Summary of the 2010 NPT final
outcome document Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Feature article from the NPT News in Review,
the daily NGO newsletter from the
2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Final Edition | Tuesday, 1 June 2010
The outcome document is 28 pages long and includes
two parts, a review of the operation of the Treaty and recommendations
for follow-on actions. The review section goes through the
Treaty paragraph by paragraph, reaffirms previous decisions,
and recalls significant developments and events that have
taken place since the last outcome document in 2000. Below,
the document is summarized by topic.
Nuclear disarmament
The unequivocal undertaking
The Conference reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking of the
NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
The Conference also resolves that NWS should implement this
unequivocal undertaking through further efforts to reduce
and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed.
Nuclear Weapons Convention
The Conference notes the UN Secretary-General’s five-point
proposal to inter alia consider negotiations on a nuclear
weapons convention and affirms that the final phase of a nuclear
disarmament process should be pursued within an agreed legal
framework, which a majority of states parties believe should
include specified timelines.
Security policies
The Conference notes the need for further progress in diminishing
the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and welcomes
the reductions announced by some NWS in the role of nuclear
weapons in their security doctrine. The Conference calls upon
NWS to promptly engage to further diminish the role and significance
of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts,
doctrines, and policies. The Conference also calls upon NWS
to promptly engage to discuss policies that could prevent
the use of nuclear weapons, and lead to their elimination,
lessen the danger of nuclear war, and contribute to non-proliferation
and disarmament.
Reductions
The Conference affirms the need for all NWS to reduce and
eliminate all type of nuclear weapons and encourages those
with largest arsenals to lead such efforts. The Conference
resolves that the US and Russia commit to seek the early entry
into force of the new START. The Conference calls upon NWS
to promptly engage in rapidly moving toward an overall reduction
in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons.
Modernization
The Conference recognises the legitimate interest of NNWS
in the constraining by the NWS of the development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development
of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
Operational status
The Conference recognises that reductions of operational status
contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Conference
also calls upon NWS to promptly engage in considering the
legitimate interest of NNWS in further reducing the operational
status of nuclear weapons systems.
Consequences and legality of nuclear weapons
The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued
risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these
weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. The Conference
reaffirms the need for all states at all times to comply with
applicable international law, including international humanitarian
law. The Conference also calls upon NWS to promptly engage
in reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons
and notes the International Court of Justice advisory opinion
on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons from
1996.
Nuclear testing
The Conference calls on all states to refrain from any action
which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT pending
its entry into force, in particular as regards to the development
of new types of nuclear weapons. States parties commit to
refrain from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies.
The Conference welcomes the latest ratifications, and expressions
of intention to ratify the CTBT by states. The Conference
resolves that all NWS undertake to ratify the CTBT and that
the CTBTO Preparatory Commission is to be encouraged to fully
develop the CTBT verification regime.
Fissile material
The Conference welcomes the declared moratoria by some NWS
on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The Conference also reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating
and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and
calls upon the CD to immediately begin such negotiations in
accordance with the Shannon mandate. The Conference resolves
that the NWS are encouraged to commit to declare to the IAEA
all fissile material no longer required for military purposes
and to place such material under IAEA safeguards. The Conference
also resolves that all states are encouraged to support the
development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements,
within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible
removal of fissile material no longer required for military
purposes. The Conference also encourages all states to initiate
a process towards the dismantling or conversion of production
facilities for fissile material used for nuclear weapons.
Reporting
The Conference notes the regular reports submitted by parties,
as decided at previous Review Conferences. The Conference
calls upon NWS to report the undertakings in Action 5 to the
Preparatory Committee in 2014, while the Review Conference
in 2015 will take stock and consider the next steps for the
full implementation of Article VI. The Conference resolves
that all states parties should submit regular reports on the
implementation of the action plan on disarmament, article
VI and the 13 practical steps from 2000, by recalling the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of
1996. The Conference also resolves that as a confidence-building
measure, the NWS are encouraged to agree on a standard reporting
form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals.
Security assurances and NWFZs
Security assurances
The Conference resolves that all NWS commit to fully respect
their existing commitments to security assurances, and those
who have not yet done so are encouraged to extend such assurances
to NNWS parties to the NPT. The NWS are also encouraged to
review any reservations made to the negative security assurances
under the protocols of NWFZ treaties.
Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)
The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Pelindaba
and Central Asian NWFZ treaties, as well as the ratification
by some NWS of relevant NWFZ treaty protocols. The Conference
also welcomes Mongolia’s declaration of its nuclear
weapon free status and supports measures to consolidate and
strengthen such status. The Conference calls on NWS to bring
into effect the security assurances provided by NWFZ treaties
and their protocols. The Conference also notes the first and
second meeting of states parties to NWFZ and acknowledges
the initiative to hold such a meeting in the framework of
the forthcoming Review Conferences of the NPT.
Non-proliferation
IAEA safeguards
The Conference welcomed that 166 states have brought into
force the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and recognized
that these safeguards are a fundamental component of the non-proliferation
regime. The Conference urges the remaining 18 states parties
to bring such comprehensive safeguards agreement into force.
Additional protocol
The Conference welcomes that 133 additional protocols have
been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and that such
protocols are currently being implemented in 102 states. The
Conference notes that the implementation of the additional
protocol increases the confidence about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities and further notes that “numerous
states were of the view that those measures have been introduced
as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system” and
encourages all states parties to conclude and bring into force
such additional protocol. The Conference also notes that while
it is a sovereign decision to conclude an additional protocol,
once in force, it is a legal obligation. The Conference also
stresses the importance of confidentiality regarding information
related to implementation of safeguards. The Conference also
calls for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear
facilities in the NWS. The Conference recommends that the
IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly.
Export controls
The Conference recognises that national rules for export of
nuclear material are necessary to ensure commitments in line
with article I, II, and III of the Treaty, while fully respecting
article IV. The Conference also notes that numerous states
underline that effective and transparent export controls are
important to facilitating trade of peaceful nuclear material,
which, according to those numerous states, depends on the
existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation.
The Conference urges all states parties to ensure that their
nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist
the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devises and urges states to make use of multilateral guidelines
and understandings in developing their own national export
controls. The Conference also encourages states to consider
whether a recipient state has brought into force IAEA safeguards
obligations in making nuclear export decisions.
Nuclear energy
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
The Conference reaffirms the right of all states parties to
the fullest possible exchange of measures for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions
of the Treaty. It also reaffirms that preferential treatment
should be given to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the
Treaty, taking into account in particular, the needs of developing
countries. The Conference encourages states to further develop
a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors.
Nuclear safety and security
The Conference notes the “paramount importance”
of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and
welcomes the adoption of the amendment to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourages
all states to become a party to it. The Conference also encourages
all parties to become parties to the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,
the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management. The Conference acknowledges that while nuclear
safety and security are national responsibilities, the IAEA
should play the key role in development of standards, guidance
and best practice conventions. The Conference encourages all
states to maintain the highest possible standards of security
and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.
The Conference also notes the entry into force of the 2007
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington
in April 2010 and calls upon all states parties to improve
their national capabilities to stop illicit trafficking in
nuclear materials throughout their territories. The Conference
recognizes the safety and security issues associated with
nuclear energy, as well as the important issue of managing
spent fuel and radioactive waste in a sustainable manner.
Nuclear fuel suppliers are encouraged to work with and assist
recipient states in the safe and secure management of spent
fuel. The Conference also considers attacks or threat of attack
on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize
nuclear safety, have dangerous implications, and raise serious
concerns regarding the application of international law on
the use of force. The Conference notes that a majority of
states parties suggested a legally-binding instrument to be
considered in this regard.
Uranium
The Conference welcomes the efforts by states parties on a
voluntary basis to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium
in the civilian sector. It also recognizes the importance
of applying best practice and basic principles in mining and
processing, including those related to environmental management
of uranium mining.
IAEA technical cooperation
The Conference notes that IAEA technical cooperation activities
contribute to improvement of many areas, such as the helping
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and welcomes
the contributions already pledged by countries or groups of
countries in support of such IAEA activities. The Conference
calls upon all states parties to continue efforts to enhance
the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation
programme and make every effort to ensure that the funding
for such programme are sufficient, assured and predictable.
Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle
The Conference notes the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched
uranium in Russia for the use of IAEA Member States, and calls
upon states to continue to discuss further possibilities to
create voluntary multilateral mechanisms for assurance of
fuel supply as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end
of the fuel cycle.
Regional issues
Middle East
The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives
of the Middle East peace process and recognises that efforts
in this regard contribute to a Middle East zone free of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ). In
order to implement the 1995 resolution, the Conference calls
upon the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995
resolution, in consultation with the states of the region,
to convene a Conference in 2012 on the establishment of a
Middle East WMDFZ. The Conference also calls upon the UN Secretary-General
and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation
with the states of the region, to appoint a facilitator to
support the implementation of the 1995 resolution and undertake
preparations for the 2012 conference. This facilitator will
also report to the NPT Review Conference in 2015 and its Preparatory
Committees. The UN Secretary-General and the relevant states
are also asked to designate a host country for the 2012 conference.
The Conference emphasises the requirement of maintaining parallel
progress in the process leading to achieving total and complete
elimination of all WMD in the region.
DPRK
The Conference condemns with strongest possible terms the
nuclear test explosions of the DPRK and recalls that it cannot
have the status of a nuclear weapon state. The Conference
also affirms that the nuclear programme in DPRK constitutes
a threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and to
the entire international community. The Conference strongly
urges the DPRK to fulfil its commitments under the Six Party
Talks and urge it to return to the Treaty and its adherence
to IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirms its firm
support for the Six Party Talks and remains determined to
achieve resolution to the issues through diplomatic means.
South Asia
The Conference urges Pakistan and India to accede to the NPT
as non-nuclear weapon states and to place their nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. The Conference also urges these two
countries to strengthen their export controls for material
and technology that can be used for nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems.
Other issues
Strengthening the review process
The Conference recommends that a dedicated staff officer should
be added to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in order
to support the Treaty’s review cycle. The Conference
also encourages past and incumbent Chairs to be available
for consultations by the incoming Chairs.
Transparency
The Conference notes the released number of nuclear weapons
in inventories of some NWS and encourages all NWS to provide
additional transparency in this regard. The Conference also
calls upon NWS to promptly engage to further enhance transparency
and increase mutual confidence.
Compliance
The Conference reaffirms that the responses to concerns of
compliance should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty and the UN Charter. The
Conference also notes the concerns expressed by numerous parties
on non-compliance of the Treaty by states parties, as well
as their calls on those states non-compliant to move promptly
to full compliance with their obligations. The Conference
underscores the importance in complying with non-proliferation
obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to
uphold the Treaty’s integrity, and the authority of
the safeguards system. The Conference underscores the importance
of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations
in full conformity with the IAEA statute and member states
respective legal obligation.
Universality
The Conference remains convinced that universality of the
Treaty is the goal and calls upon all states non-parties to
the Treaty—India, Pakistan, and Israel—to accede
to it without further delay. The Conference reaffirms that
achieving universality is essential to regional and international
peace and security. The Conference also reaffirms that new
supply arrangements for transfers of fissionable material
should require as a necessary precondition acceptance of full
scope safeguards and international legally-binding commitments
not to acquire nuclear weapons. The Conference also calls
upon all states parties to exert all efforts to promote universal
adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that
can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the
Treaty.
Withdrawal
The Conference reaffirms the national sovereign right to withdraw
from the Treaty, but reaffirms the conditions for such notifications.
The Conference also underscores that a withdrawing party is
still responsible for violations of the NPT committed before
the withdrawal. The Conference notes that numerous states
were of the view that states parties should undertake consultations,
as well as regional diplomatic initiatives, in the case of
withdrawal.
Machinery
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
The Conference expresses deep concern that after more than
a decade, the CD has been unable to commence negotiations
and urges it to begin work without delay. The Conference calls
upon the CD to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear
disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive,
and balanced programme of work. The Conference also calls
upon the CD to begin discussions on effective international
arrangements for security assurances and negotiations on a
FMCT based on the Shannon mandate. The Conference also invites
the UN Secretary-General to convene a high-level meeting in
September 2010 in support of the work of the CD.
