According to a report published today by the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, "Influential and well-informed members of Iranian civil society believe that military action against Iran would lead to further political repression, deeper enmity between the Iranian people and the United States, and severe humanitarian problems":

The 38-page report, Raising Their Voices: Iranian Civil Society Reflections on the Military Option, presents the viewpoints of 35 prominent Iranians living inside the country on the domestic consequences of an attack by the United States or its allies. These Iranians include human rights defenders, activists, lawyers, journalists, writers, leading cultural figures, and members of the political opposition.

Those interviewed in the report are people outside the ruling establishment, many having faced censorship, harassment, and imprisonment for their opinions or activities.

“The potential of a pre-emptive military strike has gone up and down over the years, but seems to remain an option. The Iranian civil society voices in this report consider such a foreign military strike an utter disaster for the human rights situation in their country,” said Hadi Ghaemi, the Campaign’s spokesperson.

The Iranians featured in the report rejected justifications for military action against Iran based on human rights violations, saying a strike would not precipitate “regime change” and would even rally some reform-oriented citizens to the side of the government. One journalist who wished to remain anonymous said, “A foreign military attack would lead to many of the [Green] movement’s rank-and-file shifting their support to the same government they currently oppose.”

This is very much in keeping with past statements from Iranian democracy activists like Akbar Ganji and Shirin Ebadi, both of whom have warned that U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iran would be a death blow for their movement. In an interview last November, Ebadi told me that a U.S. attack “would give the government an excuse to kill all of its political opponents, as was done during the Iran-Iraq war.” For that reason, the Iranian government probably “wouldn’t mind the U.S. throwing a missile at them,” she said.

UPDATE: Ali Gharib has more.

A new Zogby International poll of Arab opinions showing that views toward the U.S. have dropped since 2008 is obviously disappointing for those of us who had hopes for President Obama’s efforts in the region. Importantly, it gets at the stark divide between President Obama’s words and actions. He’s said a lot of great things about changing the U.S. approach to the region, but hasn’t followed through with much in the way of developing a coherent new policy. He’s put in a significant effort on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but hasn’t produced much. And people in the Arab world aren’t giving him points for trying.

Some of the main findings:

- After improving with the election of Barack Obama in 2008, U.S. favorable ratings across the Arab world have plummeted. In most countries they are lower than at the end of the Bush Administration, and lower than Iran’s favorable ratings (except in Saudi Arabia).

- The continuing occupation of Palestinian lands and U.S. interference in the Arab world are held to be the greatest obstacles to peace and stability in the Middle East.

- While many Arabs were hopeful that the election of Barack Obama would improve U.S.-Arab relations, that hope has evaporated. Today, President Obama’s favorable ratings across the Arab world are 10% or less.

- Obama’s performance ratings are lowest on the two issues to which he has devoted the most energy: Palestine and engagement with the Muslim world.

- The U.S. role in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya receives a positive rating only in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, but, as an issue, it is the lowest priority.

- The killing of bin Laden only worsened attitudes toward the U.S.

- A plurality says it is too early to tell whether the Arab Spring will have a positive impact on the region. In Egypt, the mood is mixed. Only in the Gulf States are optimism and satisfaction levels high.

It’s important to understand these numbers in the context of the last decade of U.S. intervention in the Middle East. While Arab publics have expressed negative views of U.S. policy for decades, Arab opinion of the U.S. fell dramatically after the invasion and occupation of Iraqas the Washington Post noted in 2004:

In Zogby’s 2002 survey, 76 percent of Egyptians had a negative attitude toward the United States, compared with 98 percent this year [2004]. In Morocco, 61 percent viewed the country unfavorably in 2002, but in two years, that number has jumped to 88 percent. In Saudi Arabia, such responses rose from 87 percent in 2002 to 94 percent in June. Attitudes were virtually unchanged in Lebanon but improved slightly in the UAE, from 87 percent who said in 2002 that they disliked the United States to 73 percent this year. Those polled said their opinions were shaped by U.S. policies, rather than by values or culture.

When asked: "What is the first thought when you hear ‘America’?" respondents overwhelmingly said: "Unfair foreign policy."

While many Arabs were willing to give Obama a chance to change the U.S. orientation, they now seem to have given up. To many in the region, unfortunately, "America is not the city on the hill. We’re Iraq. we’re Abu Ghraib, we’re Guantanamo," said the Arab American Institute’s John Zogby, who commissioned the poll. Obama’s backing protesters in Tunisia and Egypt and establishing a no-fly zone in Libya haven’t done anything to arrest the trend, something that Zogby says shouldn’t be all that surprising. "When your neighbor’s been fooling around with your wife for years, you don’t suddenly change your mind about him when he takes out your garbage and trims your hedges," Zogby remarked Tuesday at a meeting with reporters.

In regard to the absence of anti-Americanism in the demonstrations that brought down Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Zogby observed, "They’re not burning American flags in Cairo, but they’re not waving them either." A consistent theme in the responses was a desire for less U.S. intervention in Arab affairs.

As for those who claim vindication for the more aggressive policies of the Bush administration, Zogby noted, "When America was ’strongest’ in the region [2006] the numbers were at their lowest."

Zogby also stressed that the numbers show that Arabs continue to rank the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands as one of the greatest obstacles to peace and stability in the region. Whether or not one agrees with that view, it is a political fact in the region. Contrary to the claims of some, then, as countries in the region (hopefully) move toward more democratic government, we should expect the Palestinian issue to become more prominent, not less. Indeed, we’ve already seen a demonstration of this on the debate over Tunisia’s new constitution.

Shortly before Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, neoconservative pundit Daniel Pipes told an audience that, were he a registered voter in Iran, he would “vote for [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad" rather than reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. Pipes contended that a Mousavi presidency would be little different from Ahmadinejad’s, and therefore Pipes "would prefer to have an enemy who is forthright and blatant and obvious.” Mousavi’s supporters, millions of whom soon turned out in Iran’s streets to protest what they saw as an election stolen by Ahmadinejad and his cronies, obviously disagreed.

In February 2010, Pipes again put himself on the wrong side of Iranian reformers by suggesting that President Obama could "save his presidency" by bombing Iran. There is near unanimity among Iran analysts that a U.S. strike on Iran would be a death blow for Iran’s democracy movement.

Today, Pipes has piece in National Review entitled "Empower Iranians vs. Tehran," with the subhed "Iran’s most prominent opposition group should not be labeled a terrorist organization." In it, he calls for the Obama administration to remove the Mujahideen-e Khalq from the State Department’s list of designated terrorist groups, and support them against the Iranian regime. "With one simple signature," Pipes writes, "the Obama administration can help empower Iranians to seize control over their destiny — and perhaps end the mullahs’ mad nuclear dash."

To anyone who has followed this issue at all, the idea that the MEK represents some kind of legitimate Iranian opposition group is preposterous. They are despised within Iran for, among other things, having fought alongside Saddam Hussein during the hugely destructive 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war (as well as by many Iraqis for having aided Saddam in his crackdowns on Iraqi Shiites and Kurds.) Actual Iranian democracy activists — a category that does not include the MEK, which is run as an authoritarian cult — working both inside and outside Iran have made abundantly clear that they want nothing to do with the MEK, and that any perceived U.S. support for the MEK would seriously undercut efforts to press Iran on human rights.

Attempting to establish the MEK as a genuine force in Iran, Pipes claims that "the number of street protesters arrested for association with the MeK points to its role in demonstrations." No, it doesn’t. What it points to is the extent to which the Iranian regime wants to associate all reformers with the MEK in order to discredit them in the eyes of Iranians who might otherwise be sympathetic to their ideas (The picture at upper right shows a pro-regime demonstration with a picture of MEK leader Massoud Rajavi morphing into Mir Hossein Mousavi. This is not intended as a compliment.)

Much like Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, the MEK has no legitimacy within the country whose "democratic opposition" they claim to represent. Unfortunately, also like the INC, they have managed to cultivate the perception of such legitimacy in a number of Western capitals, including here in Washington, DC. While it’s appropriate to debate whether or not the MEK should continue to be designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, we should understand that supporting the MEK and supporting human rights and democracy in Iran are, in fact, mutually exclusive.

The Jerusalem Post reports that a draft of a new Tunisian constitution completed earlier this month "expressly prohibits normalization of ties with Israel, while upholding support of the Palestinians as state policy":

Early this month, the authority in charge of post-Ben Ali political reform adopted a "republican pact" to form the basis of a new constitution. The completed pact included the provision prohibiting ties with Israel, though some commission members reportedly favor leaving it out. Islamist parties, along with Arab nationalists and extreme leftist factions, are pushing to implement a constitutional provision that would ban normalization of relations with Israel.

Those reports spurred some 600 people to rally in the capital Tunis a week ago, threatening to unseat leaders believed to support normalization with the Jewish state. Tunisia and Israel briefly opened interest sections in each others’ capitals in 1996, but that cooperation ceased in 2000 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

"Death to all Tunisians attempting to normalize relations with Israel," said Ahmed Kahlaoui, who chairs a committee opposing the restoration of diplomatic ties. "We will denounce them and publish their names," he said, the AFP news agency reported, speaking at a meeting attended by hundreds of people, some waving anti-Israeli banners. Participants performed songs, dances and poems, and Tunisians veterans who took part in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war gave testimonies, AFP reported.

I don’t think it’s very likely that such a measure will end up in the final Tunisian constitution, but it’s still an important indicator of how the Israel-Palestine issue often functions in Arab politics, as a way for politicians to demonstrate their nationalist bona fides, and challenge opponents on theirs. Similar to the way that the issue functions here in the U.S., except in the other direction.

Some observers of the Arab uprisings seemed to think that a more democratic Middle East would result in the Israeli-Palestinian issue becoming less prominent. I thought that was wrong, and this latest story is more evidence for that. As polls continue to show, Arab publics continue to be deeply concerned over the issue. As we see these systems inch toward greater democratic accountability, we should expect to see that reflected more in their political debates, sometimes in ugly ways, as above.

Via InsideIran, Iran’s opposition Green Movement has issued a manifesto outlining their goals. Key among these is "the complete subordination of all government and state posts to direct popular sovereignty," and "an end to the abuse of religion by political opportunists and the supporters of despotism and authoritarianism to achieve and protect their political and economic interests." This is effectively represents a call for the disestablishment of the velayet-faqih ("rule of the clerics," the system established by Ayatollah Khomeni). While the manifesto rejects the idea that the current system is reformable, it does not appear to call for the disestablishment of the Islamic Republic.

The Green Movement, the authors write, "consists of a myriad of peoples who, together, represent the cultural, ethnic, religious, and social fabric of our diverse society, and they are deeply concerned about the fate of their beloved country and religion."

The principles that unite all Greens are the goals of rule of law, respect for human rights, and the supremacy of popular sovereignty over all state and government institutions, including the post of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. Thus, we reject the suggestion of the former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, that we Greens and the supporters of Khamenei (in other words, the supporters of despotism) apologize to each other and go forward from there. Such a suggestion is irresponsible and ignores not only the coup d’etat of 2009, but also the massive violence used against our society by Khamenei and his system that resulted in, among other things, the murder and rape of our youth. We believe that Khatami’s suggestions in this regard are dangerous and threaten splits in the Green Movement and, if accepted, will result in a loss of our social capital. Khatami’s discourse of reform is over, since Khamenei and those behind him have shown that they are unwilling to take this course and will resort to murder and mass suppression in order to ensure their political and economic interests.

In an accompanying piece, one Green Movement activist, writing anonymously, observes how the movement has been inspired by the events of the Arab Spring:

The unfolding drama in the Arab world that has already brought down despots in Tunisia and Egypt has been watched closely here in Iran—and with a degree of amazement and envy on our part. We Green activists, along with the daily growing number of ‘regular’ people disgusted with the religious despotism of Ayatollah Khamenei and with the daily deteriorating economic situation, are asking: ‘How do I differ from these Arabs? Why has our own Green Movement, which back in 2009 shook the authoritarian and corrupt pillars of Khamenei’s Islamic government, failed to achieve the popular goals of democracy and seemingly fizzled out?’

The author calls upon Green Movement activists outside Iran "to put aside its endless discussions, personality issues, perhaps egos, and certainly fears and begin to address in a serious manner (and quickly) the issues we Greens inside the country have included in this manifesto."

Notably, the author also "reject[s] inclusion on any level of the MKO [Mujahideen-e Khalq] and the National Council of Resistance of Iran [NCRI] in our genuinely popular and indigenous movement which enjoys a large social base, unlike this group."

The MKO and its umbrella group, the NCRI, spend enormous amounts of money to present themselves here in Washington and other Western capitals as "Iran’s democratic government-in-exile," and they’ve unfortunately managed to fool quite a few American politicians into treating them as such. But as this and past statements from Green Movement activists have made clear, any perceived support for the MKO would be disastrous for the cause of Iranian democracy.

Iraq war dead-ender Fouad Ajami pounces on Defense Secretary Panetta’s comments about Al Qaeda and Iraq in order to repeat his "one Arab is as good as another" justification for the Iraq invasion:

Those were Arabs, not Afghans, who struck America on that day, and it had been the proper thing to strike at an Arab “return address,” because the American strike against the Taliban did not suffice. Panetta, in an unguarded moment, gave voice to a fundamental truth about the U.S. expedition into Iraq. [...]

Our country made its way to Iraq some 18 months after 9/11 because the menace against America in that time of peril had come from Arab lands. It was Arab financiers who made it possible for the plotters and the death pilots to do their grim work. It was Arab religious preachers, with the prestige of the Arabic language, the language of the Islamic revelation, who were sowing the winds of anti-Americanism and “weaponizing” the faith itself. And it was sly Arab governments winking at the forces of terror and enabling it while posing as America’s clients and allies. We had to get the attention of the Arabs, strike against Arab targets, take on the pathologies of that world.

So, because the people who attacked us on 9/11 were Arabs, the U.S. needed to kill some Arabs in response. No matter how many times Ajami writes this, it never gets less racist. (It’s worth noting the similarity here to Osama bin Laden’s support for killing Americans, any old Americans, for the alleged sins of the American government. In both cases, what’s important is to send a message.)

Ajami goes on to once again scold critics of the war for failing to recognize its benefits, such as they are. For my part, I’ve noted repeatedly the importance of Iraq being the first Arab state where Islamists have been given an opportunity to govern, and the possible lessons that might be drawn from this in regard to Islamists’ political participation in other countries in the region.

At the same time, like so many of the war’s most vigorous cheerleaders, Ajami himself has never shown any real interest in grappling with the war’s costs, which far outweigh its benefits. Should he ever decide to do so, he can start with our May 2010 report.

Proposing to "fact check" the statements of Mitt Romney (Obama sees Israel "as a problem and not an ally") and Tim Pawlenty (Obama is "clearly determined to undermine our longtime friend and ally," Israel), the Washington Post’s Glenn Kessler concludes that it’s a matter of interpretation:

Romney’s and Pawlenty’s remarks depend much more on how one interprets Obama’s actions. We have not found any on-the-record words in which the president says Israel is the problem or that he views Israel with suspicion or distrust. But diplomacy is more than just words, but also actions. Certainly, the administration has allowed that impression to form, especially on the right.

Whether or not such impressions are the fault of the administration itself, or of an intensive effort by the administration’s critics to create them, shouldn’t it be the job of journalists, especially ones with columns called "The Fact Checker," to compare those impressions to the totality of the administration’s actual Israel policy?

I did this in February:

President Obama has significantly expanded trade between Israel and the U.S., and played an extremely important behind-the-scenes role in bringing about Israel’s acceptance into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a long sought-after Israeli goal. In September, Obama went before the United Nations General Assembly and challenged the international community to support Arab-Israeli peace, declaring that "Israel’s existence must not be a subject for debate." He also assured the world that "efforts to chip away at Israel’s legitimacy will only be met by the unshakable opposition of the United States." In comments made to The Progress Report in August, Josh Block of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee remarked, "Clearly the Obama administration remains deeply committed to the U.S.-Israel alliance."

In terms of Israel’s security, the Wall Street Journal reported that "U.S. military aid to Israel increased markedly" in 2010, an effort that stems from policy directives the White House gave the Pentagon early in Obama’s presidency to "deepen and expand the quantity and intensity of cooperation to the fullest extent." Speaking at the Brookings Institution in July, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro described in detail how the Obama administration is "preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge through an unprecedented increase in U.S. security assistance, stepped up security consultations, support for Israel’s new Iron Dome defensive system, and other initiatives." President Obama raised the amount of U.S. military aid to Israel, making it the single largest expense in the 2010 foreign aid budget. He also authorized $205 million to enable Israel to complete the Iron Dome. Obama has significantly increased the level of strategic dialogue and the depth of intelligence coordination between the U.S. and Israel, particularly regarding Iran, a key Israeli security concern. According to one Israeli official, that coordination is now "even better than under President Bush."

All of these efforts by the administration merit a single sentence in Kessler’s column, where he writes that, "despite the diplomatic differences with the Israeli government, Obama has also greatly strengthened security and military ties with the Jewish state and defended Israel repeatedly at the United Nations." For some reason, however, Kessler doesn’t allow this massive outlay of U.S. energy and diplomatic capital on Israel’s behalf to affect his final non-decision. He just acknowledges that the issue is controversial and declares the jury (of one) deadlocked.

In other words, it seems like Kessler chickened out.

The New York Times reports that angry crowds in Syria have attacked the U.S. embassy in Damascus, apparently in response to U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford’s visit last week to the city of Hama, which was seen as a gesture of support for Syrians protesting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Former Bush administration official Elliott Abrams suggests that the Obama administration has "two options" in regard to Ambassador Ford:

The first is to recall him, citing this attack on the embassy plus previous Syrian misconduct. The second is to send him back to Hama and to ratchet up his public displays of disgust with the regime and its behavior. If he does not take those steps, there is no point in his remaining in Syria. If he does take them, either he will become a symbol of resistance to tyranny (always a great role for any American envoy) or he will be expelled from Syria. The latter would dramatize America’s final break with Assad and allow us to expel the Syrian ambassador, the wretched Imad Mustapha. Either way we win.

Leaving aside Abrams strange desire to impose an American "symbol" into what is, and should be, a Syrian affair, let’s note that Ford is only there to make such a point because the Obama administration ignored Abrams’ earlier advice to recall him:

The Obama administration erred badly by sending an envoy — in a recess appointment — for this move was understood in the region as a reduction of U.S. pressure on Syria despite its increasingly dominant role in Lebanon. We should pull our ambassador, as we did in Libya, and unveil a hard-hitting political and human rights campaign against a bloody regime whose people want it gone.

The time may come to recall Ambassador Ford, but his visit to Hama sent a subtle but unmistakable message of solidarity to the protesters, and a warning to the Assad regime. It was an appropriate use of an important diplomatic tool.

Abrams, on the other hand, seems to know only one tool: the bullhorn. The Assad regime would love nothing more than to turn its current crisis from a Syria issue into a U.S.-Syria issue. It’s odd how anxious Abrams seems to be to help Assad do just that.

Back in January, when the demonstrations in Egypt really began to pick up steam, I wrote in the American Prospect that the Obama administration needed to recognize that Islamist parties would play a role in the new Egypt, and begin to adjust its policy accordingly.

Speaking to reporters yesterday, Secretary of State Clinton indicated that the U.S. would be opening limited contacts with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda.

As I note today, while some of the positions and belief of these groups are problematic for the U.S., this is still the right move:

While the United States must support principles of human rights and dignity as we continue to work with Egypt and Tunisia, we simply should not be in the business of picking winners in the new Middle East. It is folly to imagine that we can. The focus of U.S. policy should be on assisting the process of economic and political reform to provide the foundation for strong, accountable, and transparent institutions—not on selecting the people who should run them.

Any genuine commitment to the development of legitimate, representative governments in the Middle East necessarily involves recognizing that such governments will often include leaders and parties critical of, and sometimes even hostile to, the United States.

But if we’re serious about democracy, there’s really no other option. Secretary Clinton’s comments were a step in that direction.

Read the rest.

While Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty said that he’d rather not have his foreign policy views associated with neoconservative Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, his speech on the Middle East yesterday clearly showed that he’s trying to carve out a neoconservative space for himself in the GOP primary field populated largely by non-interventionists.

Which is a way of saying that the speech contained a lot of high-flown language about freedom larded over a fairly simplistic analysis of regional trends, with a big dollop of contempt for "engagement."

Pawlenty arranged countries in the region into four categories: Those that are moving toward democracy (Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq), entrenched monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan), anti-U.S. regimes (Syria and Iran), and Israel.

Here’s Pawlenty’s take on Syria:

The fall of the Assad mafia in Damascus would weaken Hamas, which is headquartered there. It would weaken Hezbollah, which gets its arms from Iran, through Syria. And it would weaken the Iranian regime itself.

To take advantage of this moment, we should press every diplomatic and economic channel to bring the Assad reign of terror to an end. We need more forceful sanctions to persuade Syria’s Sunni business elite that Assad is too expensive to keep backing.We need to work with Turkey and the Arab nations and the Europeans, to further isolate the regime. And we need to encourage opponents of the regime by making our own position very clear, right now: Bashar al-Assad must go.

When he does, the mullahs of Iran will find themselves isolated and vulnerable. Syria is Iran’s only Arab ally. If we peel that away, I believe it will hasten the fall of the mullahs. And that is the ultimate goal we must pursue. It’s the singular opportunity offered to the world by the brave men and women of the Arab Spring.

The ultimate goal of the Arab Spring is to help the U.S. defeat Iran? Something tells me that Arabs won’t be falling over themselves to sign up.

It’s good that Pawlenty recognizes that the only way to achieve a positive outcome in Syria is to "work with Turkey and the Arab nations and the Europeans." Do you know what another word is for "working with other countries to achieve common interests"? Engagement. Interestingly, this is the only place in the speech where Pawlenty mentioned Turkey, a pretty startling oversight given Turkey’s significantly increased role in regional affairs, and the extent to which many see Turkey as a model Muslim democracy.

As for the idea that a weakened Assad regime would weaken Hamas, this is quite true, and has in fact already happened. As I noted when news of the Hamas-Fatah unity deal broke, one of the factors behind Hamas’ shift was the ongoing popular uprisings against their Syrian sponsor. But who has Hamas turned to instead? Egypt. This is a good thing, as I think it’s clear that a Hamas closer to Egypt is a Hamas farther from Iran, but it’s also important to note that, just as with Turkey, it’s precisely because Egypt is moving toward greater democratic accountability that it’s playing a more conciliatory role with Hamas. This understanding was, of course, nowhere to be found in Pawlenty’s analysis.

Given that Pawlenty thinks the major focus of U.S. policy in the Middle East should be the unseating of the Iranian regime, it’s unsurprising that his contempt for President Obama’s engagement policy was most pronounced in regard to the Islamic Republic. Pawlenty trotted out the tired, nonsensical argument that, if only Obama had spoken out more vigorously in June 2009, the Green Movement could have toppled the government. I’d note that I’ve never heard this theory expressed by an actual Iranian — Shirin Ebadi even seemed a bit offended when I raised the question with her last year, insisting that “The Green movement is the Iranian peoples’ movement,” and not the instrument of outside powers — yet it seems to have hardened into a tenet of neoconservative faith.

While the engagement policy obviously hasn’t achieved an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program that was its top goal, it’s important to recognize that Obama’s approach, both in terms of negotiations with the Iranian regime and in its greater involvement at the United Nations and with other international partners, has left Iran more isolated internationally, and under pressure domestically, than when Obama came into office, when Iran was at a peak of regional influence, thanks largely to America’s "showing strength" by invading Iraq. But recognizing this would require acknowledging that there’s much more to pursuing America’s security interests than speaking loudly and shaking a big stick, and Pawlenty just doesn’t seem interested.