"I have seen no evidence yet in terms of hard changes on the ground that the Syrian government is willing to reform at anything like the speed demanded by the street protestors. If it doesn’t start moving with far greater alacrity, the street will wash them away."

That was the blunt verdict offered by U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford in a wide-ranging telephone interview with Foreign Policy today. Ford sharply criticized the Syrian government's continuing repression against peaceful protestors and called on President Bashar al-Assad to "take the hard decisions" to begin meaningful reforms before it is too late. Not, Ford stressed, because of American concerns but because of the impatience of the Syrian opposition itself. "This is not about Americans, it is about the way the Syrian government mistreats its own people," Ford stressed repeatedly. "This is really about Syrians interacting with other Syrians. I’m a marginal thing on the sidelines. I’m not that important."

Some might disagree. Last Thursday and Friday, Ford made a dramatic visit to the embattled city of Hama to demonstrate the United States' support for peaceful protests and its condemnation of the Syrian government's use of violence. His trip to Hama electrified supporters of the Syrian opposition, and marked a sharp escalation in U.S. efforts to deal with the difficult Syrian stalemate. It also sparked a vicious Syrian response, as government-backed mobs attacked the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, inflicting considerable damage. In a caustic note posted to his Facebook page, Ford called on the Syrian government to "stop beating and shooting peaceful demonstrators." Ford's sharp criticism of the Syrian government's violence against peaceful protestors and detailed outline of multilateral and American diplomatic efforts to pressure the Syrian regime suggest that the recent U.S. rhetorical escalation does mark a new stage in the ongoing crisis.

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Tunisia's post-revolutionary politics are being profoundly shaped by the meteoric rise of the long-banned Islamist movement al-Nahda. Decades of fierce repression during the regime of former President Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali crushed almost every visible manifestation of Tunisia's Islamist movement.  The banned movement played a very limited role in the revolution. But since Ben Ali's flight and the triumphant January 30 return of exiled leader Rached Ghannouchi, al-Nahda has grown with astonishing speed. A recent survey found support for the party at just below 30 percent, almost three times that of its closest rival. Its ascent is fueling a dangerous polarization, leading putative champions of democracy to endorse the postponing of elections, and frightening many secularists and women who fear for their place in the new Tunisia.

I have just returned from a trip to Tunisia focused on the resurgence of al-Nahda. I emerged impressed with al-Nahda's organizational strength, democratic rhetoric, political energy, and by their determined efforts to engage with their political rivals and reassure their critics. But I also emerged with real concerns about the growing polarization and collapse of trust across the political class, which risks dividing the Tunisian public and crippling the desperately needed democratic transition. And I found even al-Nahda's leaders unsure about how to grapple with the rising salafi trend, which may be more of a source of weakness than a source of electoral strength.

There is far more to Tunisia's emerging political arena than just al-Nahda, of course. Its rise and the resulting polarization come at a time of deep uncertainty about the fate of the revolution. Much of the old regime remains in place within state institutions, as well as in the Tunisian media, business sector, and cultural elite. Many of those who drove the popular uprising are deeply disgruntled about how little the revolution has changed their lives;  while many of the people with whom I spoke were delighted with their newfound freedom, few saw real improvement in economic conditions. Many, particularly in the southern cities where the revolution began, feel that the world has abandoned them and that their revolution has been stolen.  While the world has largely turned away from Tunisia to focus on crises elsewhere across the region, the transition to democracy there is far from accomplished.   This is an important time to refocus on the place where the Arab upheavals began. Look for more coverage of these broader issues on Foreign Policy in the coming weeks. 

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"There’s no outcry in the country to say 'comply with the War Powers Act,' outside of academia."  That's what Senator John McCain told Foreign Policy in an interview a few weeks ago.  How quickly things change. With House Speaker John Boehner presenting an ultimatum for administration compliance with the War Powers Act, and Congressional GOP leaders hinting at defunding the campaign, the demand that the Obama administration obtain Congressional authorization for the operation in Libya has suddenly become front page news. A full-scale battle over Presidential authority looms.

The administration should have secured authorization for the Libya campaign early on, to put it on solid legal and bipartisan political footing.  Congressional oversight is as important for the Obama administration as it was during the Bush administration -- a point which applies to Libya just as it does to drone strikes and global counter-terrorism operations. They probably didn't do so because they (correctly) expected that a Congressional resolution authorizing the Libya campaign would come to the President's desk with riders attached repealing health care reform, reinstating Don't Ask Don't Tell, and abolishing Medicare. But politics shouldn't be allowed to outweigh the importance of effective Congressional oversight and respecting the rule of law. 

Beyond the political jockeying, however, the sudden burst of attention to Libya should be an opportunity for the public to take a fresh look at what is actually happening in Libya. This is a good time to realize that the war in Libya was very much worth fighting and that it is moving in a positive direction.  A massacre was averted, all the trends favor the rebels, the emerging National Transitional Council is an unusually impressive government in waiting, and a positive endgame is in sight.  This is a war of which the administration should be proud, not one to be hidden away from public or Congressional view.

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As the violence in Syria grinds on with no resolution in sight, a chorus of voices is predictably rising demanding that the Obama administration do more to hasten the exit of Bashar al-Assad.  Their impatience is understandable, as is the outrage which I share about the indiscriminate use of violence by an ugly regime.  But Syria will not be solved by Obama deciding to finally use the magic democracy words that he has inexplicably refused to deploy: "Expellus Assadum!" 

The administration is right about the limits of Washington's influence over events in Syria and correct to resist pressure to indulge in symbolic gestures such as withdrawing the Ambassador or calling on Assad to leave.  Prudence is not weakness.  It is the only rational response to the turbulence and uncertainty surrounding Syria today.  That does not mean doing nothing. The Obama administration should continue to ratchet up its rhetorical condemnation of Syrian violence. It might use the threat of International Criminal Court referral and targeted sanctions to encourage regime defections. But increasing pressure is not enough.  Instead, it should continue to focus on a regional and international approach, in cooperation with regional partners such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League, designed to create a real alternative to the seemingly unstoppable descent into brutality and rebellion.

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After briefly sizing me up as I surveyed his offerings, the street bookseller near Cairo’s Tahrir Square approached me and asked: “Muslim Brotherhood books or revolution books?” I suppose the concerns of Americans scanning Arabic books in Cairo are just that obvious. Of course, I bought both. But polarization over the role of Islamists in the new Egypt and questions about the future of the revolution are on the minds of Egyptians, too. Answers to those questions are being hammered out in ways which frustrate many, infuriate some, and satisfy virtually no Egyptians.

After a week in Cairo talking to a wide range of activists, academics, political figures, Islamists, journalists, and many others -- while also taking part in this exceptional conference which I helped organize at the American University of Cairo (video here) -- I came away sharing many of the concerns I encountered in the vibrant political discussions I heard, but broadly optimistic about Egypt's prospects. It is impossible to not be impressed with the energy, enthusiasm, and talent of the diverse array of activists and social forces which came together to make Tahrir possible. While I found plenty of reasons for concern about the intentions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, I found myself more impressed by their relative incompetence than by their malevolent genius. I found the Muslim Brotherhood confident but clearly grappling with a wide range of unfamiliar issues and challenges which have the Islamists on shaky ground. I also found deep, if unsurprising, skepticism that the U.S. could or would play a positive role in shaping a new Egypt, a public sentiment with which the U.S. appears to be doing too little to engage.

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"First of all, let me say something that I shouldn't," Sen. John McCain began. "I'm not sure they should put Mubarak on trial."

In a wide ranging-interview with Foreign Policy today, McCain made the case that prosecuting the former Egyptian president for killing unarmed protesters, as the new Egyptian government has promised to do, would encourage the Arab world's other embattled dictators to cling to power rather than risk the consequences of stepping down. He also weighed in on how the United States should support democratic transitions throughout the Arab world, and blasted cuts to funding for Title VI and other international educational programs as a "short-sighted" move that could weaken American diplomatic capabilities and, over time, create a "hollow diplomatic corps." 

On Syria, McCain urged moral support for protesters, but offered a surprisingly strong warning against leading them to believe that any foreign military intervention might be forthcoming.  He called for the United States and Europe to work quickly in support of the democratic transition and economic rebuilding of Egypt -- but warned that we shouldn't call it a "Marshall Plan." And the former presidential candidate expressed cautious optimism on Libya, calling on the administration to recognize the National Transitional Council.

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The Center for a New American Security is releasing my new report this morning:  Upheaval: U.S. Policy Towards Iran in a Changing Middle East.  I had been ready to release this report in January, with a focus on how to better approach negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program and broader regional political issues in order to avoid an unnecessary and destructive war.   But I felt that the Arab upheavals fundamentally changed the situation facing both the U.S. and Iran, creating both opportunities and challenges for both. Key U.S. allies in its efforts to contain and pressure Iran have either fallen from power or face serious internal threats, the Libya war has further undermined the logic of nuclear negotiations, Israeli and Saudi fears are growing, and the risk of an unwanted and disastrous war has grown. 

Upheaval argues that the  Obama administration's strategy towards Iran had been more successful in the narrow task of pressuring Tehran than many had expected, but that the foundations of its strategy of containment are rapidly crumbling.  At the same time, Iran has had difficulty taking advantage of the struggles of some of its key Arab rivals, partly because of the powerful memory of its 2009 repression of its own protest movement and partly because of the emergence of more attractive competitors for the leadership of the "Resistance" such as Turkey and the new Egypt. The Saudi-led counter-revolution, particularly in Bahrain, threatens to repolarize the region in ways which could revive Iran's appeal across the region and undermine American efforts to reach out to emerging Arab publics.  The risk of a rapid escalation to war along a range of flashpoints, from Israel's borders to the Gulf, is higher than many believe --- and such a war would radically repolarize the region, most likely against the United States.

Upheaval offers a range of policy recommendations to help guide the Obama administration towards an effective rethinking of its policy towards Iran -- including an appeal to avoid repolarization and inflation of the Iranian threat, more effective engagement with Arab publics and with emerging new independent-minded Arab players such as Egypt and Turkey, and a different approach to the nuclear negotiations.    I expect some of the arguments to be controversial -- including the case for Iran's diminished power, the skepticism about negotiations in the current environment, and the risks of aligning with the Saudi-driven campaign against Tehran.  As always,  I look forward to comments, discussions, debate and feedback.  

You can download the full report here.  

The Gulf Cooperation Council surprised virtually everyone yesterday by announcing that it would begin membership talks with Jordan and Morocco.  While actual membership is likely a long way off, the announcement signals a new alliance in the region which conspicuously omits Egyp, along with more obvious candidates for GCC membership such as Yemen and Iraq.  This expanded GCC would of course no longer really be an organization of states in the Gulf. Nor would it be a club for small, rich oil producing states. Instead, it seems to be evolving into a club for Sunni Arab monarchs -- the institutional home of the counter-revolution, directed against not only Iran but also against the forces for change in the region.  Where the United States fits in that new conception remains distinctly unclear.

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