the most difficult problems raised by the present inquiry; namely, the problem of the ontological status of values. For if the attempt is made to by-pass the problem by rising to a level where valuation no longer applies, the result, as demonstrated above, is to call evil good, and vice versa. On the other hand, if valuation is acknowledged, and if value is equated with form and with Being, then evil becomes mere deficiency--there is no real evil, but only

¹FS, p. 183.

²DM, p. 281. See also pp. 269, 273, 277.

³See DH, p. 41.

degrees of good. The fact that in each case evil is called "non-being" simply serves to obscure the problem. The problem itself, however, continues to press for solution: on the one hand, freedom would seem to require valuation as a necessary correlate; on the other hand, an analysis of value seems to lead either to a veneration of evil Non-Being or to the relegation of evil to the realm of unreality.

Time Disparaged

The burden of the Apollonian argument thus far has been to the effect that pure change leads to chaos and meaninglessness, and that that which is incomplete is not so good as that which is complete. Consequently an attack can be expected upon the domain of change and incompleteness: time--even though time was earlier found to be indispensable to the dynamism required by freedom. Such an attack is not long in coming: "Time is an evil, a mortal disease, exuding a fatal nostalgia."¹ Why? Berdyaev raises this question and answers it himself:

Wherein lies the root of time's evil and its accompanying nostalgia? It lies in the fact that man finds it impossible to experience the present as a complete and joyful whole....²

What was formerly so highly regarded as the necessary correlate of dynamism is now unbearable when regarded as transience.³

¹SS, p. 134; see also FS, p. 95.

²SS, p. 135 (my italics).

³See SF, p. 267.

From this point of view, man's chief aim is to escape from time;¹ indeed, this is a moral obligation.² Time is a tragic problem to be solved,³ and it is the glory of Christianity and philosophy to triumph over corruptibility and change, to establish the victory of eternity over time.⁴ So intolerable is man's bondage to time that no epithet is inapplicable to it: most frequently it is held to be the result of sin,⁵ as well as a nightmare,⁶ hell itself,⁷ a living death.⁸

Is there any escape from the curse of time? On the basis of the Dionysian, it would seem that Berdyaev, like Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, must describe the human situation as a hopeless dilemma: time is intolerable, but there is no way out. Just as Heidegger was forced to modify this position in his subsequent writings, however, Berdyaev makes a far more emphatic break with the "meontic"⁹ and appeals directly

¹See DH, p. 156.

²See DM, p. 147.

³See MH, p. 187; SF, p. 263.

⁴See SF, p. 267; MH, p. 19; FS, p. 286; DH, pp. 54, 181.

⁵See FS, p. 198; DM, pp. 147, 249, 252; SS, pp. 130, 138.

⁶See DM, p. 295.

⁷See DM, pp. 268, 278; DH, p. 163.

⁸See DM, p. 251.

⁹For an example of his repudiation of Non-Being, see DH, pp. 126 f.

to eternity: "The very point under discussion is emancipation from the claims of the power of the temporal and historical, and growth towards the eternal."¹

Before examining further the extent to which the Apollonian approach exalts the eternal at the expense of the temporal, it is well to pause long enough to inquire whether or not the difference between the two is logically reconcilable or not. This will depend upon the definition of the two words. It is difficult to see how "time" can be meaningfully applied except as succession, as the indispensable condition and correlate of change. "Eternity," on the other hand, whatever nuances of meaning may attach to it, generally refers to that which is beyond flux and change (not to be confused with "sempiternity," or endless time). If this be true, then is it not also true that the word "eternal" really represents a way of saying "non-temporal" without the use of a mere negative expression, so as to imply some content to that which is beyond time? Again, if this be the case, then any attempt to reduce time to eternity, or vice versa, is tantamount to trying to reduce the temporal to the non-temporal, the changing to the changeless. This is the very thing which Plato, in his discussion of the "same" and the "other", shows to be fatal to logic. It will be recalled that in his emphasis on Non-Being Berdyaev found himself so committed to the ultimacy of time as to

¹DE, p. 54; see also pp. 126, 156.

ask, "Is time a betrayal of eternity?" Now, however, he unhesitatingly answers his own question with a decided negative: "Eternity is extra-temporal."¹ "The idea of eternity is opposed to the nightmare of both finite and infinite time."² And he goes on to include under this stricture Bergson's *durée*, which is so similar to his own "existential time." There can therefore be no time in eternity,³ nor in the realm of the spirit.⁴

One of his favorite comparisons of eternity and time is that the former is to the latter as life is to death.⁵ This means, as was implied in the discussion of values, that there can be perfection only in eternity.⁶ And it can lead, as it has so often done in idealistic and mystical philosophy, to the conclusion that after all, only eternity is real, and that time is illusory.⁷ And if this is the case, then it can no longer be true, as was maintained earlier, that time is the source of eternity; rather, he must now maintain the opposite: "Dynamism and change therefore have their

¹SS, p. 149; see also p. 152.

²SS, p. 154.

³See DM, p. 288; SS, p. 130.

⁴See SR, p. 174; SF, p. 195.

⁵See MH, pp. 68-72; DM, p. 258; DH, p. 164; SS, pp. 135, 156.

⁶See DM, p. 288.

⁷See DH, p. 156.

genesis in eternity,"¹ for time is a lapse from eternity. Paradise, therefore, conceived as the optimum state of affairs, is one in which there will be no more time.²

Finally, one further aspect of the problem of freedom and time is illumined when it is stated, in what may be called the "Apollonian contexts," that time is determined.³ The significance of such a statement is apparent when it is recalled that formerly it was precisely time which provided a complete indeterminism! This ambivalent attitude springs from the fact that there are two possible ways of regarding time: according to the first, the antecedent moment is conceived as necessarily determining the subsequent moment; according to the second, the antecedent bears no causal relation to the subsequent. The attempt may be made to hold both of these attitudes at once by dividing time into two realms; in the first realm, which may be called that of "extended" or "objectivized" time, determinism applies; in the second, which may be called "duration" or "existential time," indeterminism applies. But the artificial character of this attempt is exposed as soon as it is recognized that in both realms the definitive characteristic of time (namely, succession and change) is retained. It is therefore not immediately obvious why one of the two realms should be

¹See SS, p. 144.

²See SF, p. 267; DH, p. 197.

³See SF, pp. 144, 150 f.

relegated to determinism and the other reserved for indeterminism. But, more immediate to the present argument, can freedom be based upon either of these two realms, even if the distinction between them were valid?

The Trans-Temporal Self

At still another point does the predominance of the Apollonian effect the problem of freedom as a whole; namely, the nature of the free agent. In striking contrast to all that was said from the Dionysian point of view about the meontic nature of selfhood, it is now stated: "Personality was forged by the religion of Apollo, the god of form and measure."¹ "Without the logos, without the spiritual principle, personality disintegrates."² Notwithstanding the fact that spirit was earlier described in terms of unlimited energy, it is now maintained: "Spirit introduces the qualities of wholeness, unity, and design into man's psychic and psychic-corporeal life."³ "There is no wholeness, no totality, no universality of any kind outside personality.... To this we shall constantly return."⁴

If the self is described in terms of wholeness, the question of its relation to time is immediately raised. For time is always "not yet," it is never a completed whole.

¹FS, p. 228; see also SR, p. 36.

²DM, p. 189; see also pp. 62 f.

³SR, p. 39.

⁴SF, p. 42; see also p. 41; SR, p. 103.

Does this mean that the self, though formerly declared to be essentially temporal, is now to be taken out of time altogether? Berdyaev replies: "Spirit is timeless as well as spaceless."¹ "The essence of personality is immutable."² Perhaps the most significantly Apollonian statement in this vein is: "By virtue of its essence or 'idea', the personality is both immortal and eternal."³ With such statements there is established one of the elements of responsible freedom which was lacking when the self was regarded meontically: self-identity, the persistence of the same self throughout the passing of time. This conception, however, stands in such sharp contrast to the earlier treatment that Berdyaev could scarcely fail to notice and to come to grips with the discrepancy, as he does in the following two citations:

The personality is also the symbol of human integrity, of permanent values, of a constant and unique form created in the midst of incessant flux....The personality postulates further the existence of a dark, violent, and irrational principle, the soul's capacity to experience powerful emotions; it also postulates the soul's ultimate and everlasting triumph over this irrational principle.⁴

The personality stands in a paradoxical relationship to time. The personality is synonymous with change and perpetual creation, and yet it is at the same time immutable. Thus, on the one hand, it is temporal in so far as it realizes itself in time, but, on the other,

¹SR, p. 35; see also p. 39; FS, p. 329.

²SS, p. 194.

³SS, p. 199.

⁴SS, p. 161 (my italics).

it eschews time, like every other form of materialization, as a danger to its existence.

Whether or not these two passages succeed in accomplishing more than merely to state the problem need not be inquired here. Suffice it to note that in both the primacy is given to the non-temporal, though in the second there is perhaps a foreshadowing of the tendency to grant an equal status to both aspects.

When Berdyaev speaks sub specie Apollonis, he is able to establish not only self-identity, as already shown, but also another correlate of responsible freedom: valuation. As has already been indicated, he speaks of spirit as an "axiological category";² in other words, "Spirit is not a biological or a psychological category, but an ethical and spiritual."³ And this is possible because the self has a vantage point above process from which to evaluate that which occurs in time. If, however, the self is essentially non-temporal, of what relevance to it are the value judgments which it is able to make? This is the question which will have to be considered below.

It remains to inquire whether or not the kind of self so far described is conscious. Since, in conformity with the Apollonian principle, it is both rational and capable of evaluating, one would suppose that it was. Just at this

¹SS, p. 152.

²See SS, pp. 160, 162; SF, p. 23.

³SF, p. 25; see also p. 37.

point, however, the Apollonian joins with the Dionysian in decrying consciousness. For consciousness presupposes the separation between subject and object, and as long as there is this duality, the Apollonian demand for wholeness can never be satisfied. The conscious state must therefore be overcome. But can this be done without simply lapsing into unconsciousness? Berdyaev seeks to circumvent this danger by appealing to what he calls "superconsciousness":

The development of spirituality implies a passage beyond disrupted consciousness towards superconsciousness, an escape from the power of necessity, from the causal world, into a sphere of freedom and love.¹

When this statement is coupled with those which proclaim the necessity for escaping from time, it could well be inferred, though Berdyaev does not say so explicitly, that consciousness belongs to time, and must therefore be abandoned together with all things temporal. Whether or not this is the case, the question remains as to whether or not freedom is possible without consciousness. The answer depends upon what one is able to say about superconsciousness, and in actual fact Berdyaev is able to say nothing about such a state which would not apply equally well to unconsciousness, so that the distinction between the two turns out to be merely formal. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the following citation:

¹SR, p. 103.

There are three stages in the development of the spirit: the original paradisiacal wholeness, pre-conscious wholeness which has not had the experience of thought and of freedom; division, reflection, valuation, and freedom of choice; and, finally, super-conscious wholeness and completeness that comes after freedom, reflection, and valuation.¹

This strongly suggests that in transcending time, the Apollonian abandons consciousness, and in so doing (directly contrary to the immediately preceding citation!) leaves freedom behind as well.

Freedom Overcome

It remains only to sum up the bearing upon freedom of the various aspects of the problem considered from the Apollonian point of view. It was seen that the Apollonian does provide one necessary prerequisite of responsible freedom: self-identity. But when the self is thus elevated above time, it apparently loses all contact with the temporal. For are not the temporal and the eternal avowedly incompatible? And if the self is essentially non-temporal, how can it exercise freedom? For does freedom have any meaning apart from decisions and actions taken in the present with reference to the future? The inference seems to be: the self is non-temporal; freedom is a temporal phenomenon; therefore the self is essentially not free.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that to some extent the self does find itself a creature of time, exercising

¹DM, p. 39 (my italics).

the freedom which belongs to time (though how this can be consistently accounted for is another matter). How is it possible to account for this anomalous situation in which an essentially timeless self is embroiled in time? The answer: time is a lapse from eternity, and the freedom which accompanies time is a mark of this separation from perfection. Freedom is the result of sin. In consequence, man must bear the burden of decision--decision in accordance with the values of good and evil. If he chooses the former, which is equated with Being, he will ultimately once again reach the state of static perfection from which he fell, and there will be no more time and no more freedom.

This is just the conception of freedom which is attacked so strongly by Existentialism (and which Berdyaev himself denounces in his frequent criticism of Thomism). The Existentialists make a double charge: first, this is not freedom, but determinism; and second, freedom aims at its own liquidation. The first charge is one which Berdyaev himself makes over and over again wherever he speaks in behalf of meontic freedom. The burden of his attack is simply that where the self is determined in its actions by a given norm such as intelligible Being, then it no longer has any freedom. It is determined from without. Teleology is fatal to freedom. Yet in the Apollonian contexts he himself specifically endorses values and teleology.¹ The

¹See MH, p. 186; FS, p. 304.

second charge holds that though the self whose goal is goodness and Being is in fact determined by this alien norm, nevertheless at any time prior to its "arrival" at its goal it is theoretically free to turn aside in its purpose. But upon reaching the goal of Being, it loses even this potential freedom, being united finally and inseparably with the object of its pursuit. In his Apollonian moods, Berdyaev appears to be without defense against this second charge. Freedom, he says, is "subjection to the Truth."¹ Just as there is no more time in paradise, so also is there no more freedom.² It is even suggested that God himself is not free.³

In conclusion, it may be noted how this rationalistic view of freedom tempts the Existentialist to respond with the exaltation of Non-Being. On the Apollonian view, goodness correlates with Being and evil with non-being, in the sense of non-existent.⁴ Evil cannot therefore be taken too seriously. But the Existentialist, concerned as he is to preserve freedom at any cost, asks what it is that destroys freedom, and discovers that it is precisely the

¹SF, p. 70.

²See DM, pp. 148, 288 f., 297; DH, p. 48.

³FS, p. 131.

⁴For an example of the identification of evil with non-being in this sense, see J. Maritain, Existence and the Existent, trans. Lewis Galantieri and Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948), ch. iv.

good. The ideal of the good prevents the exercise of free choice, and the attainment of the good eliminates even the possibility of choice (Augustine's non posse peccare can be interpreted in this sense). He then asks what would preserve freedom, and discovers that the answer is-- evil Non-Being! If Non-Being will free him where goodness enslaved, he declares himself ready to worship this true god which can thus defy Being itself. In such a way the journey is begun back toward a Dionysian indeterminism as an escape from Apollonian determinism.

D - HINTS OF AN ULTIMATE DUALITY

The results of the analysis thus far have led to an impasse: in the first place, the Dionysian and Apollonian are not to be reduced to each other if logic is to be retained; but in the second, freedom has been shown to be impossible upon the basis of either the one or the other. A way out of this blind alley has sometimes been sought in an ultimate duality, in two distinct principles which react upon each other, or which alternately hold sway, in the manner of the Chinese yang and yin. Though it is not a sufficiently significant aspect of his philosophy to merit detailed attention here, Berdyaev's own tendency in this direction does serve to illustrate his perplexity over the problem of freedom and time.

Two Coeval Principles

The passages which most strongly suggest this ultimate dualism are those in which he speaks of tragedy.

For example:

Tragedy means conflict between polarities, but it need not necessarily be a conflict between good and evil, the divine and the diabolical. True depths of tragedy become apparent when two equally divine principles come into conflict. The whole of my book is devoted to describing conflicts of that type.¹

Reality consists of the conflict of two equipollent forces.² In fact, "the opposite of God is again God,"³ the structure of reality is polar,⁴ and change is the result of the pendulum swing of two coeval principles.⁵

Choice Between "Equal Goods"

If the conflict of which Berdyaev speaks is not between good and evil, but between two equally primal principles, then the meaning of the word "value" becomes uncertain indeed. Surely it can no longer refer to what one ought to choose, since there is no ground for preferring either of the two ultimates over its counterpart. And this conclusion is drawn by Berdyaev himself:

¹DM, p. 31 (my italics).

²See SR, pp. 155, 173; SS, p. 187; DH, p. 179; DM, pp. 41, 154, 156.

³DH, p. 87.

⁴See FS, p. 309; SR, p. 67.

⁵FS, p. 309.

His (man's) tragedy is, as we have seen, not merely a struggle between good and evil, but something still deeper--a conflict between values which are equally good.¹

Tragedy is connected with the conflict of values which are recognized as equally deserving of creative effort.²

From this it follows that rebellion against God is impossible;³ rebellion against God is done in the name of God himself. With the ontological basis of evil thus removed, the word "good" no longer signifies something which is "better" than evil, but only distinguishes the one cosmic principle from its opposite. Indeed, good and evil are correlative.⁴ And when this statement is coupled with the belief in two ultimate principles of equal value, then there no longer remains any reason why the two words "good" and "evil" should not be applied interchangeably. And as soon as this becomes possible, then obviously the words have lost all meaning, and valuation has ceased to have any foundation in reality.

The Polar Self

Whereas man was formerly regarded either primarily as meontic or as an immutable essence, depending upon

¹DM, p. 47.

²DM, p. 139.

³See DM, p. 54.

⁴See DM, pp. 35, 285; SR, p. 112; SF, p. 241; MH, p. 193.

whether the Apollonian or the Dionysian predominated, from the point of view of an ultimate duality man appears as a microcosmic replica of the perpetual macrocosmic conflict. He is the locus par excellence of this conflict:

There are two elements in human nature, and it is their combination and interaction that constitutes man. There is in him the element of primeval, utterly undetermined potential freedom springing from the abyss of Non-Being, and the element determined by the fact that man is the image and likeness of God, a divine idea which his freedom may realize or destroy.¹

Man has sprung from God and from the dust, from God's creation and Non-Being, from God's idea and freedom. Therein lies the complexity of human nature and its polarity. The co-existence of opposite principles in man is due not to the fall, as is often supposed, but to the original duality of human nature and origin.²

If the self is thus described as the meeting ground of two opposite principles, then it may be inferred that tragedy (in Berdyaev's sense of the word, that is, "conflict") is definitive for spirit. Human nature, he says, is polar,³ and within the depths of spirituality "all is vital tragedy",⁴ including the creative activity of spirit.⁵ The self is thus reduced to the status of battleground for the two conflicting forces.

¹DM, p. 53; see also pp. 46, 56.

²DM, p. 54; see also SF, p. 20; FS, p. 228.

³See SR, p. 90.

⁴FS, p. 33.

⁵See SR, p. 56; DH, p. 182; SF, pp. 127, 139.

Freedom Precluded

If an ultimate duality of Apollonian and Dionysian be postulated, then it does not appear that the problem of freedom and time is any nearer solution. Valuation, the essential intellectual correlate which safeguards freedom from becoming blind impulse, is eliminated, and the self is reduced at best to the mere possibility of observing the interplay of cosmic forces taking place within it. Since these forces are of equal value, their struggle loses its meaning,¹ and man's only consolation comes from the catharsis of realizing this.² The problem of freedom is actually not even raised. In its stead there is substituted the alternating interaction of determinism and indeterminism, the "fatal dialectic" of necessity and spontaneity.³

E - AMBIGUITIES

Three alternatives have now been tried, none of which provides an adequate basis for freedom. Neither the Apollonian, nor the Dionysian, nor a combination of the two

¹See SF, p. 256.

²See MH, p. 206.

³See SF, p. 255; MH, pp. 213, 220; SR, pp. 52, 56.

has proven satisfactory, and yet the laws of logic do not permit the reduction of one to the other. Under the duress of this predicament, it is understandable that one might find the laws of logic straightening, and be tempted to stretch them beyond the legitimate limit. The present section lists some of the points at which Berdyaev is in fact forced into this position by the stubborn refusal of the other alternatives to provide for freedom, the purpose being to show that when the attempt is made to solve the problem by blurring distinctions between concepts, then clarity of meaning, and with it the possibility of communication, is threatened.

Non-Being

The ambiguity surrounding Berdyaev's use of the word "Non-Being" has already been brought out. Suffice it here to note one or two of the more obvious instances. Since it is not Being, he can say that it does not exist,¹ for then it would be Being. But this non-existent Non-Being can be used in at least two distinct senses. When it is said that evil is "mere non-being," the meaning is that evil does not exist at all.² It is trivial and inconsequential. But when Non-Being becomes the abyss and inexhaustable source of all that is, it is suddenly the most real of all.

¹ See SR, p. 34.

² See FS, p. 183; DM, pp. 269 f.

Berdyaev himself recognizes these two distinct meanings when he says: "Evil...has no independent existence, it is that non-being which must be distinguished from the original void."¹ This is a distinction, however, which he seldom observes.

A similar ambiguity holds in regard to the relation of God to the primordial Non-Being. Sometimes God is identical with Being,² sometimes with abysmal Non-Being, like Eckhardt's Gottheit and Boehme's Ungrund.³

Time

The exasperating difficulties of the Apollonian-Dionysian dichotomy are nowhere more vividly illustrated than in the problem of freedom and time. On the one hand, freedom concerns action, and as such it must be temporal (Dionysian); on the other, the valuation and self-identity which are necessary to preserve freedom from chaos can only be established on a non-temporal (Apollonian) basis. This is the crux of the problem, and Berdyaev is sometimes tempted to solve it, or rather, to circumvent it, by denying the irresolvable distinction between time and eternity (though they are at times specifically said to be incommensurable),⁴ between Apollonian and Dionysian.

¹FS, p. 166.

²See DM, p. 46.

³See DH, pp. 15, 44; SF, p. 85; FS, pp. 69, 124.

⁴See DM, p. 274.

Sometimes this tendency appears as an effort to establish dynamism apart from time, so that it may be incorporated into eternity--though how there could be dynamism without time is scarcely comprehensible:

Paradise is not in the future, is not in time, but in eternity....Eternity is not a cessation of movement, of creative life; it is creative life of a different order;¹

...eternity may be creative and dynamic.³

Can any meaning be attached to creativity apart from change? Berdyaev is unwilling to go this far, and therefore is forced to admit that if there is creativity in eternity, there must also be change.³ But if change, must there not also be time? This is the rock upon which any attempt must wreck which seeks to incorporate change in eternity to the exclusion of time.

The only remaining alternative is to reconsider the sharp distinction which was elsewhere drawn between eternity and time, and to declare that they are not mutually exclusive after all.⁴ Once this liberty has been taken with the laws of logic, statements like the following can arise:

The temporality of human existence is the outcome of a degraded state, though its original nature is extra-temporal.⁵

If the original nature of temporality is extra-temporal, then

¹DM, p. 288; see also pp. 289, 295, 296 (my italics).

²DM, p. 44; see also SS, p. 143.

³See SS, p. 151. ⁴See MH, p. 65.

⁵SS, p. 156; see also p. 155.

the very meaning of words is threatened, for "temporality" can mean "non-temporality." Such are the extremities to which one may be driven in the effort to have creativity without time.

Values

The relation of valuation to freedom has also led finally to a dilemma. On the one hand, values are declared to be hostile to freedom, since they determine its exercise. If my action is directed by the good, so the argument runs, then I am not free at all, but have been dictated to from without. In order to avoid any such alien rule, sheer, spontaneous novelty is declared to be self-justifying. But such a position has no criterion against an unbridled antinomianism, and it becomes necessary to distinguish between a "good" and a "bad" novelty. Change must preserve spiritual continuity,¹ and dynamism must include design.² But to take this step is to raise once again the spectre of determinism by dictating the direction in which freedom must act. In short, there appears to be no escape from the alternatives of determinism and indeterminism.

The question of values is similarly related to time. For as long as creativity and novelty are the summum bonum, then there must be time, as in Bergson's case. But when

¹See DH, p. 50.

²See DH, p. 126.

value is regarded in terms of harmony and wholeness, then time becomes a positive detriment:

Perfection, fullness, and wholeness are not realizable in time, for they indicate the end of time, victory over it, and entrance into eternity.¹

Once again the investigation finds itself between Scylla and Charybdis, between an unrestricted, dynamic, temporal novelty which leads to indeterminism, on the one hand, and a trans-temporal harmony which enforces determinism, on the other. And once again the temptation is to reconcile the duality by obscuring the necessary logical distinctions between the two alternatives. This may be done from the side of the Apollonian, when Berdyaev attempts to include dynamism within completeness: he favors a concept of perfection which will "admit of yearning and need in the notion of completeness."² In a similar vein he says that wholeness has a special meaning as applied to spirit:

The whole and the unity acquire a different meaning, and do not imply the suppression of the "partial," the multiple, the personal.³

Once again the very meaning of words has become unstable.

The same sort of attempt may be made from the side of the Dionysian, in the form of an appeal to the "goodness" of rejecting goodness! This is strikingly illustrated in the following statements:

¹DM, p. 288.

²DH, p. 15.

³SF, p. 98.

The good is a means, it is a path, and it has arisen in opposition to evil....The good indeed lies beyond the distinction between good and evil.¹

There are two different kinds of good--the good ...that judges and makes valuations,...and the good which...does not judge or make valuations....²

In this one sees the desperate effort to preserve freedom by removing goodness, and at the same time to prevent chaos by including goodness. The device of distinguishing between two supposedly different kinds of goodness does not conceal the difficulty, much less overcome it.

Selfhood

As implied in much of the foregoing, freedom also makes a double demand upon the self. On the one hand, the self is not free if it does not change--the immutable could hardly be called free; on the other, without self-identity (that is, "sameness," immutability) there is no true freedom, but only caprice. Are these two demands reconciliable? Clearly not, if indeed it be the case that logically the mutable and the immutable are mutually exclusive. And yet, if the entire analysis is correct, the experience of

¹DH, p. 139 (my italics).

²DM, p. 294. The idea of a paradisaical "good" which has no evil correlate would seem to be required by a Christian view. The Kingdom of God is conceived as wholly good. The crucial point, however, is whether this kingdom's final triumph is reserved, as it should be, for another aeon, or whether the effort is made to apply the "good which is beyond good and evil" to the here and now. A considerable number of Christian theologians have preceded Berdyaev in following the latter course.

freedom obstinately continues to require them both. In this situation, what is more likely than that the canons of logic should once again be strained to meet the emergency. For example:

It (the personality) exists by virtue of a mysterious alliance between change and innovation, on the one hand, and constancy and self-sufficiency, on the other. In defining the human personality, stress should be laid on the persistence of its identity despite many outward changes and the acquisition of many new characteristics.¹

In other words, it is necessary to postulate a self which is both static and dynamic at the same time.

Another ambiguity is encountered with reference to consciousness. It will be recalled that the Apollonian seemed to imply consciousness, in as much as it required the intellectual elements of purpose and of valuation, but that in the last analysis it was at one with the Dionysian in rejecting consciousness (though on the grounds of divisiveness, rather than finitude). This raises the question of whether purpose, values, and indeed reason itself can be conceived apart from consciousness. Does reason liquidate itself when it rejects consciousness? If so, then purpose and values can scarcely be maintained. And yet, in the following passage, the attempt is made both to retain purpose and to transcend reason:

The Logos is akin to spirit, it informs everything with purpose. But at the same time spirit is irration-

¹SS, pp. 194 f.

al, supra-rational. The rationalistic interpretation of spirit only deforms and debases it. When confronted with man's irrational, unconscious nature, spirit struggles bravely to dominate it. In this process of spiritualization--not rationalization--my natural foundations appear alien and determined from without.¹

This passage, with its attempt to retain purpose without reason, also contains a suggestion of the device which is often used to accomplish such a feat: namely, the appeal to the "supra-rational," or "super-consciousness."² By the use of these words, the claim is made to have transcended consciousness while retaining purpose and values. Whether this claim is valid or not depends partly upon whether any distinction can be made between this "supra-rational" and the irrational. And, in fact, though a detailed scrutiny lies beyond the scope of the present study, Berdyaev nowhere distinguishes between the two, and in passages like the following strongly implies that no distinction is possible:

Orgiastic cosmic mysticism...is vitalistic rather than spiritualistic, it is expressive of soul and body. But this type of mysticism also aims at overcoming the limitations of consciousness, at breaking away from the domination of rationalism. It is problematic whether this path leads to super-consciousness or to subconsciousness.³

If the word "superconsciousness" is to be used significant-

¹SR, pp. 34 f (my italics).

²The idea of a superconscious reason has abundant precedent in German thought. Nietzsche, for example, generally speaks of the Apollonian in such terms.

³SR, p. 136 (my italics).

ly, the onus lies upon its user to distinguish it from subconsciousness. Failing this, it will have to be acknowledged that there is no freedom without consciousness. But such a freedom eludes description in either Apollonian or Dionysian terms.

Freedom

Finally, the very concept of freedom itself has turned out to be one which defies elaboration in logically consistent terms. For on the one hand, freedom does seem to require the absence of all determinism. If this point is pushed far enough, freedom becomes freedom from--that is, from all determinateness and relatedness. This is the route which leads by means of the apophatic method to the equation of freedom with the Unconditioned. But on the other hand, such a conception reduces freedom to mere energy, without responsibility, valuation, or decision--all of which are essential to freedom as actually experienced and as the very presupposition of so many of man's activities. Nevertheless the fact remains that the moment valuation and responsibility are introduced, the autonomy of freedom has been yielded up to alien considerations; the exercise of freedom is reduced to the mere process of calculation in order to determine the course of action most clearly in accord with the given norm (as in J. S. Mill's utilitarianism).

Thus analyzed, freedom appears to demand definition in incompatible terms: it defies all external reference, in order to be truly free, yet it requires just such a reference to preserve itself from caprice; in short, from the point of view of the Dionysian, it requires indeterminism, while from that of the Apollonian, it requires determinism. Confronted by this situation, one might well expect to discover attempts to by-pass the difficulty by blurring the logical distinction between these two irreconcilable aspects. Two such attempts are illustrated by the following citations. In the first, Berdyaev tries to identify freedom of choice with the totally undetermined freedom conceived simply as energy:

Personality, the character of personality, indicates that a man has made a choice, that he has established differences, that he is not indifferent, and that he makes distinctions. This freedom...is freedom of the spirit, of the creative spiritual energy.¹

In the second, the same attempt is made in slightly different terms; namely, the relation between duty and freedom. Duty, of course, stands for the rational element of valuation and decision--the very element which appears to seek the subjection of freedom. But here Berdyaev tries to reconcile the two as follows:

Freedom of personality is a duty, it is a fulfillment of vocation, the realization of the divine idea of man, an answer to the divine call. Man ought to be free....²

¹SF, p. 48.

²SF, p. 48.

whereas Kant demonstrated that duty presupposes freedom, Berdyaev sees that duty also exercises a tyranny over freedom. But in order to save freedom from chaotic spontaneity, he seeks to retain duty in an inverse status; that is, he reverses the Kantian position and says that freedom presupposes duty! At this point, however, the precariousness of his position is evident. If "duty" can have any meaning apart from the presupposition of freedom, it can only be a meaning fundamentally different from the conventional one. Here then is one more example of the extremities to which one may be driven by the perplexing nature of the problem of the relation between freedom and time: the loose use of words to join together that which strict logic holds apart.

Conclusion

The foregoing pages have sought to analyze the relation of freedom and time on the basis of the fundamental distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian. The conception of meontic freedom, it was argued, actually rests upon the Dionysian, inasmuch as Non-Being is conceived as the inexhaustible, abysmal source of energy. Such a view of freedom amounts ultimately to no more than a Bergsonian vitalism; that is, to indeterminism. Frankly recognizing that such a position does not do justice to freedom, Berdyaev turns for support to the only other possibility open to him, to the Apollonian as the basis of freedom. But this view

of the matter falls at once under his own strictures; it subordinates freedom to law, regarding it as the result of a deviation from perfection, and aiming at its eventual elimination.

Perhaps suspecting that freedom has eluded analysis in terms of either Dionysian or Apollonian separately, Berdyaev suggests in scattered passages two further possibilities. The first acknowledges an ultimate duality between the two principles, postulating their interaction in the manner of yang and yin. No serious effort is made to establish freedom on this basis, since the juxtaposition of determinism and indeterminism could scarcely account for self-determination. But the logical incompatibility of the Apollonian and Dionysian is taken seriously. The two are placed side by side, without confusion. In the final possible solution, however, this is no longer the case. Driven to desperation by the failure to account for the fact of freedom in terms of Apollonian-Dionysian theory, Berdyaev is tempted to try the expedient of merging these two principles. In order to join together what logic rigidly separates without asserting a contradiction, he must obscure the distinction between static and dynamic, immutable and mutable, eternal and temporal. As analysis showed, the appearance that these pairs had been combined was achieved by an ambiguous use of words and phrases.

Does this mean that the quest for true freedom must end in failure? The foregoing pages have analyzed several aspects of the thought of a many-sided thinker and have failed to discover freedom. Have all possibilities been exhausted, or is there still another? The concluding chapter will offer an additional alternative, one toward which many of the preceding pages have pointed, and of which there are strong hints in Berdyaev himself.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The principal conclusion to be drawn from the investigation was anticipated in the introduction and referred to throughout. Before developing it more extensively, the present chapter will, in its first section, recapitulate the chief results of the preceding pages as a means of further clarifying the issues involved, of determining more specifically the prerequisites of freedom. In the second section, the suggestion tentatively advanced at the beginning, and steadily reinforced as the inquiry proceeded, will receive explicit statement and elaboration. Finally, the concluding section will apply it to the several facets of the complex herein designated as freedom, supported by corroboration from Berdyaev. For, as already intimated, he is committed to the method of leaving no stone unturned in the search for freedom. As a result, and at times seemingly in spite of himself, the failure to uncover freedom in any other way leads him occasionally to speak of it in the terms anticipated herein at the outset in a priori analysis; that is, as a phenomenon which is at once both temporal and trans-temporal. This step, taking liberties as it does

with the canons of logic, is probably justifiable only on the basis of the failure of the alternative possibilities. Once taken, however, it provides a certain degree of self-justification by its ability to meet the requirements of freedom where other approaches have failed.

A - RECAPITULATION AND CLARIFICATION

The analysis of Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev has sought to show that all three agree basically on an irreducible logical disparity between the mutable and the immutable. By far the greater part of the study, however, was devoted to establishing that on the basis of this fundamental presupposition, none of them is able to establish freedom on the basis of either time or eternity alone. The effort to make this point has led to a rather minute analysis of the three philosophers, for the fact is that, in contradiction to the thesis maintained herein, all three claim in many contexts to establish freedom. Bergson's durée, Heidegger's Entschlossenheit, Berdyaev's meontic freedom--all these apparently fly in the face of the present thesis.

In order to vindicate its point as against this prima facie opposition, the present investigation was forced to show that, notwithstanding the strong connotations of

freedom within the thought of all three men, nevertheless they are difficult to justify when taken in the context of the respective philosophies as a whole. Perhaps the best illustration of this is Bergson, who, when he speaks about freedom per se, is apt to describe it in almost the same terms as those employed herein. That is, while recognizing its dynamic nature, he denies that it involves arbitrary caprice, and even concludes that it postulates an inseparable unity of the temporal and the trans-temporal. In this situation, the task set for this study was to show that in the mature elaboration of his thought, the emphasis on the temporal (or dynamic), at the expense of the eternal (or static) finally reduces freedom to mere spontaneous impulse, even over Bergson's own protest.

Faced by the danger of being unable to retain freedom within a total context which would in fact exclude it, the three philosophers have recourse to several complicating expedients, all of which had to be ferreted out in the course of the essay. First, the word "freedom" might be used in a restricted sense, as when Heidegger employs it to mean the mere understanding of necessity; when Berdyaev employs it to mean the absence of all limitations; and when Bergson uses it to mean the release of energy. Second, confronted by an impasse in the effort to establish freedom on the basis of either the temporal or the trans-temporal separately, Berdyaev, and to a lesser extent Heidegger, is driven

partially to obscure the logical distinction between change and changelessness. Prevented by logic from allowing the two orders to interpenetrate, yet unable to account for freedom on the basis of either separately, they are forced in desperation to blur the distinction between the two. This expedient, however, results in ambiguities which have rather the effect of threatening the meaning of words, as was shown in the case of Heidegger's dual use of the word "Non-Being," and Berdyaev's mere direct denials of the mutual exclusiveness of change and changelessness. Finally, in the face of so many difficulties, the attempt may be made to cut the Gordian knot by suspending freedom altogether, as in the case of Heidegger's "letting things be," or Berdyaev's rejection of all decision as entailing limitation. It was necessary to show that this sort of askesis is in contradiction with itself, that it represents in fact a decision against decision, that freedom can be opposed only by pre-supposing freedom.

In its pursuit of the inquiry into how far Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev are able to fit freedom into a wholly temporal or a wholly non-temporal scheme, and how far it is in fact necessary for them to resort to some of the above-mentioned expedients, the investigation has also hoped further to clarify the problem by analyzing it into its component parts. As a result, it is now possible, by means of a partial recapitulation of the preceding chapters,

to determine more precisely the point at which alternative theories have broken down, and so to discover the requirements which a new approach would have to meet. The aim of the present section is accordingly to review the several constituent parts of the problem in the light of insights gained from the study of Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev. In this attempt to bring the several aspects of the problem into sharper focus, the crux of the matter can be effectively highlighted by presenting each of its facets in terms of a dilemma--the same dilemma, in fact, which was earlier seen to apply to the relation of freedom and time in toto. This, it will be recalled, was the apparently anomalous situation in which the mutually exclusive alternatives of determinism and indeterminism each contained an ingredient of freedom, on the one hand, while precluding freedom, on the other. Briefly, determinism provided the element of causality, though the complete predictability which it posits was fatal to freedom; and indeterminism allowed for unpredictable novelty, though only on the level of sheer caprice. The search for freedom thus found itself in a dilemma. There appeared to be no third alternative to a choice between causality plus predictability, on the one hand, and novelty plus chaos, on the other.

As a result of the clarification which the preceding pages have made possible, this section will consider the

several aspects of the problem of freedom and time in the light of the same dilemma. Beginning with freedom as a whole, and then passing in turn to its several components of causality, selfhood, valuation, and choice, it will show that the mutually exclusive realms of time and eternity both provide an indispensable element of freedom, on the one hand, but both destroy freedom, on the other. The aim of this procedure will be twofold: first, in the light of the foregoing analysis, to emphasize the predicament which awaits the attempt to account for freedom in terms of either time or eternity alone; and second, to make explicit the requirements which a third alternative would have to meet in order to make a successful attack upon the problem. This will serve as preparation for the second section of this chapter, in which the conclusion toward which the present investigation has been led will be further elaborated, and also for the third section, in which it will be applied successively to these requirements which other presuppositions have failed to fulfill.

Freedom

The chapters on Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev have attempted to reveal the impossibility of interpreting freedom exclusively in terms of either eternity or time, static or dynamic, Apollonian or Dionysian, noumenal or phenomenal. The former member of each pair, standing for

order and harmony, represents the immutability without reference to which all change is chaos, all so-called "freedom" mere impulse. The latter, standing for variety and dynamism, represents the factor of change, without which freedom is meaningless. The former sets eternity over against transience and time, the latter rebels against a static eternity in the name of creative activity. These remarks immediately suggest that freedom contains elements of both these principles: time supplies novelty and change, but without a criterion novelty becomes indeterminism; eternity, on the other hand, supplies a permanent criterion, but either cannot account for change at all, or else necessarily determines whatever change there is.¹ Thus, when regarded in the light of the problem of freedom, the two principles of change and of immutability appear to supplement each other. But from the point of view of logic, there is an irreducible opposition between them. On the ground of this logical incompatibility, a combination of the two has been regularly eschewed by philosophy, even though it is apparently required by freedom. Rather than risk the

¹In the introduction it was stated that determinism was one of the two possible ways of looking at events on a purely temporal basis. As the above statement suggests, the course of the discussion has revealed that deterministic theories of time may make a subtle appeal to eternity; that is, to that which determines, such as causal law. Sometimes, of course, this appeal is quite explicit. Whether it is always present, if only implicit, is beyond the scope of the present study to inquire.

declaration that these two mutually exclusive elements coexist inseparably in an act of freedom, most philosophers have attempted to account for it on the basis of either one or the other. The temptation to do this is strengthened by the ease with which it can be shown from either point of view that its opposite cannot establish freedom, and vice versa. Bergson, for example, believes that freedom has been established by the refutation of determinism, while some passages in both Heidegger and Berdyaev concur with Spinoza's view that freedom is established with the understanding that all is determined, that there is no underivable novelty. From the side of time, the dead hand of a static eternity appears fatal to freedom. But from the side of eternity, the sheer dynamism of time represents an unprincipled chaos which must be brought under control (or, in some cases, escaped).

Hence, on the one hand, all three philosophers are tempted at times to try to insure freedom by grounding it in the temporal. For Bergson, the perpetual novelty of durée is thought to guarantee freedom as against a changeless, lifeless eternity; for Heidegger, Zeitlichkeit entails the burden of free choice as one aspect of the stigma of Non-Being which inheres in Dasein as such; and for Berdyaev, the meontic nature of freedom refers to its inexhaustible, dynamic capacity to burst all static limits. On the other hand, however, none of them can altogether escape viewing

the matter from the opposite point of view, from seeing that on a basis of sheer succession, freedom is reduced to mere spontaneous impulse. Hence, in this vein, even Bergson is constrained at times to give some direction to his élan vital; Heidegger seeks a more authentic kind of freedom in the understanding of necessity; and Berdyaev transfers freedom to the realm of Apollonian form and order as a refuge against the chaotic Dionysian forces he has unleashed. In every case, the philosopher has indirectly acknowledged the two orders, temporal and trans-temporal, involved in freedom, without being able to do full justice to both elements consistently with the terms set by his thought as a whole.

Required: a third alternative which will provide dynamic change and novelty without going over to indeterminism, and which will also provide an immutable plane of reference without thereby establishing determinism.

Causality

Among the more specific aspects of the problem of the relation of freedom to time is that of causality. On the one hand, the category of cause and effect seems inevitably to lead to determinism; for if every event has an antecedent cause, then in principle every future event is derivable from a sufficient knowledge of the present situation; and if derivable, then predictable; but predictability correlates, not with freedom, but with

determinism.¹ But on the other hand, the category of causality appears essential to freedom; for if the relation between the agent and his act is not in some sense causal, then he can no longer be responsible for it; self-determination is replaced by chance. A dilemma is thus posed in which cause-and-effect is at the same time essential and fatal to freedom!

In the introductory chapter, Kant and C. D. Broad were cited as examples of thinkers who agreed time alone is insufficient to account for freedom, that it can provide only for either determinism or indeterminism, and that responsible freedom requires a relation between agent and act that is in some sense causal. From these premises, however, each philosopher drew different conclusions. Granted Professor Broad's prior premise, that a philosopher is not justified in appealing to the trans-temporal, it follows that the notion of responsibility is, as he says, delusive. Kant, on the other hand, recognizing that in practice men do, men must, presuppose responsibility (and on this point he is perhaps more truly "empirical" than Broad!), infers therefrom that Broad's major premise must be mistaken. Taking his stand on the fact freedom is a

¹In the second chapter of his Ethical Studies, F. H. Bradley points out that freedom, too, requires a kind of predictability, in the sense that I depend on someone to exercise his freedom in a consistent way, rather than capriciously. But this is scarcely the same kind of predictability as in determinism, the predictability maintained by Laplace before Napoleon.

necessary presupposition of human conduct and social relations, and acknowledging that it cannot be explained on a temporal basis, he concludes that a trans-temporal reference is necessary to account for it. And since he also recognizes that freedom presupposes a causal relation between agent and act, he postulates a different order of causation, one which is trans-temporal and therefore outside the deterministic sphere of antecedent-and-consequent.

Up to this point, the present thesis has found itself in agreement with Kant. But it encountered a grave difficulty in following his next step. For him, the temporal and trans-temporal orders are separated as absolutely as are the phenomenal and noumenal. On this basis, it is very difficult to understand how the timeless self, for all its non-temporal causality, could ever alter the course of events in space and time. And indeed, it was seen that in fact Kant's metaphysic requires a strict determinism regarding all such events. At this point, the present thesis must depart from Kant, for a freedom which is not effective in time is not the freedom herein under discussion.

On this particular issue, the present writer inclines more toward the contemporary emphasis on time as indispensable to freedom, as illustrated by Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev. Durée, Zeitlichkeit, the "meontic"--all three, however short of genuine freedom they may ulti-

mately fall, do at least insist on the dynamic nature of freedom, on its capacity for introducing the new, the underivable, into the stream of temporal events. Each of the three contemporary philosophers, however, is in agreement with one of Kant's primary presuppositions; namely, the sharp separation of the static and dynamic orders. Consequently, having so emphasized the temporal aspect of freedom, they are forced to confine freedom to the temporal order, and in so doing, as the foregoing pages have attempted to show, are confronted with the by now familiar Scylla and Charybdis: determinism and indeterminism.

In this situation, since the chief function of the temporal in their philosophies is to provide the dynamic element of novelty, both Bergson and Berdyaev, and to a certain extent Heidegger as well, come down on the side of indeterminism. All three, however, also recognize the insufficiency of indeterminism as a substitute for freedom, and attempt to remedy the situation by implicit or explicit appeals to the trans-temporal--Bergson more in the form of corrective, supplementary statements, Heidegger in the form of an appeal to the understanding of necessity, and Berdyaev in the form of a reinstatement of the Apollonian as opposed to the Dionysian. By thus introducing the trans-temporal, however, they cross the barrier which they themselves have erected between the mutable and the immutable, falling thereby into the inconsistencies cited above. In so doing, they

re-emphasize the inability of either the temporal or the trans-temporal to provide by itself the kind of causation demanded by self-determination.

Required: A third alternative which will make use of Kant's idea of a cause which is not anterior to its effect, but which will not separate this noumenal causality from the temporal world on whose basis alone it is postulated.

The Self

Implied in the foregoing pages is the close relation between freedom and philosophical anthropology. Actually, the word "freedom" itself is no more than a generalization from the fact of free agents; properly speaking, it ought to refer to no more than "that by virtue of which an agent acts responsibly, as distinct from the insane or from animals." Some of the confusion surrounding the word may stem from the tendency to regard it as an abstract concept, like "slavery," instead of as a structural constituent of man and of man alone.

When freedom is thus understood, the agent who exercises it must, on the basis of the definition herein intended, be involved in change; freedom refers to actions, and activity involves before-and-after, or change. On the other hand, he must transcend change, for two reasons: first, to discriminate between kinds of novelty implies a point of vantage above transience from which to evaluate

it, a point of leverage from which decisions in time are taken; second, responsibility requires that the agent retain his identity, that he remain the same in spite of change.

Because of the logical incompatibility of change and changelessness, however, the attempt has generally been made to establish the free self on the basis of either one or the other. Thus, on the one hand, Heidegger and Berdyaev follow Bergson in believing that by stressing the temporality of the self, they have secured its freedom. Just as Bergson finally fails to preserve any significant distinction between durée and the self, so Heidegger tends to equate Dasein and Zeitlichkeit, and so also does Berdyaev indicate that in so far as the self is free, it participates in dynamic, abysmal Non-Being. On the other hand, however, neither Heidegger nor Berdyaev confines himself to this view, but rather oscillates between it and its opposite. Berdyaev, compelled by the force of Hume's argument that if change is absolute, then there is no such thing as self-identity, often takes the view that the self is free only in so far as it transcends time. In this position he is joined by Heidegger, though perhaps for not quite the same reason. Less concerned with self-identity than to establish some sort of "philosopher's vantage point" from which to survey the nightmare of existence, Heidegger often inclines toward the view that the only true freedom consists

in acknowledging and acquiescing in necessity. If the trans-temporal element in such a position is less obvious than in Berdyaev's case, one has only to recall another of Hume's arguments: that if change is absolute, then one may never speak of empirical necessity at all. To do so, as Heidegger does, is therefore ipso facto to make a trans-temporal appeal; and similarly, the self which can understand such necessity must do so from a trans-temporal standpoint. Thus do Heidegger and Berdyaev illustrate, each in his own way, the dilemma involved in the attempt to locate the source of the self's freedom either in time or in eternity.

Required: A third alternative which will account for the free agent as retaining his identity throughout change.

Values

At this point in the discussion, one can frankly face a problem not clearly foreseeable from the outset, one which Existentialism takes especially seriously; namely, the relation of valuation to freedom. In the introduction it was granted that whereas law did indeed exercise a constraint on freedom, it was nevertheless justifiable in as much as it guaranteed a basis in which freedom could operate on its "higher" level without fear of chaos or oppression. On this "higher" level choice, decision, and responsibility continue to characterize freedom; the

difference lies in the criterion of decision. Whereas it is in the one case the law (though never absolutely so), in the other it is the values to which the individual freely gives allegiance.

At this point the Existentialist interjects a question: "These values you speak of," he says, "though they are of a different origin than law, do in fact have the same effect as law. You yourself have said that at this so-called 'higher' level values merely replace law. What can this mean except that they function in the law's stead? In so doing, they too exercise a constraint on freedom. They want it to conform. From their point of view, it must be subjected. Values, like laws, exercise a tyranny over freedom."¹

This might well be the voice of any of the three thinkers herein considered, for as the preceding chapters have shown, all maintain (in some contexts) that values as such constitute an encroachment upon freedom. If I am forbidden to do a thing simply because it is "bad," they would say, then my freedom is thereby curtailed. Bergson therefore resists the interposing of any value judgments in an act of "freedom," for that would impede the pure, spontaneous thrust of the élan vital. Similarly, Berdyaev insists that freedom must be meontic, for only then is it

¹Kant tries to avoid such a "heteronomy" by his conception of the self as its own law-giver ("autonomy"). For the Existentialist, however, this merely puts the self at war with itself, for regardless of its origin, a law as such places an intolerable restriction upon freedom.

completely indeterminate, subject to no restraint; the distinction between good and evil must be transcended, he maintains, for "the good has a bad origin." Heidegger, too, finds values at war with freedom; more consistently than the other two he strives to remain beyond good and evil.

In other contexts, however, all three are forced to re-introduce criteria of decision. Without a criterion, there is no longer any decision at all. Without decision, freedom degenerates into mere impulse, and the distinction between man and animals vanishes. Bergson, for example, though he repudiates the ordinary source of morality, is none the less bound to advocate morality from a "second source"; in so far as he does so, he sets up a criterion of human action, even though it be that of uniting mystically with the élan vital. Heidegger, too, in spite of his explicit denial of ethical significance to eigentlich and uneigentlich, is unable to avoid giving them just such a connotation; one should act in an eigentlich manner. Finally, Berdyaev makes a similar capitulation by renouncing Bergson's view that life qua life is self-justifying, and by asserting that the values of order, harmony, and wholeness must be served if freedom is to be distinguished from mere impulse.

In the case of values, therefore, as in other aspects of freedom, a dilemma arises: On the one hand, in so far as values dictate to freedom, they contravene it; on the other hand, without principles of discrimination and of choice, there is no longer freedom, but only ir-

responsible caprice. Furthermore, though a radical solution may be attempted by suspending freedom altogether, nevertheless such an effort depends upon a prior act of decision whose criterion (or value) is that decision ought to be avoided. This expedient thus succeeds only in revealing that freedom, including valuation, is an inevitable constituent of man qua man.

Required: A third alternative which can supply a criterion of decision without becoming vulnerable to the Existentialist protest against the subjection of freedom to the tyranny of abstract, static ideals.

Choice

Closely related to valuation is the phenomenon of choice, which, as was vividly illustrated by Berdyaev, is unacceptable to either the Apollonian (eternal) or Dionysian (temporal) point of view. From the former standpoint, to choose is to exclude, and therefore to preclude the cherished possibility of totality. To put the same point in another way, to choose is to put oneself in relation, both to the criterion of decision and to that which is excluded. For logic, however, relations constitute an insuperable problem; it is driven to say that the subject of a free act, like the subject of a logical proposition, must be unrelated, self-sufficient. That is, it must not choose. From the Dionysian side, too, choice is

a burden; when unrestricted novelty is the desideratum, choice is felt as a limit, since it may have something to say about the kind of novelty that is desirable.

Confronted by this opposition to choice from the side of both temporal and trans-temporal, the three philosophers react in what has by now become a familiar pattern: On the one hand, when they regard freedom from the side of the dynamic, they see in choice the abhorrent threat of a limitation, since choice determines the direction in which creative energy shall be applied. Desperate to avoid this at all costs, they rebel against all choice and thus fall into indeterminism. It thus turns out that the kind of freedom which Bergson advocates does not exercise discriminating decision--to do so characterizes merely the "first source of morality"; "true" freedom consists rather in surrendering to the urge of the vital forces. A similar position is carried to the extreme by Heidegger, who, in the frantic attempt to burst the restraining bonds imposed by the necessity of choice, lashes out in all directions in a frenetic nihilism. By Berdyaev, too, choice is felt as a burden upon freedom; since it implies a criterion, it necessarily imposes limitations, thereby contravening freedom as seen from the Dionysian standpoint, and inducing Berdyaev to argue that the only true freedom must be meontic.

When, on the other hand, they regard choice from the point of view of the immutable, all three philosophers find it at war with the cherished Apollonian demands for totality and unrelatedness, for choice excludes, and choice makes relative distinctions. In seeking to remove this disturbing element from freedom, they thereby emasculate it, leaving nothing in its place but the recognition of necessity. Though this tendency is less pronounced in Bergson, there is a sense in which even he gives voice to a determinism of sorts. For the indeterminism which characterizes his thought as a whole is not consistently conceived as an indeterminism as far as the individual agent is concerned. On the contrary, instead of being urged to give free reign to his own vital forces, he is sometimes adjured to submit to the surge of the élan vital as a whole. Though this total impetus is utterly spontaneous, nevertheless from the standpoint of the individual Bergson's call is felt as a summons to relinquish personal decision and submit to the dictates of the vital impetus--that is, to allow himself to be wholly determined by them. In Heidegger's philosophy, the same tendency is quite explicit. In the name of wholeness, independence, and unrelatedness, he renounces choice as incompatible therewith. His Entschlossenheit is thereby reduced to a merely epistemological term signifying the acknowledgement of necessity. Finally, in Berdyaev's thought, the indeterminate, meontic freedom frequently gives way to the opposite.

Instead of explosive energy, freedom in these contexts is conceived in terms of Apollonian harmony and order, which look askance at any deviation from their fixed proportions. From this standpoint, any element of spontaneity, any purely personal element, is definitely out of order. Freedom in the meontic sense is a non desideratum, and the mere faculty of choice itself is a mark of imperfection. The free agent ought to choose in accordance with the given laws of harmony and order; that is, his only choice is to conform. He would be better off without the faculty of choice to make deviation even a possibility, and his goal is the eventual liquidation of this hampering capacity.¹

Choice, then, enjoys a peculiar status among the several components of freedom. In the case of causation, an enduring self, and values, all three were apparently compatible with an Apollonian starting point, but not with a Dionysian. Choice, however, has been revealed as undesirable from both points of view. The Apollonian finds it divisive, the Dionysian finds it limiting. Is there any point of view from which it can be upheld? The course of the investigation has revealed that there is. As has been illustrated several times in the preceding pages, this attempt to condemn

¹When St. Augustine said that although it is indeed freedom to be able to sin, it is a greater freedom to be unable.

choice from the side of either the Apollonian or Dionysian actually rests on that which it explicitly denies. In the one case, a decision is made against choice in the interest of totality; in the second case, in the interest of novelty. But what is this but choice--choice which contradicts itself by denying that upon which it depends? As values can only be opposed in the name of another value, explicit or otherwise, so choice can be opposed only by choice. This has been illustrated vividly by the futility of Heidegger's attempt to put freedom "in brackets," and by Berdyaev's attempt to appeal to an ultimate duality in order to avoid the necessity of choice.

Required: a philosophical readiness to admit that the decision against choice is self-contradictory, and to give up, if necessary, the criteria of totality and novelty, both of which are essentially quantitative, in favor of a qualitative criterion--even though it implicate the acting subject in relatedness.

B - A POSSIBLE CONCLUSION

In the preceding section, the attempt was made to bring into sharper focus the various aspects of the problem of the relation of freedom and time. In every case, it was noted that neither time nor the trans-temporal could provide

a sufficient basis to account for the various ingredients of freedom. Though each provided an indispensable element, each was also open to objection from the point of view of its opposite. As long as the discussion confined itself to either time or the trans-temporal, it could get no further than this. It was condemned to shuttle back and forth, seeking what one lacked at the hands of the other, but unable to find a sufficient basis for freedom in either alone.

In other words, by following these three philosophers in their running battle with the problem of freedom and time, and by noting the blind alleys into which they were led by the above-mentioned expedients, the inquiry is impelled to the quest for another alternative. In this situation, what is more natural than to try as a last resort the "solution" indicated in the introduction by a priori analysis; namely, that although "temporal" and "non-temporal" are logically disparate, experience requires that they be predicated simultaneously and inseparably of the free agent? Having specified in the preceding section the requirements which a successful approach to the problem would have to meet, the study undertakes herewith to develop such a "solution" as a possible way of meeting them.

Conclusion Stated

As a result of the foregoing analysis of the difficulties encountered by the three philosophers in the effort

to account for freedom either in purely temporal or in purely non-temporal terms, the present thesis submits herewith a possible view which might escape these difficulties. Most succinctly stated, it is as follows: a) Logically, there is no reconciliation between the mutable and the immutable; b) the concrete datum of freedom eludes description in terms of either the one or the other, appearing rather to include some and exclude other aspects of both; c) therefore freedom requires a juncture of what logic holds asunder; an intersection of the mutable and the immutable as partially constitutive of the free agent. The remainder of this section elaborates some of the implications of this conclusion in two ways: first, by replying to two possible objections; and second, by distinguishing it from several other philosophies with which it might be compared.

First Objection Anticipated

One critical reaction to the possible conclusion just stated would run as follows: From its earliest beginnings, philosophy has been entirely aware that a combination of change and changelessness characterizes not merely the free agent, but indeed all natural objects. Whether it be a mountain, a river, a tree, or an animal, all exhibit this same twofold nature: on the one hand, qua temporal, all are involved in change; they are never quite the same

from one day to the next. On the other hand, each also exhibits an element of permanence, and enduring structure, which enables us to say that in spite of change, it is still the same mountain, river, tree, or animal, and no other. Without this element of sameness, we could not even communicate with each other about any given object, for no sooner would we have uttered its name than lo! it would have metamorphosed into another, and we would have to begin again. This curious combination of sameness and otherness, far from being ignored by philosophy, has in fact been one of the puzzles which has preoccupied it. To Plato, for example, one test of a true philosopher was whether or not he perceived this intriguing interplay of the-one-and-the-many, the-same-and-the-other. Therefore, says the imaginary critic, the conclusion which you reach after so much investigation and analysis is nothing new to the philosopher. Rather, it is the point from which he takes departure. In bringing your essay to this conclusion, you have arrived at the philosopher's starting point.

To this objection, the following reply might be made: There is no doubt that for philosophy the starting point often has been the puzzling combination of the two orders which logic holds apart: the mutable and the immutable. Philosophy, however, acknowledges the law of non-contradiction as final arbiter. Under its aegis, one and the same datum cannot be both mutable and immutable at the

same time. When, therefore, it is said that philosophy begins with the combination of the mutable and the immutable, it must be recognized that this combination represents a challenge, a problem to solve. Responding to the challenge, it sets itself to unravel the intertwined strands, to separate the two orders, so as to reach a state of affairs in which mutable is mutable, immutable is immutable, and never the twain shall meet.

To abandon the task at this point, however, would be to leave it still unfinished. Simply to separate the two orders would be to set up an ultimate dualism. In the effort to go beyond such a dualism, philosophy frequently takes one of the two orders as primordial to the other. Thus rationalism, on the one hand, generally takes its stand upon the immutable, tending to regard it as more real than the mutable. Seeking the unchanging substance underlying all change, the essence of every existent, it tends to exalt the eternal over the temporal, the noumenal over the phenomenal. Empiricism, on the other hand, refuses so to under-estimate the importance of the every day world of space and time, or to allow the particular to be swallowed up in the universal. In order to avoid sacrificing the changing to the changeless, it takes its stand upon the natural and historical processes of which man finds himself a part, even at the cost of ignoring, as Hume tends to do, the non-temporal altogether, of concentrating upon change to the point of

forgetting structure. An illustration of the transition from a predominantly rationalistic to a predominantly empirical point of view is offered by the history of the physical sciences. By contrast with Newtonian times, when physics saw in particular events the illustration of inflexible natural laws, contemporary physics contents itself with the tabulation of statistical averages of the events which it observes.¹

So much for the argument that philosophy takes as its starting point the combination of the mutable and the immutable. The reply has been that in general philosophy has sought to resolve this mixture into its constituent elements. By no means is it maintained herewith that such an undertaking is unjustified or unfortunate. On the contrary, both the rationalist and the empiricist can claim significant results in terms of insight achieved and obstacles overcome. Just as the Newtonian theory of natural laws enabled man to gain greater understanding of nature, so also the contemporary theories of indeterminate variability enable man better to predict the future. What the present thesis does maintain, however, is that this same procedure, this same attempt to separate out the elements of mutability

¹The illustration is by no means perfect. Newton's molecular theories belong more to an empirical scheme, and even today physics is not without its a priori aspects. Might one go so far as to say that science has succeeded better than philosophy in safeguarding both the temporal and the non-temporal aspects of its subject matter?

and immutability, is inadequate when applied to the phenomenon of human freedom. Whereas natural objects and occurrences may be better understood by considering each element in isolation, a similar procedure in the case of freedom is altogether inappropriate. The whole weight of the preceding chapters has been to the effect that, however plausibly other phenomena may be profitably analyzed into their temporal and non-temporal aspect, whenever man attempts to analyze freedom into its two component parts, the result is either determinism (which would correspond to a more Newtonian, mechanistic scheme) or indeterminism (which would be more in line with modern theories of emergent novelty). As long as its point of departure is also its point of attack, as long as it persists in separating the given combination of the mutable and the immutable, philosophy appears doomed to oscillate between these two possibilities, while the phenomenon of freedom continually slips through its fingers.

At this point, the discussion recurs briefly to a point raised in the introduction, when it was asked: is it possible that the non-temporal may be interpreted simply as spatial? Certainly space is distinct from time. If, then, it is held that all natural objects, and not freedom alone, are compounds of temporal and non-temporal, may this not simply be tantamount to saying that they are spatio-temporal?

Might it not be plausibly maintained that the structural element in natural objects, their logos, correlates with their spatiality, just as Descartes found a correlation between mind and extension? If, for the sake of argument, the foregoing position be granted for the moment, could it add anything to the immediate problem under discussion? Could it help answer the critic who says that since all objects represent a compound of the temporal and the trans-temporal, therefore the conclusion of the present paper merely states the starting point of philosophy? Evidently it could, provided that the following three premises are all recalled: First, that freedom requires an inseparable compound of the temporal and the trans-temporal; second, that natural objects represent a similar compound; and third, that there is between free agents and other natural objects one radical difference, the same difference which the law postulates when it distinguishes between responsible and non-responsible agents.

From these three premises, one conclusion in particular is possible, perhaps even plausible; namely, that in order to account for this irreducible difference, it may be necessary to postulate a non-temporal constituent of freedom which is different from the non-temporal element of other natural objects. In order for it to be different, it would have to be non-spatial. And this in turn would mean that what has been referred to throughout as the non-temporal

element of freedom should be more properly designated as the non-spatio-temporal element. This, of course, was exactly what Kant meant by the non-temporal self, and may even be what Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev are really driving at when they speak of subjective time as the necessary pre-condition of freedom. What the foregoing analysis has sought to show is that the great mistake in each case is to call it "time." In the course of their diatribe against the extended (or spatial) world as inimical to freedom, they have sought to establish a point of reference beyond space. In this attempt, what was more natural than to turn to the most obviously non-spatial dimension of experience, time? What the present essay has sought to show is that this search for freedom in time alone, as distinct from space, was premature. While agreeing with them (as against Kant) that time is indispensable to freedom, it has concluded with Kant (as against them) that time alone is just as fatal to freedom as is space. Moreover, as has been noted, all three philosophers seem at times to sense this necessity of a non-temporal element. Perhaps the most striking example is durée: in so far as it connotes "that which endures," as it seems at time to do, it might even be regarded as the very opposite of the "pure change" which it ultimately comes to signify.

In order for these conceptions of subjective time to fit into the conclusion herewith suggested, they would have

to be radically reconsidered and reinterpreted. In view a) of their own hostility to space and b) the insufficiency of time to account for freedom, they would have to posit, not a temporal, but a trans-spatio-temporal dimension which inseparably interpenetrates the (spatio-) temporal as a necessary constituent of the free agent. As already mentioned, a further investigation of this rather provocative notion lies beyond the scope of this study, which has deliberately referred simply to the "non-temporal," without attempting to determine whether this word should be understood in a spatial or a trans-spatial sense. At times, for example, it has spoken of the non-temporal as the static-- a word of definitely spatial connotation; at other times, it has referred to it as the eternal, which rather suggests a trans-spatio-temporal reference. Which of these two terms would in fact be more appropriately applied to the non-temporal element of freedom might well provide a subject for future research, although perhaps the results reached herein provide some preliminary intimation of the direction which such an inquiry might take.

Second Objection Anticipated

A second objection to the conclusion suggested might be expressed as follows: Part of your argument has rested upon showing that when the three philosophers try to establish freedom on the basis of either time or the

non-temporal alone, they are frequently forced into the self-contradictions which you are at such pains to expose. But now you yourself blithely assert a contradiction; namely, that the concrete datum of freedom is at one and the same time both mutable and immutable. How are you justified in reproaching the three philosophers for doing what you do yourself?

In reply to this objection, it should be noted that whereas the three men herein discussed strive to avoid contradiction, at least where the relation of time and eternity is concerned, the present thesis affirms it. To be sure, they do at times endorse certain antinomies: Bergson sometimes speaks of durée as combining the one and the many; Heidegger's three 'ecstasies' constitute a multiplicity-in-unity; Berdyaev sometimes embraces paradox (for the one among several senses in which he does so which coincides with the position taken herein, see the following section). Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency on the part of all of them to strive to overcome the antinomies. For them, as for philosophy in general, contradiction is the goad which spurs the philosopher either to abandon the spatio-temporal world, where contradictions occur, or to show that in the last analysis the contradictions were only apparent. Both these tendencies are to be found in the thought of Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev.

In any case, however, in the contexts thus far cited, they rarely, if ever, assert the inseparable interpenetration of the mutable and the immutable. The present thesis has been that the failure to do so leads them into unwitting, unacknowledged contradictions, and at the same time prevents their establishing true freedom. By contrast, the present thesis would establish freedom by putting the antinomy where it belongs: at the intersection of time and eternity which partially constitutes the free agent. Thus, instead of the failure to account for freedom accompanied by unintentional contradiction, it would establish freedom by the conscious systematic use of contradiction at the point where it apparently belongs.

Brief Distinction from Kant

Before proceeding further, it is well to distinguish the present conclusion from that of Kant. It has from time to time been observed that the present hypothesis has affinities with him. It agrees, for example, that there can be no freedom on the basis of time alone, and that since it is impossible not to act as though freedom existed, there must therefore be a non-temporal self. But whereas Kant's metaphysic is hard put to explain how the self in its noumenal aspect ever influences the phenomenal world in which this freedom is supposed to operate, the present thesis has maintained that a non-temporal self is no more free than an

exclusively temporal self, that true freedom posits an inseparable union of the temporal and non-temporal in one and the same self.

But is this last view so different from Kant? Did not he, too, insist that the self must be seen from two aspects, phenomenal and noumenal, neither separable from the other? The reply to this question recalls the above distinction between a mixture and a compound. In the former case, the two elements can be juxtaposed without interpenetrating, like the layers of a cake; in the latter, by contrast, each has so merged with the other that to take one away would destroy the whole, just as to subtract hydrogen from water would leave only oxygen. With this distinction in mind, one can readily see which of the two alternatives applies to Kant. True, he did hold that neither the phenomenal nor the noumenal could be abstracted from the self, that the self was comprised of both. But nevertheless one of the outstanding features of his philosophy is the rigidity with which the two orders are kept absolutely separate. On such a basis, freedom cannot consist of both, but must be confined to one or the other. In actual fact, it is explicitly referred to the noumenal aspect, in contrast to the present view that an intersection or interpenetration of eternity and time is necessary to account for freedom.

Brief Distinction from Hegel

If, it may then be asked, you depart from Kant at the point where he keeps time and the non-temporal separate, what is to distinguish your position from Hegel, who sought to unite them? The answer would be that although Hegel does indeed recognize contradiction in the world, he does not regard it as final. Rather, it helps to supply the dynamic to his dialectic, it is the goad which spurs the mind ever onward, to come to rest only when all contradictions have been overcome; that is, when in the light of totality, the contradictions are recognized as merely preliminary. The truth, he says, is the whole. It is the merely partial "truths" which involve contradictions as well. From such a panlogism the present thesis is far removed. Though it might agree with and profit from Hegel's frank recognition of the antinomies in the world, it has tried to show that to go beyond the antinomy of time-and-eternity is to destroy freedom. And indeed there is very little of responsible freedom in Hegel. So concerned is he with the concrete universal that concrete individual is easily snowed under, with the result that in the name of Freiheit the agent becomes the pawn of the Absolute. In contradistinction to this view, the present position sees no freedom apart from free agents as loci of an intersection of the temporal and trans-temporal orders, an antinomy which can not be dissolved in the light of the whole.

Comparison with Broad

As was noted earlier, there is one point at which the position taken herein is in agreement with Professor C. D. Broad: that there can be no freedom on the basis of time alone. From this premise, however, he concludes that freedom is an illusion, for empiricism can postulate nothing beyond time. For Broad, at least, the concrete experience of freedom must be sacrificed to this principle. During the fifteen years since he wrote Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism, his interest in psychical research has led him to a most significant qualification of this position. Where his experience of freedom was insufficient to induce him to make any inference beyond the temporal, the phenomena of extra-sensory perception, and of pre-cognition in particular, have persuaded him to make the following rather startling proposal: "The establishment of paranormal pre-cognition requires a radical change in our conception of time, and probably a correlated change in our conception of causation."¹

The new conception of causation to which he refers is demanded by the fact that subjects of experiments in psychical research have consistently been able to foretell future events. In such cases, the cause of the subject's present mental perception is something which has not yet

¹C. D. Broad, "The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy," in Philosophy, October, 1949, p. 303.

happened, does not yet exist. Such causation as this, transcending as it does the more familiar causal pattern of antecedent-and-consequent, corresponds with the conception herein developed of the kind of causation necessary to account for responsible freedom; that is, one in which the cause is not anterior to its effect. Whereas Broad postulates it in order to account for precognition, it has been adduced herein to account for a causal relation between agent and act without thereby establishing determinism.

Likewise, what Broad means by a radically new conception of time also has affinities with the present thesis, though he expresses it differently. Specifically, what he calls a new kind of time is herein designated as "trans-temporal." He arrives at his own view by asking the question, what is the medium in which this new kind of causation is operative? Certainly it is not the ordinary medium of antecedent-and-consequent, for the cause is actually subsequent to its effect. He therefore concludes that, whatever this medium is, it transcends that of antecedent-and-consequent--though he continues to call it time. At this point, a difference arises between his view and the present one, perhaps merely a difference in terminology, or perhaps a more fundamental one. For the present thesis has been that, in the interest of clarity, the word "time" must be restricted to the realm of antecedent and subsequent. What is at stake, it has maintained, is the distinction between

the mutable and the immutable. If another category, in addition to that of succession, be adduced, it should properly be designated as trans-temporal. Significantly, his own earlier view (in Determinism, Indeterminism, and Voluntarism) did restrict the word "time" to the sphere of succession. Terminology, however, need offer no cause for dissension. More important is the fact that Professor Broad has suggested a view of causation and its relation to succession which postulates that which, according both to his own earlier view and that of the present essay, should be called "trans-temporal." Just such a view, moreover, has been postulated by the present thesis as required by responsible freedom. On its basis, Professor Broad could in principle reconsider this "delusive notion."

C - CONCLUSION APPLIED

In the first section of this chapter, the problem of the relation of freedom to time was restated in the light of insights gained from the preceding chapters. More particularly, it was specified what requirements a successful approach to the problem would have to meet. In the second section, a possible way of meeting these difficulties was stated and elaborated. In the present section, the test of these requirements will be applied to the conclusion toward which this study has been led: namely, that out of justice

to the fact of freedom, it may be necessary to join together what logic holds asunder. Although "temporal" and "non-temporal," "mutable" and "immutable," are logically disparate, experience may require that they be predicated simultaneously and inseparably of one and the same "datum," the free agent. So far, the case for thus flouting logic in the name of fact has commended itself only indirectly; that is, by the fact that nothing else is satisfactory. But just as other possible positions were subjected to severe scrutiny, so, too, must this one be tested by the several requirements of freedom in order to determine whether it can stand up under fire where the others failed--whether, that is, it can supply what was "required" in the first section.

In this undertaking, there will be considerable assistance from Berdyaev, who alone sometimes hints at a similar answer to the problem. Determined to explore all possibilities in his examination of the problem of freedom and time, Berdyaev alone among the three philosophers studied herein entertains at times the one to which the present study has led--even though he never gives it final endorsement over against alternative solutions, but rather maintains from beginning to end a tolerant and even positive attitude toward them. In the chapter on his philosophy, those aspects of his thought which support such a view have been deliberately withheld, with an eye to their use as corroboration of the essay's own conclusion. He has conse-

quently been presented up to this point as falling into the same dichotomy of determinism-and-indeterminism as Bergson and Heidegger; as attempting to derive freedom from the mere juxtaposition of two coeval principles, Apollonian and Dionysian; and finally, as falling into ambiguities by obscuring the logical distinction between these two, between the immutable and the mutable. In addition to these four different positions of his, however, there is another Berdyaev, one who lends strong support to the conclusion herein offered. It may indeed be that his infrequent intimations of such a conclusion are not altogether intentional. Certainly they are far from consistent or systematic. Perhaps they may best be regarded as produced under the duress of the extremities to which he is driven by the fruitlessness of the search for freedom along other lines. In alliance with those of his statements which regard freedom as a compound in which time and eternity interpenetrate distinguishably, though inseparably, the present chapter proceeds to apply such a view to the various facets of the problem.

Contradiction

The several lines of analysis undertaken in the preceding pages have all tended to converge at a single point: namely, the conclusion that the phenomenon of freedom can possibly be accounted for as at once both temporal

and non-temporal. Far from being accepted lightly, such a suggestion ought to be subjected to especially rigorous testing, because of the logical contradiction it requires. Before proceeding to a preliminary application, however, it is well to pause and inquire precisely what this contradiction does and does not involve. Since a similar conclusion is sporadically drawn by Berdyaev, a brief examination of his use of paradox and contradiction will serve this purpose.

At least two of the senses in which Berdyaev uses the terms "paradox" and "contradiction" are emphatically not the meaning indicated above. According to the first, the two terms are alike derogatory; they bear the connotation of "intolerable."¹ Hence it is not surprising that they characterize exclusively what is for him such a deplorable sphere, the objective world.² Objectivation, indeed, is so lamentable because of its paradoxical nature. In this opinion Berdyaev is at one with much idealist philosophy, and he takes a further step in the same direction by concluding that the irrational objective world is therefore not real but illusory.³ Since the objective world as the seat of paradox is unreal, one is not surprised to learn further that paradoxes are only apparent;⁴ they do not apply

¹See, for example, FS, pp. 27, 50 f.

²See DH, pp. 195 f., 202.

³See FS, pp. 56, 59, 61; SS, pp. 61, 84; SR, p. 52; SF, pp. 199, 242, 267; DH, p. 198 n.

⁴See SF, p. 264.

to the real world. This is one of the grounds on which Berdyaev dismisses both freedom and values in the ordinary sense; since they are paradoxical, appeal must be made to "another kind" of freedom and goodness. The preceding chapter attempted to show in part that when the attempt is made to elaborate this view, contradiction is only worse confounded. The opinion that Berdyaev rebels against traditional idealism should recall this equation of the rational with the real.

The unreality of the objective world being established by its self-contradictory character, the incentive is therewith supplied for a search for the "real" world, and the instrument of the search is the apophatic method. At just this point, however, the source of endless confusion is encountered--for he now refers to this method as paradoxical! At first sight, it might seem incredible to attempt to overcome the paradoxical world by a paradoxical method, but explanation lies in the two senses given to the same word. In distinction from the sense already mentioned, the second meaning derives from Nicholas of Cusa's doctrine of the coincidentia oppositorum, which Berdyaev endorses.¹ A coincidence of opposites certainly sounds like a genuine paradox, and he does not hesitate so to designate it.² As the discussion proceeds, however, one becomes increasingly

¹See SS, p. 118; FS, pp. 22, 65.

²See FS, p. 74.

suspicious that there is more to this "coincidence" than meets the eye. Perhaps the most striking single statement to indicate that the word "paradox" is used in a very special sense, occurs when he is contrasting apophatics with the cataphatic method of orthodox theology. "The formulas elaborated by theology," he says, "exclude paradox!"¹ One has only to recall the orthodox doctrines of original sin, the two natures of Christ, and the trinity, which have presented stumbling blocks to reason precisely because of their paradoxical nature, in order to conclude that the word has been given a very different meaning. As to what this meaning is, it can perhaps be best stated as the loss of all distinction between contraries; instead of a "coincidence" of opposites, it might be described with less confusion as the "impossibility of opposites," so that the same thing can be designated indifferently as good or bad, divine or demonic, creative or destructive.² All this is attested by Berdyaev himself when he speaks of the overcoming of the "false antinomies" of this world,³ since the apophatic method is "above the law of identity and contradiction."⁴ It is

¹SR, p. 129.

²Helmut Kuhn mentions the general Russian tendency to regard destruction as creative, especially on the part of Bakunin, by whom Berdyaev was influenced. See op cit., p.22.

³See DH, p. 199.

⁴See FS, p. 65.

the only means of getting beyond the opposition of logical contraries.¹ This does not mean, however, that it is anti-logical. On the contrary, the drive to overcome opposition is a fundamental demand of logic, and Berdyaev appeals to the rationality of apophatics on just these grounds.² It alone takes the requirements of logic in total seriousness and follows them with complete consistency, clinging tenaciously to the tail of the kite it has chosen until it leaves the world behind altogether and finally finds itself in--Nothing.

It would therefore be a mistake to say that Berdyaev embraces paradox in the sense of an interpenetration of opposites.³ In neither of the above two senses does he do this, but rather strictly adheres to the demands of logic. In the first case, the discovery of paradox in the objective world is his excuse for seeking another; in the second, his determination to overcome these antinomies is carried out to the bitter end, though only at the price of dissipating all distinctions.

Between these two usages and the one suggested by the whole weight of the present inquiry there is a world of

¹See SR, pp. 127, 177; DH, pp. 44, 48.

²See SR, p. 123.

³This is the sense in which it will be employed herein, as equivalent to "antinomy," rather than in its more technical application to puzzles like "all Cretans are liars."

difference. Where the first of these placed a negative valuation upon the paradoxical as such, the present usage maintains a neutral attitude, neither revelling in it for its own sake, nor pronouncing it illusory or intolerable when it is in fact encountered. And where the second no longer retained a distinction between opposites, this third way maintains rigid logical distinctions. The complaint is sometimes made that to affirm a paradox is ipso facto to render the whole enterprise of communication dubious in the extreme, for if the possibility of paradox be admitted in principle, then (so it is argued) what is to prevent one from saying "black" while meaning "white"? The answer is that it is the apophatic method which can call black white, since it acknowledges no distinction between the two, whereas the method in question insists upon their difference. The former method abandons the use of concepts, while the latter preserves them. When the latter postulates the inseparable coexistence of the temporal and the trans-temporal as the necessary precondition of freedom, the former must press beyond this distinction to undifferentiated Non-Being. In so doing, however, apophatics is subject to a double accusation: first, in denying the distinction between the mutable and the immutable, it is apophatics which strikes at the roots of communication; and second, as shown above, in so far as Non-Being subtly takes on the guise, now of static void, now of dynamic abyss, apophatics is dependent upon the very distinction it denies.

Thanks to the rich variety of his thought, however, Berdyaev does not confine himself to the two uses of paradox described above, but does himself subscribe on occasion to what has been referred to herein as the "third" usage. In the sections of the fourth chapter entitled "Duality" and "Ambiguities," a tendency in this direction was already observable. The suggestions of an ultimate duality represented a retreat from apophatics in so far as they preserved a rigid distinction between time and eternity; they did not, however, envisage the possibility of an inseparable union of the two. The ambiguous statements such as the suggestion that eternity is both static and dynamic¹ also represented a retreat from apophatics in so far as they preserved these two elements from dissipation in the undifferentiated unity of Non-Being. In recognizing that both were indispensable, however, these statements were not careful to distinguish them, falling thereby into the ambiguities indicated in the previous chapter.

Over and above these steps away from the apophatic method, there are further, more positive endorsements of the kind of paradox advanced herein as the necessary postulate of freedom. Perhaps the most decisive blow he strikes for this position is his break with the idea that thought and Being are one.² What does this mean for the present purpose?

¹See DH, p. 112.

²See DH, p. 196.

Simply this: As long as this maxim held sway, then paradox (in the present sense of the word) was ruled out a priori, for reality could never abrogate the rules of thought, it could never violate the law of non-contradiction. This was the reason why apophatics relegated conceptual thought, with its contradictions, to the sphere of "mere" Being, and sought refuge for itself in a more primordial Non-Being, where contradiction was impossible. If, on the other hand, it is denied that thought and Being are one, then the incentive not to stop short of homogeneous unity is replaced by a willingness to search for systems of coherence in the world without recoiling if two of these logically disparate systems should happen to intersect. This point is emphasized by Berdyaev when he says that existential truth may in fact run counter to logic.¹ Far from being hostile to logic, such a view actually serves to safeguard it by refusing to abandon concepts, on the one hand, and by maintaining the distinction between them, on the other. And if, moreover, the phenomenon of freedom should require an indissoluble compound of the mutable and the immutable, such an attitude would be in an especially favorable position to comprehend it.

Freedom

The burden of the entire inquiry has, of course, been to the effect that precisely such a compound is required

¹See DE, p. 48.

by the fact of freedom, that a principle of permanence must coexist inseparably with a principle of change. That neither by itself can give an adequate account of freedom is acknowledged on occasion by Berdyaev himself, when he declares that neither in Greek philosophy,¹ as representative of the Apollonian, nor in German thought,² as typically Dionysian, has there been a satisfactory account of freedom. On the contrary, he declares, in entire agreement with the conclusions reached in Chapter IV, Dionysian "freedom" leads to chaos and Apollonian "freedom" becomes tyranny.³ The solution must combine both these elements. At this point, however, he becomes somewhat difficult to follow, asserting that such a combination is possible only in the two natures of Christ, the God-Man.

On the basis of the attitude toward paradox developed above, however, it would be equally possible to say simply that in the fact of freedom what we have is an intersection of two systems of coherence, the static and the dynamic, logically irreconcilable but joined in experience. Such a compound would combine novelty with a criterion, structure with creative change. Moreover, it would establish a basis for a causal relation between agent and act without passing over into determinism. For cause-and-

¹See MH, pp. 29, 110.

²See SF, p. 79; DH, ch. ii, especially p. 27.

³See FS, pp. 125-137.

effect becomes determinism on the assumption that the cause is anterior to its effect. The scheme herewith suggested, however, provides for a non-temporal "cause," like Kant's, without separating it from the temporal order. Instead, a causal series in time could be initiated completely de novo, underivably, without any absolutely determining antecedent. The dilemma of determinism-versus-indeterminism would thus be surmounted by a genuine self-determination in which the self, qua temporal, acts relevantly to the time process, but also, qua trans-temporal, alters the course of process. And this is apparently what Berdyaev has in mind when he speaks of self-determinism¹ and "determinism from within."²

The Self

If freedom is conceived as self-determination, the inquiry reverts to the self which determines. The hypothesis herein proposed as one which adequately accounts for the phenomenon of freedom implies some definite assumptions concerning the nature of the free agent. Specifically, if freedom is conceived as grounded in the intersection of the mutable and the immutable, then the self is precisely the locus of this intersection, partaking at once of both the temporal and eternal orders. It is emphatically not describable in terms of either one separately, but only in terms of both at once.

¹See SS, p. 39.

²See SF, p. 80.

It is immediately apparent that such an account of the self is able to fulfill the requirements mentioned above; that is, it can account for identity throughout change. Qua trans-temporal, the self remains the same; qua temporal, it undergoes change. Neither of these two aspects can be separated from the other without destroying freedom, for the attempt to do so must then interpret freedom either in terms of the static or of the dynamic--an undertaking which the present study has tried to show is fatal to freedom.

Although Berdyaev was among those who tried to separate the dynamic from the static element of the free agent, and who were thereby obliged to attempt to account for freedom on the basis of either the one or the other, nevertheless there are numerous passages in which he insists that this must not be done. This is especially true (though not always) when he develops his conception of personalism: "Therein lies the mystery of personality-- a mystery based on the co-existence of contraries."¹ What are the contraries which thus co-exist? Berdyaev's answer follows so closely the tenor of the present essay's conclusion that three separate expressions of it are herewith reproduced verbatim:

¹SS, p. 162. In the context of this and the three following citations, there lurk traces of Berdyaev's other tendency to regard contradiction as a thorn in the flesh, as something to be surpassed.

The sense of time is based not only on fear but also on creative activity. Neither Bergson nor Heidegger attaches sufficient importance to this duality, which is based upon the impossibility of admitting either the static or the dynamic aspect of human nature. To admit stasis would be to deny the process of eternal renewal; to admit dynamism would be to deny the eternal foundations of human nature. This duality is inherent in the very structure of personality defined as the union of the mutable and the immutable.¹

Personality is changelessness in change. That is one of the essential definitions of personality. Changes arise in one and the same subject. If one subject is replaced by another, there is then no change in the proper sense of the word.²

Personality is the unchanging in change, unity in the manifold. It strikes us unpleasantly, alike if there is the unchanging in man and not change, and if there is change and not the unchanging; if there is unity and not the manifold, or the manifold and not unity. Both in the one case and in the other the essential qualitiveness of personality is disclosed. Personality is not a congealed condition, it breaks up, it develops, it is enriched; but it is the development of one and the same abiding subject. That is its very name.³

Here he abandons the dogma that the rational is the real, together with the consequent indictment of the contradictory phenomenal world and the flight into Non-Being. Indeed, in the passages in which he dwells upon his conception of personality, he often finds it necessary specifically to denounce mysticism's withdrawal from the world and from all

¹SS, p. 131 (my italics).

²SF, p. 8. The final sentence of this citation propounds the interesting idea that change itself is perceivable only from a vantage point beyond change. Kant also held that change presupposes permanence (in op. cit., the "first analogy.")

³SF, p. 22 (my italics).

relations with it.¹ Instead, he applies reason rigorously to an analysis of the free agent, and when it encounters the intersection of two disparate systems of coherence, he no longer passes a negative judgment upon the result. Rather, he accepts it as the end result of rational inquiry, recognizing that to abstract either element out of the compound not only does violence to the fact of selfhood, but also precludes freedom by having to account for it as either exclusively static or exclusively dynamic. With this position the conclusion toward which the present study has tended is in entire accord.

Values

A particularly difficult problem for freedom was posed by the question of values. On the one hand, one of the principal factors which served to distinguish freedom from mere impulse consisted in values as the criterion of choice; on the other hand, to introduce values at all is to give them dominion over freedom, to subject it in bondage to static, abstract ideals to which it must conform. Is it possible that the conception of freedom as an irresolvable compound of the mutable and the immutable may help to solve this dilemma? As long as values are regarded exclusively

¹See FS, pp. 261-265; SR, ch. vi. In both these contexts, while rejecting Eastern and Western mysticism as alike fatal to personality, Berdyaev refers vaguely to a third kind of mysticism which will avoid this danger, but never says what it is.

as the 'eternal verities' of conceptual thought, as long as the highest value is the 'idea of the good', then the Existentialist protest appears unanswerable: any deviation from the fixed norm draws opprobrium upon itself, so that in so far as freedom involves novelty, change, and dynamism, it must be suppressed. Under the tyranny of values it becomes the "freedom" to toe the mark.

Is there a value which might escape this charge of despotism while remaining still a value properly so called? It is first necessary to inquire more specifically into this double requirement. In the first place, it would have to remain a 'value' in the sense of constituting a point of reference beyond the free agent; this is the guarantee against arbitrary caprice. In the second place, however, it would have to permit growth and creativity; this is the safeguard against tyranny. The ideal goodness, in terms of which values are so often conceived, can fulfill no more than the first condition; against them both Existentialism and pragmatism have rebelled in the name of freedom. The common criticism against both these schools, however, is that they in turn are able to fulfill only the second condition. Here again we have the familiar dichotomy: the one side seeks a criterion in the static, the other rebels in the name of the dynamic, and neither is able to fulfill the twofold requirement. Obviously, what is demanded is an inseparable com-

ination of both static and dynamic. Yet it is altogether understandable that a value which is at the same time static and dynamic is not readily forthcoming. For such a combination runs counter to the canons of logic. Is such a thing even conceivable?

The answer suggested by the conclusion to which this essay has been led is this: Whether or not such a thing is conceivable, we do encounter in experience one concretion of just such a compound. Indeed, the whole argument has attempted to establish such a locus of intersection of the static and dynamic orders as the necessary precondition of the phenomenon of responsible freedom; namely, the free agent! For the whole burden of the analysis thus far has been to the effect that freedom is best understandable as exercised by a self which retains its identity throughout change. Here, then, is something which does fulfill the double requirement necessary to provide value without tyranny, change without caprice. Whether or not the self is in any given situation regarded as a value is another question, beyond the purpose of this study to inquire. Indeed, whether anything is so accepted depends not so much upon proof as upon the response of the individual. It is only a value for some one. Suffice it here simply to establish one experienced datum which, whether accepted as a value or not, is in any case meta-

physically able to meet the double requirement of permanence-in-change.

Although the present essay is content to let the matter rest with this metaphysical undergirding of a more extensive answer to the general problem of ethics, Berdyaev takes up the argument just at this point. His consideration of some of the practical implications and difficulties of the position just outlined is therefore of interest as an indication of where it might lead. Placing human selfhood at the center of his "personalistic ethics,"¹ the first difficulty he encounters is the possibility of making one's own self the supreme value. His reply is that if everybody did this, the resulting chaos would be exactly comparable to a situation in which there were no values, but only impulse. The very idea of value, he concludes, includes a trans-subjective reference,² since even though man may say, "My will be done," he really means, "My will be done because it is good." Hence the attempt to discover value by reference to one's own self alone is self-negating. If personality is the basis of value, it must include other persons. In fact, the very idea of personality presupposes a reference to

¹See DM, Part II, ch. iv. It should be recalled that throughout the treatment of personalistic ethics, there are, in addition to passages cited here, a large number representative rather of the several standpoints analyzed in the previous chapter of this study.

²See DM, p. 21.

another.¹ At this point Berdyaev endorses Martin Euber's conception of I-and-Thou.² No longer regarded in terms of law, whether the public law of statutes and custom or the private law of ideal norms, value now becomes a relation to a person. While it formerly consisted in conformity, it now is conceived as personal loyalty. As such, it contains both static and dynamic elements at the same time: static, inasmuch as the loyalty is to the same person; dynamic, inasmuch as the possibilities of creative growth and elaboration of the relationship are indeterminate. The problem of finding a value which is at once mutable and immutable has thus found a solution.

Berdyaev notes, however, that a further problem arises, one which confronts all humanism; namely, the problem of conflicting loyalties. What is the criterion by which one makes a choice between them? The traditional solution to this question has been the appeal to a summum bonum as the criterion by which relative goods are judged. Berdyaev agrees that the personal loyalties which constitute his values are also relative, that discrimination between them without reference to a highest good is arbitrary. Hence he too admits the necessity of a "best" in order to distinguish the "better" from the "worse"--but with one decisive difference: recalling that the double demand upon any value

¹See especially SS, pp. 167 f., 173; also DM, p. 57; SF, pp. 30, 34.

²See SR, p. 149.

is fulfilled only in personality, he concludes that the summum bonum must be a person; that is, God:

The only thing higher than the love for man is the love for God, Who is also a concrete Being, a Person and not an abstract idea.¹

God is a Person rather than a Universal Essence.²

God is not an abstract idea, not an abstract existence, elaborated by the categories of abstract thought. God is a Being, a Personality.³

Though the support of such a conclusion lies beyond the purpose of this study, it is here recorded in order to show the direction which a development of the present thesis might take. Berdyaev's argument might be summarized briefly as follows: if personality is the only datum of experience which fulfills the double requirement of value (identity throughout change); if allegiance to values therefore no longer involves conformity to a fixed norm, but rather personal loyalty; and if a highest loyalty is required as the criterion of relative ones--then such a criterion would be discoverable in God-as-Person. Following this line of thought one step further, and applying it to the time-honored equation of goodness and truth, he even goes so far as to say that truth itself is a concrete personality.⁴

¹DM, p. 106.

²SR, p. 44.

³SF, p. 51. It should be recalled that Berdyaev often expresses the opposite view, as, for example, in DH, pp. 6 f.

⁴See SF, p. 81.

One further objection against the conception of value in terms of personal loyalty is raised and answered by Berdyaev; namely, the complaint that in actual fact it exercises just as great a tyranny over the self as does law. For loyalty is a relation, and as long as I am in relation to another, I am not self-sufficient. My destiny is not wholly in my own hands, but is determined partly from beyond me. In this situation, the "other" to whom I am related may exercise in effect an intolerable dominion over me. Even a tyrant can have loyal subjects; and in the last analysis, anyone to whom I give my loyalty enjoys an intolerable, even if only potential, tyranny over me. This argument is in fact endorsed by Berdyaev in a very large portion of his writings. Essentially, it rests on the logical law of identity, which cannot account for relations (praedicatum in subiecto est). In this vein he writes that the misery of personality is its relatedness¹ to the objective world. In order to be true to itself, it must withdraw into its own realm of infinite subjectivity,² where there are no longer any relations. In order to give any content to this realm, he is forced to say that the personality includes all of society, indeed all history, and the whole universe within itself.³ There can be no plurality, for that would involve relations, which, in turn, would condition the self.

¹See FS, p. 51.

²See SF, p. 22.

³See SS, pp. 98, 107, 181; SF, pp. 40, 42, 135.

In the contexts relevant to the point under discussion, however, Berdyaev takes the opposite view. Although logic may indeed denounce all relations as fatal to self-sufficiency, he now appeals to one particular kind of relation which as a matter of experience actually becomes the way of self-fulfillment, rather than self-estrangement: love. In many contexts, it is true, he speaks of love simply as narcissism,¹ as a relation to self; in others, he says that in so far as it does involve a relation to others, it bears the stigma of the objective, plural world, and must be rejected.² In still other passages, however, he explicitly endorses it as a relation to another--the one relation which overcomes in experience the subject-object cleavage which so perplexes logic.³ When love is so conceived as a relation between two or more, Berdyaev realizes that it is incompatible with the very apophatic mysticism which plays such a prominent part in his thought as a whole:

Love, on the other hand, postulates differentiation, the existence of another personality rather than the identity of personalities....The mysticism of Plotinus...is also a mysticism of the One which is attainable through an abnegation and abstraction of the plural world. In Plotinus there is no mystery of the personality and therefore no mystery of love. In Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy...as in Hindu mysticism, the One is super-being

¹See SS, pp. 96, 165; SF, p. 56.

²See FS, p. 33.

³See FS, pp. 199; SS, p. 195.

and is realized apophatically....Thus the spiritual path leads from complex plurality to simple unity. Being is identical with mind, with nous. In Hindu and Platonic mysticism everything is diametrically opposed to the dialogical and dramatic relationship between man and God, between one personality and another, as revealed in the Bible. Spirituality is interpreted as being opposed to the personality, and therefore as independent of love, human freedom, and a relation between the plural and the One.¹

This affirmation reveals not only the close affinity between mysticism and logic, but also the conflict between logic and love. Whereas the former cannot tolerate plurality, the latter presupposes it. Consequently, when speaking in this mood, Berdyaev insists upon pluralism as the pre-condition of love,² since love is a relation between two or more:

Love is always for the concrete and the individual. It is impossible to love the abstract and the general.... Love is a two-term relation and presupposes the meeting of two, their communion and unity, and the formation of a third--fellowship and brotherhood....It is individual and goes from one personality to another. Love is personalistic.³

In the concrete experience of love, Berdyaev thus finds an answer to the complaint against relatedness, a complaint which stems from the demands of logic: How can I fulfill myself unless I am self-sufficient? How can a relation to another fail to exasperate me? Berdyaev gives the same answer that was given in the case of freedom:

¹SR, pp. 135 f.

²See SF, p. 68; DH, p. 133.

³DM, p. 187. See also FS, p. 281; SS, pp. 185, 195; SR, p. 162.

apply logic rigorously to an examination of experience, but do not be misled into letting logic get the upper hand so as to dictate the results a priori.¹ If freedom postulates a subject in whom two mutually disparate orders of coherence intersect; if there is in fact an experience in which relatedness is felt not as self-estrangement but as self-fulfillment; and if this in turn requires a metaphysic of plurality as opposed to the logician's quest for identity,-- then in each case logic can do no more than acknowledge this state of affairs. It must neither declare the situation unreal nor attempt to obscure the fact that experience may join together in fact that which logic would put asunder. On this basis Berdyaev speaks of the (logically) "impossible" experience in which personal relations fulfill instead of negating the self:

Personality presupposes a going out from self to an other and to others, it lacks air and is suffocated when left shut up in itself....Personality is I and Thou, another I. But the Thou to whom the I goes out and with whom it enters into communion is not an object, it is another I, it is personality....The personal needs another, but that other is not external and alien.... Personality is to be found in a series of external relations with other people and in acts of communion with them.²

¹Some recent trends in logic, though they too take their stand upon the law of non-contradiction, avoid a metaphysic of identity by refusing to raise metaphysical questions. When the present essay speaks of "logic" as denying relations in the name of undifferentiated unity, it refers to the metaphysical implicates of such a logic.

²SF, pp. 42 f.

Choice

Essential to freedom and closely related to the question of valuation is the factor of choice. The above analysis disclosed the dilemma which it presents: On the one hand, to choose is to acknowledge a principle of choice beyond oneself, to stand in a relation of subordination to this criterion; moreover, to choose is to exclude, and therefore ipso facto to deny oneself all that is rejected in favor of the one thing chosen. But on the other hand, one cannot escape choosing; even the attempt to avoid choice altogether depends upon a prior "choice against choice." In some contexts, Berdyaev's reaction to this dilemma is negative. Either he recommends escape from spatio-temporal existence (or at least from consciousness) in which choice is inevitable, or, recognizing that escape is impossible, he is content to pronounce life a wretched tragedy because of the necessity for continual self-limitation and self-denial (that is, choice).

But, as already abundantly demonstrated in the present chapter, there is another Berdyaev, able to reply to the dilemma on the basis of the view of freedom herein proposed. If freedom postulates a self constituted partly by the intersection of the temporal and the trans-temporal, then this self is what it is, indissolubly; that is, its very structure requires the continual exercise of freedom, continual

decision and choice. The attempt to escape it is out of the question--this is the metaphysical account of why not to choose is to choose, and so on in infinite regression. As Berdyaev puts it, ethics can only be opposed in the name of another ethic.¹ Once this is accepted as a given datum about the free agent beyond which one cannot go, then whether it is regarded as tragic or not depends upon the criterion of evaluation employed. When logic sits in the judgment seat, then the relatedness involved is condemned as intolerable; when this same logic utters its maxim, "Determination is negation," it thereby applies a quantitative principle of judgment and can consequently only deplore the limiting aspect of every act of choice. Thus from the point of view of logic, freedom is indeed a curse.

But, as Berdyaev argued in the case of values, there is another possible point of view, based rather on experience than on logic, according to which it was argued that a relation need not be a cause for Weltschmerz, but rather for rejoicing. And now, from the same standpoint, he makes a case which sounds at first even more radical: that self-limitation can be the means of self-fulfillment. This can be seen by analogy with the apophatic method in its ontological application: When, in accordance with the logical dictum that "determination is negation," all positive

¹See DM, p. 19.

affirmations are denied to ultimate reality, the result is total negation, Non-Being. Similarly, in accordance with the same logical formula, one might attempt a "practical apophatics" in the realm of action, seeking to remain wholly indeterminate by making no choices or decisions, to abide in the realm of infinite possibility by refusing ever to actualize oneself in a concrete decision. In the second case the result is exactly the same as in the first: non-entity--with the added irony that in the second it has been deliberately chosen! To the logical complaint that to choose is to limit, Berdyaev replies that not to choose is to remain indeterminate, which in turn is to land in non-entity--by choice:

When we abolish such limits and when man finds himself in a state of confusion and indifference, his personality begins to disintegrate, for the power of conscience is inseparably connected with the denunciation of evil. In the confusion and state of indifference resulting from the loss of the perception of evil man loses his freedom of spirit....¹

But when men are "shamefully indifferent to good and evil," when they are too tolerant and broadminded and renounce moral struggle, the result is demoralization and decadence.²

By the same token, mutatis mutandis, personality is created in the making of decisions:

Personality, the character of personality, indicates that a man has made a choice, that he has established differences, that he is not indifferent, that he makes distinctions.³

¹FS, p. 161.

²DM, p. 158.

³SF, p. 48.

There is therewith established a 'metaphysic of choice' as the complement of the 'metaphysic of value' already developed. Each had to be independently established so that neither relatedness nor limit need necessarily be feared as fatal to the self. It now remains simply to join the two together; that is, to indicate how personal loyalty may actually be chosen as a value. Berdyaev finds the keystone to his ethical edifice in love. Personal loyalty does place a limit, but this limit is not felt as restrictive if it is chosen in an unmotivated act of love for a concrete person. "Love implies by its very nature discrimination and choice; it is individual and goes from one personality to another."¹ Such a relationship must be experienced, rather than conceived. To attempt to describe it further is only to reiterate. It is a relationship in which the limits involved in a spontaneous personal allegiance serve to fulfill the self, to provide a concrete opportunity of free creativity, rather than to oppress it. With this the final intellectual link in the ethical system has been added. Whether or not this same link is added in practice is a matter of the response of the individual, of whether he does in fact react toward others with the love which would supply the answer to the ethical problem if it were his to command.

¹DM, p. 187.

Summary: The Free Agent

Along three different lines of approach, the present study has tended toward a single conclusion concerning the relation of freedom and time. First, a priori analysis indicated that whereas freedom was meaningless apart from action, and therefore from time, the attempt to account for it in terms of time alone could only arrive at either determinism or indeterminism; determinism, if the antecedent moment of time necessarily caused the subsequent moment; indeterminism, if there was no causal relation between the antecedent and subsequent moments. This suggested that an adequate account of freedom would have to include both time and the trans-temporal. Second, this thesis was tested by examining the treatment of the problem by Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev. In every case, the attempt was made to account for freedom in terms either of eternity or of time, but, except for some parts of Berdyaev's thought, never in terms of both. And in every case the result was the same: what was established was either determinism or indeterminism, but not freedom. Sometimes the attempt was made to get rid of freedom, but this very attempt presupposed freedom. Sometimes the logical distinction between the static and the dynamic was obscured in order to introduce elements of both into freedom without affirming a contradiction--but this only increased the suspicion that such an affirmation

was necessary. Finally, in the case of Berdyaev, this last, desperate extremity was attempted. It was asserted that though the mutable and the immutable are logically mutually exclusive, nevertheless, in order to account for freedom, an "intersection" of these two orders must be postulated, with the free agent as its locus. This radical solution was subjected to preliminary testing by applying it to the various facets of the problem encountered herein, with the following results:

First, if freedom represents the intersection of time and eternity, then a solution is provided in principle to the problem of how there can be a causal relation between agent and act (essential for responsibility) without at the same time acceding to determinism; for since the problem is no longer confined to time alone, the cause does not have to be anterior to its effect. The possibility of initiating an underivable temporal-causal series is established. Second, the free agent can thus both be active in time and still retain his identity throughout change, since he is partly constituted by the union of the mutable and the immutable. Third, the double demand of value can now be met. On the one hand, a value must provide a standard of reference outside the self in order to prevent chaos and caprice; on the other hand, it must not exercise the tyranny of the letter over the spirit; that is, it must be both static and

dynamic at the same time. Though logically difficult to conceive, such a datum is provided in experience in the person of another free agent. As an example of the kind of ethics that might be constructed upon such a foundation, Berdyaev's personalistic ethics were cited. Finally, it was shown that the element of choice involved in freedom, which has often proven a stumbling block to philosophy, not only cannot be rejected without presupposing freedom, but also, on the basis of an ethic like Berdyaev's, can be the source of creativity, rather than restriction. As applied to these several aspects of the problem of freedom, then, the hypothesis with which this study concludes apparently supplies a possible answer to some otherwise exceedingly difficult problems.

Finally, if there is one principal point at which the present hypothesis confronts much traditional treatment of the problem, it is that of anthropology: specifically, the nature of the free agent's relation to time and to eternity. Whether or not the logical disparity between change and changelessness is irreducible, as the present inquiry has maintained, the fact remains that traditional philosophy has in fact often kept the two rigidly separate. In so doing, as demonstrated herein in the case of Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev, it has allowed the phenomenon of freedom to slip through its fingers. Instead of taking departure from the

free agent as a given datum, it has tended to interpret man in terms of eros and logos, will and idea, Dionysian and Apollonian, phenomenon and noumenon--which, translated into temporal categories, represent dynamic and static, temporal and eternal. On the basis of this dichotomized anthropology, in which the two elements are considered in separation from each other, there is no true freedom, but either indeterminism, when the mutable predominates, or determinism, when the immutable predominates.

In contrast to such a procedure, the conclusion here suggested would not begin with a preconceived metaphysical framework in which time and eternity could not intersect a priori. Instead of trying to coerce freedom into such a system, it would rather begin with freedom as concrete datum and make whatever metaphysical inferences are necessary to account for it. Chief among these is the conclusion that if freedom is to exist at all, the static and dynamic elements, though logically incompatible, can emphatically not be separated within the self, but must rather coexist in a state of inseparable interpenetration. The self can only be truly free if it represents an indissoluble compound of both.

Any attempt to resolve the point at which time and the trans-temporal intersect would be able to follow only one of the two coordinates at a time, and would therefore either leave the other behind altogether, or at best only

consider it in isolation. But philosophy has all too often been tempted to push its analysis beyond the intersection point. Starting with the given datum of a self in whom time and the trans-temporal intersect, it has sought to separate these two strands by abstraction, thus producing that monstrosity, the "philosopher's man," a combination of mind and body, of rationality and vitality. By extrapolation, these two principles may then be extended to comprise "the world as 'will' and idea." And what becomes of freedom under the domination of these two concepts? The preceding pages have sought to gather evidence that when rationality dominates, the result is determinism; when vitality dominates, indeterminism. The philosophy of Bergson, Heidegger, and Berdyaev testifies that when the self is reduced to reason and force, freedom ipso facto gives way to either determinism or indeterminism. To try to discover freedom on the basis of either of its two components separately is like trying to account for water on the basis of hydrogen and/or oxygen separately. Just as there is not a trace of water if the two gases are merely juxtaposed, so also is there nothing left of freedom if time and/or eternity are separately analyzed out of the indissoluble compound which constitutes the free agent.

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- | <u>Primary Sources</u> | Abbreviations
used in
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