Jan 1999
Shumpei Kumon
Introduction: Proposals from the Long-Wave Perspective
Something has gone wrong for Japan during the 1990s. It seems as though Japan has contracted a serious illness. Is it possible that Japanese society has lost all self-administrative capability, both politically and economically? Not only does it seem unlikely that Japan will be able to recover soon from this recession, which it has been experiencing ever since the burst of the bubble economy, but it appears as though the recession is getting even worse. According to Seiichiro Saito, Japan has entered its last phase of a ten-year asset deflationary period that began with the 1991 recession (Ten Years of Deflation, Nihon Keizai Shinbun Publishing Co., 1998.) Yasuo Takeuchi claims that Japan's glory days were supported by the combination of "Kasumigaseki feudalism" and "Kaisha socialism," essentially "Japanese style socialism." This system, he claims, is now decaying and sinking (The End of "Japan," Nihon Keizai Shinbun Publishing Co., 1998). Kimindo Kusaka predicts that Japan's GDP will be halved in the process, also implying that Japan's key industries (e.g., automobiles and electronics), banks, general contractors, construction, agricultural cooperatives and farmers will disappear, forcing every Japanese citizen into a common low economic class (The Devil's Prophecy, Kodansha, 1997). In addition, several high placed U.S. government officials have been quoted as claiming that what Japan needs now is not reform but a "revolution" (Bungei Shunju, July 1998). Only two or three years ago such eccentric statements would have been passed over with little more than a chuckle. However, today many individuals are beginning to realize the inherent possibility of these scenarios. If we look back we will discover that Japan began to falter during the 1970s at the time of the first oil shock. At that time, Japan was thought to have experienced an end to its period of rapid economic growth. However, Japan desperately managed to live through rampant inflation, streamlined its management, learned to emphasize efficient resource utilization and overcame two oil shocks. As a consequence, while the United States continued along a path of decline, it appeared as though Japan had achieved the status of an economic superpowe. However, in hindsight it appears as though while attempting to overcome these crises Japan pushed the wrong buttons. Japan chose to boost its strengths, which existed exclusively in raising the productivity of manufactured goods as well as energy efficiency, all the while worrying about the emergence of social insecurity and preserving an economy plagued by a high-cost structure in which low productivity sectors relied on high productivity sectors. With the oil crisis now history, Japan in the 1980s began to gloat as it enjoyed unprecedented prosperity: the arrival of the new media boom and the bubble economy triggered off by a rapid rise in the strength of the Yen. Despite the optimism, most investment during this period was poured into real estate and the new media boom ended in the mid-1980s as nothing more than a fad. Actually, Japan was left far behind in making the investments and economic reforms necessary to lead the world in the information revolution, which had been born of the financial sector of the world economy. Of course, it was impossible for the bubble economy to last forever, and when it eventually burst in the 1990s the lack of effective recovery measures only served to prolong the recession. Japan's experience contrasts with that of the United States, which was able to recover from its recession relatively quickly and to make the necessary investments in information technology. This led to economic recovery and long-term development.These observations suggest that since the 1970s Japan has lost focus and has entered into a long-term state of confusion. Although the point at which there will be an upswing is still unclear, it seems likely that the situation will increasingly deteriorate for some time. However, if we examine the historical record an interesting and important pattern becomes clear. We propose that the downswing that began in the 1970s is part of a larger biorhythmic feature of Japanese society characterized by sixty-year long-wave cycles of up swings and downswings, what we refer to here as the Long-Wave of Modern Japan. In what follows, after summarizing some long-wave trends in Japanese history we describe (1) the structure of these cycles, (2) the dynamics associated with the cycles, (3) Japan's national goals during each cycle, and (4) implications of the long-wave theory.
General Long-Wave Trends In Japan
The thirty years of Bakumatsu (since the arrival of the Black Ship) and the mid-Meiji era were years when Japanese society experienced a long-term lull in its biorhythm and entered a downswing. Until then, Japan had been satisfied with its limited trading partners Holland and China. However, with the arrival of the Black Ship on Japanese soil representing the strength of America and emerging European powers, an alarmed Japan was torn between a policy of Kaikoku, opening borders allowing the landing of foreigners, and Johi, excluding foreigners. Eventually the Tokugawa government collapsed and was replaced by a revolutionary government, whose initial success was only limited because of its myopic structural reforms and internal power struggles. The new government had to make major efforts to cope with the revolts led by the disillusioned Samurai, culminating in the (1877) Seinan War on one hand, and with movements requesting political freedom and civil rights on the other hand. However, Japan experienced thirty years of prosperity when it replaced the ancient bureaucratic system of the Ritsuryo period that had been restored under the new government and instituted a modern cabinet and parliamentary system during the latter part of the Meiji era (mid-1880s). This prosperity extended until the beginning of World War I. There followed a downswing. The thirty years between World War I and the end of World War II were years perhaps best described by the late Naohiro Amaya, a former top MITI official, as a period in which Japan headed toward "the swamp at the bottom of the hill" (The Clouds Floating Above The Hill And The Swamp At The Bottom Of The Hill, Tsusho Sangyo Chosakai, 1985). These analogies seem to poignantly describe the period, during which Japan sank into a long-term state of confusion. The result was that Japan annulled its alliance with the U.K. and embarked on a collision course with the United States, which had emerged as the new hegemonic power trying to advance into Asia. Japan not only foolishly continued on its suicidal mission of expanding the frontline in its battles with mainland China, which resisted formidably, but also plunged head first without much confidence of victory into the Great East Asian War, drawing other Asian countries into the devastation. In the end, Japan was thoroughly defeated. During this period Japan also failed to commit fully to the revolution in heavy-chemical industries (the Second Industrial Revolution), and therefore was unable to enjoy the benefits of the new industrial age. Instead, Japan directed most of its efforts in the area of industrial technologies toward the military, but its chievements in this sphere remained only partial. Despite the fact that Japan was able to develop world class war ships and fighter planes, it was unable to develop quality tanks or automatic guns. This weakness was evident in Japan's utter defeat in its battles with the Soviet Union in 1938 and 1939. In addition, Japan failed miserably to develop and mass-produce durable consumer goods, particularly passenger cars, geared towards the domestic market. However, during the thirty years following the end of World War II (1945-1975), Japan managed to implement major reforms and rebuilding initiatives that, prompted by its catch-up style of rapid economic development, allowed Japan to secure a middle class living standard for most of its hundred million citizens and eventually rewarded Japan with the status of economic superpower. Those thirty years represent an upswing period of great energy and development. After a series of trials and errors the Meiji Restoration finally placed Japan on a path towards national prosperity and military strength, transforming Japan into one of the most powerful nations in the world. At that time, as the late Ryoutaro Shiba put it, Japan was aiming for the "clouds floating above the hill" (Saka No Ue No Kumo, Bungei Shunju 1969), and was attempting to reach those clouds by running up the hill of all-out westernization/modernization. Incredibly, Japan reached this level of success and became the only developed non-western country. Japan was gifted with great fortune and was marching along the long-term path of great prosperity. It was clearly experiencing an upswing. Thus, Japanese society since the last days of the Tokugawa government has experienced cycles of thirty years of confusion and downswing followed by thirty years of development and upswing. This suggests that Japan has been experiencing a sixty-year long-wave cycle. The reason why Japan's development has been characterized by this sixty-year long-wave cycle is unclear. It is difficult to determine whether this cycle relates to the fate of Japanese society, a kind of environmental factor, or to its evolutionary rhythm, a kind of endogenous factor. We believe that there is some truth to all of these factors. However, let us assume that a sixty-year cycle is most representative of the fundamental nature of social change in Japanese society. Figure 1 depicts an overall image of this long-wave cycle as it re-occurs three times since 1855. As can be seen in this diagram, this wave is similar in shape to a sine curve.
Of course, it is impossible for any wave of social change to occur precisely at some fixed-year interval. Societies do not operate like physical entities such as the solar system, atoms or man-made clocks. Societies also are not like biological systems, which operate on their own endogenous day/year cycles. Rather, societies are complex systems within which multiple autonomous subjects behave according to individual will and interact in a complex manner. In this sense, societies belong to a unique class of systems that may best be called social systems. As such, even if it were possible to perceive a cyclical pattern of social change at the macro-level, it is impossible for this designated time period to be followed precisely. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the various macro-level changes in any given society would all occur cyclically. For example, Japan's population has continued to rise since the end of the Tokugawa era. However, there also exist fluctuations in the levels of population growth per annum. In the long-term, it also is likely that the Japanese population will reach a turning point after which the total population will begin to decrease. Thus, it is impossible to consider a variable such as population or percentage of population increase in terms of cyclical change, let alone try to examine these changes in light of a sixty-year pattern. For the purposes of this essay, however, we will start with assuming the existence of a long wave that repeats downswings and upswings with an overall cycle of sixty years. This, we further assume, provides a general framework for a series of basic social changes from the above-mentioned fate of societies to the changes in shapes of the political and economic systems that will be discussed later. Utilizing this framework as a guide, we will attempt to discover where society stands today and what conditions can be predicted in the future. In light of this, it will be possible for Japan to develop strategies and policies able to deal effectively with future trends. The following describes the general framework used throughout this essay. The First Stage: (1855-1915) The age of internationalization under British hegemony. The First Downswing: (1855-1885): Social upheavals during the end of the Tokugawa government and the Meiji Restoration. The First Upswing: (1885-1915): Military and economic development during the latter part of Meiji Period. The Second Stage: (1915-1975) The age of world-marketization under U.S. hegemony. The Second Downswing (1915-1945): Confusion during the Taisho and mid-Showa period.
The Second Upswing (1945-1975): Period of rapid economic growth during the post World War II years. The Third Stage: (1975-2035?): The age of globalization under U.S. leadership.
The Third Downswing (1975-2005?): Confusion between the end of the Showa period and the Heisei period.
The Third Upswing (2005-2035?): The period during which informatization clearly advances?
Based on this framework, we propose that Japan currently is experiencing its third social transformation since Bakumatsu, and is in its initial downswing phase. It appears as though this downswing will continue for a while, but not indefinitely. Eventually, most likely around the year 2005, Japan will begin to experience new momentum and begin an upswing. Notice that our long-wave model begins with a downswing stage. However, the stage at which one begins to examine this wave is rather arbitrary. It is possible to begin analysis at the downswing stage, the beginning of an upswing or even at the mid-way point in the downswing or upswing stages, depending on what causal relations one chooses for the wave. It also is possible to change the starting point of the long-wave according to the kind of social change being examined. As will be demonstrated later, when examining Japanese institutional systems such as economic and legal systems through a long-wave framework, we feel that it is most appropriate to begin our analysis from the point at which the long-wave enters into its upswing (essentially the bottom of the wave). It is often the case that as these systems near the end of their life spans, several patchwork initiatives attempting to prolong the longevity of the system are undertaken. However, ultimately the wave enters its downswing and the supporting economic and legal structures eventually lose force and collapse. For this reason, when analyzing Japan's political system it seems most appropriate to begin analysis at the wave's midpoint. However, if one wants to examine social changes as a whole, it seems most appropriate to start from the peak of the long-wave, taking the perspective that it is some abrupt changes in environmental conditions, both internal and external, that drives the system in question into its new cycle. It is important to recognize that we do not adhere to the assumption that a long-wave cycle should be fixed at sixty years. Rather, it may be quite appropriate to posit a series of roughly ninety-year long waves occurring in succession with, for example, thirty-year overlaps. Although our immediate interest is to examine the individual cycles of Japan's long-wave in its details, another point of interest lies in seeing if some interrelationship exists between Japan's long-wave cycle and those of other countries and the world at large. First, it would be of interest to document how similar to Japan's long-wave are the long-wave cycles of those states that led the world in the age of modernization and those states that are predicted to lead the world in the future. For example, according to research compiled by father and son historians Arthur Meier Schlesinger and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the United States has a thirty-year political cycle. This observation could be examined in greater detail. It also may be possible to posit long-wave cycles for countries such as the U.K., Holland, Russia and China.
Second, although a country level analysis is important, it also would be valuable to determine to what extent the long-wave analyses would be relevant with respect to the world as a whole. For example, the Kondratieff cycle theory analyzes global economic trends through a fifty (40-60) year long-wave. Yasusuke Murakami managed to combine two Kondratieff waves to explain the one hundred-year cycle of innovation in industrial technology (fifty years of breakthrough and fifty years of maturation). Shumpei Kumon, a contributor in this collaborative research, took a closely related view in his 1978 book, in which he proposed a one hundred-year cycle theory of industrialization. At the Davos World Economic Forum it was agreed that the global economy has been on an upswing (an expansion period of the Kondratieff cycle) since 1990. In the area of international politics, there is Modelski's evolutionary theory of world politics, which studies the long-term structural transformations of world politics and explains them in one hundred-year cycles. Other fifty-year long-wave cycles include those relating to global wars, alliances, nation-state systems, global leadership, and international organizations. Third, if we assume that world polities or economies operate on a fifty or one hundred-year transformation cycle, what relation does this have to Japan's sixty-year cycle (or any other country's cycle)? Perhaps Japan since Bakumatsu has experienced in a sixty-year cycle the global social changes that usually take place in a longer one-hundred-year cycle. If so, there may occur some differences in cycle topologies between a society following a sixty-year cycle and other societies (or the world) following 100-50 year cycles. For example, during its first period of modernization, Japan's cycle may have been synchronized with the world cycle. However, during its second period Japan's cycle phase could have been ten to fifteen years behind the world cycle, which allowed Japan to take advantage of late-comer's status and to achieve a catch-up type development modeled after other developed countries. However, as Japan emerged as a world leader during its third period, the lag between Japan's cycle and that of the world was so great that they crossed over, completely out of sync. When the world was entering an upswing, Japan was beginning its downswing. Conversely, when Japan begins its upswing in 2005, the world may already be dipping into its downswing. This is a situation that modern Japan has never experienced in the past. In fact, this kind of lag may be one of the reasons why today Japan is experiencing such a severe sense of choke. It also is likely that Japan's next upswing will be considerably different from its two previous upswings.
Section 1: A Perspective on the Past:Several Facets of the Sixty-Year Long-Wave
Let us begin by examining the fundamental characteristics of modern Japan's long-wave cycle as described in Figure 1. We interpret the sixty-year cycle to begin with a thirty-year downswing phase that eventually transforms into a thirty-year upswing. Because it is not reasonable to assume that a given society would completely change at a particular point in time or during a very short period of time, imagine that transformation occurs over a period of about ten years, five years before and after a downswing (or until an upswing reaches its turning point). Let us refer to these ten years during which society shifts from an upswing to a downswing as the pinnacle of upswing, and the ten years during which social downswing transforms into an upswing as the trough of downswing. During modern Japanese history, Japan has experienced the pinnacle of upswing three times: during the 1850s, 1910s, and the 1970s. Japan has experienced the trough of downswing twice, during the 1880s and the 1940s. Japan is likely to experience its third trough of downswing sometime near the year 2000. Such a perspective enables us to interpret historical implications of the upswing and the downswing phases in each sixty-year period in relation to the troughs of downswing and the pinnacles of upswing that precede those phases. We hypothesize that the drastic changes in environmental conditions experienced during the period characterized as the pinnacle of upswing causes the long-wave pattern that follows it to emerge. Societies require a considerable amount of time before being able to understand and react to changes in environmental conditions. Even more time is necessary for societies to discuss, agree upon and implement effective corrective measures to cope with these changes in environmental conditions. In some cases it is necessary for societies to experience major failures and face bitter realities before serious initiatives for reform can take root.We conclude that a society requires approximately one generation, or thirty years, to establish effective counter-measures and new institutions at the trough of downswing to cope with abrupt changes in the prevailing environmental conditions at the pinnacle of upswing.
To clarify, consider the biorhythms of various species, particularly the transition periods during which the biological process either dips below average or jumps above average. Thus, when examining social systems it may be beneficial for us to focus on similar transition periods. Here we have taken two ten-year periods around the zero level points of a sine wave, referring to these periods as ten years of submergence and ten years of emergence. We contend that these ten-year periods characterize most accurately those trends apparent in the ages of downswing and upswing, whether they are about the subjective sense of the times or about the ways of existing institutional setting. For example, during the initial ten years of submergence of the first downswing stage (1865-75), the Tokugawa government (Bakufu) collapsed in the midst of great political and economic turbulence. Similarly, Japanese society experienced great recessionary periods during the ten years of submergence in both the second downswing (1925-35) and the third downswing stage (1985-95). In contrast, the ten years of emergence of the first upswing stage (1895-1905) were years when Japan staked its future destiny on both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars and emerged victorious. As a result, Japan experienced great military growth and industrial development during this period.
In addition, the years between 1955-1965-the ten years of emergence of the second upswing stage-were years of prosperity and wealth because this period corresponded to that of rapid economic growth following the end of World War II. Another important fact is that during the ten years of submergence and the ten years of emergence major political changes occurred. For example, in 1866 a coalition was formed between the Satsuma and Choshu clans. In 1955, Japan's polity experienced emergence of the so-called "1955 system," giving rise to long-term political stability maintained by tacit collaboration between the Liberal Democratic Party, which gained two-thirds of the seats, and the Socialist Party, which gained one-third of electoral seats. It is important that the reader be aware of these historical dates during which Japan experienced significant changes in its political system. This all occurred during two periods, the ten years of submergence and the ten years of emergence.Similar ten-year classification schemes can be applied to the history of institution building and destruction. For example, as is shown in Figure 3, the ten years shown as a ten-year trough is a period of new institution building. These newly built institutions are then strengthened and improved by further reforms implemented during the ten years of emergence. However, this same system begins to experience difficulty during its ten-year peak and, despite various temporary reform measures attempted during the following ten years of submergence, the downswing cannot be prevented. Thus, as society enters into the ten-year trough, it begins to face the misfortune of total collapse of the old institutional setup. We might also analyze the long-wave from a thirty-year above water and a thirty-year below water perspective. That is, two fifteen-year periods at the pinnacle of upswing or the trough of downswing that separate the upper half of the wave from the lower half. The upper thirty-year half of the wave is a period characterized by relative strength and prosperity. In contrast, the thirty years below water are characterized by relative weakness, a lack of vitality and poverty. If the difference between a general upswing and a downswing phase in the long-wave reflects the difference in the force of social change perceived more subjectively, then the difference between the upper and lower halves of thewave will be ascribed to the difference in the levels of accomplished results observed more objectively, or the concomitant degree of people's trust in the prevailing system. During a society's thirty years above water, it is likely that many would erroneously assume that the pace of development would continue indefinitely. For example, it is quite likely that even after a society passed its pinnacle of upswing stage and entered a downswing, many would continue to believe wishfully in the strength and stability of the existing regime. In contrast, during the thirty-year under water stage, as society continues to experience stagnation and obstructed growth, many will feel hopeless and arrive at the conclusion, again erroneously, that there will be no end to the crisis. Furthermore, despite the fact that society may actually have entered an upswing, many will refuse to believe in the longevity and intensity of this upswing. This was observed during the late 1950s when, despite the fact that Japan had already set out on the path of rapid economic growth, most economists continued to describe Japan's economic situation as a "boisterous dance on thin ice." The reality in Japan today is that most Japanese have lost faith in the Japanese style of management and continue to hold a negative and reluctant view of the rapidly emerging information-communication revolution. Finally, if we combine all of these approaches in an attempt fully to analyze the sixty-year cycle, it may be most appropriate to take a fifteen-year perspective. This involves dividing the long-wave cycle into four fifteen-year periods. The two fifteen-year periods that make up the thirty-year downswing stage are:
The age of exploration (or the age of culture).
The age of confusion (or the age of conflict).
The two fifteen-year periods that make up the thirty- year upswing stage are:
The age of reform (or the age of politics).
The age of development (or the age of economics and/or military growth).
These four periods correspond to our hypotheses concerning the basic structure of the sixty-year long-wave cycle as depicted in Figure 3 above. Table 1 and Figure 4 below summarize these relationships. Table 1: Framework for Modern Japan's Long-WaveFate of the TimesThirty years of downswingThirty years of upswing The system's life-spanThirty years of deterioration and collapse (Thirty years of exploration for a new system)Thirty years of building and strengthening the system
Confidence in the regimeThirty years above waterThirty years under waterThirty years above water
Fifteen-year cycleThe age of explorationThe age of confusionThe age of reformThe age of development
First stage:
1855-19151855-18701870-851885-001900-15
Second stage:
1915-19751915-301930-451945-601960-75
Third stage:
1975-20351975-901990-052005-202020-35
Let us now examine various points and periods throughout modern Japanese history from the perspectives outlined above. In this way it will be possible to determine the significance and implications of the events that took place during the sixty-year cycle. It also will be possible to identify at exactly what stage in the cycle certain events took place. For example, we will be able to determine whether the event occurred during a downswing or an upswing, at the pinnacle of upswing or in the trough of downswing. Whether the event happened above the surface (upper half of the wave) or below the surface (the lower half of the wave), or whether during the transitionary period between submergence and emergence. It is also possible that the event would be most accurately described by utilizing either the four ten or fifteen-year period approaches. By employing these approaches it will be possible to identify the specific characteristics of that time and even predict characteristic patterns that we can expect in the future.
One other important consideration is that both the fifteen-year, four-stage analytic scheme (exploration, confusion, reform, development) that describes the inherently repetitious nature and characteristics of each period and the ten-year, four-stage analysis scheme (peak, submergence, trough and emergence) representing another repetitive sequence are complementary in nature. They make it possible to collectively analyze the dominant characteristics of each period in the long-wave cycle. These four phase analysis schemes are particularly useful when translating Japanese years into Christian years during the Showa period, because there was only a five-year lag time between the last two digits of the two calendar-year systems.[Endnote 1] For example, the second ten-year trough occurred during the 1940s (between Showa 15 and Showa 25) and the ten years of emergence from 1955 to 1965 took place during the Showa 30s period. Furthermore, the 1960s marked the first ten years of the fifteen-year age of development and the 1970s consequently coincided with the ten-year peak. Unfortunately, this relatively simple translation scheme ended with the Showa period, as Japan entered the new Heisei period in 1989. Of course,each sixty-year cycle is unique historically, as is each period included in the sixty-year cycle (thirty-year, fifteen-year or ten-year periods). While history possesses common and universal characteristics, it is also replete with unique and diverse phenomena that never will be repeated. These unique and diverse historical incidents that occur throughout the sixty-year cycle are discussed later. A caveat. We do not intend to suggest that our long-wave theory is universal in the sense that it will as a rule repeat itself everywhere and according to the exact dates and cycles we posit. For example, states that are heavily influenced by relations with other states may not develop an indigenous long-wave cycle. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that major environmental changes will occur regularly. Even assuming that a social rhythm depicting a downswing and upswing is maintained, the cyclical pattern of the long-wave could change or be replaced by a completely new long-wave cycle, depending on the frequency and the degree of environmental change. At the same time, the absence of major environmental change may make an endogenous long-wave cycle decline and disappear eventually. Another possible scenario is one in which society experiences traumatic environmental transformation, causing it to plunge directly into social collapse rather than leading to a downswing. Finally, as a result of the overly extreme efforts to cope with the immense environmental pressure, a newly constructed system might entirely explode. Put differently, the fact that history documents that a certain long-wave pattern exists with a specified time frame does not guarantee that this same rhythm will be maintained in the future. Past long-wave sequences merely express the likely pattern of events that possess the highest probability of occurrence in the near future. It even is possible for those individuals who develop an understanding of the long-wave rhythm to change the rhythmic pattern of the long-wave itself, providing they are able to arrive at a consensus as to the direction in which they want to take society. For example, it may be possible for these individuals to propel society out of a downswing and into an early upswing. However, note that the pattern of a long-wave reflects the overall social atmosphere or fate, and thus cannot be persuaded to change its over-all behavior by the mere consciousness and actions of a few individuals. Rather, society could slip into further decline should society fail to reach a consensus as to possible recovery measures and their institutionalization. This despite the fact that the long-wave pattern demonstrated a propensity toward a possible upswing. However, the existence of a long-wave suggests that most societies are equipped with the vitality to arise from confusion and stagnation.
Section 2: Long-Wave Dynamics
Let us begin by examining the similarities between each sixty-year long-wave. If we begin our analysis of the sixty-year long-wave with a downswing phase, then our initial study would begin during what we have called the ten-year peak (the final five years of the upswing phase combined with the initial five years of the downswing phase). Our focus here will be on the similar characteristics possessed by each ten-year peak. Put simply, these similar characteristics stem from sudden objective and subjective environmental changes, both domestically and internationally, and a vague but widely shared perception concerning the occurrence of such changes. What took place in the 1850s was extension of American and European military and industrial might to Asia, particularly to Japan, symbolized by the landing of the Black Ship. As a result, Japan was immediately awakened from its age of undisturbed peace. However, it was not easy for Japan to understand the significance of such environmental change and the impact that it might have on Japanese society, nor to develop the proper policy initiatives capable of dealing with such changes at the government level. It also was impossible for Japan to develop a common nation-wide understanding of the problem and arrive at a consensus on the most appropriate measures to be taken in a single day. As a result, between Bakumatsu and the beginning of the Meiji period Japan was dragged into a state of turbulence and confusion. Thus, the main reason why Japan's long-wave entered into its downswing stage during the 1850s was a sudden change in the international environment. If it is not possible to apply the long-wave analysis to the pre-1850 period, then we can perhaps argue that it was this environmental change that actually initiated the first downswing stage of the long-wave cycle as we know it. However, the sixty-year long-wave may have existed also during the Tokugawa period and even prior to that.[Endnote 2] Next, let us examine the ten-year peak of 1910, which gave rise to the second sixty-year cycle. During these ten years, Japan again experienced significant environmental changes. Emerging victorious from the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, Japan was able to sweep away its military threats in North East Asia. Then, after profiting from the results of WWI, Japan blindly followed the example set by Western states as it expanded its presence from the Korean peninsula to Manchuria, marched into Northern China and Siberia and also extended its military efforts as far as the South Pacific Islands. However, in the midst of this expansion, Japan was confronted by a serious and abrupt change in the international system. The first of these changes was Great Britain's annulment of its alliance with Japan. In addition, Japan was forced into a face-off with the newly emerging superpower, the United States, over interests in the Far East. This came as a shock to Japan, which had received financial support from the U.S. and signed a peace treaty mediated by the U.S. during the Russo-Japanese war. As such, Japan's relations with the United States continued in a downward spiral and some, including Kanji Ishihara, began to think that the final World War would be fought between the United States and Japan. Even more significant was the fact that the nature of international relations shifted from an emphasis on imperialism and colonization. Indeed, after experiencing the incredible brutality of WWI, international public opinion favored the outlawing of wars of invasion and colonization. In effect, after WWI the legitimacy of entering into war for purposes of advancement of national prestige and self-glorification was denied.
The third aspect of change rose out of national independence movements aiming to prevent colonialism and dependency relationships. This wave of change can be said to have modeled itself after the American way. Seizing this opportunity, the United States immediately embarked on an attempt to promote and legitimize a new political ideology of equal opportunity, open-door, and respect sovereignty. Once again, Japan was unable to comprehend and deal with such drastic change in the international environment and found itself unable to reach a domestic consensus as to the best means of action. As a consequence, Japan lost all upward momentum and started to shift toward a downswing.[Endnote 3] Japan experienced its third ten-year peak during the 1970s. Here, as was experienced twice before, Japan had trouble understanding, agreeing upon and dealing with changes in the international environment. The IMF-GATT framework, which made Japan's rapid economic development after WWII possible, began to show signs of weakness during the late 1960s. Following the "Nixon Shock" of 1971 (America's departure from the dollar-gold standard), Japan had no choice but to adopt a fluctuating exchange rate system in 1973. The second Nixon shock of 1972 (the normalization of relations with China) represented a break from the previous East-West bipolar system that characterized international relations during the cold war. Further destabilizing the world were the two oil shocks experienced during the 1970s, which made people realize the finiteness of natural resources. However, the most impacting development, which occurred during the 1970s, was that of the microchip. This development was to lead the world towards a revolution in information-communication technology as well as in industrial structure, management forms, and lifestyle. Japan, however, was slow to realize the real impact of this development. As a result, Japan entered its third downswing phase, which continues today. Next let us examine the transition period between the downswing and upswing phases of the long-wave, namely the period we call the ten-year trough (trough of downswing). The most recent ten-year trough experienced by Japan was during the 1940s. The first half of this period was characterized by the development of what Yukio Noguchi termed the "1940 system" (1940 Nen Taisei, Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha, 1995). During the latter half, post war reforms were implemented and the current constitution ( or, the Showa Constitution) was proclaimed. This ten-year trough can be described as ten years of system reform. The rapid economic growth experienced after WWII (during the second upswing stage) was made possible by the legal and institutional changes undertaken by Japan during the 1940s. Therefore we would like to suggest that the second upswing phase experienced by Japan beginning in the 1940s be labeled the 1940s System rather than the 1940 System.[Endnote 4]
With this example, let us look back sixty more years to the 1880s. This was a decade of relative stability as revolts against the new government ceased, a Western style party and monetary systems (with a silver standard) were implemented, and a cabinet and privy council instituted. On top of this the Great Japanese Imperial Constitution (Meiji Constitution), was proclaimed and an Imperial Diet was inaugurated. The very roots of growth experienced prior to WWI by the Great Japanese Empire were supported by legislation and institutions created during these ten years. Here we refer to the newly created system during this decade as the 1880s System.
Today we likely stand at the brink of creating a new constitution (perhaps to be called the Heisei Constitution) as well as a new social and economic system we will refer to as the 2000s System that will propel Japan into the 21st century. Thus, the administrative reforms that are currently being developed and put into place, regardless of whether they are realized or falter, do not signify an end to the reform process. Rather, they could very well represent a kind of preface of the preface to major and fundamental systemic changes for Japan. If so, the systemic reforms attempted during the latter part of the 1990s were just preparation for the construction of the 2000s system. Today, Japan is in the latter part (1990-2005) of its third downswing phase (1975-2005), or the middle of the fifteen years of conflict. Similar to the two previous downswings, Japan's economy has already experienced its most severe state of confusion and the worst recessionary period of the downswing phase. In the two previous downswings Japan endured a revolution with civil wars and was completely defeated and occupied in wars with other states. What will be the historically catastrophic event that Japan in its third downswing phase will have to face in the near future? The likelihood of Japan either waging war or being invaded by an outside state seems considerably low. Perhaps a revolution? During the second downswing phase, some military and bureaucratic cliques came close to revolution under the banner of the Showa Restoration. There also were several assassinations and coups carried out against the ruling regime of the time. However, this did not result in overthrow of the government nor the seizure of power by any other entity, unlike the case experienced during the first downswing phase. Both the Young Turks of Japan and progressive bureaucrats chose a path of compromise with the Old Guards, demanding a greater voice internally.
During the present third downswing there were several figures, such as Ken'ichi Omae, who pushed for a Heisei Restoration similar in fashion to that of the Showa Restoration. However, all of them faded away before having any major influence on society. In 1993, although the opposition managed to form a coalition and oust the Liberal Democratic Party from power, the coalition failed to maintain strength and eventually returned to an alliance with the Liberal Democratic Party. The Japan Communist Party remains as the sole genuine opposition party, but it is unlikely that this party will be able to gain enough popular support to secure power. In fact, only existing political parties attract any interest at all.
We believe that the catastrophe will relate to the sinking of the Japanese economy or the Japanese "System". Perhaps Japan's financial system will collapse causing a global economic crisis. Consequently, Japan will be regarded as having lost all its autonomous capability for rehabilitation, forcing its economy to be placed under international management and supervision. More likely is collapse related to the Year 2000 software coding problem. In this scenario, catastrophe is brought on as a result of Japan's failure to deal with Y2K problems, causing severe economic and social confusion.
Section 3: National Goals Established During Each Sixty-Year Cycle
As noted above, it takes approximately one generation's time before the nation as a whole can establish and realize its new goals for major strategic and social change. These goals are a result of both frustration and confusion experienced during the ten-year peak as society undergoes both internal and external changes in its environmental condition. When society reaches the periodwe call the ten-year trough, it finally begins to reorganize itself, allowing it to pursue a new set of goals to cope with the various environmental changes first experienced during the previous ten-year peak. Let us examine the goals and strategies that Japan established for itself during the latter part (thirty years of upswing) of each sixty-year cycle. The basic developmental goals established by Japan during its first thirty-year upswing relate to the period when it ran toward the "clouds floating above the hill".
Those goals were as follows:
Domestically: To achieve Bunmei Kaika (a blossoming of civilization) --essentially the attainment of westernization.
Internationally: To establish itself as one of the major world powers.
Japan's dual strategy for attaining these goals was Fukoku-Kyohei (rich nation and strong military)--essentially industrialization and militarization. This policy was systemically enshrined in the 1880s under the Great Japanese Imperial Constitution (the Meiji Constitution). In terms of militarization corresponding to the first phase of modernization, international society in the late 19th century was reaching the maturation stage of the prestige game played by sovereign states. The then hegemon, Great Britain, attempting to establish an international balance of power, had realized on the one hand one hundred years of peace in Europe under Pax Britannica, and on the other hand was pursuing colonization of Africa and Asia.
At the same time, in terms of industrialization corresponding to the second phase of modernization, the development of the railroad was the driving force behind the first industrial revolution that had begun in the late 18th century, leading it to its maturation stage. Consequently, it was almost historical necessity for Japan--which became aware of being a mere late comer to Western-style modernization--to adopt a double-front operation of simultaneous industrialization and militarization. Japan judged correctly, and brilliantly managed to reach these goals during the next thirty years. Not only did Japan manage to become the only country in Asia to be a modern industrial state by the beginning of the 20th century, but it also managed to sweep away all military threats in the Far East and established itself as a regional hegemonic power throughout Asia.
In comparison to the goals established during the first sixty-year cycle, the developmental goals of the second sixty years (1915-1975) that were only agreed upon and established following Japan's defeat in WWII were:
Domestically: Democracy--establishment of a democratic society.
Internationally: Pacifism--construction of a peaceful nation.
Japan's grand strategy for attaining these two goals was concentration on economic development, specifically the abandonment of military development. How broad and deep the consensus was concerning the above goals and strategy is demonstrated by the fact that all political groups in Japan, from the rightist Liberal Democratic Party to the leftist Japan Communist Party, agreed on the need to pursue democracy and pacifism in the wake of WWII. Even more telling was when the Socialist party opposed Prime Minister Ikeda's income-doubling plan and called for a one percent increase in the proposed growth rates. This despite the fact that social conditions in the aftermath of debates involving Japan's security relationship with the U.S. were extremely unstable. The Showa Constitution adopted during the 1940s systematized the national consensus concerning the two goals, even though the language of the Constitution did not specify the strategy to realize these goals.
During the mid-20th century the world was reaching the maturation stage of the second industrial revolution (the revolution in the heavy and chemical industries). One major goal during this period was to change the lifestyle of each individual through the introduction and consumption of automobiles, electronic appliances, and other consumer durables. The bipolar structure of international relations created as a result of the Cold War (and which emerged in the 1950s) allowed Japan to cultivate its principles of democracy and pacifism and concentrate upon economic development within the prevailing international political framework. Japan therefore became known as a model economy and a core country for production and consumption in the Far East. As a result, Japan was accepted by the United States as an important ally. Similar to past upswings, Japan managed to adopt the most appropriate goals for development. The tremendous achievements of the catch-up style of rapid economic growth adopted by Japan are proof. The governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) managed to withstand threats of communism and socialism by gaining the support of the majority. Under the umbrella of America's nuclear arsenal and its dollar, the LDP retained long-term power (with the tacit consent of the Socialist Party, which had complementary responsibilities). In 1968 Japan finally overtook West Germany in economic development, and assumed the second largest GNP in the free world. Twenty years later, Japan overtook the United States on a GNP per capita basis.
As we continue to anticipate our proximate entrance into the thirty-year upswing stage of the third sixty-year cycle, it will be interesting to see what new goals and strategic initiatives Japan will embark upon. What objectives will be most appropriate? We would like to offer the following developmental goals as an option:
Domestically: Chiiki-shugi (localism)--essentially communitarianism.
Internationally: Globalism.
The grand strategy that should be adopted for the realization of these goals is the sincere promotion of informatization. As explained above, the information-communication industry currently is creating a breakthrough in the third industrial revolution comparable in historical significance to the industrial revolutions of one hundred and two hundred years ago. Therefore, a sincere promotion of the information industry by Japan is an absolute necessity. As the world enters into the third phase of modernization (after militarization and industrialization), the world will begin to experience simultaneous changes far surpassing those experienced during the industrial revolution. These changes will take place around the globe as international society transforms itself into an information society. As a result, a new type of social organization will be developed, one qualitatively different from the existing nation-states or industrial enterprise. These new organizations are often called "non-governmental organizations (NGOs)" or "non-profit organizations (NPOs)". However, we would like to suggest that such entities be referred to as information intelprises, or perhaps simply as intelprises.
Intelprises are organizations unlike the state, which seeks to advance national prestige and self-glorification, and unlike business enterprises, which seek to increase wealth. Rather, intelprises aim to increase wisdom or intellectual influence by creating and disseminating information and knowledge that is of value to those who share them. As the sovereign state evolved simultaneously with a concept called the nation (or subjects), and as industrial enterprises developed in tandem with the concept of citizens (or employees), so will the information intelprise bring about rise of consciousness and behavioral patterns through the creation of and co-evolution with a new class of people who might be called netizens. These netizens will not only actively pursue, create and disseminate information and knowledge, but they will do so in a manner that promotes their vision of how society should be constructed by communicating and collaborating with others. These people are at the core of the information society as active members of the information intelprise, and also as the object of its dissemination activities of information and knowledge. Thus, when we speak of informatization we are not simply referring to the rise of the information industry. We are also referring to the rise and proliferation of information intelprises as defined above. Japan's strategy for the third long-wave cycle will therefore be similar to the double-front policy of rich nation and strong military that characterized the first cycle. If we are to achieve both localization (strengthen our community relationships) and globalization simultaneously, then it is necessary to change our present constitution, because it presumes the existence of a system in which power is concentrated in the central government. During the third cycle Japan must reorganize itself, yielding substantial power of autonomy to its various regions and communities, and implement a federal state system. Internationally, Japan as a state must reorganize itself as a political power that presupposes partial delegation of its national sovereignty (military, economic and information-communication) to supra-national institutions. For these reasons, we believe that the coming 2000s system will be defined by a new constitution.
Section 4: Several Implications of the Long-Wave
We started this collaborative work with the hypothesis that the long wave of social changes occurring in modern Japan (and possibly in other countries and the world at large) can be interpreted as a sine wave with a roughly sixty-year cycle-period. We have also hypothesized that in terms of social consciousness, the long-wave begins with a downswing (a period of exploration) and ends in an upswing (a period of development). When considering prevailing social institutions, the long-wave begins with an upswing (the formation of a fundamental institutional framework) and ends with a downswing (the attempt to prolong the longevity of a faltering social institution). However, in every other sense the fundamental nature and position of each subsequent long-wave remains the same, both in consciousness cycles and institutional cycles. It is also possible to posit more complex and integrated schemes. First, we can approach the long-wave over a ninety-year rather than sixty-year period. From this perspective, a series of S-shaped ninety-year long-waves emerge in succession with overlaps of thirty years. For example, the second long-wave of modern Japan would have begun in 1915, rather than in 1945, and would extend until the year 2005. In this case, the thirty years of downswing between 1915-1945 would be considered the first thirty-year phase in the ninety-year long-wave, and coincides with the last thirty-year phase of the first long-wave between 1915-1945. Similarly, the thirty years of downswing between 1975-2005 would coincide with the final thirty years in this ninety-year cycle (refer to Figure 5).
This new approach would assume that the thirty-year downswing of the long-wave corresponds to both the last thirty-year period of the previous long-wave cycle and the first thirty-year period of the new long-wave cycle. This implies that the downswing period is much more complex and difficult to understand than the upswing period. In other words, we argue that the conspicuous characteristics of the "complex" period can be found in the conflicting attempts under changing environmental conditions to maintain old consciousness and institutions on the one hand, and to create new consciousness and institutions on the other hand. In contrast, the subsequent "simple" period corresponds to the core of the ninety-year long- wave, purely representing the very historical characteristics and challenges born and faced by each wave. By employing this framework we are able to develop a comprehensive scheme for understanding both a sixty-year long-wave of social consciousness that begins with a downswing, and another sixty-year long-wave of social institutions that begins with an upswing (refer to Figure 6).
Next, let us add still another point of view that does not assume that exactly similar long-wave patterns are repeated from cycle to cycle, but rather assumes that each cycle has different relative position and amplitude, or that there exists a long-term trend penetrating through a series of long-wave cycles. This does not exclude the possibility that this long-term trend itself forms a long wave of a still longer cycle-period. We then introduce two different assessments of the historical significance of the long-wave of modern Japan. The first is to view modern Japan's long-wave as one of "historical decline" (refer to Figure 7 below). In this graph the long-wave travels on a downward trend from left (past) to right (future). This trend places each successive peak or valley lower in position than those of the previous cycles. In other words, the overall value or extent of accomplishment during each upswing diminishes successively. Furthermore, the level of failure experienced during each downswing phase increases successively. This view would support those who regard Japan's mode of modernization since Bakumatsu (essentially westernization) basically as a failure. Furthermore, this view would value the accomplishments of militaristic development much more than economic development, and subsequently the achievements of economic development much more than intellectual development.
It is possible to interpret Figure 7 in the following manner. By pursuing a policy of rich nation and strong military during the first long-wave cycle, Japan was able to transform itself into a powerful military state and wipe out all neighboring military threats. Furthermore, by emerging as a regional hegemon it was able to establish peace in the Orient. Subsequently, Japan was able to emerge as a global power following WWI and eventually became one of the major players in the last world war. Japan even attempted to become the main player of the Final World War. However, the Japanese nation was ruthlessly deprived of its world-historical destiny and mission as a result of its unfortunate defeat in the Great East Asian War (Asian part of WWII). Following its signing of the peace treaty, although Japan did manage to regain its nominal independence, in reality it was downgraded to a quasi state, whose existence was only recognized and barely allowed under the authority and grace of the United States nuclear arsenal and its dollar. Although, through its strategy of concentration of economic growth during the second long-wave cycle Japan did manage to develop into an economic superpower and surpass other major powers in terms of its GNP, this does not mean that it was able to regain the political or military prestige it once had. This fact was particularly evident in how Japan was humiliated during the recent Gulf War by criticism that it tried to buy itself out of political responsibility. Today, Japan is about to submerge economically. It is anticipated that by implementing a strategy to enhance wisdom, Japanese society and the Japanese people will be able to achieve a certain degree of intellectual development. However, at the same time it is almost certain that Japan will lose most of its independent standing as a nation, not only militarily but also economically. Japan in the third long-wave cycle will lose its independence as a nation state decisively and ultimately. From the economic viewpoint, there will never come another time when Japanese companies will dominate the world market.Japan will lose both national prestige and wealth, leading only an idle and stagnant existence.
There is an alternative interpretation that hopefully is more plausible and more widely acceptable. It sees modern Japan from a development perspective that increases in value and meaning as it moves on in history from left to right (refer to Figure 8). The overall value or extent of accomplishment experienced during each upswing will increase successively. Furthermore, the level of failure experienced during each downswing phase will diminish successively. This approach would support those who regard Japan's mode of modernization (essentially westernization) as a success. Furthermore, this approach would value the accomplishments of economic development much more than militaristic development, and subsequently the achievements of intellectual development much more than those of economic development.
It is possible to interpret Figure 8 in the following manner. Japan managed to gain independence and develop into a modern nation-state during its first long-wave. Despite major setbacks as a result of its defeat, Japan managed to develop in both economic and social forms. The living standards of it people, and in particular that of the rural districts, increased substantially as compared to the Bakumatsu era and the beginning of the Meiji era. During the second long-wave cycle Japan was able to achieve its goals of peace and prosperity through a social system focused on economic development. Despite the fact that Japan's political autonomy was sacrificed during the second long-wave as compared to the first, Japan was able to achieve and maintain its status as a modern nation-state in the absence of military prowess. Furthermore, Japan was able to establish peaceful and cooperative relations with numerous countries. Most importantly, Japan's goal of becoming a peaceful nation-state focused upon economic development was not uniquely Japanese, but instead represented a new universal principle that regarded wars of invasion as a crime. From this perspective, ASEAN member states also prescribed to this principle. Another factor supporting this interpretation is the notion that in Japan's next catastrophe, maybe sinking during the trough of the wave, it will not be destroyed militarily. Even though it might collapse economically, such a collapse will not be as destructive as the one experienced during military conquest and defeat. Further, the next upswing phase will bring about intellectual growth much more interesting and valuable than both militarization and industrialization. Even if intellectual growth achieved during the third upswing does not present such rapid levels of growth as were experienced during the two previous upswings, it will definitely be a significant development. Through this, in addition to the peace and prosperity Japan was able to establish previously, each individual Japanese citizen will be able to live and communicate with their own preferred groups or communities, and by collaborating strive towards the realization of their own ideal social goals. It will be possible for all to reap the benefits and enjoy the achievements of this intellectual growth. Enjoying pleasure or conviviality will become possible. Even if during that process Japan were to lose its own political autonomy (for example by becoming one party in a greater Asia Pacific Federation), or even were to lose its economic autonomy either as a national economic unit or as Japanese corporations (for example many Japanese firms may become multi-national or multi-cultural enterprises), maintenance of peace, prosperity, and pleasure is paramount.
Most likely, the dividing line between the adoption of one of these two approaches will be the product of a subjective rather than objective evaluation of the facts. If so, figures 7 & 8 above represent subjective rather than objective long-wave cyclical patterns obtained by adding different evaluative weights respectively. In addition, these two interpretations or evaluations are not necessarily antinomies. They can co-exist within the same individual's mind despite the fact that there are contradictory elements. Regardless, our collaborative research does not end here. We aim to gather new participants and continue in this effort. We would like to invite all persons interested in this research to join our endeavor.
E-mail address: glocomsec@glocom.ac.jp
ENDNOTES
Japan has a unique year cataloging system, which is counted according to the reigns of the Emperor. This often causes confusion when translating Christian years into Japanese years.
Shumpei Kumon, a contributor to this collaborative effort, has argued that the sixty year long-wave theory also applies to the Bunka and Bunsei Eras. Taichi Sakaiya is of the same opinion (The Formula for a Satisfied Society, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1994). For those who are of the opinion that it would be most appropriate to analyze the economic system beginning with an upswing stage of the long-wave theory, it is possible to begin one's analysis with the sixty years between 1885-1945, a period when Japan seriously began to industrialize according to the western model. Another possibility would be to begin the analysis with the sixty year period of 1825-1885, a period of "prototypical" industrialization. While working at Yale University during that time, Kan'ichi Asakawa, in his book, Nihon no Kaki, attempted to enlighten the Japanese people as to the nature of the changes in the international environment. He managed to warn of the dangers that lay ahead for Japan if it did not come to terms with these changes. However, in the end very few seem to have listened to Asakawa. There may be those who would object to labeling this period of growth following the end of WWII with a name representing a continuation of the 1940s. Such an objection originates from the aftereffect of the war that is still prevalent among many of us, and from the spell of a peculiar interpretation of history that may be called "Tokyo war tribunal history view" imposed on post-war Japan. Many modern historians and social scientists are recently coming to the understanding, which we support, that there was a certain degree of political and systemic continuity between pre-war and post-war Japan.