

I.1. Research Goals, Approaches, and Methods

This study is not so much on political developments as on changes and variations in Russian intellectuals'¹ perceptions, images, and attitudes towards Japan and the Japanese from 1855 to 1905, as well as on the historical events that provoked these perceptions and reactions. While most studies of Russo-Japanese relations from that period focus mainly on the history of diplomacy or the naval history of wars, this study explores the evolution of Russian perceptions of Japan at a non-formal level in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The study argues that concrete political events such as the Meiji reforms, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the "Boxer Rebellion" of 1900, the worsened Russo-Japanese regional rivalry that followed, as well as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, had significant impact upon the formation of some positive or negative images of Japan in Russian intellectuals' minds. What is more, it claims that such grand historical events brought both to cardinal changes in some Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan, and sharpened some old ones. Another assumption, around which the study is built, is that perceptions of the "other" are reflected through the prism of self-perceptions. Therefore, in this study both Russian intellectuals' perceptions of the "self" (Russia) and the "other" (Japan) are examined.

¹ There are a lot, often conflicting or vague definitions of "intellectuals." In the specific Russian meaning, the term "intelligentsia" refers to a group of people not unanimous in its views by united by the common ethos of opposition to the government.

Such a definition of the analyzed here Russians, however, exempts from its scope highly educated people who did not go into opposition to the Autocracy and yet, expressed openly their opinion on Japan and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 in a written form. Therefore, more suitable for the purpose of this study- targeting finding out and analyzing a broader range of Russian views on Japan- are the definitions of "intellectuals" from *The Britannica Encyclopedia*, and *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*. *The New Dictionary of Literacy* defines an 'intellectual' as "a person who engages in academic study or critical evaluation of ideas and issues."

According to *The Encyclopedia Britannica* on line, "Intellectuals' form an artistic, social, or political vanguard or elite."

See *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, Third Edition. Edited by E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil. Copyright © 2002 by Houghton Mifflin Company; also *Brittanica.com*

The "intellectuals" studied here belong to the social vanguard from which the focus of the study falls upon famous Russian scholars, journalists, and writers at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century who have written about Japan.

Finally, while this study does look at the regional events around that time, the research target remains detecting and analyzing Russian perceptions, images, and attitudes to Japan, demonstrating their origin and evolution, as well as establishing parallels and striking similarities in them. The theoretical point of this exercise is to argue for a greater degree of sensitivity to cross-cultural encounters and the born of them mutual perceptions when interpreting international history and relations.

The time span of the study ² is from 1855 until 1905 including, covering the most important cross-cultural contacts that Russia and Japan had with each other. This period reflects the first more extensive Russo-Japanese encounters and provides a variety of Russian written resources on Japan, which though scarce in the first decades of Japan's opening to the world, increased immensely in number around the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

On the other hand, the fact that images and attitudes tend to be formed at an early stage of encounter between two nations is also taken into account. Then images either turn into stereotypes or undergo slight (only in the case of grand events cardinal) changes of their attributes. Impressions usually have a strong power of preservation. Therefore, this study reviews Russian perceptions of Japan and the Japanese since Admiral Putyatin's visit to Japan, and the signing of first Russo-Japanese formal agreement.

The focus of the study falls upon prominent Russian intellectuals' writings about Japan and the Japanese, and their responses to the Sino-Japanese-War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. In search for a new look upon Russian encounters of Japan and the Russo-Japanese War, it reviews mostly prominent Russian representatives of the so-called "vanguard of the social elite"- namely, famous scholars, journalists, and writers, who have written on Japan during the period 1855-1905. Here they are treated under the common denominator "intellectuals" (or "publicists" when reviewing their publications in newspapers and journals). More specifically, this study analyzes prominent Russian intellectuals' pre-war, and wartime perceptions of Japan using concrete examples from their writings. At the same time, the impact, which some concrete historical events had upon the formation of some positive and negative images of Japan among Russian intellectuals, is explored, too.³

The purpose of such analysis is fourfold:

² Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are rendered according to the Gregorian calendar generally in use in the "West." When quoting documents that are Russia-specific, notations of Old Style (O.S.) or Julian calendar appear in the text or in the notation.

³ Quotations from Russian articles and books are translated from Russian into English by the author of this study unless otherwise indicated.

First, taking for granted that understanding of the “other” nation stems from individual, and group visions and attitudes towards both it and the Fatherland, this study reviews Russian intellectuals’ perceptions of both Russia and Japan. The aim is to attempt to clarify how their visions originated, and on what basis they were justified.

Second, such analysis aids to manifest the evolution of Russian intellectuals’ prognosis about Japan in a historical perspective. Some often shared pre-war and wartime Russian intellectuals’ perceptions of Japan are compared within the time span 1855- 1905 in order to see how they originated and evolved, and if there were any cardinal changes in Russian intellectuals’ images and attitudes towards Japan.

On the one hand, the study also aims to demonstrate what affect the wars of 1894-5 and 1904-5 had on Russian intellectuals’ pre-war visions and attitudes on Japan. In addition, it is interesting to trace changes in Russian intellectuals’ images of Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

Third, this study seeks to disclose whether the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 provoked some negative images about Japan in the Russian minds or there were pre-war existent negative stereotypes, which were simply echoed in wartime writings.

Fourth, the study looks for some interesting parallels and striking differences in Russian intellectuals’ perceptions of pre-war and wartime Japan, and in their responses to the wars of 1894-5 and of 1904-5.

The Russo-Japanese relations from 1855 until 1905, and some regional historical events, which led to the clash of Russian and Japanese interests, are reviewed here only to the extent to see what impact they had on the Russian intellectuals’ perceptions towards Japan during that period.

Approaches and Methods Used

The main research approach is in International History combined with History of Ideas, as well as with some theoretical clarification of key terms based on cognitive sciences such as Social Psychology and Behavioral Psychology. The study reviews a wide variety of primary and secondary sources – Russian, English, and other written sources. The general approach here is

compatible with the constructivist approach to International Relations. Hence, the study may be regarded as a constructivist attempt to interpret International History. In order to analyze Russian scholars, journalists, and writers' responses to the wars of 1894-5 and 1904-5, and their pre-war and wartime perceptions of Japan, this study has explored the usefulness of the analytical perspective that has not been widely applied in the Russian context. It has also assumed a "heuristic" approach in search for parallels and striking differences in Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan during that period.

I.2. Overview of the Study

Images of a nation are those stable enough, stratified, and dynamic images, which refer to the culture, history, politics, and economy of that nation. Those images comprise within themselves a set of symbols and social visions on the perceived nation's position in the world, and its foreign relations orientation.

The image of Japan in Russian minds in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries turned out to be a metaphysical phenomenon, with plenty of flexible meanings, defined by a number of historical, political, economic, and cultural factors.

For the sake of comprehension, the chapters of this study are built around five important sub-periods in Russo-Japanese encounters (1855-1868; 1868-1895; 1895-1902; 1903-4; 1904-1905). Each of them affected and conditioned in a different way the interpretation of the events that followed, and the born of them perceptions. Hence, the relative position of Japan in each period- in "seclusion" or "open" to the world, "weak" or "powerful," "stable," or in "turmoil" - had an effect on Russian intellectuals' images of Japan. In addition, their images also depended on whether they originated from first hand observations or from secondary sources. Finally, the big regional disturbances such as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the "Boxer Rebellion" of 1900, the Manchurian crisis, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 had also affected Russian intellectuals' perceptions on Japan bringing to changes in some of them or sharpening still others.

The first phase from 1855 until 1868 is noted mostly with rare Russian individual visits to Japan- those of single Russian diplomats, merchants, scholars, and explorers. Because of her long "seclusion" from the world, Europeans perceived Japan as "weak" and "less civilized" according to the western standards of civilization and state power. The image of Japan in

Europe was that of a “distant outsider”- “mysterious” and “beautiful” but “weak” and “backward,” needing guidance along the path of civilization.

Within the second phase from 1868 until 1895, because of Japan’s successful westernization and modernization, and her victory over huge China, Russians’ curiosity towards the country imminently increased. What is more, the regional events in 1894-5 brought to some cardinal changes in Russian perceptions of the County of the Rising Sun. Japan started to be viewed by some intellectual circles in Petersburg and Moscow as a positive example of modernization to follow. At that time, Japan also turned out to be a mirror into which Russia gained more self-knowledge and confirmed her self-identification.

On the other hand, with Japan’s “opening” to the world, international power relations got complicated. Colonial powers’ activities in Asia, the “decay” of the Celestial Kingdom, and Japan’s victory over it, which secured her place among the great powers, caused growing instability in East Asia. In addition, Russia’s further penetration in the region, and the rivalry between Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea led to mutual distrust at formal levels. Russian officials started perceiving Japan as another rival in the region.

At a broad level, however, many of the regional events did not perturb common Russians. Hence, except government officials, those events attracted the attention of few intellectuals. One reason for the comparatively limited attention to Japan from Russian side could be that Russia was faced at that time with the urgent and difficult task to modernize and preserve her national identity. The question about the proper course of Russia’s development was tied up with the issue of her attitude towards the “West” and the “East.” Russia’s marginal position between Europe and Asia brought this issue to extreme complexity.

Especially in the mid 1850s, the influence of nationalism generated new intellectual currents within Russia, the most popular of which were the so-called “Slavophiles” (*Slavyanophilii*),⁴

⁴ Most popular “Slavophiles” at the end of the nineteenth century were I.S. and K.S.Aksakovii, I.V. and P.V. Kireyevsky, A.I.Koshelev, Yu.F.Samarin, A.S. Homyakov, V.A. Cherkaskii. On Russian “Slavophil,” see “Vostok, Rossiya i slovyanstvo” (The “East,” Russia, and Slavdom), Collected Essays from 1885-89, published in *Sobranie Sochineniy* (Moscow: V.Sablin, 1912), 6:145-93); also Homyakov, A.S. *O starom i novom*, (About the old one and the new one), M. 1988:102; and Riasanovsky, N. *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophil: A Study of Romantic Ideology* (Gloucester, Mass.: P.Smith, 1965)

“Westerners” (*Zapadniki*),⁵ “Easterners” (*Vostochniki*),⁶ “Populists” (*Narodniki*),⁷ and “Socialist Revolutionaries” (*Sotsialisti- Revolyutsioneri*).⁸ Each of those currents had their own perceptions on Russia’s cultural and geopolitical identity, and her mission in the “East” or the “West,” respectively. The dilemma – to the “East” or to the “West”- reached its peak in the late 1890s. With the exception of the press releases about the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and the few Russian works about Japanese reformation, Japan and Russia’s advances in the Pacific remained in the periphery of the intellectuals’ discussions until 1900.

In general, it could be admitted that most Russian intellectuals in 1900 did not entertain any negative images of Japan. Vladimir Solov’ev’s (a prominent Russian thinker in the end of the nineteenth century) prophesy about a coming great danger from the “East” in the face of Japan and China, was not interpreted seriously by the majority of Russian intellectuals then. Japan was still perceived by Russians as a “distant mysterious outsider,” or a “competitor” in East Asia at most, but not as an “enemy” yet.

It was after 1900, when at times the western and the Russian reaction to the increasing Japanese influence in Asia became colored by the idea of the “peril of a pagan invasion from the Asian East.” In Russia, in the early 1900s, most notable among those warning against “barbarians,” and appealing for Russia’s conquest of Chinese territories since “international rights cannot be taken into account when dealing with “semi-barbarous” peoples,⁹ were some

⁵ Most popular “Westerners” in early nineteenth century were P.V.Annenkov, V.P.Botkin, T.N.Granovskii, K.D.Kavelin, M.N. Katkov, I.S. Turgenev, P.Ya.Chadaev, and B.N.Chicherin. On the Russian Westerners see Roosevelt, P.R., *Apostle of Russian Liberalism: Timofei Granovsky* (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1986, qtd in Malia, M., *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1999:144

⁶ Western scholars researching Russian history coined the term Russian “Easterners” (“*Vostochnik*”). Here, it signifies only those intellectuals who argued for Russia’s racial or civilization akin to Asia and did not see Asia as a “yellow threat” to Europe.

Most prominent Russian “Easterners” in the 1880s were Professor Vasilii P. Vassiliev (1818-1900) Prince Esper Ukhtomskii (1861-1921), and Doctor Petr Alexandrovich Badmaev (B.Zhamsaran) (1849-1920). On Russian “Easterners” see Sarkisyanz, *Russia and the Messianism* (1955: 218-22).

⁷ Most popular “Populists” at the end of the nineteenth century were I.N.M’ishkin, D.M. Rogachev, M.Sazhin, S.F.Kovalik, I.Voinaral’skii, M.A. Bakunin. On Russian “Populists” see Malia, M. loc. cit., p.145; and also Fyodorov, N. F. , *Sochineniya* (Essays), M., M’isl’, 1982:343

⁸ Prominent “Socialist-Revolutionaries” since 1894 were P.Lavrov, G.I.Uspenskii, and L.Trotsky. see Trotsky, L. *Moya zhizn. Opit avtobiografii* (My Life. An Attempt to Design Autobiography), I.: Panorama, 1991

⁹Fyodor F. Martens, “Russia, and China,” qtd. In Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904* , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958:42

Russian intellectuals belonging to the so-called conservative “Westerners.”¹⁰ Their views represented one extreme of “the Russian Idea” *vis-à-vis* Asia, an attitude that reminds some kind of racial imperialism.¹¹ It was also asserted that a union between China and Japan would overturn the balance of power between the “West” and “Non-West,” and hence constitute a major threat to the western civilization.

However, although separate Russian conservative publicists exploited the idea of the “Yellow Peril,” in 1894-5 and 1900, most of the Russian educated elite did not perceive Japan as a serious threat. In fact, the image of the “enemy” in Russian national mind was clearly defined in the face of a European great power, which varied at a time, but was not often related to the Far East.

On the contrary, there were “Easterners” (“*Vostochniki*”) in the early 1900’s who proclaimed that it was high time for Russia to turn her sight at her cultural and racial akin in the “East” in search for cultural enlightenment and alliance against the “decaying” western individualism and materialism.¹²

Things changed significantly after 1900. Most researchers of Russia and Japan note serious worsening of the Russo-Japanese relations since the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900. Russia’s delay to withdraw her army from the occupied by her Manchuria as well as her intense economic endeavors in the Far East provoked Japanese suspicion and hostility. Japan perceived Russia’s advance in the “East” as a threat to her life rights and interests. The Russo-Japanese rivalry over Manchuria and Korea reached its peak in 1904.

At a non-formal level, however, Russo-Japanese encounters kept peacefully evolving through the intercultural exchange in literature, poetry, and arts. Besides, although the Russian press

¹⁰ The “Westerners,” believed that Russia remained backward and primitive and could progress only through Europeanization. Some of them were openly anti-Asian in their claims for westernization. P.R. Roosevelt, *Apostle of Russian Liberalism: Timofei Granovsky* (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1986, qtd in Malia, M. *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1999:144

¹¹ Russia’s aggressive policy in Asia was justified by people such as professor Fedor F.Martens (the most prominent Russian authority on international law and adviser to the Foreign Office then) in his two pamphlets “*Rossia i Kitai* (Russia and China)”, St.Petersburg, 1881, and “*Russia and England in Central Asia*”, London, 1887 60 qtd. in Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*, Octagon Books, New York, 1977:42

¹² Prince Esper Esperovich Ukhtomskii (1861-1921) alleged organic affinity of Russia with China and even with India. He opposed any foreign invasion of China during the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900. (see Sarkisyanz, E. *Russia and the Messianism* (1955: 218-22)

released series of articles reprinted from the western press for an upcoming war between Russia and Japan, the majority of Russian publicists' interpretations on the matter demonstrated their firm disbeliefs in that. They were full of hopes for a beneficiary solution between Russia and Japan over Korea and Manchuria. Until the very first day of the war of 1904-5, majority of Russian intellectuals did not perceive Japan as a serious threat yet. On the contrary, they highly admired her striking success in modernization.

When Japanese suddenly attacked the Russian float in the Port Arthur on 8 February 1904 (27 January O.S.), most Russians interpreted it as a very “mean,” “treacherous” act against Russia. The first few months of the Russo-Japanese War, all the social strata in the Russian Empire seemed united around the notion to protect Russia’s dignity and image. The war termed the Russians through all the hopes, illusions and disappointments, and imminently enriched or sharpened their perceptiveness regarding Russia and Japan’s positions on the world arena.

Until the big defeats of Russian army and fleet by Japan in 1904-5, Russian intellectuals, belonging to various schools of thought, had entertained a variety of illusions about a short war. Some were inspired by faith and ideas about Russia’s military and intellectual superiority over the “West” and the “East,” and her destiny to bring Slavic enlightenment to the world.¹³ Russia has asserted herself as a great power through centuries on the international arena, a power with grand material and human resources, while the newly opened reforming Japan was just rising in power. Hence, once the belligerences started, a great number of Russians expected to have “a short victorious war” over the “*yaposhkami*” (the Japes). In the very beginning of the war, in some wartime Russian writings, various denigrating images of Japan as an “enemy” originated. In addition, the Russian poster art and political cartoons of the Russo-Japanese War era repeated and further distorted those negative images of Japan as the “enemy.” Thus, they managed to create certain stereotypical images of the Japanese among the Russian public.

Still, along with negative images of Japan, there came up in Russia plenty of positive ones. Some reform-minded Russian intellectuals, mainly “Liberals,” “Populists,” and “Social Democrats,” perceived Japan as a successfully modernized country- a model that Russia could

¹³ Regarding that, some Russian “Slavophiles” (“*Slavyanophili*”), and “Easterners” (“*Vostochniki*”) were most notable. See (N.S. “*Russkaia i nemetskaia vostochnaya politika*”, in *Russkaya M’isl’*, 1882, No.1, pp.37-60; see also Pozdneev, A., “*Vassil’ev, V.P.*,” *Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia*) All qtd. in Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*, Octagon Books, New York, 1977:42

follow in performing urgent socio-political reforms. Russian “Social Revolutionaries” went even further viewing Japan’s military attack as a *just* act against Russian regional imperialism.

Others, among which were some prominent Russian peoples of Art, under the influence of “*Japonisme*,”¹⁴ were more concerned with the uniqueness of the Japanese drawings and poetry in which they found their source of inspiration.¹⁵ For example, the *Vessy* (Scales), the main journal of the Moscow “Symbolists,” devoted two issues to Japanese Art towards the end of 1904, and in 1905, there was a highly successful Japanese exhibition in St. Petersburg.

With the advance of the war, and hence, with the increase of the losses from the Russian side, Russian intellectuals turned their sights towards the internal problems, blaming the Autocracy for being incapable to cope adequately with the internal and external problems. Hence, in the peak of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Japan often resumed a secondary place in the Russian intellectuals’ discussions.

After the signing of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, a new *status quo* was reached in East Asia. Both Russia and Japan were over-exhausted by the war efforts -the casualties and the costs were extremely high for both sides. What is more, the war of 1904-5 triggered the revolution in Russia. The new political configuration there demanded urgent reforms at all social levels. The weakened autocratic regime required greater attention on domestic affairs. All those contributed to the Russo-Japanese agreement on regional balance of power, which in turn gave impetus to the 1907-10-12-16 public and secret Russo-Japanese agreements. What is more, around the World War I, Russia needed the help of the Japanese, both to secure her geographic position and for war supplies. Russia’s place in the dialogue of the European social

¹⁴ see Lehmann, J.P. “Old Japonisme; Tokugawa Legacies and Modern European Images of Japan”, in *Modern Asian Studies*, 18,4 (1984)pp.757-768

¹⁵ Europeans were drawn first to Japanese art and secondly to Japanese forms of poetry. Japanese art was seen and praise at the Paris world exhibitions of 1867, 1878 and 1900, and Sergey Kitaev organized exhibitions in Russia from 1896. Features such as the absence of perspective and shadow in the western sense, the use of empty space and asymmetry influenced many artists in Europe at the turn of the century, including the Russians Kandinsky, V, Chagall I., Ostroumova-Lebedeva, A. and Falifeev, V. (Goreglyad, V. N. “Russian-Japanese Relations: Some Reflections on Political and Cultural Tendencies”, in Rimer, J.Th. (ed.) *A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford, 1995:198;

In 1905, the prominent Russian “Symbolist” Valery Bruisov had imitated the five-line *tanka*, and written about his love for Japanese temples, and his longing to visit them and see the works of Japanese artists. See Heldt, B. ““Japanese” in Russian Literature”, in Rimer, Th. (ed.) *A Hidden Fire. Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 1995:177-8

progress was, for Russian “conservative” and “liberal” thinkers alike challenged by the emergence of Japan as a competitive military and intellectual force. This in turn led to the re-evaluation of some stereotypes of Japan in Russian minds.

The time span of this study will be limited, however, up to the year 1905- with the signing of Russo-Japanese peace treaty at Portsmouth. In 1905, Russia was shaken by the revolution. The opposition front was gaining strength after Russia’s disastrous defeats in Mukden and Tsushima. Russia’s structural weakness became evident in those two grand battles. Naturally, Russian intellectuals’ attention fell upon the urgent reforms that Russia needed to recover her internal balance and international prestige. Then, Japan and the war remained out of the scope of intellectuals’ discussions. Moreover, the Bulgarian declaration of state independence in 1908, and the Bosnian crisis the same year, as well as the followed Balkan Wars of 1912-13 diverted Russian intellectuals’ attention again to the Balkans, and the issues of the Far East and Japan were somehow neglected in the Russian intellectuals’ writings around that time.

I.3. Review of Related Literature

My research of the issue has established that no substantial study in defining Russian perceptions of Japan from 1855 until 1905 has been undertaken with the exception of few articles briefly mentioning Russian or Soviet perceptions of Japan in general, or focusing explicitly on images of the “enemy”.¹⁶

An exception presents Vassilii Molodiakov’s book based on his doctoral study of three prominent Russian thinkers of the early twentieth century, representatives of the so-called “Symbolist” school of thought in Russian literature.¹⁷ He examines Vladimir Solov’ev, Valerii Bruisov and Andrei Bely’s images and attitudes towards Japan in the beginning of the

¹⁶ See Mikhailova, Yu. "The Image of Japan in Russo-Soviet Japanese Studies," *Japanese Studies Bulletin, Australian Association of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1993, pp. 59-74; Verbitsky, S.I., "Russian Perceptions of Japan," in Goodby, J.E., V. Ivanov, and N. Shimotomai (eds.), *"Northern Territories" and Beyond*, Westport and London, Praeger, 1995, pp. 63-69; Heldt, B, ““Japanese” in Russian Literature”, in Rimer, Th. (ed.) *A Hidden Fire. Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 1995:171-183; also Swinton, E. S. *Russo-Japanese War Triptychs: Chastising a Powerful Enemy*, in *Ibid.*, p.114-133

¹⁷ Molodiakov, V. *Obraz Iaponii" v Everope i Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX - nachala XX veka* (The Image of Japan”in Europe and Russia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries), Moscow-Tokyo, Institut Vostokovedeniia RAN, 1996

twentieth century by applying a geopolitical approach. V. Molodyakov traces how the myth about Japan as the “Yellow Peril” came into being in Russia. He emphasizes that in contrast to Europe or the USA where it circulated mainly on the level of “yellow press,” in Russia this myth became an inspiration for the most outstanding intellectuals of the time and their prophetic vision of the future.¹⁸

Another Russian scholar who wrote on Russian images of Japan is Yulia Mikhailova.¹⁹ In her article “Images of Enemy and Self: Russian “Popular Prints” of the Russo-Japanese War”, Yu. Mikhailova studies what Japan’s image in Russia was at the level of mass consciousness during the Russo-Japanese War and thereafter. The objects of her analysis are the so-called “popular prints” (*lubki*) produced during the war of 1904-5.

The Russian Journalists Alexander Kulanov and Yulia Stonogina in their common article “Obraz i real’nost: Iaponia i Rossia glazami drug druga” (Image and Reality: Japan and Russia as Seen by Each Other)²⁰ discuss how Russians and Japanese construct their images of each other nowadays. A.Kulanov and Yu.Stonogina argue that these mostly positive yet superficial images tend to obfuscate political problems (such as the Kuril islands/Northern Territories issue) and leave them unsolved.

The sociologist Gilbert Rozman, in his article “Obraz Rossiiskih predstavlenii o Vostochnoi Azii, 1972-2003” (Reinterpreting Russian Images of East Asia, 1972-2003),²¹ reveals how different strands in Soviet ideological and scholarly perceptions of that region have ushered in obstructive and ambiguous policies towards Russia’s East Asian neighbors. Now those strands are slowly giving way to a more realistic and pragmatic Russian attitude to the “East,” argues Gilbert Rozman.

The Historian, Marlène Laruelle, in her article “Misl’it Aziyu ili misl’it Rossiyu?” (Thinking of Asia or Thinking of Russia?²² reveals Russian double view on the “East.” She draws on

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 156

¹⁹ Mikhailova, Yu. “Images of Enemy and Self: Russian “Popular Prints” of the Russo-Japanese War” in *Acta Slavica Iaponica* No.16 (1998) , Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University

²⁰ Kulanov, Al. and Yuliya Stonogina “Obraz i real’nost: Iaponia i Rossia glazami drug druga” (Image and Reality: Japan and Russia as Seen by Each Other in *Neprikonovennii zhapas*, 2003, N.3 (29)

²¹ Rozman, G. “Obraz Rossiiskih predstavlenii o Vostochnoi Azii, 1972-2003” (Reinterpreting Russian Images of East Asia, 1972-2003) in *Neprikonovennii zhapas*, 2003 N.3 (29)

²² Laruelle, M. “Misl’it Aziyu ili misl’it Rossiyu? (Thinking of Asia or Thinking of Russia? in *Neprikonovennii zhapas*, 2003 N.3 (29)

examples from the ideology of “Eurasianism” and an Aryan/Scythian myth about the origin of the Russians to demonstrate that Russian political thinkers’ discourse on Asia has usually had little to do with the reality of Asian countries. Rather, it has been an ideological subterfuge used to appear “more European than the Europeans.”

Susanna Lim in her paper on cross-cultural perceptions between Russia and Japan in the Modernist period (1904-1922) titled “Yellow Face, White Face: Race in Russian and Japanese Modernism,”²³ treats not only the most common notion of postcolonial discourse, “Orientalism,” but also what she proposes to describe as “Occidentalism,” or the construction of the “West” by the “East.” Race in her writing serves not only the political function of power and control but also an aesthetic function, as each side appropriates the other’s image not only to empower itself but also to create new identities that transcend fixed boundaries.

The social, political, intellectual, and literary contexts of the war of 1904-5 are examined in some detail in the book *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective* edited by David Wells and Sandra Wilson.²⁴ The volume comprises conference papers concerned not with events of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, but with its symbolic meaning in the home countries of the belligerents, its influence on intellectual, political, and aesthetic thought. The book is an account of perceptions and images of the war in some Russian and Japanese literary works, emphasizing the polyphonic nature of its attendant discourses, the distortions in messages as they were transferred from one semiotic system to another. It includes three short papers on Russian images of Japan during the war of 1904-5. Adrian Jones’ paper reviews the most reactionary parts of the political spectrum’ responses to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 as reflected in the Russian Revolutionary newspapers *Osvobozhdenie*, *Revoliutsionnaia Rossia*, and *Iskra* in the war period.²⁵

²³ Lim, S. *Yellow Face, White Face: Race in Russian and Japanese Modernism*, University of California, Los Angeles, 2003

²⁴ Wells, D., and Wilson, S. (eds.) *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999

²⁵ Jones, A. “East and West Befuddled: Russian Intelligentsia Responses to the Russo-Japanese War”, in Wells, D., and Sandra (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Wilson, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999: 134

Sandra Wilson's paper ²⁶ examines Russian attitudes in general, and Japanese attitudes in detail, to the war across a wide range, analyzing how different groups and individuals linked the conflict with their interpretation of national identity and of Japan's place in the world and how the war itself was later subsumed into the dominant interpretation of national identity.

David Wells' paper focuses on the Russo-Japanese War, as presented in Russian high literature,²⁷ examining in some detail the literary context of the war in the writings of three Russian "Symbolists" and two literary "Realists." He argues that the tendency to interpret the war in terms of something else is found not only among the Russian "Symbolists," but also in Russian writers who aspired to "literary realism." In the first stages of the war, they used the war as an opportunity to assert Russia's status as a great power, to insist on her manifest destiny in Asia and to condemn Japan as a "Yellow Peril" posing a potential threat to the whole European civilization, argues David Wells. ²⁸

In contrast to David Wells' argument, this study manifests that majority of Russian scholars, journalists, and writers did not entertain negative images of Japan even during the peak of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. On the contrary, most of the reform-minded intellectuals though belonging to different ideological camps viewed Japan as a progressive state destined to enlighten East Asia. Few were those Russian intellectuals who saw in Japan a regional rival or a possible "Yellow Peril" to Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

On the other hand, this research has also established that the details, the causes of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Russo-Japanese relations before and after the war, as well as the diplomatic correspondence exchange between Russia and Japan during that period have been explored in an impressive great number of studies.²⁹

In explaining the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Western and Russian scholars apply different approaches. One approach is to look for scapegoats among the Russian ruling elite as

²⁶ Wilson, S. "The Russo-Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical Memory" in Wells, D., and S. Wilson, *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:160

²⁷ Wells, D. "The Russo-Japanese War in Russian Literature" in *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective* Ed. By David Wells and Sandra Wilson, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:108

²⁸ Ibid, p.108

²⁹ See the enclosed list of bibliography

B.B. Glinski, B.A. Romanov, and A.N. Kuropatkin have done.³⁰ Another approach, which W.L. Langer, A. Malozemoff, C.M. Paine, and D. Wolff, to mention but a few, have undertaken is to examine its diplomatic context by reviewing chronically the past on the bases of plenty of primary and secondary sources.³¹ Still other approach is to reveal the interplay of the official ideology and foreign policy in Russia during the decade before the outbreak of war with Japan, which D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye has successfully applied in his study.³² The few newly published in Russia books on the War of 1904-5 also fall either in the category of military history,³³ or in the category of the analytical review of the diplomatic history.³⁴

An interesting multifarious approach to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 presents the book *Russko-Iaponskaya voina 1904-5. Vzglyad cherez stoletie* (The Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 - A Look after a Century). Being a collection of papers from an international conference in commemoration of 100 years from the War of 1904-5, it manages to cover a broad range of topics from the military history up to the mutual images of the enemy in search for new interpretation of some old facts.³⁵

³⁰ See Glinskii, B. B. (ed.), *Prolog Russko-Iaponskoi voiny: Materiali iz arkhiva Grafa S.Iu. Witte* (Petrograd: Brokgauz- Efron, 1916; also Romanov, B. A. *Russia in Manchuria, 1892-1906*, transl. by Susan Wibur Jones, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards, 1952; and Kuropatkin, A. N. *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, trans. A.B. Lindsay, 2 vols. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1909).

³¹ See Langer, W. L. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); also Lager, W. L. "The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War," in Carl E. and Elizabeth Schorske, (eds.), *Explorations in Crisis: Papers on International History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969: 3-45); see also Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). Also Paine, C.M. *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); and Wolff, D. *To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999

³² Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. *Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*, Northern Illinois University Press 2001

³³ Shatsilo, V., and Shatsilo, L. *Russko-iaponskaya voina 1904-5* (Russo-Japanese War 1904-5), Moskva, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2004

³⁴ Molod'akov, V., *Rossia i Iaponia: poverh bar'erov. Neizvestn'ie i zab'itie stranitsii rossisko-iaponskikh otnoshenii (1899-1929)* (Russia and Japan: Over the Barrier. Some Unknown Pages from the Russo-Japanese Relations), Moskva, ACT, Astrel', 2005; see also Pavlov, D, *Russko-Iaponskaya voina 1904-5 gg. Sekret'n'ie operatsii na sushe i na more* (Russo-Japanese War 1904-5. Secret Operations on Land and Sea), Moskva, Materik, 2004; and Lil'ie, M.I. *Dnevnik Osad'ii Port-Artura* (Diary on the Siege of Port Arthur), Moskva, Tsentrpoligraph, 2002

³⁵ See Airapetov, O. R. (ed.), *Russko-Iaponskaya voina 1904-5. Vzglyad cherez stoletie* (The Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 - A look after a Century), Moskva, Tri Kvadrata, 2004

The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero (2005)³⁶ is another remarkable collection of conference essays presenting various aspects of the War of 1904-5. It accepts only as its figurative focus a conventional examination of the war's campaigns on land and sea. Due emphasis also falls on the conflict's origins, impact, conclusions, and aftermath. The first section of the book comprises five essays by historians who examine the remote and proximate causes of the war from various vintages, including diplomatic history. The second section constitutes a topical treatment of the war's course on sea and land, followed by coverage of discrete aspects, ranging from strategy and generalship to tactics and military intelligence. The third section examines the various ways in which the war found reflection in the media on the home front. The final section reviews the postwar years- military and financial establishments, anti-colonial causes, and the shape of memory itself.

The aim of this study, however, is to try to apply other approach, by viewing the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the events around it, mainly through the cultural perspective, which creates the opportunity to see the human perceptions, images, and attitudes towards the "other" that originated from those important historical events.

Despite the importance of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, both in terms of its immediate effects and of its longer-term consequences not only in material, but also in their psychological aspects, it has attracted comparatively little attention from scholars other than military historians, though it does hold a firm place in several "grand narratives."

In addition, a lot has been written on the various Russian intellectual thought at that time and its evolution through the years. However, few if any have researched Russian intellectuals' responses to the war of 1904-5 as well as their pre-war and wartime perceptions of Japan. In only few of the above-mentioned writings on the Russo-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese foreign relations, there could be found a paragraph or two on prominent Russian intellectuals' attitudes to the war and Japan.

Indeed, there lacks a single monograph on this topic, which to describe Russian intellectuals' reactions and visions on the war of 1904-5, and on Japan.

Finally, although the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 presents a discursive mark in the history and international relations of both Russia and Japan, this study is not be limited to the Russian responses to the war but it also analyzes the Russian intellectuals' visions on Japan from 1855

³⁶ Steinberg, J. W., Bruce W. Menning, D. Schimpelpenninck van der Oye, D. Wolff, and Sh. Yokote (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, BRILL, Leiden-Boston, 2005

until 1905 in a historical perspective. The expansion of the time span of the study from 1855 to 1905 is an attempt to present in depth the evolution of Russian social elites' perceptions of Japan.

To sum up, as seen from all of the above, no substantial research has been done so far to analyze and trace the evolution of Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan from 1855 until 1905, as well as to reveal a broader range of Russian intellectuals' responses to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Scholars generally appreciate the fact that the Russians and the Japanese have traditionally entertained highly contrasting and volatile images of each other. Beyond identifying those images, however, there has been no attempt to analyze them on a deeper level, to determine how they originated, what spoken and unspoken assumptions they contained, which intellectuals shared them, or why they differed.

Consequently, no attempt has been made to fit those images back in the larger ideological context that produced them and at the same time to look at the historical events around which they originated. Moreover, by doing so, to determine what insights they might provide about the Russian intellectual minds at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

Therefore, inasmuch as most studies dealing with the Asia-Pacific Rim area focuses on political and socio-economic history rather than intellectual history, this topic is highly innovative.

I.4. A Cognitive Framework of Analysis- a "Friend" or a "Foe"

Scholars, journalists, and politicians often speak of enemy images when referring to armed conflicts between countries. Their empirical foundation is rooted in claims about subject's perceptions that are a subject's cognitive construction of reality (Boulding, K. 1956, 1959; Holsti, O. 1967; White, T.K. 1965, 1968; Jervis, R. 1976; Silverstein, B. 1989; Herrmann, R.K. et al., 1997).³⁷ Kenneth Boulding in his study on national images defined the image as "the

³⁷ See Boulding, K. *The Image*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956
See also Boulding, K. "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (3) 1959:120-131; Jervis, R. *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976; and White, R.K., "Images in the Context of International Conflict." In *International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis*, ed. by H.C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965; see also Holsti, O. "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy." In *Enemies and Politics*, edited by D. Finley, O.Holsti and R. Fagen, 1967:25-96. Chicago: Rand McNally;

total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.”³⁸ He felt that perceived hostility or friendliness and the perceived strength or weakness of a unit were central features of a subject’s image of that unit.³⁹ Subsequent scholars dissembled K. Boulding’s general notion into different types of images, with the enemy image and its component parts receiving a great deal of attention especially during the Cold War.⁴⁰

In psychological and socio-psychological studies, “enemy images” are defined in general, as the commonly held, stereotyped, dehumanized images of the “out-group.”⁴¹ According to the “Social Identity Theory” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979),⁴² differentiation between groups is “asymmetrical,” i.e., positively biased towards the “in-group” and negatively biased towards the “out-group.”

In fact, the “out-group,” that is, the “other” can appear in various images. The “other” is perceived as fundamentally different from “us.” The concept of the “other” appears in cases where there exist linguistic and cultural differences involved in the definition of our identity.⁴³ In most everyday relationships, we do not perceive the “other” as “evil.” The “other” can simply imply the “foreigner,” or the “outsider,” that is, the “other” is spoken about in neutral terms.

and White, R.K., *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam War and Other Wars*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1968; Silverstein, B. “Enemy Image: The Psychology of US Attitudes and Cognition Regarding the Soviet Union”. *American Psychologist* (44): 1989: 903-913; Herrmann, R.K. and J.F. Voss, T. Y. E. Schooler, J. Carrochi, “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata”, in *International Studies, Quarterly* (41): 1997: 403-433

³⁸Boulding, K. “National Images and International Systems”, *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* (3): 1959: 120-1

³⁹ Ibid,p.124-5

⁴⁰ See Broffenbrenner, U. “The Mirror Image in Soviet- American Relations: A Social Psychologist’s Report”. *Journal of Social Issues* (17): 1961:45-56; see also White, 1965, 1968; Holsti, 1967; Silverstein, 1989- all op.cit. above

⁴¹ Zur, O. “Love of Hating” in *The History of European Ideas* 13 (4): 1991: 350

⁴² Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict” in W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole. 1979: 33-57

⁴³ James A. Aho suggests that the life world is experienced as a coherency of objects and what is “not-me.” The latter is made of both natural things and persons called “you.” A further distinction is made between “intimate you” (called by first name), and “others” (called by family names). The “intimate you” and “me” form the so called “us” while the rest which alienates to us, is called “them.” See Aho’s phenomenological approach to “me” and “not-me” in Aho, J. A. *This Thing of Darkness*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994

In warfare, however, the belligerent countries perceive each other as enemies, and thus, the “other” becomes associated with the image of the “enemy.”⁴⁴ In such case, the “enemy” is perceived as an evil, threatening, and insidious menace.⁴⁵ Various psychological mechanisms are involved in this process - exaggerated fear, anxiety-based overreactions, perceptual distortions, mirror projections, good-bad stereotypes, frustration-aggression, and scapegoat.⁴⁶ Nevertheless that the origination of the image of the “other” as the “enemy” usually proceeds along the above-mentioned lines, there sometimes occur cultural variations and historical consequences in specific cases that should also be taken into consideration.⁴⁷

In addition, this project reveals the images of the “other” as varying between ones with open structure (giving possibility of additional, independent attributes for describing the object)⁴⁸ and ones with closed structure such as stereotypes.⁴⁹

Within the framework of cognitive theories, the image of a nation is understood as an image that constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation.⁵⁰ In addition, all the messages coming from the perceived nation are filtered through the image of that nation, and thus simple or distracted reality is often created.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Ofer Zur argues that humans have fought seven types warfare, each representative of a specific type of enemy: the symbolic enemy, the withholding enemy, the worthy enemy, the enemy of God, the offensive enemy, the oppressive/betraying enemy, and the invisible enemy within. See Zur, O. “Love of Hating.” *The History of European Ideas* 13 (4): 1991: 345-70

⁴⁵ “In analyzing the process of “*enmification*” (imagining the enemy), scholars have introduced a variety of constructs: the view of the enemy as “devil,” the perception of the “incorrigibly malevolent” adversary, misrepresentation through “mirror imaging,” and “diabolical images of the enemy.”” See Mikhailova, Yu. “Images of Enemy and Self: Russian “Popular Prints” of the Russo-Japanese War”, *Acta Slavica Iaponica* No.16 (1998) <http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/acta/16/a-16.html>

On the process of “*enmification*,” see Rieber, R. W., Robert J. Kelly, “Substance, and Shadow,” in Rieber, R.W., (ed.), *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*, New York, Plenum Press, 1991:5-20.

⁴⁶ Lorand B. Szalay, Elahe Mir-Djalali, “Image of the Enemy,” in Rieber, R.W. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 214-215.

⁴⁷ E.g. Relations and mutual perceptions of China-Japan during and after the war of 1894-5, of Russia-Japan during and after the war of 1904-5, and of US-Japan during and after the WWII, differ along cultural lines and historical consequences.

⁴⁸ On the structural openness of the image, see Scott, W. A. “Psychological, and Social Correlates of International Image.” In Kelman, H.C (ed.), *International Behavior: Social Psychological Analysis*. New York, Holt Rhinehart and Wilson, 1966:80-81

⁴⁹ For some the stereotype is synonymous to the image, (e.g. Duijker, H. and N. Frijda, *National Character and National Stereotypes*, Amsterdam, North Holland Publication Co., 1960; Buchanan, W. and H. Cantrill, *How Nations See Each Other*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1953)

⁵⁰ This definition of the image of a nation is after Scott, W. A. “Psychological and Social Correlates of International Image.” in op.cit., 1966:72

⁵¹ This was the case of Russian elite’s pre-war denigrated image of Japan, which led them to underestimate Japan’s military capabilities and intentions in 1904.

When the attributes for describing such distracted images remain unchanged over time, the images turn into exaggerated stereotypes. For example, Finkelstein, Imamura, and Tobin (1991:5) have observed “an array of exaggerated stereotypes that have characterized western thinking about Japan and discouraged generations “Westerners” from penetrating beyond surface appearances to a deeper understanding of Japanese [culture]”.⁵² This also points out to the existence of a “mysterious” Oriental *schema*⁵³ among “Westerners” through which their perceptions of Asia are reflected. In social cognition, *schema* functions to organize our knowledge about other people and other groups and their actions.⁵⁴ One apparent *schema* is how the “West” has long seen Japan as part of the “mysterious,” “dusk,” and “exotic” “Orient” representing the image of the “other.”

“Such sense of “Otherness” is definitely required for self-identity,” argues René Girard.⁵⁵ According to him, there can be no cultural themes without antithesis. Following a similar line of argument Edward Said claims, “Orientalism is never far from the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying “us” Europeans as against all those “Non-Europeans”... the idea of European identity as superior one in comparison with all non-European peoples and cultures.”⁵⁶ In the nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth centuries, “Westerners” often interpreted the division “East”-“West” as one between an eternally superior “Occident” and a backward, inferior “Orient,” thus justifying western “civilizing” colonial endeavors in Asia and Africa.

On the other hand, despite ultimately reinforcing the presumption of the West’s authority as the standard by which to measure modernity, some Eastern intellectuals nonetheless attempted to reorganize this duality in hopes of representing a world where the “Orient” was the superior civilization, with a morally corrupt, misdirected materialistic “Occident” that was starting to fall behind⁵⁷. Some Russian “Easterners” (“*Vostochniki*”) in order to justify Russia’s alignment with the “East” argued in similar terms.

⁵² See Finkelstein, B., Imamura, A.E., and Tobin, J.J. (eds.) *Transcending Stereotypes*. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press. 1991: 5

⁵³ “*Schema*” is “a knowledge structure that summarizes generic knowledge and previous experience with respect to a given class of stimuli and events and, at the same time, gives meaning and guides anticipation with respect to similar stimuli and events in the future” see Ross, L., and Nisbett, R.E. *The Person and the Situation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1991:12.

⁵⁴ Van Dijk, T.A. *Communicating racism*. Newbury Park, CA:Sage,1987: 184

⁵⁵ Girard, R. *Violence and the Sacred*. London. John Hopkins University Press, 1977

⁵⁶ Said, E. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage books, 1994:7.

⁵⁷ Worringer, R. *Comparing Perceptions: Japan as Archetype for Ottoman Modernity, 1876-1918*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, March 2001:12.

In brief, it is well known that Russia and Japan had entertained for a long time a variety of images of each other—from neutral, to highly positive or negative. Such image construction was most intensive around the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

This thesis reviews a whole array of Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan and Japanese for the period 1855-1905. It follows the construction of images of the "other" in neutral terms as the "outsider" or the "foreigner," of images of the "enemy," as well as of images of the "friend." The purpose of such exercise is to clarify whether there was a gradual evolution and/or persistence in the Russian perceptions of Japan and Japanese during that period.

When reviewing the Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan and Japanese, this thesis keeps to the above-mentioned cognitive key concepts. Hence, the term intellectuals' perceptions in this research refer to Russians' contemplating (imagining) the "other" nation (Japan) because of which their images of that nation are born. Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan (and Russia herself), reflected through their *schemata*, are treated here as an important "intervening variable" between the regional historical events ("independent variable") and Russian intellectuals' responses ("dependent variables") to them. Important historical events such as Japan and Russia's first encounters, and regional activities, as well as clashes and alliances from 1855 until 1905 affected Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan (and Russia), which in turn provoked certain responses of theirs to the Japanese empire .

Hence, the incorporated framework ⁵⁸ postulates a correlation among events (independent variable), Russian intellectuals' perceptions (intervening variable), and intellectuals' responses (dependent variable) to Japan and the war of 1904-5.

It should be admitted however, that during the examined period, similarly to Japan, Russia was facing the dilemma of modernity and national identity. There was strong need for urgent reforms at all levels of Russian society so that Russia could contain her internal unrest and overcome her backwardness compared to the "West" and Japan. As a result, Japan and even the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 somehow remained in the periphery of the Russian intellectuals' discussions especially in the second half of 1905.

⁵⁸ A similar framework for analysis has been established by Robert Jervis that places decision-makers' perceptions of other nations and of the world as an important intervening variable between events (independent variable) and foreign policy decisions (dependent variable). See Jervis, R. *Perceptions, and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.

In addition, a considerable number of Russian intellectual movements or circles did not come out with collective pronouncements both on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and on Japan but rather individual members of theirs announced publicly their own opinions on the matter. Thus, few of the research data are categorized according to the spectrum of Russian ideologies such as “Easterners,” “Westerners,” “Slavophiles,” “Populists,” or “Liberals,” “Conservatives,” “Social Democrats,” and so on. In its main bulk, the data organization follows the time framework of the investigated period. Thus, Russian intellectuals’ perceptions of Japan are divided into direct or indirect pre-war, wartime, and post-war perceptions, while Russian intellectuals’ responses to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 are reviewed in two main sections: Russian intellectuals supporting the war of 1904-5, and others opposing the war.

A survey and analysis of some prominent Russian intellectuals’ writings from the period 1855-1905 related to Japan (also shedding some light on the ideological orientations of various Russian individuals) has been conducted in order to estimate the frequency, depth, and particular usage of images of Japan. Those primary sources consist of Russian newspaper and journal articles, monographs, reminiscences, travel accounts, diaries, short stories, novels, poetry, and some Russian archival documents.

They are utilized to inform a discussion on Russian intellectuals’ perceptions of Russia and Japan’s roles in East Asia from 1855 until 1905, and their responses to the wars of 1894-5 and 1904-5.

In addition, this research is framed within the understanding of the concrete relationship between the Russian and Japanese empires at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries because a study of representations of one nation by another involves posing questions of factuality and origin of information.

II.1. Russia's Turn towards the Pacific since 1855

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Russia's diplomacy focused on gaining benefits in the Balkans and the Near East ("*Blizhnii Vostok*") from the decaying Ottoman Empire. Russia's defeat in the Crimean war of 1853-56,⁵⁹ however, undermined her influence in Europe, weakened her international prestige as a "Great Power," and shook European balance of power. It became obvious that Russia did not "inscribe" well into the European context, and was not capable to carry out there some constructive policy.

When Nicholas I's son, Alexander II, succeeded to the throne in 1855, he was aware that major reforms were necessary, and focused all state efforts in carrying them. Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov (Foreign Minister from 1856 to 1883) did his best to secure the necessary long-term peace for Russia. In his "Memorandum to the Tsar" (1856), Prince A. Gorchakov argued that Russia, no longer able to rely on the solidarity of legitimate European monarchies, should conduct a restrained policy in Europe. Therefore, she should expand her national interest in Asia in the future.⁶⁰ The problem was to formulate a foreign policy that would provide Russia with the opportunity to recover militarily and financially from the defeat, and to preserve her stance as a European power. Prince A. Gorchakov distinguished himself with the strategy he elaborated. He called it *recueillement* –that is, gathering strength while conducting Russian expansionistic policy into parts of the world such as the Asian East where there was little danger of a risky war for Russia, Schimmelpennick Van Der Oye argues.⁶¹

⁵⁹ The causes of the Crimean War (1853-56) between Russia on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and Sardinia on the other, were inherent in the unsolved Eastern Question. Russia, fighting alone against four powers, was finally defeated in 1856. The humiliating for Russia peace treaty, the so-called The Treaty of Paris (1856), demilitarized the Black Sea and deprived Russia of southern Bessarabia, and a narrow strip of land at the mouth of the Danube River. What is more, the treaty gave the West European powers the nominal duty of protecting Orthodox Christians and Slavs living in the Ottoman Empire, removing that role from Russia, which had been, destined as such protector in the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. See Macfie, A.L., *The Straits Question 1908-36*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessalonica, 1999; also Schroeder, P., *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the Concert of Europe* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972); also Piggott, F.T. *The Declaration of Paris of 1856: A Study Documented*, London: University of London Press, 1919:241; also Anderson, M. S.(ed.) *Documents of Modern History: The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923*, London: Edward Arnold, 1970:83; also Jelavich, B. *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914*, Cambridge University Press, 1991

⁶⁰ *Memorandum* qtd. in Chicherin, G.V. "Rossiya i aziatskie narody (Russia and Asian Peoples)," *Vestnik NKID*, vol.2, August 13, 1919.Reprinted in idem, *Statii i rechi* (Articles and Speeches) Moscow; izdatel'stvo Socialnoekon literatury, 1961:86-98

⁶¹ See Schimmelpennick Van Der Oye, D. *Towards the Rising Sun, Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*, Northern Illinois, University Press, 2001:112

Another proponent of Russia's peaceful penetration towards the Pacific Ocean was the Finance Minister Sergei Witte. He argued for regional political influence through economic means rather than costly territorial conquests. His decision to begin construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in March 1891 was said to have been prompted more by strategic and diplomatic considerations rather than by commercial concerns.⁶²

Under those conditions, Russia's foreign policy became oriented towards the Pacific. More specifically, the new strategy aimed at reorientation of Russia's strategic and commercial interests towards the Far East. It also targeted establishment of the biggest in the Pacific Ocean fleet capable to compete with the British in the region, and to turn into her profit the Pacific system of trade. The Japanese Sea and the Yellow Sea gained the status of the "current Mediterranean"- they divided but at the same time brought closer Russian and Japanese empires. As a result, Russia renewed her efforts to confirm her formal relations with China and Japan after 1856.⁶³

Meanwhile, within Russian society the hardships and the confusion of the social roles, which had accompanied Alexander II's social reforms, created deep craving for new ideals. Russia at the end of the seventeenth century had successfully joined the European "family of nations,"⁶⁴ and by 1815 had emerged as the most powerful state in Europe. Peter the Great's reforms in the eighteenth century introduced western models of culture and institutional structure, followed by partial secularization of the society. However, in the nineteenth century, Russia fell further "behind" the other European powers, both in terms of industrial development, and of socio-

also Ponomarev, B.N. (ed.), *Istoria SSSR s drevneishih vremen do nashikh dnei v dvukh seriakh i dvenadstati tomakh* (History of USSR since Ancient Times till Nowadays in Two Series and Twelve Volumes), 11 vol. To date (Moscow:Nauka, 1966-), 5-217

⁶² See studies on Witte's strategy done by Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, BERG, Leamington Spa/Hamburg/New York 1987; also Romanov, B.A. *Russia in Manchuria* (Ann Arbor, 1952); and Schimmelpennick Van Der Oye, D. *Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*, N. Illinois Univer. Press, 2001

⁶³ Around the time of the Crimean War in Europe, Russia explored the opportunities of opening China and Japan to Russian trade. The first formal Sino-Russian Treaty, establishing trade relations between the two empires, was signed the Ili Treaty in 1851; few years later, in 1855 Russia and Japan signed a formal diplomatic and trade treaty in Shimoda.

⁶⁴ Peter the Great succeeded in bringing Russia into a Baltic coalition against Sweden, which marked Russia's debut as a player in the European system. Through his military victories, Peter the Great acquired a direct link with Western Europe. In celebration, Peter assumed the title of "Emperor" as well as "Tsar," and Muscovite officially became the Russian Empire in 1721. See Curtis, G. E. (ed.), Chp. "Peter the Great and the Russian Empire", *Russia: A Country Study*, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1996:2-3

political transformations. What is more, her European opponents often attempted to discredit her standing. Since Frederic the Great, for example, who maintained that Russia belonged “half in Europe and half in Asia,”⁶⁵ there persisted in the “West” a stereotype about Russia being an “Asiatic empire” implying some negative connotations in it. Hence, to some western people Russia remained “culturally marginal,” to use Albert Rieber’s term.⁶⁶

Growing sense of backwardness, along with intellectual stimulus from the “West,” gave rise to intense Russian intellectuals’ debates as to the future course of Russia.

Under Nicholas I, the government exercised severe censorship and other controls over education, publishing, and all manifestations of life. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, however, the Russian government changed its position towards intellectuals’ gatherings and debates by accepting a more moderate policy. At that time, various intellectual circles arose in the place of the salons, the assemblies of the nobility, and military headquarters in the provinces. Their tribunes were the daily newspapers and the “thick journals” (*tolstye zhurnaly*). Those daily newspapers and intellectual journals started to play the role of a substitute parliament, argues Dietrich Beyrau.⁶⁷ The dilemma of Russia’s modernization and national identity turned into the focal point of intellectuals’ discussions in the wake of Alexander II’s reforms.

II.2. Image of the “Self” and the Dichotomy “East”-“West” in Russian Minds

“East” and “West” have been symbols in Russian culture for centuries and have served as reference points for Russians in their search of cultural and geopolitical identity. Russia’s crucial defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-6 made Russian political and intellectual thinkers alike to start seeking solutions for improving Russia’s internal and external situation and image.

⁶⁵ Cit. by Rieber, A. J. “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: an Interpretive Essay”, in Hugh Ragsdale (ed.), *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1993:3

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.344

⁶⁷ “Sundry secondary forums flourished for the general public: the societies and associations of the different professional groups; the universities with their rituals of public lectures and scholarly disputes, especially the highly regarded defense of doctoral theses; but also the law courts with their spectacular trials of criminals and revolutionaries; the subculture of the revolutionary circles (*kruzhki*) and conspirator groups comprising mainly students”, cit. from Beyrau, D. “Broken Identities: The Intelligentsia in Revolutionary Russia” in *Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia*, Madhavan K. Palat, ed., Palgrave, 2001:137

In the following decades, the dichotomy “East” - “West” in Russia’s further civilization development reached its peak in Russian intellectuals’ discussions. The question about the proper course of Russia’s development was tied up with the issue of her attitude towards the “West” and the “East.” Russia’s marginal position between Europe and Asia brought this issue to extreme complexity.

Especially in the mid 1850s, the influence of nationalism generated new intellectual currents within Russia.

One group, the so-called “Westerners” (“*Zapadniki*”) believed that Russia remained backward and primitive and could progress only through Europeanization. According to the mainstream “Westerners,” this could be achieved through abolishing serfdom and limiting the Autocracy. They claimed that “Peter the Great’s work marked the beginning of civilization in Russia, and that mission should be brought to an end within the lines of the Western civilization.”⁶⁸

Another intellectual group, the so-called “Socialist Revolutionaries,” (*Sotsialist Revolyutsionerii*) favored A.I. Herzen and M.A. Bakunin’s ideas of “peasant socialism.” They believed that socialist future would dawn in “young” Russia. Borrowing from “Slavophiles,” those “Revolutionaries” claimed that “Russia’s peasant commune was already “proto-socialist,” and that on this basis the Russian serf-Prometheus could propel the tsarist empire directly from autocracy to socialism...[those] revolutionary intellectuals, by looking westward through the prism of Dialectical Idealism, discovered the progressive promise of their nation’s backwardness.”⁶⁹

Similarly, “Populists” (“*Narodniki*”) believed that the Russian peasant communes possessed unique virtues that could save the world from decadence; that agriculture alone could resurrect the state. Nikolai Fyodorov (1828-1903), the father of the “Populist” ideology in the nineteenth century, wished that the agrarian civilizations of Russia and Asia (visioning Iran, India, and China) were waging a defensive struggle against the nomadic powers of the steppe allied with

⁶⁸ Roosevelt, P.R. *Apostle of Russian Liberalism: Timofei Granovsky* (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1986, qtd in Malia, M., *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1999:144

⁶⁹ See Martin Malia, loc. cit., p.145

the sea powers. His advice was that Russia should separate herself from the “European and American bandits” and side with the “underdogs” of Asia.⁷⁰

“Slavophiles” (“*Slavyanofili*”),⁷¹ on the contrary, were so deeply involved in clarification of Russia’s relations with the “West” that most of them completely neglected the Asian East-or rather, they took it for granted.⁷² . They idealized the Holy Russ that existed before Peter the Great. “They condemned Peter the Great’s westernizing revolution and venerated the devout and patriarchic society of seventeenth century Moscow as the icon of the true Russia.”⁷³ “Slavophiles” viewed old Russia as a source of wholeness and ardently criticized western rationalism and materialism. Some of them believed that the Russian peasant commune (*mir*) and the tradition of the Orthodox Church (*sobornost*) offered some attractive alternatives to western capitalism, and thus could make Russia a potential social and moral savior of Europe.⁷⁴

The question of the realms of Russia and Europe was ever put into a discussion. Russian nationalists borrowed their concepts from Europe to idealize and mobilize Russia. They sought to define best her dignity and strength. As Nikolai Ivanovich Nadezhdin (1804-1856) argued, “It is not our role to be the echo of a civilization which lies in ruins and agony..., [our role is]

⁷⁰ See Fyodorov, N. F. *Sochineniya* (Essays), M., M’isl, 1982:343

⁷¹ The most prominent “Slavophile” at the end of the nineteenth century was Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887), and Yuri Samarin (1819-1876).

⁷¹ Exception of the main stream “Slavophile” presented Konstantin N. Leont’iev (1831-1891). Tibetan and Hindu traditions were more inspiring to him than Western Christianity was. K.Leont’iev had a strong racial vision (see his *Racial Politics as a Weapon of World Revolution* 1888), and strong hopes that the Turanian element would shape the Russian Slavic culture into something spiritually more elevated and distinct from European. (Leont’iev, K.N. “Plemennaya politika kak orudie vseмирnoi revolyutsii (Tribal Politics as a World Revolution Weapon)” in *Vostok, Rossiya i slovyanstvo*(*The “East,” Russia, and Slavdom*), Collected Essays from 1885-89, published in *Sobranie Sochineniy* (Moscow: V. Sablin, 1912), 6:145-93).

⁷² For example, A.S. Homyakov (the father of the “Slavophile idea”) argued that Russia incorporated in herself a number of various tribes...but she received her name, culture, and importance by the Russian people. The rest tribes should merge with the Russians completely. A.S. Homyakov, *O starom i novom*, (About the old one and the new one), M. 1988:102

⁷² Riasanovsky, N. *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophile: A Study of Romantic Ideology* (Gloucester, Mass.: P.Smith, 1965) cited in Martin Malia, loc. cit., p.143

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ The Crimean war of 1853-56 literary shattered the Russian public understanding on the idea of Russia. Under the condition of national disgrace, the idea of Russia came up in new forms. In its new development two movements were distinguished: one, represented by N.Ya.Danilevskii and K.N. Leont’ev, resting on the absolute uniqueness and self-value of the Russian culture and her way of development, and another one, represented by F.M. Dostoevsky and VI.Solov’ev, confirming the universality and belongingness to the whole humankind of the Russian culture. See Novikova, L.I., and I.N.Sizemskaya, eds., *Rossia mezhdru Evropoi i Aziei: Evraziiskii soblazhn. Antologia, (Russia between Europe and Asia: Eurasianist temptation. Anthology)*, Nauka, 1993:7

to create a new, young, strong civilization, a genuine Russian civilization which will renew old Europe.”⁷⁵

After Russia’s crucial defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-56 by four European powers, however, the idea of Russia renewing old Europe turned to be inappropriate for the time being. New horizons had to be found to nourish Russian intellectual search for Russia’s right course of action. Naturally, the increasing western presence in Asia at that time provoked in some Russian politicians, scholars, and writers bigger interest in the “Orient,” in general, and in China and Japan, in particular.

The “Oriental theme” especially in Russian culture of the 1890s gained more and more importance. Lagging seriously behind the “West” in regards to her industrialization and socio-political reformation, Russia was faced more urgently than ever by the fateful choice whether to go the “East” or to the “West.” The dual geopolitical interpretation of the “East” by the Russians as the “European East” and “Asian East” became important not only as a factor of the tsarist policy in the Balkans and in East Asia respectively, but also as an element of the Russian national identity.

In search for a proper civilization discourse for Russia’s further development, a group of Russian intellectuals, the so-called “Easterners” (“*Vostochniki*”)⁷⁶ argued for Russian culture to be more closely affiliated with that of the “Orient” than with that of the “West.” In contrast to Western Orientalists, who referred to the “Orient” mainly to describe the past of the Western world,⁷⁷ Russian “Easterners” saw Russia’s future in the “Orient.” They believed that Russia’s “historical mission” was to merge with the “Orient” by incorporating it into the Russian Empire. Thus, Russia would profit from it both spiritually and materially, and gain strength to oppose the Western imperialistic endeavors in Asia.

⁷⁵ Citation in Kohn, H. *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*. Notre Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press. MS D377.3 K57

⁷⁶ The term Russian “Easterners” (“*Vostochniki*”) was coined by western scholars researching Russian history. Here it notifies only those intellectuals who argued for Russia’s racial or civilization kinship to Asia and did not see Asia as a “yellow threat” to Europe.

⁷⁷ Western Oriental studies of Sanskrit and the Semitic languages tended to emphasize the people of Asia (India) only in terms of the development of Western civilization. Most prominent Russian “Easterners” in the 1880s were Professor Vasilii P. Vassiliev (1818-1900), Prince Esper Ukhtomskii (1861-1921), and the Dr. Petr Alexandrovich Badmaev (B.Zhamsaran) (1849-1920)

Six decades later, (in the 1920s), “Eurasianism,”⁷⁸ with its characteristic theory of “the periphery” and “the center,” was adopted by some Russian intellectuals as a challenge to the “West.” “Eurasianism” attempted to overcome the rift in Russian intelligentsia among the pro-reform “Westerners,” pro-tsarist “Slavophiles,” and the pro-Orient “Easterners.”

Russia’s role, “Eurasianists”⁷⁹ argued, “was not to imitate western liberalism and democracy, or to reject it out of hand. Russia’s unique role was to gather from Eurasia’s rich diversity a third way, consistent with the culture and traditions of Orthodoxy and Russia but incorporating the best from the “East” and the “West.””⁸⁰ In their terms, Russia’s mission was to reform the “West” and modernize the “East.”

In brief, Russian intellectuals, belonging to different civilization schools of thought, entertained different images of Russia and her position in the world. Russian intellectuals’ visions on the Asian East as the very different “other” from Russia or as her similar, “other” rose from those conflicting Russian self-perceptions of Russia. Although it has already been a few centuries since Russia had established herself as great European state power, at the end of the nineteenth century “hot” intellectual debates were still ongoing as to whether Russia belonged to the “West” or to the “Asian East,” or presented an interesting amalgam of both. Yet, the followers of the idea of Russia as part of Asia were scarce, compared to those arguing for Russia’s civilization akin to Europe. At the end of the nineteenth century Asia was perceived by most Russian intellectuals as “immobile,” “backward,” or “decaying.”

II.3. Russia’s Mission in Asia- “Easterners’ Ideas”

Since the beginning of the reign of Tsar Nicholas I,⁸¹ however, there existed among few Russian intellectuals a different idea of Asia. They perceived Asia’s immobility not as

⁷⁸ A definition of “*Eurasianism*” as a world of ideas, which were formed in the Russian emigration of the twentieth century into a system known under the name of *Evrasiistvo*, was provided by Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938) See *Iskhod k Vostoku. Predchuvstviya i svercheniya. Utverzhdenie Evrasiitsev*(*Exodus to the East. Presentiments and Reality. Eurasianists’Assertion*), (Sofia, 1921, with articles by G.V. Florovsky, R.O.Jakobson, P.P. Savchinsky, P.N. Savitsky, and N.S. Trubetskoi.

⁷⁹ Other prominent Eurasianists at that time were Georgi Vernadskii (1897-1972), and Petr N. Savitsky (1895-1968) See Mirsky, D.S. “The Eurasian Movement,”*The Slavonic and East European Review* 6 (1927): 311-20

⁸⁰ Hahn, G. M. “The Rebirth of Eurasianism”, *The Russia Journal* #14, July 12-18, 2002, online in *Russia Weekly*, issued by Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, info@cdi.org accessed in July 2004; see also Milan Hauner, *What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today*, Boston, Unwin Hayman, 1990:60-63

⁸¹ Note: Nicholas I came upon the throne on December 1825

“sluggish” but rather as “steady.” It was in accordance with some ideas about the “East” and the “West” shared by Tsar Nicholas I and later by Tsar Nicholas II. Those autocrats exerted strict censorship against any revolutionary trends from the “West.” Thus, they believed the decay of the “Western civilization” could not affect Russian society. Russia’s unique origin and development kept being accentuated receiving various interpretations among Russian elite. The most interesting one presented Count Sergey Uvarov’s visions on Russia’s uniqueness based on her “Orthodoxy,” “Autocracy,” and “National Traits” (*narodnost*),⁸² originating from her combination of the “East,” the “West,” and the Slavic culture. He also became famous with some radical reforms while he was the Minister of Public Education (*prosveshchenie*) from 1833 to 1849.

In 1810, Count S. Uvarov proposed to Tsar Alexander I the establishment of an Oriental Academy in St. Petersburg. According to him, Russia “lies, so to speak, in Asia,” and therefore, she was in a much better position than other “enlightened” country to modernize Asian nations. “It is to Asia that we owe the foundations of a great human civilization,” argued Count S.Uvarov.⁸³ Nevertheless, Russia further developed due to her “Orthodoxy,” “Autocracy,” and “National Traits” (*narodnost*), while Asia had recently fallen behind in progress because of her “immobility.” Meanwhile, he perceived the immobility of Asian regimes in a positive light and praised the Chinese for enjoying “their supreme happiness in perfect immobility.”⁸⁴ Thus, Count S.Uvarov interpreted the Chinese “immobility” in a dual sense. On the one hand, “immobility” to him meant slow response to the modernization process, which he viewed as an obstacle in competing with the “West.” On the other hand, he perceived the Chinese “immobility as a sign of a stable and strong imperial regime.

His dubious interpretation of Chinese regime obviously aimed to praise strong autocracies, and simultaneously to justify Russia’s mission in the “East.” In order to help the Celestial Kingdom to advance, Russia should establish an Oriental Academy in Petersburg “to mediate between the civilization of Europe and the enlightenment of Asia.”⁸⁵ However, Russian strong interests in Asia should not be neglected due to her moral obligation to it, Count S.Uvarov

⁸² Count Sergey Uvarov (1786-1855) - a Russian classical scholar best remembered as an influential imperial political leader. In 1832, Uvarov was appointed Deputy Minister of Public Education. In 1833-1849, he succeeded his father-in-law Count Razumovsky as the Minister. He was elected Honorable Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1811 and was the President of that venerable institution from 1818 until his death.

⁸³ Quoted in Borodin, B., “Vozzreniia deiatelei russkoi kul’tury na Kitai,” in *Most nad rekoi vremeni. Sbornik proizvedenii russkikh i kitaiskikh avtorov* (A Bridge over the River of Time: Collection of Writings by Russian and Chinese Authors), Moscow: Sovremennik, 1989:4

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 4-5

further argued. “The simplest notions of politics suffice to perceive the advantages that would accrue to Russia were she seriously to occupy herself with Asia. Russia, which has such intimate relations with Turkey, China, Persia, and Georgia, would at the same time not only make an immense contribution to the progress of general enlightenment but would satisfy its dearest interests as well,”⁸⁶ concluded Count S. Uvarov, without specifying which Russia’s dearest interests were.

The Russian court in the early 1800s must have not perceived seriously Count S. Uvarov’s proposals for Russia’s enlightenment mission and expansion in the “East” justified on her racial and cultural kinship with Asia. Balkans and European balance of power remained Russia’s main priorities in her foreign policy for the next few decades. Moreover, it was about 60 years later when Count S. Uvarov’s dream of setting up a Department of Oriental Studies at the Petersburg University finally came true.

Still, S. Uvarov’s views on Russia’s civilization kinship to Asia and her enlightenment mission there found some followers among the so-called “Easterners” (“*Vostochniki*”) at the end of the nineteenth century. Similar to S. Uvarov, “Easterners” considered Russian culture more closely affiliated with that of the “East.” They believed that Russia’s “historical mission” was to merge with it by incorporating it into the Russian Empire.

The most curious figure among those “Easterners” is the Tibetan doctor P.A. Badmaev (named B. Zhamsaran before his baptism). He first graduated from the Sino-Mongol-Manchurian Department at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Petersburg. Then he specialized into the field of Tibetan Medicine at the Petersburg Medico-Surgical Academy.

In order to broaden his knowledge and skills in Oriental languages and medicine, P. Badmaev traveled a lot to China, Mongolia, and Tibet. He initiated the opening of the Petersburg Oriental School where a number of Buryat Mongols and Russians studied Chinese and Mongolian languages as well as Tibetan Medicine. His unconventional medical methods of treatment enjoyed great popularity in the Russian court. Having secular education, Doctor P. Badmaev quickly reached the positions of Imperial Adviser and Army General. His wish to

⁸⁶ Ouvaroff, S., “Projet d’une academie asiatique,” in *Etudes de philologie et de critique*. 2nd ed. (Paris: Typographie de Firmin Didot Frères, 1845), pp. 1–48, at pp. 8–9. transl. in Lukin, Al., *Russia between East and West: Perceptions and Reality*, Paper presented at the Joint Session of the European Consortium for Political Research (Edinburgh, 28 March-2 April 2003), p.3.

be baptized into the Christian faith was supported by Tsar Alexander II, who in 1861 became P. Badmaev's Godfather.⁸⁷

P.Badmaev was ardent proponent of the idea of Russia's turn to the Asian East. His main thesis was that by bringing closer cultures, it would be easier for Asian peoples to join the Russian empire.

In 1893, Peter Badmaev presented Alexander III a grand project about securing the Mongol-Tibetan-Chinese East voluntary joining to Russia.⁸⁸ In his proposal, he stressed upon the influence of the "White Tsar"⁸⁹ and the Orthodox Christianity on East Asia.

Similar to S. Uvarov's case, however, P.Badmaev's project did not find its application into practice. Nevertheless, it had its consequences- such as the three-hundred- day journey of Nicholas II, the Heir of the throne, around Asia in 1890-91.⁹⁰

The most prominent "Easterner" in the early nineteenth-century Russia, however, was Professor Vassily P. Vassiliev (1818-1900). He was the first Russian professor "Sinophile" who later became the establisher of the Russian Faculty for Chinese and Far Eastern Cultural Studies at the Kazhan University. V.P.Vassilev spent more than fifty years researching about East Asia, and writing extensively on Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongolian languages, culture and religion.⁹¹

⁸⁷ The broadening of the Christian church canons was at that time a part of the Russian imperial policy of assimilation of different races and cultures in the proper Russia.

⁸⁷ Qtd. In Lukoyanov, I.V., "Vostochnaya politika Rossii i P.A.Badmaev" (Russia's Eastern Politics and P.A. Badmaev). *Voprossii istorii* 14. 1., 2001:118.

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Since 1552 with Ivan IV the Horrible's start of assimilation of Siberia, peoples in the Asian part of the Russian Empire named the Russian Emperor "white tsar" which meant "emperor of West."

⁹⁰ This journey was considered of great importance at the court, the evidence for which is its three-volume description, published in 1893-95. Its author was another "Easterner," Prince E. Ukhtomskii, who had also been a participant in the expedition around Asia. See Ukhtomskii, E.E. *Puteshestvie na Vostok Evo Imperatorskigo V'isochestva Gosudarya naslednika Tsarevicha (1890-1891)* [The Journey to the East of His Imperial Highness, the Heir of the Emperor]. Collected Works- Leipzig, 1893. Vls. 1-3. N. S.

⁹¹ On Vassilev's Works, see Grohovskii, P.L. "Buddhologicheskoe nasledie V.P.Vassileva. Aktualnie vopros'i vostokovedeniya" (P.V.Vassilev's Written Inheritance about Buddhism, Significant Oriental Studies Issues), p.513, a paper presented at the 13th International Conference for Young Scholars Chelovek, Priroda, Obshtestvo, Aktualn'ie Problemi, Pb.2002;

<http://www.sovmu.spbu.ru/main/conf/man-nat-soc/2002/9-1.htm>;

Also Kuznetsova, T.V., *Kniga bez granits. Predposilki i puti proniknoveniya Russkoi knigi v Kitai (XVII-XIX v)* [Books beyond Limits. Premises and Ways of Russian Book Penetration in China (XVII-XIX C)], 2000, online

In 1839, the Kazhan Academy of Sciences sent the young then scholar V.P.Vassilev on a Christian mission to China. One of his missionary aims was gathering information about the languages and cultures of the peoples of the “East.” In Beijing, V.P.Vassilev wrote several volume works titled “Buddhism. Ego dogmaty, istoria, i literatura” [Buddhism. Its Canons, History, and Literature] (SPB. 1857), which also included articles on the Quinn Empire’s history and geography.

The Sinophile V.P.Vassilev appealed publicly for the recognition of the Chinese language and culture in Russia since China played a special role in the world history of civilization. What is more, he stressed on the necessity of maintaining good Sino-Russian relations. V.P. Vassilev wrote in 1881, “Study and description of our neighbors, especially those closer to us than some Russian remote lands comprises our scholarly as well as political obligation.” He went further arguing that Russia’s advance in the “East,” in contrast to all European Colonial Powers, was to liberate the oppressed Asian peoples from “the tyranny of internecine strife and impotency.”⁹² Thus, V.P. Vassilev also invoked Russia’s missionary role as a “bringer of enlightenment” and “protector of the oppressed” by to give a good justification for Russia’s endeavors in Asia.

Similarly, in the peak of the argument between Russia and England over Afghanistan in 1885, the Russian “populist” (“*Narodnik*”) journalist S.Yushkov in his article “Anglo-Russian Conflict” (1885) contrasted to the English exploiter of Asia, the Russian peasant-accommodator of Asian space. In his perceptions, Asia’s hope for a better future lied in Russian peasants. Russian peasants were the only ones capable of awakening the giant Asian continent to a new life. Russia’s peasant culture, being closer to Asian nations than the pompous capitalist Western culture, could serve as a catalyzer which to bring to the unification of all those suffering from the exploitation of the Western powers.⁹³

http://hghltd.yandex.com/yandbtm?url=http://www.fessl.ru/publish/periodika/vestnik/vest2000_3/11.shtm&text

⁹² From V. P.Vassiliev’s article “China’s Progress,” qtd. By Malozemoff, A., in his *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*, Octagon Books, New York, 1977:50

⁹³ On S.Yushkov’s, article “Anglo-Russian Conflict” (1885) cit. in Utkin, A. I., “Rossia i Zapad,” Chapter 9 “Ancestors”, online publ.in *Rossiiskoe Obrazovanie*, 8,12,2003, RUDN,<http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/50394>

Russia's mission to liberate and enlighten the peoples of Asia was further elaborated by another famous Russian "Sinophile," the personal adviser of Tsar Nicholas II, and newspaper publisher, Prince Esper Esperovich Ukhtomsky (1861-1921).⁹⁴

Prince E. E. Ukhtomskii, in contrast to Professor V.P.Vassilev and the journalist S.Yushkov, appealed for organic merging of the Asian East with Russia. In his book, *K sobytiyam v Kitaie. Ob otnosheniakh Zapada i Rossii k Vostoku* (On the Events in China, On the Relations of the "West" and Russia with China),⁹⁵ he alleged organic affinity of Russia with China and even with India. In his perceptions, Russia belonged more to the Asian East than to the European West. In his terms, "the "West" educated our spirit, but what a poor and weak reflection it had on the surface of our lives... Asia feels instinctively that Russia is a part of the immense spiritual world, which both spiritualists and scholars vaguely define as the "East." He argued that Asian countries, including China, had unique cultures at least equal to that of the "West."

At the same time, according to the Prince, "through us the "Orient" has gradually arrived at consciousness of itself, at a superior life... We have nothing to conquer. All these peoples of various races left themselves drawn to us, by blood, by tradition, and by ideas. We simply approach them more intimately. This great mysterious "Orient" is ready to become ours."⁹⁶ Hence, Russia being brethren to Asians was the one that could unite the Asian East, understandably by incorporating it to the Russian imperial realm. According to Prince E. Ukhtomskii, Russians were attracted instinctively to the Far East, and they shared big admiration of its peoples. Therefore, Russia's spiritual unity with the "East" would proceed naturally. In his terms, there was nothing easier for Russians than to get along with Asians.⁹⁷ Besides, "in Asia, there is in fact no border and there cannot be borders, except the unbounded blue sea, unbridled like the Russian spirit, and freely lapping against its shores."⁹⁸

Prince E. Ukhtomskii, similarly to S.Uvarov, invoked Russian "National Traits" (*narodnost*) and "Autocracy" as the uniting links between Russia and Asia. He did not argue for aggressive annexation of the Asian "East" by Russia but rather appealed for introducing to it the values of the Russian spirit and Autocracy. He was convinced that "the "East" believes in the

⁹⁴ Prince Esper Esperovich Ukhtomskii was quite a colorful figure at that time- a wealthy landowner, a specialist in Chinese culture and language, an owner of the magazine "*Peterburgskie Vedomosti*," and personal advisor of Nicholas II.

⁹⁵ Ukhtomskii, E.E., *K sobytiyam v Kitaie. Ob otnosheniakh Zapada i Rossii k Vostoku* [On the Events in China. On the Relations of the West and Russia with China] (St. Petersburg: Vostok, 1900); On Ukhtomskii's ideas see also Sarkisyanz, E., *Russia and the Messianism* (1955: 218-22)

⁹⁶ Transl. and qtd. in Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958:43-44

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 74 and 82

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 84.

supernatural powers of Russian spirit ...exactly like we do. The “East” appreciates them and understands them just as we value the best of all that has been bestowed to us by our native antiquity: the Autocracy. Without it, Asia is incapable of sincerely loving Russia and painlessly identifying itself with it. Without it, Europe would easily divide us and overcome us as it successfully did with the Western Slavs who are suffering from a bitter lot.”⁹⁹ In Prince E.Ukhtomskii’s understanding, the incorporation of the Asian East in the Russian Empire should undergo with peaceful introduction of Russian values and norms.

He stood against Russia’s participation along with the western powers in the suppression of the “Boxer Rebellion” in China since Russia’s historical sympathies do not coincide at all with Western view on the “East.”¹⁰⁰ Being Tsar Nicholas II’s personal advisor, the Prince tried to persuade him that Russia’s future was connected with that of Asia’s. As he claimed, “There is a huge abyss between Western Europe and the Asian peoples, but such abyss does not exist between Russians and Asians.”¹⁰¹ He argued that “for the Russian empire, there is only one path: either to become what she had been for centuries destined for to be- world power, uniting the “East” with the “West,” or go along the path of degradation. Because on the one hand, Europe herself will suffocate us with her superiority, and on the other, the awakening Asian tribes will be more dangerous to us than our distant relatives [Europeans]”.¹⁰² Hence, for Russia it was safer and more beneficial to be a mediator between the “East” and the “West”- uniting them and leading them.

Prince E. Ukhtomskii naturally became one of the proponents of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and systematic economic penetration into China through Manchuria. Thus in practice, Russia could dominate not only in European affairs but also in Asiatic ones. Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s attitude to the “East” was predicated on his view of Russia’s belonging to Asia. Russia’s akin to the “East” was invoked again to justify empire’s further peaceful penetration in the Pacific region.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p.85-6

¹⁰⁰ See Ukhtomskii, E. E. *K sobytiiam v Kitaie. Ob otnosheniiakh Zapada i Rossii k Vostoku* [On the Events in China. On the Relations of the West and Russia with China] (St. Petersburg: Vostok, 1900), p.17-18

¹⁰¹ Ibid.p.18

¹⁰² Qtd. in Ol’denburg, S.S., *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaya II.* (Reign of Emperor Nicholas II), Rostov na Don, 1998:103.

From all of the above written on Russian “Easterners,” there could be distinguished several peculiar parallels in their perceptions of Russia and the “Asian East.”

More specifically, Russian Easterners’ idea on Asia came in slightly different varieties over the 1800s:

- It implied some sort of solidarity (equal or hierarchical) but varied in terms of boundaries of “Asia,” and concrete ideological content;
- Russia and Asia were seen as allies opposing a Western expansion in the Pacific;
- Russia was at times seen as a carrier of Western civilization to Asia;
- Russia was imagined also to be a model of a synthesizer of the best from the Eastern and Western civilizations;
- Russia was seen as a bringer of a distinctive civilization capable of uniting the “East” and the “West.”

The three later versions implied an unequal relationship between Russia and the rest of Asia, with Russia playing the role of the leader.

Compared with the strong Russian cultural affinities with the “European East,” however, the boundary of the sense of Russian cultural affinity with the “Asian East” was rather vague. Unlike the Slavic or Orthodox region, the “Asian East” was not defined by clear boundaries. Hence, some Russian intellectuals, such as Prince E.Ukhtomskii, alleged Russia’s racial and civilization commonality with China, and even India.

It must be admitted, however, that Russia’s turn to the “Asian East” in search or bringing of spiritual enlightenment and allies against the “West” was not a popular idea among the Russian intellectuals compared to those of the “Slavophil” and the “Westerners” at that time. Few were those intellectuals who shared such an understanding for Russia’s further course of action. The fact that those Russian intellectuals who came up with suggestions on Russia and the “Asian East” did not perceive or call themselves as “Easterners” in contrast to the “Slavophiles” who had even elaborated a political platform for their demands, also supports that argument. What is more, Russia has built through the centuries her pillars of governance on the strong faith in the Autocracy, Orthodox Christianity, and Slav uniqueness. Hence, in the beginning of the twentieth century, when Russia deeply advanced in the Pacific region, Russian ruling elite found it difficult to justify Russia’s expansion there and strive for a regional hegemony by making a claim of being the cultural or political center of the Asian region as they did in the Balkans. In practice, to protect Russia’s security and economic interests in the Pacific in the 1850s, the Russian government followed closely the steps of the American one, and exerted

some pressure on China and Japan, thus succeeding in concluding diplomatic and trade agreements with the two East Asian empires.

II.4. Initial State of Information on Japan

II.4.1. General Outline of Russia's Encounters with Japan (1855-1900)

Russian first encounters with Japan could be traced back to 1702 when the first introduction of a Japanese man, a merchant named Dembei, to the Russian court was recorded.¹⁰³ Since then until 1855, Russo-Japanese encounters were limited mostly to few Russian expeditions trying to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the secluded at that time Japan or to explore her shores for geographical purposes or for ethnographic descriptions of the Pacific region.¹⁰⁴

When Russo-Japanese demarcation began in 1855, the buffer zone between Japan and Russia, created by Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, “transformed into an arena of shifting frontiers.”¹⁰⁵ This marked the beginning of the Russo-Japanese clashes of regional interests followed by a decade that witnessed Russia's expansion eastward to the Pacific Ocean,¹⁰⁶ and Japan's opening by the Commodore Mathew Perry.

¹⁰³ In 1702, V. Atlasov introduced to Peter the Great (1672–1725) a Japanese merchant captured in Kamchatka, named Dembei. The Russian Tsar personally questioned the Japanese man about Japan and the Japanese people, and then assigned him as an instructor of Japanese language to children.

¹⁰⁴ On narratives on Japan written by Russian explorers, official envoys, scholars, and tourists between 1792 and 1913, translated in English see Wells, D. N. (ed. and transl.), *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913, an Anthology of Travel Writing*, Routledge Curzon, London and New York, 2004.

¹⁰⁵ See Stephan, J.J., ‘On the Historical Frontier’, in “*Northern Territories” and Beyond. Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives*, J.E.Goodby, V.I.Ivanov, N. Shimotamai (eds.), Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, 1995:47-55;

George Alexander Lensen expressed a similar view arguing that “the [Russo-Japanese] relations from 1697 to 1875 revolve primarily around two Russian objectives: the establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations with Japan and the delineation of a Russo-Japanese frontier. After 1875 considerations of a different nature fix the attention, and Russo-Japanese relations, with their extension to the Asiatic mainland, become a more integral part of Far Eastern international relations as a whole.” Lensen, G. Al., *The Russian Push toward Japan. Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875*, Octagon Books, New York, 1971:viii

¹⁰⁶ “In 1850 Russians founded Nikolaevsk at the mouth of the Amur River. Three years later, they occupied Sakhalin, the long slender island that stretched 593 miles along the Asiatic coast just north of Japan's island of Hokkaido. Then, while fighting Britain and France in the Crimean War of 1854- 56, Russian forces occupied the northern bank of the Amour River, a move that was flagrant violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, which recognized the area as Chinese territory” Esthus, R. A., *Double Eagle and Rising Sun. The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 1988:1

By signing of the Treaty of Shimoda in February 1855 about trade and borders, Russia and Japan established their first formal relations. This, however, did not immediately lead to extensive Russian contacts with Japan. Records show that until 1868 there were rare Russian individual encounters with Japan- those of single Russian sailors, explorers, merchants, and diplomats visiting or studying Japan during that period.

Vassilii Mikhailovich Golovnin (1776-1831) emotionally described the earliest famous close prolonged contact between Russians and Japanese in his reminiscences on Japan. Captain V.M. Golovnin was captured in 1811 by Japanese authorities during an attempt to penetrate the waters of the Kuriles and Hokkaido. V.M.Golovnin spent three years in Japanese captivity (1811, 1812, and 1813).¹⁰⁷ It is said that he contributed to the better understanding between Russians and Japanese in the early 1800s. “Golovnin had gained the esteem and affection of his captors, and when he left there was a festive farewell gathering in which Russians and Japanese took part in great harmony. The Japanese crowded round their one-time prisoners with gifts and kind words, and some were on the verge of tears at parting. As the frigate “Diana” was towed out, the Japanese and Russians exchanged thunderous cheers.”¹⁰⁸ Such a behavior demonstrated a unique intercourse between Japanese and Russians, combining fear and attraction. V.M. Golovnin’s was the most important trial to establish good relations with the Japanese on the Kuril Islands. This intercourse played an important part in revealing to the Japanese their weakness and in opening a breach in the policy of seclusion.

Captain V.M. Golovnin’s memoirs of his adventures in Japan were noted as “remarkably objective and sympathetic” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*¹⁰⁹ V.M. Golovnin’s book comprises three parts. The first and the second ones are full of descriptions of his everyday life in captivity. Those two parts are not divided into separate chapters but look more like a science fiction plot. Author’s personal perceptions of the Japanese and their lifestyle and customs prevail in them. V.M. Golovnin praised the high level of Japanese education, the concern of the

¹⁰⁷ Vassilii Golovnin was the Captain of the frigates “Diana” (1807—1809) and “Kamchatka” (1817—1819). In 1811, Golovnin described and mapped the Kuril Islands from the Strait of Hope to the eastern shores of the Iturup Island (*Etorofu* in Japanese). While exploring the Kunashir Island (*Kunashiri* in Japanese), Golovnin was taken prisoner for two years by the Japanese. It was only in 1813 that the admiral and his team were freed thanks to the Japanese merchant, Takadaya Kaheya. In 1821, Golovnin was appointed assistant director of the Naval College, and later in 1823 - General Quartermaster of the Fleet.

¹⁰⁸ Golovnin’s memoirs excerpted in Lensen, G.Al., *Russia’s Eastward Expansion* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964:61-5

¹⁰⁹ Excerpt from the *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, Tokyo ; New York, N.Y. : Kodansha, 1983, vol.3 :45

Japanese government for its subjects, the “sensitivity,” “astuteness,” “honesty,” “hospitality,” and “cleanliness of the Japanese people.” He portrayed the Japanese as “fiery patriots,” conscious not only of the harm that foreign actions had brought in years past, but confident of their own superiority. V.M. Golovnin noted Japanese “civility,” “courtesy,” and “courage.” He felt that the Japanese lagged behind Europe in many aspects, but he noted that their capabilities were tremendous and predicted that they would catch up with the Europeans and become potential rivals in the future if they chose to modernize and to arm.¹¹⁰

The third part of his book looks more like a directory book. It comprises nine sections- about Japan’s geography, the origin of the Japanese, their national traits, religion, customs and traditions, state government, commerce, manufacture and so on. G.M. Golovnin’s work became the first source about Japan published in Russia, revealing so many different aspects of Japanese society and people. It was also published in English in 1818,¹¹¹ and was considered an invaluable source of information about Japan and the Japanese at the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹¹² It was also evidence that the secluded Japan started gradually to broaden her perceptions of the surrounding world, and to open for contacts with other nations.

Because of her long seclusion, Japan was perceived by Europeans as “weak” and “less civilized” according to western standards of civilization and state power. The image of Japan in Europe was that of a “distant outsider”- “mysterious” and “beautiful” but “weak” and “backward,” needing guidance along the path of civilization. V.M. Golovnin’s perceptions of Japan and the Japanese introduced a considerably different image of the isolated country. Nevertheless, Japan kept being perceived by Russian educated elite as a “primitive” “exotic” state (similarly to most writings in the “West”). Hence, she remained out of the scope of the Russian intellectuals’ discussions around that time, which focused mostly on what civilization model Russia was to follow, and what she could gain from it.

Russian intellectuals’ interest in Japan, actually, began with Japan’s growth of influence in the Far East. In the first two decades of Japan’s opening and reformation, there began to arrive in Japan the first voyages of Russian missionaries, explorers, scholars, political journalists, businessmen, military officers, scientists, artists, diplomats, or other government officials.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, vol.3 :45

¹¹¹ Golovnin, V. M., [*Narrative of My Captivity in Japan*, (London: Colburne, 1818)]

¹¹² Golovnin, V.M, *Zapiski flota kapitana Golovina o priklyucheniayah ego v plenu u iapontsev: v 1811, 1812-1 1813g s priobshcheniem zamechanii ego o Iaponskom gosudarstve i narode: [v 3 ch.]* (The Fleet Captain Golovnin’s Notes about His Adventures as a Captive of the Japanese in 1811, 1812, and 1813with some review of Japanese state and people: in 3 parts), SPB.: V Morskoi typography, 1816

They imminently exerted some influence on Russian perceptions of Japan and the Japanese upon their return to Russia.

The Russian journals *Morskoy sbornik*, *Otechestvenn'iya zapiski*, *Zhivopisnoe obozrenie*, *Delo*, *Niva*, *Russkoe Slovo*, *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, *Vestnik Evropii*, and some others, published a number of reminiscences of Russian naval officers, explorers, and diplomats about Japan.¹¹³ Naturally, coming from different shapes, forms, and backgrounds, those perceptions of the Country of the Rising Sun differed. Russians used to view Japan through the prism of their cultural backgrounds and personal experiences.¹¹⁴ What is more, there was also difference in the perceptions of Japan among Russians who resided in Japan and saw the country first hand compared to the majority Russians who had to rely on current publications on Japan.¹¹⁵ In addition to the various accounts of Russian sailors, explorers and diplomats, there appeared few Russian scholarly works on Japanese geography; history, institutions and ethnography, and the main western European studies of Japan were translated into Russian.¹¹⁶

At a broad level, Russian images of Japan at the end of the nineteenth century were also shaped by some information on Japan coming from Western Europe, mainly from France, Germany, and England. During that time, Europeans imagined Japan to be an exotic country of samurai, geishas, Zen gardens, chrysanthemums, *hara-kiri*, tea ceremonies, and multitudes of religious festivals- images exclusively based on few travel antologies or popular fiction novels. For example, Fedor M. Dostoevsky, the most popular Russian writer in late 1860s, was also influenced by the “exotic” Japanese custom of committing a *hara-kiri* about which he wrote in his novel *Idiot* (1868),¹¹⁷ and by the mandatory military service in Japan which he referred to later in his *Dnevnik* (Diary)(1883).¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Early interesting accounts on Japan presented Ivan Krusenstern's *Voyage around the World (Nagasaki, 1804-5)*, and A.Kornilov's *In the East (Hakodate, late 1850s)*. See Ivan Krusenstern, and A.Kornilov's reminiscences translated in English in David N.Wells, (ed.), *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913. An Anthology of Travel Writing*, Rutledge Curzon, UK, 2004

¹¹⁴ A possible explanation for such evaluations and creation of image of the “other” is that people often choose in an evaluative process of thought to adopt a set of close to their understanding criteria, which they later use to judge fact claims *a priori* and that in some sense fulfills their need to know things about the world “in the best manner.” On creation of belief systems and images see Dr Berggren, N. “A Note on The Concept of Belief”, on-line, 28 Sept.2004, <http://www.trufax.org/general/beliefsystems.html>

¹¹⁵ Dr Berton, P. “Japanese Studies in the West: Russian Japanology and Perspectives on Japan,” in *Tsushin*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2000

¹¹⁶ Kirby, E. St. *Russian Studies of Japan. An Exploratory Survey*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981

¹¹⁷ Fedor M. Dostoevsky, *Idiot*, first published in series in 1868 in the journal *Russkii Vestnik*

¹¹⁸ See *Bibliographia, pisma, zametki iz zapisnoi knizki F.M. Dostoevskogo*, (F.M. Dostoevskii's Bibliography, Letters, Comments, and Notebook), M. 1883 ã. SPB. Typography A.S. Suvorin, [2], 332, 375, 122, V.,

Pierre Loti's novel *Madame Chrysanthème* (Paris, 1887)¹¹⁹, however, was the most well known novel on Japan in Europe during that period. There the Japanese were denigrated presented as “small dolls,” “figurines of yellow ivory,” or “little monkeys without intelligence.” The image of the Japanese lifestyle was one of a “sugary, pink-tinted reality,” and Japanese things and people were “microscopique,” “miniscule,” “miniature,” argues Setsuko Ono in her studies on P. Loti.¹²⁰ According to her, since smallness connotes children, women, pet animals, toys, or insects, such images refer to physical weakness and general inferiority. Those physical characteristics are often extended to moral and mental characteristics such as “childish,” “easily affected,” “immoral,” and so on. Hence, the general observation that persisted then among Europeans was that Japan was not to be perceived seriously, concludes Setsuko Ono.¹²¹

In fact, “exotic” was a theme, which appeared in all general books about Japan in the mid-1880s¹²² focusing on some Japanese idiosyncrasies and characteristics unfamiliar in the “West.” However, one constant theme was the “smallness” of everything. That created the image of a “toy-like quality” of Japan. Hence, it could be argued that the attribution of such characteristics to Japan often led to a general observation that she was not to be perceived seriously as a state. It was said that Pierre Loti's novel *Madame Chrysanthème* was deeply influential on the Russian court and partly responsible for Russian underestimations of Japanese military and political strength in 1904.¹²³ Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovskii in his travel

¹¹⁹ Loti, P. *Madame Chrysantheme* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1887), first edition.

From 1887 to 1924, Loti's *Madame Chrysantheme* was translated into seven European languages and reached 222 editions. “Pierre Loti was the “first literary observer of talent” to visit Japan. He shaped the mentality of the epoch. His popularity and fame were such that wherever he went, he was received by the head of the state.” Ono, S., *A Western Image of Japan. What did the West see through the eyes of Loti and Hearn?*, A Ph.D. thesis N.235, Genève, 1972:7

¹²⁰ Pierre Loti, *Madame Chrysanthème*, 1893:220, qtd. in Setsuko Ono, *a Western Image of Japan. What did the West see through the eyes of Loti and Hearn?*, A Ph.D. thesis N.235, Genève, 1972:31.

¹²¹ Ono, S., *A Western Image of Japan*, loc. It., pp30-31.

¹²² Published materials about Japan in Russian at that time comprised mainly some Russian travel notes on Japan as well as a few translated western popular novels on Japan and the Japanese such as Pierre Loti's *Madame Chrysanthème* (Paris, 1893), and *Japoneries d'Automne* (Paris, 1889), as well as Lafcadio Hearn's *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan* (1894), *Out of the East: Reveries and Studies in New Japan* (1895), *Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life* (1896), to mention but a few of Hearn's most translated works written during his life in Japan. On Loti and Hearn, see Setsuko Ono, *a Western Image of Japan. What did the West see through the eyes of Loti and Hearn?* A Ph.D. thesis N.235, Genève, 1972

¹²³ Lehmann, J.P. *The Image of Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850-1905*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978:44-45; p.93

notes “Around Korea, Manchuria, and the Liaodong Peninsula (Nagasaki, Yokohama, 1898)” also admitted to have been influenced by Pierre Loti’s novel on Japan.¹²⁴

However, images of the “other” are rarely perceived by one nation unanimously. On the contrary, perceptions of the “other,” happening at different times and stages of development of both the perceived and the perceiving, often finalize in a multifarious phenomenon comprising conflicting images of the “other.” Hence, along with some denigrating images of Japan, there also co-existed peacefully some positive images of it among the Russian intellectual circles.

For example, the mid-nineteenth-century Japan was much admired in Russian artistic circles. At that time, Europe was in full swing under the fashion of what the French called “*Japonisme*.” Consequently, Russia was also grasped by the charm of the Japanese Art and poetry. “*Japonisme*” found its reflection in European everyday life on teapots and vases, in the fabric of women’s dresses, and in the way people arranged flowers.¹²⁵ From 1896, Japanese art exhibitions started to be held in Russia under the initiative of Sergey Kitaev.¹²⁶ “Features such as the absence of perspective and shadow in the western sense, the use of empty space and asymmetry influenced many artists in Europe, including the Russians V.V.Kandinskii,¹²⁷ M.Z.Chagall,¹²⁸ A. Ostroumova-Lebedeva, and V. Falifeev.”¹²⁹ Several Russian writers were also interested in Japanese culture and literature before 1904, notably Anton Chekhov, Nikolai-Garin-Mikhailovski, Leonid Andreev, and the poets “Symbolists”-Valerii Bruisov, Andrei Bely, and Konstantin Bal’mont. “Bruisov, Bely and Bal’mont all made translations and imitations of Japanese poetic forms, and a Japanese influence has been detected more generally in the Russian writing of the entire *art nouveau* period.”¹³⁰

¹²⁴ Garin-Mikhailovski, N. “Around Korea, Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula (Nagasaki, Yokohama, 1898)” in David N. Wells, ed. and transl., *Russian Views of Japan 1792-1913. An anthology of travel writing*, Rutledge Curzon, London and New York, 2004:177

¹²⁵ Enchi, F., *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, Part I “Among Themselves. The Invisible Japanese, Masks,” 1958

¹²⁶ Sergey Nicholaevich Kitaev (1864-1927) - Russian officer, member of the Petersburg Society of Water-Color Artists; ardent collector of Far Eastern Art; the majority of his collection comprised Japanese engravings from XVII C.; died in Japan.

¹²⁷ Vassily Vassil’evich Kandinskii (1866- 1944)- famous Russian artist and theoretician of Art, founder of Russian abstractionism, leader of Russian Vanguard Art;

¹²⁸ Mark Zakharovich Shagal (1887- 1985) – a prominent Russian artist, one of the world leaders of the Vanguard Art in XX C.

¹²⁹ Goreglyad, V. N. “Russian-Japanese Relations: Some Reflections on Political and Cultural Tendencies”, in. Rimer, J.Th. (ed.) *A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford, 1995:198

¹³⁰ Rannit, Al. “Anna Akhmatova Considered in a Context of Art Nouveau,” in *Anna Akhmatova, Sochineniia(Stories)*, ed. G.P. Struve and B.A. Filippov, vol.2, Washington, 1968:21-4.

As for the academic level, the Russian state of information about Japan kept increasing. In 1865 Iosiff A. Goshkevich (1815–1875), the first Russian imperial consul in Japan (also famous for his Russo-Japanese dictionary, 1857) brought to Petersburg the first Japanese students to study at various Petersburg institutions.¹³¹ Japanese language began officially to be taught at the University of Petersburg in 1870, and Japanese studies were further encouraged by the donation of Prince Arisugawa in 1883 of three and a half thousand books to the university library. A separate Japanese department was established in 1898, and the following year a similar department was opened in Vladivostok.¹³² Those Japanese students and Japanese books presented a good opportunity to Petersburg's academic society in the 1870s and 80s for the first time to have a direct contact with Japanese people and culture.

Although all those cross cultural activities taking place in Russia in the 70s and 80s of the nineteenth century, however, Russian interest in Japan remained in the periphery of the Russian intellectuals' debates compared to their interest in European model of culture, politics, and economy during that time. Hence, Russian writings on Japan until the beginning of the twentieth century were scarce.

II.4.2. Visits to Pre-Meiji Japan

- Ivan A. Goncharov's Frigate "Palada"

Russian crews' experiences in Japan in 1853 and 1858 reveal some interesting examples for the beginning stage of the Russo-Japanese relations and Russian first-hand perceptions of Japan.¹³³ Besides the formal accounts of those expeditions, Ivan Goncharov's¹³⁴ book titled *Frigate*

¹³¹ Iosif Antonovich Goshkevich (1815–1875) served as the first Russian Imperial Consul in Hakodate, Japan from 1858 to 1865. <http://www.japantoday.ru/japanaz/g28.shtml>

¹³² Dal'nevostochnii gosudarstvennii universitet, *Istoriya i sovremennost' 1899-1999*, (History and Present) Vladivostok, DVGU, 1999:13

¹³³ Among those reminiscences the most popular were Ivan Krusenstern's *Voyage around the World (Nagasaki, 1804-5)*; Vasilii Golovnin's *Narrative of My Captivity in Japan (Ezo, 1811)*; A.Kornilov's *In the East (Hakodate, late 1850s)*.see Wells, D.N., (ed.), *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913. An Anthology of Travel Writing*, Rutledge Curzon, UK, 2004

¹³⁴ Ivan A. Goncharov (1812–1891) – a famous Russian writer and publicist. From 1853 to 1855, Goncharov attended the first Putiatin's expedition to Japan as his personal assistant. Upon his return to Russia, Goncharov gained the position of a Censor at the Ministry of State Enlightenment [Education]. He published his travel notes in several articles under the title *Frigate Pallada* in Petersburg journals: *Morskoi sbornik*, *Otechestvenn'ie zapiski*, *Sovremennik*, *Bibliotheca dlya cheteniya*, and *Russkii vestnik*

“*Pallada*” (Nagasaki, 1853) presents an interesting example of a first-hand experience with Japanese culture before the Meiji reforms. It demonstrates a peculiar Russian view on the long time secluded Japan.

Several times since the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia tried to establish relations with Japan by sending expeditions with her embassies on board, yet, unsuccessfully. Secluded Japan kept refusing to deal formally with Russia. International environment in the nineteenth century, however, provoked Russia to send one more embassy to Japan. There was a deep necessity to do her border demarcation in the Far East. What is more, Petersburg believed that an eventual establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between Japan and Russia would bring to consolidation of Russia’s position in the Pacific region. In addition, Russians also considered some possibilities of American or European forceful opening of Japan, which in turn would endanger Russian Far East if done before the border demarcation and the establishment of formal Russo-Japanese relations.

A special committee was set up to deal explicitly with Russia’s interests in the Far East. It came up with a recommendation that the government should send Vice-Admiral E. V. Putyatin on an expedition to China and Japan. The main mission of this Russian embassy was to sign a trade treaty with Japan. E.V. Putyatin received orders to act with exceptional peace and tact, and to conform to the Japanese. The Vice-Admiral received a letter from the Tsar into which the friendly character of Russian visit and a request for opening of Japanese ports for Russian commercial ships were stated explicitly.¹³⁵

It was only five weeks after Commodore Perry’s landing at Kurihama on August 22, 1853, when the four Russian warships, led by Vice Admiral Efvim Putiatin, anchored in the Nagasaki Harbor. On the board of one of those ships, frigate “*Pallada*,” was the famous Russian writer Ivan Goncharov. He was assigned as the Vice-Admiral E.V.Putiatin’s official secretary. On his return from Japan in 1855, I.Goncharov published his notes on Asia in a two-volume edition under the title *Frigate “Pallada.”*

in the period 1855-1858. Because of the increased interest in it, a third edition of the travel anthology *Frigate Pallada* was released in January 1879. *Frigate “Pallada.” Ocherki puteshestvia v dvuh tomah*, (Frigate “Pallada.” Anthology of Travel Notes in Two Volumes), Ornatskaia, T.I., and D.B. Oznobishin, (eds.), Leningrad, izdatel’stvo “Nauka,” 1986, 3rd edition.

¹³⁵ Krainyuk N.Yu. N.A. Samoilov, and A.V. Filippov, *Rossia i Iaponia* (Russia and Japan), website of scholarly works (http://snprinc.newmail.ru/r_about.html), 2005.

I. Goncharov was highly praised by his contemporaries and thereafter. His name was often mentioned along with those of the great thinkers and writers of the 1850s and 60s such as N. G. Chernishevskii, Al. I. Herzen, N. A. Nekrasov, N. A. Dobrolyubov, M. E. Salt'ikov-Shtedrin, and I. S. Turgenev.¹³⁶ I. Goncharov was called a poet-artist who objectively, even naturalistically in details drew his observations.¹³⁷ *Frigate "Pallada"* enjoyed big success among Russian educated elite during that time. Because of the increased interest in it, under the insistence of the reading audience, and schoolteachers, as well as school librarians, a third edition of the travel anthology *Frigate "Pallada"* was released in January 1879.¹³⁸

Due to the strict military order on the ship, the author admitted that he left the frigate "Pallada" only a few times. Most of his descriptions were based on his observations from the deck of the ship. Therefore, he confessed that *Frigate "Pallada"* did not present a systematic travel anthology, rather it came out to be a collection of some travel notes, remarks, scenes, and sceneries described in his letters to friends. He excused himself for his personal presence in the travel notes; however, he found author's presence in a book to be the most suitable form for a travel work based on the collection of his personal correspondence with friends during the two-year traveling.

The description of Japan and the Japanese is in volume two, under the title, "Russkia v Iaponii v kontse 1853 i v nachale 1854 godov" (Russians in Japan at the End of 1853 and the Beginning of 1854) from p.242 to p.307 and from p.344 to p.379. I. Goncharov dedicated to Japan a one hundred-page description, which considerably exceeded any of his other descriptions of places visited by the Russians on the frigate *Pallada's* one-year cruise from Europe to the Pacific and back to Petersburg via Siberia. This manifests that Russians had a serious mission to fulfill in Japan- the establishment of the first formal diplomatic relations between the Russian and Japanese empires. Hence, any denigrated description of Japan given by an official from the frigate *Pallada's* delegation could have harmed the future relations between the two countries. That might be another reason (besides author's naturalistic style of

¹³⁶ Lyatskii, E. *Goncharov- Zizn, lichnost, tvorchestvo. Kritiko-biographicheskie ocherki* (Goncharov- Life, Personality, Works. Critico-biographical Essays), Stockholm, Severn'ie Ogni, 1920:2

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.14

¹³⁸ See the "Author's Remarks" to the third edition of *Frigate Pallada*, January 1879 reprinted in Goncharov, I. *Frigate "Pallada." Ocherki puteshestvia v dvuh tomah* (Frigate "Pallada." Anthology of Travel Notes in Two Volumes), Ornatskaia, T.I., and D.B. Oznobishin, (eds.), Leningrad, izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1986, 3rd edition

writing) why I.Goncharov was trying to be a dispassionate objective observer of Japan and the Japanese.

Nevertheless, in few passages of his one-hundred- page description of Japan, I.Goncharov let his personal feelings prevail his naturalistic observations regarding Japanese nature, governing system, people's appearances, habits, and traditions.

His *schemata* of Japan were obviously constructed in advance based on some preliminary knowledge. It is evident from his exclamation at his first sight of Japanese islands,

“Here it is that country like a locked casket, with a lost key; a lot have in vain endeavored to turn her into their friend by treacherous politics, gold, or by force; here is that great heap of humanity, who cunningly evade from the Ferula of the civilization; who dares to live in accordance to their own understanding and rules; who directly refuses any friendship, religion, or trade with foreigners; who laughs at our attempts to enlighten them, and by some inner, random laws of their anthill, rejects the natural law, and the peoples' law, and any European law, and any injustice.”¹³⁹

A similar view persisted in European images of Japan in early 1850s.¹⁴⁰ In addition, in I.Goncharov's theory on the origin of the Japanese people, Japan was perceived as an integrative part of the “Orient.”¹⁴¹ Similar to previous European writers on Japan, I.Goncharov emphasized the contrast between Japanese and Europeans- as a behavior and appearance.¹⁴²

Initially, Admiral Putiatin and his crew were pessimistic about Japan since the previous Russian diplomatic expedition led by N.P. Rezanov had met only hostility of the Japanese authorities, and had failed. As Ivan Goncharov, wrote: “We were entering [the harbor] with a somewhat compressed heart, at least I was, with the feeling with which one enters a prison, even though the prison is planted with trees.”¹⁴³ Much to Russians' surprise, the Japanese authorities appeared to be more willing to establish relations with the Russians this time. In this respect Goncharov wrote, “The Japanese are not at all what they were forty years ago.” “Times changed, and they started treating foreign visitors with extreme politeness.”¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Ibid, Volume two, Chapter I- “Russians in Japan at the end of 1853 and the beginning of 1854”, 1986: 246

¹⁴⁰ Ono, S. *A Western Image of Japan. What did the West see through the eyes of Loti and Hearn?*, A Ph.D. thesis N.235, Genève, 1972

¹⁴¹ *Frigate “Pallada”*, 3rd ed., Volume two, Chapter I- “Russians in Japan at the end of 1853 and the beginning of 1854”, 1986:261

¹⁴² *Frigate Pallada*, 3rd ed., Volume two, 1986: 362

¹⁴³ McOmie, W. “*The Frigate Askold and the Opening of the Russian Foreign Settlement at Nagasaki*”, on-line article, http://www.uwosh.edu/home_pages/faculty_staff/earns/home.html

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Goncharov referred to cases mentioned by Golovin (*Zapiski flota kapitana Golovina o priklyucheniyah ego u iapontsev v 1811, 1812, 1813 godah* [Naval Captain Golovin's Notes on his

Nevertheless, he criticized the Japanese inability to lead an effective dialogue with the Europeans “due to their highly-developed system of mutual espionage and habitual mendacity.”¹⁴⁵ In their contacts with the Russians, the Japanese behaved with “childish mistrust to our visit and suspicion of our having some evil schemes towards them,”¹⁴⁶ claimed I.Goncharov. Moreover, “They are constantly frightened¹⁴⁷ [of each other], and everything [that’s, to speak freely] is forbidden to them.”¹⁴⁸“They have to ask permission from the superior for everything,”¹⁴⁹ pointed out I.Goncharov.

When explaining Japanese governing system, I.Goncharov revealed his discontent that due to its hierarchical social structure, Russians had to wait for months to get a reply from the Mikado.¹⁵⁰ The Japanese officials did not dare to accept any documents from the Russians or discuss any issue with them without the rulers’ permission.¹⁵¹ This hierarchical system was very strictly observed, “Someone’s disloyalty was demanded to be followed by his committing *seppuku*.” I.Goncharov, when referring to Japanese subordination system, often mentioned that form of suicide.¹⁵² Therefore, he concluded, Japanese society would long remain a closed system. “And it could not be changed by force or wittiness, but our hope for a change lies in their cowardice.”¹⁵³ In addition, Japanese people “feel strong necessity of development... The people are poor, need to communicate with others... They are sociable, and easily get attracted to new things; and if they were not followed constantly by spies, we would have concluded tractates without the agreement of the Shogun...,”¹⁵⁴ argued I.Goncharov. Although the generally friendly and cordial relations between Russian officers and Japanese officials, the regulations that prevented the Russians from going ashore freely, were viewed as evidence of Japanese common distrust to foreigners.

Adventures and Encounters with Japanese in 1811, 1812, 1813] when Japanese used to capture any foreigner that happened to land on Japanese soil. p.256.

¹⁴⁵ Ivan Goncharov quoted in Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Goncharov, I., *Frigate “Pallada”*, 3rd ed., Volume two,1986:249

¹⁴⁷ “Ibid, p. 255- Goncharov refers to the Japanese spy system

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p.272, p.349

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.349

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.252, p.275

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Ibid., p.248, p.257, p.277

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p.365

Besides, the image of Japan as a “poor” country persists in I. Goncharov’s notes as evident from his descriptions of Japanese clothing and lifestyle.¹⁵⁵ The Japanese men looking “feminine,”¹⁵⁶ (a popular perception in Europe during that time) was another often-mentioned topic by I.Goncharov. The Japanese men are “so gentle,”¹⁵⁷ “their well-shaven faces and hairstyle do not give them a manlike look,”¹⁵⁸ claimed I.Goncharov. He saw European superiority in European men’s “masculinity and sturdiness.”

Another Western stereotype about Japan shared by I.Goncharov was that “everything in Japan is small- their boats, the houses, the meals, the cutlery.”¹⁵⁹

Nevertheless, he was stunned by the beauty of the Japanese nature,¹⁶⁰ Japanese cleanness, and orderliness in everything, as well as their natural curiosity towards everything new and their desire to learn.¹⁶¹ In fact, Japanese “orderliness” and “cleanness” are virtues most often admired by I.Goncharov in his notes.

On the other hand, although having mainly contacts with Japanese interpreters, local officials, and sailors, I. Goncharov came up with generalizations about Japanese people. To him, most of them “lack lively eye expressions, brave appearance, vivid curiosity, and briskness- all those features are so consciously well- possessed by European men.”¹⁶² European superiority again was evoked to express implicitly the notion of Japanese men being physically and spiritually inferior to the Europeans, and thus, easy to deal with. “You cannot see any manful, energetic facial expression,” further argued I.Goncharov, “rather there are a lot of cunning and clever ones.”¹⁶³ Thus, another western stereotype of Japanese being “mean” and “witty,” concealing well their true feelings and thoughts, comes ahead.¹⁶⁴

The notion of “*Jeune Japon*”¹⁶⁵ (young Japan) was also stated explicitly in several paragraphs. He perceived Japan as young, exhausted but inhabited by cunning people who were like

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.247; p.258, p.274,p.347

¹⁵⁶ Ono, S. A *Western Image of Japan. What did the West see through the eyes of Loti and Hearn?*, A Ph.D. thesis N.235, Genève, 1972

¹⁵⁷ Goncharov, I., *Frigate “Pallada”*, 3rd ed., Volume two, 1986:249

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.370

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p.251-2

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p.278, p.283, p.284, p.357,p.362

¹⁶² Ibid., p.262

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.258

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.,p.348

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.294, p.348

children¹⁶⁶ who needed to be guided by a senior. Moreover “If we do not do that, and the Americans do not do it either, then somebody after them will do it, but it is destined to happen- to transfuse some fresh healthy fluid in Japan’s veins, which she spilled suicidally and became enfeebled and lost in the darkness of a pitiful childhood.”¹⁶⁷ “There could be seen a lot of liveliness and joy hidden under their mask of apathy, but it could also be seen that they have lost most of their life forces, and thus need new refreshing beginning”.¹⁶⁸ In his perceptions, Japan was “so weak now that she cannot stand any war against her...”¹⁶⁹ I.Goncharov gave a rather poor characteristic to the Japanese armory, and military capabilities in general, as well as to the small, unstable Japanese houses and boats. “Japanese have guns with futile, and swords, even two swords each ...but what could they do with all those toys!” I.Goncharov exclaimed.¹⁷⁰

It would not be too general a leap to conclude that the idea of Japan, as expressed in the above-mentioned I.Goncharov’s perceptions, was of a “poor,” “weak,” “underdeveloped,” and thus “easily conquerable” country. Further, in his travel notes, I.Goncharov again referred to the Japanese system of seclusion and her backwardness. Because of it, he argued, Japanese “see that their system of isolation and alienation, into which they sought safety... only impeded their development...They cannot but admit crying, “We, the children, are guilty! And like children to obey the guidance of the superior”, that is, Americans and Russians.¹⁷¹

Such a view on Japanese lifestyle, government, and military capabilities must have exerted some influence on Russian public and ruling elite in the late 1850s since I. Goncharov’s *Frigate “Pallada”* was published as series in the most read at that time Petersburg magazines.¹⁷² A number of reviews of Goncharov’s work at that time noted the great significance of his travel anthology for Russia’s developing views on the Asian East and Japan. It was natural that next Russian travelers to Japan often repeated some of Goncharov’s

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.278

¹⁶⁷ Ibid

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p.365

¹⁷⁰ Extract for the on-line abstract from I. Goncharov’s *Frigate “Pallada”- “Nagasaki -9 September 1853,”* <http://his.1september.ru/2004/30/4.htm> or the full printed edition in I.A. Goncharov, *Frigate “Pallada.” Ocherki puteshestvia v dvuh tomah (Travel Notes in Two Volumes// Sobr. soch. (Collected works).* Ö. 6. İ., 1952

¹⁷¹ Goncharov, I., *Frigate “Pallada,”* 3rd ed., Volume 2, 1986: p.365.

¹⁷² Ivan Goncharov’s *Frigate “Pallada”* was published as series or articles in different Petersburg magazines: “*Morskoi sbornik*,” “*Otechestvenn’ie zapiski*,” “*Sovremennik*,” “*Bibliotheca dlya cheteniya*,” and “*Russkii vestnik*” in the period 1855-1858. <http://www.japantoday.ru/japanaz/g28.shtml>

characteristics of Japan and the Japanese, and thus finally confirmed them as stereotypes in Russian minds.¹⁷³

It must be admitted, however, that the above quoted paragraphs from I.Goncharov's *Frigate "Pallada"* present a small part of the one hundred-page description of the beauty of Japanese nature, Japanese ordered and simple lifestyle, as well as the great number of exchanged formal visits and pretty gifts. All those were viewed highly positively by I.Goncharov who went into tiny details describing them. What is more, the general idea about Japan, constructed when reading I.Goncharov's *Frigate "Pallada,"* is one of a "remote," "small" "isolated" country "full of wonders and contradictions." For those who could read between his lines, Japan is a "weak and underdeveloped" (according to Western standards of civilization) country, waiting to be "opened" and "enlightened," and that understandably, could be reached under American or Russian guidance.

In the following years, 1854 and 1855, the Russo-Japanese relations have gone on a higher level becoming a bit more friendly and co-operative. On the one hand, the Japanese authorities' in 1854 assisted for the ill-fated Russian frigate "Diana" to be repaired on the Japanese coast¹⁷⁴. In addition, in 1855 the two empires signed a treaty for establishing borderlines and formal diplomatic relations between them.¹⁷⁵

Hence, when next Putiatin's expedition arrived in Nagasaki in mid-July 1858 in order to forge a more favorable for Russia commercial treaty with Japan, Capitan Ukovsky expected the same friendliness and generosity of the Japanese authorities. His frigate "Askold" happened to be in a similar disastrous state as the frigate "Diana" was. Captain Ukovsky was able to meet the Nagasaki governor and receive the expected assistance by the Japanese authorities. What is more, Russians were allowed to establish their residence in Inosa, near Nagasaki, where they enjoyed "unrestricted, independent, and intimate relations with Japanese of all classes" as

¹⁷³ See Savada K., "Goncharov in Japan" in *Japanese Slavic and East European studies*. Tokyo, 1983, Vol.4. pp 95-109

¹⁷⁴ Russian frigate "Diana," a ship from the Putiatin's expedition float, was destroyed because of an earthquake in Heda in 1854 but it was rebuilt with the Japanese authorities' active assistance and was renamed Hedoi after the port Heda. see Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/relation/index.html>

¹⁷⁵ 7 February 1855 – The Treaty of Shimoda was signed, establishing the formal Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations. See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/relation/index.html>

recorded by Lt. Litke, one of the serving officers on the “Askold,” and stated in the memoirs of the Dutch Dr. Pompe, too.¹⁷⁶

A.F. Mozhaiskii, an officer on frigate “Diana” in 1854’s expedition to Japan, also wrote about Russo-Japanese friendly relations. In his cover letter to the scholar Z.F. Timma, editor of the journal *Russkii hudozhestven’ii listok*, the officer stated that the Japanese “gave us a complete freedom of action. Living in Japanese cities and making short trips around the country provided us with a lot of material for observation. To us everything was so novel and interesting that we could not stay impartial to it.”¹⁷⁷ Those early friendly relations between the Russians and the locals were the reason why, argues William McOmie, later, in 1905, more than 1,000 Russian prisoners-of-war were lodged in eighty different homes in Inosa and treated not as “enemies,” but as “old friends.”¹⁷⁸

In 1857, A.F. Mozhaiskii’s aquarelles of Japan were printed in the journal *Russkii hudozhestven’ii listok*. Thus, Russian public received one of the first visual impressions of the Japanese lifestyle, architecture, and nature. Those aquarelles being Russian first-hand visual impressions of Japan must have exerted some influence on Russian minds at the end of the nineteenth century.

In brief, the first period reviewed here dates back to Tokugawa Japan. Before the Meiji reforms, Japan did not fit into the European set of standards to measure civilization. Hence, Russian writings on secluded Japan characterized with their dualism. On the one hand, Japanese were perceived as “primitive” and “naïve.” On the other hand, they were praised for being “energetic,” “skillful,” and “curious” to everything new, which opened big future in front of them. The awareness of Russia’s marginal position between the “East” and the “West” by Russian writers during that time, however, softened their critical notes on the Asiatic nation in comparison to some western notes on Japan.

¹⁷⁶ About Lt. Litke and Dr. Pompe’s statements on the Russian Foreign Settlement in Inosa, see William McOmie, “*The Frigate Askold and the Opening of the Russian Foreign Settlement at Nagasaki*”, on-line article, http://www.uwosh.edu/home_pages/faculty_staff/earns/home.html

¹⁷⁷ *Russkii hudozhestven’ii listok*, 1857, 1 14, L.1, qtd. by A. Shteingauz in “Iaponia I iaponst’ii glazami russkikh (vtoroya polovina XIX v.)” [Japan and the Japanese through Russian Eyes (Second Half of the XIX C.)], *Toronto Slavic Quarterly*, University of Toronto, online release <http://www.utoronto.ca/tsq/12/shteingauz12.shtml>

¹⁷⁸ see McOmie, W. “*The Frigate Askold and the Opening of the Russian Foreign Settlement at Nagasaki*”, on-line article, http://www.uwosh.edu/home_pages/faculty_staff/earns/home.html

Such dual treatment can also be seen in Captain Vassilii M. Golovnin's description of secluded Japan. He praised Japanese education, and government as well as a number of Japanese personal traits.¹⁷⁹ However, when comparing Japan to Europe, he felt that Japan lagged behind Europe in many aspects. Still, he predicted that the Japanese would rapidly catch up with the Europeans and become their rivals due to their incredible capabilities.¹⁸⁰

The writer Ivan Goncharov, who also had the opportunity to see Japan before her reformation along European lines, shared a similar dualism about Japanese people and their governing system. He viewed Japan as an integrative part of the "Orient," which bore with it the attributes of being "backward" but with "hidden potential"- that charmed and scared at the same time Europeans.¹⁸¹ In contrast to V.Golovnin, however, I. Goncharov perceived Japan to be a "child" needing the guidance of the more civilized- the United States or Russia. As most first writers on Japan, both V.Golovnin and I.Goncharov emphasized some striking differences between European and Japanese behavior, appearances, and lifestyles.¹⁸² They created a number of positive and negative images of the Japanese trying to keep some balance in their presentations, which increased the impression of a dual treatment of secluded Japan.

In the next decade, which witnessed the Meiji reforms, however, Russian views on the so-called "New Japan," turned to differ considerably from those of the "Old Japan," the secluded one. Japanese reformation along the European model provoked Russian intellectuals to start entertaining new, more positive perceptions of Japan.

¹⁷⁹ V. Golovnin cit. by the *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, Tokyo ; New York, N.Y. : Kodansha, 1983, vol.3 :45; see also Golovnin's memoirs excerpted in Lensen, G.Al. *Russia's Eastward Expansion* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964:61-5

¹⁸⁰ *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, Tokyo ; New York, N.Y. : Kodansha, 1983, vol.3 :45; see also Golovnin, V. M. [*Narrative of My Captivity in Japan*, (London: Colburne, 1818)] and Golovnin, V.M. *Zapiski flota kapitana Golovina o priklyucheniayah ego v plenu u iapontsev: v 1811, 1812 i 1813g s priobshcheniem zamechanii ego o Iaponskom gosudarstve i narode:[v 3 ch.]* (The Fleet Captain Golovnin's Notes about His Adventures as a Captive of the Japanese in 1811, 1812, and 1813 with some review of Japanese state and people: in 3 parts), SPB.: V Morskoi typography, 1816

¹⁸¹ Goncharov, I. *Frigate "Pallada"*. *Ocherki puteshestvia v dvuh tomah*, (Frigate "Pallada." Anthology of Travel Notes in Two Volumes), Ornatskaia, T.I., and D.B. Oznobishin, eds., Leningrad, izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1986, 3rd edition; Chapter I- "Russians in Japan at the end of 1853 and the beginning of 1854", 1986:261

¹⁸² Ibid. 362

III.1. Direct Perceptions of Reformed Japan – Esper E. Ukhtomskii (1891)

The beginning of the Meiji Restoration and the followed major reforms imminently attracted Russian intellectuals' attention to Japan. On 3 January 1868, following a *coup* at the imperial palace in Kyoto, responsibility for the administration of Japan passed to a new regime. It formally brought to an end the rule by the Tokugawa Shogunate that had lasted since the start of the seventeenth century. The youthful Meiji emperor who headed the new government ruled in an era of unprecedented reform. The Meiji revolution turned into the catalyst towards industrialization in Japan that led to the rise of the island nation as a military power by 1905, under the slogan of “National Wealth and Military Strength” (*fukoku kyohei*). To achieve this national slogan, the idea of the “Industrial Development” (*shokusan kogyo*) was also formulated. As a result, the decades after 1868 witnessed a radical transformation of many aspects of Japan's national life. Because of the unprecedented speed and positive effect, Japan's westernization and modernization received high appraisals among European educated circles. Western press, especially the British one, was following closely Japan's reformation. Very much provoked by some writings in the “West,” Russian intellectual circles also got interested in Japan's transformation. There were even Russians who started appealing for closer relations between Russia and reformed Japan. Thus, Russia was expected to benefit best materially and spiritually from the “Asian East.”

Among those proclaiming unification with the “Asian East” was Prince Esper Esperovich Ukhtomskii, His Highness Nicholas' personal adviser, a popular Sinophile and publicist.¹⁸³

In 1890-1891, Prince E. Ukhtomskii took part in the informal visit of the future Russian heir of the throne, Nicholas, to Japan. His Highness' three-hundred- day journey around Asia in 1890-91 was considered of great importance at the Russian court. Its author was the above-mentioned prominent Russian “Easterner,” Prince E.E. Ukhtomskii, who was ordered by His Highness Nicolas to describe in details his travels in Asia.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ On Prince E.E. Ukhtomskii's Easterner's ideas see the beginning of Chapter II

¹⁸⁴ Ukhtomskii, E.E. *Puteshestvie na Vostok Evo Imperatorskogo V'isochestva Gosudarya naslednika Tsarevicha (1890-1891)* [‘The Journey in the East of His Imperial Highness, the Heir of the Tsar]. Collected Works- Leipzig, 1893-5, Vls. 1-3. Ń. S

This study reviews Chapter XXXVI and Chapter XXXVII of the English translation of Prince E.Ukhtomskii's travel notes published in two volumes in 1896-1900 in England.¹⁸⁵ The description of His Highness Nicholas' visit to Japan comprises forty-seven impressive large format pages (over 40cm each) along with numerous drawings of Japanese people and buildings.

The author of the book, Prince Esper E. Ukhtomskii, often declared openly his stance about Asia. He argued ardently for Russia being akin to Asian peoples, and insisted on her unification with the "East." Nevertheless, he similarly to I.Goncharov approached Japan at first with a lot of anxiety. As he himself admitted, he had been influenced by the notes of previous Russian sailors to Japan which in their essence were contradictory. On the one hand, "our officers...were charmed by the country, by the air and the brightness of its spring, by her eagerness to advance along the path of western progress, with the civility of the Japanese, and the thoughtfulness they displayed to foreigners," wrote the Prince.¹⁸⁶ On the other hand, there stood the "skeptical voices of the more experienced officers, raised in warning against too great an enthusiasm for the new institutions of a people strange to Europe and with a prehistoric civilization..." Those voices, however, "were lost in the general chorus of the sympathetic ones..." What E. Ukhtomskii set as one of his tasks was to "verify, during our stay of four or five weeks in the domains of Mikado, these mutually exclusive opinions..."¹⁸⁷

His preliminary perception of Japan also comprised of some contradictions. Prince E. Ukhtomskii pointed out that "now everything in this country is full of unexpected and contradictory contrasts, and presents a network of mysterious devices of political character for preventing a foreign interruption into the native social system."¹⁸⁸ Being a member of the imperial court, the Prince naturally was more interested in what political dividends Russians could derive from their visit. Russia was proud of reaching agreements with Japan without any bloody enforcement on her side in contrast to the United States and England.¹⁸⁹ In Prince E. Ukhtomskii's understanding that became possible because "there seems to be nothing easier for Russians than to get along on with Asiatics. We agree so well with one another in our views of

¹⁸⁵ see *Travels in the East of Nicholas II., Emperor of Russia : When Cesarewitch, 1890-1891* / written by order of His Imperial Majesty by Prince E. Ukhtomsky; translated from the Russian by Robert Goodlet; edited by Sir George Birdwood, Westminster : Archibald Constable, 1896-1900, 2 v. : ill., 40 cm.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., II vol., p.409

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p.437

the most important and vital questions, that a certain close spiritual kinship soon comes to the front...”¹⁹⁰At the same time, he found “the Japanese who suddenly assumed a place amid the civilized nations of the world” to be somewhat “incomprehensible.” Their “tendency to exalt in their most secret thoughts and feelings their ancient world, barbarous as it seems to a foreign eye, while at the same time grasping at all foreign novelties; while carrying their imitation of contemporary Europe and America to the greatest extremes; while despising the stranger in their hearts, yet submissively learning from him...” E.Ukhtomskii found it hard to understand.¹⁹¹

On the other hand, because of Japanese “apt to extremities,” he prophesized Japan’s speedy rise to a position possible to threaten European interests in the Pacific region. As he argued, “people with such a diseased national self-concept, yet with such wonderfully disciplined tact in their dealings with their more powerful rivals in world arena, must sooner or later express themselves definitely, and doff their mask of assumed politeness.”¹⁹² As an example of the “savageness in the [Japanese] spirit,” Prince E. Ukhtomskii quoted the Japanese admiration of the forty-seven samurai who sought bloody revenge for their master and after that disemboweled themselves. “There have been even cases of suicides committed here [in front of their monument] in memory of these great heroes.” To the Prince, such views and acts “seemed at the very least incomprehensible, just as it was incomprehensible how Japanese could pride themselves, as on real monuments of glory, on the mounds in which lied buried heaps of cut Korean ears and noses which they had brought as trophies.”¹⁹³ As a result, he concluded that the relations of “the civilized European nations towards Japan “were strange, filled with an element of disdain where penetration of a politico-economical character should be in place.”¹⁹⁴

Yet, there was a lot to be admired in Japan, according to the Prince. “Japanese art, for instance, is inimitable...,” he pointed out. Nevertheless, he argued for “not lauding it to the skies” since “it is confined to the reproduction of lower forms of nature”... which ignores the ideal on earth” (as in the Western art).¹⁹⁵ Another innovative thing much admired in Europe- the great number of Japanese women attending university - was praised yet also put down to earth by Prince E. Ukhtomskii. “The female students attend universities, read papers, and follow the

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.419

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.409

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.410

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.413

course of politics...” However, “the native social system” did not allow women to be present at national parliamentary meetings. Hence, in practice, he argued, “the inferior position of women here is very much marked.”¹⁹⁶

Along with this “unnatural haste to attain to a one-side perfection” and “to outgrow themselves,” Japanese “are inspired with a more and more risky nationalistic craving to extend their supremacy in the Pacific,”¹⁹⁷ further argued E. Ukhtomskii. He perceived Japan’s invention of “a new military flag...with eight broad of rays...symbolizing the currents streaming forth from this “young” country as an indicator for expansionistic ambitions. “May not this explain the demand for a considerable army, for which there is no use, excepting on the continent?” exclaimed pathetically E. Ukhtomskii.

Although being an ardent “Easterner” appealing for Russia’s unification with the “East,” Prince E. Ukhtomskii was among the first who prophesied the coming of the “peril” from Japan. In his terms, “At present the current is beginning to turn, and millions are preparing unseen, having chosen the rich land of Korea, along with Manchuria and stagnant China with her inexhaustible resources, as their base of operation, to begin their traditional struggle with haughty Europe. What will the future then bring forth?”¹⁹⁸ Regardless of his premonitions about rising Japan, he could not help admiring Japanese managerial skills and industriousness when referring to how Japanese “work to develop their industrial forces and extend their commercial relations.”¹⁹⁹

One of Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s main arguments, however, remained the possible threat coming from Japan’s growing ambitions. In his perception, Japan appeared “toy like and amusing” only “at distance.” At a scrutiny of “the life pulsating in the depths of her energetic population...,” stated Prince E. Ukhtomskii, we could see “an elemental danger of undistinguishable nature [that] creeps nearer and nearer to the careless “West.” Like the crawling fogs enveloping passing ships in the straits of Formosa! It must not be forgotten that the Land of the Rising Sun, with its 3850 islands, has a population of more than forty million souls.”²⁰⁰ In support of his argument, Prince E. Ukhtomskii turned to Japan’s “peculiar past and a very problematic future.” He referred to the chasing of Christians in the seventeenth-

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p.413

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p.414

century Japan. What is more, Japanese “barbarism” did not limit to missionaries, bit it also spread to “their refusing to shelter people who have wrecked nearby their shores...”²⁰¹ Moreover, in their recent past, “The Japanese commenced invading and ravaging Korea without mercy and without stay.”²⁰² Those negative images of Japan as cruel and barbarous though referring to her past, obviously aimed to strengthen Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s argument that similar cruelty could be expected from present-day Japan.

Their visit to Inosa, however, challenged his perceptions of the “detached and cruel Japanese.” The head Buddhist priest Okamura warmly welcomed His Highness and his company at his place, and they shared lovely memories about Captain Unkofsky and Lieutenant Ukhtomskii, (E. Ukhtomskii’s grandfather) who had been sheltered in Inosa until their ship got repaired. That warm welcoming provoked the Prince to write a one-page apotheosis on Russian and Japanese “close spiritual kinship.” His thesis was that, “In spite of the deep, almost radical, difference in their national psycho-physical characters, the Japanese, and the lower-class Russians stand nearer to each other than Europeans, in a kind of fraternal relationship,” united also around their ideas of “the unseen power [God], the throne, and the scepter.”²⁰³ Prince Arisugawa and his suit’s cordial visit on the Russian frigate “Pamiat Azova” and the pleasant conversation they all had there, further confirmed in E. Ukhtomskii his belief in Russian and Japanese “close kinship.”²⁰⁴

What is more, at the sight of the smiling “one mile and a half line of spectators” welcoming them in Nagasaki, Prince E. Ukhtomskii admitted to have been deeply moved. The “graceful,” “smiling children” charmed him. “Every one of these tiny beings is prettiness itself,” exclaimed E.Ukhtomskii. He was pleasantly surprised to learn that at the age of five or six all of them went to school. At that time, in Russia majority of the children in the countryside did not attend schools.

Another thing much admired by the Prince was Japanese women’s skills to dress and arrange their hairstyles beautifully. As most visitors to Japan around that time, he went into details

²⁰¹ Ibid, p.417

²⁰² Ibid, p.433

²⁰³ Ibid, p.419

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p.420

describing Japanese women's beauty- their "long trailing dresses with valuable embroidery..." their "wonderful headdress..." and their "graceful movements..."²⁰⁵

Religion in Japan, however, did not receive high estimation in his notes. Japanese temples, with their "lack of display," and the Japanese priests with their "loose robes," as well as "the lack of idols" and "solemn ceremonies and public worship," led Prince E. Ukhtomskii to the thought that "the relations of the laity to their religion are the most primitive."²⁰⁶ Contrary to Japanese, the majority of Russians at the end of the nineteenth century distinguished themselves with their deep Orthodox Christian beliefs, and their mass celebration of God and Saints, as well as with the beauty and grandiosity of their churches.

The next stop of His Highness's travel, Kagoshima, impressed very much the Russians with its "conservative and patriotic mood." "Every one of these islanders" wrote Prince E. Ukhtomskii, "though highly educated, regards foreign civilization, in his heart of hearts, with the utmost contempt." This again provoked some negative perceptions of Japan in his mind. He suspected Japan in "semi-sincere and feverish policy to her Asiatic island neighbor" China. He predicted "the worst consequences for England" because she "to some extent, identifies her commercial and mercenary interests with those of the Japanese."²⁰⁷ Prince E. Ukhtomskii, however, perceived Russia, as "too powerful and too full of a firm faith in the future of her advance to the Pacific to be hindered by this state [Japan], sympathetic though it is to us Russians." He treated Japan as a "pseudo youthful...still greatly hampered by the elements of an effete, almost prehistoric civilization."²⁰⁸ While France, Germany, and the United States received E.Ukhtomskii's justification for keeping commercial relations with Japan, England was highly blamed by him for "regarding other nations exclusively as blind tools for British greed..." He deeply criticized "the English, who have always incited the Japanese to a policy of adventure,"²⁰⁹ artificially "boosting Japanese pride in themselves." "To excite the kingdom of the Mikado, to turn this ambitious nation to easy and ephemeral victories, is not difficult. But in case of failure, it will be ablaze with eternal fire, and will thirst for vengeance on the true cause of their misfortunes, namely the English..."²¹⁰ In fact, Russia had various disputes with England in the Near East and Asia in the 1880s and 90s. To the Russian court, England was the

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p.424-5

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p.426

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p.428

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p.429

²¹⁰ Ibid.

most serious rival of Russia in the Pacific. A possible Anglo-Japanese alliance, therefore, would have created serious impediments to Russia in the Far East, which troubled a lot Prince E. Ukhtomskii as seen from his notes above.

However, their visit to Kagoshima – “a reflection of ancient Japan”-also made him believe in a possible unification of Russia with Japan based on some commonalities. The Prince of Satsuma had ordered a demonstration of “wrestling and skillful archery” for the Cesarewitch. That provoked Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s associations with his homeland, and made him conclude that “Both Japanese and Russians, it is true, set store by conquests of a warlike rather than of a peaceful character. These islanders are born warriors.”²¹¹ However, because “danger and adventures spurred them,” Japanese “formed a complete parallel to our Cossack adventurers,” he pointed out. Because “the idea of universal fame, of predominance over other nations, of priority among the myriads of their race, is one they can appreciate,” the Japanese should be treated with reserve, further argued E. Ukhtomskii. He even referred to the legend about the Japanese hero Yositsuneh who allegedly became the head of the Mongolians- “the invincible Ghengizkhan.”²¹² Mongolian invasions in Russian minds had always been linked to the bloody “Dark Ages” in the Russian history, and that alliteration must have provoked similar associations in majority of Russian reading public.

Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s purpose for inciting such images became clear in the next few lines of his story. According to him, “Had the bold islanders in their warlike ardor succeeded in gaining a footing on the continent, they might perhaps have incited the peaceful “yellow” East to new conquests, boundless to their conception...” As the Prince himself admitted “such conquests hitherto have never led to any politically solid and lasting results, but, nevertheless, they bear witness to the possibility of rousing the deep-lying, sleeping, primeval forces of Asia. In every one of her nations lie the germs, to be developed sooner or later...”²¹³

Prince E. Ukhtomskii turned out to be one of the first Russian intellectuals who propagated the idea of a possible East Asian alliance based on the Chinese and Korean vast human and material power, and Japanese knack for organization, which might threaten the “West.” “It is clear, then, that from a military point of view”, argued E. Ukhtomskii “ no “*Drang nach*

²¹¹ Ibid, 434

²¹² Ibid

²¹³ Ibid, p.434

Westen” need now be alarming to the European powers...”²¹⁴ East’s “special center is Japan”, stated E. Ukhtomskii. “Three centuries ago, the Japanese sovereign, Hideoshi, was already dreaming of his boundless ambition of transferring his capital to Peking. Such dreams may yet be revived!”

It has to be taken into consideration, however, that those comments of his, as E. Ukhtomskii himself admitted, were copied by him from his diary and revised after the “Otsu incident” when the Russian Heir was attacked by a Japanese nationalist. This assault had exerted some influence on Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s perceptions of Japan and the Japanese since his notes turned out towards the end to be a bit more apathetic as compared to his initial notes. In Kagoshima region, he saw “indirect connection to the assault of the Cesarewitch,” since it was “a nursery of dislike to everything foreign.”²¹⁵ He rejected the notion that the assault at Otsu was provoked by “the admission of the illustrious travelers into the “holy of holiness” of the Japanese people, where honor was done to them as descendants of the sun...” To Prince E. Ukhtomskii, this was not true in the case of Cesarewitch since “monarchical principle is strong among the native masses and they [Japanese] reverse all that proceeds from the fountain-head of Russian autocracy.”²¹⁶ In addition, during the last decades, as he claimed, “As near neighbors we became more accessible for purposes of study and comprehension. From that moment the Asiatics clearly grasp the principles of our autocratic constitution, they become one spirit with us.” He quoted V.V. Golovnin who told on Japanese bows of respect when shown the Russian Tsar’s sign.²¹⁷ In addition, it was the “East” that awakened in Russians their “sleeping powers and heroic daring, and now calls them to deeds of glory...,” argued E. Ukhtomskii. In contrast to “the man of the “West” (the German, the Frenchman, the Englishman, and the Italian)” who across the foreign seas found only money and position, the Russian men managed to retain untouched thier spirit overseas. That was possible, because, in his perception, “in Asia, we have not, nor can we have, any bounds...”²¹⁸

However, Russia’s growth turned unprecedented. As Prince E. Ukhtosmkii admitted, “we have spread and grown to a monstrous size....”²¹⁹ As a result, Russia came to the dilemma “either to become what she is destined to be- a great power uniting the “West”with the “East,” or

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid, p. 437

²¹⁶ Ibid,p.443

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid,p.444

²¹⁹ Ibid, p.445

ingloriously and imperceptibly to tread the downward path....” Along the downward path, she would run the risk to be “crushed by Europe” or by “the races of Asia, awakened...more dangerous to Russia than the nations of the West.” Russia’s grand mission to unite the “East” and the “West” under her guidance before such a disastrous thing happened was justified by E. Ukhtomskii based on Russia’s kinship with Asia (and Europe). As he wrote, “It was Asia that devastated us, and it was she, on the other hand, that renovated us. It is owing to her that Russian mind has developed the idea of a Christian autocrat placed by Providence above all earthy vanity, amid a throng of heterodox but sympathizing races....”²²⁰ The idea for the creation of a grand Eurasian power able to oppose British ambitions was not new in the Russian court. However, Prince E. Ukhtomskii was among the first who expressed openly such opinion in a written form. To support his thesis, he referred to Old Russian folk songs and poems about the “White Tsar”²²¹ destined to be the “king above all kings.”²²²

The twenty-ninth of April (May 11) 1891, however, challenged Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s perceptions of “brethren” Japan because of the bloody assault of High Highness Nicholas, the Cesarewitch, by a Japanese nationalist. The Prince did not go into details about the incident because “it was afterwards described in the Russian Government Messenger,”²²³ as he later clarified. He could not but mention at least the events as they were in order of happening. “The criminal, Tsudo Santso, was among the watchers over the safety of the illustrious guest of Japan,” as E. Ukhtomskii, noted. ²²⁴The fact, that the villain was a police officer, was what shocked Russians most, though political murders had happened in Russia. The Cesarewitch Nicholas was himself a witness of the political murder of his grandfather Alexander II. To show that there would be no formal repressions over the incident, the “first words” of the slightly wounded in the head by a sword Heir, as recorded by E. Ukhtomskii were: “It is nothing, if only the Japanese will not think that this incident can in any way change my feelings toward them and my thankfulness to them for their cordiality!” This the Cesarewitch

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ The *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii* by Sigismund von Herberstein explains that the Muscovite rulers wore white robes to distinguish themselves from the purple of the Roman rulers and the red of the Byzantines. The Russian tsar was thus called the "White Tsar". There was also a legend, popular in Mongolia, China, and Tibet, about the “White Tsar” who would come from the North (from “Northern Shambhala”) and restore the now decadent traditions of true Buddhism. See [NationMaster.com - Encyclopedia: White Russia](http://www.nationmaster.com-encyclopedia:WhiteRussia)
<http://www.rambler.ru/srch?oe=1251&words=Rerum+Moscoviticarum+Commentarii&hilite=2680B67>
E (20/07/2005)

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid, p.448

²²⁴ Ibid, p.451

repeated to Prince Arisugawa, who ran up to him a few seconds later.”²²⁵ Nicholas also ordered the Russian ambassador in Japan D.E. Shevich²²⁶ to send a message to Tokyo with the same context. ²²⁷ The Cesarewitch seemed to bear the incident with dignity and calm.²²⁸

To demonstrate his deepest sympathy, “on the following evening, the Emperor of Japan arrived at 11 p.m. by train in Kyoto.” He was met, however, at the station by the Russian ambassador D.E. Shevich, who informed him “Cesarewich had retired for the night, and asked him to postpone the visit for the next day.”²²⁹ This could be interpreted as a sign of Cesarewitch’ indignation to the event, and his willingness to show where Japan stood in comparison to Russia- a behavior of the superior towards the inferior. Later, the ex-Minister of Finances Sergei Witte would write in his memoirs “this event [the “Otsu incident”] provoked in the future heir’s heart a negative attitude towards the Japanese.”²³⁰

Konstantin Pleshakov, the Russian writer who wrote on the Baltic fleet in the battle of Tsushima also stated, “Russian heir was filled with hatred and thrived for retribution towards the State of the Rising Sun...”²³¹

The Russian scholar Petr Podalko expresses a similar comment. He admits the possibility of Nicholas’ keeping resentment towards the Japanese since the so-called “Otsu incident.” In his terms, “It is possible that the attempt at Nicholas has put a negative stamp on all the followed Russian policy in the Far East...”²³² Petr Podalko also refers to the memoirs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.P.Izvol’ski (1906-1910) that say “even if the attempt in Kyoto has not caused

²²⁵ Ibid, p.452

²²⁶ Dmitri E. Shevich (1838-1906) – Russian diplomat, an ambassador in Tokyo (1889-1892), later ambassador in Portugal (1892-1896), a member of the State Council

²²⁷ Russian consul D.E. Shevich’s letter to N.K. Girs, AVPRI.F.138.Op.467.D.114/121 ob.L.13-16, qtd. in Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D., “Incident in Otsu”, online Russian historical journal *Rodina*, N.10, 2005, http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=1659&n=88 ·

²²⁸ see *Travels in the East of Nicholas II., Emperor of Russia : When Cesarewitch, 1890-1891* / written by order of His Imperial Majesty by Prince E. Ukhtomsky ; translated from the Russian by Robert Goodlet; edited by Sir George Birdwood, Westminster : Archibald Constable, 1896-1900, 2 v: 452

²²⁹ Ibid, p.453

²³⁰ Witte, S.Yu. *Izbran’ie vospominaniya 1849-1911*, M. 1991:288, qtd. By David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Incident in Otsu”, online Russian historical journal *Rodina*, N.10, 2005, http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=1659&n=88

²³¹ Pleshakov C. *The Tsar’s Last Armada. New York*. 2002, qtd by D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Incident in Otsu”, Russian online historical journal *Rodina*, N.10, 2005, http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=1659&n=88

²³² See Podalko, P. *Iaponia. Rossiiskie diplomatische predstavitelstva v Iaponii. Iz istorii ustanovleniya rosiisko-iaponskih otshoshenii* (Japan. Russian Diplomatic Missions in Japan. From the History of Russo-Japanese Relations). Russian Online Journal *Japan Today*, <http://www.japantoday.ru/arch/jurnal/0102/11.shtml>; also Podalko, P. *Iaponia v sudbah Rossian* (Japan in Russians’ Fate), Institute Vostokovedenia RAN, Kraft publ., Moskva 2004:37

him [the Cesarewitch] much harm, I am convinced...that at least it has affected our Far Eastern policy, which has had its epilogue in the Russo-Japanese War.”²³³

On the other hand, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye assumes a contra argument when describing the “Otsu incident.” In his words, “One of the most stable *cliché*, related to the causes of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, turned to be the so called “Otsu incident”...” According to the Canadian professor D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, there is enough evidence showing, that the physical wound which the Cesarewitch had, did not leave the psychological scar, which could turn it into hatred to the Japanese. He points to Nicholas’s letters to his relatives at home, (written after the incident), full with kindly feelings for his Japanese hosts, and with his worries about creating some discomfort to them.²³⁴

This study follows a similar to Schimmelpenninck van der Oye’s line of thought, noting that Prince E. Ukhtomskii had explicitly stated in his travel notes that the incident in Otsu should not impede Russo-Japanese relations. What is more, both Prince E. Ukhtomskii and the Cesarevich Nicholas’ later comments on the matter point to the fact that then Russians treated the incident as a mere “act of a fanatic.” “It is impossible to admit that the cause of the crime was hatred of the Russians, because such hatred is unknown in Japan,” clarified E.Ukhtomskii.²³⁵ Both the Cesarewitch²³⁶ and prince E.Ukhtomskii were highly pleased by the warm sympathies to the Russian Heir expressed in numerous telegrams arriving from all over Japan. “As soon as this murderous attempt was publicly known, the outburst of indignation in the land was universal, and irrepressible...These messages according to an estimate made by the Japanese Ministry of the Court, numbered twelve thousand,” clarified E.Ukhtomskii.²³⁷ Besides, the judicial investigation of the assault showed that “beyond the general psychological sate of the criminal there were no immediate or apparent causes for the crime.”²³⁸ What is more, on May 7 (May 19), the day of the Cesarewitch’ leave, the Emperor of Japan together

²³³ Izvol’skii, A.P. *Vospominania* (Memoirs), M.1989:160 cit. in Podalko, P. Ibid, pp37-38

²³⁴ Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. “Incident in Otsu”, online Russian historical journal *Rodina* , N.10, 2005, http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=1659&n=88

²³⁵ “This was written before the war between China and Japan”, says the note at the bottom the page: Ibid, p.455

²³⁶ “I received a thousand telegrams, presenting condolences to me from different Japanese people,” wrote Nicholas in his letter to Maria Fedorovna, dated of 8 May (O.S.) 1891: AVPRI, F. 642. Íp. 1. D. 2321. L. 184, 185. qtd. by Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. “Incident in Otsu”, *Rodina* , N.10, 2005, http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=1659&n=88

²³⁷ see *Travels in the East of Nicholas II., Emperor of Russia : When Cesarewitch, 1890-1891 / written by order of His Imperial Majesty by Prince E. Ukhtomsky* ; translated from the Russian by Robert Goodlet; edited by Sir George Birdwood, Westminster : Archibald Constable, 1896-1900, 2 v:456

²³⁸ Ibid,p.456

with Prince Arisugawa, and their suits had a farewell lunch with the Cesarewitch on the deck of the Russian frigate “Pamyat Azova,” which received prince E.Ukhtomskii’s high appraisal of its friendly atmosphere.²³⁹

In brief, as evident from all of the above E.Ukhtomskii’s travel notes on Japan, the Russo-Japanese encounters kept evolving in a very positive direction during Nicholas’s stay. It could be stated that both the Cesarewitch Nicholas and Prince E. Ukhtomskii’s perceptions of Japan and the Japanese then were mostly positive. They could not help admiring the Japanese efficiency and knack for organization. The state itself charmed them with its beautiful nature. The original presents and the warm welcoming they received during all the places of their visit (including the town of Otsu) also contributed to the friendly environment into which the Cesarewitch’ visit proceeded. “The exceptional reception and the ovations accorded to the Cesarewitch by the people of Japan must certainly have raised the gorge of the fanatical samurai...,” noted E. Ukhtomskii.²⁴⁰ His Highness Nicholas also stated in his letters that “We were so much delighted with the Japanese, with their welcoming, and all their handicrafts and factory-made goods, that we forgot all the previously visited by us countries [in Asia].”²⁴¹ Although Russia and Japan had already started arguing over the Sakhalin and the Kuril islands some time before the Cesarewitch’ visit to the Country of the Rising Sun²⁴² it did not reflect on his stay there. As seen from E. Ukhtomskii’s emotional expressions, the Heir of the Russian throne was warmly greeted as such by crowds of Japanese showing their reverence to him. Even the bloody incident in Otsu did not change the generally beneficiary point of view that the Cesarewitch Nicholas had towards the Japanese as show Ukhtomskii and Cesarewitch’ notes quoted here.²⁴³ E. Ukhtomskii’s perceptions of Japan as extremely energetic “young” state which might soon question the *status quo* in the region did not invalidate the here stated opinion, that the Cesarewitch and the Prince E.Ukhtomskii were amazed and pretty much

²³⁹ Ibid, p.454

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p.456

On the second year of his coming to the throne, Nicholas II would again confirm in front of his German guess that what had happened in Japan “ was a deed of a fanatic” Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst to Wilhelm II, letter, 12/9/1895, GP 9. D. 360., qtd.by Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. “Incident in Otsu”, loc.cit http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=1659&n=88

²⁴¹ Nicholas in his letter to Maria Fedorovna, dated of 8 May (O.S.) 1891: AVPRI, F. 642. Îp. 1. D. 2321. L. 184, 185. qtd. by Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. “Incident in Otsu,” loc.cit.

²⁴² In November 1890 , angry Japanese crowd throw stones at the Russian diplomatic mission in Tokyo

²⁴³ . David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye shares the same argument. He further argues that the greatest sympathy in Nicholas II during his round trip in Asia provoked Japan and the Japanese while China and her inhabitants provoked his neglect or irritation. See Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. *Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*. Northern Illinois University Press, 2001: 20

satisfied with their visit to Japan. Hence, it could be hard to argue that the so-called “Otsu incident” that happened in 1891 could have been one of the causes for the stiff Russo-Japanese relations later and had led to the war of 1904-5, having also in mind that it was Japan that attacked first in 1904.

What could be stated with certainty after viewing E. Ukhtomskii’s travel notes on Japan was that Russians initial prejudices about the Country of the Rising Sun being a country of “contradictions” and “quite incomprehensible” were confirmed during their one-month trip around the country. Japan’s unique embodiment of the “West” with the most valuable traditions of the “East” provoked both Russians’ admiration and at the same time led them into some incomprehension. This incomprehension, however, stemmed mostly from their misunderstanding of Japan’s customs and traditions as well as Japanese national psychology (although E. Ukhtomskii claimed to know them pretty well). There was also some cautiousness about accepting Japan at face value as observed through all E.Ukhtomskii’s notes. Japan’s successful modernization and fervent insistence on being recognized as equal by the “West” led Prince E.Ukhtomskii to the thought that Japan would soon present a challenge to the great powers. This, nevertheless, did not negate the fact that Russo-Japanese relations during the Cesarewitch’ visit evolved in positive light. They comprised mostly of friendly exchanges of presents, visits, shows of mutual respect, as well as numerous demonstrations of customs. The Cesarewitch and his suit were presented with a wonderful opportunity to explore the Country of the Rising Sun for a month almost with no restrictions- an honor, which had not been granted to any European royal guest of Japan before.

III.2. Indirect Perceptions of Reformed Japan –Publicists’ Viewpoints

The Cesarewitch’ travels in Asia imminently provoked bigger interest in her among Russian elite. Among all Asian countries, however, rising Japan with her speedy and successful reformation of her society at all levels- social, economical, political, and military, attracted the biggest attention in Russia. Japan’s crushing victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 demonstrated the superiority of her modernization, and brought to her most of the

rewards that Western powers were enjoying in China. This was an indicator that Japan was finally admitted to the Western imperialist club.²⁴⁴

Some Russian intellectuals admired such Japan's growth and ambitions. However, others viewed it with some suspicion, because the regional rivalry between Russia and Japan had increased since 1890s. Around that time, both states started more ambitiously to pursue their military, political, and commercial interests on the East Asian mainland. Russia, firmly determined to protect her own interests in Manchuria,²⁴⁵ and backed by France and Germany, forced Japan through the so-called "Triple Intervention" of 1895, to give back the Liaodong peninsula in Manchuria in exchange for an increased indemnity from China. Hence, after 1895, China could no longer be a contender for mastery in Korea, and Manchuria, and the contest there now lay mainly between Russia and Japan.

That regional rivalry between Russia and Japan found different interpretations in Russian intellectuals' writings during that period. With the growth of Japan's activity and influence in the Far East in the 1890s, Russian interest in Japan increased. It was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 that distracted for a whole year some Russian intellectuals' attention from the major topics of the time, namely on Russia's place in the world, and her proper course of action in regard to the Polish Issue, and the Balkans. The events in East Asia that followed imminently provoked some changes in Russian perceptions of Japan.

²⁴⁴ "Extraterritoriality disappeared in Japan, while Japan joined those who enjoyed its benefits in China; tariff autonomy returned to Japan while Japan joined in depriving China of its own tariff autonomy; Great Britain shifted its reliance from China to Japan in its search for an East Asian counter to Russian power" See Jansen, M. *Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894-1972*, Princeton University, Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago, 1975:23

²⁴⁵ Moreover, since the other great powers were becoming more and more active in the Far East, Russia was faced with the difficult task to solve some urgent strategic and diplomatic problems as well as some financial and economic issues regarding her presence in East Asia.

On the one hand, "the Pacific outposts of the Russian Empire had to be made defensible and ice-free port annexed on the Korean coast if possible. In addition, "the task that confronted our army after Japan's actions was to preserve all that had been taken by Russia in 1897 in the Far East." Kuropatkin, A.N. *Russko-iaponskaya voina, 1904-5: Itogi voin'ii. Glava pervaya. Istoricheskie zadachi Rossii, predyavlen'ie Voennomu vedomstvu v XVIII I XIX stoletiyah. Rezultat'ii* (Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905: About the War, Chapter Ist. Russia's Historical Tasks Announced by the War Commandment in XVIII and XIX Centuries. Results) SPB.:Poligon, 2002

<http://militera.lib.ru/h/kuropatkin/app.html>

On the other hand, Russian expansionism in the Far East was closely related to the Russian Finance Minister's (Sergei Witte) financial and economic strategy- owing to protectionism and capital imports, the Russian industrialization was to benefit considerably from the new resources and markets of East Asia. See Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, BERG, Leamington Spa/Hamburg/New York 1987: 192; and also Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. *Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of an Empire and the Path to War with Japan*, Northern Illinois University Press, 2001:67

So far, Russian images of Japan were constructed on the base of few popular Western and Russian writings on Japan. Among them, the most popular in Russia were P. Loti and L.Hearn's books on Japan, and V.M. Golovnin and I. Goncharov's experiences in the "East." The above-mentioned Russian authors most often referred to the exotic theme, focusing on some Japanese characteristics unknown in the "West."²⁴⁶ As the first extensive writings on Japan, they have exerted a considerable impact on Russian pre-war perceptions of Japan. As the Moscow historian, D.Golovnin, a witness of Japan's transformation, wrote a few years later, "Until recently, to Europeans and Americans alike, Japan presented a newly found and curious form of a state into which their interest resembled that of the naturalist when discovering an unknown so far island bird..." As a result, the image of Japan as the "exotic other" or a "fairytale state of miniatures"²⁴⁷ prevailed at the general level in Russia until 1890s.

The closed "exotic" Japan, however, has turned into a modern nation insisting on her righteous place in the world. The start of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and its unexpected turn were the first events that challenged some Russian intellectuals' perceptions of Japan, and their images of the Country of the Rising Sun became more and more complex and ambiguous. This confirms the assumption that the images of a country depend on various factors, but the major one is the change of that country's position in the international arena.

²⁴⁶ Published materials' on Japan in Russia at that time comprised mainly some Russian travel notes on Japan the most popular among which were Ivan A. Goncharov's, *Frigate "Pallada." Ocherki puteshestvia v dvuh tomah (Travel Notes in Two Volumes//* reprinted in I.A. Goncharov *Sobr. soch. (Collected works)*. Ò. 6. Ì., 1952; and Vassilii M.Golovin's *Zapiski kapitana Golovina o priklyucheniayah evo v plenu u iapontsev v 1811, 1812 i 1813 godah, s priobshcheniem i zamechaniim ego o iaponskom gosudarstve i narode*", first published as series of articles in *Journal S'in otechestva*, 1815, later reprinted in a book , Moskovskoi typography, St. Petersburg, 1816; There were also some works on Japan's geography, flora and fauna, as well as on Japanese language which targeted mainly a limited reading audience such as the notes of the geographer and explorer Venyukov, M.I. *Obozrenie Iaponskago arhipelaga v sovremennom ego sostoyanii* (Outline of the Contemporary Condition of the Japanese Archipelago) 2 ed., SPB, 1871

At that period Western popular novels on Japan and the Japanese in Russia were those of Pierre Loti's *Madame Chrysanthème* (Paris, 1893) and *Japoneries d'Automne* (Paris, 1889), as well as Lafcadio Hearn's *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan* (1894), *Out of the East: Reveries and Studies in New Japan* (1895), *Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life* (1896), to mention but a few of Hearn's most translated works written during his life in Japan.

More on Loti and Hearn, see Ono, S. *A Western Image of Japan. What did the West see through the eyes of Loti and Hearn?* A Ph.D. thesis N.235, Genève, 1972

²⁴⁷ The term "exotic" was often used in the Russian literary writings at that time when it came to the explanation of first encounters with strangers who completely differ in appearance and lifestyle from the European ones. More specifically, "exotic" meant something mysterious, strange, and wild. Although Japan had already undergone reforms in her education, military, and governing system, in the general Russian mind Japan still fell into the category of the "exotic Orient."

III.2.1 Japan and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 in the “Liberal” and “Conservative” Press

Responses to the events in the Far East in 1894-5 came in different tones and interpretations in the Russian press. At that time, due to the Alexander II's reforms, the press enjoyed less strict censorship, which in turn led to an increase in the number of the Russian daily newspapers and “thick journals” (*tolstye zhurnaly*). Those daily newspapers and intellectual journals started to play the role of a substitute parliament.²⁴⁸ Although the dilemma of Russia's modernization and national identity was still the focal point of intellectuals' discussions at that time, the sudden outbreak of the Sino-Japanese armed clashes in 1894, initiated a number of publications about it.

Having in mind that the Russian metropolitan press had All-Russian importance at that time, this paper reviews only famous Petersburg and Moscow journals belonging to two main ideological currents- the “conservative” and “liberal” ones.²⁴⁹ Of this main stream Metropolitan press, the “moderate-conservative monarchist” Petersburg journal *Nablyudatel*,²⁵⁰ the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M'isl*,²⁵¹ and the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*²⁵² were among the few journals giving explicit emotional evaluation of the events in the Far East in 1894-5.

²⁴⁸ As Dietrich Beyrau argues, “Sundry secondary forums flourished for the general public: the societies and associations of the different professional groups; the universities with their rituals of public lectures and scholarly disputes, especially the highly regarded defense of doctoral theses; but also the law courts with their spectacular trials of criminals and revolutionaries; the subculture of the revolutionary circles (*kruzhki*) and conspirators comprising mainly students”, cit. by Beyrau, D. “Broken Identities: The Intelligentsia in Revolutionary Russia” in *Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia*, Madhavan K. Palat, (ed.), Palgrave, 2001:137

²⁴⁹ Note: The translations from Russian into English of all the quotations bellow from the Russian journals are made by the author of this paper.

²⁵⁰ *Nablyudatel. Zhurnal literaturn'ii, politicheskii i uchen'ii*, “Sovremennoe obozrenie. Politicheskaya hronika” (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), issues 1894-5 *Nablyudatel* was a monthly journal of literature, politics, and science, published in St.Petersburg (1882-1904), with A.P.Pyatkovskii being its publisher and chief editor. *Nablyudatel* belonged to the moderate conservative journals arguing for progressive development of the Russian society under the guidance of the autocracy. The journal was subsidized by the Russian government. *Nablyudatel* enjoyed less popularity in Russia than the liberal journals reviewed here, however, in this study it serves as a counter weight to the Russian liberal journals' view on Japan.

²⁵¹ *Russkaya M'isl Ezhemesechnoe literaturno-politicheskoe izdanie, a monthly journal of literature and politics*, published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918. His chief editors were S.A. Yurev (from 1880 to 1885), V.A.Gol'tsev (from 1885 to 1906), and P.Struve (from 1906 to 1918). From 1885, V.A. Gol'tsev gave the journal “Russian democratic character based on western European culture” (*Russkaya M'isl*, 1904/12, p.243). Hence, in the journal's articles there persisted two main directives- reformism and enlightenment.

²⁵² *Vestnik Evrop'ii. Zhurnal Istorii-Politiki-Literatur'ii* (*Vestnik Evrop'ii*- a monthly journal of history, politics, and literature) published in St.Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. Its establisher and chief editor-publisher was professor M.M.Stasyulevich until 1908. From 1908 to 1916, its chief editors became prof.

Concern over Russia's geographical proximity to the armed clashes, as well as over the possibility of Russia to be involved in the conflict as an ally to China or Japan, were given priority in the "Political Review" of the monarchist *Nablyudatel*. Initially, this conservative journal presented Japan as a potential though indirect threat to Russia and a disturber of the regional peace. In contrast, the two liberal journals, namely *Russkaya M'isl* and *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, focused on Japan's modernization and her positive role in the "East."

The monarchist journal *Nablyudatel*, in the first months of the war of 1894-5, followed the Russian official line of policy viewing Japan's regional ambitions as disturbing the stability of the Far East.²⁵³ According to it, the Sino-Japanese clashes over Manchuria and Korea increased the rivalry between Britain and Russia over China.²⁵⁴ *Nablyudatel* provided an emotional description of the revolts that broke up in Manchuria and in Korea almost simultaneously. In the first two articles on the Sino-Japanese armed clashes, the journal defended China's interests, and saw Japan as an unwelcome intruder in the Sino-Korean affairs. As the journal stated "a revolt also burst out in Korea, and Koreans turned to China for help, which sent her fleet and troops in Korea in response. The same did Japan justifying her interference by having special rights over Korea although Koreans did not ask for it."²⁵⁵

Contrary to the conservative journal's line of argument, the "liberal" *Russkaya M'isl* justified Japan's sending troops in Korea because of the need of defense of Japanese inhabitants in Korea against the *Togakuto* rebels. According to this Moscow journal, "in 1893, there were 9 240 Japanese living in Korea while there were only 2 240 Chinese and less than 200 Europeans

M.M. Kovalevsky, and from 1916 to 1918, D.D.Grimm and Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskii, respectively. *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, the oldest and the most solid among the 'thick journals', defended the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and related to her intellectuals. In the general platform of the Russian liberalism, formulated by the journal in 1882, the focus fell on the reformation of the Russian autocracy into a constitutional monarchy along the European model. During its 52 years of existence, *Vestnik Evrop'ii* ardently followed this political platform.

²⁵³ In 1894 and 1895, concerning the Far East problems, there were several "special meetings" held in Petersburg, under the chairperson Prince A.B.Lobanov-Rostovskii, the Naval Minister N.M.Chihachev, the Military Minister P.S.Vannovskii, and the Financial Minister S.Yu.Witte as participants. See Shatsillo, V., and Shatsillo, L. "*Russko-iaponskaya voina 1904-5*" (The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5), Moskva, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2004: 15

It is interesting that *Nablyudatel* did not refer to the threatened Russian interests in Manchuria in relation to the ongoing construction of the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway there. Neither was it mentioned that a possible defeat of China would give Japan territorial gains and increased influence in Korea and Manchuria. Hence, this would bring Japan close to the Russia's lands and would severe the regional competition for sphere of influence. However, those concerns of the Russia's ruling elite obviously remained unknown to the public.

²⁵⁴ "Sovremennoe obozrenie.Politicheskaya hronika" (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel*, 1894/07, (15-28pp), see p.29

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p.27-28

there.” It also referred to the so-called “condominium” signed between Japan and China for shared rule over Korea. Besides, “the robbery of Japanese homes in Seoul and the three ports open for foreigners as well as the insults towards the Japan’s consular urged Japan to send her troops to put out the revolt.” What is more, Japan was perceived by *Russkaya M’isl* not only as a “pacifier” but also as a “reformer” in Korea ready to fight for her goals. In the journal’s terms, “The Japanese government put to the Korean ruler the demands to carry domestic reforms and did not fear a war against such a giant as China.”²⁵⁶

A similar beginning for its brief notes on the foreign affairs in the Far East chose the Petersburg liberal journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*. With a sign of admiration towards “brave” Japan did the liberal journal announce the beginning of the war in the Asian East pointing, “Comparatively small Japan attacked the huge immobile China...Both China and Japan’s governments wished simultaneously to pacify Korea and to reform the poor peninsula.” The Petersburg journal also referred to “Japan’s rights based on her old relations with Korea and later confirmed by China herself in the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1885.”²⁵⁷

In contrast to the above-mentioned two “liberal” journals, the “moderate conservative” *Nablyudatel* did not limit itself to brief comments on the causes for the war. It went further viewing the fight between Japan and China through the racial discourse. The peacefulness of the “white race” was contrasted to the severity of the “yellow race.” “While the white races increase their armory for the sake of preserving peace, the yellow races started a serious bloody war among themselves that might take unexpected turn. The two big representatives of the yellow races, namely the Chinese and the Japanese, fight against each other over a third akin race-Korea” following their own Asian rules.”²⁵⁸ In addition, Japan’s ambitions for regional influence initially were seen by the journal as a disloyalty to her racial brethren and a sign of greediness. Although *Nablyudatel* admitted, “The political reasons for this war, however, remain quite unclear...” the journal referred implicitly to Japan as a traitor to her patron China. “Both Korea and Japan, which are now turning against China, developed under her sphere of influence”. With this aggressive interference in China’s sphere of influence, Japan appears

²⁵⁶ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1894/09 (185-194pp), p. 193 -194

²⁵⁷ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1884/09 (367-381pp), p.379

²⁵⁸ “Sovremennoe obozrenie. Politicheskaya hronika” (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel’*, 1894/10 (1-13pp), p.1.

ungrateful to her patron.²⁵⁹ What is more, Japan was perceived as a traitor to her brethren Korea, too. “Korea, being enlightened, brought the Buddhism, the Confucian teachings, and the phonetic alphabet into Japan...” However, “what did Japan in turn, was since the first Shoguns, to often raid into the Korean peninsula in order to rob and kill, and bring back home as trophies cut noses and ears of the Korean peaceful inhabitants...” The image of Japan being “cruel” and “not civilized” was further strengthened by *Nablyudatel*’s referring to the chase of Christians in sixteenth-century Japan. According to the journal, “those present civilizers [the Japanese], did not treat better even their own people who followed the Christian religion.” *Nablyudatel* went into details describing the chase and torture of the Christians in Japan—“missioners were boiled in barrels with not extinguished sulfur; melted lead was poured in their throats, or their bodies were peeled between wooden planks...it is said that four million people died in those purges”.²⁶⁰ This detailed reference to some events from the Japanese history that had happened a couple of centuries before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 without even quoting official sources of information obviously aimed to influence the reading public to perceive the Japanese as extremely “barbarous” and “cruel.”

Russia has for centuries been considered the center of the Christian Orthodox religion after the fall of Byzantium. Chasing of Christians in Japan was a bloody event that must have provoked extremely negative images of Japan among the deeply religious Russian audience. When such negative images are constantly reminded, they turn into negative stereotypes. Those images of Japanese being “barbarous” and “cruel” were echoed again in the Russian press during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. This is an example how group shared historical memory turns into another factor that influences present day images of a country.

Nablyudatel further insinuated other negative image of Japan as an “exploiter” though through a less shocking evaluation of Korean-Japanese relations in the 1890s. The main idea was that Japanese robbery of Korea was continuing. “At a time when there are only three open ports for foreigners to trade with Korea, Japan overtook all Korean trade in her hands, as well as the major Korean production.” What is more, “Japan exploited Korea ... A hundred million Japanese obviously feel overstuffed in their islands, and they do not want to give up the colonization and exploitation of Korea.”²⁶¹ These journal’s remarks could have been provoked by the interpretation of some Japanese colonial publicists who came to speak of overseas

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ *Nablyudatel*, 1894/10(1-13pp.) see p.2;p.3

²⁶¹ Ibid. p.3

territory as new living area for the overcrowded Japan. Still others perceived that Japan had economic interests abroad, specifically in Asia. These interests considered opportunities for trade and investments, access to sources of foodstuffs and strategic materials, as well as to markets for manufactured goods.²⁶²

In contrast to *Nablyudatel*, both “liberal” journals, *Russkaya M’isl* and *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, justified Japan’s interference in Sino-Korean relations based on the “civilization discourse.” *Vestnik Evrop’ii* argued that “Korea with no doubt will win if she frees herself from her aboriginal oppressor and goes under the rule of the more civilized Japan, otherwise, a China’s victory would be a great disaster to the Korean population.”²⁶³ Both “liberal” journals prescribed to Japan the role of a modern reformer, however, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* emphasized extensively on Japan’s reforming mission in Asia prophesying a huge disaster in case of Japan’s failure to do so.

In addition, it was not Japan but China that was perceived by *Vestnik Evrop’ii* as a “peril” to Europe. As the journal put it, “China with her innumerable mass of strong and enduring inhabitants presents a disastrous threat to Europe in future, and the timely prevention of this nightmare would be a great relief to all European nations.” However, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* did not clarify as to how exactly China could turn into a threat to Europe. Nevertheless, it bluntly declared, “China’s disintegration would be most beneficial to our Asian possessions and interests; we would be free from the necessity to keep considerable troops along our Asian borders; and on the ruins of the empire which is an example of stagnancy, there would start a new life opening good perspectives for all her neighbors...”²⁶⁴

From the stated above, it becomes clear that *Vestnik Evrop’ii* referred mainly to the Russia’s interests and security in the Far East, as well as relied on Russia’s support to Japan. Contrary to the “conservative” journal, *Nablyudatel*, which viewed China’s disintegration and Japan’s growing ambitions in the region as threatening to destabilize the Far East, the “liberal” *Vestnik Evrop’ii* perceived keeping the integrity of China as threatening to both Russia and East Asia. It was Japan, according to the Petersburg “liberal” journal that was destined to become the savior and modernizer of the “East.” Besides, “a Japanese final victory would also bring a huge benefit for all East Asia, shaking up the immobile as if turned into a stone, political organism

²⁶² Duus, P. “Economic Aspects of Meiji Imperialism,” *Occasional Papers, No.1*. East Asia Institute, Free University of Berlin, 1980:1)

²⁶³ *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1884/09,(367-381pp), p.380

²⁶⁴ Ibid. p.381-382

of China. Then, in front of hundreds of millions human beings destined to a pitiable and hopeless existence under the Chinese suppressing yoke, there would open opportunities for new lives through the disintegration of the Celestial Empire into several independent kingdoms and regions. This turn over in the history is highly desirable from all points of view.” *Vestnik Evrop’ii* also prescribed to Japan the historic mission of fighting on behalf of the “West” against the barbaric China that was threatening Europe’s, or more exactly, Russia’s interests and security in the Far East. In brief, Japan was expected to do the hard work reforming the “East,” as well as securing safe access to China and Korea for Europe.²⁶⁵

Both the Petersburg and the Moscow “liberal” journals expressed hopes in Japan’s final victory and open admiration of her modernization.²⁶⁶ According to *Russkaya M’isl*, China’s defeat was predictable since “the Japanese army is organized in a European way. It is armed with very good weapons invented by Japanese and western gun makers. In wartime, Japanese army could increase quite in number. Besides, German officers train it. Chinese fleet is bigger than Japanese, however, in military aspect it is much less...”²⁶⁷

Similarly, *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, when comparing Japan and China’s capabilities, also praised highly Japan’s successful westernization and modernization. In the journal’s terms, “Japan compared to China is a country of a brave progress and energetic intellectual development; and in fact, Japan’s military successes present only logical consequence and continuation of her cultural and social successes.”²⁶⁸

However, both *Russkaya M’isl* and *Vestnik Evrop’ii* also admitted the possibility of unexpected turn in the war and Japan’s defeat by China. “Due to her four or five hundred million inhabitants, the Celestial Empire could bear a row of defeats and exhaust Japan regardless of Japanese victories if there are no rebellions among the various Chinese populations, argued *Russkaya M’isl*.²⁶⁹

To *Vestnik Evrop’ii* “ if we judge by superficial indicators, China is more powerful than Japan...China has ten times bigger population than Japan, and her government has unlimited authority...Chinese soldiers are stronger and have more stamina than the Japanese ones...”

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p.380

²⁶⁶ *Russkaya M’isl*, 1894/09(185-194pp), p.194; and *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1884/10, (839-850pp), p. 839.

²⁶⁷ *Russkaya M’isl*, 1894/09(185-194pp), see p.194

²⁶⁸ *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1884/10,(839-850pp), p.844

²⁶⁹ *Russkaya M’isl*, 1894/09 (185-194pp), p.194

However, the row of China's defeats, according to *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, "once again proved the old saying that state's power did not depend on the size of its army and on the strength of its autocracy..." It depended on "the cultural and intellectual development of that nation, on the lively social energy and initiative, as well as on the efficiency of the governing system supported by [public] awareness of the social obligations and interests." The journal explicitly expressed high admiration of the reformed state along western liberal lines commemorating to this few paragraphs.²⁷⁰

The followed successes of the Japanese army in Manchuria confirmed that Japan's superiority over China was because of her successful modernization of all levels of her society. This brought to some sharp changes in the tone of the "Political Review" in the next few issues of the "conservative" *Nablyudatel*. The journal's sympathy to Korea and China suddenly gave place to Japan instead. In the November 1894 issue of *Nablyudatel*, "the disciplined along the European model Japanese army" also received positive evaluation. Moreover, this time Japan's insistence on reforming Korea was seen by the journal as "*just* and absolutely necessary" since "the Korean population is unsatisfied with both his and foreign rulers but are helpless to go on a serious revolt...his own ruling elite and other nobility are robbers and bribe-takers not better than the Chinese.... In Korea people work only to secure their everyday existence, and all extra is taken by their nobility." This populist speech quite unusual for a pro-monarchist journal as *Nablyudatel*, ended up with an emotional outburst: "How is it possible not to sympathize to Japan in her desire to change this unbearable situation?"²⁷¹

As seen from all of the above written, *Nablyudatel's* perceptions of Japan have undergone a drastic change- from presenting Japan as "barbarous" and "aggressive" to viewing Japan as a "civilized nation" with a special mission, namely to free and reform the backward Korea. The modern and disciplined Japanese army was also praised by the journal. This sudden change in the journal's visions and tone about Japan comes once again to prove that changes in a country's position in the international arena bring changes in her image as seen by the "others."

The tendency to justify Japan's fight against China, based on the "civilizing mission" along Western lines, was followed throughout the whole war by the two liberal journals *Russkaya M'isl and Vestnik Evrop'ii*, and at the end of the war, by the moderate conservative journal *Nablyudatel* as well.

²⁷⁰ *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1884/10 (839-850pp), p.840

²⁷¹ *Nablyudatel*, 1894/11 (1-11pp) see p.3-4

Although Japan was perceived as “civilizer,” the strategy and tactics applied by the Japanese and the Chinese armies in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 received in general rather negative evaluation by the conservative *Nablyudatel*. According to the journal, “the Sino-Japanese War is lead in a typical Asian way. There is no trace in it of the European way- that is, no sudden attacks, pressure, or decisive battles. Japanese act with extreme caution and slowly.... Chinese fight limply and apathetically;... and that they [the Chinese] themselves realize the impossibility to fight against a smaller in number but trained in a European way Japanese army is proven by the fact that they officially turned to the European countries and North America with request to act as intermediaries for the conclusion of peace...”²⁷²

European way of leading a war seems to be measure for the “right” way to fight, according to the conservative journal’s standards. In addition, the superiority of the “West” was called upon by *Nablyudatel* to justify European presence in the Far East. Here the “civilization discourse” was also espoused to give a “civilized” Europe the world historical mission of being the protector of the weak and poor nations and their guide along the path of “civilization.” “No matter how underdeveloped those yellow skin races are ,when they see that Europe’s interference in their lives would improve their poor existence, though not immediately, but they will comprehend how beneficial that cultural guidance for them might be”, argued *Nablyudatel*.²⁷³ However, the growing appetite of the “civilized countries” for a piece of the Celestial Kingdom was also admitted by the journal.²⁷⁴

Such aggressive European policy in Asia was justified by professor F.F.Martens- the most prominent Russian authority on international law and adviser to the Russia Foreign Office in the 1880s- in his two pamphlets “Rossia i Kitai (Russia and China)”, St.Petersburg, 1881, and “ Russia and England in Central Asia”, London, 1887. For example, Russia’s conquest of Central Asian and Chinese territories was acceptable since, according to professor Martens, “international rights cannot be taken into account when dealing with semi-barbarous peoples”²⁷⁵

²⁷² “Sovremennoe obozrenie. Politicheskaya hronika” (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel*’ 1894/12 (1-9pp) p.7

²⁷³ Ibid, p.9

²⁷⁴ Ibid

²⁷⁵ Fyodor F. Martens (1845-1909) was a professor in International Law at the Petersburg University. Since 1881, he became a permanent member of the Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and representative of Russia at the Hague First Peace Conference in 1899. His most famous writings comprise of “*Sobranie traktatov i konventsii zaklyuchenn’ih Rossiei s inostrannami derzhavami*”(Collection of the Tractates and Conventions signed between Russia and foreign states),

Nevertheless, hopes for peaceful solution of the regional disturbance were expressed by the conservatives *Nablyudatel* as well as by the two liberal journals *Vestnik Evrop'ii* and *Russkaya M'isl.*

With the signing of the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki on 5 April 1895, some Russian journals, as *Vestnik Evrop'ii* noted, changed their flattering tone towards Japan suddenly into a critical one.

One reason could be that the preliminary conditions of the treaty “put ahead the issue of the great European powers’ political tasks in the Far East and their treatment of it,” as *Vestnik Evrop'ii* stated. The focal point of press discussions in Europe fell upon the increased Japan’s presence in the Far East. “Should Japan be allowed to enjoy the fruits of her victory, and is it acceptable at all to let Japan dominate over China? To whom Japanese increased power is profitable and to whom it is dangerous? Hot journalistic political debates on those issues started immediately after the cease of the fire between the belligerent countries.”²⁷⁶

For example, with China’s defeat and the upcoming peace negotiations, *Nablyudatel* resumed its ironic and critical tone against Japan. Japanese “self-confidence and growing appetite” about China and Korea were said, “to grow with each victory in the war.” What is more, “now they [Japanese] are even unsatisfied with having Korea, Formosa, and some Chinese islands. They are also eager to know how much contribution China is able to pay them and what territorial indents Chinese contemplate to give them...urgent interference from the side of the European powers are required in order to check Japan’s growing pretensions.” Meanwhile, in a complete contradiction with the above, *Nablyudatel* openly expressed its admiration of Japan and her significant mission in the “East” in conclusion. In order to see the striking difference of tone and attitude, from all of the above written in the “Political review” in *Nablyudatel*, the citation is given in full. “Japan suffered great losses, took big loans, lost a lot of brave and disciplined soldiers. She was the bearer of the real culture in the depths of the stagnant East;

unfinished, and his lecture course “*Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo tsivilizpvan'ih narodov*” (Contemporary Law of the Civilized Nations), 1882

On his pamphlets “*Rossia i Kitai* (Russia and China)”, St.Petersburg, 1881, and “*Russia and England in Central Asia*,” London, 1887 see Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*, Octagon Books, New York, 1977:42

²⁷⁶ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1895/05 (410-423pp), see p.410

she proved that nowadays even ancient nations [such as China] could not exist on decaying bases. And for that she [Japan] has to be awarded.”²⁷⁷

Although admitting that Japan had to be awarded for her positive role in the Far East, *Nablyudatel* expressed its surprise by the clauses of the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. It gave to Japan not only some financial contribution, and the Island of Formosa as it was initially expected but also the Pescadores and the Liaotung (Liaodong) Peninsula with the Port Arthur and the fortress *Vei-ha-vei*. Nevertheless, those last two big Japanese gains, according to *Nablyudatel*, “would be probably temporary in Japan’s possession.”²⁷⁸ What is more, the journal made another hint about a possible alliance between Japan and China against the “West”- “it is said that there is a conclusion of a defense and common offense alliance between the nations of the yellow races in order to rebuff the white races, and this is quite possibly [true].”²⁷⁹

In fact, some ideas of regional solidarity and the Japanese responsibilities of leadership in an East Asian co-operation against western invasion were often present in the Japanese and Korean press during that time.²⁸⁰ Hence, in the western as well as in the Russian press then there circulated the idea that if Japanese military prowess and knack for effective organization combined with China’s vast manpower and resources, this would overturn the balance of power between the “West” and “Non-West,” and hence constitute a major threat to the “Western civilization.” This was also an echo of the idea of a coming “Yellow Peril” from the “East” insinuated by Kaiser Wilhelm II’s “*Knack fuss* picture.” It is well known that the German Emperor exploited this sentiment in order to direct Russian Emperor Nicholas II’s attention away from Europe toward the Far East. In Russia, the concept of the “Yellow Peril” was also taken up at a popular level by few Russian intellectuals such as G.Danilevskii,²⁸¹ L.A.Tikhomirov,²⁸² and Vl.Solov’ev.²⁸³ The later covered it into a symbol of a “real threat” to Russia and to the whole Christian world.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁷ “Sovremennoe obozrenie. Politicheskaya hronika” (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel*, 1895/03 (1-11pp) p.11

²⁷⁸ Ibid, 1895/05 (1-14pp) p.7

²⁷⁹ Ibid

²⁸⁰ Schmid,A. *Korea between Empires, 1895-1919*,Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2002:12

²⁸¹ Grigorii Petrovich Danilevskii (1829-1890) - a famous Russian novel writer and explorer of Pre-Amur region who introduced the idea of a ‘Chinese invasion’ of France. see Danilevskii, G.P, “ Zhizn cherez sto let (Life after 100 years), in Danilevskii, G., *Sochinenia*, vol. XIX, SPb, 1901:23

²⁸² Lev Alexandrovich Tikhomirov (1852-1923) - famous Russian philosopher, publicist and public figure. See “Iz dnevnika L.A.Tikhomirova (1899-1904)” [From L.A.Tikhomirov’s Diary], *Krasnii Archive*, 1936, Vol.1 and 2, released online <http://www.pravaya.ru/faith/11/4707>

In contrast, although *Nablyudatel* mentioned the union of the “yellow races” against the “white race,” it did not interpret the Sino-Japanese alliance as a serious peril to European civilization. The journal did not also portray Japan or the Sino-Japanese alliance as a direct “Yellow Peril” to Russia.²⁸⁵ What is more, according to *Nablyudatel*, the followed European interference in the peace negotiations was not provoked out of concern over European interests and security but rather out of concern over China’s partitioning and Korea’s dependence. As *Nablyudatel* argued, “Russia having insignificant trade relations with the “East,” France carrying the biggest part of the Eastern trade, and Germany, not having any trade relations to the “East,” declared that the winner’s demands are too big, and concluded an alliance among themselves in order to make Japan become more moderate...and England openly stood in defense of China.”²⁸⁶ Its position on Russia’s role in the peace treaty revisions *Nablyudatel* expressed implicitly. It stated that Europe was “not pleased with the peace treaty and insists on its revision, and claimed that since such a great country as Russia, although all her victories agreed on the Berlin Congress and obeyed its decisions, then the “yellow skin” nations should follow her example.” Thus, Japan was seen in the role of a student who had to learn the “rules of the civilized world.”²⁸⁷

Most ironic about those debates on Japanese demands were some journalists’ dubious standards to the Country of the Rising Sun. On the one hand, Japan was expected to be modern and powerful in order to pacify and reform the “East.” On the other hand, Japan was urged to be moderate in her actions and subservient to the great powers’ demands.

Those dubious perceptions and expectations from Japan led to an extreme range of images of Japan in the Russian press- from Japan “the reformer” to Japan “the greedy barbarian,” from a “peril” to Russia to her “true ally.” As *Vestnik Evrop’ii* wrote, “In some our newspapers there

²⁸³ Vladimir Sergeevich Solo’vov (1853-1900) – a prominent Russian religious philosopher, writer, and poet “Symbolist.” See his story “Tri Razgovora” (Three Discussions) with the attachment “Kratkaya Povest ob Antihriste” (A Short Story about the Antichrist), in Solov’ev, VI. “*Tri razgovora*” [Three Conversations] (01/1900), Engl transl. (New York, 1954), pp. 193-195; and his article “Kitai i Evropa” (China and Europe), in *Russkoe Obozrenie*, 1890/2, 3, 4

²⁸⁴ Verbitsky, S.I. ‘Russian Notions about Japan’, in: Nish, *Contemporary European Writing on Japan; Scholarly Views from Eastern and Western Europe*, Woodchurch, Kent, 1988:217-20

²⁸⁵ *Nablyudatel*, 1895/05 (1-14pp) p.7-8

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 1895/06 (1-11pp) see p.1

²⁸⁷ *Nablyudatel* referred to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 in which Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire and liberated the Balkan Christians. A large Bulgaria was created under the rule of a Russian Governor. Naturally, fearing a strong Russian presence in the Balkans, the European great powers summoned the Berlin Congress in 1878, which remapped the Balkan states cutting 2/3rds of the Bulgarian lands, and made Russia give up half of her demands on the issue. *Nablyudatel*, 1895/05(1-14pp) p.8

are persistent negative evaluations about the Japanese people- how cruel they are, how those powerful barbarians might harm us a lot in the future...however, the same judgment was recently used by the foreigners about our own [Russian] barbarianism...” Meanwhile, further argued the journal, “the people who had direct contact with Japanese claim the opposite...Some people even exaggerate Japanese good features.”²⁸⁸

The journal referred to Alexander Yakovlevich Maximov, a prominent writer, publicist, and ethnographer, who had lived and written extensively on the Far East. A. Maximov in his book *Nashi zadachi v Tihom okean* (Our Tasks in the Pacific Ocean, 1895), described the Japanese “as knights, who do not bear haughtiness and political hypocrisy but recognize only the policy of honor, prudence, mutual trust, and impartiality...” In Maximov’s words, “Japan is our only true ally along the Pacific coast; our friendship with her is as much important to us as it is to her...”²⁸⁹

Another positive evaluation of Japan, which *Vestnik Evrop’ii* quoted, was from the Colonel of the General Staff D.V. Putyata’s special study on China (1895). When referring to a possible Russia’s ally in the Pacific, D.V. Putyata viewed the Japanese as “people of honor, entrepreneurial, energetic and capable of cultural development; therefore it is worth keeping friendly relations with such people, based on mutual benefits.” Japan, in his perceptions, did not present any threat to Russia because “by size and number of population she could not compete with Russia or threaten her in any aspect.” Any threat from Japan because of her cultural growth was also absurd, according to D.V.Putyata. It was decaying China, not rising Japan, in Colonel’s opinion, that presented the real peril to Russia.²⁹⁰

Others, however, viewed Japan’s growth for such a short period as insufficient for completing the internal reformation of the Japanese society, and thus, she could be neither a rival nor an equal partner to Russia in the Pacific. There was still in Japan a severe struggle for political reforms impeded by the old oligarchy, according to D.D. Pokotilov, Russia’s official representative in China, quoted by *Vestnik Evrop’ii*. To D.D. Pokotilov, this political conditions

²⁸⁸ *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1895/05/01 (410-423pp), p.410;p.411

²⁸⁹ Maximov, A. Ya. *Nashi zadachi v Tihom okean’* (Our Tasks in the Pacific Ocean), SPB, 189: 27-28, qtd. In *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1895/05/01 (410-423pp), see. P.411-54.

Putyata, D.V. “*Kitai, Ocherki geografii, ekonomicheskago sostoyaniya, administrativnago i voennago ustroistva i pr. S XVI chertezhami*” (China, Outlines on Her Economic Condition, Administrative, and Military Structure, etc. With XVI Charts), SPB, 1895, p.265, qtd. in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1895/05/01 (410-423pp), see p.412-13

²⁹⁰ Putyata, D.V. op.cit., p.265, qtd. in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1895/05 (410-423pp), see p.412-13

provoked Japan's government to resolve to war with China in search for victories which could distract Japanese public from the chronic internal political crisis. "That is why the [Japanese] ministry eagerly interfered in the Korean issue ..." Consequently, it would not be fair to put high demands to Japan about the peace treaty with China. "Japanese people were in a period of internal struggles and had only recently freed themselves from the feudalism," further claimed D.D. Pokotilov. On the contrary, Western Europeans "should look at the Japanese energetic strivings for cultural and scientific progress with empathy."²⁹¹ His perception of Japan as still weak and in a process of transformation is in contrast to most of the above quoted references. This vision on Japan, however, might have reflected some official stance to Japan, since Dimitrii Dimitrievich Pokotilov at that time was assigned as the director of the Shanghai Branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1894, where he acted as a mediator between China and Russia (and from 1905-1908 he became the official Russian ambassador in Beijing).

All the quoted above intellectuals by the liberal journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, had lived long years in East Asia, and had expressed their first hand perceptions of the region in a number of their writings. By referring to their expert opinion on the matters of East Asia, the journal obviously aimed to strengthen its argument on Japan's decisive role in the region, as well as to reflect the two-side discussion on Japan among Russian intellectuals during that period. In its concluding notes on the war, *Vestnik Evrop'ii* again openly expressed its deep admiration of Japanese chivalry. The Japanese Emperor's pronouncement to the Japanese people after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki, in which the Emperor appealed to Japanese modesty and empathy towards China, won the deep admiration and respect of the liberal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*. As the journal noted, "The Japanese Emperor's appeal could serve as a model for conscious humanism and modesty not only to our [Russian] patriots, but also to the state rulers and publicists from the Western Europe..." Although keeping a firm positive stance to Japan, *Vestnik Evrop'ii* admitted that Japan's possession of Liaodong Peninsula might disturb the regional balance of power. Hence, according to the journal, Russia along with Germany, and France had probably done it right to interfere in limiting Japan's demands in order to secure the regional peace and prevent from further undesired consequences. This temporary interference on the Russia's side would hopefully not ruin the Russo-Japanese relations, concluded *Vestnik Evrop'ii*.²⁹²

²⁹¹ Pokotilov, D.D. *Korea i yaponno-kitaiskoe stalknovenie. S kartoyu Korei* (Korea and Sino-Japanese Conflict. With map of Korea), Spb.1895, p.60, qtd. in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, Ibid.

²⁹² *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1895/05 (410-423pp), see p.417-8

The conservative journal *Nablyudatel* also interpreted the presence of European troops in the Far East as the absolute necessity not only for the balance of peace but also for the further reforms of China, Korea, and Japan.²⁹³ With a bit of irony *Nablyudatel* pointed out that the “militaristic states in Europe can use their extra troops in the Asian East instead of fighting against each other....” As it describe it, “France has already had her Indo-China, England is managing even without army with her Indies, Burma, and Siam; only Germany has no colony in the Asian East, but she could have one in that vast land- there is more space for everybody than in Europe.”²⁹⁴ In fact, this monarchist conservative journal paid significant attention to the geopolitical factor. The Far East, according to the journal, was seen as a vast arena on which great powers should seek new solutions for their imperial rivalry.

It is interesting that *Nablyudatel* did not declare any definite stance as far as Russia’s position in the Far East went. Russia had no colonies in her possession as the other great powers did; however, she had applied for centuries a cheaper but more effective strategy – to rule over certain regions by building a strong sphere of influence there under the justification of having special rights in that region,²⁹⁵ or by expanding her economic and political influence there. Nevertheless, when referring to the European military interference and cultural guidance of the Asian East, the journal saw the great powers as acting on an equal base without giving explicit preference to Russia’s regional interests.

On the other hand, according to the *Journal de St.Petersbourg* cited in same article in *Nablyudatel*, “preserving the territorial *status quo* in the Chinese mainland is for Russia a political necessity which should be obtained at any price,” and therefore Japan’s submission to the “Triple Intervention” presented “a victory of the diplomacy.”²⁹⁶

Nablyudatel, however, expressed a completely different opinion on the positions of Russia and Japan in the Far East. It argued, “Our [Russia’s] diplomacy is as always in contra with the public opinion, especially about the Eastern matters. All our gains in central Asia are due to the

²⁹³ *Nablyudatel*, 1895/02 (1-10pp) see p.10

²⁹⁴ “Sovremennoe obozrenie. Politicheskaya hronika” (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel*, 1895/02 (1-10pp) see p.10

²⁹⁵ For example, Russia’s regional imperialism in the Balkans at the end of the nineteenth century, as well as her gradual intrusion in Manchuria and Korea in late 1880s.

²⁹⁵ “Sovremennoe obozrenie. Politicheskaya hronika” (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel*, 1895/03 (1-11pp) see p.11

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1895/03 (1-11pp) see p.2

Russian armory not to the diplomatic negotiations... For the ordinary [Russian] inhabitant it is insignificant whether Japan will also become a continental state. In addition, why should we care about Korea's independence? ...we naturally need unfreezing port in the South of Korea...but whether we are going to get it, it is not yet clear..."²⁹⁷

A possible explanation for *Nablyudatel's* disregard of Asia could be that this monarchist journal had focused for years its polemics entirely on the issue of carrying reforms in Russia "necessary for the progressive development of Russian society under the guidance of the autocracy."²⁹⁸ The majority of the monarchists did not see Russia's past and future related to Asia but to Europe. Russia had to compete constantly and to confirm her place in Europe, while Russia's expansion in Asia was understood a result of the natural obedience of "the weakest" to "the strongest." In addition, in *Nablyudatel's* words, "Russia had insignificant trade relations with the East," that is, Russia's primary interests were mainly in Europe.²⁹⁹

The following couple of years, however, proved that Russia had significant interests to pursue in the Far East. Russia's further agreements with China, and gained concessions from the Celestial Kingdom found deep approval even in the liberal journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*.³⁰⁰

Once Japan obeyed the European powers demands, returned the Liaodong Peninsula, and decreased the amount of her indemnities from China, the peace in the Far East was recovered. The focus of the Russian publicists moved again towards Russia's internal problems and her role in the European matters though not for long.

As seen from all of the above written, a variety of images of Japan and China were entertained in some popular Russian journals during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. Russian intellectuals' images of Japan at that time varied- from extremely negative ones, originating from some kind of "social Darwinism," to highly positive ones, placing Japan as a successful state model, which should be learned from, or assigning her the role of a reformer of the "East" It is difficult, however, to trace where those multiple and conflicting images of Japan originated from in the Russian press at that time. All the ambivalence of Russian images of

²⁹⁷ Ibid, p.2-3

²⁹⁸ online Kozlova, E. "*Pechati Rossii v kontse devetnadsatago veka*" (Russian Press at the end of the Nineteenth Century), http://www.newsman.tsu.ru/library/main/kozlova_his (25/06/2005)

²⁹⁹ Ibid, p.3

³⁰⁰ "Inostrannoe Obozrenie"(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1898/01/01 (397-408pp), p.400; and 1898/04/01 (839-852pp), p844

Japan and attitudes to her collectively suggest different interpretations. One possible explanation is that at that period Europeans perceived the Asian East as “exotic” rather than “ordinary” and “enigmatic” rather than “comprehensible.” The “East” was believed to be the “other” of the “West,” and hence, different intellectuals interpreted their meeting in different terms- either as a coming evil or as a sign of stability and a material and spiritual unity.

Besides the traditional interpretation of the interaction between the “modern West” and the “old-bound East,” Russian multifarious perceptions of Japan could also be a product of the growing diversification and fragmentation of the cultural and political thought of Russia during that period. Naturally, publicists belonging to different ideological groups divided along political lines into “Liberals,” “Conservatives,” “Populists,” “Social Democrats,” or “Social Revolutionaries,” or else divided along civilization modes of thought into “Slavophiles,” “Westerners,” “Easterners,” and so on, could have been under the influence of the ideological movement with which they associated themselves. Hence, such a diversification of Russian cultural and political thoughts might have reflected on the Russian construction of various images of Russia itself, and Russia and the ‘others’.

However, it should be also admitted that such written pronouncements could have been purely provoked by the occurred changes in the international arena, and thus could present spontaneous individual responses, and be not related to any ideological movement.

Since Japan emerged as the first modern state in East Asia, majority of Russian publicists started looking upon her in more favorable terms- as a representative of the western civilization in Asia. The defeat of China in the “Opium War,” the unequal treaties of 1850’s imposed by the western powers to her, and her inability to reorganize, had brought to the disintegration of the “Chinese World Order.”³⁰¹

In contrast, Japan had managed quickly to modernize along Western lines and come up as a solid military force in the region. Hence, during and after the Sino-Japanese War of 1884-5, Japan was perceived by the above reviewed Russian journals to be a “progressive” force in contrast to the “old” and “stagnant” China –a weak, decaying country unable to cope with the new regional realities.

³⁰¹ Jansen, M. “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives”, in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, Meyers, R., and M. Peattie (eds.), Princeton University Press, 1984:63.

Another commonly shared idea by the reviewed here journals was to envision special messianic roles of European powers in the “East,” and that in turn affected their vision of Japan’s role in the same region. This demonstrates the assumption that the images which one society derives from another are determined not so much by perceptions as by self-perceptions. In the above journals’ understanding, Japan was destined to be a reformer and modernizer of the “East” but she was too small and weak to be a maintainer of the regional balance compared to Europe (including Russia).

An interesting difference among the reviewed here press opinions on Japan is that only the conservative journal *Nablyudatel* had some critical stance towards Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. It viewed Japan in somehow negative terms with few exceptions, in contrast to the two liberal journals, which presented Japan only in positive light.

As seen from all of the above written, Russian intellectuals entertained various images of Japan before and during the course of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. Prince E.Ukhtomskii saw Japan in 1891 as still “weak,” and “in a process of reforming,” but with energy that soon would boost up under the influence of pressing chauvinistic views. His predictions on rising Japan came true just a couple of years later when Japan attacked China to defend her regional interests. The Russian central press comments on the course of the war were full of implicit reformist propaganda targeting Russian political leaders. Reformed Japan served to them as an example of progressive force, while in stagnant China they saw a decay that would soon happen to Russia if not reformed. Hence, reform-minded liberals openly praised all Japanese successes at home as well as on the battlefield. The conservatives though initially reserved against constitutional Japan, with the advance of the Sino-Japanese War changed their critical attitude to Japan admitting her successes and excellent organization. Still along with the positive images of Japan, there existed some negative stereotypes from her recent past in Russian mind. With the new developments in the Far East in the following decade, Russian perceptions of Japan kept evolving and increasing their ambivalence.

Chapter IV Rising Japan – “Adored” or “Feared”

IV.1. Individual First-hand Experiences in Japan (1898-1902)

- Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovski (1898)

The changes of Japanese society brought about by the Meiji Restoration attracted increased attention among Petersburg and Moscow’s intellectual circles in the context of the reform movement in Russia. Some Russian left wing groups also referred to the progressiveness of the social reforms in Meiji Japan when appealing for a revolt against the existing Russian imperial system.

The famous Russian neo-populist, writer, and publicist, Nikolai Georg’evich Garin-Mikhailovskii (1852-1906)³⁰² constructed a highly positive image of reformed Japan in his travel notes during his voyage on an academic purpose in East Asia in 1898.

Garin- Mikhailovskii was best known for his literary treatment of controversial social issues and his activities regarding political reforms in Russia during that period. His account of thier short stay in Nagasaki and Yokohama in 1898 differentiates itself from the travel notes from that period by “its reflexivity and its sensitivity to the aspirations of ordinary Japanese,” to use David N.Wells’ terms.³⁰³

N.G. Garin- Mikhailovskii (a railway-engineer by education) was deeply impressed by the Japanese “creativity and imagination” on his visits of Japanese factories and railway shops in Nagasaki and Yokohama in 1898. He was “convinced as a specialist by the striking dedication and original talent of Japanese technicians and workmen.”³⁰⁴ In this, he acknowledged the

³⁰² Garin-Mikhailovskii gained big popularity with his trilogy *Detstvo Tëm’ii* (Tyoma’s Childhood), 1892, *Gymnazist’ii* (High school students), 1893, and *Students* (Students), 1895. Later his works were collected and printed under the title *N.G.Garin-Mikhailovskii, Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, (N.G.Garin Mikhailovskii, Collected Works, Five vols.) Moscow: Gos.izd-vo khudozh.lit-ry, 1958, 5 vols

³⁰³ Wells, D. N. (ed. and transl), *Russian Views of Japan 1792-1913. An Anthology of Travel Writing*, Rutledge Curzon, London and New York, 2004:176

³⁰⁴ Garin-Mikhailovski, N. *Around Korea, Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula* (Nagasaki, Yokohama, 1898), in *Ibid.*, p.185

Japanese superiority over Russians. The Japanese “mobility and individual peculiarities” also struck him.³⁰⁵

He could not but admit that he himself had also been under the influence of Pierre Loti’s *Madame Chrysanthème* (Paris, 1887). Before China’s defeat of Japan in 1895, on a broader level, Russian perceptions of Japan followed the general Western European current of views—seeing Japan as an exotic Oriental country, intellectually inferior to the western civilization, and Japanese often denigrated presented as small yellow ivory dolls or monkeys. “But reading Loti”, as Garin- Mikhailovskii admitted, “who would have thought that so soon the Japanese people would experience a war with China that would straight away promote Japan into the ranks of the civilized nations? This war demonstrated Japan’s real position in regard to technology and political development.”³⁰⁶ “Compared with the Koreans, hopelessly entangled by government surveillance and the burden of their past, compared even with the vigorous but equally trammled Chinese, the Japanese are a force bursting out towards freedom, impressive for their determination, energy, and vision.”³⁰⁷ Garin- Mikhailovskii also contrasted the “Japanese adaptability, and the rejection of all routine” to the Russian “prejudices and inflexibility,” the Japanese “friendliness and effectiveness” when serving customers with Russian “rudeness and lack of interest in that matter”.³⁰⁸

Although Garin-Mikhailovskii was a prominent publicist in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, however, it is hard to judge how much influence his perceptions of Japan had upon the Russian court and society. Most of the research regarding Russian state of information about Japan at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries show that the detailed knowledge of Japan remained confined to a small group of specialists or governmental officials³⁰⁹. In addition, the influence of novels such as P. Loti’s novel *Madame Chrysanthème*, on a broad level, was still great.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p.178

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p.177

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p.183

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 178

³⁰⁹ Kirby, E. S. *Russian Studies of Japan. An Exploratory Survey*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981; also Wells, D. N., (ed. and transl.), *Russian Views of Japan 1792-1913. An Anthology of Travel Writing*, Rutledge Curzon, London and New York, 2004; and Lensen, G. Al. *The Russian Push toward Japan. Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875*, Octagon Books, New York, 1971; also Rimer, J.Th. (ed.) *A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford, 1995; and Wells, D., and Sandra Wilson (eds.) *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999; also Berton, Dr P. “Japanese Studies in the West: Russian Japanology and Perspectives on Japan” (*Tsushin*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2000);

- E.I.Bulgakova (1899)

Another interesting first-hand experience in Japan presented E.I Bulgakova,³¹⁰ a specialist in sociology and history, an honorable member of the Society for Defense of Female Rights. E.I. Bulgakova was also known as a publicist, a theoretician of some kind of utopian socialism. She has written a number of articles on “female workers,” defending their rights and arguing for social justice.³¹¹ The stance of hers could be also seen in her interpretations of Reformed Japan. E.I. Bulgakova went on a short visit to Tokyo in 1893, and soon after her return to the home country, she set to write an empirical historical observation of Japan’s geography, past and present economy, government, and social structure. Her book *Iaponia i iaponts’ii* (Japan and the Japanese) came up in Moscow in 1899. It comprised a 151- page description of Japan, based both on some personal experiences and on German, English, French, Russian, and Japanese secondary resources, as well as some articles from the Russian journals *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, and *Istoricheskii vestnik*.

After Leon Mechnikoff’s *L’empire japonais*, published in Genève in 1881, E.I. Bulgakova’s detailed observations on Japan was the second Russian study embracing several areas of research and based on reliable sources.

Only in the first twelve pages, which present an introduction to the survey, did E.I. Bulgakova allow herself to be overtly subjective in her opinion on Japan. In the beginning of her introduction, she presented several stereotypes about Japan and the Japanese, which Russian public had entertained for some years until 1890s. E.I.Bulgakova stated that, “Until recently, just the words “a Japanese man” provoked in us the image of an uncivilized man from the Mongolian race, with a yellow face, narrow slanted eyes, and a flat nose, wearing a weird gown and wooden sandals.”³¹² This image presented a generalization of the man from the yellow race in Russian minds. Such an image conceived the fears and prejudices of its creator and aimed to provoke associations with the bloody barbarous Mongolian invaders in Russia centuries ago.

Another stereotype introduced by E.I. Bulgakova referred to stereotypes about Japan as a state. “We imagined Japan to be a semi-wild state in the Far East, populated by people who spent

³¹⁰ Note: E.I. Bulgakova’s full name and exact birth date could not be verified in the Russian online sites for the lack of such information.

³¹¹ On her social stance, see Bulgakova, E.I. *A brief look at the Kiev female workers*, Kiev Division of Russian Society of Women’s Defense, Kiev, 1906

³¹² Bulgakova, E.I. *Iaponia i iaponts’ii* (Japan and the Japanese), Moskva, Typography Vilde, 1899: 3

their whole lives in participating in numerous useless ceremonies and in praying to Gods,” wrote E.I. Bulgakova.³¹³ Such an oversimplified image of a state could have stemmed from Russian reluctance to treat an Asian nation as equal. Some Russians perceived the Asian nations incorporated in the Russian imperial realm as semi-civilized needing enlightenment and guidance from Russia. Those traits were automatically transferred to Japan being an Asian nation.

In addition, the scarce facts about Japan in Russia until the end of the nineteenth century, and the distorting power of the ways in which those few facts could have been organized to serve particular interests, might have also contributed to the relativity and distortion of Russian knowledge about Japan. For example, Japanese praying to various Gods was perceived by Russian religious minds as an act of barbarous paganism from which Russia had got rid of since tenth century but into which Japan was still involved. Hence, Japanese combination of Buddhist religion with Shinto beliefs and Confucian teachings must have met some misunderstanding in Russia.

The Japanese governing system was also viewed with some dose of misunderstanding from some Russians, as explained by E.I. Bulgakova. “We thought that in Japan there were two men of power: one spiritual leader, ruling from his unassailable temple-fortress in his capital Kyoto, a leader who is perceived by the Japanese as their God on Earth, inaccessible, hidden from the eyes of the ordinary people. And another one- a worldly leader, living in Tokyo and ruling all the civil and military affairs. The Europeans were at a loss to which one they should turn to [when dealing with Japan].”In addition, some Europeans treated Japanese beliefs about the Godly origin of their emperor, with doubt and even mockery. Moreover, “Japanese laws, customs, and lifestyle, were perceived by the Europeans as barbarous and ridiculous. Therefore, until not long ago, European states did not want to make any compromise in regard to Japan’s insistence on all foreign residents to be judged by Japanese laws,”³¹⁴ pointed out the author.

E.I. Bulgakova used the above-mentioned Russian denigrating stereotypes about Japan and the Japanese as images to which she contrasted some new Russian perceptions of Japan provoked by Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. In her terms “And after all that, in 1894 we read in the newspapers about a number of brilliant Japanese victories over the huge Chinese Empire, which overwhelms Japan twenty-six times both in size and number of

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

population.”³¹⁵ This unexpected row of victories of Japan over China, gave the Russian war observers the impression of something “unworldly” happening on the battlefields. “As if by a magic, the Japanese army appeared there- excellently trained, disciplined, and organized along the west-European model... Japanese conscript army with their ammunitions and weapons do not differ at all from European soldiers....Japanese won a row of victories over China, easily, as if in a game. They are easily sinking Chinese ships, destroying their fortresses, and the glory of Japanese weapons is growing quickly.”³¹⁶

Not only in the military field were the Japanese praised for scoring victories but also in their education system. “A considerate number of children (53 per cent in year 1889) go to school. There are also an impressive number of high schools and higher institutions. In addition, in Berlin, Paris, or London you could see Japanese who have come to fill in the gap in their education.”³¹⁷ Reforms in education were especially praised by Russian intellectuals whose discussions were often focused on criticism of Russia’s backward position in comparison with Europe and even Japan. Culturally as well as materially, the contrasts in pre-revolutionary Russia were extraordinarily sharp. In 1897, the illiteracy rate in Russia was 79 per cent, and schools were forced to raise their fees to prevent the poorer classes gaining education.³¹⁸

Hence, the fact that “soon Japanese surpassed their European teachers not only in the fields of army and education but also in commerce and manufacture...” should have served as a mirror to Russians self-perception as well, besides their positive reaction to it. In a very short notice, Japanese “have started competing with the French and British in the European markets. International exhibitions held in 1877, 1884, 1890, and 1895 in Japan demonstrated unquestionably Japan’s quick success and the fact that the Japanese were well-acquainted with the latest inventions,”³¹⁹ pointed out E.I. Bulgakova. Only thirty-forty years ago, Japan was neglected because of her seclusion, and of the glass ceiling created by foreigners’ prejudices, argued Bulgakova.³²⁰

³¹⁵ Ibid, p.4

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid, p.5

³¹⁸ *Russia 1870-1917. Statistics*, <http://www.historyhome.co.uk/europe/russia1.htm>

³¹⁹ Bulgakova, E.I. *Iaponia i iaponts’ii* (Japan and the Japanese), Moskva, Typography Vilde, 1899:5

³²⁰ Ibid, p.6

As seen from the above written, the newly born images of Japan in Russia, after her reformation, and especially after the War of 1894-5, were in deep contrast with the previous Russian images of Japan as mentioned by E.I. Bulgakova.

Some specialists in social psychology, such as Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1956), and Deutsch, K. W. and Merritt, R. L. (1965), argued in their analyses on national and international images, that “human thinking and imagining” is very resistant to “sudden environmental pressure.” Therefore “once established in a group, stereotypes tend to persist,”³²¹ and “almost nothing in the world seems to be able to shift the images of forty percent of the population even within one or two decades”³²²

The contrasting old and new images of Japan, however, came to prove that cardinal changes in some intellectuals’ perceptions of Japan were provoked by big events such as Meiji reforms and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. Such judgments are usually associated with feelings of like or dislike. Japan’s move towards the European model of civilization provoked positive images in Europe along with prevailing feelings of likeness. Some of the negative images of Japan were substituted by new positive images; however, it must be admitted that there were still others, negative ones, which remained in co-existence with the new positive ones.

An example of dubious standards and contrasting images of Japan present even E.I. Bulgakova’s perceptions of Tokyo. As she stated, “an interesting mixture of old and new customs could be seen in Tokyo.”³²³ Some of those old and new customs she found strange yet nice while others she perceived as weird and appalling. “*Jinrikisha*” – “a cart drawn by a man instead of a horse with an amazing speed and at extremely low price” was one of the things Bulgakova perceived as amazing. Yet, as she herself admitted, “Europeans still cannot get used to the view of this “man-horse.”³²⁴

Japanese women’s appearance was another thing that E.I. Bulgakova, as a woman could not help noticing. “Young Japanese girls called “*musume*” wear tons of powder and rouge on their faces, and peculiar skillfully arranged hairstyle, but some look very sweet and move with inborn graciousness,” noticed E.I. Bulgakova. However, she found “most middle-aged women

³²¹ Sherif, M. & , Sherif, C.W. *An outline of social psychology*. New York: Harper, 1956: 653;

³²² Deutsch, K. W., and Merritt, R. L. ‘Effects of Events on National and International Images’, In Kelman, H. C. (eds) *International Behavior. A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965: 183

³²³ Bulgakova, E.I. *Iaponia i iaponts’ii* (Japan and the Japanese), Moskva, Typography Vilde, 1899:8

³²⁴ Ibid.

to have repelling appearance. By blackening their teeth and pulling out their brows, they prove to their husbands that they are not interested in other men.”³²⁵ This note on the elderly Japanese women is another example of misunderstanding of a completely different culture. What E.I. Bulgakova admired, naturally was Japanese that resembled Europeans. As she noted, “of course, women belonging to the high class had got rid of this tradition [to blacken their teeth and pull out their highbrows]. They are dressed along the latest European fashion, speak foreign languages, and play the grand pianos.”

Although criticizing initially foreigners’ prejudices to Japan, E.I. Bulgakova herself praised openly only things that were close to her understanding of what was civilized and what was not. For example, she perceived as “strikingly surprising the openness of the Japanese lifestyle. “ They spend most of their time in the streets and keep their houses open. The walls of their wooden-paper houses are slid away and a passer by could see everything inside... Women take baths together with men and that is not considered a shame...”³²⁶ This along with the “beggars with strange bamboo hats playing clarinets,” and “prisoners with wooden planks locked around their necks”, as well as the “long Buddhist processions in the streets” comprise the “aborigine part of Tokyo city”, as E.I. Bulgakova dryly stated. While “in the European one, you’d see marvelous two-story stone houses, wonderful shops lit by electricity, rich restaurants with elegant furniture, and waiters wearing suits and white gloves, and you’d forget you were in the Far East. Japanese from high class wear European clothes, speak French, German, or English.”³²⁷ This small European oasis in the Asian East was what E.I. Bulgakova admired most in her observations on Japan. She was most “struck by the speed with which Japan has adopted a lot from Europe.”³²⁸

In order to explain Japan’s striking success in various fields she presented a brief empirical review of Japan’s past, Meiji reforms, its causes and effects, Japan’s geographic location and natural resources; agriculture, rice and tea production; commerce and manufacture; public education; religion; customs and traditions. The focus of E.I. Bulgakova’s study, nevertheless, fell upon Meiji reforms and education system as well as on Japanese religion. Her book *Iaponia i iaponts’ii* (Japan and the Japanese) was a fine example of the ambivalence of Russian

³²⁵ Ibid, p.9

³²⁶ Ibid, p.10

³²⁷ Ibid, p.10

³²⁸ Ibid, p.14

perceptions of Japan, as well as it was one of the first serious attempts to present a broader picture of Japan to the Russian reading public in the late 1890s.

- Grigorii Al. De- Vollan (1902)

The Russian historian Grigorii Alexandrovich De-Vollan (1847-?), being also a diplomat on an active career, had tremendous opportunities to travel and observe indigenous peoples and cultures such as those in Spain, Hungary, Egypt, Ceylon, India, and Japan, on which he wrote extensively.³²⁹ Some of his travel notes were published in the Russian journals *Russkoe Obozrenie* and *Russkoi Vestnik* in 1893-97. G. De-Vollan visited Japan twice during the period 1893 -1902, lived there for about six years total, after which he was assigned as the Russian General Consul in Mexico. While in Japan, he often undertook long trips around the country with the aim to collect valuable ethnographic materials.³³⁰ In 1903 in his book *V strane voshodyashtago solntsa. Ocherki i zametki o Iaponii* (In the Country of the Rising Sun. Essays and Notes about Japan),³³¹ G. De-Vollan presented his first-hand perceptions of Japan and the Japanese as well as some general outlines of Japan's geography, history, culture, and economy. More precisely, his book comprises five sections (total 497 pages) out of which half (chapter II-257 pages) is dedicated to his personal images of Japan.

G. De-Vollan's main thesis was that the Country of the Rising Sun presented a nation with a unique culture, capable of adoption of foreign cultural elements in order to enrich her own cultural wealth, and at the same time of preservation her own originality. In the very beginning of his writing, he pointed out that he aimed at presenting an objective vision of Japan different from the extremely emphatic or negating ones in the western and Russian writings. Truth resided in the power of writers and academics to tell stories of the "Orient" that claimed

³²⁹ See De-Vollan, G. *Po belu svetu: putev'ie zametki: ch.I. Hispania. Egipet. Ceylon i India* (Around the World: travel notes, ch.I: Spain.Egypt.Ceylon.India), SPb. 1894; *Tovarishtstvo "obshtestvennaya pol'za"*; also his *Ugorskaya Russ. Istoricheskii ocherk* (Ugrian Russia, Historical Outline), M., 1878; and his *Trud'ii vengerskii Akademii. Kriticheskii obzor* (Works of the Hungarian Academy. A critical Review), M., 1879, ¹ 19; as well as his *V strane voshodyashtago solntsa. Ocherki i zametki o Iaponii* (In the Country of the Rising Sun. Essays and Notes about Japan), with drawings, St. Petersburg, Typ.A.S. Suvorina, 1903

³³⁰ In 1910, he donated one of the biggest collections (340 objects) on Japanese culture to the Russian Ethnographic Museum.

³³¹ De-Vollan, G. *V strane voshodyashtago solntsa. Ocherki i zametki o Iaponii* (In the Country of the Rising Sun. Essays and Notes about Japan), with drawings, St. Petersburg, Typ.A.S. Suvorina, 1903: 85

successfully to represent it, as E. Said put it skillfully. G. De-Vollan did not make an exception of that trend. The image of Japan, he presented in his book, was in practice his construction based on his personal experience and impressions claimed to be “objective.” G. De-Vollan aimed at giving a “multi-side” presentation of the country, which only an “insider” could provide, as he stated in his introduction³³². He criticized L.I. Mechnikov (a Russian scholar who worked several years in Japan and wrote about her a lot) for insinuating mainly positive images of Japan presenting her as being a “peaceful and well-being” country for centuries.³³³ L.I. Mechnikov presumably argued that during two hundred years, Japan had been in a complete tranquility and proliferation, and thus arts and sciences developed during her seclusion.³³⁴ Such an argument should be treated with some reservation, stated G. De-Vollan, because “in Japanese lives, there were many dark sides which became brighter when foreigners came.”

The causes for the speedy implementation of reforms in Japan G. De-Vollan saw within “the spirit of the era” as well as within “the situation into which most Japanese feudal lords were caught.”³³⁵ He presented the “majority of the Japanese feudal lords” as being “effeminate and incapable of state deeds before the reforms came” since they lived all their lives “under the exceptional care of women.”³³⁶ The idea of the “effeminate East”³³⁷ was not new in the Western writings on the “East”; however, G. De-Vollan was among the first Russians (along with I. Goncharov) who expressed explicitly such an opinion in a written form. Besides, in contrast to the western idea of the “effeminate East,” G. De-Vollan did not perceive Japan or all the Japanese men as “effeminate” but only the Japanese feudal lords as such since they “devoted themselves to pleasures only...surrounded by their wives and concubines...,” which had affected their mentality and behavior correspondingly.³³⁸ With the implementation of the reforms, the Japanese from the feudal high class were given noble titles along the European model, and annual contributions, since they had voluntarily given up their lands to the Mikado,

³³² Ibid, p.vii

³³³ Mechnikov, L.I. *Iaponskaia imperia (strana, narod, istoria)* [Japanese Empire. A Country, People, and History]. SPb. 1881 also Mechnikov, L.I., “Vospominaniya o dvuhletnei sluzbe v Iaponii” (Memories of My Two-year Service in Japan)// *Russkie vedomosti*, 1884, N.204;

³³⁴ Mechnikov L.I. qtd. in De-Vollan, G. *V strane voshodyashtago solntsa. Ocherki i zametki o Iaponii* (In the Country of the Rising Sun. Essays and Notes about Japan), with drawings, St. Petersburg, Typ.A.S. Suvorin, 1903: 83

³³⁵ De-Vollan, G., Op.cit., 1903:94

³³⁶ Ibid,p.94

³³⁷ The literature of the West, E. Said argued, had served the enterprise of colonialism by defining the East as effeminate, corrupt, deceitful, lazy, primitive, and non-rational — that is, as being everything that European culture imagined it was not.

See Said, E.W. *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979: 56-57

³³⁸ De-Vollan, G. *V strane voshodyashtago solntsa. Ocherki i zametki o Iaponii* (In the Country of the Rising Sun. Essays and Notes about Japan), with drawings, St. Petersburg, Typ.A.S. Suvorin, 1903:94

pointed out G. De-Vollan. That pacified to some extent the high class since it “secured for them decent incomes and some privileges. However, that did not extend to the samurai class and led to some discontent...”³³⁹

Hence, “of great interest” to G. De-Vollan, was “to discover how Japanese from all social strata, who had lived for centuries under an absolute seclusion, turned out into complete support of the reform movement, with no exception.”³⁴⁰ New ideas coming from Europe and America “made an incredible turnabout in Japanese minds, who rushed to get everything in Japan changed along the European model.” That, however, also brought to “some exaggeration”, argued G. De-Vollan, such as some “absurd combinations of Japanese and European clothes and hairstyles” besides the imitation of “many bad sides of the European civilization.”³⁴¹ Those “funny sides inevitable to any reform movement, however, should not belittle the Japanese success in reforms and speedy acquirement of new weapons, ships, railways, and telegraph. Army, fleet...postal system, public education, and administration, were all transformed along the European model, and now we could see the amazing results,” argued G. De-Vollan.³⁴²

Like the first European writers on Japan, he pointed to some idiosyncrasies demonstrating how different Japan was with her “*jinrikisha*,” the simplicity and emptiness of Japanese homes, the right-side reading of Japanese books, the open in public, without any trace of a shame, Japanese lifestyle,³⁴³ the married women’s blackening their teethes, and so on.³⁴⁴

G. De-Vollan, however, did not limit himself to description of those idiosyncrasies. He went out further, pointing out some generally accepted misperceptions in Europe about Japan and the Japanese.

According to G.De-Vollan, one of the biggest European misperceptions about Japan was the mass expectation that “Japan would change drastically after the implementation of the European civilization model.” That, however, “did not happen in those thirty years,” he argued because “Japan had kept her own spirit and traditions.”³⁴⁵

³³⁹ Ibid, p.95

³⁴⁰ Ibid, p.98

³⁴¹ Ibid, p.98-99

³⁴² Ibid, p.99

³⁴³ “Japanese spends his life in the street: he works, washes, dresses in front of everybody, even toilet and garbage are not hidden in the rear as in Russia...”, Ibid, p.112

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p.107, 112, 113

³⁴⁵ Ibid, p.499

Another European misperception, pointed out by G. De-Vollan, was that Japan would turn into a Christian state after the adoption of European culture. In his opinion, that did not fulfill either, and “the numerous missions in Japan enjoyed only limited success.”³⁴⁶

Still another European misperception about Japan was the general belief that she would open widely her doors to foreigners after her westernization. That did not also come true, in G. De-Vollan’s understanding, because “Japan wanted to go ahead by her own strength for which Japanese youth were sent abroad to learn and bring knowledge home, as well as foreign teachers were assigned at Japanese schools...”³⁴⁷

In his presentation of Japanese art, literature, architecture, and lifestyle, G. De-Vollan demonstrated both their good and the bad sides in accordance to his perceptions. There was some change in his tone, from a more critical one in his notes from the period 1893-1900 to a more positive and defending one around 1902. Initially, G. De-Vollan did not give high evaluation to Japanese literature, art, and architecture. Like E. E. Ukhtomskii, he argued for “not loading them to the skies.” As G. De-Vollan appealed, “we should not forget that Japanese boom in Art coincided with the European Renaissance when Rafael, Michelangelo, Leonardo Da-Vinchi and others created their masterpieces. What could Japanese compare with those giants?”³⁴⁸ G. De-Vollan perceived Japanese art as “decorative and naturalistic” comprising mainly “drawings of animals, birds, and still-life.” What he admired in it was the “higher developed sense of nature that Japanese have, compared to Europeans” as well as “the originality of Japanese drawings.”³⁴⁹

Japanese erudition, “frozen in Chinese immobility, had not given any valuable literary product (with the exception of *Genji Monogatari*)”, kept his critical review of Japanese works G. De-Vollan. In his understanding, “Japanese educated class spent their time in studying, copying, and discussing Chinese classics, and did not come up with their own original literary creations.”³⁵⁰ To Japanese high literature, he contrasted Japanese folk tales and poems, which “stayed detached from Chinese influence, thus preserving their natural and poetic beauty...and hence, deserved to be paid more interest in.”³⁵¹ G. De-Vollan shared B.H. Chamberlain’s main argument (*Things Japanese*, 1890)³⁵² that “European civilization killed Japanese literature.

³⁴⁶ Ibid, p.501

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p.501

³⁴⁸ Ibid, p.403

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p.404

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p.378

³⁵¹ Ibid, p.379

³⁵² Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850-1935), was a Professor at the Tokyo Imperial University and one of the foremost British Japanologists active in Japan during the late nineteenth century. He also wrote

Three thousand books were released annually in Japan, however, all they were translations from the Western literature.”³⁵³ The cause of that, G. De-Vollan saw “not in the lack of Japanese talent, but in different public needs and demands at a time.” “Civilized in her own way, Japan had not only to learn urgently the latest scientific discoveries, but also to curve European model along her own way and jump from feudal into a constitutional period,”³⁵⁴ justified Japan’s state of matters G. De-Vollan.

Nevertheless, Japanese architecture was also not spent from his criticism. In his terms, “in architecture, Japanese could not create anything grandiose such as the Parthenon, the Milan Cathedral, St. Peter, or St. Sofia Churches, and so on...”³⁵⁵. “ Nothing impressive did they create in sculpture either...mainly Buddhist figures of bronze or wood...,” further stated G. De-Vollan. In fact, he saw “Japanese genius in creating tiny figures and in details of decorations, all they are full of thinness and beauty...”³⁵⁶ As seen from the above-quoted, G. De-Vollan’s perceptions of Japanese material creations were both positive and negative, however, lacking the pathos of previous Russian writings on Japan.

While Japanese literature, art, and architecture did not deserve G.De-Vollan’s high admiration as they had provoked in some peoples of Art in Russia,³⁵⁷ Japanese character and mentality received his highest appraisal. The “quiet” Japanese lifestyle compared to the “noisy” Chinese lifestyle was due to “Japanese inborn tact which keeps him away from any harsh, rough things” in G. De-Vollan’s vision.³⁵⁸ He perceived Japanese educated class as “extremely loyal and proud, however, managing to hide those traits of theirs under the mask of humbleness and delicacy”. He contrasted them to some Japanese commoners who “by drinking whiskey

some of the earliest translations of *haiku* into English. He is perhaps best remembered for his informal and popular one-volume encyclopedia *Things Japanese*, which was issued first in 1890 and revised by him several times thereafter.

³⁵³ Ibid, p.382

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p.383

³⁵⁵ Ibid, p.398

³⁵⁶ Ibid, p.399

³⁵⁷ Russian artists Kandinsky, Chagall, A. Ostroumova-Lebedeva, and V. Falifeev, were influenced by the Japanese art (see Goreglyad, V. N., “Russian-Japanese Relations: Some Reflections on Political and Cultural Tendencies”, in Rimer J.Th., (ed.) *A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford, 1995:198

Russian literary realists-Anton Chekhov, Nikolai- Garin-Mikhailovski, Leonid Andreev, and the Russian symbolists-Valerii Briusov, Andrei Bely, and Konstantin Bal’mont were also influenced by Japanese literature and poetry (see Aleksis Rannit, “Anna Akhmatova Considered in a Context of Art Nouveau,” in Struve, G.P., and B.A. Filippov, (eds.) *Anna Akhmatova, Sochineniia* (Stories), vol.2, Washington, 1968:21-4

³⁵⁸ Ibid, p.149

consider to have acquired European culture, and hence show rudeness and bad manners.... The majority of Japanese, however, possess inborn fineness.”³⁵⁹ In contrast to previously viewed I.Goncharov, E.Ukhtomskii, Garin Mikhailosvkii, and E.I. Bulgakova, he did not go explicitly into any comparison between Japanese and Russian traits. His images of Japanese men and women, however, clearly demonstrated that his perceptions were reflected through his cultural background. Being a European, he could not help pointing out that “due to the changes brought by European civilization,” the stance of Japanese women in society had also improved, “Women are no more slaves without any rights in their families...”³⁶⁰

Meanwhile, he admitted that Europeanization of Japan remained somehow “on the surface, because it did not touch the mere spirituality of Japanese people.”³⁶¹ In fact, the key to Japanese successes since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was much-discussed topic in Western as well as in Russian press around that time. G. De-Vollan presented his own interpretation as a key to understanding Japanese.

On the one hand, he saw “Japanese extreme curiosity to everything new,” as one of the causes for the successful modernization of Japan.³⁶² In addition, “loyalty to the suzerain and to the parents, as well as justice is considered the biggest virtue ...sometimes this virtue is exaggerated and as a result crimes and suicides could be committed in the name of the suzerain or the family.”³⁶³ Such loyalty could be another reason for Japanese speedy implementation of the proposed by the Mikado reforms, as G. De-Vollan expressed implicitly.

In addition, “Japan’s adoption [westernization] did not touch the mere spirituality of Japanese people...” argued G. De-Vollan. He contrasted European and American “individualism” to Japanese “impersonality” which was “most obvious in Japanese art and nature. Japanese do not separate themselves, do not put themselves on pedestals, they live and spiritually merge with nature.”³⁶⁴ That was still another key to understanding Japanese model- a combination of the “West” and the “East.”

Japanese westernization and modernization “went completely naturally,” further argued

³⁵⁹ Ibid, p.181

³⁶⁰ G. De-Vollan, referred to husband’s right to kill his unfaithful wife, or to bring concubines. Ibid, p.350-353

³⁶¹ Ibid, p.497

³⁶² Ibid, p351

³⁶³ Ibid, p.395

³⁶⁴ Ibid, p.497

G. De-Vollan. In his interpretation, “the Japanese were convinced that they could not oppose Europe. On the contrary, they saw the need to adopt as much from it as necessary to stand for their independence and national spirit”.³⁶⁵ In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, Japanese “demonstrated that they had learned their lessons from Europe,” concluded G. De-Vollan.³⁶⁶ He saw Japanese soldiers as “brave ones, despising death, ready to sacrifice their lives in the name of their soldiers’ duties.”³⁶⁷ He conceived Japanese soldiers to possess “an immense spiritual force.” Like E. E. Ukhtomskii, G. De-Vollan sensed some threat into it. Moreover, Japanese nationalism expressed in the slogan “Japan for the Japanese” was “penetrating all social strata in Japan,” pointed out G. De-Vollan. “There are a lot of Japanese imagining that future belongs to the yellow race. Their confidence comes from their military successes.” That is why, he considered of great importance the question “where this immense spiritual force is going to be directed to.” In case the Japanese “directed this force into their defense, then we should empathize them”, concluded his notes on Japan G. De-Vollan.³⁶⁸

The end of 1890s, around which those few last lines were written, showed clearly increased rivalry in the Far East. After the treaty of 1875, Sakhalin went into Russian possession, and the Kurils- into Japanese one. Territorial appetites of both Russia and Japan, however, were not satisfied. Russia’s further penetration in the Far East and her increased influence in Korea could not but bother Japan, which had her own plans for the region.

On the other hand, Japan’s successful modernization and defeat of China in 1894-5, as well as Japan’s big influence in Korea were interfering Russia’s regional plans. Hence, both states were on alert about each other’s moves in the Far East.

While some Russians still entertained denigrated images of Japan or belittled Japan’s successes at home and on the international arena, others who had the opportunity to have first-hand perceptions of reformed Japan, such as E. Ukhtomskii, N. Garin-Mikhailovskii, E. I Bulgakova, and G. De-Vollan, had all noted in their notes that Japan’s growth was speedy and Japan would soon challenge the regional *status quo*. Prince E. Ukhtomskii and the diplomat Grigorii De-Vollan, being engaged formally in service to Russia, were naturally more interested in Japan’s capacity to interfere Russia’s plans in the Far East. Nevertheless, both of them similarly to N.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, p.498

³⁶⁶ Ibid.p499

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid, p.502

Garin-Mikhailovskii and E.I. Bulgakova, could not help admiring Japan's positive changes as seen from their travel notes on the Country of the Rising Sun.

In brief, Ivan Goncharov's *Frigate "Palada,"* Esper E. Ukhtomskii's *The Journey of the Cesarewitch,* Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovskii's travel notes on Nagasaki and Yokohama, E.I. Bulgakova's *Iaponia i iaponts'ii* (Japan and the Japanese, 1899), and Grigorii de Vollan's *V strane voshodyashago solntsa* (In the Country of the Rising Sun, 1903), present interesting first-hand contrasting Russian intellectuals' visions on Japan. Those views differ considerably - I. Goncharov's book written in 1853-5, at the dawn of the Russo-Japanese relations, presented Japan and the Japanese in a bit denigrated perspective, while the other three ones written in the 1890s, after Japan's reformation, gave a highly positive evaluation of the country and the people there. In addition, there could be seen differences in the perceptions of the short-term visitors of Japan and the ones that lived and worked in Japan for a few years such as G. De-Vollan and L. Mechnikov.³⁶⁹ These so-called "long-term" visitors viewed Japan from the perspective of the "insider" trying to present balanced critical viewpoints.

Such evolution of perceptions, from perceiving Japan in somewhat negative and denigrated aspects to positive and even empathic ones, besides writers' personal predispositions to Japan, might also follow some official change of Russian state of mind regarding Japan after the signing of diplomatic and trade treaties between 1855 and 1898, and moreover so after Japan's reformation along western lines.

IV.2 Indirect Observations of Russo-Japanese Regional Rivalry (1898-1902)

IV.2.1. Russia and Japan's Gradual Advances Further in the Asian East

Since the late 1890s, Far East witnessed an increased rivalry with European powers and Japan being the main actors on the stage. The European "Triple Intervention" in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty agreement of 1895 was accentuated greatly in the following years when Russia, Germany, France, and Britain divided China into spheres of influence and gained leases on the China coast. The Russian gains included a concession for a railway across Manchuria, a

³⁶⁹ Mechnikoff, L. *L'empire japonais*, Geneve, 1881

twenty-five-year lease on Port Arthur, and a railway line running to the navy base.³⁷⁰ In addition, the full time construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and its connection with the Trans-Manchurian and Trans-Mongolian railways were to happen soon.

In 1898, the Trans-Siberian line was declared completed, and Russia could finally celebrate a better connection with her Pacific town Vladivostok. Russia's presence in the Far East, however, did not limit to railway constructions. A year before that Russia had founded a Russo-Korean Bank (1897) along the model of the Russo-Chinese Bank (1896), and both enterprises promised an accelerated input of Russian capital in the region.³⁷¹

Moreover, in 1896, Colonel A.M. Bezobrazov bought the rights over a concession for timber exploitation along the river Yalu – a border river between Korea and China. Under the patronage of the Minister of the Internal Affairs V.K.Pleve, A.M. Bezobrazov managed to approach directly the Russian Tsar with a proposal for Russian governmental support of a private, but favored by the Autocracy commercial enterprise targeting the overcoming of Korea. Soon after that, the Russian Timber Export Company was established, headed officially by A.M. Bezobrazov (and unofficially by the Russian government) as its president. The semi-private enterprises for timber concessions along the river Yalu further contributed for Russia's financial influence in the region.

Nevertheless, some scholars argue that the Finance Minister S.Yu.Witte's acts rather than A.M. Bezobrazov's should be blamed for the worsened Russo-Japanese rivalry. Count S. Witte aimed at bringing the administration of Korean tariffs under Russian tutelage, acquiring concessions to open up gold and copper mines on the Yalu River, and generally keeping the entire country open to Russian influence.³⁷²

The Autocracy, in order to activate further its policy in the Far East, set up the Committee for Far Eastern Affairs in May 1903. Colonel A.M. Bezobrazov was assigned its State-Secretary.

³⁷⁰ The headquarters of the Russian Pacific Fleet were to be transferred to the ice-free Port of Arthur (*Lüshun* in Chinese); nearby Talien (*Dairen* in Japanese, *Dal'nyi* in Russian) was to be developed as a commercial port, and the entire Liaodong Peninsula incorporated directly into the Russian empire. See Rostunov, I.I. (ed.), *Istoria russko-iaponskoi voiny, 1904-1905 gg* (History of Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5), Moscow, 1977:39-40; also Esthus, R.A. *Double Eagle and Rising Sun. The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 1988:2

³⁷¹ Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*, Berkeley, 1958: 84-92

³⁷² Romanov, B.A. *Russia in Manchuria*, Ann Arbor, 1952:109; and Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904* (Berkeley, 1958: 90; also Conroy, H., *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1869-1910*, Philadelphia, 1960; and Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism. The interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, BERG, Leamington Spa/Hamburg/New York 1987: 196

Then, in practice, he started dictating the Far Eastern policy enjoying the full support of Tsar Nicholas II. In addition, in August 1903, General E.I. Alekseev was appointed the Governor of the Russian Far Eastern region.³⁷³ Thus, Russia set up her firmly in the Pacific.³⁷⁴

Of all the great powers having interests in the region, Japan objected Russia's advances there most sharply. Japan felt her security threatened by Russian growing presence in the region. In addition, Japanese blamed Russian gains in China and Korea to be at the expense of the "spilt Japanese blood" in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. That kind of propaganda provoked various negative sentiments and riots among Japanese people. Japan, however, had also managed to secure beneficiary gains in the region after the War of 1894-5. The Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 had accorded her the most-favored-nation treatment, and thus, access to all existing treaty ports (plus four new ones) as well as rights of trade, residence, manufacture, and travel enjoyed by other treaty powers in China. In addition, the "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" of July 1896 made a more specific grant of rights to Japan in the China's open ports and settlements of the sort enjoyed by the western nationals. This followed "Protocol of October" provided Japan with a number of exclusive concessions for residence and trade.³⁷⁵ All those indicated that Japan found her place among the great powers and like Russia had set firmly her foot in the region.

The increased Russian and Japanese influence in the region disturbed the balance of power there, and troubled a lot Britain, and the United States, which had their plans for China and the region as a whole. France and Germany, though trying to counter balance, had also their own interests in the great power game in Asia. Hence, all great powers watched each other's moves there with great suspicion. Russia, however, was on a big alert about the British and American moves there, and to a much lesser degree about the Japanese ones. On the other hand, Japan perceived Russia as her main rival for influence in the Pacific.

³⁷³ Alekseev, Evgeny Ivanovich (1843-?) - Admiral, Adjutant General. As commandant of Kwantung, Alekseev was increasingly involved in discussions of Russian policy in the Far East

³⁷⁴ see Romanov, B.A. *Russia in Manchuria* (Ann Arbor, 1952); and his *Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii rusko-yaponskoi voiny 1895-1907* [Outlines of the Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War] (Moscow/Leningrad 1947, 1955); also Malozemoff, A., *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904* (Berkeley, 1958); and Dallin, D.J. *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (New Haven, 1949); also Sumner, B.H. 'Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East 1880-1914', *Proceedings of the British Academy 1941* (London, 1942)

³⁷⁵ See Mac Murray, J.V.A. *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, vol.1, New York: Oxford University Press, 1921

With those new developments in the Far East in the late 1890s, Russian images of Japan kept evolving. They reflected not only the changing attitudes of Russian people towards themselves and the “others” but also the changes taking place in the region and in Japan. Provoked by Russia’s deeper penetration in the Asian East, some Russian journalists and writers started paying more attention to Russia’s major rivals in the region.

In the early 1898s, the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*³⁷⁶ perceived Britain as the most serious rival to Russia for influence in the Pacific. Reformed Japan was seen by the journal as the “master of the Pacific Ocean” along with Britain. However, Russia “could easily come in agreement with Japan, besides, Japan alone does not present for us any serious peril, especially with having France and Germany on our [Russian] side”, argued *Vestnik Evrop’ii*.³⁷⁷

The journal did not also perceive Japanese protests against the demands of the “Triple Intervention,” and later against Russian concessions in the region as a threat that could destabilize Russia’s position in the region. In its terms “our [Russia’s] gains of Port Arthur and Talién do not break the established international practice but on the contrary; it is in accordance with it.”³⁷⁸ Russia’s expansion was justified by journal as a *just* practice in accordance with the established Western European approach when dealing with weaker or less developed nations.

In addition, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* presented Russia as the main initiator of the idea of fewer arms in the world, and preservation of peaceful and friendly international relations. The journal reprinted in full, from the *Pravitel’stvenii Vestnik* (the State Newspaper) of 16 August 1898, the Tsar’s formal proposal towards foreign policy of arms cuts.³⁷⁹ On 18 May 1899, Russia initiated the start of the World Peace Conference III in Hague. According to *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, “this initiative of Russia best corresponds to her international stance and politics; it could be even said that no other state at present times could come up with such a suggestion without

³⁷⁶ *Vestnik Evrop’ii. Zhurnal Istorii-Politiki-Literatur’ii* - a monthly journal of history, politics, and literature) published in St.Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. Its establisher and chief editor-publisher was the Professor in History M.M.Stasyulevich until 1908. The journal openly pursued policy of liberalization of Russian society via reforms.

³⁷⁷ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*,1898/04, (839-852pp), p.844

³⁷⁸ Ibid, p.846

³⁷⁹ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*,1898/09 (380-394pp), p.380

creating serious inconveniences to her.”³⁸⁰ In relation to this, the journal criticized England “for impeding Russia’s peaceful policy in the Pacific.”³⁸¹ Although *Vestnik Evrop’ii* recognized Japan’s growth of influence in the “East,” it saw Russia not Japan as the main peace mediator in the region. In the journal’s understanding, Japan might be destined to be a reformer and modernizer of the East but she was too “small” and “weak” to be a maintainer of the regional balance.

In April 1898, M.M.Stasyulevich – a professor in history and editor of *Vestnik Evropii*³⁸²- was among the first who pointed out the worsened great power rivalry in the Far East. “Russian, German, and French common acting in the “East” met English dissatisfaction;” on the other hand, “unrests in Seoul provoked Russia to keep her army there until stable conditions were reached,” noted the professor.³⁸³ It is interesting that a year later professor M.M.Stasyulevich started perceiving European and Japanese partitioning of China as “a more peaceful ongoing rivalry [than before].” According to the “liberal” M.M.Stasyulevich for Korea, which had been “the apple for discord” between Russia and Japan long time, there was also found a peaceful solution after Russia and Japan had finally agreed to proclaim her independent.³⁸⁴

Contrasted to the internal events in Russia at that time, the Far Eastern rivalry indeed seemed to develop quite peacefully. The internal unrest in Russia in the late 1890s was dangerously growing under the influence of revolutionary trends imported from Western Europe. The row of workers strikes and university disturbances of 1899 that shook Russia naturally distracted for a while Russian journalists’ attention from the Far East.

IV.4.2.2 Publicists about the “Boxer Rebellion” and the “Manchurian Crisis” (1900-1902)

It was the so-called “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900 in North China against foreigners, and the followed occupation of Manchuria by Russia that provoked again Russian publicists’ interest in the region. Both Russia and Japan committed troops to the foreign expeditionary force sent to

³⁸⁰ Ibid, p.382

³⁸¹ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1898/06 (810-820pp), p.816

³⁸² Stasyulevich, M.M. “Inostrannoe Obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Vestnik Evrop’ii* is mostly left unsigned by him.

³⁸³ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1898/04, (839-852pp), p.840

³⁸⁴ Ibid, 1899/01 (384-398pp),p.387

quell the rebellion. In mid 1900, when the rebels began to destroy parts of the Trans-Siberian railway in Manchuria, Russian troops invaded the region, and by the beginning of October, Russia in practice had occupied the whole Manchuria.³⁸⁵ Once the rebellion was over, however, Russians did not withdraw but rather took Chinese permission that Russia kept her troops in Manchuria until China guaranteed the security of her railway equipment and borderlands.

It should be admitted, however, that it was not the Boxer Rebellion with its horrible killings of Christian missionaries and diplomats that attracted most Russian publicists' attention, but the great powers' objections to Russian occupation of Manchuria. Few were those Russian intellectuals that bothered to contemplate over the killings of Christians by the rebels, and on the further consequences of the "Boxer Rebellion" for the world peace.

The Russian famous philosophers of the late nineteenth century, Vladimir S. Solov'ev (1853-1900)³⁸⁶ and Lev A. Tikhomirov (1852-1923)³⁸⁷ were among those few Russian intellectuals who "saw" the "Boxer Rebellion" as the beginning of a "barbarian invasion" of Europe.

The religious philosopher and poet-symbolist V.I. Solov'ev wrote extensively on the idea of Russia, and Christianity, trying to predict their further history of evolution. His works reveal him as some kind of an idealist, a theologian, and a mystic at the same time. His metaphysical theories, however, are too complex and not related enough to the issue of Russia and Japan to be reviewed more deeply here. In general, his philosophic-religious ideas kept evolving during the time. In late 1880s, V.I. Solov'ev broke off with the so-called "Slavophiles" ("*Slavyanofily*"), and became the constant publicist in the oriented to the "West" Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*. At the end of his life, however, he turned out not only to be

³⁸⁵ Almost the entire Chinese Eastern Railway with the exception of the junction at Harbin was lost as well as a large part of the southern railway including Mukden. By the autumn of 1900 about 170 000 Russian troops had been sent to pacify the area. See Furuya Tetsuo, *Nichiro sensô*, Tokyo, 1966:25, qtd. in Wells, D., and Wilson, S. (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:6; also T'an, Ch.C. *The Boxer Catastrophe*, New York, 1955; Purcell, V.C. *The Boxer Uprising*, Cambridge, 1963; Lensen, G.A. *The Russo-Chinese War*, Tallahassee, 1967

³⁸⁶ Vladimir Sergeevich Solov'ev (1853- 1900) - widely regarded as the most original, and influential of the Russian philosophers of the nineteenth century. His philosophical ideas, however, are considered quite complex and even contradictory by some contemporary scholars. Solov'ev tried to clarify the relationship between (civil) society and (national) religion in Russia, past and present, in order to explain Russia's place in Europe.

³⁸⁷ Lev Alexandrovich Tikhomirov (1852-1923) - famous Russian philosopher, publicist and public figure, author of the "Monarhicheskaya Gosudarstvenost" (Monarchic State System) [1905]. Part of his life, he spent defending ideas of the so-called 'progressive camp', and then he transferred to the 'reactionary, obscurantist camp'. L.A. Tikhomirov was said to be the leader of the monarchist movement 'Black-Hundreds in early 1900s.

West- minded, but also to be highly xenophobic. Vl.S. Solov'ev started paying exclusive attention to any possible threats to Russia and European civilization as a whole from the "East." Chinese immigration flux in the Far East as well as Japan's growing ambitions and advance in the region must have led him to the associations of past Mongolian invasions in Russia. In his article on history of religions called "Kitai i Evropa" (China and Europe) [1890],³⁸⁸ he perceived China as the core of the "East" and the main "threat" to European civilization. On the other hand, he imagined Meiji Japan to be a progressive pro-Western state, that is, as one that had adapted Christian civilization values and norms.

Japanese attack and victory over China in the War of 1894-5, however, provoked him to reproach Japan for her "anti-Christian" behavior, as the Russian scholar Vassilii Molodyakov noted.³⁸⁹ The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and later the "Boxer Rebellion" of 1900 incited in Vl.S. Solov'ev some pessimism about the ability of Europe to withstand the Asian influx, and preserve Christian behests of love.

In his famous symbolic poem "Pan-Mongolism,"³⁹⁰ Vl.S. Solov'ev drew an apocalyptic picture of the destruction of Russia and Christianity by barbarian invaders from Asia:

...From Malaysian waters to the Altai mountains,
Chieftains from the Eastern isles
At the walls of rebellious China
Gathered their hosts.

Like innumerable locusts
And like them insatiable,
Protected by the occult power,
The tribes head north.
Oh, Russia! Forget your former glory:
The double-headed eagle is smashed,
And yellow babes play
With rags remaining from your flags.

Submitting to trembling fear and terror,
Who could forget the commandment to love...?
And the Third Rome lies in ashes,
A forth will never be.
Who could forget the commandment to love...?³⁹¹

³⁸⁸ Solov'ev, Vl. "Kitai i Evropa" (China and Europe), in *Russkoe Obozrenie*, 1890, ¹ 2, 3, 4

³⁸⁹ Molodyakov, V., "Vladimir Solov'ev, "Pan mongolism"", online journal *Japon.ru*, released on 14 / 03 / 2005, <http://www.avto.japon.ru/?TextArchive&ID=266>

³⁹⁰ The poem "Pan-Mongolism" was written at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 but printed first in Russia in 1905, as V.Molodyakov pointed out. Op.Cit.
See it in Russian in Solov'ev, V. *Sobranie sochineniy* [Selected Works] (St.Petersburg: 1901-1908), vol.6, p. 126.

Russia, envisioned by some religious Russians as the only true heir of the Byzantine Commonwealth, was called the “Third Rome” that preserved the “True Faith,” and guarded the Christendom. In V.I. Solov’ev’s prophesy that “Third Rome” also tumbled down, invaded by Asian “pagans.” Thus, the Asian East presented to V.I. Solov’ev a “threat” not only to Russia but also to the whole Christendom.

The ideal he propagated was the Christian one of love and self-denial, of universal unity against Slavophiles. At the same time, being a patriot in the narrow sense, he rejected Count Lev Tolstoy’s teaching of “non-violence” and “non-resistance to evil.” In contrast, V.I. Solov’ev welcomed any personal sacrifice for the “general good.”³⁹² To counter Lev Tolstoy’s pacifist teachings, and to emphasize explicitly the threat coming from the “East” to the “West,” V.I. Solov’ev, wrote the story “Tri razgovora” (Three Discussions) with its attachment “Kratkaya povest ob antihriste (A Short Story about the Antichrist) [from p. 180 to p. 228].³⁹³ “Tri razgovora” was published in 1899 and in 1900. The story presented “an excellent example of irony, and humor, of his dialectic and power of self-expression,” to use Dr Hagberg Wrightp’s terms.³⁹⁴

V.I. Solov’ev used the language of the metaphor and through his characters’ monologues and dialogues drew a colorful picture of a future Sino-Japanese attack against the “West.” In his prophesy about the coming of Antichrist, Japan after conquering Korea and China, formed a united Pan-Mongol Empire. The Sino-Japanese armies under the leadership of the Antichrist (a young Japanese royal leader) conquered Russia, and then the rest of the world. V.I. Solov’ev warned about the threat coming from the formation of a strategic Sino-Japanese alliance based on the idea of Pan-Mongolism (lately interpreted as Pan-Asianism). In addition, as the Russian historian Boris Mezhuiev, who researched V.I. Solov’ev’s stance to the Asian East noted,

³⁹¹ The English translation of “Pan Mongolism” is taken from Alexander Lukin “Perceptions of China Threat and Russo-Chinese Relations”- a paper written for International Conference “China Threat Perceptions from different countries” Hong Kong January 11-12, 2001
www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/russiachina.pdf

³⁹² See Solov’ev, V.I. *Opravdanie dobra* (Justification of the “General Good”), Chapter 18. “Smisl Voin’ii” (The Sense of a War), released online
http://www.krotov.info/library/s/solov_vl/08_024_18.html

³⁹³ Soloviev, V.I. *War, Progress, and the End of History. Including a Short Story of the Anti-Christ. Three Discussions*, Transl. by Alexander Bakshy, London, University of London Press, 1915

³⁹⁴ Biographical notice by Dr. Hagberg Wrightp, in *Soloviev, V.I. War, Progress, and the End of History. Including a Short Story of the Anti-Christ. Three Discussions*, Transl. by Alexander Bakshy, London, University of London Press, 1915: x

“Solov’ev sympathized to the colonial policy of the European powers in Asia and stood up for the union with them against China.”³⁹⁵ In Solov’ev’s perceptions, the “barbarian invasion” of Europe, was imagined to come soon in the face of “awoken” China or of Japan in union with China. This vision of his, though in 1900 it was not treated seriously by the Russian Court or intellectual circles, during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and afterwards it was often referred to by Russians as “the prophesy that came true.” His idea of “pagans” from the “East” threatening European civilization was further elaborated by some Russian poets and writers of the first half of the twentieth century- Valerii Bruisov, Vyacheslav Ivanov, Aleksandr Blok, and Maksimilian Voloshin.

The other famous Russian religious philosopher of the late nineteenth century, Lev Alexandrovich Tikhomirov (1852-1923), like Vl.S. Solov’ev, perceived the Asian East as a “threat” to the Christendom. Like Vl.S. Solov’ev, his philosophical views underwent several changes during the time. Part of his life L.A. Tikhomirov spent defending ideas of the so-called “progressive camp,” and then he transferred to the “reactionary, obscurantist camp,” arguing for strong Autocracy supported by strong Christian Church. That imminently reflected on his writings from that period.

He saw Russia’s participation in the quelling of the “Boxer Rebellion,” “as a minute of test for Russia, more precisely, for our ruling class which I feared would fail.” “If the Petersburg press keeps condemning wars and use of force as [the newspapers] *Novoe Vremya* and *Svet* did...,” then “we shall soon become the first victim of the Chinese invasion,” prophesized L.A.Tikhomirov.³⁹⁶ He admitted having read Vl.S.Solov’ev’s story “Tri razgovora” (Three Discussions) with its attachment “Kratkaya povest ob antihriste (A Short Story about the Antichrist). “ The story is about the future conquering of Europe by China and Japan...He [Solov’ev] turns to be a prophet!” pathetically exclaimed L.A.Tikhomirov.³⁹⁷

He argued for Russia’s firm policy against the “pagan East”: “immediate capture of Manchuria; intense colonization of everything that could be colonized; populate it with Russians, Fins, Polish, in general, all kinds of immigrants [from Russia], and spread along our border with China (the Mongol-Manchurian one) our new Cossack troops, cleaning it from any

³⁹⁵ Mezhuev, B. “Vl. S. Solov’ev i peterburgskoe obshtestvo 1890 godov. K predistorii ‘imperskogo liberalizma’” (Vl.S. Solov’ev and the Petersburg Society in 1890s. A Prehistory of the ‘Imperial Liberalism’), *Russkii Archipelag*, 2005, online article <http://www.archipelag.ru/geopolitics/nasledie/anthropology/12/>

³⁹⁶ “Iz dnevnika L.A.Tikhomirova (1899-1904)” [From L.A.Tikhomirov’s Diary], *Krasnii Archive*, 1936, Vol.1 and 2, released online <http://www.pravaya.ru/faith/11/4707>

³⁹⁷ Ibid. Note of 24 May 1900

Chinese. That is the only way we could defend ourselves when necessary...,” the religious philosopher appealed ardently.³⁹⁸ The killings of Christian missionaries by the rebels had invoked his anger and provoked him to appeal: “Leave China to the Europeans- to take all they want, let China become the “second Poland,” [obviously referring to Russian pogroms of Polish riots in the 1890s.]

L.A.Tikhomirov justified Russia’s advance in the “Asian East” as natural expansion because of her cultural evolution. “What could have happened to us if we had not kept moving? If Europe had not gone to Asia, Africa, America, Australia, then there would be no world culture,” argued L.A.Tikhomirov. He perceived Russia’s existence and her mission to be her “intercourse with the world.” As he put it, “that intercourse should not necessarily have the character of colonization and hatred.” He envisioned Russia as a state that had already taken her place in the world family. He also recognized Japan as “state admitted in the world family.” “Nobody touched Japan. If a nation could participate in the peaceful communication between peoples- then she could enter it [the world family],³⁹⁹ argued L.A.Tikhomirov. Like some Western-minded Russian intellectuals, he took European Christian world as a standard to measure civilization. Thus, Japan after adopting European civilization modes of thought and political structure was perceived by L.A.Tikhomirov as a member of the civilized world family. China, on the contrary, not only failed to modernize but ran against her civilizers.

In a word, in 1900, both religious philosophers V.I. Solov’ev and L.A.Tikhomirov, perceived China as a threat to the Christian world, and Japan as a new member of the European civilization.

Japan’s rise, however, provoked V.I. Solov’ev to prophesize a Sino-Japanese invasion of Russia and the image of the Antichrist in the face of Japan.

L.A.Tikhomirov, in contrast, kept admiring Japanese steady policy in the Far East. As he wrote in his diary “Russia does not know what she wants, that is why she does nothing [in the Far East]. Only Japan has a firmly established plan, and that is what Russia fears most.”⁴⁰⁰ In addition, L.A.Tikhomirov expressed his regret that Russia “lacked capable state men.” Otherwise, “she should conquer Manchuria; drive out the Chinese; and populate it by Russians.” In his perception, Chinese would not be dangerous if Russia divided the rest of China with Japan and Europeans, and Mongolia and Tibet were granted independence. “Then,

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Ibid, Note of 28 June 1900

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. Note of 18 July 1900

Japan, if she wants, could contrive to gather together the broken pieces of the idol of Pan-Mongolism. And if she managed to do that for 100 years, by then China would already be civilized, not a “savage horde” like now...,” concluded L.A.Tikhomirov. He felt deep indignation towards the so-called “Easterners” arguing for Russia’s kinship with Asia as seen from his diary notes. In his rough terms, “Scoundrel Gol’strem wrote in *Peterburgskie Vedomosti* “Russia and Asia are one,” and that “Russia should lead the awakening of Asia... mean and venal phrasemonger! Witte’s [the Finance Minister] money can be smelled also in [the Petersburg monarchist newspapers] *Svet*, *Novoe Vremya*, and *Grazhdanin*.” It was said that the Russian Minister of Finances S.Yu.Witte appealed for a peaceful penetration to the Asian East through economic means. For that purpose, Russia’s kinship to Asia was sometimes brought about to justify Russia’s advance in the Far East. It is well known that L.A.Tikhomirov argued for a more aggressive approach towards the less civilized nations in order to enlighten them through Christianity. A meek autocratic stance must have irritated him, making him contrive to such a rude attack even towards the loyal to the government monarchist journalists.

In brief, both V.I.S. Solov’ev and L.A.Tikhomirov saw Russia’s presence in Manchuria as necessary for the enlightenment of the aborigines into the right Christian faith. Both of them perceived the internal instability in China as a threat to Russia. While the liberal “Westerner” V.I.S. Solov’ev later started pursuing Japan as a leader of the Pan-Mongolian (understandably, Pan-Asian) union against Europe, the reactionary monarchist L.A.Tikhomirov welcomed reformed Japan into the world family of civilized nations. Both philosophers, however, argued for Russia’s firm Manchurian policy in order to fulfill her enlightening mission there.

In a quite different way did Russian “Populists” and “Liberal-Constitutionalists” see Russo-Japanese rivalry over Manchuria after the quelling of the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900. The below reviewed journalists and single publicists’ writings about the Far East present an interesting interpretation of Russia and Japan’s interests in Manchuria and their stances in the region.

S.N.Yuzhakov, Professor of Sociology, a political observer and *de facto* editor of the “populist” monthly journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* ⁴⁰¹ (issued both in Petersburg and Moscow), presented a six-page description of Manchuria’s geographic position and natural resources once Russia

⁴⁰¹ *Russkoe Bogatsvo. Ezhemesechn’ii literaturnii i nauchnii zhurnal*- a monthly journal with philosophical and moral-religious ideology. Since 1892, it took a liberal-populist turn into its ideology under N.K. Mikhailovskii and V.G.Korolenko’s editorship, and became a center of the ‘Liberal Populism’. It was published in both St. Petersburg and Moscow from 1879 to 1918.

decided to prolong her army's withdrawal from Manchuria.⁴⁰² Due to the scarcity of information on the Asian East in Russia, such a descriptive article could have targeted filling some information gap.

On the other hand, however, it sounded more like a justification of Russia's imperialistic policy towards China though written by an ardent "Populist" ("*Narodnik*"). According to Professor S.N. Yuzhakov, Manchuria was a natural extension of Russian border regions, thus completing her organically. He perceived the northern part of Manchuria to be "the most important for Russia because of its size, close location, and economic profitability."⁴⁰³ Nevertheless, this "populist" observer went into detail to describe the three biggest provinces in Manchuria- their geographical location, climate, population, natural resources- an approach usually applied when contemplating future lands for imperial enlargement. Russia, in contrast to other great powers, which had to build colonies in Asia, advanced further in the region due to her military might, incorporating in her realm the land and peoples she met on her way.

In the case of Manchuria, Russia followed a similar strategy though Russia's turn to the Asian East was proclaimed to aim peaceful penetration in search for economic profits. The occupation of Manchuria by the Russian army, and her reluctance to withdraw once the "Boxer Rebellion" was over, imminently provoked some hostility among the other participants in the pacifying mission there. Japanese government officials, however, seemed most concerned about it. They perceived the increased Russian presence in the region as a Russian attempt to control the Chinese government at Beijing and a prelude to Russia's dominance of Korea. The international rivalry in the region kept intensifying.

That also invoked different reactions among Russian publicists themselves. Professor S.N. Yuzhakov admitted Russia's occupation of Manchuria to be "a dangerous crisis, worrying deeply this remote part of Asia, as well as creating inductive waves of worries in the remote [European] West." At the same time, he argued that the "great geographic [strategic] and economic significance" of Manchuria for Russia should not be neglected.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰² Yuzhakov, S.N. "Politika"(Politics) in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1901/04 (156-161pp)

⁴⁰³ Ibid, p.157

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

In contrast, V.A.Gol'tsev,⁴⁰⁵ Professor of Law and *de facto* editor of the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M'isl*,⁴⁰⁶ did not perceive Manchuria to be as profitable as the “populist” S.N. Yuzhakov did. “It is too great a distance between our lands and the open unfreezing port. ...The enormous railway connecting the Siberian railway with the Port Arthur would have to be guarded from the local hostile population with great self-sacrifices from our side. [What is more], it is hard to expect that we could have profitable cargo traffic there. [However], we should not abandon it...”⁴⁰⁷ Similarly to S.N. Yuzhakov, V.A.Gol'tsev saw Russia's presence in Manchuria as provoking many hostile reactions both among other great powers as well as between the local Chinese. “In China now the doors are open to rivalry among the states, diplomatic intrigues, and military clashes. A dangerous for us neighbor is being awakening. In regard to this, the grouping and re-grouping of the great powers is of special importance,” noted V.A.Gol'tsev.⁴⁰⁸ He could not but admit that the regional situation seemed unpredictable “because there are alliances-triple and double at the same time.”⁴⁰⁹ The region turned into vital interest for all great powers. Not just the “European concert” of great powers was involved in East Asia: the rise to power of a rapidly modernizing Japan and the awakening of American interest in China had created an imbalanced system prone to conflict where costs could not be predicted accurately.

The Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, under the editorship of the “liberal” M.M.Stasyulevich, Professor of History, in turn presented a quite peculiar interpretation of Russian occupation of Manchuria. In the journal's terms, “Manchuria was taken by us because of necessity, under the pressure of the ongoing there events which we could not foresee. Once we entered the Chinese region, we, of course, could not leave it before recovering its internal

⁴⁰⁵ Victor Alexandrovich Gol'tsev (1850- 1906) - a Professor in Law at the Moscow university until 1893 when he was forbidden by a decree to teach anymore due to his revolutionary ideas. From 1895, *de facto* V.A. Gol'tsev became the editor of the Moscow journal of literature and politics *Russkaya M'isl*, and in 1905-6, he turned to be officially appointed its editor until 1906. Under his leadership, the journal turned from a Slavophil to a liberal constitutionalist stance. The “radical” Golt'sev sided along with the revolutionary circles in Moscow in their struggle for limiting the power of the Autocracy and establishing a constitutional government.

⁴⁰⁶ *Russkaya M'isl, Ezhemesechnoe literaturno-politicheskoe izdanie* - a monthly journal of literature and politics, published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918. Its chief editors were S.A. Yurev (from 1880 to 1885), V.A.Gol'tsev (from 1885 to 1906), and P.Struve (from 1906 to 1918). See Ì. Èlevenskii, ENI “Literaturnaya entsiklopedia” (Encyclopedia of Literature) <http://feb-web.ru/feb/litenc/encyclop/lea/lea-3971.htm>;

also *Arhiv Gol'tseva* (V.A. Gol'tsev's Archive), vol. I, Ìoskva., 1914;

⁴⁰⁷ Gol'tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Russkaya M'isl*, 1901/04, (197-206pp), 197p.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, p.197

order and securing the safety of our railway equipment...our troops will remain there until we receive from the Chinese guarantee for the future of our railway.”⁴¹⁰ Russia’s delay to withdraw her troops after the “Boxer Rebellion,” should be treated “simply as an act of providence rather than as a deliberate act of perfidy,” argued the Petersburg “liberal” journal.⁴¹¹

To the other great powers, however, it seemed that Russia kept intentionally her troops in the region aiming at overtaking not only Manchuria but also Korea. In 1902, in order to limit Russian influence in China and Korea, and confirm her rights in the region, Japan concluded an alliance with Britain. The alliance recognized the interests of both powers in China and the special interests of Japan “politically as well as commercially and industrially” in Korea.⁴¹²

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 further challenged the situation in the Far East. “The new Far Eastern affairs after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance present to us a matter of special interest,” Professor V.A. Gol’tsev pointed out. “That is why we re-print here Lord Lansdowne’s dispatch⁴¹³ of January 30, 1902 about the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.”⁴¹⁴ In turn, “Franco-Russian declaration [of March 20, 1902]⁴¹⁵ provoked by this alliance greatly worried the Japanese,” clarified V.A. Gol’tsev referring to the Paris journal *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales* [1901/8]. They [the Japanese] now contemplate on which side Germany would stand, and try to attract her for their cause.”⁴¹⁶ In Professor V.A. Gol’tsev’s perceptions, Japan was a rising power capable to challenge the regional situation. He praised her military capability and discipline openly. As he stated “Japan increased her army at peace time up to 140 000 people. They are excellently armed. Japan is also eagerly improving her fleet.”⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁰ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1903/06 (764-775pp.), p.765

⁴¹¹ Ibid, p.766

⁴¹² Esthus, R. A. *Double Eagle and Rising Sun: The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*. Duke University Press, Durham and London 1988, p.3; p.197

⁴¹³ In November 1900, Lord Lansdowne was appointed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. As British foreign secretary (1900–05), he signed the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

⁴¹⁴ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1902/02 (226-234pp), p.228

⁴¹⁵ Franco-Russian declaration of March 20, 1902 in favor of the principles enunciated in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and reserving the right to take counsel to safeguard their interests. This was generally taken as a counterblast to the new combination and an extension of the Franco-Russian Alliance to the Far East.

⁴¹⁶ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1902/09, (233-242pp), 236p.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid, p.237

In addition, as a “Liberal” struggling for limiting the power of the Autocracy and establishment of a constitutional government, Professor V.A. Gol’tsev could not but admire Japanese reforms. He also pointed out with satisfaction that the prevailing majority of Japanese Lower House deputies were liberal-minded. He found it necessary to stress that “Liberals” outnumbered the “conservative” and “chauvinist” parties there. “On the top of these “Liberals” stands Baron Itoh with 158 members; next come the progressive party (with Baron Okuma as the leader) and 69 members. The rest groups- inevitable chauvinists- are considerably less in number.”⁴¹⁸ He expressed his disappointment from Baron Itoh’s fruitless visit to Petersburg before the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As he noted, “unfortunately, this visit did not bring to any diplomatic resolutions.”⁴¹⁹

Professor V.A. Gol’tsev placed Japan’s acute public reaction to the matters in the Far East, contrasting it to Russians’ neglect of them. As he pointed out, “The society for “National Unification” (*kokumin-dolei-kai*) actively propagates for the Anglo-Japanese alliance and against Russia. It costs a lot of efforts to Baron Itoh and the Prime-Minister to restrain such extreme chauvinistic movements which could lead Japan to a very dangerous clash.”⁴²⁰ He also referred to a nationalistic article in the Japanese newspaper *Nichi-nichi-Shimbun*. It said: “The alliance between Japan- the most powerful military state in the Far East and England- the most powerful naval state in the world- comprises one invincible entity.”⁴²¹ Professor V.A. Gol’tsev did not comment those Japanese bold perceptions of Japan and England. Instead, he presented other Japanese newspaper, *Chino*, as a counter view on the Anglo-Japanese alliance. “There it was found a newspaper (*Chino*) which was not glad at all with the Anglo-Japanese union. For England, such an alliance was a very good opportunity to increase her influence in the region...In case of a European military clash, noted the newspaper, it is very convenient for England to have Japan with her powerful military forces on her side...Japanese people should seriously consider that responsibility.”⁴²² As the “liberal” professor pointed out, “a considerable number [of Japanese] were disappointed because of Baron Itoh’s unsuccessful visit to Petersburg and the Anglo-Japanese alliance signed after that. However, the majority of

⁴¹⁸ Ibid

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1902/09, (233-242pp),p.237, note: V.A. Gol’tsev did not quote the date of issue of the Japanese newspaper *Nichi-nichi-Shimbun*,

⁴²² Ibid, 1902/09, (233-242pp),p.238, note: V.A. Gol’tsev did not quote the date of issue of the Japanese newspaper *Chino*

the Japanese seem to be Russophobes,” noted V.A. Gol’tsev. Although they do not shout loudly “Ahead to Port-Arthur!” they quietly discuss it among themselves.”⁴²³

Looking at Professor V.A.Gol’tsev’s expose, it would not be too great a leap to conclude that the author aimed at warning about the growing ambitions of Japan and her turning into another possible enemy for Russia, though it was stated implicitly. He could have also aimed at provoking a bigger attention to the matters in the Far East among Russian public. At the same time, it should be admitted that V.A. Gol’tsev openly acclaimed Japan’s reformation, liberalized governing system, as well as her excellently equipped and trained army. Japan, in his argument presented a newly reformed powerful state deserving proper attention from Russian officials.

Some other Russian intellectuals in turn distinguished themselves with their extremely positive stance to modernized Japan. The radical publicist and historian A. V. Mezier, famous for her historical articles and translations issued in Petersburg in the early 1900s, expressed her open admiration of rising Japan.⁴²⁴ A. V. Mezier praised Japan highly in her notes to the translated by her book *Epoha velikih reform v Iaponii* (Era of Great Reforms in Japan).⁴²⁵ She welcomed “the radical changes in Japanese society. For only ten years, Japan built her telegraph and railway systems, her fleet, and arsenal. Until 1853, Japan as a naval state was lower than China”⁴²⁶ In the light of those reforms and newly acquired stance of Japan in the region the question that A.V. Mezier considered important was “whether Japan would become the leader of the enlightenment process in the rest of the “East” or not?”⁴²⁷ In her understanding, “Japan is Russian Far Eastern lands’ closest neighbor and she has for Russia such an importance that she cannot have for any other European country.”⁴²⁸

⁴²³ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1902/09, (233-242pp), p.238

⁴²⁴ Avgusta Vladimirovna Mezier- writer and journalist- wrote and translated a number of historical and geographical articles and brochures for the Petersburg journal *Russkaya Shkola* in 1900-1906. Most popular works of hers are Mezier, A.V. *Russkaya slovesnost s XI po XIX st. vkl., chast 2* (Russian Literature from XI to XIX C. incl., part 2), CPb., 1902; Also Mezier, A.V., *Ukazatel istoricheskikh romanov, originalni i perevodnih, razpolozhennih po stranam i epoham* (A Directory of Historical Novels, Original and in Translation, Divided along States and Periods), SPb. 1902; And Mezier, A.V., *Slovarn’ii ukazatel’ po knogovedeniyu* (Literary Directory of Books), chast 1, Leningrad, 1931.

⁴²⁵ Baron von Zibold, A. *Epoha velikih reform v Iaponii* (Era of Great Reforms in Japan), transl. and notes by A. Mezier, S.Peterburg, typ.F.Vaisberg and P.Gershuin, 1902

⁴²⁶ Ibid, p.3-4, (A. V. Mezier referred to data from Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, p.541)

⁴²⁷ Ibid, p.5

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

A.V. Meizer prescribed three missions to Japan that could be of great importance to Russia. Firstly, she perceived Japan as a bringer of enlightenment in the Far East. In her terms, “For our Usuries region, for Kamchatka, and even for Northern Siberia, Japan will become a center or a breeding-ground for bringing European enlightenment.”⁴²⁹ The remoteness of Russia’s heartland from the Far East left those border regions underdeveloped. That is why, according to A.V. Meizer, “Japan has big importance for the development of our wild borderlands.”⁴³⁰ In addition, she noted that some Russian settlers there also confirmed Japan’s beneficiary reformation. “Our naval officers and white-collar workers in the Far East, go to Yokohama to relax in European atmosphere. . . .”⁴³¹

Secondly, A.V. Meizer perceived Japan as a significant supply center for Russia. “From Japan, our ships get supplies, assistance, and a convenient port. . . .”⁴³²

Thirdly, she also saw Japan as an important political partner to Russia. “Russia and Japan have common neighbors- China and Korea- and our relationships with them should soon be clarified. From this originate some commonalities in Russia and Japan’s political interests,”⁴³³ argued A.V. Meizer.

Although she envisioned Japan to be the bringer of European enlightenment in the “East,” being Russian she could not but point out that initially “Japan looked for model for her development in Peter the Great’s reforms. Nowhere in Europe could be found such a high level of centralized power as in Russia, and that is what Japan followed.”⁴³⁴ Nevertheless, although Russia was noted as an old enlightened country, it was the modern Japan that A.V. Meizer perceived as more suitable to modernize the remote from Russian heartland “Far East.”

In December 1902, another highly positive evaluation of reformed Japan was published in the Petersburg “social reformist” journal *Mir Bozhii*.⁴³⁵ Its article “Iaponia v sotsial’nom i

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid, p.6

⁴³¹ Ibid, p.5

⁴³² Ibid, p.6.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid, p.8

⁴³⁵ *Mir Bozhii, ezhemesechnii literaturnii i nauchno-populyarnii zhurnal dlya obrazovania*, (Mir Bozhii, a Monthly Journal of Literature and Popular Fiction for Education) S.Peterburg, Typ. I.N. Skorohodova. *Mir Bozhii* was a monthly journal printed in St. Petersburg from 1892 until 1906 under the editorship of Ostrogorskii, V.P. (until 1902) and Batyushkov, F.D. until 1906. In the first years of its existence, the journal aimed to contribute for self-education of Russian society and published a number of historical and popular scientific reviews. Gradually, it turned into a social reformist organ, a tribune of some legal Marxists and some representatives of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals arguing for cooperation between classes and rehabilitation of idealism. *Mir Bozhii* enjoyed big popularity among the democratic intelligentsia in the early 1900s. see *Literaturnaya entsiklopedia* (Literary Encyclopedia), vol.7, 1934, online

politicheskoy otnoshenii” (Japan –A Socio-political Review) was left unsigned possibly because of its rather extreme apotheosis of Japan’s liberalism and successful modernization. As *Mir Bozhii* stated, “Japan provokes the greatest interest and amazement in Europe with her speedy reforms and successful change into a civilized state in such a short notice.”⁴³⁶ What is more, according to *Mir Bozhii* Japan should be treated as “unique” not only because of her present but also because of her magnificent past. “Japan has an incredible history. For about 2560 years not even once did she fall under a foreign invasion. [Besides] It was the only monarchy with a constitution, about which European countries knew nothing, until Marco Polo discovered her,” argued *Mir Bozhii*.⁴³⁷ That was a direct blow at the Autocracy since Russia still lacked constitution and elected parliament.⁴³⁸

In the early 1900s, *Mir Bozhii* sided along the “legal Marxists” and reform-minded “petty bourgeoisie” targeting urgent reforms of Russian society. Hence, *Mir Bozhii*’s high praising of “the Japanese parliamentary system and liberal trends in her society” presented in an implicit form (due to the severe censorship during that time) the journal’s political argumentation.

Mir Bozhii also expressed open satisfaction that “Japanese attempt to implant western civilization in a society with a purely Asian culture turned out to be so speedy and successful.” Therefore, in the journal’s expectations, “soon Japan would have nothing more to learn from Europe...And Japanese are extremely proud of that.”⁴³⁹

Overall, *Mir Bozhii*’s apotheosis fell upon “Japan’s incredible success for the last fifty years.” The journal ascribed to Japan “the role of a ‘school teacher’ of Asia.” “That is, Japan will play the main part in the awakening of the Asian states. She will make China and Korea to go along the path of progress and will help Siam.”⁴⁴⁰ In *Mir Bozhii*’s perceptions “Japanese army and officers, merchants, and educated people in general possess much more extraordinary capabilities to exert influence over their Asian brethren and subordinate them under Japan’s control than any other nationalities.” The journal contrasted European dishonest and aggressive

<http://feb-web.ru/feb/litenc/encyclop/le7/le7-3321.htm>

⁴³⁶ “Iaponia v sotsial’nom i politicheskoy otnoshenii” (Japan -Socio-political Review) in *Mir Bozhii, ezhemesechnii literaturnii i nauchno-populyarnii zhurnal dlya obrazovaniya*, (a monthly journal of Literature and Popular Fiction for Education), S.Peterburg, Typ. I.N. Skorohodova, December 1902 (37-80pp), p.37

⁴³⁷ Ibid

⁴³⁸ It was three years later, in 1905 30 October, when the Tsar issued Imperial Manifesto creating a semi-constitutional monarchy; in 1906 May - Russian Duma (Parliament) met for the first time.

⁴³⁹ “Iaponia v sotsial’nom i politicheskoy otnoshenii” (Japan -Socio-political Review) in *Mir Bozhii*, December 1902 (37-80pp), p.38

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 79

approach when dealing with “less civilized people” to Japanese sincere desire to reform the “East.” According to *Mir Bozhii*, “in contrast to European nations which agree to help Asian nations to reform only under the condition to monopolize the reformed one later, Japan wants to teach Asians how to reform themselves alone as she did it.” In support to this argument, the journal referred to local Chinese and Korean reactions to Japanese presence in their lands. In the journal’s terms, “Chinese admit they have more benefits from Japanese merchants than any others. In Korea, the Japanese immigrants have established well-organized neighborhoods in their towns and those inhabitants evidently are enjoying proliferation. Koreans wish to imitate Japanese immigrants. Koreans did not have other schools than missionary ones before Japanese immigrants opened their schools there.”⁴⁴¹ Another area where Japan could be the “teacher of the East” was “in the naval and commercial affairs,” argued the journal referring to some specific figures from the French journal *Revue des Revues*.⁴⁴² In a word, *Mir Bozhii* envisioned Japan as the most proper “school teacher for the East”- having all the necessary capabilities and most importantly without any imperialistic back thoughts in contrast to European empires.

On the other hand, similarly to the historian A.V. Meizer, the “social reformist” journal also perceived Japan as a bringer of profits to Russia. As *Mir Bozhii* put it, “Even if it may look strange at first sight, her cooperation will help Russia turn her Eastern Siberia into inhabited and prolific region.”⁴⁴³

Professor A.M. Pozdnev⁴⁴⁴, known as the first Professor of Oriental Studies in Russia, also gave positive estimation to Japan’s growth. Although researching mainly Mongolian and Chinese history, ethnography, and economy, Professor A.M. Pozdnev was obviously provoked by Japanese increased influence in China and Korea and wrote a three-page appraising review of Japan’s current economic situation. It was published in *Izvestia Vostochnogo Instituta*, Vladivostok (1902) where Professor A.M. Pozdnev was assigned the Dean. He noted that after the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900, Sino-Japanese relations turned friendly again. In his terms, “Japan did many efforts to improve her relations with China, and agreed to carry the sacrificing mission there in 1900. Japan is gradually acquiring political influence over her neighbors,

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Ibid, p.80

⁴⁴³ Ibid ,79

⁴⁴⁴ Alexei Matveevich Pozdnev (1851-1920)- à professor specialist in Mongolian folklore and history, assigned as the head master of the Vostochnii Institut in Vladivostok in 1899; lectured also in Petersburg and Moscow Universities.

which might have significant resonance in future.” Although that statement sounded more like a warning to European players in the region, Professor A. M. Pozdnev did not elaborate further on it. He paid, instead, a lot of attention to Japanese economic growth referring to concrete statistical data in order to prove his argument that “Japan goes headlong along the path of capitalism with all its consequences”⁴⁴⁵ presumably both positive and negative to her as well as to her neighbors.

In brief, among the few Russian writings on Japan at that time dominated the positive attitude and admiration of Japanese successes reached at such a short notice. As seen from the above, “Populists,” “Liberals,” and “Social Reformists” alike recognized Japan as a growing economic and political power in the region. The role that most of them assigned to her, however, was one of a “school teacher of Asia,” rather than a regional leader among the great powers. Japan just appeared on the international arena and her position there still needed to be proved while Russia and the other European powers had already demonstrated their military, economic, and political powers in various occasions. That kind of logic seemed to stem from all of the above reviewed writings on Japan, though not always explicitly stated.

On the other hand, Russian intellectuals reviewed here noted that Japan would soon dare to challenge Russia although at the current moment Britain seemed to be a bigger peril to Russia’s interests in the region. Regional rivalry over Korea and Manchuria kept increasing. The number of great power players interested in the region also increased. The regional balance of power was getting more and more fragile.

The Russian press, however, was bothered more by the series of riots in Russia. The year 1902 wrote enormous spread of the workers strike movements and the peasants disturbances. The domestic situation seemed as “a volcano existing beneath Russia,” which could “erupt at any minute.”⁴⁴⁶ The year also marked the end to the South African War, also known as the “Boer War.”⁴⁴⁷ Russian press was overwhelmed by news on the course of the Boer war, its end, as well as the growing internal unrest all over Russia. As Russian historian Oleg Airapetov, who wrote extensively on the Russo-Japanese relations 1894-1905, also noted, it often happened

⁴⁴⁵ “Japan in 1901” in Pozdnev, A. (ed.), *Izvestia Vostochnogo instituta*, Vol.III, 1901-1902, Vladivostok, Typ. Sushtinskii i ko., 1902(625-627pp), p.625

⁴⁴⁶ see *Dnevnik A.V.Bogdanovicha*, Moscow/Leningrad, 1924, p.269 (24 Dec.1901), cited in Solov’ev, Yu.B. *Samoderzhavie i dvoryanstvo v kontse XIX v.*(Autocracy and Gentry), Leningrad 1973:156

⁴⁴⁷ The Boer War- fought between Great Britain and the two Boer republics, the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free state between 1899 and 1902.

that educated class in Moscow paid less attention to the events in the Far East than to the ongoing “Anglo-Boer War” then⁴⁴⁸.

A possible reason for that could be that the Autocracy in Russia was at full power and all the decisions regarding the foreign imperial policy were treated as priority of the Tsar - that is, it was something, which should not concern the public. Another reason could be that due to Russia’s strong military power, Russian society did not feel itself or the Russian empire directly threatened by Japan or any other actor in the Far East during that time.

Still other explanation provides other Russian historian, Boris M. Mezhuev, arguing for the existence of two societies in Russia from 1892 to 1904 - that of Petersburg, and that of Moscow. Petersburg society was said to be more supportive and active in the Russia’s Far East foreign policy expecting to benefit a lot from the new developing perspectives in Asia, while Moscow society was said to be more Slavophil-like, oriented to Europe.⁴⁴⁹ This differentiation made by the Russian historian Boris Mezhuev, is a contra-argument addressed to the American historian Barbara Jelavich. She states that Russian expansion in the Far East never enjoyed a broad support from Russian society; that Russian national interest at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries laid in the Balkans and the rest of Europe instead.⁴⁵⁰

As if to prove Barbara Jelavich’ argument, in the period 1901-2, Russian intellectuals seemed to perceive the Far Eastern issue as deserving less attention, and hence, their writings about it remained scarce.

In general, there could be distinguished two specific traits of Russian writings on Japan so far. On the one hand, Russian written works between 1855 and 1899 demonstrated increased

⁴⁴⁸ see Airapetov, O. “Army, Society, and Colonial War”, *Rodina* N.1, 2004
<http://lwww.japon.ru/?aText&ID=41685>

⁴⁴⁹ As B.M. Mezhuev argues, Moscow and Petersburg’s educated elites differed in their opinions and responses to the official foreign policy between 1892 and 1903. Thus, Mezhuev differentiates two societies connected in their own ways with the government and common people- Petersburg’s, and Moscow’s ones. Moscow, at that time, “capital of the unofficial public” Russia declared its position on *zemstvo* (local organization) meetings, while Petersburg- on the pages of the first mass Russian media such as the newspapers *Novoe Vremya* and *Birzhev’ie Vedomosti*. Mezhuev, B.V., “Modeling of the Term ‘National Interest’ . In regard to Russia’s Far Eastern Policy at the End of XIXth and the beginning of XXth Centuries”.

E-Journal *Polis* ,<http://www.politstudies.ru/fulltext/1999/1/4.htm>;

On “imperialistic journalism”, Petersburg, and Moscow Press media reflections of Russia’s foreign policy for 1892-1903 see also McReynolds L . *The News under Russia's Old Regime The Development of a Mass-circulation* , Press, Princeton, NJ, 1991: 168—197

⁴⁵⁰ Jelavich, Á. A. *Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814 - 1914* , Philadelphia -NY, 1964

interest in Japan; on the other hand, they lacked specific purpose and focus of their interest. They presented writings comprising a bit of various areas. Russians aimed at drawing as broader a picture of the Country of the Rising Sun as possible in order to introduce various aspects of Japanese society and fill in the existing information gap about Japan. Russian “discovery” of the “East” and Japan had just begun in contrast to that of the “West.” Therefore, in their greatest number, those writings had informative descriptive character. In addition, some western works about Japan also influenced them. Thus, they often followed the western line of thought about the “East.” Some important historical events, such as the Meiji reforms and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, had also affected the image of Japan in Russia bringing to changes in the tonality of the Russian intellectual writings about Japan.

Since 1900, the followed events in East Asia led Russo-Japanese relations and mutual perceptions at the formal level to a mutual contest for a regional influence and mutual distrust. Nevertheless, at the non-formal level, the majority of Russian intellectuals did not perceive Japan’s growth to be a threat to Russia. On the contrary, they still highly admired Japanese successes along the path of modernization. There were still others, mainly from the Russian artistic elite, who felt deep regret for Japan losing her original beauty and indigenous customs. Hence, it could be argued that Japan’s growth challenged and changed some Russian perceptions of her, or furthered sharpened some others. The image of Japan in Russian minds turned to be dynamic- it varied with the times and with its creators. Still, until 1902, it could be stated that the image of Japan among Russian intellectual circles was predominantly positive.

The numerous publications in the western press of 1903 about the highly worsened Russo-Japanese formal relations provoked Russian publicists to pay much closer attention to the development of the Russo-Japanese rivalry in the Far East. Some Russian journals and newspapers started reprinting and commenting foreign press predictions for an approaching war between Russia and Japan.

Initially, most Russian press reviewed here insisted on all the predictions of a war between Russia and Japan to be treated as western press' insinuations or at least as English and American provocations.

What is more, Russian intellectuals who wrote on the issue in the St. Petersburg daily newspapers *Pravistel'stvenii Vestnik*, *Novosti i Birzhevaia Gazeta*, *Peterburgskii Listok*, and the journals *Vestnik Evropii*, *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, as well as in the Moscow daily newspapers *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, *Russkie Vedomosti*, and *Novosti Dnia* as well as the journal *Russkaya M'isl*, all expressed their beliefs in a beneficiary development of the Russo-Japanese negotiations over Manchuria and Korea. A possible explanation for such unanimity of Russian press judgment in the first half of 1903 could be the lack of specific official information both from Russian and Japanese sides as some Russian publicists admitted. Therefore, even Russian central press had to rely on western and Japanese press releases about the Russo-Japanese clashes of interest.

However, with the worsening of the Russo-Japanese relations in the second half of 1903, even the most optimistic publicists expressed their fear of an imminence of an armed clash between Russia and Japan. Until the very burst of the war in 1904, Russian public, as could be seen from the written below, was "kept in a fog" about Russia's official Far Eastern endeavors and could only speculate about it.

In the first half of 1903, Russia's publicists ardently debated on Russia's advances in Manchuria and Korea and Japan's demands over the issue. Various schools of thought and political movements created various interpretations. Some justified Russian expansion to the Pacific. Others insisted on immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from the region to avoid dangerous conflict with other great powers. The arguments for which state was the greatest

challenge to Russia in the East also varied- from Japan, and/or England, or USA, to some peculiar future alliance between Japan and China and Korea.

V.1. The Press about the Worsened Russo-Japanese Relations in 1903-4

In early 1903, when most Russian journals and newspapers perceived Japan, and/or England, and the United States as serious rivals to Russia in the “Asian East,” the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* pointed out China as a “peril” not only to Russia but also to all the humanity. The Professor of Sociology at the Petersburg University S.N. Yuzhakov,⁴⁵¹ who also acted as political observer and *de facto* editor of *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, presented a very peculiar justification of Russia’s troops in Manchuria. According to him, “Bloody Chinese revolts present danger to all the humanity.”⁴⁵² He criticized England for inciting the “Asian East” “by playing roles in accordance with her interests only.” The fact that England concluded alliance with Japan in 1902, the “populist” Professor S.N. Yuzhakov interpreted as “setting a wolf to keep the sheep” (if Solov’ev’s prophesy is doomed to happen).⁴⁵³ A critic in a “populist” tone on Western interference in the “Asian East” followed. In his terms, “the European strives to extract the biggest profit from Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese only provoked in the local people hatred and distrust [towards the “West”]. ... “Barbarians” get the latest modern weapons [from the “West”] and on the top start hating the “white devils” more....”⁴⁵⁴ He referred to the famous Russian religious philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev, who had predicted a couple of years before, a dreadful “pagan invasion” of Europe from the “Asian East.” In S.N. Yuzhakov’s argument, “Germany and England by “cutting pieces of meat” from China, had prepared the base for the future development of the events in the Far East.”⁴⁵⁵ Understandably, the “West” was to be blamed for inciting or provoking hostile feelings among East Asians to Russia.

The publicist, however, did mention neither Russia nor Japan’s active participations in great powers’ game for regional hegemony. Instead, he reminded the warning of the leader of the

⁴⁵¹ S.N. Yuzhakov- a professor in Sociology at the Petersburg University, “Populist” (*Narodnik*); most famous for his editorship of the twenty-two volume “Great Encyclopedia”, Leiptsig, Vienna, 1900-1909.

⁴⁵² Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika” (Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1903/03 (125-136pp),p.128

⁴⁵³ Ibid

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., p.128-9

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid

populist movement, N.K. Mikhailovskii,⁴⁵⁶ that “even if there is not another Mongolian invasion in the near future, there is a good reason to think that we live in the Eve of very important events in the Far East.”⁴⁵⁷ The ardent “populist” S.N. Yuzhakov argued against the “forced civilization over the yellow races” because it was then when destructive, “capitalism and nationalism entered the life of the local people.” Thus, by “bringing poverty to mass population there, the “West” provoked the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900, noted Professor S.N.Yuzhakov.⁴⁵⁸

On the other hand, according to him, “While China rejected the forced reformation; Japan used the most of it.” Japan, he stated, “have learned her lessons from Europe- how to seek colonization for her market, and extra supplies.”⁴⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in his perceptions, “in contrast to Europe, Japan lacked the cultural base necessary to fight capitalism.” Refracted through his “populist” lenses, Professor S.N.Yuzhakov’s image of Japan was of a country “forced by capitalism to seek exit out, using nationalism to justify her strategy, and to motivate her population to support that “national deed.”⁴⁶⁰

According to that radical “Populist” (“*Narodnik*”), “Japan adapted a program along the western imperialism presumably aiming at: colonization, annexation, occupation, or uniting with a rarely populated territory; or capture of a densely populated territory (in practice or *de facto*) to “civilize,” or “find new markets.” He also saw Japanese expansion in East Asia because of limitation of her expansion in the Southeast Asia by USA, France, and England. “Japan could expand only in the East Asia where she could meet the least confrontation,” argued S.N.Yuzhakov.⁴⁶¹

Russia, also limited by other great powers in her expansion to the “West,” had chosen to seek expansion in the “Asian East.” “Russia’s position in South Manchuria, obviously irritates many countries, however, nobody intends to fight over that. Therefore conflict is over Korea,”⁴⁶² argued the “populist” observer. Russian troops along the Korean border according to some

⁴⁵⁶ Nikolai Konstantinovich Mikhailovskii (1842—1904)- famous Russia publicist, literary critic ,and editor of the populist journal of politics and literature *Russkoe Bogatsvo* from 1890 until 1904). As leader of the populist movement in Petersburg since 1886, Mikhailovskii led active propaganda against both monarchists and social democrats.

⁴⁵⁷ “Politika” (Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1903/03 (125-136pp), p.129

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid, p.131

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid, p.132

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

⁴⁶¹ Ibid, p.134

⁴⁶² “Politika” (Review of Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1903/12 (121-136pp), p.126-7

Western press cited by Professor S.N. Yuzhakov, “turned Korea’s independence into fictitious.” Therefore, to secure Japanese interests in Korea, Japan had to turn Korea into a Japanese protectorate under Japanese occupation of strategic spots. S.N. Yuzhakov found the western press claims that annexation of Korea would be merely a little compensation for the Japanese because of the Russian occupation of Manchuria as reasonable. In his terms, “If that is the real situation in the region, then we should not blame Japan for being too demanding... We do not need Korea,” he argued.⁴⁶³ Moreover, while he found North Manchuria to some extent profitable but highly risky for Russia to dominate there, he did not see “any use of Russia’s occupation of Korea- a densely populated with foreign to us Asiatic people.” In order to avoid any armed clashes between Russia and Japan “A further peaceful discussion is absolutely possible and necessary,”⁴⁶⁴ concluded Professor S.N. Yuzhakov.

In contrast to the “neo-populist” journal, the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* went into defense of Russian presence in Manchuria. The personality of the active “Liberal” M.M. Stasyulevich, a Professor of History at the Petersburg University, who was editing the “Political Review” section at this journal, could be strongly felt. His journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* defended in its own way Russian presence in the Far East. In its terms, “Our real policy in China does not justify the bad attitude and blames in the American press towards Russia.” In the journal’s perceptions, Russia “suffered more than other [powers] from the Chinese revolt and we less than others took care of our preys there and of the defense of our interests.”⁴⁶⁵ The journal’s argument was that Russia had always tried to preserve the world peace, not to break it. Its main editor - M.M. Stasyulevich, who followed closely his best friend Count Lev Tolstoy’s teachings for “non-violence,” maintained this line of thought for years. Hence, Russian armed occupation of Manchuria was justified as a final measure, “an act of necessity” in order to recover internal peace there and to secure the safety of Russian railway equipment.⁴⁶⁶ Russia’s delay to withdraw her troops was perceived by *Vestnik Evrop’ii* as “improvidence” rather than as “perfidy,” because Russia “always strived to preserve the world peace.”⁴⁶⁷

The Moscow “liberal” journal, *Russkaya M’isl* also expressed worries about the complicated situation in the Far East. The friction, according to its editor, the Professor of Law V.A. Gol’tsev, was “due to the difference in the great powers’ interests there” which “made

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid

⁴⁶⁵ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie,” (Review of Foreign Affairs), *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1903/06, (764-775pp), 765p.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, p.766

diplomats from Europe, North America, and Japan pay bigger attention to Russian army in Manchuria and her withdrawal.”⁴⁶⁸

Japan officially challenged Russia’s position in the region in her Note of April 1903, threatening to resort to force if the evacuation of Russian army from Manchuria again failed.⁴⁶⁹ That must have provoked Professor V.A.Gol’tsev to argue for paying bigger attention to Japan, her development, and her ambitions in the region. While admitting the great power interests in the Asian East, in the journal’s perceptions, Japan was Russia’s most serious rival there and she was to be watched closely.

In order to fill in urgently the information gap in Russia about Japan, *Russkaya Mi’sl* published in its next couple of issues some more detailed information on Japanese history, economy, and regional policy. For example, a thirty-page historical review of Japan titled “Iaponia prezhde i teper” (Japan- Past and Present) written by the historian and active “liberal” publicist D.Golovnin, was published in *Russkaya Mi’sl* in July 1903. The article presented another apotheosis of Japanese reformation process- an implicit “liberal” propaganda for performing urgent reforms in Russia.⁴⁷⁰ D.Golovnin started his presentation of Japan with an ardent acclamation of her speedy reformation. According to him, “Japan’s historical fate is unique, without analogue in the whole world.”⁴⁷¹ D.Golovnin, however, pointed out that until recently foreigners viewed Japan as a “newly discovered island bird.” Some denigrated stereotypes created by writers of the Orient such as Pierre Loti were still dominating Europeans and Americans alike, as D. Golovnin noted. “Even nowadays images of Japan are that of a “fairytale state of miniatures- a state populated by smiling small men and sweet small women with doll like babies, all living in houses of cards amongst marvelous nature.”⁴⁷² How strong that stereotype must have been in Russian mind could be seen even in the famous Tsar

⁴⁶⁸ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), *Russkaya M’isl* , 1903/05 (225-230pp), p.228

⁴⁶⁹ On Russo-Japanese relations during the “Boxer Rebellion” see Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904*, Berkeley: Univ. of California press, 1958:208;227;237-249; also Romanov, B.A. *Russia in Manchuria, 1896-1906*, Ann Harbor, MI, 1952:139; Keylor, W.R. *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, Oxford University Press, 2000:13; also Danilovic, V. *When the Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers*, University of Michigan Press, 2002:188p; and Riasanovsky, N.V. *A History of Russia*, Oxford University Press, 1999:401

⁴⁷⁰ Golovnin, D. “Iaponia prezhde i teper” (Japan Before and Now), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1903/07 (35-65pp) The article was based on a public lecture given by D.Golovnin on 15 March 1903 in Moscow to raise money for the “Society for social aid to female students in Moscow” and then published in the Moscow liberal journal *Russkaya M’isl*, 1903/07

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., p.35

⁴⁷² Ibid

Nicholas II's denigrated remarks about Japanese right before the War of 1904-5, referring to them as "*makaki*" (macaques) or simply "*iaposhkami*" (Japes).⁴⁷³ Such belittling attitude towards Japan in Russia must have provoked the historian D.Golovnin to point out several times in his article "year by year, this lovely toy country Japan changes." What is more, "Reforms, which took European states a hundred years to be elaborated and applied, were put into practice in Japan one after another for some twenty-three years," he pointed out.⁴⁷⁴ D.Golovnin openly expressed his regret about Japan's "loosing more and more of the beauty of her originality and substituting her old lifestyles with new European ones... foreigners, looking for something different and pleasant, feel deep nostalgia for her old original beauty."⁴⁷⁵

To answer the question, "why then the Japanese need all those railways, telegraphs, and telephones since they bring only disharmony to Japan..." D. Golovnin went into a detailed description of Japanese history since ancient until modern times. His main argument was that "Contemporary evolution has deep organic reasons and presents a historical moment of great importance to Japan."⁴⁷⁶ His focus fell on the reformation of Japan, which went at "a dazzling speed." He was mostly impressed by the Japanese administrative and civil reforms. As a "Liberal," he highly acclaimed Japan because she "moved from an absolute monarchy into a monarchy with representative parliament for only twenty-three years thus presenting a model for a short state evolution..."⁴⁷⁷ His essay reminded much of an implicit (due to strict censorship) propaganda for further reformation and westernization of Russia. As D.Golovnin ardently pointed out "Japanese people have the rights of speech and free press, the right of gatherings and associations under certain conditions according to the law. The constitution guarantees Japanese citizens safety and security of their property."⁴⁷⁸ He went into detail on the Japanese constitution. Reformed Japan has turned into a model of a modern state to follow, in D.Golovnin's argument.

⁴⁷³ Tsar Nicholas II sometimes referred to Japanese denigrated as '*makaki*' or '*iaposhki*' even in his correspondence as could be seen from Tsar Nicholas II's Diary and from The Finance Minister Count Witte's diary. See *Dnevnik imperatora Nikolaya II (1890-1906)* [Diary of Emperor Nicholas II], Berlin, Slovo, 1923; also Yarmolinsky, A.(ed.) *The Memoirs of Count Witte*. New York and Toronto, 1921

⁴⁷⁴ Golovnin, D., "Iaponia prezhde i teper" (Japan Before and Now), in *Russkaya M'isl*, 1903/07 (35-65pp),p.35

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid, p.36

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid,p.45

A possible explanation of such ardent reformist polemics could be found when Japan's reformation is contrasted to the internal situation in Russia during that period. The year 1903 marked growing pressure for revolutionary reforms in Russia. She was falling further behind in social and economic aspects from the other great powers, and the gap between her social strata was getting wider and wider. Tsar Nicholas II's failure to consider reforms led to an escalation of the political opposition to the Autocracy.⁴⁷⁹ Workers strike movement spread all too quickly, adding to the unrest all over Russia. The students, with their continual protests and demonstrations were not least inclined to express their revolutionary fervor. The Autocracy tried to subdue the growing opposition through a row of arrests, strict police regime, and severe censorship. That only provoked a wave of terrorist attacks on ministers and governors-general throughout Russia.⁴⁸⁰ Standing on the background of those internal disturbances, the events in the Far East naturally seemed remote and irrelevant to most Russians. Russia's reformation at all levels stood first on the agenda of intellectuals' discussions. There were few Russian publicists, however, that kept following closely the development of the international rivalry in the Far East provoked mainly by the Western and Japanese press reactions to it.

The Moscow "liberal" journal *Russia Mi'sl* kept contemplating on Japanese mood towards Russia in its summer issues of 1903. Its editor Professor A.V. Gol'tsev wrote a five-page essay in which he warned that "Japan, of course, is highly displeased with our occupation of this region, and she perceives us as a dangerous rival." Therefore, V.A. Gol'tsev argued, "Russia should be on serious military alert in order to be able timely to secure her Manchurian railway, the Port-Arthur, and the Dal'nii [Russian Far East]."⁴⁸¹ He perceived Japan acting together with Britain, as the main threat to Russian interests in the Pacific. Therefore, "it is understandable that we have to watch closely everything that Japan undertakes, her cultural successes, her government needs, and last but not least the public dreams there."⁴⁸² Professor V.A. Gol'tsev referred to the French journal *Questions Diplomatic et Coloniales*, and its article

⁴⁷⁹ Russian liberals (mainly members of the middle class) wanted to see the system reformed on the British model—a strong parliament with a figurehead king. On the other hand, the growth of the working class saw the development of socialism. The Russian Social and Democratic Labor Party (formed in 1898)⁴⁷⁹ followed the ideas of Karl Marx and called for an end to the Tsarist state. The Social Revolutionary Party (formed in 1901) drawing its support from the peasantry advocated land reforms and many of its members favored direct action or the use of violence. See Pershin, A. *Agrarnaya revolyutsiya v Rossii, (Peasant Revolution in Russia. vol.1, Ot reformy k revolyutsii, (From Revolution to Reforms)*, Moscow, 1966: 63, p.226

⁴⁸⁰ Pershin, A. loc.cit. pp.63ff. 226ff. also Wildam, A.K. *The Making of a Workers' Revolution. Russian Social Democracy 1891-1903*, Chicago, 1967

⁴⁸¹ Gol'tsev, V.A. "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M'isl*, 1903/ 05 (225-230pp), p.228

⁴⁸² Ibid

“Evolution of Japanese Foreign and Domestic Affairs” commenting Japanese military plans in the Far East against Russia. ⁴⁸³

Although the Moscow “liberal” *Russkaya M’isl* perceived Japan as the major challenge to Russia’s position in the region, similarly to the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* and the “populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, it expressed hopes for a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern question. What is more, its editor V.A.Gol’tsev also referred to a Japanese journal called *Japan Weekly Mail* (Yokohama) as a contra argument to that of the French journal *Questions Diplomatic et Coloniales*. V.A. Gol’tsev believed in the possibility Russia and Japan to reach a peaceful solution for the Far Eastern question. He quoted another French correspondent who declared that “Japanese public opinion is obviously getting rid of their previous imperialistic madness...”⁴⁸⁴ As an example served the latest elections for public representatives in Japan- “out of 46 million, only 970 000 voted”. In that withdrawal from voting, Professor A.V. Gol’tsev saw “a sincere movement in Japan for alliance with Russia, and public reluctance to do Britain’s dirty work [in the region].”⁴⁸⁵ In addition, he expressed deep satisfaction from the decreased hostility towards Russia in Japan. He even pointed out that “in Tokyo there was established a society for strengthening the friendship between Russia and Japan. It has two other divisions: in Hakodate and in Vladivostok.”⁴⁸⁶ Professor V.A.Gol’tsev perceived “ the establishment of sincere relations with Japan- fast developing culturally and politically- as the best guarantee for our cultural activities in the Far East.”⁴⁸⁷ Being a reform-minded “Liberal”, he focused on Russia and Japan’s capabilities to spread reforms and cultural enlightenment in the region instead of viewing them as two imperialistic powers seeking economic benefits and strategic priorities there.

On the other hand, the dual presentation of Japanese mood towards Russia, obviously aimed to introduce to Russian public a broader picture about Japanese reactions to Russian advances in the region. It might have also aimed at pacifying domestic and international emotions that had arisen on the matter. Russian intellectuals seemed seriously disturbed by the ongoing friction in the Far East between Russia and the other great powers.

⁴⁸³ Ibid

⁴⁸⁴ ibid

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid, p.229

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid

V.2. Fears and Hopes about an Approaching War between Russia and Japan

In August 1903, the Far Eastern rivalry reached a critical level, and Japan initiated diplomatic negotiations with Russia designed to find some accommodation between them -whereby Russia would recognize Japan's influence in Korea, and Japan in turn, to recognize Russia's influence in Manchuria. Russia was slow to respond and negotiations dragged on into the fall of 1903. The period September – November 1903 was mostly noted for its diplomatic inactivity between them. Russia seemed to keep lacking a coherent policy in the Far East. The causes for that, the German historian Dietrich Geyer sees in the internal structural weakness of the Russian Empire: “the Autocracy provided weak leadership and was unable to weld together the conflicting ambitions of the various elites; rural Russia was devastated and impoverished, and thus aggravated the nation's chronic and political instability. Finally, industrialization had bred Witte's [the Russian Minister of Finance] borrowed imperialism.”⁴⁸⁸

It must be admitted, however, that S.Yu.Witte⁴⁸⁹ had already lost (in August 1903) his position of Minister of Finance presumably because of his disagreement with the government on a more aggressive advancement of Russia in the Far East. Instead, General A.M. Abaza- a prominent Tsar's dignitary was appointed the Chairman of the Committee of the Far Eastern Affairs, and in practice started playing the role of Finance Minister. Through the Committee, General A.M. Abaza conducted the Tsarist aggressive policy in the Far East. In addition, the Secretary of State A.M. Bezobrazov, who had become favored both by the Tsar and by the Minister of the Internal Affairs V.K. Pleve, was given quite a freedom to maneuver in the Far East as he found it best for Russia's interests. All those marked the victory of the so-called “*Bezobrazovskaya klika*” (Bezobrazov and his *clique*)⁴⁹⁰ in the Russian government. The Secretary of State A.M.

⁴⁸⁸ Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism. The interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, transl. by the German Bruce Little, BERG, Leamington Spa/Hamburg/New York 1987:187

⁴⁸⁹ Count Sergei Yulyevich Witte (1849–1915), Russian Premier. A railway administrator, he became Minister of Communications (1892) and Minister of Finance (1892–1903). He introduced the gold standard, reformed finances, encouraged the development of Russian industries with the help of foreign capital, and opened up Siberia to large-scale colonization with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. S.Yu. Witte was dismissed in August 1903, probably because he opposed the aggressive policy of Tsar Nicholas II in East Asia, but he was recalled in 1905 at the close of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) to negotiate peace with Japan.

⁴⁹⁰ “Bezobrazov's *clique*” -A group of upper class landowners in Russia, active in the period 1898-1905, often blamed by Western and Russian scholars for provoking the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 by her adventuress foreign policy in the Far East . In practice, the clique targeted the setting up of a joint-stock company for the exploitation of natural resources in Korea and Manchuria. Its leaders were State-secretary A.M. Bezobrazov, Grand Duke Alexander Mihaylovich, Interior Minister V.K.Pleve, at al. The Guards Colonel A.M. Bezobrazov was most prominent among them with his proposal for aggressive approach towards Korea and China, and a possible colonization of Korea. For details, see

Bezobrazov and his *clique* also jokingly known as “*Koreitsy*” (the Koreans) or “*Mandzurtsy*” (the Manchurians), favored Russian imperial designs in Korea and Manchuria. They appealed for colonization approach towards the East Asian nations to secure Russia’s commercial and strategic interests there. The ambitious commercial endeavors of A.M. Bezobrazov and his *clique* in the Asian East further contributed to sharpening Russo-Japanese relations.

the Japanese interpreted Russian activities in Korea and Manchuria as very dubious and threatening Japan’s strategic security, which in turn made them intensify their preparations for an armed conflict with Russia. Hence, Japanese preparations for a war turned to be a highly speculated topic in the Russian central press the second half of 1903. Very much provoked by the Western press prophesies for a coming serious armed conflict between Russia and Japan, Russian publicists undertook the duty to warn the public on the “coming peril.” That “peril,” however, received different interpretations in the Russian press- to some it was clearly defined in the face of Japan, to others it was England, and/or the United States hiding behind Japan, while there were still others that maintained the hypothesis that real peril to mighty Russia did not exist.

In October 1903, the Petersburg daily “liberal upper-bourgeois” newspaper, *Novosti i Brzhevaia Gazeta*,⁴⁹¹ in its brief note “Iaponia i Rossia” (Russia and Japan), cited the *Reuters Agency*’s “worrying news about the bellicose mood in Japan and her preparation for a war.”⁴⁹² According to the quoted agency, “The prolonged meetings of the Ministers of Defense and Navy, with the Emperor, and Baron Itoh, and his First Minister demonstrate the gravity of the coming crisis.” The newspaper warned about Japanese vigorous preparations for a war. As it stated “Japanese fleet is already ready. Army is provisioned...Feverish activities are going within the arsenal, fortifying and security measures are tested.”⁴⁹³ The newspaper, however, limited itself to the issuing of a warning rather than commenting on it.

Lukoianov, I.V. “Bezobrazovtsy,” in Steinberg, J. et al. (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, Brill, Leiden-London, 2005: 65-86pp

⁴⁹¹ *Novosti i Brzhevaia gazeta*- a daily political, literary and commercial newspaper, organ of the Russian liberal large-scale industrialists, printed in St. Petersburg since 1877 to 1905. Her chief editors were O.K. Notovich and Korolenko. The newspaper welcomed the development of private enterprise, and argued for necessity of constitutional reforms in Russia. Being supported by the stationary joint-stock companies, however, in its bulk, it published news on bourgeois journalese enterprises.

⁴⁹² “Iaponia i Rossia”, in *Novosti i Brzhevaia gazeta* , SPB, 10 October (27 September O.S.) 1903

⁴⁹³ Ibid

One day later the Petersburg small print mass daily newspaper *Peterburgskii Listok*⁴⁹⁴ also echoed news for an approaching serious conflict in the Far East citing the French correspondent of *L'Independ. Bel.* in Peking. Under a short notice titled “Na Dal’nem Vostoke” (In the Far East) the newspaper pointed out that “China preferred to see Manchuria be overtaken by Russians than by other European countries” since others would require additional sacrifices from Chinese side. Hence, it was not China, but Japan with her regional ambitions that *Peterburgskii Listok* perceived as a serious challenge to Russia’s advance in the Asian East. In the newspaper’s terms, “the only obstacle to Russia’s conquering Manchuria is coming from Japan.”⁴⁹⁵

The Petersburg “liberal upper- bourgeois” daily newspaper *Novosti i Birzhevaia Gazeta* went even further by starting reviewing the possible interferences in a case of a war. As the journal stated, in the ongoing argument over Manchuria, “England supports Japan dearly in Peking and Soul. Germany stays neutral. As for the United States, Japanese press claims that in case of breaching of Japan’s rights, they would protest vigorously.”⁴⁹⁶

A telegram of 12 October (29 September O.S.) 1903 from the Port Arthur was reprinted in the Moscow “upper-bourgeoisie” daily newspaper *Novosti Dnia*⁴⁹⁷ announcing, “Japanese press is furiously reproaching Russia for her actions in Manchuria.” As the newspaper noted “the new demands placed by Russia in regard to her evacuation from Manchuria are declared [by the Japanese] excessive.”⁴⁹⁸ The newspaper published also other short telegram of 12 October (29 September O.S.) 1903 from St. Petersburg saying, “in fact, there is no “Manchurian question,” and it is no concern of Japan at all.” The newspaper reminded that Russia had a formal agreement with China stating the conditions under which Russia should withdraw her army from Manchuria. Moreover, Russian railway in Manchuria needed proper guarding by Russian troops. “That is all about the Manchurian question,” dryly pointed out the newspaper. It saw

⁴⁹⁴ *Peterburgskii Listok*- a small print mass daily newspaper issued in St.Petersburg. The journal followed the mass public interest of the day. The newspaper was printed in Petersburg from 1864 until 1917, and it enjoyed considerable public interest. In 1890s its daily prints accounted for 50 000 issues while in 1905-7 they increased to 80 000 to make it second most read daily newspaper in Russia.

⁴⁹⁵ “In the Far East”, in *Peterburgskii Listok*, SPB, 11 October (28 September) 1903

⁴⁹⁶ “Iaponia i Rossia”, in *Novosti i Brzhevaia gazeta*, SPB, 11 October (28 September O.S.) 1903

⁴⁹⁷ *Novosti Dnia*- a daily political, social, and literary newspaper, meant for business circles. Published in Moscow from 1883 to 1906. Its main editor was A.Ia.Lipskerov.

⁴⁹⁸ “ Telegramm’ii”(A telegram), in *Novosti Dnia*, 30 September (13 October new style) 1903

Russian prolonged stay in Manchuria as a *just* act since “China failed to provide for her part of the agreement. Any state would do as Russia have done in such a situation.”⁴⁹⁹

The official daily newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs *Pravitel'stvenii Vestnik*⁵⁰⁰ also resorted to some comments on the situation in the Far East in the fall of 1903. The newspaper published a short *communiqué* titled “Iaponia” (Japan) announcing that “the latest news about some diplomatic misunderstandings between Russia and Japan concerning Russia’s promise to withdraw from Manchuria, and the possibility of an armed conflict between those states persist more often in foreign newspapers.” Instead of clarifying the actual situation, that government press organ assumed an Aesop language notifying that “In those pieces of news, truth, desires, and fiction are so deeply intertwined that it becomes impossible to set any division.”⁵⁰¹

Further, instead of referring to formal announcement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government press organ cited the British daily newspaper *The Daily Mail* about the matters in the Far East since “all the newspapers re-print the information about the Far East from *The Daily Mail*.”⁵⁰² It was mentioned briefly that the Russian Ambassador in Japan Baron Rosen had returned from Port Arthur to Tokyo with a note of 4 October (new style) after a meeting with the Governor-general of the Far East General Adjutant Alekseev. The note stated in the newspaper terms “The issue about the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Manchuria concerns only two states- Russia and China, and that’s no business of Japan.”⁵⁰³

After a twelve-day discussion between the Japanese Foreign Minister Baron Komura and Russian Ambassador in Japan Baron Rosen, it became clear that Russian and Japanese parts could not come up to any agreement about the exclusion of Manchuria from Japanese sphere of interests.⁵⁰⁴ As the government newspaper *Pravitel'stvenii Vestnik* stated, “as a result, Russia’s proposals were rejected by the Japanese government as it was announced to Baron Rosen.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid, 29 September (12 October new style) 1903

⁵⁰⁰ *Pravitel'stvenii Vestnik* - the official daily newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs; issued from 1869 to 1917 in St. Petersburg. It published government decrees and communiqués.

⁵⁰¹ “Iaponia”, in *Pravitel'stvenii Vestnik*, SPB, 30 September (13 October new style) 1903

⁵⁰² Ibid

⁵⁰³ Ibid

⁵⁰⁴ *Japanese White Book*, N.19, 20. Telegram of 16 and 22 October 1903- Komura and Kurino. *British documents*. Also II.N.249- telegram of 22 October 1903 - MacDonald from Tokyo. cit. in Romanov, B.A. *Diplomatic Development of the Russo-Japanese 1904-1905*, released online http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Author/Russ/R/RomanovBA/romanov_01.htm

Japanese newspapers since then even more insistently started demanding the [Japanese] government to undertake drastic measures.”⁵⁰⁵

The Petersburg “liberal upper-bourgeois” newspaper *Novosti i Birzhevaia Gazeta* also reprinted a brief warning for an upcoming clash. According to the British journal *The Globe*, cited there, “In London people think that the “temporary” postponement of the evacuation of Manchuria would become “permanent”... Russia and Japan confronted, and if one of them does not concede- war is imminent.”⁵⁰⁶

In contrast, the Petersburg “liberal” Western-minded intellectual journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, did not focus on the foreign press comments, but rather presented its own interpretation of the Russo-Japanese dispute. In its November 1903 issue the journal proclaimed, “The Manchurian question does concern directly neither our national dignity nor our lively interests.... Our national dignity does not demand incorporation of Manchuria into Russian realm...our lively interests definitely do not allow Russia to waste money on the accomplishment of foreign to our culture Asian tribes.”⁵⁰⁷ In *Vestnik Evrop’ii*’s vision, Russia “made a huge mistake by deciding to connect the Siberian Railway with the Pacific Ocean via Chinese territory which does not guarantee us safety...”⁵⁰⁸

What is more, in its perceptions of Russia, “our homeland does not need to prove her military power via new military deeds.”⁵⁰⁹ Russia had indeed proved herself as a mighty state in numerous wars while Japan was still a rising power having one local war only in her biography. That line of thought clarifies to some extent Russian publicists’ disbeliefs in Japan daring to attack Russia. Yet, if a war happened, it would be “a complete waste of human force, and especially disastrous for our future, having in mind the hostile to us England, and partially so USA...,”⁵¹⁰ clarified *Vestnik Evrop’ii*. It is interesting that even when faced by the increasing crisis in the Russo-Japanese relations, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* did not envision that much Japan but England and the United States as serious threats to Russia.

Such perceptions might have been provoked by the western press announcements that the President of the USA Theodore Roosevelt and the Secretary of State John Hay had already started a single project intended to counter Russian dominance in Manchuria. In 1903, USA

⁵⁰⁵ “Iaponia”(Japan), in *Pravitel’svenii Vestnik*, SPB, 13 October (30 Sept. O.S.) 1903

⁵⁰⁶ *Novosti i Birzhevaia gazeta*, SBP, 15 October (2 Oct. O.S.) 1903

⁵⁰⁷ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1903/11 (389-438pp), p.386

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p.387

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid*

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid*

negotiated with China to open more Manchurian cities for a trade. This forced the Russians into an undesirable position, for they did not want to oppose blatantly the United States, yet they could not simply allow them to stick their foot in the door to Manchurian trade. They eventually, after much stalling, gave into USA's demands, which in no small part weakened their stranglehold over Manchuria.⁵¹¹

In addition, in accordance with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, in the case of Russo-Japanese armed clash, Britain would become more actively involved into it if another power (probably an allusion to France) entered the war as a Russian ally.

The shaken balance of power in the Far East must have made *Vestnik Evrop'ii* constantly restate that Russian presence in the Far East was "more dangerous than profitable to Russia" because it dragged her into numerous disturbances with Europe, USA, Japan, and China, and on the other hand, it involved her into risky and doubtful commercial enterprises.⁵¹² In addition, the journal warned, "tempted by some perspectives in the Far East we should not forget the Balkans that could involve us soon in a conflict..." In *Vestnik Evrop'ii*'s understanding, both the Near East and the Far East presented some peril for Russia "so we should be on alert!"⁵¹³ The journal placed bigger responsibility on Britain and USA for the worsened Russo-Japanese relations due to their "unfair game" in the Far East, than on Russian and Japanese imperialistic moves there. Besides, the journal perceived Japan as weak and "easy to reach an agreement with, once we manage to separate her from her troublesome alliance with the British and the Americans."⁵¹⁴ What is more, Russia's power was not doubted even for a minute by the Petersburg "liberal" journal. In its terms, "even if Japan for some unknown reasons went into preparing any military schemes against Russia, we of course, would do everything possible to restrain her from such madness, and not give Japanese any motifs for frustration."⁵¹⁵

On the other hand, "liberals" wish for a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern crisis was also declared by the Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*. It presented both Japan and Russia as states "willing to keep peaceful mutual relations and harmony in their

⁵¹¹ Esthus, R.A. *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966:9

⁵¹² "Inostrannoe Obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1903/08; 1903/09;1903/10;1903/11;1903/12

⁵¹³ Ibid, p.311

⁵¹⁴ Ibid

⁵¹⁵ "Inostrannoe Obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1903/08, (792-802pp), p.802.

agreements.”⁵¹⁶ It was Britain and USA that were provoking Japan and Russia to take the path of war, stated *Vestnik Evrop’ii*. Therefore, “the aggressive western agitation on the Manchurian Question required if not firm retort [from Russia], at least an authoritative factual explanation which would also be necessary to the puzzled Russian society”.⁵¹⁷

The Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl*, however, contrary to the Petersburg “liberal” journal, did not perceive England and USA as threats to Russia since “still England and USA do not see any necessity to interfere in the [Manchurian] issue.”⁵¹⁸

Instead, the journal warned against a threat coming from Japan. Russia “needs to stay on a very serious military alert...”⁵¹⁹

Japan had already challenged Russian occupation of Manchuria formally (Japanese Note of April 1903).⁵²⁰ Russia’s delay to withdraw her troops from there made Japan initiate formal negotiations with Russia over Manchuria and Korea. The stale of the Russo-Japanese negotiations in the fall of 1903, along with some administrative changes in Russian government (the dismissal of S.Yu.Witte, the establishment of the Committee of the Far Eastern Affairs, the appointment of Secretary of State Bezobrazov favoring aggressive policy in the Far East) pointed to Russian “deliberate delay” to withdraw thier army from Manchuria. The other great powers interpreted it as a “winning time until gathering strength” for further advancement in the “East.” That behavior proved to be very risky in the following year.

Under those conditions, naturally, the focus of the Russian central press remained upon Manchuria or as the press called it, the “Manchurian Question.” The increased “crisis of the Far East” as the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* noted, made “Liberals” highly doubt Russian benefits there. The journal argued, “the Near East (*Blizhnii Vostok*) has for us bigger importance at present and future than some dubious gains from the Far East (*Dal’nii Vostok*) where giant losses of efforts and money are taken for normal...”⁵²¹ Russia’s missions in the Balkans and the Near East were given priority in the journal’s interpretations. In addition,

⁵¹⁶ Ibid, p.802.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1903/ 05 (225- 230pp), p.228

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Japanese in their Note of April 1903 to the Tsar Nicholas II, threatened to resort to force if Russian evacuation of Manchuria again failed. see Takeuchi, T. *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*, Doubleday, Doran & Co, INC. Garden City, New York, 1935:138

⁵²¹ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1903/09 (364-375pp), p.371

Russia's "Orthodox Christian" foreign policy became even more accentuated in the second half of 1903 after the brutal military *coup* in Serbia (10 June 1903), and the failed Macedonian revolt (2-8 August 1903). Russia's self-appointed role as a protector of the oppressed Christian states demanded from her active policy in the Balkans and active missionary work in Jerusalem. On the other hand, Russia was expected to profit more from the decaying Ottoman Empire. Persia and Crimea were other profitable lands for Russia to keep exploring. The Far East (*Dal'nii Vostok*) in contrast to the Near East (*Blizhnii Vostok*) did not provide to Russia any immediate profits but only vague benefits in the long term, according to Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*.

Similarly, the Moscow "liberal" journal *Russkaya M'isl*, also declared, "our presence in Port Arthur and the construction of the Manchurian railway cost a lot to Russia, and this enterprise is only a big burden to Russian people..."⁵²² Instead of wasting money on doubtful enterprises in the "Asian East," Russia should focus on improving her internal affairs, argued *Russkaya M'isl*. It appealed, "We have many internal problems to solve, and we have left behind from Europe and even from Japan in socio-cultural aspect."⁵²³ The Moscow "liberal" journal saw some opportunity in the negotiations between Russia and Japan "to avoid war with Japan, which would be dangerous and very costly...A war in the "East" could provoke the Asian nations, which is not desirable by any of us." The journal expressed hope that "Britain would calm down Japan."⁵²⁴ Its editor, A.V. Gol'tsev cited western press releases about "the ongoing energetic preparations for a war in Japan." Like other Russian publicists' announcements, A.V. Gol'tsev referred to the western press publications as "rumors which appeared about Japanese army increases in some places in Korea."⁵²⁵ He also pointed the increases of Russian armed forces in Manchuria and Korea.

The situation was getting more and more prone to an armed conflict. It seemed to be a matter of time - Japan or Russia would attack first.

The Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, managed by the ardent "liberal" and "pacifist," Professor M.M. Stasyulevich, also finally admitted the exceptionally critical situation in the Far East. It openly stated, "The prevailing militaristic viewpoints towards such sensitive issue as Manchuria are dangerous for our state." The journal blamed the "greedy

⁵²² Ibid

⁵²³ Golt'sev, V.A. "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M'isl*, 1903/10 (265-271pp), p.269

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Ibid

Manchurians” visioning the “Bezobrazov’s *clique*” “who brought to Russia serious troubles without any indications of a successful solution.”⁵²⁶ The journal also expressed its worries about the possible outcome of an armed conflict between Russia and Japan. In its predictions, “our fleet in the Pacific Ocean would be destroyed because behind the Japanese stand the British. Even victories would never be able to secure for us final and stable peace in the Far East...”⁵²⁷ Therefore, the “liberal” journal kept insisting on Russia’s further expansion in the region to be extremely risky. “Russia could only win an enemy in the face of Japan and then it would always be necessary to fortress ourselves from a troublesome neighbor.” In its terms, “Japanese society is inspired by anger towards Russia, blaming us for having secretive schemes against Japan.”⁵²⁸ Moreover, according to the journal, “unpleasant disagreements with China and Japan over Manchuria would turn against us the public opinion in England, Germany, and the USA...”⁵²⁹ Therefore, the journal argued, Russia should give up Manchuria and “declare more clearly her peaceful intentions in the region,” instead. It expressed naïve belief that “when Japanese understand our peaceful policy, they would soon calm down.”⁵³⁰ The “liberal” journal kept presenting Russia as the initiator of the Hague Peace Conference, which would not resort to a war in the Far East.

In its December 1903 issue, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* again proclaimed, “We know better that Russia has no conquering plans, and that she firmly stands for peace and friendship with other states.” The liberal journal pleaded for more clarity from Russian officials on the matter in order to “put an end to western press rumors [about a coming war].”⁵³¹

In turn, the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* published its own predictions on the approaching armed conflict between Russia and Japan. As the journal also noted “A war is coming between Japan and Russia. Crisis has been for a long time deepening and then subsiding, and now it is deepening again, which troubles the whole world.”⁵³² Its political observer Professor S.N.Yuzhakov reviewed in some detail the existing situation and gave his predictions on the chances of victory of Russia and Japan in a possible war between them.

Comparing the military capabilities of Russia and Japan, “at first sight, the war between Japan and Russia seems absurd,”⁵³³ pointed out the professor. The data on military forces and

⁵²⁶ *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), 1903/11 (377-388), p.387

⁵²⁷ Ibid

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), 1903/12 (808- 820pp), p.813

⁵³⁰ Ibid

⁵³¹ Ibid, p.814;

⁵³² Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika” (Politics) , *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1903/11, (134-145pp), p.134

⁵³³ Ibid

equipment cited by him, demonstrated that Japan did not match Russia at all in power capabilities. “This would be a battle between a “lion” and a “jackal,”⁵³⁴ ironically noted the “populist” observer. “This absurd correlation of powers,” according to him, however, “is true only at first sight.” In support of that striking argument, Professor S.N. Yuzhakov pointed out “a number of other factors that had to be taken in consideration” when comparing Russia and Japan. In fact, he argued that Russia could not send to the Far East all or even a comparatively big part of her military forces. “This would disturb the political balance in Europe, and Russia and other European powers’ most important interests there might be seriously affected. In addition, this would cost Russia a lot of capital and time to be accomplished,” predicted the professor. He even considered the possibility of a joint offense against Russia by Japan, China, and Korea.

On the other hand, Russian success in an armed conflict in the Pacific seemed highly doubtful to him. “It would be the naval forces, that would play the main role in an armed conflict there,” argued Professor S.N. Yuzhakov.⁵³⁵ Japanese fleet was strengthened and increased in number and quality. Therefore, he appealed Russian belittling attitude to Japan to be changed. “Ten years ago Japan was *quantité negligeeable* in naval battles against a great European power.⁵³⁶ However, in the professor’s understanding, ten years ago nobody in Russia thought of a war against Japan since Japan was considered Russia’s friend. “Nowadays things changed: everybody thinks about the coming war, and Japanese fleet dangerously increased in number. Besides, we should judge our fleet nowadays also in its quality which is questionable,”⁵³⁷ he argued. The remoteness of the bulk of Russian fleet from the probable battle scene in the Far East was such that “in a naval war only naval genius, lucky chance, or a considerable prolonging of the war could give Russia opportunity for a victory [over Japan],”⁵³⁸ bitterly pointed out S.N. Yuzhakov.

⁵³⁴ According to professor S.N. Yuzhakov’s statistics there were:
“1600 Russian Battalions versus 156 Japanese battalions;
1250 Russian Cavalry squadrons v. 51 Japanese Cavalry Squadron;
680 Russian Batteries v. 114 Japanese Batteries;
5300 Russian Cannons v. 682 Japanese Cannons;
3 ½ million Russian soldiers v. 400 000 Japanese soldiers;
See Yuzhakov , S.N. “Politika” (Politics), loc.cit.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Japan had only three battle cruisers and one battleship against Russia’s six battle cruisers first rank in the Pacific Ocean a decade ago, in Professor S.N. Yuzhakov’s argument. Yuzhakov, S.N., “Politika” (Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1903/11, (134-145pp), p.134

⁵³⁷ Ibid, p.135

⁵³⁸ Ibid, p.136

He extended his argument even further in time, after a possible victory of Japan over Russia happened. He prescribed to Japan an invincible power. In his words, “Russia’s defeat in sea battles would make Japan invulnerable and provide her with an opportunity to choose further attacks thus forcing Russia to spread her army on. This, in turn, would bring another failure for Russia.”⁵³⁹ Professor S.N. Yuzhakov prescribed to Japan more chances for a success and warned Russia to “be on a big alert and to try to cool down Japanese irritation.” In his vision, “If both countries put some more efforts to solve peacefully their disagreements, the war could be prevented.”⁵⁴⁰ He insisted on the fact that Russian profits from the Far East were negligible, and therefore there was no need to fight over that. Professor S.N.Yuzhakov formulated three main life interests for Russia in the Far East: “a place of colonization; a convenient exodus to the Sea; or securing the Trans-Asian way.”⁵⁴¹ After pointing out all the obstacles and dangers that Russia could meet on her path of expansion in the Far East, the professor concluded, “we have not found an access to an unfreezing port; we spent millions of rubles; and moreover, we have to spend more in a war. None of these justify the big sacrifices we have to make to keep our present gains in the Far East. If possible, we’d better sell those gains.”⁵⁴² At the end of his essay, the professor underlined that the Petersburg “liberal” press *Vestnik Evrop’ii* and *Russkie Vedomosti*⁵⁴³ had come to a similar conclusion about Russian expansion in the “East.”⁵⁴⁴

In January 1904, the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, contrary to all its declarations so far about western press illogical insinuations, had to admit, “The situation in the Far East worsened a lot- a peril is coming that we have considered until recently impossible.”⁵⁴⁵ In the Far Eastern crisis, the journal prescribed to Japan “a role as a great state on which depends the question of a war or peace.”⁵⁴⁶

On the one hand, the “liberal” journal kept insisting on Russia being a state “world known for her peacefulness, not being motivated to fall into militaristic mood.” It expressed some hopes for a peaceful solution of the crisis since “Japanese Emperor gave a speech (on 10 Dec. 1904 new style) in optimistic tone pointing out to the Ministers their obligation to take care of

⁵³⁹ Ibid

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid, p.137

⁵⁴² Ibid, p.141

⁵⁴³ *Russkie Vedomosti*- a political and economic daily newspaper established in Moscow in 1863. It kept a moderate liberal position, and thus enjoyed a wide audience. Around 1900s it counted to 29-32 thousand prints per day. Compared to the Petersburg liberal journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, it did not follow actively the events in the Far East until the break of the hostilities in 1904.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1904/01 (378-390pp), p.378

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid

securing peace and improvement of the empire.” Those hopes for a friendly solution of the Far Eastern crisis were somehow clouded by the revolt of the Japanese Lower Parliament House against that speech and its petition to the Emperor insisting on “Emperor paying bigger attention to the beneficiary chances in the foreign policy.”⁵⁴⁷ As a result, the Emperor of Japan released the Parliament and appointed new parliamentary elections in March 1904. That gave *Vestnik Evrop’ii* reason to argue, “Japanese government does not intend to go for a war. The serious gap between government and public opinion in Japan on the issue of war or peace saved the world from a dangerous step, and prevented for a while the catastrophe.”⁵⁴⁸ The mere fact that the peace in the Far East depended not only on England or on Russia but to a greater extent on Japan, was pointed out several times by the “liberal” journal as an event of “big political significance to present and future.”⁵⁴⁹ The fact that “Japan puts demands on Russia, gets from her some concessions, talks and acts as a powerful state with abundant forces to buttress her demands...” the journal found it (with some trace of envy) a natural consequence of Japan’s reformation. “Japan has an impressive military fleet and huge army, excellently trained and disciplined along the European model. She also enjoys the support of great England with which she is in a formal alliance...,” further supported its argument the “liberal” journal.⁵⁵⁰ Conducting active “liberal reformist-policy” for years, this Petersburg journal underwent into ardent political propaganda on the effects of social reforms. It wrote a one-page apotheosis on “the striking reformation success of Japan which defines best her new role in the Far Eastern crisis.”⁵⁵¹ In contrast to Russia and her partial success in reformation, “Japan did not divert from her chosen way and gradually reformed all her political system in accordance with the conditions and necessities of contemporary cultural lifestyle.”⁵⁵² Russia’s internal structural weakness was contrasted to Japan’s strength. That is why, according to the “liberal” journal, “now the whole world press is waiting to hear what Japanese government or parliament have to say on the issue.”⁵⁵³

Nevertheless, being also Russian, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* could not but feel tempted a little bit to seek some punishment for “Japanese growing self-confidence.” From the stance of belonging to a mighty state, it announced “we could teach them a lesson...but the international lessons under the form of a war have unfortunately equally harmful consequences for both belligerent

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid, p.379

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid, p.379- 80

⁵⁵¹ Ibid, p.380

⁵⁵² Ibid

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

sides.”⁵⁵⁴ Yet, Russia’s principles of keeping the world peace should prevent her from such a temptation in the journal’s viewpoint.

Interestingly, a month before the war between Russia and Japan burst out, the journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* again apologized for “the lack of any details about what led to the sharpening of the Far Eastern crisis.” “No authoritative clarification did we get about it, and foreign sources appear to be too subjective and unfair,” regretted the journal.⁵⁵⁵ Its essay ended as ever with “hopes that Russian representatives in the Far East could find a peaceful approach for the existing intricacy, not related to Russia’s life interests.”⁵⁵⁶

The Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya Mi’sl* in its “Review of Foreign Affairs” in January 1904 for the first time did not go into reformist propaganda praising Japanese reformation successes. Sensing the approaching danger, Professor V.A.Gol’tsev, the editor of the journal, limited his political observations to a short announcement that “during the last month there was a big danger coming in the Far East, and it remained much more so this year, too.”⁵⁵⁷ It defended Japanese rights over Korea, since “for the overpopulated Japan, the closest market is Korea.”⁵⁵⁸ In contrast to the Petersburg “liberal” journal, the Moscow “liberal” journal had treated Japan’s rising after her reformation with great caution. It was Japan, not England that its observer, Professor V.A. Gol’tsev, had pointed out as a serious threat to Russia since Japan’s rise was naturally accompanied with growth of her regional ambitions. What *Russkaya Mi’sl* shared with the other Russian “liberal” press, was “hopes from the bottom of our hearts that peace be preserved and satisfactory to both sides agreement would be reached.”⁵⁵⁹

What is more, Professor V.A.Gol’tsev highly praised “the majority of Russian press, which though confronted with the nasty ghost of a bloody war, remained reserved, and did not use chauvinist tone.” He sharply criticized the few others, such as the Petersburg government supported daily newspapers *Novoe Vreme* and *Moscovskie Vedomosti* for their chauvinistic propaganda inspiring “splitting of blood” between “the *bogatir’ii* (epic heroes) and the *pigmei* (pygmies).” “There were few other voices appealing for splitting blood but they were an

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid,p.381

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid, p.382

⁵⁵⁷ Gol’tsev,V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs),in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/01 (222-230pp), p.222

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid, p.223

exception,”⁵⁶⁰ concluded the professor. The final words of the “Liberal” V.A.Gol’tsev, could serve as an example of prevailing Russian mood about Japan and the Far Eastern crisis at the time. His essay points out to a comparatively reserved stance among Russian “Liberals,” and more aggressive one on the side of “Monarchists” close to the government. Moreover, as both the Petersburg and the Moscow “liberal” journals stated, the fact that Japan grew to a position to put demands on Russia, reformist-minded “Liberals” met with appraisal, yet it obviously hurt their pride.

The Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* in January 1904 also warned, “The possibility of a war (according to Russian and Japanese press declarations) has not yet passed away. Both countries are increasing their armory.”⁵⁶¹ Its political observer, Professor S.N. Yuzhakov, similarly to Professor V.A. Gol’tsev, perceived Russia and Japan as equally responsible for the deepening of the crisis in the Far East. As S.N. Yuzhakov stated, “Russian occupation of Manchuria turned into endless and this became the starting point in the Russo-Japanese conflict...”⁵⁶² Japanese preparations for a war, the numerous chauvinistic attacks in the Japanese press, and public demonstrations also contributed to “the sharpening of the conflict,” according to Professor S.N. Yuzhakov.

In contrast to the other press announcements reviewed here, however, he went into condemnation of Russian foreign policy in the Far East. Additional causes for sharpening the conflict were, in his terms: “The prolonged silence of the Russian diplomacy; the military preparations in Russia; the formation of the Far Eastern Committee – all those provoked in the Japanese big worries and heated up their patriotism.”⁵⁶³ The political observer Professor S.N. Yuzhakov, similarly to *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, perceived “the dissembling of Japanese parliament and the assignment of new elections in three months” as a sign of possible peaceful solution of the crisis. Nevertheless, he argued that “Russia’s target to isolate Japan from Manchuria, and Japan’s target to use Manchurian issue to get solution to the Korean issue” is a very “dangerous game.”⁵⁶⁴ Only a couple of weeks later, all those predictions of a war between Russia and Japan came true.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid

⁵⁶¹ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika” (Politics), *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1904/01 (76-88pp), p.80

⁵⁶² Ibid, p.78

⁵⁶³ Ibid

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid, p.79

As could be seen from the reviewed here Metropolitan journals and single publicists' writings about Japan and Russia, opinions on Russian and Japanese endeavors in the Far East differed along political and civilization lines of thought. The interpretations presented by those publicists though focusing on the same issue still varied as much as varied the range of the presented here Metropolitan journals and newspapers- "liberal," "conservative monarchist," "neo-populist" to "social reformist" ones, and from "Westerner" to "Easterner" or "Slavophil" ones. Nevertheless, a great number of commonalities exist in their writings on Japan and the Far Eastern question.

In a word, "Liberals" and "Populists" ("Narodniki") reviewed here argued against Russian advance in the Asian East at the expense of China, Korea, and Japan. They all warned about the high risk that Russia was running –to destroy her relations with the other great powers interested in the region and to provoke hatred in the locals. "Liberal" and "populist" minded Russian intellectuals alike expected a peaceful solution to the issue until the very break of hostilities. The Moscow "liberal" journal *Russkaya Mi'sl* noted, "We hope that our government and that of the country of the Rising Sun would find friendly solution to the problem..."⁵⁶⁵ The "neo-populist" journal *Russkoe Bogatstvo* also expressed worries on the growing unrest in the Far East and stated, "a peaceful discussion is absolutely possible and necessary."⁵⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii* kept insisting that the western press claims on the "commercial interests in Korea and Manchuria for which Russia was risking to have a war with Japan and quarrel with the USA", to be "fantastic" and "too illogical."⁵⁶⁷ The "liberal" journal announced openly its "firm disbelief in such possibility and insinuations proclaimed by the English and American press" and its "hope that such hostile predictions would be put to an end by our formal diplomatic agency's clarification."⁵⁶⁸

On the other hand, Russian "Liberals" and "Populists" alike tended to be quite Japanophile minded as could be seen from their open admiration of Japanese miraculous success in the reformation process. They often went into comparison of Russian and Japanese present state of economic, political, and military development, pointing out Japan's superiority over Russia in many fields. That could be another possible cause for the above reviewed intellectuals to sense

⁵⁶⁵ Gol'tsev, V.A. "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M'isl*, 1903/11 (194-200pp), p.199

⁵⁶⁶ "Politika" (Review of Politics), *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, 1903/12 (121-136pp), p.126

⁵⁶⁷ "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1903/12, (808-820pp.)

p.814

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid

initially subconsciously, and a few weeks before the clash, more tangibly, the threat coming from “grown” Japan.

However, both “Liberals” and “Populists” had some doubts about Russia’s success in an armed conflict with Japan. Interpretations for the possible reasons varied to some extent. They mostly referred to Russia’s power and past successes. However, the remoteness of the possible battlefield made them all doubt in Russia’s capability to transfer on time enough land and naval forces. The Petersburg “Liberal,” Professor M.M. Stasyulevich, the editor of journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* was the only one that kept an intense propaganda of non-violence. The journal constantly reminded to its reading public that Russia had always acted as a defender of the world peace; therefore, she should do her best to prevent the war with Japan. Few were those Russian publicists, as seen from the above written, that insisted on punishment of Japan’s arrogance to dare putting demands on mighty Russia.

The majority of Russian intellectuals, reviewed in this chapter, cherished positive feelings to Japan, and did not go into fanatic chauvinistic propaganda against her. On the one hand, in contrast to Japan, where the government foreign policy enjoyed big public support, Russian intellectuals seemed to stay at a distance from open debates on Russia’s foreign policy. The end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was still the time when Russian intellectuals were more devoted to philosophical reflections on the meaning of human existence. Nevertheless, there were few among them, as seen from this study, who felt deep moral responsibility for the fate of their own nation, and humanity as a whole. They used the tribune of the so-called “*tolstie zhurnaly*” (thick intellectual journals) to declare in both explicit and implicit ways that Russia should put more efforts into carrying urgent reforms to modernize instead of wasting energy and capital in dubious enterprises in the East. All the Russian publicists reviewed here warned against “the highly dangerous game” into which Russia and Japan were playing. Russians both at formal and broader levels, however, somehow neglected such predictions of an approaching war between Russia and Japan, since the outbreak of the war a couple of weeks later left them all stunned.

VI.1. A Brief Historical Outline to the Events that Brought to the War of 1904-5

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the Far East in common Russian mind still remained a remote rarely populated borderland, guarded from invasions more by the severe climate and hard living conditions than by Russian troops. The severe climate did not make the region attractive for dwelling or economic exploitation. At the official level, the things were interpreted not much differently. Although Russian exploration of the Far East started in 1770s, the region remained in the periphery of Russia's political, economic, and strategic interests until the mid 1850s.

In fact, for centuries, Russia had been pre-occupied with the building her sphere of influence in the Balkans instead. She had went into many troubles (including several wars with the Ottoman Empire) to preserve her image as the only guard of the oppressed Orthodox Christian and Slav people. In addition, Russia targeted gaining access to the warm Mediterranean Straits in order to secure her strategic and economic interests in "European East" and the "Near East." As for the "Asian East," most scholars researching Russian history of diplomacy admit that Russia lacked an elaborated doctrine about it. Russian ruling elite's decisions regarding the Far East were often taken on the occasion, lead by the momentary need. Russia's defeat in the Crimean war of 1853-6, for example, considerably undermined Russia's image as a great player in Europe. The negative turn which the Crimean War of 1853-56 took for Russia, created a necessity for her to search new horizons for expansion. Thus, the Far East started attracting more attention at first at formal, and later at broader levels in Russia. It was at that moment of crisis when Easterners' ideas of Russia's kinship to Asia gained some meaning in Russian perceptions of their homeland and her position in the world arena.

The increased western presence in the region as well as the opening of Japan by Commodore M. Perry in 1853 provoked Russia to urge with securing her borders and commercial interests in the "Asian East."⁵⁶⁹ On 7 February 1855 (26 January, O.S.), Admiral E.V. Putyatin, following closely the steps of the Americans, managed to sign a treaty with Japan arranging

⁵⁶⁹ Between 1852 and 1853, before Commodore Mathew Perry's arrival in Japan, there had been many articles written in American and European newspapers speculating on what effect his arrival would have on potential trade with Japan. The London Times, most notable, wrote a major article on this topic in 1852. see www.Tokyo1.org

some border demarcations and commercial relations between the two empires.⁵⁷⁰ Twenty years later a further border demarcation between Russia and Japan followed, and with the St. Petersburg Agreement of 1875, the Kuril Islands were transferred to Japan for recognition of Sakhalin being Russian. Thus, both Russia and Japan had confirmed their regional expansions. In addition to Russian and Japanese imperial ambitions for influence in the Asian East, that transfer of lands would also appear to be partially accountable for the friction between the two empires in the following decades.

Meanwhile, at the domestic level, both Russia and Japan's rulers started reforms targeting modernization of all levels. In contrast to Russia's, however, reforms in Meiji Japan turned to be speedy and highly successful. Russia managed to carry out only partial reforms. Meiji Japan began to be admired in most European educated circles. Japan's economic and military growth, however, was naturally accompanied by the growth of her ambitions. She did not fear to challenge "giant" China on a war over Korea for her strategic and economic interests there. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, which followed, Japan proved her successful westernization and modernization.

China's decay, her defeat by Japan, and the followed peace talk in Shimonoseki, in turn, confronted Russia with the dilemma whether to continue to back up China and preserve the *status quo* in East Asia or to join the territorial fight over the Middle Kingdom (Korea).⁵⁷¹ As

⁵⁷⁰ On 7 February 1855 (26 January, Julian calendar), the first Russo-Japanese Treaty was signed in the city of Shimoda. The Treaty of Shimoda specified that the boundary between Russia and Japan would lie between the islands of Urup and Iturup. Urup and all the Kuril Islands to the north became Russian territories. Iturup was proclaimed a Japanese possession, and by implication, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group remained in Japanese possession. Sakhalin was left unpartitioned. Inaba, Chiharu. *Russko-iaponskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia 1850-1917 gg.: Katalog dokumentov (po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii)* (Russo-Japanese Relations 1850-1917; Catalogue of Documents from the Russian Imperial Foreign Policy Archive). Vol. 1: (1850-1917). Tokyo: Nauka Ltd, 1997

⁵⁷¹ Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye argues that the approaches that China and Japan had both made to Nicholas II's government, during the Shimonoseki peace talk, place the dilemma in front of the Tsar had to choose between China and Japan. Schimmelpenninck points out as the advocates of a pro-Japanese orientation the State Adviser and active diplomat M.A.Hitrovo and the Councillor of Moscow city Duma, and active diplomat Count P.A.Kapnist. In the Russian Foreign Ministry, that one that supported a pro-Chinese orientation was said to be Count Cassini. The most powerful advocate for entente with Peking, however, according to Schimmelpenninck's writing, was Finance Minister Sergey Witte. His active involvement in the Trans-Siberian Railway made him adamantly oppose any territorial acquisitions in East Asia. To realize the ambitious aim of his, Witte insisted on retaining the Quinn dynasty's goodwill, concludes Schimmelpenninck. (See Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, D. *Toward the Rising Sun Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*, Northern Illinois University Press, 2001:125, p.126, p.127).

both B.A. Romanov (1952:50) and D. Geyer (1987: 193) prove by referring to *Krasnyi arkhiv* (Russian Red Archive), the Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte argued against Japan at the third special conference on 30 March 1895. S. Yu. Witte claimed: “The Treaty of Shimonoseki had been actually a preventive strike against the Siberian line, which henceforth requires an expensive contingent of hundreds of thousands of troops to defend it.” He argued that in case “southern Manchuria remained in Japanese hands, all Korea would soon be lost, and then Mikado would make his entry into Peking. Russia should therefore do all she could to drive Japan once more from the Chinese mainland, even at the risk of an outbreak of hostilities”.⁵⁷² The Russian historian B.A. Romanov (1952: 50), and the German historian D. Geyer (1987: 193), as well as the Canadian historian Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye (2001, 125-6) all point out that at the meeting S. Yu. Witte managed to convince Tsar Nicholas II to support China by turning all arguments so far in policy against Japan.

Nevertheless, Tsar Nicholas II’s ambition to enlarge his empire by advancing further in Asia (as can be seen from his diaries)⁵⁷³ should not be underscored when discussing the Autocracy’s decisions about the Far East. In addition, the ardent Easterner Prince E.E. Ukhtomskii, Tsar’s personal advisor, also played a considerable role in inspiring dreams in the still young Tsar about his becoming “the White Tsar” uniting and enlightening Asia.⁵⁷⁴

Meanwhile, on the international arena, the competition of Germany and France for Russia’s goodwill, as well as Britain’s attempt to negotiate spheres of influence with Russia, created a convenient moment for Russia to advance her policy in the “Asian East.” Upon Russian insistence, a diplomatic intervention coordinated with France and Germany forced Japan to limit her demands to China. By May 1895 Japan were to vacate the Liaodong Peninsula (including Port Arthur) and content herself with Formosa (Taiwan) and the indemnity from

The Foreign Minister Prince Lobanov, the Chief of the General Staff Obruchev and the Grand Admiral Aleksey Aleksandrovich were primarily concerned with confrontation with England so they advised seeking a compromise (*Krasnyi arkhiv*, 50/51, pp.3-53, and 52, pp.62-83, cited in see Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, BERG, Leamington Spa/Hamburg/New York 1987:193.

⁵⁷² (Minutes of the special meeting on 30 March (11 Apr.) 1895: *Krasnyi arkhiv*, 52 pp.78-91 quoted in Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, BERG, Leamington Spa/Hamburg/New York 1987: 193; cf., Romanov, B.A. *Russia in Manchuria*, Ann Arbor, 1952, pp.50ff.

⁵⁷³ “Dnevnik Nikolaya Vtorogo” (Diary of Nicholas II), *Krasny Arkhiv*, vols. 20-22; also *Dnevnik imperatora Nikolaya II (1890-1906)* [Diary of Emperor Nicholas II], Berlin, Slovo, 1923; released online: <http://pms.orthodoxy.ru/abort/mr/books/history/library/diaris/1904.htm>;

⁵⁷⁴ See Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D., *Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*. Illinois: Northern Illinois University, 2001

China.⁵⁷⁵ Since Russia initiated that so-called “Triple Intervention” in the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki, a big wave of indignation swayed all across Japan over Russians. Japanese “blood spilt” over Korea, the Japanese believed, had gone “in vain.” The followed regional events further deepened that feeling of humiliation between the Japanese. They perceived Russian advance in the region to be at the expense of Japan, China, and Korea.

Russia seemed to be on alert at least a bit about the feelings she had evoked in Japan, since she advanced in the region by trying to win China and Korea firmly on her side in order to buttress her regional position.

In 1896, Russian Minister of Finance S.Yu.Witte initiated the establishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank in order to finance the construction of a railroad across Northern Manchuria, and thus shorten the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This would have alleviated communication and trade between Russia and the regional nations. Gradually, supported also by the European great powers, within two years Russia acquired leases on the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur, and began building a trunk line from Harbin in central Manchuria to Port Arthur on the coast.⁵⁷⁶

Those Russia’s gains were exactly what Japan was denied a couple of years ago. Although Japan strongly objected Russian gains, Russia in practice had acquired monopoly rights over the whole Manchuria.⁵⁷⁷ In addition, the foundation of a Russo-Korean Bank in 1897 also promised an accelerated input of Russian capital in the Asian East.⁵⁷⁸ Hence, from 1895 onwards, Japan felt her position threatened by Russia not only in Manchuria, but also in Korea. The followed regional events just exacerbated the Russo-Japanese rivalry there.

Most scholars researching Russo-Japanese relations, however, view the so-called “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900 in North China, as the starting point of Russo-Japanese serious clashes of

⁵⁷⁵ In the Moscow Protocol of 28 May (9 June) 1896, Tokyo had to agree that ‘the fundamental integrity and independence of Korea’ was inviolate and that nothing could be done in this regard which St. Petersburg opposed. See Geyer, D. *Russian Imperialism*, pp.193; also Romanov, B. *Russia in Manchuria*, pp. 102ff.; and Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904*, Berkley, 1958: 87

⁵⁷⁶ The headquarters of the Russian Pacific Fleet was to be transferred to the ice-free Port of Arthur (Lüshun in Chinese); nearby Talien (Dairen in Japanese, Dal’nyi in Russian) was to be developed as a commercial port, and the entire Liaodong Peninsula incorporated directly into the Russian empire. See Rostunov, I.I. (ed.), *Istoria russko-iaponskoi voyny, 1904-1905 gg* (History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5), Moscow, 1977:39-40

⁵⁷⁷ See Nish, I. *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War*, London, 1985:43.

⁵⁷⁸ Malozemoff, A. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War*, Berkeley, 1958:84-92

interest, and the events that followed as the main cause of the followed Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

In 1900, both Japan and Russia committed troops to the foreign expeditionary force sent to suppress the Chinese rebellion towards foreign residents there. In mid 1900, when the rebels began to destroy parts of the Trans-Siberian railway in Manchuria, Russian troops invaded, and by the beginning of October, Russia had occupied Manchuria. Russians did not withdraw afterwards but rather took Chinese permission to maintain their troops there until Chinese borderlands with Russia were secured by China.⁵⁷⁹ Japan, however, feared that Russia would seek to extend further her power onto Korea,⁵⁸⁰ and looked for every possibility to ostracize Russia from Manchuria and Korea.

Hence, in 1902, in order to contain Russia in the “Asian East,” and confirm her own rights there, Japan concluded an alliance with Britain. The alliance recognized the interests of both powers in China and the special interests of Japan “politically as well as commercially and industrially” in Korea.⁵⁸¹

Russia also gained room to maneuver in Asia because of her alliance with France and the growing rivalry between Britain and Germany. Nicholas II, however, failed to orchestrate a further coherent policy in the Asian East because of ministerial conflicts, argues Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye.⁵⁸² As a result, the Russo-Japanese negotiations, initiated by Japan in 1903, were protracted by Russia, which in turn made Japan interpret it as Russian unwillingness to negotiate. While Russia was still deliberating on her replies, Japan used the convenient moment to make a surprise attack over the Russian fleet in Port Arthur on the night of 8 Feb (27 Jan. O.S.) 1904.

⁵⁷⁹ By the autumn of 1900 about 170 000 Russian troops had been sent to pacify the area. Manchuria was thus occupied by the greatest military force ever sent from Europe to the Far East. Only a handful of Russian battalions were ever assigned to the allied supreme commander, Count Waldersee. Vice – Admiral E.I. Alekseev extracted virtually unlimited power of command from the Chinese governor of Mukden late in 1900s (Wording of the agreement in Romanov, B.A. *Russia in Manchuria*, Ann Arbor, 1952: 427

⁵⁸⁰ Furuya T. *Nichiro sensô*, Tokyo, 1966:25, cit. in David Wells and Sandra Wilson, (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:6.

⁵⁸¹ Esthus, R. A. *Double Eagle and Rising Sun: The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 1988:3; and p.197

⁵⁸² Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye also argues that the conflict came about because of St. Petersburg's erratic and confused diplomacy. See Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D., *Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*. Illinois: Northern Illinois University, 2001

On the other hand, Soviet literature explained the War of 1904-5 as a clash between two imperialistic strives. That is, Russia's uncoordinated aggressive moves in the Asian East and Japan's growing appetite for regional influence, territorial and economic gains, as well as thirst for military victories were said to have led the two empires along the path to war.

From a contemporary geopolitical and strategic viewpoint, Russia's move further into the Asian East is explained through three aspects- international, regional, and bilateral ones.

In brief, on the international plane, Russia sought to recover her stance as a great power after the Crimean War of 1853-6, and to form alliances and conclude negotiations in order to be able to compete with Britain in the Pacific while enjoying German and French support for her advances there.

On the regional level, Russia sought economic and strategic gains in the Pacific, such as a non-freezing port for her Baltic fleet, and securing her border with China, as well as extracting economic profits from Manchuria and Korea.

On the bilateral level Russia and Japan, during the period 1855- 1904, had managed to sign a number of agreements - on demarcation of their borders, trade and fishing rights, and last but not least, on the integrity and open door policy of China and Korea. Nevertheless, both Russia and Japan kept pursuing intense advance in the Asian East at the expense of China and Korea.

Although Japan initiated further negotiations with Russia over Manchuria and Korea in 1903, after some time they led to a dead end. Russia, believing in her might and underestimating Japan's power, protracted the negotiations in order to keep Japan away as long as possible from advancing her interests in the region. As some contemporary Russian historians argue, to Russia's interests, most desirable was the elimination of her disadvantages on land and naval positions in the Asian East even at the risk of war.⁵⁸³

In turn, at the end of the twentieth century, Japan started more intensely than ever to perceive Russia as a long-term strategic threat. Geo-strategic concerns to secure her interior lines by stemming Russian interest in Korea and China, accompanied by public nationalistic fervor to seek revenge for the inflicted so far humiliations by Russia, drove Japan to reside to war

⁵⁸³ Kashirin, V.B. "“Russkoi Moltke” smotrit na Vostok,” (Russian Moltke Looks towards the East), in Airapetov, O.R. (ed.), *Russko-iaponskaya voina 1904-1905, vzglyad cherez stoletie* (Russo-Japanese War 1904-5. View a Century Later), Moskva “Tri Kvadrata,” 2004: 150; also Airapetov, O.R. ““Na sopkah Manchurii...” Politika, strategiya, i taktika Rossii” (On Manchurian Knolls. Russia's Politics, Strategy, and Tactics). Op.cit. p.355

against that giant empire. This study, however, would be limited to Russian perceptions on the war and Japan, rather than on the war events and material gains or losses.

VI.2. A “Short Victorious War”- Hopes and Beliefs

Western, Russian, and Japanese press were commenting over the whole 1903 year about the approaching war between Russia and Japan as could be seen from the previous chapter of this study. In addition, the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, Baron R.R. Rosen⁵⁸⁴ consistently warned Tsar Nicholas II about Japan’s military preparations.⁵⁸⁵ Information came to Petersburg from both formal and informal channels about the Japanese preparations for a war. Then why did Japanese attack on 8 February 1904 (27 Jan., O.S.), come as a surprise to the Russian Court as well as to the Russian public?

In addition, once the war burst out, the mass indignation to the Japanese “mean” sudden attack provoked Russians from all occupations to cry out for quick punishment of the “ignoble” enemy. Distracting masses from internal problems and opportunity to confirm her imperial extension in the Asian East might have been other reasons for which the Autocracy wished a quick revenge over the “mean enemy.” The Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Pleve⁵⁸⁶ had presumably argued for a “short victorious war” over Japan to cool down the internal unrest.

⁵⁸⁴ His Excellency Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, was Russian Ambassador to Japan from 1903- 1914. As the Finance Minister S.Yu.Witte wrote in his diary “ Our Ambassador in Tokyo, Baron Rosen warned the government that in Japan there is a tension and advised us to leave the Yalu “shelter” and enter into an agreement with Japan regarding Korea, but insisted on Manchuria staying Russia’s.” Graf S.Yu. Witte, *Vospominania. Tsarstvovanie Nikolaya II* (Memoirs. Reign of Nicholas II), vol.I, 2nd edition, Gosudarstvenoe izdatelstvo Leningrad, 1924:228

⁵⁸⁵ The Epilogue of the Port Arthur Court Process (1908) verifies that Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs learned from the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo about some concrete plans of the Japanese government to seize Port Arthur. The names of some Russian government officials supporting the idea of giving up Port Arthur to the Japanese, and siding with them in the eventual partitioning of China were also reported. In turn, the Special Committee of Military and Naval Affairs were called in. It was decided there that the unfreezing Port Arthur presented an important guarantee for maintaining Russian imperial presence in the Far East.

See the Epilogue of the Port Arthur Court Process. Collected Articles, SPB., 1908:17, cit. in Balakin, V.I., Causes and aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, in *Novaya and Noveishaya Istorija*, N.6, Instituta Dal’nevo Vostoka, RAN, 2004, online release, <http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/VV/JOURNAL/NEWHIST/BALAKIN.HTM>

⁵⁸⁶ Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Pleve (1846-1904) - a prominent Russian state figure. Since 1884, Director of the Police Department; since 1884 senator and vice-minister in the Ministry for Internal Affairs, since 1894 State Secretary, since 1899 Minister of Internal Affairs and Chief of Gendarmerie (political police). He actively supported war between Russia and Japan (1904-1905). E. S. Sazonov, a member of the Social Revolutionary Party, killed him in July 1904 for his extremely strict policy towards revolutionary movements.

Although the Autocracy and the public seemed to appeal for a “short victorious war” over the “*yaposhkami*” (the Japes) for different reasons, in the first days from the start of the belligerences, all Russians seemed united around the idea that mighty Russia should impose a severe punishment to the bold “Asiatics.”⁵⁸⁷ Right-wing newspapers vilified Asian perfidy and noisy demonstrations were held in all major cities in Russia in the first week. Loyal subjects marched along the streets with portraits of the Tsar, and audiences in theatres all over Russia demanded that the national anthem be played before shows. At a performance of “Rigoletto” at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow during “Shrovetide,” for example, the national anthem was played as many as three times by popular consent even before the curtain was raised, and a further three times before the commencement of the final act.⁵⁸⁸

To find out where Russian chauvinistic confidence in Russia’s might, their ignorance (or rather neglect) of Japan, and their shock of the Japanese attack were rooted in, this paper explores some Russian beliefs and myths of the mighty Mother Russ that have been entertained for centuries by Russian people, along with some Russian perceptions of the “Asiatics.”

From recent Russian interpretations about the beginning of the War of 1904-5, it becomes clear that Tsar Nicholas II and his closest suite had entertained the idea of a war against Japan after the break of Russo-Japanese negotiations. However, they preferred to believe that “tiny” Japan would not dare to threaten “giant” Russia first.⁵⁸⁹ Tsar’s confidence expressed in a letter of his to his German cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II on that matter also confirms that. His statement that “There won’t be any war, because I do not want it” demonstrates the Tsar’s blind belief in Russia’s military might and his ignorance of Japan’s current power and firm determination to secure her strategic interests in East Asia.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁷ The term “Asiatics” in most Russian references is used in its negative meaning- ‘cruel’ and ‘hypocritical’.

⁵⁸⁸ Bartlett, R. “The Russo-Japanese War in Russian Cultural Consciousness, a paper for the International Conference *Re-imagining Culture in the Russo-Japanese War*, Birkbeck College, University of London, 27 March 2004

⁵⁸⁹ *Dnevnik imperatora Nikolaya II (1890-1906)* [Diary of Emperor Nicholas II], Berlin, Slovo, 1923; also released online <http://pms.orthodoxy.ru/abort/mr/books/history/library/diaris/1904.htm>; and see Chornovil, N., *Russko-iaponskaya voina, nachalo voinii* (Russo-Japanese War, the Beginning of War), <http://abakus.narod.ru/beg/1.html>; also Steinberg, J.W., et al., (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, BRILL, Leiden-Boston, 2005

⁵⁹⁰ Graf S.Yu.Witte, *Vospominania. Tsarstvovanie Nikolaya II*, (Memoirs. Reign of Nicholas II), vol.I, 2nd edition, Gosufarstvenoe izdatelstvo Leningrad, 1924:227

What is more, both the Russian military agent's latest report about Japan's military capabilities, and the Minister of Defense General A. Kuropatkin's written comment on it, present another fine examples of that denigrated attitude towards the Japanese military power. According to Colonel G.M. Vannovskii's ⁵⁹¹ report to General A.N. Kuropatkin, "Japanese army has not yet overcome the internal condition of disorder ...on the one hand; it is no more an Asian horde but accurately organized along European model more or less well-armed army. On the other hand, it is not at all the real European army born historically, along her own cultural principles. Tens or hundred years will pass until Japanese army masters those moral principles on which each European army is founded, and then she [Japanese army] could compete on an equal base at least with the weakest European states."⁵⁹²

General A.N. Kuropatkin endorsed the following resolution on the report: "I have read it. There is no more enthusiasm among our ex-military agents about the Japanese army. This is a sound judgment."⁵⁹³ The General himself, after an inspection of the Russian army in the Far East in 1903, reported to Tsar Nicholas II, "we should absolutely not worry about the fate of the Pre-Amour region, and now we should also not worry about the fate of Port Arthur; we indeed hope to be able to hold North Manchuria."

A similar opinion expressed the Governor-General of the Russian Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev, who announced, "We have omitted nothing to reach that goal of ours."⁵⁹⁴

Such self-confidence seemed to have prevented Russians from further investigations on Japan's naval power and ability to transfer quickly troops on the continent.⁵⁹⁵ As the

⁵⁹¹ In 1898, Colonel Gleb M. Vannovskii (1862-1943) was assigned as Russia's military agent in Tokyo.

⁵⁹² Colonel G.Vannovskii to General A.Kuropatkin, in 1900, *Voenno-istoricheskaya komisiya po opisaniyu russko-iaponskoi voin'i//Russko-iaponskaya voina*(Military History Committee for Description of Russo-Japanese War//Russo-Japanese War). St.Petersburg, 1910, vol.1, 430p., qtd in Shimelpennink van der Oye, D., "Shapkami ne zakidali. Russkaya voennaya razvedka na Mandzhurskom fronte", (Not an Easy Win. Russian Military Espionage on the Manchurian Front) transl. in Russian by Oleg Airapetov, in *Rodina- Rossiiskii istoriceskii ilyustrovann'ii zhurnal (Rodina- Russian Historical Illustrated Journal)*, 2004/01,p.35

⁵⁹³ Ibid, p.35

⁵⁹⁴ Admiral Evgenii Ivanovich Alekseev (1843-1918)- in 1903 the admiral was assigned imperial Governor –general of the Russian Far East, and from February to October 1904 he was appointed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army.

see Russian Archive Materials on Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 in *Voenno-morskaya istoria 1855-1945 (Naval-Military History 1855-1945)*, online

http://www.tsushima.iatp.org.ua/war1904_sili_russ2.htm

⁵⁹⁵ "It is well known that Japan has never been a priority to Russia's military-scientific committee which devoted great attention to China leaving Japan in the periphery of its sphere of observation," argues David Schimpelpennick. Van der Oye. As an example he refers to the collection of materials of the Headquarters responsible for Asia titled "Armed Forces of China and Japan" where the report on China is 169 pages while that on Japan comprised only 16 pages.

monarchist editor of the most popular conservative newspaper in Petersburg A.Suvorin pointed out, when the war burst out, “Amazing events are happening. A few days ago I said we did not know Japan, neither did our diplomats, nor our military men; our financial men did not know her either, but Japan knew us very well. We entered the war unprepared.”⁵⁹⁶ A.Suvorin referred to the French Chairman of the Budget Committee who announced ironically at a cocktail party, “His Highness [Nicholas II] who summoned the peace conference in Hague so much desired peace that the people around him forgot to prepare for a war.”

Such was Russian officials’ belief in Russia’s capabilities to interfere and pacify by exerting insurmountable influence over the opponents that they totally neglected Japan’s preparations for an armed conflict. V. Titov, a high officer at the Ministry of Transport subjected to great derision the Russian government preparation for an armed conflict with Japan in his book *Otkliki voiny Iaponii i Rossiiu v 1904* (Responses to the War between Japan and Russia in 1904). As he sarcastically put it, “We overslept, yawned, and danced not noticing the war. Over twenty years Japan went quickly on the way of technical reformation of her fleet and land army. Meanwhile, we did not notice anything, did not hear anything, and did not even want to listen to anything.”⁵⁹⁷

Such attitude and self-confidence among the government officials made the Russian diplomat Dmitrii I. Abrikosov conclude later, “St. Petersburg had no idea of the real strength of Japan, and thought that “tiny” Japan would never dare to make war against “huge” Russia.”⁵⁹⁸

Possible explanations for Russians’ surprise of the Japanese bold attack on the Russian fleet in 1904, and the initial patriotic outburst all over the country which followed, could be found in the above-mentioned Russian policy makers’ perceptions of Japan, as well as in some shared Russian beliefs of Russia herself. On the one hand, it meant that Japan was still perceived by

See Butakov, *Vooruzhenn’ie sil’i Kitaya i Iaponii// Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii*, (Armory of China and Japan// Collection of geographical, typographical, and statistical materials on Asia), St.Petersburg, 1883-1914 vol.3, 17-186pp.; qtd in Shimmelpenninck van der Oye, D., “Shapkami ne zakidali. Russkaya voennaya razvedka na Mandzhurskom fronte”, transl. Oleg Airapetov, in *Rodina- Rossiiskii istoriceskii ilyustrovann’ii zhurnal*, 2004/01, 34p, 34-37pp.

⁵⁹⁶ Suvorin, A. “Malenkie pisma” (Short Notes) in *Novoe Vremya* 1904, cit. by Titov, V. “Otkliki voiny Iaponii i Rossiiu v 1904 (Responses to the war between Russia and Japan in 1904), SPB., 1904: 57

⁵⁹⁷ Titov, V. “Otkliki voiny Iaponii i Rossiiu v 1904 (Responses to the war between Russia and Japan in 1904), SPB., 1904: 58

⁵⁹⁸ Dmitrii Ivanovich Abrikosov (1876-1951)-a Russian diplomat prominent with his memoirs. In 1908- a second secretary in the Russian mission in Peking, in 1912- a second secretary in the Russian embassy in Tokyo; From 1914-1917 worked for the Far East Dept. of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in 1917- assigned as first secretary in Tokyo; from 1921 to 1924-the *charge' d'affaires* in Tokyo. See Lensen, G. Al. (ed.), *Revelations of a Russian Diplomat. The Memoirs of Dimitrii I. Abrikosov*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1964:89

Russian ruling elite as developing and reforming along European lines. What is more, “tiny” Japan was not expected to dare challenge “huge” Russia.

On the other hand, most Russians still fell into the charm of myths about Russia being a powerful all enduring force. The vast size and military power of the Russian empire fed a sense of national patriotism, which reinforced the power of the paternalistic Tsar. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-56 undermined the myth about her invincibility, which came into existence after the Napoleon Wars, and remained intact in Russian minds for almost half a century. Russian empire had pretensions to be the “bastion” against European reaction, and the “arm of the law,” as well as the “fighter” against any revolutionary and liberal “contagions” in Europe. Those self-perceptions, and hence, self-appointed roles, however, were shattered in 1856. That in turn served as incentive for growing civic consciousness among Russian educated elite and search for new horizons as well as ideals. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 returned their faith in Russia’s might and destiny as a “savior.” With her victory over the Ottoman Empire, Russia secured two gains- to be a step closer to the Bosphorus Straits, and to liberate Slav brethren from the “Turkish yoke.” Russian and Balkan Slavs, and Orthodox Christians proclaimed the war of 1877-78 as “the Holy War.” Two of the myths about Russia’s world mission were invoked then. On the one hand, Russia as the true heir of the Byzantine Commonwealth was the destined protector of the Orthodox faith and Slav culture; and on the other hand, she was the guard of Europe curbing Muslim presence there.

At such crucial points in their history, Russian people were instinctively conscious of themselves as the carrier of a certain historical mission⁵⁹⁹ that went beyond the boundaries of their everyday lives. Since Russia had never constituted a nation in the Western understanding of this term,⁶⁰⁰ some Russian intellectuals did not equate the nation and the state.⁶⁰¹ They would rather see Russia’s historic role in “leading humanity towards unification through moral perfection” as, for example, Fyodor Dostoevsky defined the mission of Russian people.⁶⁰² To others, Russia’s world mission implied the notion of a savior and protector. Thus, Easterners’

⁵⁹⁹ Belief in a mission is defined here as a belief that a group is in some way chosen for a purpose.

⁶⁰⁰ In Russian minds, Russia was defined more by geographical boundaries than by common blood in contrast to Prussia.

⁶⁰¹ Russian philosophers and ethnographers have traditionally maintained that human culture and civilization constitute a single whole, representing, in Vladimir Soloviev’s term “some large entity” or “great cumulative substance”, while nations are an interim stage in the advancement of ethnos towards a super national, global unity. Vladimir Soloviev, *Russian Idea*, Moscow, 1990, qtd. in S.V. Kortunov, “In “The Fate of Russia: Several Observations on ‘New’ Russian Identity”, online article <http://www.stanford.edu/group/Russia20/volume/pdf/Kortunov.pdf>

⁶⁰² Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Idiot*, M., 1868-69

idea of Russia's unification with, and guidance of the "Asian East" along the path of enlightenment also gained some meaning and justification among some Russian intellectuals around that time.

VI.3. The Idea of the "Yellow Peril" and the Myth of the "Third Rome"

With the highly worsened Russo-Japanese relations in January 1904, however, the "Easterners' idea" of Russia's mission in Asia turned to be inappropriate to be maintained. Even the most ardent "Easterner" ("*Vostochnik*") Prince E.E. Ukhtomskii who insisted on Russia's kinship with Asia and her "burden" to unite and enlighten the "Asiatics," became more restrained in his pronouncements. Japan's regional ambitions and demands on Russia provoked him to make some corrections in his claims in regards to her, giving up the idea of the historical future of the Japanese nation and his hope for "brotherly support and the goodwill of our people." A day before the war burst, the "Easterner" E.E. Ukhtomskii tried to clarify the reason for which common Russians would go into a war against Japan. In his terms, "apart from the realization that there came a moment to get out of the narrow nationalistic views, there also came the awareness that F. Dostoevsky's "exclusive human being" is actually the citizen of the Russian Monarchy. The thrust upon us war should serve as a powerful rising of patriotic feelings from various ethnic and religious groups that form the Third Rome- Russia. It should unite them against the terrible war, into which other dangerous to us elements could join Japan."⁶⁰³

Similarly to the times of the Russo-Turkish Wars, the idea of Russia being the "Third Rome," and hence, the sole protector of Europe from "pagans," was resurrected by few publicists in the first couple of months of the war. This claim was given classic expression centuries ago by the abbot of a monastery near Pskov, Filofei, who in his letter to the Tsar Basil III (Russ. Vassilii) expounded the famous doctrine of Moscow as the "Third Rome." The doctrine held that Moscow after the fall of Constantinople (1453) was the only provident center of the true Christian faith. Filofei appealed for Muscovite to assume the position of the "Third Rome," with the Russian Tsar becoming the ruler uniting all the Christian kingdoms under his

⁶⁰³ Ukhtomskii, E.E. "Pered Grozn'im budushtim" (A Menacing Future), *Sankt-Petersburgskie Vedomosti*, 1904/26 January (O.S.)

protection.⁶⁰⁴ The doctrine of the “Third Rome” became an important part of Russian sense of historical mission in the past centuries. Thus, one of the chief components of later Russian Pan-Slavism emerged – the idea of Russia’s messianic destiny.

This Russo-centric religious idea during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, in contrast to the Russo-Turkish Wars, did not enjoy wide support in Russia. Yet, in the very first days of the start of the Russo-Japanese war, it persisted as often in the Russian publicists’ writings as the idea of defense of Russia’s image and dignity. The “West” and the “East” again began to be interpreted in their extreme duality: “civilized” versus “barbarian,” “good” versus “evil,” “true” believers versus “pagans.”

In a brochure titled “Voina Rossii s Iaponiei” (The War between Russia and Japan) issued in Moscow in June 1904, the image of “mighty” and “rightful” Russia fighting against “tiny” “mean” “barbarian” was projected in a the two hundred- page description of war events in the first half of 1904. As its author, the prominent writer Claudia Lukashevich⁶⁰⁵ argued, with their “betraying mean attack... Asiatic pagans demonstrated to be Asiatics. They do not follow rules, and have no nobility.”⁶⁰⁶

The term “Asiatics” comprised a number of negative attributes to the image of Mongolian invaders preserved in Russian historical memory. Later the term was broadened to include all people from Asia who somehow threatened with their invasions Russian lands. This denigrating image of the “other” belligerent party was contrasted to the grandiose image of Russia. In C. Lukashevich’ perception, Russia as a “powerful iron army will manage to have her revenge. Vivacity and energy comes out of awaken Russia.”

⁶⁰⁴ Filofei’s letter to the tsar argued that following the Council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople (the “Second Rome” or Tsarigrad) under Turkish yoke, Rus’ was the only strong Orthodox country left, the guardian of the Western Orthodox tradition. “All Christian Orthodox kingdoms have now come together in your kingdom. You are the only Christian monarch on earth,” wrote Filofei. It was in this sense that Filofei regarded Rus’ as the “Third Rome”: “two Romes have fallen, there is now a third, there will not be a fourth.” (Letter of the Elder Filofei, qtd. in Kokoshin, A. A. *Reflections on Russia's Past, Present, and Future*, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, June 1997:17, www.ciaonet.org/contrib.html#koa)

⁶⁰⁵ Lukashevich-Hm’iznikova, Claudia V. (maiden name Mirets-Imshenetskaya, 1859-1931) - a popular writer and pedagogue, famous for her books for children, elementary school textbooks, historical brochures, musical and dramatic matinees, and calendars. She is also known for organizing a Red Cross camp for wounded soldiers during the WWI.

⁶⁰⁶ Lukashevich, C. “Voina Rosii s Iaponiei” (The War between Russia and Japan), Moscow, June 1904:10

That firm belief in Russia's capabilities was generally shared and often repeated between the Russians in the first days of the war. Still, in contrast to most intellectuals' writings on the war, this female author saw the way "Russia accepted the war as a feat- quietly, without loud speeches, just carrying flags and prays to God to bless Russia with victory."⁶⁰⁷

Along with the negative image of Japan as Russia's "enemy" in the war, there existed some positive ones related to the common Japanese people. The second half of C. Lukashevich' book contained a short essay "Iaponia i Iaponts'ii" (Japan and the Japanese) written, as the author admitted, three months after the war started. It differed considerably in its tone and content from the first part of the book dedicated to the war events. Those three months exhausting battles and rows of defeats for Russia, proved Japan's superiority in military aspect. Hopes for end of the bloodshed with the interference of a third party circulated in the press along with beliefs for recent announcement of peace. Russians started looking upon Japan with more respect admitting her advantages. That created an interesting image of the Japanese comprising old negative attributes together with newly acquired ones. Thus, the Japanese in C. Lukashevich' perceptions were "small size but with extreme stamina, lively, joyful, industrious, and extremely polite..." "but at the same time they are "subtle and cunning, rule of honor do not exist for them. They are not cowards and at the face of death they demonstrate their full neglect."⁶⁰⁸

C. Lukashevich' writing on the war and Japan presents an excellent example of a dual treatment of the issue. In the very beginning, Japanese attack over Russia was perceived as if "the giant was bitten by the mosquito, but it was a bite anyway," as C. Lukashevich pointed out.⁶⁰⁹ A few months later, she had to admit as most Russians did, "Japanese fleet is powerful and Japan has an excellently trained army."⁶¹⁰

In addition to the perception of the Japanese as "pagans" or "barbarians," Russian conservative press (such as *Novoe Vremya*, *Sankt Peterburgskie Vedomosti*, and *Moskovskie Vedomostii*), under the influence of the western press, also echoed another term- the "Yellow Peril." In the western press, the war was widely understood to be a racial conflict and an epochal

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid, p.16

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid, p.171, p.188

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid, p.84

⁶¹⁰ Ibid, 217

confrontation between the “yellow East” and the “white West.”⁶¹¹ Japanese government had to make a great amount of effort to prevent the war from being depicted as a “racial war” between the “white” and “yellow” races. “Yellow Peril” had become a shorthand expression for a considerable number of ways in which the “Orient” was thought to menace the “Occident” in Western understanding.⁶¹²

The origin of the idea of the “Yellow Peril” could be traced back to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, expressed in the Kaiser Wilhelm II- *Knack fuss* picture with a note: “*gelbe Gefahr*” (“Yellow Peril”). In 1895 Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) wrote to his cousin Nicholas II (1868-1918), “For that is clearly the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate the Asian Continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow Race.”⁶¹³ Kaiser Wilhelm II presumably exploited this sentiment in order to re-direct Tsar Nicholas II’s attention away from Europe toward the Far East.

At the height of the war of 1894-5, the prominent Russian religious philosopher Vladimir S. Solov’ev also predicted huge peril coming from China and Japan. He even drew an apocalyptic picture of the destruction of Russia because of an invasion of Eastern “barbarians” in his poem “Pan-Mongolism.”⁶¹⁴ In 1900, at the time of the “Boxer Rebellion” in North China, V.I.S. Solov’ev obviously impressed by the growth of Japanese ambitions, in his story “Tri razgovora”(Three Conversations), with the attachment “Kratkaya Povest ob Antichrista” (A Short Tale of the Antichrist) warned against a future united Sino- Japanese attack at the “West” and European subjugation under the “Golden Horde.”⁶¹⁵

⁶¹¹ Once the war started, the western press was full of comments on the Kaiser Wilhelm II ‘s letter to Nicholas II , Berlin 11/II 1904; in *Letters From the Kaiser To the Czar - 22 August 1901-30 October 1904*, <http://www.gwpda.org/wwi-www/wilnick/wilnickc.htm>

⁶¹² The “Yellow Peril” idea organized itself around a number of central themes or issues. Richard Thompson distinguishes between “yellow peril,” “racial peril,” “population peril,” and “economic peril” of Oriental immigration, “economic competition” from the Orient, “cultural peril,” and “military peril.” See Thompson, R. A. *The Yellow Peril.1890-1924*, Arno Press, New York Times Company, New York, Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin 1978: p.iii

⁶¹³ “The Emperor William to the Tsar, April 26,1895, Private letter. Extract” (written in English). Source: *German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914*, selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale, Volume III, “The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910,” (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), pp. 1-13.; also “The Far Eastern Situation from a German Standpoint,” *Review of Reviews* (January, 1896), 13:3-4

⁶¹⁴ Solov’ev, V.I. *Sobranie sochineniy* [Selected Works] (St.Petersburg: 1901-1908), vol.6, p. 126.

⁶¹⁵ see Vladimir Solov’ev, *Tri razgovora* [Three Conversations] (01/1900), transl.(New York, 1954), pp. 193-195; Also Berdyaev, N. A. “Problema Vostoka i Zapada v religioznom soznanii V.I. Solov’eva” (The Problem of “East” and “West” within the Religious Consciousness of V.I. Solov’ev) in *O Vladimire Solov’eva* (About Vladimir Solov’ev), Publishing House Put’, Moscow, 1911, p. 104-128

Chinese rebellion and the intense Chinese immigration after it provoked a few Russian conservative publicists to use the term “yellow” in a racial discourse. The one who broadly introduced the term to the Russian public around that time in a racial discourse, was the ethnographer and explorer of the Far East, I.S. Levitov through his works *Zheltaya Rassa* (Yellow Race) (SPB, 1900), *Zheltaya Rossia* (Yellow Russia) (SPB, 1901), and *Zheltaya Rossia kak bufernaya kolonia* (Yellow Russia as a Buffer Colony) (SPB, 1905). In I.S. Levitov’s interpretation, Russia should secure a territory between Baikal and the Pacific for the incoming Chinese and Korean immigrants and let them mix with Russian dwellers there. Thus could be formed a buffer zone “Zheltorossia” (Yellow Russia) between the “white heartland Russia” and China, which should serve to isolate and protect Russia from threats both from “East” and “West.” That was highly necessary, in I.S. Levitov’s understanding, since Japan and the other “Asiatics” were designing schemes against Russia and against Europe as a whole. What is more, “once buffered by this colony Russia, which is destined for a great future, could create in Manchuria an open door for trade, or could oppose Japan on the continent, and overtake “the yellow Bosphorus”- Formosa.”⁶¹⁶ Still, the threat to Russia that I.S. Levitov was envisioning came mainly from the influx of “yellow immigrants” from China and Korea into Russia. It was a cover version of the American press releases about the “Yellow Peril” to the United States coming from the immigration flood there after the “Boxer Rebellion.”

The term “yellow race” received an extreme racial interpretation *vis-à-vis* Asiatics in a public lecture, given by Professor I. A. Sikorsky from the Kiev University of St. Vladimir. The professor proclaimed the “superiority of the white race” and denigrated the “yellow race.” The “whites” he argued, were able to perform intensive intellectual tasks while the “yellows” lacked pursuit of knowledge, and were rather distinguished for their “fanaticism, insidiousness, and impudence.” He even declared that Russo-Japanese war was “an important biological event” in the sense that “the Russian mission is to purge the Mongol stock.”⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁶ Levitov, I.S. *Zhelt’ii Bosphor* (Yellow Bosphorus), 1903:86; also his *Zheltaya Rossia. Doclad.* (Yellow Russia. Report) SPB, 1901; and his *Zheltorossia kak bufernaya kolonia* (Yellow Russia as a Buffer Colony), 1905; For a more detailed study on Russian intellectuals’ ideas of “yellow Russia” and “white imperialism” see Laruel, M., ““Zheltaya opasnost’ v rabotah russkikh natsionalistov nachala veka” (“Yellow Peril” in the Works of Russian nationalists at the Beginning of the Century), in Airapetov, O. (ed.), *Russko-iaponskaya voina, Vzglyad cherez stoletie*, Tri kvadrata, M. 2004:579-592; released also online:

<http://www.polit.ru/research/2004/10/11/laruelle.html>

⁶¹⁷ Professor Ivan Alekseyevich Sikorsky (1842-?) was appointed a head of the Department of Nervous and Psychic Diseases of the Medical faculty at Kiev University on January 1, 1885. He founded the journal *Problems of Nervous-Psychic Medicine and Psychology* in 1886. Qtd. in Yulia Mikhailova, *op.cit.*

The numerous western press predictions of a coming peril from the “Asian East” exerted some effect even on such ardent liberals as Prince S.N. Trubetskoi⁶¹⁸ who had always been more concerned with the struggle for reforms of government and education systems, than with the problems in the Far East. The external threat provoked him to publish a short essay titled “Rossia –na rubezhe” (Russia –on the Edge), in which he admitted, “We are witnessing a great world historical drama...The later V.I. Solov’ev’s prophesy started coming true.”⁶¹⁹ In his claims, the professor alluded to V.I. Solov’ev’s theory on the ending of the historical process and coming of “evil” from the “East.”

When Japan attacked the Russian ships at the night of 8 February (27 January O.S.) 1904, the suddenness of that event, and the shock from Russian losses there, led to a burst of a storm of anger and indignation towards Japan all over Russia. In Petersburg, there were mass demonstrations into which even students took part. At that crucial moment, few monarchists and conservative “Slavophiles” echoed V.I. Solov’ev’s prophesy about “the march of the Eastern barbarians northward.”⁶²⁰ The religious philosopher Lev A. Tikhomirov, also famous as a journalist, and ideologist of the monarchist movement- regardless of his doubts in Russia’s victory, supported Russia in the war, believing that Holy Russia had an important mission to fulfill. Russia should not only protect the Christendom by defeating the Asian “pagans” but should also turn China and Japan into true Christian nations, argued the religious philosopher.⁶²¹ The Europeanization of Japan gave some hope to L.A.Tikhomirov that she could be easily converted into a true believer in the Orthodox Christianity under the guidance of Russia. Numerous missionaries in China and Japan through the centuries had failed to turn the “yellow nations” into true Christians because they were not teaching the right faith in a proper way. That noble mission was prescribed to Russia to fulfill as the best representative of

⁶¹⁸ Sergey Nikolayevich Trubetskoi (1862- 1905)- a professor of philosophy at the Moscow University (and from 2 Sept.1905 Univ. Head)- an active reform-minded liberal, the ideologue of the liberal movement *Zemstvo*, also known for his contribution to the academic reforms.

⁶¹⁹ Vladimir Solov’ev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, ed. S.M.Solov’ev and E.L.Radlov, 2nd edn, St.Petersburg, 1911-13, vol.10 (reprint Brussels,1966),p.193-4;

⁶²⁰ Vladimir Solov’ev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, ed. S.M.Solov’ev and E.L.Radlov, 2nd edn, St.Petersburg, 1911-13, vol.10 (reprint Brussels,1966),p.193-4;

⁶²¹ Tikhomirov,L.A., “Iz dnevnika L.A.Tikhomirova (1899-1904)” [From L.A.Tikhomirov’s Diary], *Krasnii Archive*, 1936, Vol.1 and 2, released online

<http://www.pravaya.ru/faith/11/4707> see also L.A. Tikhomirov’s article “Christianskie zadachi Rusii i Dalnii Vostok” (Russia’s Christian Duties and the Far East), in *Eparchialnii Vestnik*,1904, online http://www.vob.ru/public/bishop/ep_vest/2004/2-72/popovkin.htm

See also Tikhomirov, L.A., “O smisle voiny” (About Wars), M., 1904, repr. In L.A.Tikhomirov, *Christianstvo i politika*, Moskva, 1999; and his *Apokalipticheskoe uchenie o sudbah i kontse mira* (Apocalyptic Teaching about Destiny and End of the World) Sergiev Posad, 1907, Vo.III, pp.75-83;

the Christendom. Yet, L.A. Tikhomirov did not put forward Russia's kinship to Asian people as the other prominent monarchist, Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii, had done in his pronouncements on Russia's enlightening mission in Asia.⁶²²

Although Japanese Europeanization, there were still few Russian intellectuals such as the conservative publicist Colonel P.N.Dubenskii (with penname P.Vozhin),⁶²³ editor of the brochure *Letopisi voini s Iaponiei* (Chronicle of the Russo-Japanese War) (1904), who perceived Japan as a well-disguised "wild barbarian." The row of losses and exhausting bloody battles must have provoked P. N. Dubenskii to state, "seven months from the campaign, the illusion of Japan being the bearer of European progress and culture tumbled down." In his perception, "'Asiatics' [Japanese] needed only the utilitarian aspect of the European civilization- military, industrial, technical... In their minds, they remained the same barbarians as they were for thousands of years."⁶²⁴ Japan to him, turned to be the barbarian who had to be stopped from her further advancing. In contrast to the above-mentioned intellectuals, however, P. N. Dubenskii did prescribe to Russia neither enlightening mission in Asia nor the mission of a savior of Europe.

Other conservative publicists kept developing the topic of the "barbarian invasions towards Europe." The Petersburg conservative monarchist daily newspaper *Novoe Vremya*⁶²⁵ published few short series of essays on the coming "Yellow Peril" from the "East." The first one was printed two weeks before the war burst out.⁶²⁶ Prince M. O. Men'shikov,⁶²⁷ a writer and

⁶²² Ukhtomskii, E.E., *Puteshestvie na Vostok Evo Imperatorskogo V'isochestva Gosudarya naslednika Tsarevicha (1890-1891)* [The Journey in the East of His Imperial Highness, the Heir of the Tsar] Collected Works- Leipzig, 1893-5. Vls. 1-3. Ń. S; also Ukhtomskii, E.E., *K sobytiiam v Kitaie. Ob otnosheniiakh Zapada i Rossii k Vostoku* [On the Events in China. On the Relations of the West and Russia with China] (St. Petersburg: Vostok, 1900); On Ukhtomskii's ideas see also Sarkisyanz, E., *Russia and the Messianism*, J.C.B. Mohr, 1955: 218-22

⁶²³ Petr Nikolaevich Dubenskii (1864 - 1905)-a writer and journalist. Published a number of political articles in the monarchist Petersburg press *Russkie Vedomosti* and *Novoe Vremya* under the pseudonym P.Vozhin. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 initiated the publishing of a wartime brochure *Letopisi voini s Iaponiei* (Chronicle of the Russo-Japanese War)

⁶²⁴ P.Vozhin (P. N. Dubenskii), "Ethics of the man-beast", in Colonel Dubenskii, P.N. (ed. and publ.), *Letopisi voini s Iaponiei* (Chronicle of Russo-Japanese War), SPB.1904, N.7, p.8

⁶²⁵ *Novoe vremya*- a daily newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from 1868 until 1917. At the beginning, it was a daily newspaper following a moderate liberal ideology. However, since 1876, with the appointment of its new editor A.S. Suvorin, the newspaper turned into a press organ of the monarchists- namely, some reactionary noblemen and members of the administrative- bureaucratic circles. Since 1905, it became an official press organ of the conservative monarchists, the so-called *Chernosotentsi* (the Black Hundreds).

⁶²⁶ The daily newspaper *Novoe Vremya* had published few short notes on the coming 'yellow peril' from the East, first printed even two weeks before the war burst. See *Novoe Vremya*, from January and February 1904, N.10005; N.10006; N.100012

journalist, famous for his reactionary conservative ideology, who wrote those series of articles in *Novoe Vremya*, titled “Iz pisem k blizhnim.” Rak-otshelnik” [Letters to Akin Ones. Hermit Crab] treated the war between Russia and Japan in some racial discourse. In his first article of 11 (24 January) 1904, he presented a peculiar interpretation of Russia’s Christian mission in the “East.” As M.O. Men’shikov ironically noted, “two hundred years later the phrase “Mongolian invasion “is turning again into a real factor of our foreign policy. Russia has saved Europe from Mongolians, but Mongolians have also saved Europe from Russia”⁶²⁸ The fall of the Mongolian Empire has given rise to Russia, according to M.O. Men’shikov, which in turn, has turned into “a huge ugly empire- a new provocation to the yellow race – to embark on invasion in order to put Russia down again.”⁶²⁹ He perceived Japan as a representative of the “Mongolian race, possessing a million soldiers, causing many troubles lately.” Still, it was huge China, or Japan’s union with China that M. O. Men’shikov perceived as the big threats to Russia in the near future. In his argument, “since Japan modernized along the European model so quickly, then China could soon do it, too.” Japan, awakened by her Europeanization, in M. O. Men’shikov’s understanding, was going to war against Russia “without being threatened.” “Then, China, humiliated and insulted would not stay calm,” concluded the conservative publicist. In a Solov’ev’s style, he warned, “If Japanese dream to rule Korea and Peking comes true, then Pan-Mongolian union will become an ugly reality.” The union presumably could bring to a new subjugation of Russia under “yellow yoke.” “We should fight against any unification of Mongolian tribes,” appealed ardently the publicist. He foresaw China turning into new Carthagem. He also prescribed a special historic mission to Russia. In his vision, “to Russia belongs the mission of the “Third Rome”- to defend herself and European civilization,” proclaimed ardently the radical monarchist M.O. Men’shikov.⁶³⁰ The greatest fear of M.O. Men’shikov, similarly to the above-mentioned intellectuals, was not the strength of Japan alone, but the specter of an anti-white alliance of Asian nations led by Japan, which would precipitate a cataclysmic confrontation between the “East” and “West.” To the idea of the “Third Rome,” which should defend the true faith from “pagans,” was added the idea of

⁶²⁷ Mikhail Osipovich Men’shikov (1859-?) - a famous writer and journalist. In the beginning of his career as a publicist, Men’shikov was notable as ardent follower of L. Tolstoi and his ideas of “moral good.” The second stage of his life underwent a cardinal turn. As a regular agent of the conservative newspaper *Novoe Vremia*, M.O. Men’shikov started propagating radical monarchist ideas. His numerous books and articles on exploration topics or moral religious topics from his first stage of publicist work enjoyed greater popularity than his later works.

⁶²⁸ Men’shikov, M.O. “Iz pisem k blizhnim.” Rak-otshelnik” (Letters to Akin Ones. Hermit Crab), in *Novoe Vremya*, 1904/ 11 (24 January O.S.), p 2, N.10005

⁶²⁹ Ibid, p.3-4

⁶³⁰ Ibid, p.4

struggle against the “Yellow Peril” (understood as Pan-Mongolian union targeting subjugation of European civilization), thus enriching the scope of Russia’s world mission.

The Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo*,⁶³¹ also reminded of V.I. Solov’ev and N.K. Mikhailovskii’s predictions of the “awakening of the yellow races.” Its *de facto* editor, the professor of Sociology S.N. Yuzhakov, in his article “O prichinah voiny” (About the Causes of the War) cited the late leader of the “populist” movement in Russia and famous publicist N.K. Mikhailovskii’s article on the Far East and the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900 which presented a peculiar vision on Japan as a rising power.⁶³² N.K. Mikhailovskii referred to a stereotype about Japan, common to many Europeans at the end of the nineteenth century. As he put it, “while this small country populated by small people was reforming itself politically, Europe was smiling...at that time nobody expected that these small yellow faced people could ever get their voice heard by the great powers concert...” However, as N.K. Mikhailovskii predicted, “soon there would come time not only to consider Japan seriously but also to thank her for her assistance to put East Asia in order and civilize it...”⁶³³ “N.K. Mikhailovskii’s prophesy came true,” commented S.N. Yuzhakov. The real peril that S.N. Yuzhakov warned about was “a union of Japan, Korea, and China,” that might be provoked by “the reformed and armed Japan.” In his understanding, “this would be a peril to the mere existence of European peace in general, and to the “East,” especially.”⁶³⁴ He even argued, that “the danger of a new Mongolian invasion...although it might look fantastic... has been proved by European theoreticians.”⁶³⁵ S.N. Yuzhakov reminded again V.I. Solov’ev and N.K. Mikhailovskii’s prophesizing on the barbarian invasions from the “East.” In his perceptions, “barbarians (visioning Japan, Korea, and China) remain barbarians but this time they are armed.” In his vision, the war could provoke the awakening of yellow races. Interestingly, the ones that S.N. Yuzhakov blamed for the disturbed regional balance were neither the Russian nor the Japanese imperial expansionistic ambitions but “the European great power rivalry and their sale of weapons to China.”⁶³⁶

⁶³¹ *Russkoe bogatsvo. Ezhemesechn’ii literaturnii i nauchnii zhurnal*- a monthly journal, with philosophical and moral-religious ideology. Since 1892, it took a “liberal-populist” turn into its ideology under N.K. Mikhailovskii and V.G. Korolenko’s editorialship, and became a center of the “legal populism.” It got published both in St. Petersburg and in Moscow from 1879 to 1918.

⁶³² Mikhailovskii, N.K. “Literatura i zhizn” (Literature and Life), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1900/7

⁶³³ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika- O prichinah Voiny”, in *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1904/3 (125-136pp), p.127

⁶³⁴ Ibid, p.127

⁶³⁵ Ibid, p.128

⁶³⁶ Ibid

The prominent publicist and literary critic L. Slonimski, in his article “Zhyoltaya opasnost” (Yellow Peril) in *Vestnik Evropii* also warned about the danger of awakening of China as a result of possible victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. Since 1895, pointed out L.Slonimski, “China started looking up to Japan as her teacher and ally.” Regardless of their old hatred, “being the same race naturally they get closer.” Old Russian stereotypes about Mongolians being “bloodthirsty” and “merciless” were transferred automatically on the Chinese and Japanese by the author. In his perceptions, “Chinese and Japanese do not value human life. Due to that is the striking to Europeans cruelty that could be seen in different Asian nations.” He referred to mass killings in Manchuria in 1850s and 1860s. “Japanese were at a time also famous for their bloodiness,” added L.Slonimski, citing examples of Japanese invasions in Korea in the sixteenth century. “Traditional for Europeans respect to human beings is foreign to the people of the Mongolian race.”⁶³⁷

Yet, strangely enough, although the article was published four months after the burst of the war, the author mentioned Japan in a few lines in the context of China’s awakening. The peril that L.Slonimski predicted was not Japan or a union between China and Japan but China alone. Regardless of the presentation of the bloodthirsty Mongolian race in the first couple of pages, L.Slonimski focused his article on the argumentation that Chinese people were “genius,” “enterprising,” “serious,” persistent,” “patient,” “energetic,” “cunning,” “skillful,” “witty,” “hypocritical,” “evil,” and “vindictive.”⁶³⁸ Having that in mind, Chinese, in his understanding, could present “economic, political, and moral peril to Europe.”⁶³⁹ Since Russia missed her opportunity to sign a treaty securing her border with China, and focused on the commercial treaties with her instead, Russia should expect “Chinese influx,” which might endanger her politically, economically, and culturally.⁶⁴⁰ On the one hand, that argument of L.Slonimski reminded much the American press statements on the danger of Chinese immigration flood and cheap work force there.

Similar to other Russian intellectuals, L.Slonimski perceived the “Asiatics” in their duality, assigning to their image both negative and positive attributes. His argument fit in the Russian general discourse on the “Yellow Peril” perceived in the face of China or China supported by Japan. It must be admitted that in the common Russian discourse on the “Yellow Peril” there lacked the aggressive tone typical for a racial treatment of such issue. The fear of Asiatic

⁶³⁷ Slonimskii, L. “Zhyoltaya opasnost” (“Yellow Peril”) in *Vestnik Evropii* 1904/5 (305-321pp), p.308, 309, 310

⁶³⁸ Ibid, p.307-8

⁶³⁹ Ibid, p.311

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid, p.305

invasions towards Europe targeting military, economic, or cultural dominance was prevailing in the few Russian intellectuals' works on that issue.

In this pending danger coming from the "East," the Pan-Mongolian union, there was a mystical anxiety, a presentiment of the end of the history that was also caught by the most sensitive to changes social stratum- Russian "Symbolists,"⁶⁴¹ witnesses of the war of 1904-5. The views they advanced in the early years of the twentieth century cannot be understood without a clear concept of their grounding in the particular historical period. They operated within a discursive framework defined at least partly by external events. As it turned out, the socio-political situation of Russia during 1904 and 1905 provided a unique window of opportunity for visions of Russia's present and future development to be expressed in various ways in public. The central event of this period was imminently the Russo-Japanese War. Critical of the tsarist regime, when contemplating the war of 1904-5, the "Symbolists" spoke of "crumbling," "decay," and "the passing of the old order," of "psychological collapse," of "death," "destruction," and "Apocalypse." They drew heavily on medieval and eighteenth-century Russian Christian myths in their own responses to the war. Exploring attitudes within and outside the "Symbolist" literary movement shows a surprisingly wide range of publicly held attitudes concerning the war. As David Wells notes, "Symbolists' representation of the war has been "manipulated to serve a variety of ideological and aesthetic ends."⁶⁴² The "Symbolist" poets, witnesses of the war, such as Andrei Bely, Valery Bruiusov, and Konstantin Belmont all interpreted it in the context of ancient Christian and Greek myths. In their symbolic poetry, they prescribed to Russia the historical mission as the "Third Rome"- to guard the true faith and European civilization.⁶⁴³

For example, Valery Bruiusov (1873-1924), the most popular Russian poet-symbolist, leader of the "Symbolist" literary movement, believed in Russia's historical mission to be the "Third

⁶⁴¹ Symbolism was the leading literary movement (with realism and naturalism falling considerably behind) in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century.

⁶⁴² Wells, D. "The Russo-Japanese War in Russian Literature", in Wells, D. and S.Wilson, (eds.) *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:108

⁶⁴³ Vl. S. Solov'ev's apocalyptic vision of the destiny of the "Third Rome" was taken in the context of the Russo-Japanese War by the symbolist poets Andrei Bely, Valery Bruiusov, Konstantin Belmont. See Andrei Bely's article "*Apokalipsis v russkoi poezii*" (Apocalypse in Russian Poetry), published in *Vesy* in April 1905; and reprinted in Andrei Bely, *Kritika, estetika, teoriia simvolizma*, vol. 1, Moscow, 1994, pp.337-389 ; On Valery Bruiusov, Konstantin Belmont, and Andrei Bely see also Heldt, B. "Japanese" in Russian Literature', in *A Hidden Fire. Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, ed. Thomas Rimer, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 1995, pp177-81

Rome” destined to defend the Christendom from “barbarians.” V. Bruisov used images of ancient Rome to express allegorically his indignation at the Tsushima defeat, and to address such patriotic concerns as the inadequacy of Russian political and military leadership. He entertained grand illusions about Russia’s military and intellectual superiority in the war of 1904-5. V.Bruisov’s poems set the tone for the political discussion among the literary elite, reflecting simultaneously their attitude toward this major political event. V.Bruisov’s sentiments concerning the events of 1904-1905 can be found in several of his poems.⁶⁴⁴ The myth of the “Third Rome,” and the “peril of the coming Antichrist” from the “East” also turned into quite an inspiration for the other outstanding Russian “Symbolists” of the time and provoked their prophetic visions of Russia’s future, as V. Molodyakov’s study on Andrei Bely, Konstantin Belmont, and Valery Bruisov demonstrates.⁶⁴⁵

That mission of Russia as a savior of Europe from the “pagans” of the “East” was invoked from the very first days of the war until its end also at the mass level, in search for effective propaganda for mobilization of people towards the war effort. Some Russian nationalistic circles printed popular broadsides (*lubki*), pamphlets, and popular cartoons (*narodnyie kartinki*) exploiting the issue of the “Yellow Peril” to its fullest.⁶⁴⁶ The biggest success enjoyed the popular broadsides with a patriotic cartoon- for example, “a Cossack devouring a Japanese soldier for breakfast.”⁶⁴⁷

The third edition of the brochure titled *Zheltaya opasnost. Kartina imperatora Vilgelma II i obyasnienia k nei* (“Yellow Peril.” Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Drawing with Explanations), came out of print in Russia in 1904. The brochure belonged to the war propaganda materials targeting inciting patriotic feelings in the masses. In order to unite Russian society in the face of an external threat, the brochure referred to Vl.S.Solov’ev’s prophesy. In its terms, “Providence probably sends to Europe the “Yellow Peril” as a punishment and as a reminder that she should

⁶⁴⁴ “Towards the Pacific Ocean” (27 January 1904); “To the New Year - 1905”; “To fellow-citizens, and “Tsushima”; “Julius Cezar”; “Meterlink- uteshitel (O “zheltoi opasnosti”)” [Meterlink- comforter (about the “yellow peril”)], all publ. in *Bibilographia*. 1993. 1 3. Also in Bruisov, V., *Sobranie sochinenii v 7 tomah* (Collected Works in 7 vols.), Vol.I, Moskva, 1973:423-4; and Valerii Bruisov, “Meterlink Uteshitel .O ‘zheltoi opasnosti’” (Meterlink Comforter. About the ‘Yellow Peril’), 1905, in *Bruisov, V., Mirovoe sostyazanie* (World Contest) M.2003, Airo.XX

⁶⁴⁵ Molodiakov, V. *Obraz Iaponii" v Evrope i Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX - nachala XX veka* (The Image of Japan” in Europe and Russia at the End of the 19th and the Beginning of the 20th Centuries), Moscow, Institut Vostokovedeniia RAN, 1996: 156

⁶⁴⁶ See Mikhailova, Yu. “Japan’s Place in Russian and Soviet National Identity. From Port Arthur to Khalkhin-gol,” online article <http://www.intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/~yulia/publ/japplace.htm>

⁶⁴⁷ Brooks, J. *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917*, Princeton, 1985: 288-99

unite in order to get rid of it. Then, Europe would fulfill God's words to become universal; and the whole earth would become one with God's church."⁶⁴⁸ The peril here was reviewed through the religious context of "good versus evil," and God's punishment of "pagans." For highly religious Russians that was an effective tool for heating up their nationalistic feelings. The peril of a new Mongolian invasion of Russia in the face of Japan, united with China, and Korea, should be prevented at any rate argued the author of the brochure. Such fears of invasions from the "East" could be traced long back in Russian minds.⁶⁴⁹ Mongols had instituted a grim reign of terror over Russians whom they had subjugated for over 260 years (1223- 1480). Russian settlements were slaughtered *en masse*, with lucky survivors barely escaping to the north and west, bringing tales of terror from the new Asiatic invaders. Russia was overrun and subjugated by Asiatic hordes for almost three centuries. This fatal event contributed quite as much as the disadvantage of soil and climate to retard her development. Horrifying collective memory about it imminently keep transferring from generation to generation, at peaceful times fading away, but when provoked by a threat from outside, such memory gets conjured up again, often in more exaggerated form as in the popular broadsides (*lubki*) with cartoons.

Among Russian educated elite, however, such chauvinistic and religious propagandas were viewed as "rude and cheap."⁶⁵⁰ Although a great number of publicists and scholars had actively involved themselves into clarification of the Russo-Japanese War into public, few revealed the armed clash through the racial discourse. Majority of "Liberals," "Populists," and "Social-Democrats" were domestically oriented, concerned primarily with internal political and social changes. There was little interest in warding off the "Yellow Peril," about which Wilhelm II had been importuning his Russian cousin for yeas, or in pursuing a "mission" in East Asia, which had been used to provide ideological justification for Russia's imperialist policies.

⁶⁴⁸ Popular brochure *Zheltaya opasnost. Kartina imperatora Vilgelma II I obyasnienia k nei* (Yellow Peril. Kaiser Wilhelm II's Drawing with Explanations), SPB, 1904, qtd. in Remnev, A.V. *Russkii "Drang nah Osten" na rubeze XIX-XX vekov* (Russian *Drang nah Osten* on the Border of Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries)

http://www.iriss.ru/attach_download?object_id=000100000216&attach_id=000030

⁶⁴⁹ J.O.P. Bland argues that frequent comparisons of supposed current dangers with depredations of Genghis Kahn suggest that the fear of Oriental invasion into Russia might have been an outgrowth of Russian fears of the Mongols, and some other barbarian incursions into the Russian lands through the Middle Ages down until the current day. See Bland, J.O.P. "The Yellow Peril," *Living Age* (June 22, 1912: 273-708)

⁶⁵⁰ For example, I. P. Belokonsky published a series of articles in the journal *Obrazovaniye* where he analyzed many pictures in detail, heavily criticizing them. In particular he noted that all "lubki publications were based on praise of rude, physical force, which by itself was treated as the Alpha and Omega of happiness." Ibid.

The idea of “Yellow Peril” to European civilization met only the mockery of some intellectuals. Among them was S.N. Siromyatnikov [with penname Sigma] (1864-1934) - a popular publicist, and public activist, defending the right wing in the conservative political ideology and “Easterners” school of thought.⁶⁵¹ He became more popular with his ardent “Easterner” ideology. As he ironically noted, in his essay “Zametki Pisatelya” (Writer’s Notes) in *Novoe Vremya*, “since we did not include China, Japan, Korea, and India in our education programmes, now we are anticipating an invasion from wild yellow beings.”⁶⁵² Instead, he threatened the “West” with a union between Russia and Asia, when Russia would stop defending Europe with her “breast.” Russia in his perceptions was an eastern state as much as her people follow the eastern people’s strong attachment to God. In addition, Russia inherited the principle of Autocracy from the “East” through the Byzantine Commonwealth and the Golden Horde. Hence, Russia appeared to be the heir of the Byzantine Church and Chinese state thought.⁶⁵³

He seemed convinced that if the religious philosopher V.I. Solov’ev had accompanied him on his trip to China in 1897 as they were both contemplating about it, he “would not have prescribed to Pan-Mongolism the role of a butcher of Europe.” S. Siromyatnikov argued for a “study of Asiatics’ attempt to unite against Europe, instead of writing against some invasions.”

As ardent “Easterner,” his thesis was in full accordance with the main lines of the “Easterners’ discourse.” According to him, “Russia should undertake the leadership role in an Asiatics’ union.” In contrast to the other ardent “Easterner” E.E.Ukhtomskii, however, S. Siromyatnikov did not see “Russia’s mission in enlightening the Asiatics only...” In his viewpoint, “Russia should do more than that. She should unite and guide Asian nations in order to make their transfer to a peaceful mass easier.” That noble enterprise, however, had its price. “While preserving her Russian nationality, Russia should leave other nationalities to dissolve into her.” In such case Russia did not need to “waste her energy to fight with them,” concluded the

⁶⁵¹ Sergey Nikolayevich Siromyatnikov (1860-1933)- Famous Russian writer and journalist; one of the founders of the first Russian right-wing organization *Russkoe Sobranie* (Russian Assembly) in Saint Petersburg in 1900. Members of this nationalistic organization became high officials, writers, and journalists belonging to the conservative movement such as Prince D.P.Golitsin, Prince M.N.Volkonskii, A.S. Suvorin, N.A.Engelhard, etc.

⁶⁵² Siromyatnikov, S. “Zametki Pisatelya”(Writer’s Notes) in *Novoe Vremya*, 18 (31 January.), p.2

⁶⁵³ Siromyatnikov, S.N. *Opit’ii Russkoi m’isli* (Trials of Russian Thought), SPB, 1901: 34-35,42

conservative publicist.⁶⁵⁴ Those pacifying and unifying words of his, however, were written ten days before the Russo-Japanese war started.

Once the war burst out, Siromyatnikov-Sigma put the blame for it on both Russia and Japan. In his understanding, “In that immense political event as the current war, Russia is as much to be blamed as Japan, but it is not the time now to look for scapegoats and tear with civil unrest our poor country...”⁶⁵⁵ However, he could not but express his momentous feelings of anger against those who brought Russia to the war. According to him, “the war was provoked by those who poured Russian gold in Manchuria thus turning it into an attractive tidbit for Japan..., by those that built castles instead of fortresses in Manchuria...” Siromyatnikov-Sigma mocked at some Russian chauvinistic claims of Russia’s military might and Japan’s weakness. In his terms, “patriots” “were convincing us that to three Japanese soldiers is enough to oppose one Russian, and then in the course of war, they were arguing that to one Japanese soldier were needed three Russian ones...”⁶⁵⁶ He opposed the war between Russia and Japan proclaiming it to be “evil and horror.”⁶⁵⁷

On the other hand, being leader of the “right-wing reformatory conservatives,” he justified Russian advance to the “East,” arguing that it was dictated by Russia’s policy to overcome her overpopulation. To him, North Manchuria could have become the home of millions of Russian peasants. “In Asia Russian peasants became full up... and then they could peacefully evolve,” argued Siromyatnikov-Sigma.⁶⁵⁸ Nevertheless, believing in Russians to be in racial and civilization kinship with Asians, he could not but oppose the war. Moreover, he disagreed with “patriots” that opposition to the war meant opposition to the government. “Such absurd belief is hard to destroy,”⁶⁵⁹ concluded Siromyatnikov-Sigma.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid, p.2

⁶⁵⁵ Siromyatnikov-Sigma, “Zametki pisatelya. III (Writer’s Notes III)”, reprinted in *Russkoe Slovo*, N.56, Thursday 03 (16) February 1905

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid

⁶⁵⁷ Siromyatnikov-Sigma, “Zametki Pisatelya XII” (Writer’s Notes XII), in *Russkoe Slovo*, N.86, Sunday, 06(19) March 1905

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid

⁶⁵⁹ Siromyatnikov-Sigma, “Zametki pisatelya XXVI” (Writer’s Notes XXVI), in *Russkoe Slovo*, N. 157, 22 May (3 June O.S.) 1905

Another reactionary publicist, Vassilii Silovich,⁶⁶⁰ a regular political observer for *Novoe Vremya*, supported Siromyatnikov-Sigma, and kept the mockery of the idea of “Yellow Peril.” His essay “Na Zheltuyu Temu” (On the Yellow Topic), presented a critic to those who “perceived the Japanese warning to Russia to leave Manchuria and Korea as some growing “yellow typhoon,” reminding of Vl.Solov’ev’s prophesy about the approaching global “yellow influx.”⁶⁶¹ He expressed “deep gratitude to S. Siromyatnikov for calming down people.” “Otherwise, hysteria would be our worst peril,” noted the reactionary V.Silovich. In his perceptions, China presented “real peril” to Europe “with her huge mass of population.” Japan was too small to ruin Russia. In his terms, “we cannot expect Japan to be another Tamerland⁶⁶² or Napoleon...if so, she would have to go through 1812 and the fields of Waterloo (Manchuria),”⁶⁶³ threatened V. Silovich, four days before start of the war of 1904-5. This argument presented another example of the self-confidence that had overtaken a great number of Russians before the Japanese bold attack on the Russian fleet.

In a quite different way did the editor of *Novoe Vremya*, A. Suvorin,⁶⁶⁴ interpret Russian and Japanese capabilities. He perceived Russia’s expansion in the Pacific to be “for the first time due to her mind not to use of force.” Russia had “crossed mountains and forests to connect via railway Europe with Asia and to get an unfreezing port.” “Then should we give up Manchuria?”⁶⁶⁵ That question, rhetorical in its essence, was “left to the reading public to decide.” A.Suvorin, famous for his pro-monarchist attitude about the Far East, did not present an exception from the formal stance. A.Suvorin’s argument was in full accordance with the Tsar’s personal adviser, Prince E.E. Ukhtomskii’s Easterner’s ideology justifying Russia’s imperial extension in Asia. In A. Suvorin’s interpretation, “There was a considerable part of Asia within Russia. Historically Russia, of course, is not in Asia, but geographically, she is not exactly in Europe. That border state is connecting two worlds. Since Russia is the most

⁶⁶⁰ Vassilii Silovich Krivenko (1854-1931) - Russian writer and active public figure (Chairman of the Russian Theatre Society, and member of the Petersburg city Duma.)

He wrote a series of reactionary political observations in Petersburg journals and newspapers such as *Voennii Sbornik*, *Pchela*, *Novosty*, and *Novoe Vremya*.

⁶⁶¹ Silovich, V. “Na Zheltuyu Temu” (On the Yellow Topic) in *Novoe Vremya*, 22 Jan (4 Feb.) 1904.N.10016,p.3

⁶⁶² V. Silovich presumably meant the cruel Mongolian ruler Timur-Tamerland.

⁶⁶³ Silovich, V. “Na Zheltuyu Temu” (On the Yellow Topic), in *Novoe Vremya*, 22 Jan (4 Feb.) 1904.N.10016,p.3

⁶⁶⁴ Alexei Sergeevich Suvorin (1834-?) - A famous Russian journalist and publisher; His early career as a journalist, A.Suvorin distinguished himself as a moderate liberal Westerner, arguing ardently for political freedom, and protesting against narrow-minded nationalism. Since his start as a publisher and de facto chief editor of the Petersburg daily newspaper *Novoe Vremya*, A.Suvorin passed into the camp of reactionary monarchists which brought to him big subsidies from the government.

⁶⁶⁵ Suvorin, A. “Malenkiya Pisma” (Short Letters), in *Novoe Vremya*, 12 (25 Jan.) 1904, N.10006,p.2

developed nation in Asia, she should become its leader.” That presented some peculiar propaganda seeking obviously to establish a bridge between the “Slavophiles” and “Easterners,” and unite them around the idea of Russia’s mission to guide and protect the “East” and the “West.” That theory that would become known a decade later as “Eurasianism” (*Evrasiistvo*). In contrast to other monarchist writings on Russia and Japan, however, A.Suvorin did not draw a denigrated image of Japan. “Appraisals to Japan have been loaded to the skies, or we have been threatened by some “Yellow Peril,” commented the western press announcements A.Suvorin. He appealed against the vulgar propaganda in the Western and Russian press. “We should respect not humiliate our enemy,” concluded his notes the editor of the monarchist newspaper *Novoe Vremya*.⁶⁶⁶

As Professor V.A.Gol’tsev, the editor the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl*, also ironically noted “ western press tries hard to resurrect the ghost of the “Yellow Peril” and impose on us Kaiser’s appeals....”⁶⁶⁷

The Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evropii*, in the article “Zheltaya Opasnost” (“Yellow Peril”) also bitterly pointed out, ““Yellow Peril” is not dangerous to Europe as far as China is in a state of immobility and internal decay... That “peril” would not be dangerous even if China is awaken and modernized...The “peril” hidden in Europe’s own sins would be more dangerous.”⁶⁶⁸

An anonymous article in the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* titled “K Russko-iaponskoi voine” (About the Russo-Japanese War) of May 1904 also ironically mocked at the denigrated presentations of the Japanese as “*krivonogie makaki*”(bandy-legged monkeys), “*yaposhki*” (Japes), “*aziatsii*”(Asiatics), as presented in the conservative press such as *Novoe Vremya*, *Moscovskie Vedomosti*, etc. As the author of the article pointed out, “those journals tried to present the war as a struggle between races and civilizations, between Christians and pagans. That counterfeit smog has already evaporated and to everybody it became clear that the present war is exclusively political.”⁶⁶⁹ In contrast to the conservative press belittling or tendentiously presenting negatively Japan, the author of the article in

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁶⁷ Gol’tsev. A.G. “Inostrannoe Obozrenie” (Foreign Affairs Review), in *Russkaya Mi’sl*, 1904/02, p. 247

⁶⁶⁸ *Vestnik Evropii*, “Zheltaya Opasnost”, 1904/05, p.320-1

⁶⁶⁹ “K Rssko-iaponskoi voine” (About the Russo-Japanese War) in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1904/5 (130-147pp),p.140

Russkoe Bogatsvo constructed an overtly positive image of her. As he pointed out, “We do not fight against another illiterate Turkey, but against a state that has far surpassed us in education. Practice demonstrated that we do not deal with a state against which we could “*zakidat shapkami*” (“win easily”).”⁶⁷⁰ To the idea that Japan presented a “peril of barbarous invasion” of Europe, the author sarcastically rejected such notion. “It appeared that “pagan” Japan did not lack knightly generosity or even compassion- traits considered to belong exclusively to Christians,” stated the author. He referred to an incident at the battle of Yalu when Russian wounded officer was treated by Japanese Red Cross, and let go. “Even if Japanese target to win European public opinion on their side, we should not reject all, what is more, such facts bring big moral relief,” argued the “populist” *Russkoe Bogatsvo*.⁶⁷¹

Moreover, its editor Professor S.N. Yuzhakov in December 1904 presented an interesting interview on the “racial discourse of the war” given by Prince Dolgorukov, the vested with power by the Far East *Zemstvo* (local government) for the newspaper *Russi*. Prince Dolgorukov, who just came from the battlefield commented, “I am convinced that there is no racial hatred between Russian and Japanese, in vain chauvinists blow that war towards the racial one.” The Prince argued, “The war is over economic interests.” He expressed his confidence that “once the war ends, Russia and Japan would live friendly as Russia and France did after the battle of Sevastopol.” Prince Dolgorukov even went into a peculiar ideology promoting internationalism and peace among races. As he prophesized, “there will come the time when the man with the flat face and strong skulls would be a friend to the man with European features. Their union would be based on strong cultural tendency and common human values.”⁶⁷²

Such pacifism was also popular among some open-minded “Liberals” such as the editor of the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, the Professor of History M.M Stasyulevich as well as the editor of the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl*, the Professor of Law, V.A. Gol’tsev. It presented a more naturalistic interpretation of Count Lev Tolstoy’s ideas of mutual love and peace, and lives in accordance to God’s will.

From the above written it can be seen that allusions to Japan as the “Yellow Peril” were rather superficial in “conservative” intellectuals’ writings, and were hardly present in the biggest part of “liberal” and “populist” writings about the war. The idea of “peril” from the “East” took a

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid, p.141

⁶⁷¹ Ibid

⁶⁷² Prince Dolgorukov’s interview for the newspaper *Russi* was reprinted in full by *Russkoe Bogatsvo* , 1904/12 (174-192pp), p.185-186

more concrete form after 1905, that is, after Russia's defeat.⁶⁷³ In the rare cases when the term "Yellow Peril" was invoked, however, it referred to China or to a union between awoken China and risen Japan. For example, an article titled "V chayanie zheltoi opasnosti" (In Expectation of the "Yellow Peril") printed in the moderate conservative petty-bourgeois journal *Niva*,⁶⁷⁴ in early 1905, appealed for "cardinal reforms at the military and naval administration after all the losses of Russian army and fleet in the Far East". In the journalist's thesis "the necessity of fortifying Russian means of defense is out of any doubt: not to mention the peril coming from the West." In addition to the peril to Russia from the "West," the author predicted another peril coming from the "East." That "Asiatic peril," however, was not perceived as Japan alone since "with the Japanese invasion Russian people will cope with anyway although having to exert a lot of efforts." In the journal's understanding, the real peril presented a possible Chinese flux in Russian lands. "China, as a grand and mysterious "yellow sphinx," after thousands of years deep sleep, undoubtedly shows some indications of national awakening,"⁶⁷⁵ stated *Niva*. What is more, Japanese victories over the "white race" in the face of Russia provoked "the yellow people to feel their real power and start speaking about their human rights," argued the "petty-bourgeois" journal. Japan's positive influence as a reformer of the "East" was also noted in the article. "Nowadays, under Japanese influence, Chinese protests have become more civilized and conscious."⁶⁷⁶

It is interesting, that, regardless of Japanese numerous victories in the battles with Russian army and fleet, *Niva* did not perceive Japan as a further threat to Russia in the military sense of the term. It rather perceived Japanese civilizing mission in East Asia, as a threat to Europe for the near future. Japan's victory over Russia and her enlightening mission in the region were expected to awaken yellow people's power and self-confidence, which could present a great

⁶⁷³ Boulger, D.C. "The "Yellow Peril" Bogey," *Living Age* (February 6, 1904), 240:321; also Mikhailova, Yu. "Images of Enemy and Self: Russian 'Popular Prints' of the Russo-Japanese War", *ASI*, vol. XVI, 1998, 30-53pp.; also M. Laryuel, 'Yellow Peril' in the Russian Nationalists' Works at the Beginning of the Century, in Airapetov, O. (ed.), *Russo-Japanese War, A View a Century Later*, 2004, online,

http://www.polit.ru/research/2004/10/11/laruelle.html#_ftn6

⁶⁷⁴ *Niva- Ilyustrovann'ii zhurnal literatur'ii, politiki i sovremennoi zhizn-* a weekly illustrated journal of literature, politics, and contemporary lifestyle, published in St. Petersburg from 1870 until 1918. Its establisher and publisher was A.F.Marx, and R.I.Sementkovskii was its chief editor until 1904. After that, it went under the control of L.F. Marx, as its publisher, and V.Ya. Svetlov as its editor. *Niva* was one of the most popular weekly journals in Russia in the early twentieth century, whose circulation reached 275 000 copies in 1917. With its moderate conservative ideology, it suited best to the bourgeois and petty bourgeois circles.

⁶⁷⁵ Svetlov, V.Ya. (ed.) "V chayanii zheltoi opasnosti. Politicheskoe obozrenie" (In Expectation of the Yellow Peril. Political Observation), in *Niva*, 1905/ vol.20, 400pp

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid

danger to the “West.” In its biggest part, however, the article referred to Chinese immigration flood in the United States, American restrictions to it, and Chinese responses to them.

That again demonstrates that the idea of “Yellow Peril” was borrowed from the American press, and did not quite fit in the Russian self-perceptions and their perceptions of Japan. Russia itself presented a unique gathering of races and religions, which once taken for granted was not questioned or criticized by Russian intellectuals. Russian existentialism characterized by its philosophic reflections explicitly on Russia’s history and future was still the “hot” topic of intellectuals’ debates along with comments on the battles and regret for Russia’s losses. Hence, it often happened that, the “enemy” was abstract in most publicists’ writings on the war during that time.

More specifically, when commenting on the war, Russian intellectuals focused their arguments upon Russia’s losses, Russia’s strategies and moves, and last but not least, upon Russia’s “ineffective clumsy military and naval bureaucracy.” Japan mostly presented in their writings as a reference point when comparing Russia and Japan’s military and naval power and financial capabilities, as well as losses. The patriotic burst in the first month of the start of the war naturally united Russians around the idea of seeking revenge for the “Japanese mean surprised attack.” In the very early stages of the war, some Slavophil minded Russian intellectuals used the opportunity to assert Russia’s status as a great power, to insist on its manifest destiny in the world, and to condemn Japan as a “Yellow Peril” posing a potential threat to the whole of European civilization in their war sketches.⁶⁷⁷

Throughout the first couple of months of the war, Russian “Liberals” and “Conservatives” alike shared the view about Russia’s ultimate triumph. A Japanese informant in Russia reported in July 1904 that Russian elite, though experiencing deep humiliation from the defeats, expected final victory.⁶⁷⁸ When the shock of the surprise attack passed away, Russian intellectuals started viewing the war in a more sober way, trying to be reasonable and restrain their emotions.

⁶⁷⁷ see Vykhodtsev, P.S. “Russko-iaponskaia voina v literature epokhi pervoi russkoi revoliutsii,” (Russo-Japanese War in the Period of the Russian First Revolution) in Desnitskii, V. A., and Muratova, K.D. (eds.), *Revoliutsiia 1905 goda i russkaia literatura*, (The Revolution of 1905 and Russian Literature) Moscow, 1956, pp.282-3; and Iezuitova, L.A. *Tvorchestvo Leonida Andreeva (1892-1906)*, (Leonid Andreev’s Works) Leningrad, 1976, pp.151-2;

⁶⁷⁸ Motono Ichirō to Komura Jutarō, 2 August 1904, *Telegram Series, reel 55*, pp.17, 808-17,811, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (microfilm collection), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., qtd. by Esthus, R. A. “Nicholas II and the Russo- Japanese War,” *Russian Review*, Vol. N.40, Oct.1981, p.397

Although Russian press had printed (or rather re-printed from the “West”) some warnings against a possible armed attack over Russia from Japan, Russian society seemed unaware of the seriousness of the situation in the Far East. Few were those that contemplated the idea of a war against Japan before it started. As seen from the Russian intellectuals’ publications on the Far Eastern question, at the informal level, there were no active supporters of the idea of going on a war against Japan. In contrast to Japan, where the images of Russia constructed in the realm of domestic public opinion were venomously anti-Russian and the society largely supported the government in a war against Russia,⁶⁷⁹ few if any Russians at the broad level had a clear vision on who the Japanese were and what they were targeting. This was partially due to the high illiteracy level of the mass, and due to the strict censorship, which left the Russian press without formal clarification on the problem until the very beginning of the war.

In addition, Western press releases on the issue were treated by Russian press as insinuations aiming at deliberate inspiration of hostile feelings among Russians and Japanese.

Finally yet importantly, there was the prevailing belief among Russians at all social levels in Russia’s might and her capability to pacify such situations. Hence, before the start of the belligerences, Russian society as a whole was not prepared psychologically for war. Russian educated elite, who had a much clearer idea of Japan’s growth and regional ambitions (as seen from the reviewed here intellectuals’ writings), also preferred to believe in the beneficiary solution of the Far Eastern crisis. In the rare cases when Russian “Liberals” wrote on the issue before the war, they praised Japan for her reformation successes and the liberalization of her society. In contrast, they criticized the Autocracy for its clumsy foreign policy and reluctance to undertake broad reforms in Russia. Few conservative minded intellectuals mainly among the large-scale industrialists, cherishing some ideas of commercial profits from the Asian East, supported Russia’s imperial advances there regardless of the risk of war. Yet, it cannot be said that even in such cases the war was desirable or that Russian nationalists carried a mass propaganda for an aggressive approach towards Japan in contrast to some Japanese nationalistic circles.

⁶⁷⁹ Shimazu, N. ““Love the Enemy”: Japanese Perceptions of Russia,” in Steinberg, J. W., at al., (Eds), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, BRILL, Leiden-Boston, 2005, (365-384pp), p.365

Moreover, although there was some patriotic burst to defend Russia's image and punish the bold Japanese in the very first days of the war, the majority of Russians perceived the war as a fight lead on a foreign territory for a foreign land. This created the sense of fighting for something remote and useless and pretty much cooled down the initial nationalistic incentive among Russian society.⁶⁸⁰ In addition, in the first half of 1904, educated class in Moscow and Petersburg seemed to pay less attention to the Russo-Japanese War compared to the attention they paid to the much more remote Anglo-Boer War two years ago.⁶⁸¹

Russians obviously expected quick victory over the "tiny" Japan, and initially did not put much thought into it. Russian mass ignorance about the reality of the Far East as well as Russian peoples' firm beliefs in quick victory over the "yaposhkami" (the little Japes), were even greater than their patriotic enthusiasm, points out the Russian historian Oleg Airapetov.⁶⁸² Even the Financial Minister Sergei Witte, presumably the strongest proponent of peace, in June 1904, expressed in front of the British Ambassador Sir Charles Hardinge his expectations about the terms that a victorious Russia would impose upon Japan.⁶⁸³

The further development of the war, similarly to its beginning, brought one surprise after another to the Russians. The row of first Russian losses (the destruction by a mine of the flagship Petropavlovsk was followed by the defeats at Tyurenchen and Nanshan and the siege of Port Arthur) provoked some Russian intellectuals to get out of the scope of their existentialist debates and express openly their stances about the war. Especially since the second half of 1904, Russian intellectuals started articulating more vigorously their political or religious philosophical views on the issue. Although their responses to the war came in different forms and tonality, the focus remained mostly on Russia, her human and material

⁶⁸⁰ In December 1903, over a month before the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Princess Elissaveta Fedorovna in her conversation with the Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, shared her prognosis on the mood of the Moscow society: "they do not want the war, they don not understand the purpose of that war, therefore there will not be any enthusiasm about it..." Kuropatkin, A.N. "Dnevnik" (Kuropatkin's Diary), K.A. II (1923), qtd. in see Oleg Airapetov, "Army, Society, and Colonial War," "Rodina" N.1, 2004

<http://www.japon.ru/?aText&ID=41685>.

⁶⁸¹ Russian newspapers were following closely the Anglo-Boer War from its very beginning. See *Novoe Vremya*, *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, *Vestnik Evropii*, and *Russkaya Mi'sl* from 1902.

⁶⁸² see Airapetov, O., "Army, Society, and Colonial War," "Rodina" N.1, 2004

<http://www.japon.ru/?aText&ID=41685>

⁶⁸³ Hardinge to Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, 30 June 1904, in *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, (ed.) G.P.Gooch and Harold Temperley, 11 vols. (London, 1926-38), 4:2-4, qtd. By Esthus, R. A., "Nicholas II and the Russo- Japanese War," in *Russian Review*, Vol. N.40, Oct.1981, p.397.

losses, as well as her campaigns on land and sea. It often happened that in many intellectuals' pronouncements on the war, Japan was either omitted, or presented mainly as a point of comparison about military strategies, capabilities, and organization. Later, the big Russian human and material losses became incentives to growing opposition of both the autocracy's plans and the war itself.

Roughly put, Russian intellectual community divided in their opinion on the war into "radical opposition," "moderate opposition," "patriots," and "Symbolists."

"Patriots" (with the exception of some close to the government conservative grand publicists), mostly kept the lower end of the mass press. Instead of following their own philosophical or religious ideology like the "moderates" and the "Symbolists," "patriots" went with the formal propaganda stream calling for revenge against the "mean" "barbarous" "enemy."

"Moderates," in turn, comprised the spectrum of those intellectuals who opposed the war in general, and insisted on immediate halt of belligerences due to some moral or religious beliefs. Yet, until the disastrous catastrophes in Tsushima and Mukden, they did not oppose the Autocracy openly for its ill-bread war strategies and approaches.

"Symbolists," in contrast, perceived the war as a refection of a large-scale event such as the approaching Apocalypse or the advent of the Antichrist. They used the war as a convenient occasion to put ahead their ideas of Russia's world destiny as the "Third Rome."

Extreme opposition formed the so-called "Social Democrats" and "Social Revolutionaries" who, in contrast to other educated circles, came up with group pronouncements, opposing ardently to the Russian imperialist war against "progressive" Japan.

Intellectuals' responses varied also in their forms- from individual written works such as articles, books, poems, and telegrams to oral public lectures or even demonstrations. It should be admitted, however, that regardless that some Russian intellectuals came up with pronouncements on the war, they did not always coincide with their ideological movements or circles. In their majority (exception present the "Social Revolutionaries" unanimous in their pronouncements), those were momentous individual responses provoked by grand historical events.

VII.1. “Liberals” and “Social Democrats” about the War of 1904-5

Although the majority of the Russian “liberal-bourgeois” opposition⁶⁸⁴ shared the widespread disapproval of the war, there was no consensus among them on the attitude to take during the war. Their main demands so far fell upon insistence for personal freedom within a lawful state, limitation of the autocratic power by a constitution, introduction of a parliamentary system, and intensive capitalist development of a state. The Russo-Japanese War with all its suddenness and horror confronted them with the dilemma to keep being opposition during the war or be idle until its end.

B. Struve,⁶⁸⁵ the editor of the issued abroad “liberal-bourgeois” journal *Osvobozhdenie*, argued on the pages of the journal that Russian people should draw a clear distinction between “the hateful regime conducting the war and the army dispatched to fight in that war.” In his perception, state and government were separate entities. His perception of the Autocracy as separate from the people led to his twofold appeals for opposition to the government but support of the Fatherland and its army, since “the army is the people in arms.”⁶⁸⁶ P.B. Struve even provoked students in his “Pis'mo k studentom” (Letter to the Students”) to go on patriotic demonstrations in moral support of the Russian army but to add to their slogans “May long live the army,” the one “May long live freedom.”⁶⁸⁷ He proclaimed the war as “pointless, but that did not mean that one should welcome the defeat of his country and countrymen, or trample on their patriotic feelings.”⁶⁸⁸

In turn, the other prominent “liberal-bourgeois,” the Professor of History at the Moscow University and active publicist P.N. Miliukov,⁶⁸⁹ also used the journal *Osvobozhdenie* to carry

⁶⁸⁴ Russian liberal-bourgeois opposition to the Autocracy with its reformist policy combined with anti-proletarian and anti-revolutionary behavior led by P.B. Struve and P.N. Miliukov differed considerably from the revolutionary left wing opposition such as the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries led by V.Lenin and L. Trotsky.

⁶⁸⁵⁶⁸⁵ Petr Bergardovich Struve (1870-1944) – a prominent Russian publicist, one of the leaders of the “legal” Marxism. In 1902, he started editing Russian liberal journal *Osvobozhdenie* published in Paris. The journal came up twice a week and soon became the organ of the Russian liberal-bourgeois opposition.

⁶⁸⁶ Struve, P.B. “Pis'mo k studentom,”)Letter to the Students) *Listok Osvobozhdeniia*, February 11 (24 Feb.), 1904,p.2-3

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸⁸ Struve, P.B. *Voina, Osvobozhdenie*, February 5 (18 Feb.), 1904

⁶⁸⁹ Paul Nikolayevich Miliukov (1859- 1943)- prominent Russian Professor of History at the Moscow University, and active political figure, one of the leaders of the Russian liberal-bourgeois opposition targeting constitutional democracy and social reformism; also Chairman of Central Committee of the

out opposition propaganda. In contrast to P.B. Struve, however, P.N.Miliukov perceived Russian army as the weapon of the government, as the “symbolic fist to Russian audacity.” He insisted on differentiation between the “official Russia” conducting the war, and “Russia of the future”- a state of peace and freedom.⁶⁹⁰ He believed that military defeats of Russia could speed up the liberation of the country from the autocratic regime. Therefore, he advised against any postponement of oppositional activity during the war.⁶⁹¹ In his understanding, “continued opposition [to the government] including opposition to the war would make Russia reform politically in time to secure true national solidarity.”⁶⁹² That appeal of his was printed in *Osvobozhdenie* just four days after the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Pleve fell victim to a terror attack.⁶⁹³ To the growing social unrest, the Autocracy responded by introducing a partial political amnesty and limited censorship. That provoked P.N. Miliukov to publish a radical essay titled “Novii Kurs” (The New Course) insisting on the formal abolition of the Autocracy followed by political, religious, and speech freedom, instead of those partial political reforms.⁶⁹⁴

To “Liberals,” even the “half-formed” Japanese representative institutions secured a better rule than “the whims of the father-figure Autocrat.”⁶⁹⁵ They contrasted Japanese “progressive” constitutionalism with Russian “worn-out” imperial bureaucracy.⁶⁹⁶ As the “moderate liberal,” Prince A.Volkonskii argued, “The result of all these [Japanese] reforms is obvious... Tolerance, civil rights (with insignificant exceptions), the emergence of an ethos of civic duty, the advance of national spirit and national unity, are all results of free initiative... in Japan public life is in full swing!”⁶⁹⁷ What is more, Russian “Liberals” in opposition greeted with applause the news about Russian fleet’s defeat at the Tavrchevskii Palace. Wartime “liberal” opposition to the government continued after Pleve’s death, with the war issue, however going to a peripheral

Party of Cadets, and editor of its central organ the journal *Rech*; in 1917 Minister of Foreign Affairs in the First Temporary Government, then immigrated.

⁶⁹⁰ “ss” [Miliukov], “Voina i russkaia oppozitsiia,” pt.I, *Osvobozhdenie*, March 7 (20 March), 1904, pp.329-30

⁶⁹¹ On P.N.Miliukov and P.B.Struve’s ideas, see Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov, and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996:116

⁶⁹² “ss” [Miliukov], “Voina i russkaia oppozitsiia,” *Osvobozhdenie*, March 7 (20 March), 1904, pp.329-30

⁶⁹³ On 15 July 1904, V.K. Pleve was assassinated for his severe policy against any opposing activities in Russia.

⁶⁹⁴ “ss” [Miliukov], “Novii kurs,” *Osvobozhdenie*, October 2 (15 Oct.), 1904

⁶⁹⁵ L.E. *Osvobozhdenie*, no.50, June 25 (17 June) 1904, pp.3-4, 7.

⁶⁹⁶ D.P. *Osvobozhdenie*, no.53, August 2 (15 Aug.) 1904, p.49

⁶⁹⁷ Volkonskii, A. “Voina,” in *Osvobozhdenie*, no.59, 10 November (23 Nov.), p.158; see also the public pamphlet, “Narod i voina,” reprinted in *Osvobozhdenie*, N.57, 2 October (15 Oct.) 1904, pp.119-20

level. It gave place to active reformist propaganda and quick growing opposition to the Autocracy from many reform-minded ideological groups.

That prompted some intellectuals such as the Professor of Philosophy at the Kiev University, Prince Evgenii Trubetskoi, to come up with appeals for the Autocracy to forestall the revolution by initiating reforms- from- above. In his article “Voina i byurocratsia” [War and Beurocracy] E.Trubetskoi blamed the Autocracy for strengthening the revolutionary parties [presumably by delaying the reformation process].⁶⁹⁸

In turn, the editor of the “liberal-bourgeois” journal *Osvobozhdenie*, the economist P.B. Struve, published “Otkritoe pismo” (Open Letter) to Prince E.Trubetskoi in the journal. He argued, “There is no internal enemy in Russia apart from the Autocracy.”⁶⁹⁹ The debate contrasted two viewpoints “no enemies on the left” versus “reforms from above than revolution below.” By the end of 1904, Russian reform-minded “liberals” were under growing external and internal pressure to make a corporate commitment to the growing opposition movement in the country.

Active opposition to both the war and the government carried also the highly revolutionary stratum of the Russian leftist circles- the “Social Democrats” and “Socialist Revolutionaries.” L. D. Trotsky,⁷⁰⁰ the ideologist of “*Mensheviki*” (the Minority) section of the “social-democratic” movement, appealed for an immediate and complete halt of the useless and disgraceful for Russia war. He blamed the Autocracy for pursuing “unrealistic imperialistic aims in Asia at the expense of the Russian common people,” and insisted on urgent signing of a peace treaty with Japan. In his article titled “Doloi pozornuyu boinyu!” (Down with the Shameful Slaughter!),⁷⁰¹ published in the revolutionary newspaper *Iskra*,⁷⁰² L. D. Trotsky condemned the Russo-Japanese war as means of reaching political goals. As he pathetically stated, “War is necessary neither to workers nor to peasants! War is not necessary to all the

⁶⁹⁸ Trubetskoi, E.N. “Voina i byurocratia” [War and Beurocracy], in *Pravo*, 39, 9 Oct. (26 Sept. O.S.), SPb., 1904

⁶⁹⁹ Struve, “Otkritoe pismo” (Open Letter) in *Osvobozhdenie*, October 1904, cited in Kassow, S.D., *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*, Univ. of Berkeley Press, CA, 1989:216

⁷⁰⁰ Lev Davidovich Trotsky (1879 – 1940)- One of the major theorists of Russian socialism, active participant in 1917 October Revolution, commissar of Foreign affairs, and the closest fellow-fighter to V.I.Lenin; leader of the right faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), the “*Mensheviki*”

⁷⁰¹ Trotsky, L. “*Doloi pozornuyu boinyu!*” (Down with the Shameful Slaughter!), *Iskra*, May 1905, In *Ì. Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya* (Russian Political Encyclopedia), 2000:6; also online release in Trotsky’s Archive, <http://www.marxists.org/russkij/trotsky/1925/trotl126.htm>;

⁷⁰² *Iskra* (1900-1905) - daily newspaper, printed in Paris under the editorship of V.I.Lenin and G.B. Plehanov; spread illegally in Russia; press organ of the Russian social-democrats

[Russian] people! It is necessary only to the government bandits who dreamed of capturing new lands and wanted with people's blood to put down the flame of people's anger."⁷⁰³ He criticized those Russian revolutionaries that sided along with the Japanese aggressor, visioning V.I. Lenin,⁷⁰⁴ and the group led by him, the so-called "*Bolsheviki*" (the Majority Social Democrats). He argued, "Freedom in Russia cannot be acquired with the help of the Japanese bayonets and at stake of Russia's national humiliation."⁷⁰⁵ His article was written as a retort to the propaganda conducted by V.I. Lenin and his revolutionary section. The "*Bolsheviki*" greeted Japanese victories over Russia, perceiving them as victories of a progressive force over a "decaying" suppressive one.

V.I.Lenin, in his article "Samoderzhavie i proletariat" (The Autocracy and the Proletariat) in the newspaper *Vperyod* [No.1 of January 4, 1905 (December 22, 1904 O.S.)], made the point that "The development of the political crisis in Russia will now depend mainly on the course of the war against Japan." To him the war exposed "the rottenness of the Autocracy; drained Russia's strength financially and militarily, and tormented and spurred on to revolt the long-suffering masses of the people, of whom this criminal and shameful war was demanding such endless sacrifices. " In his perceptions, "absolutist" Russia was defeated by "constitutional" Japan. The "*Bolsheviki*" predicted Russia's military *fiasco* and redoubling of the public discontent. "We must prepare for that moment with the utmost energy," V.I.Lenin appealed ardently.⁷⁰⁶ From the very beginning of the war, the "*Bolsheviki*" spread propaganda leaflets such as "The War started" or "To the Recruits," exposing the anti-national character of the Russo-Japanese War and appealing to the workers, peasants, and soldiers to fight against the Autocracy instead.⁷⁰⁷

⁷⁰³ Ibid

⁷⁰⁴ Vladimir I. Lenin (1870 – 1924) – the leader and ideologist of the left faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), "*Bolsheviki*" (The Majority), who after 1905 called themselves "*Socialist revolutionerii*" (Socialist Revolutionaries).

⁷⁰⁵ Trotsky, L. " *Doloi pozornuyu boinyu!*" (Down with the Shameful Slaughter!), loc.cit.

⁷⁰⁶ "The Autocracy and the Proletariat" was published as an editorial in the newspaper *Vperyod*, No. 1, January 4, 1905 (December 22, 1904); also reprinted in *Lenin Collected Works*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Moscow, vol.8, pages 17-28. transl. B. Isaacs and The Late I. Lasker

Note: *Vperyod* was an underground Bolshevik weekly-published newspaper in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1903), to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen numbers were issued. The newspaper's organizer, manager, and guiding spirit was V. I. Lenin. Other members of the Editorial Board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky, and A. V. Lunacharsky

⁷⁰⁷ For example, Saratovsk' s "*Bolsheviki*" devoted to the anti-war theme eight propaganda leaflets during 1904. see "Russko-iaponskaya voina i Saratovskii kraj" (Russo-Japanese War and the Saratovsk Region) <http://elosar.narod.ru/HTML/HIS/233.HTM>; also Sidorovichev, A. *Saratovtsii v russko-iaponskoi voine 1904-5 godov* (Citizens of Saratov in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5), Saratov, 2001

On the other hand, the fall of Port Arthur after a six-month siege and the numerous losses on both sides provoked V.I. Lenin to condemn openly the bloodshed between Japan and Russia. In his article “Padenie Port Artura” (The Fall of Port Arthur, January 1905), V.I. Lenin predicted, “this latest military debacle signifies the collapse of our entire political system.” In his image Japan presented the “advancing, progressive Asia” which had “inflicted to the backward and reactionary Europe an irreparable blow.” He reviewed the Russo-Japanese War as “an armed clash between an old conservative bourgeois state and a young progressive bourgeois one.” As V.I. Lenin publicly proclaimed, “It is not Russian people but Russian Autocracy that started that colonial war, turning it into a war between the “Old” and the “New” bourgeois world. It is not Russian people, but the Autocracy that suffered this disgraceful defeat.”⁷⁰⁸ He blamed the government for “provoking a needless war,” and appealed for peoples’ revolt against the “decaying Autocracy.”⁷⁰⁹

In fact, both “*Mensheviks*” and “*Bolsheviks*,” opposed firmly the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 anathematizing it as an “imperialistic war” targeting imperial expansion at the stake of Russian people. At the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International held during the war (August 14 to 20, 1904), opening addresses were given by both Georgi V. Plekhanov⁷¹⁰ for the Russian delegation, and Sen Katayama⁷¹¹ for the Japanese “socialist” delegation. On the stage, they embraced amid the enthusiastic applause of the assemblage. They proclaimed themselves vigorously anti-war. G.V. Plekhanov, speaking on behalf of the “*Mensheviks*,” opposed to the military victory of Russian imperialism, the victory of Russian working-class struggle for socialism. According to him, “Revolutionary proletariat should always, even regardless of wars, strive towards revolution.”⁷¹² That could be interpreted, however, that the “*Mensheviks*” did not proclaim for Russia’s military defeat. As the American writer and “socialist” activist, Hal

⁷⁰⁸ Lenin, V.I. “Padenie Port Artura” (The Fall of Port Arthur), first printed in newspaper *Vperyod* 1 2, January 14 (Jan. 1, O.S.) 1905; reprinted in *Lenin Collected Works*, transl. in English by B. Isaacs and I. Lasker, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Moscow, Vol.8, (pp.47-55), p.47; also released online via *Marxist Internet Archive* <http://mia.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/jan/14.htm>. See also Yaroslavskii, E. *Russko-iaponskaya voyna i otnoshenie k nei bol'shevikov* (Russo-Japanese War and the Bolsheviks’ Attitudes to It), M. 1939.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid

⁷¹⁰ Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856-1918) – a revolutionary and Marxist theoretician, founder of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia; later stood at the side of “*Mensheviks*.”

⁷¹¹ Sugatamo Yabuki (Sen Katayama) (1859-1933) – founder of the Japanese Socialist Party both in Japan and in America

⁷¹² Plekhanov, G.V., “Patriotism i Sotsializm” (Patriotism and Socialism) in the French journal *La vie socialiste*, also repr. in *Izbr. filosof. proizv. V 5-ti tomah* (Selected Philosophical Works in 5 vols), Vol.III, p.89-98 released online in Russian <http://www.comunist.ru/root/archive/theory/patrio...>

Draper argues, the “*Menshevik*” “counterpoised their own socialist solution to any military outcome, victory, or defeat, on the plane of the inter-imperialist conflict.”⁷¹³

In contrast, V.I.Lenin preached some kind of peculiar “defeatism” – one that sought to combine some variety of “defeat of your own government” with the anti-war policy of opposition to both war camps, states Hal Draper.⁷¹⁴

In addition, although the “*Menshevik*’s” position appeared identical to the “*Bolshevik*’s” one, there were also other differences in their claims on the war. The “*Menshevik*” argued that the underlying causes of the war were exclusively political: the ossified character of Tsarism and its need for a foreign diversion provoked Japanese to resort to war. The “*Bolshevik*,” in turn, argued that the war had also economic motives: Russian capitalism chasing markets and sources of raw materials abroad. To the most revolutionary of the “Social Democrats,”⁷¹⁵ the war invited attacks on the “imperial plutocracy” and the “cannibal capitalism” of “bloodthirsty speculation” devouring the lives of workers and peasants.⁷¹⁶

Nevertheless, both sections of the “social democratic” movement used the war extensively to reach their aims, namely, tumbling down the autocratic regime in Russia and its substitution with a new *just* social order. To ruin the image of the autocratic power, “*Bolshevik*” and “*Menshevik*” from the very beginning of the war unanimously propagated insistently about the Autocracy’s inability to defend the country from the external threat. The “*Menshevik*” Parvus (real name Alexander Lazarevich Gel’fand) published a series of articles titled “*Voina i revoliutsia*” (War and Revolution) in the issued abroad revolutionary newspaper *Iskra* conducting such oppositionist propaganda. He foresaw the defeat of Russia by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War and the failure of the followed it revolution. In his predictions, the defeat of a decaying imperialist state by a progressive one was imminent. As he wrote, “To liquidate tsarism, History has established its appropriate adversary. By virtue of its geographical position, Japan has the priority, in the struggle against the Autocracy, over the capitalist states of

⁷¹³ Draper, H. “The Myth of Lenin’s “Revolutionary Defeatism,”” in *New International*, theoretical journal of the US Independent Socialist League. The article appeared as a 3-part series in Vol.XIX No.5 (September-October 1953), Vol.XIX No.6 (November-December 1953) and Vol.XX No.1 (January-February 1954). Also released online

<http://www.marxists.org/archive/draper/1953/defeat/chap2.htm#n28>

⁷¹⁴ Ibid

⁷¹⁵ On “Revolutionary Socialists” see Jones, A., “Easts and Wests Befuddled: Russian Intelligentsia Responses to the Russo-Japanese War” in Wells, D. and Wilson, S. (eds.) *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999,pp. 134-160

⁷¹⁶ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, no.39, 1 January 1905, p.9; and no.41, 15 February 1905, p.1; also no.43, 15 March 1905, p.3

Western Europe...”⁷¹⁷ He also prophesized, that the Russian Revolution “would shatter the basses of the capitalist world and would give the working class a vanguard position.” His predictions on the war and the revolution after it, won Parvus a name of a great analytic among Russian “Social Democrats” once they came true.⁷¹⁸ In contrast to the “*Bolsheviki*,” the “*Mensheviki*” were more active in their anti-war propaganda. A row of famous “*Mensheviki*” such as Yu.O.Martov, B.Aksel’rod, F.I.Dan, G.B.Plehanov, A.N.Potresov, N.N.Zhordania, I.G.Tseteli, N.S.Cheidze were said to have advanced anti-war slogans for immediate cessation of arms.⁷¹⁹

VII.2. “Pacifists” versus “Patriots”- Lev Tolstoy’s Ideas and Principal “Conservative” Press Responses

Count Lev N. Tolstoy⁷²⁰ and his “pacifist” followers (often called “Tolstoyans”) presented another strong opposition to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. They also appealed ardently for immediate halt of the belligerences. In contrast to the majority of oppositionists to the war and to the government however, Count L.Tolstoy and his followers had carried for a long time anti-war and anti-suppressive government propaganda due to their moral or religious beliefs rather than targeting some personal or group political gains. Count L.Tolstoy’s pacifist and oppositionist ideology dated back since the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8- the last war into which he took part and which changed cardinally his views on the world and man’s mission there, as well as his lifestyle.

Count L.Tolstoy’s ethic principles of lifestyle had their origin in the Bible: “Moses’ Decalogue” (first and foremost “Do not kill!”), and the “Old Testament Commandment”- “Love your neighbor, as you love yourself!” (Levit, XIX, 18), as well as the “Evangelical Covenant” about “non-resistance to the evil by force.”⁷²¹ Those commandments Count L. Tolstoy interpreted in their literary meaning and preached them with great devotion. His moral

⁷¹⁷ Parvus, *Iskra*, no.61, 5 March 1904, p.2

⁷¹⁸ Parvus cited in Shub, L. “Kupets revolyutsii” in *Novii Zhurnal*, N.87, New York, 1967:298

⁷¹⁹ “Mensheviki i Bolsheviki v period Russko-iaponskoi voinii i pervoi Russkoi revolyutsii” (*Mensheviki* and *Bolsheviki* in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War and Russian Revolution), in *Istoria Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bol’shevikov): Kratkii kurs.* (History of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): A Brief Course. Central Committee of C.P.S.U.(B.), (ed.), 1938, M.; reprint OGIZ- Gospolitizdat, 1946:53

⁷²⁰ Count Lev N. Tolstoy (1828-1910)-a prominent Russian novelist, religious philosopher, and pacifist.

⁷²¹ See Lur’e, Ya.S. *Posle L’va Tolstogo. Istoricheskie vozzrenia Tolstogo i problem’ii XX veka* (After Lev Tolstoy. Tolstoy’s Historical Outlook and Issues of the Twentieth Century), SPB, “Dmitri Bulanin”, 1993

views on non-violence and non-resistance were well defined in his articles: “Ofiterskaya pamyatka” (Commemorative Booklet for Officers) 1901, and “Soldatskaya pamyatka” (Commemorative Booklet for Soldiers) 1901, “Bethink Yourselves,” 1904, and in his brochures “Rabstvo nashego vremeni” (Slavery in Our Times) 1898, “Patriotism i pravitel’stvo” (Patriotism and Government) 1900, and “Edinoe na potrebu” (Universal Need) 1905.⁷²²

Days before the Russo-Japanese War burst out, Count L.Tolstoy, as the most prominent Russian novelist and philosopher abroad, was sent a telegram by the *North American Newspaper* inquiring whether he was “Sympathetic to Russia, or Japan, or neither?” A day after the war burst, Count L.Tolstoy sent back a telegram (handwritten in English by his family doctor Grigorii M. Berkenheim), containing a brief but powerful retort. It said, “I am not for Russian nor for Japanese governments, but for the deceived laboring people of both countries, obliged to fight against their welfare, conscience, and religion. Tolstoy.”⁷²³

Five months later, in his article “Bethink Yourselves!” of 27 June 1904, he ardently argued for peoples’ unconditional obedience to true Christian and Buddhist dogmas forbidding killing, and appealed for non-resistance of violence by force as “God expects us to do so.” In his perception, this was “again a useless war, unreasonable sufferings, lies again, mass stupidity, humans turned brutal...” In accordance to God’s will to humans, he ardently opposed the war, and asked Russian soldiers to disobey their officers and immediately leave the battlefield.⁷²⁴

To the blames that this “enemy” was killing Russian soldiers and was threatening Russian interests, Count L.Tolstoy replied, “Before the war started, my life had started.... I cannot act in contra to God’s demands to me, and therefore, as a human, I can neither directly nor by any implication or order, nor in assistance or excitation, participate in a war; I cannot, I do not want, and I will not!”⁷²⁵

Count L.Tolstoy’s deepest indignation was provoked by the senseless death of thousands of people both Russian and Japanese, “suffering for their predatory rulers’ sake.” In his Letter of

⁷²² See those articles and brochures in Tolstoy, L. *Poln.Sobr.Soch. Yubileinoe izdanie v 90 t.* (Full Collected Works. Anniversary Edition in 90 Volumes), Moskva, 1928-1958; also Sokolow J.A., and Roosevelt P.R. “Leo Tolstoi’s Christian Pacifism”, Pittsburgh, 1987, *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* ; No. 604.

⁷²³ “Pismo L.N.Tolstogo v amerikanskoj gazetii *North American Newspaper* “ L.N.Tolstoy’s Letter to the North American Newspaper) of 9 (22) February 1904, in *Rossiiskii Archive, Istoria Otechestva v svidete’stvah i dokumentah XVIII-XX vv.* (Russian Archive. History of Homeland in Documentary Evidence from XVIII-XX Centuries), Studio Trite, M., 1992:246

⁷²⁴ Tolstoy, L. N. “Bethink Yourselves!” *The Times*, Monday, Jun 27, 1904; pg. 4; Issue 37431; col A

⁷²⁵ Ibid

22 November (O.S.) 1904 to his doctor from the neighboring village, Count L.Tolstoy expressed hopes that “Russo-Japanese War would open peoples’ eyes to the criminality of the Russian government and would convince them in the necessity to get rid of this political violence.”⁷²⁶

Yet, Count L.Tolstoy admitted to suffer from deep patriotic distress at the surrender of Port Arthur. As he wrote with regret in his diary, “The surrender of Port Arthur has distressed me. I suffer from it. This is patriotism. I am brought up on it and I am not free on it...”⁷²⁷

Count L. Tolstoy’s anti-war and non-resistance to evil ideas found their resonance even at the “enemy” state. The famous Japanese newspapers *Asahi Shimbun* and *Heimin Shimbun* also translated in Japanese and reprinted Count L.Tolstoy’s article “Bethink Yourselves” in a series of periodic issues in 1904. The weekly newspaper *Heimin Shimbun*, under the editorship of Kotoku Shyusui and other “Socialists” openly declared their anti-war stance. In a Tolstoy style, they declared, “Call us not loyal to the government- wonderful! Call us traitors of our country-wonderful! However, if you consider us not loyal because we do not glorify the war and do not ingratiate ourselves with the military officers, then we would bear with pleasure the shame of being called “not loyal” to our country.”⁷²⁸

One of Count L.Tolstoy’s Russian “pacifist” followers among the writers was the famous dramatist and writer Leonid N.Andreev (1871-1919). In November 1904, in the heat of the Russo-Japanese War, he wrote his story *Krasn’ii smeh* (Red Laughter) which put the start of a new turn in his creative work –from realism to symbolism. The madness of the war he disclosed in a symbolic way, through the image of the “Red Laughter,” beginning its reign in the world.⁷²⁹ Through symbols, L.N. Andreev expressed his deep disgust and horror of the war. The red color, symbolizing blood, was prevailing in his story. His main character was one of the “people marching in silence under the sun, grown numb of exhaustion and heat, swinging and falling down, insane people. They do not know where they are going...red insane eyes...in

⁷²⁶“Spomeni na zemskii vrach iz sosednego Koreiza Konstantin Vassil’evich” (Memoirs of the Zemskii Doctor from the Neighbouring Koreiza Dr. Konstantin Vassilev’ich) in Bol’shakov, L., *Orenburgskaya tolstovaya entsiklopediya*, vol. III, p.75, 188; also released online <http://www.orenburg.ru/culture/encyclop/tom3/342.h>

⁷²⁷ Tolstoy, L. *Sobranie sochinenii* (Collected Works), vol.20, Moscow, 1965:206, cited in Wells, D. and S.Wilson, *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, 1904-05, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:124

⁷²⁸ cit. from online info from *Asahi Shimbun* <http://www.inopressa.ru/asahi/2004/02/11/14:16:33/tolstoy>
⁷²⁹ On Leonid Andreev’s ideas see Iezuitova, L.A. *Tvorchestvo Leonida Andreeva (1892-1906)* [Leonid Andreev’s Works], Leningrad, 1976:151-2;

them you can see only horror and madness...blood is pouring off the pale face, laughing with an insane laughter- the Red Laughter....”⁷³⁰

Similar to Count L.Tolstoy’s earlier anti-army and anti-war “Sevastopolskih razhazov” (Sevastopol Stories), L. Andreev took a psychological approach, likening wars to insanity. The issue of the grave soldier’s lifestyle in the war and the sufferings of those hurt substituted the typical, for a war literature, issue of the “enemy” versus Fatherland.

Another follower of Count L.Tolstoy’s pacifism was Alexander I. Kuprin (1870 - 1938) - a famous writer from the “realist” literary school of thought. In May 1905, when the whole country was suffering from the losses and defeats in the war, A.Kuprin became famous with his anti-army story “Poedinok” (The Duel). It was originally published in the sixth volume of collected stories *Znanie*. Portraying Russian army and staff officers A.Kuprin with merciless veracity, like L.Tolstoy in his “Sevastopolskih razhazov” (Sevastopol Stories), demonstrated the tedious sides of Russian army. In his satirical description of the state of the Russian army, he mocked at the vain pomposity of Russian officers, criticized them severely, and deeply sympathized to common soldiers’ sufferings. As he wrote, “Officers brought soldiers to utter physical exhaustion without considering with what was left of thier strength. Company commanders offended and upset junior officers; juniors in turn talked smut unnaturally lubberly and hideously; corporals hoarse out of swearing fought with each other. ..”⁷³¹

A. Kuprin started writing his story before the war and completed it after the fall of Port Arthur. Although the Russo-Japanese War was not mentioned explicitly there, the reading public perceived “Poedinok” (The Duel) as a true depiction of the war events of 1904-5. Because of *Poedinok*’s fame, the sixth volume of collected works “Znanie” was printed in 20 000 copies and was quickly sold out. In a month, “Poedinok” came up as a separate novel (it was re-issued five times until 1916). The military debacles and oppositionist fervor through the country determined the great success of this anti- army and anti-war story.

A.Kuprin wrote another critic of the Russian army in a much more popular style – the spy story “Stabs Capitan Rybnikov” (Staff-captain Rybnikov) (1905). The spy plot featured a Japanese spy agent so skillfully disguised as a Russian officer in St. Petersburg that he freely passed for Russian from the Central Asian lands. This spy was described as “malicious, mocking,

⁷³⁰ Andreev, L. “*Krasnii smeh*” (Red Laughter), 8 November 1904, online released text <http://lib.ru/ANDREEWL/redlaugh.txt>

⁷³¹ Kuprin, A. “Poedinok” (The Duel), in *Znanie* , vol. 6, May 1905, Chapter II, 71—72pp., see also online released text <http://www.kuprin.de/rutxt/berkov.txt>

intelligent, even noble, but not human, animal instead, or more precisely of face belonging to a being from a different planet.”⁷³² The Japanese skillfulness in spying was among the topics often present in the Russian press. Japanese preparedness for the war due to their excellent spying network was often contrasted to Russian bad military organization and clumsy bureaucracy. As a writer who targeted broad reading public, A.Kuprin skillfully combined his appraisal of Japanese spy agent’s cunningness and skillfulness with his patriotic negativism towards this “enemy.” For example, his main character Shtavinskii often contemplated about “samurai’s spirit,” and “brave as a devil despising death” Japanese spy under the cover name Rybnikov. Nevertheless, he perceived the elusive spy as “yellow monkey, machine, inhuman,” and finally unmasked him by his uttering the words “banzai!” in the arms of a Russian prostitute. A.Kuprin’s critique of the Russian military spy network and army organization was at times presented implicitly through his ridicule of scenes in this deeply psychological thriller, yet it persisted as a red line through the whole his story.⁷³³

Still other follower of Count L.Tolstoy’s anti-war propaganda was the famous Russian naturalist writer Vikentii V. Veresaev (Simidovich) (1867 -1945) – a doctor, prose writer, literary critic, and translator of poetry. Russian “Populists” and “Social Democrats” often used his oppositionist stance towards the bureaucratic regime as a cause to start public polemics on political issues.⁷³⁴ When the Russo-Japanese War started, V.Veresaev was sent to the battlefield to serve as a medical officer. He started transcribing impressions of the war and the Russian army while he was still on active duty, and published them in series of articles under the common name “Razkazov o voine” (Stories about the War) (1906), and later in the long memoir “Na voine” (In the War) (1907). His works presented his protest against the senseless mass death. He described the bloody front-line atmosphere very naturalistically. In addition, he revealed Russian untalented army command, the embezzlement of public funds, and clumsy military bureaucracy. Being a doctor, however, he most often reflected upon human moral duties and mission. His stories varied a bit in their subject, but each in one way or another

⁷³² Kuprin, A.I. “Stabs Capitan Rybnikov” (Staff-captain Rybnikov), in *Mir Bozhii*, 1906, N1-4; N.1., p.34

⁷³³ Kuprin, A.I. “Stabs Capitan Rybnikov” (Staff-captain Rybnikov), in *Mir Bozhii*, 1906, N.4:236-; also *A.I.Kuprin Izbrann’ie Sochinenia* (Selected Works), M., Hudozhestvennaya L-ra, 1985: also released online <http://kuprin-aleksandr.planetaknig.ru/read/29961-...>

⁷³⁴ See the Petersburg populist journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1899/1 and 1899/2; and the Social-democratic newspaper *Nachalo*, 1899/4

captured the gloomy atmosphere of the front and people's inability to see their real assignment from God.⁷³⁵

"Pacifists" like Count Lev Tolstoy, Leonid Andreev, Alexander Kuprin, Vikentii Veresaev and other followers of Tolstoy's anti-war ideas met rigorous criticism in the face of the "patriotic" principal conservative press, loyal to the government.⁷³⁶

In contrast to the "pacifists," those "patriots" supported Russia in the war of 1904-5 due to their beliefs that Russia's dignity and image of a great power, as well as national interests in the Far East had to be defended, while Japan had to be punished for her "mean" surprising attack. The "conservative" press comprised the biggest part of the so-called "patriots." It was intolerable in its attacks over the "traitors" of the Fatherland.

As the Petersburg "upper-bourgeois" newspaper *Novosti i Birzhevaya Gazeta* pointed out, Count L. Tolstoy's appeals to the soldiers to leave the battlefield in the middle of the war, "even if Petersburg and Moscow were under threat," provoked both Russian and English evening and morning press to react immediately with sharp comments. "This demonstrated the great fame and influence which L. Tolstoy enjoyed at home and abroad."⁷³⁷

On the other hand, through the Russian press comments on Tolstoy's pacifist propaganda became clear separate newspapers and journals' stance on the issue of war or peace, which otherwise often remained vaguely defined probably due to the strict wartime censorship.

The most influential among the "conservative" newspapers *Moskovskie Vedomosti* was the first in Russia to react with an article "Idet Russko-Iaponskaya Voina" (Russo-Japanese War is Going on) on the same evening of 27 June 1904. It demanded from the government to "bridle

⁷³⁵ "Razkazov o voine" (Stories about the War), 1906, and the memoir "Na voine" (In the War) 1907; On V. Veresaev and the War of 1904-5, see Scherr, B.P. "The Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Literary Imagination," in Steinberg, J. at all. (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, BRILL Leiden-Boston, 2005: 425-448

⁷³⁶ "Conservatism" is a capacious term comprising within its range different nuances of viewpoint from bordering with moderate liberalism to utmost obscurantism. Conservative monarchist press argued for preservation and consolidation of autocracy. The right wing of the conservative monarchist press, in addition to its adherence to principles of 'Autocracy,' 'National Traits,' and 'Orthodoxy,' argued for defense of landowner and nobility's interests, criticized any form of opposition to the autocracy, and demonstrated openly its anti-democratic views. There were also conservative monarchists who often closed up with liberal-bourgeois stratum in defense of economic reforms from bourgeois character.

⁷³⁷ "Russia's Victory" in *Novosti i Birzhevaya Gazeta*, St. Petersburg, 2 July (19 June O.S.) 1904

the old madman” and exhibit him “outrageous naked and unadorned.”⁷³⁸ Any opposition to the Autocracy and the policy led by it, the conservative newspaper considered a betrayal to Russia. What is more, to *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, the appeal to soldiers to leave the battlefields in the heat of the war presented “either the biggest sin or an idea of an old insane man.”⁷³⁹

Next morning, the London correspondent of the other “upper-bourgeois” newspaper *Novosti i Birzhevaya Gazeta* reported ironically in the article “Podeda Rossii” (Russia’s Victory) [of 15 (28) June 1904] that a newspaper like the *Times* with an opposite stance to that of Count L.Tolstoy, had published his article obviously for some self-benefits. As *Novosti i Birzhevaya Gazeta* commented it bitterly, Russia “won” since “everybody, friends and enemies, reverently bowed their heads in front of the grandeur of such words...”⁷⁴⁰

The Moscow “petty-bourgeois” newspaper *Russkii Listok* in its article “Goloss L.N.Tolstova v Anglii” (L.N.Tolstoy’s Voice in England) issued two contradictory comments on the English press about Tolstoy. His appeal was criticized by the *Times*, and highly praised by the *Daily News*. *Russkii Listok* limited its comments to the reports on the English press reactions since, as it pointed out, “it was very bad timing to transmit Count L.Tolstoy’s message to Russian public in the in the heat of the war.”⁷⁴¹

The Petersburg “monarchist” newspaper *Novoe Vremya* simply remarked that Count L.Tolstoy’s pacifism was well known in Russia long before the current war. Instead of attacking Count L.Tolstoy, *Novoe Vremya* attacked the English press suspecting it of deliberate propaganda targeting disturbances among Russian people. The fact that “England is Japan’s ally, means that publishing such a statement in an English newspaper turns to be more than a simple slip up or naivety. The conservative newspaper notable for its patriotic support of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war reproached the *Times* that “such an act is reprehensible.”⁷⁴²

⁷³⁸ “Idet Russko-Iaponskaya Voina” (Russo-Japanese War is Going on) in *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, M., 27 June (14 June O.S.) 1904

⁷³⁹ Ibid

⁷⁴⁰ “Russia’s Victory”, London. 15 (28) June 1904, *Novosti i Birzhevaya Gazeta* Carrespondent’s Report reprinted with comments in *Novosti i Birzhevaya Gazeta*, St.Petersburg, 2 July (19 June O.S.) 1904

⁷⁴¹ “Glass L.N.Tolstova v Anglii” (L.N.Tolstoy’s Voice in England” in *Russkii Listok*, Moskva, 3 July (20 June O.S.) 1904

⁷⁴² “Graf Tolstoy i voina” (Count Tolstoy and Wars) in *Novoe Vremya*, St.Petersburg, 4 July (21 June O.S.) 1904

The Petersburg “conservative upper-bourgeois” newspaper *Grazhdanin* in the article “Dnevnikii” (Diaries) proclaimed Count L.Tolstoy to be “the worst enemy and the executioner of Russian war heroes.” Among those going to war, *Grazhdanin* argued, there were “people who hate the idea of war, yet, out of love to their Fatherland and their Tsar, place this love above their detestation of wars...sacrificing their lives in the name of their homeland.” Count L.Tolstoy and his followers were proclaimed “traitors” to Russia by the known for its strong nationalism newspaper.⁷⁴³

The Russian church also took up this call full heartedly moreover so since Count L.Tolstoy was excommunicated by it long time ago for his peculiar religious preaching inconsistent completely with the Orthodox Christian canons. According to the holy pious Johan Kronshtadskii, “in the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese hegemonic ambitions, the interests of English “civilizers,” and those of the Russian revolutionary nihilists joined together.” In addition, Russian clergy found Russian “Orthodoxy threatened mostly by revolutionary-nihilists and Tolstoyan aspirations.”⁷⁴⁴ The purpose of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Russian Orthodox Christian clergy saw in the assertion of Russian Orthodoxy in the Far East, and ideas as Tolstoy’s were distracting Russian people from their mission.

The “conservative upper-bourgeois” *Moskovskie Vedomosti* in the article “Noveishii pamphlet grafa Tolstogo” (Count Tolstoy’s Latest Pamphlet) also bitterly reminded that L.Tolstoy had long ago ceased to be Russian and Christian. Therefore, the current war could not provoke in him any “collision of feelings.” The Moscow conservative press declared Count L.Tolstoy “foreign to Russia, to whom it was completely indifferently, whether Japanese would conquer Petersburg, Moscow, or all the Russia and would demand humiliating shameful conditions...No Russian could feel, think, and act so vulgarly and meanly,” concluded the newspaper.”⁷⁴⁵

The Petersburg “conservative upper-bourgeois” newspaper *Grazhdanin* in the article “Tolstoy zagovoril” (Tolstoy Began to Speak) argued that his “nasty anti-patriotic article,” could be a result of “either a delusion or a crime,” but “in any case, it must be immediately fulminated,”

⁷⁴³ “Dnevnikii” (Diaries) in *Grazhdanin*, St.Petersburg. 7 July (24 June O.S.) 1904.

⁷⁴⁴ Citation from online article “ Russkie misliteli o zashtite Pravoslavia na Dal’nem Vostoke” (Russian Thinkers about the Defense of Orthodoxy in the Far East) in *Voronezhkii Eparhialnii Vestnik* (Diocesan Newspaper from Voronezh), http://www.vob.ru/public/bishop/ep_vest/2004/2-72/popovkin.htm

⁷⁴⁵ “Noveishii pamphlet grafa Tolstogo” (Count Tolstoy’s Latest Pamphlet) in *Moskovskie Vedomosti* 10 July (27 June O.S.) 1904

especially in our times of “disorder and agitation everywhere.” Hot with the fumes of patriotism, *Grazhdanin* imagined people like Count L.Tolstoy “in the peaceful times to lead dissolute lives, grow physically and morally weak, vulgarize, and visibly grow stupid.” In its fervent chauvinistic viewpoint, “war is not a disaster. It is our salvation, our heroic means to shake up and change root and branch the currently feeble and sodden [human] organism. God knows what is right,” pathetically concluded *Grazhdanin*.⁷⁴⁶

The effect of Count L.Tolstoy’s ideas into practice could be also seen in Colonel E.I.Mart’inov’s article “Otkuda proizhudit sila Iaponii i slabost’ Rossii?” (Where do Japan’s Strength and Russia’s Weakness Come from?) written as a retort to Count L.Tolstoy’s “Bethink Yourselves.” Colonel E.I.Mart’inov’s, participant in the war, compared the Russian and Japanese public attitudes towards the war and their armies. His comparison was not in Russia’s advantage. In his viewpoint, “in semi-literate Russia, the university departments, the literature, and the press, systematically conduct views regarding nationalism as an outdated idea, and patriotism as idea, which is under the dignity of the contemporary “intellectuals” to possess.” He sharply criticized Tolstoyan preaching of “love to the whole humankind; wars as remains of barbarity, and army as the main obstacle to social progress...ideas which penetrated even the army.”⁷⁴⁷ Such views highly contrasted to the patriotic fervor in Japan in support of the war against Russia.

Russian lack of patriotic support for Russian military activities in the Far East were criticized not only by E.I.Mart’inov but by the majority of Russian “conservative” publicists who shared Vl.Solov’ev’s ideas of “Opravdanii dobra” [Justification of the “Good”], and “Tryoh razgovorah o voine, progresse i kontse vsemirnoi istorii” [Three Conversations on War, Progress and End of Humanity].⁷⁴⁸ Such intellectuals argued for the necessity of a “*just* war” or a “*holy* war” in defense of the homeland’s security and interests. In this context, E.I.Mart’inov’s article must have found large repercussion in the conservative press since it was reprinted immediately in full in the newspapers *Novoe Vremya*, *Molva*, *Russ*, *Voennii Goloss*, and *Russkii Invalid*.

⁷⁴⁶“Tolstoy zagovoril” (Tolstoy Began to Speak) in *Grazhdanin*, St.Petersburg, 14 (1 O.S.) July 1904

⁷⁴⁷ Mart’inov, E.I. “V chems sila Iaponii i slabost’ Rossii? (Where does Japan’s Strength and Russia’s Weakness hide?) January 1904, publ. in various Russian newspapers in 1904: *Molva*, *Rus’*, *Voennii Goloss*, and *Russian Invalid*, <http://cruiserx.narod.ru/martinov/martinov.htm>

⁷⁴⁸“Opravdanii dobra” [Justification of the “Good”], 1900 and “Tryoh razgovorah o voine, progresse i kontse vsemirnoi istorii” [Three conversations on war, progress and end of humanity], 1900, reprinted in Solov’ev, Vl.S. *Sobr. Soch. v dva toma*, (Collected Works in two vols.), M.1988, Vol.1, p.467-

In brief, members of widely differing schools of thought appropriated the Russo-Japanese War to put forward their own particular ideas.

Russian “conservative” press, for example, played the leading part in conducting images of Russia and Japan that suited most the ruling elite. The articles and semi-literary sketches which appeared in the “conservative” press close to the government, made use of the opportunity (in 1904 at least) to assert Russia as a great power, to insist on her mission in Asia, and to condemn Japan as a “Yellow Peril” or at least as a “barbarian” posing a potential threat to European civilization. With such agitation, the “patriotic” press aimed at raising the spirits of patriotism in its reading public, and uniting the split up social strata. Any pacifist slogan or publication in wartime immediately turned into conservative publicists’ target of deep criticism and mockery as happened with Count L. Tolstoy’s telegrams and letters.

VII.3. “Moderate” Press’ Attitude to the Belligerent Countries and the War

Among the Russian press, few journals and newspapers tried to keep moderate stance on the “other” belligerent party- Japan and the war against her. Their pose was a strong opposition neither to the Russo-Japanese War nor to the Autocracy. Yet, it was not a strong support to Russia in that war either. In general, they did not support the war against Japan perceiving it as a war led over a remote and needless to Russia land, a war bringing only vast human and financial losses to Russia. In addition, the “Moderate Liberals” and “Moderate Conservatives” openly paid tribute to Japanese capabilities and organization. Although that brought them to some extent closer to the other liberal minded intellectuals such as the “Liberal-bourgeois” and the “Social Democrats,” the so-called “Moderate Liberals” firmly kept distance from any revolutionary activities or open anti-government propaganda. At the end of 1904, however, after the row of Russia’s defeats, even a great number of moderate and conservative minded intellectuals joined the opposition movement.

Niva- one of the most popular among Russian educated elite weekly journals, presents an example of withdrawal from the ideological movement it belonged.⁷⁴⁹ With its moderate

⁷⁴⁹ *Niva. Ilyustrovann’ii zhurnal literatur’ii, politiki i sovremennoi zhizn* (a weekly illustrated journal of literature, politics, and contemporary lifestyle), published in St. Petersburg from 1870 until 1918 . Its establisher and publisher was A.F.Marx, and the candidate of Law and Literary critic R.I.Sementkovskii was its chief editor until fall of 1904. After that, it went under the control of L.F. Marx, as its publisher, and V.Ya. Ivchenko (pen name Svetlov), as its editor. *Niva* was one of the most popular weekly journals

conservative ideology, until mid 1904 *Niva* suited best to the “bourgeois” and “petty-bourgeois conservative” circles, the majority of which followed closely the official wartime propaganda. Although *Niva* reflected the opinion of the “moderate conservative” intellectuals, many “liberal” intellectuals found it prestigious to publish in it. The second half of 1904, however, *Niva* changed its policy towards the war and Japan cardinally, thus, presenting a more “liberal” point of view.

Its owner and publisher A.F.Marx aimed to keep the journal away from the polemics on the war. However, obviously provoked by Russia’s losses, he finally allowed the editor of *Niva*, the candidate of Law and literary critic R.I.Sementkovskii, to release a brief cover of the war events. In its first political reviews, titled “Responses to the War,” *Niva*, similarly to the majority of Russian “conservative” journals and newspapers, focused its expose on the patriotic outbursts among the Russians, their readiness for self-sacrifices, and the public raising money for the army.⁷⁵⁰ Like the majority of Russian society, *Niva* believed that “the unity and power of Russian people hardly leave any doubt that Japan would soon get a severe penalty.”⁷⁵¹ What is more, in *Niva*’s perceptions, “Russia was destined to defend with her “breast” European nations and their civilization from the pressure of semi-barbarous, mysterious, and foreign to us Asia.” Since that required “a more detailed study of those hostile forces...”⁷⁵² *Niva* published a row of articles on Japan during 1904-5- on her history, geography, religion, military skills and strategies.⁷⁵³

The ongoing war, however, brought to Russia mainly human and material losses. Because of that, the “moderate conservative” journal focused on the heroic deeds of Russian soldiers and the generosity of Russian common people instead. Although *Niva* appealed against the war since it was “destructive to all,” it referred mainly to the lots of atrocities committed by the Japanese army. In the journal’s perceptions “in Asia human life has no value, that is why the yellow world is used to bloody sacrifices.” The image that *Niva* constructed of the Japanese in 1904 was of people who “showed eastern barbarianism combined with Western techniques in

in Russia in the early twentieth century, whose circulation reached 235 000 copies in 1900, and 275 000 copies in 1917.

⁷⁵⁰ “Kak otkliknulas Rus’ na vest o voine” (How Russia Responded to the News of the War), in *Niva*, 1904/vol.6, 113-114pp.

⁷⁵¹ “Otkliki Voin’ii” (Responses to the War), in *Niva* 1904/vol.7, p.136

⁷⁵² “Hristianskie mucheniki v Iaponii v XVI veka” (Christian Martyrs in Japan at the End of the XVI C), *Niva*, 1904/vol.14, 267-270pp.;

⁷⁵³ For example, “Iaponia i Korea” (Japan and Korea); *Niva*, 1904/vol. 6, p.120; and “Hristianskie mucheniki v Iaponii v XVI veka” (Christian Martyrs in Japan at the End of the XVI C), loc.cit.; also “Iaponskie bogove” (Japanese Gods), *Niva* 1904/vol.47, 943pp.; and Yu. Elets, “Vblizi Iapontsev (iz tekusht’ii vojn’ii) [Close Look at the Japanese], *Niva* 1905/vol.9, 170pp.

the fight.” Nevertheless, as its editor R.I.Sementkovskii pointed out ironically, “Japanese government relies on Baron Suematsu’s sweet eloquent skills to convince Europe in Japanese gentleness and mildness.”⁷⁵⁴

On the other hand, the journal presented Russia “as an extremely peaceful state which resorts to war only as final means to defend her national interests.”⁷⁵⁵ That interpretation did not vary much from the “civilization discourse” in the mainstream “conservative” journals. Interestingly, Russians like Japanese, presented themselves to the world as “civilized” people fighting against “barbarians.”⁷⁵⁶ That approach could have targeted winning a broad range of sympathizers both inside and outside of Russia. On the other hand, it demonstrated that to some Russians Japan was still a remote country, and their knowledge of the Japanese was still negligible as *Niva* itself admitted.⁷⁵⁷

At the end of 1904, however, the “moderate conservative” journal *Niva* changed its sharp accusing tone pointed to Japan. The series “Otkliki Voin’ii” (Responses to the War) turned to extremely positive stance to the Japanese, which was in full contrast from the rest of the big conservative press such as *Novoe Vremya* and *Moskovskie Vedomosti*. For the first time *Niva* praised both Russian and Japanese “bravery, high military qualities, and great tenacity - excellent examples for the history of war.”⁷⁵⁸

The list of Japanese victories in 1904 and 1905 was indeed highly impressive,⁷⁵⁹ while Russia had not listed even one major victory over Japan with the exception of few single acts of bravery of Russian land and naval forces. That could be one possible cause for the sudden change in the tone of the moderate conservative journal. Another reason could be the assignment of a new publisher and editor after the death of its first publisher Adolph F.Marx. Under the new editor Valerii Ya. Ivchenko (with penname Svetlov), *Niva* started pouring

⁷⁵⁴ “Otkliki Voin’ii” (Responses to the War), in *Niva* 1904/vol.25,p.500

⁷⁵⁵ “Otkliki Voin’ii” (Responses to the War), in *Niva* 1904/vol.25, p. 500

⁷⁵⁶ On the Japanese “civilization discourse,” see Shimazu, N. “Love the Enemy”: Japanese Perceptions of Russia, in Steinberg, J. W., *et al.* (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, BRILL, Leiden-Boston, 2005, (365-384pp)

⁷⁵⁷ *Niva*, 1904, vol.14,p.167

⁷⁵⁸ “Otkliki Voin’ii” (Responses to the War), in *Niva* 1904/vol.39, p.777

⁷⁵⁹ List of major battles in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 won by Japan: the Battle of Yalu River (April 30- May 1, 1904); the battle of Dalian (May 30, 1904); the Battle of the Yellow Sea (August 10, 1904); the Battle of Ulsan (August 14, 1904); the Siege of Port Arthur (August 1, 1904- January 2, 1905); the Battle of Liaoyang (August 24- September 4, 1904); the Battle of Shaho (October 5, 1904- October 10, 1904); the Battle of Sandepu (January 25- 29, 1905); the Battle of Mukden (February 20- march 10, 1905);and the Battle of Tsushima (May 27-28, 1905).

superlatives about the Japanese. Japanese “enthusiasm and ardent patriotism” were openly praised as important cause for Japan’s war successes in next series “Otkliki Voin’ii” (Responses to the War). Due to the strict wartime censorship in Russia, however, *Niva* did not go into an explicit criticism of Russian military bureaucracy and war campaign. Instead, it published an apotheosis about the “amazing Japanese accuracy and punctuality when dealing with important matters.” What is more, “the mastering of combat techniques was not a problem for the Japanese due to their good system of army organization, proper behavior in war, and an excellent system for enlisting conscripts,” pointed out the journal. Finally, “Japan has no financial problems since takes unlimited loans from England and USA.” In a word, Japanese military capabilities and organization was everything that Russian ones, as implicitly expressed, were not.⁷⁶⁰

Another article in *Niva* written by the war correspondent Ya.U.Shishko also praised highly “Japanese officers’ politeness and good-heartedness,”⁷⁶¹ contrasting them to Russian officers. Ya.U.Shishko gave Japanese first POW camps as exemplary for their “good conditions and treatment” of Russian prisoners of war.⁷⁶² Besides Japanese inborn tact, that, according to the author, could have also been due to Japan’s attempt to prove to the world to be a civilized nation.”⁷⁶³

These images of the Japanese army men and Japanese POW camps in June 1905 are in full contrast to the picture of Japanese treatment of Russian wounded or captured soldiers drawn in *Niva* under its previous editor R.I. Sementkovskii. In July 1904, a year before the above-mentioned apotheosis of the Japanese chivalry, *Niva* released a desperate appeal to European states for interference against Japanese war atrocities. The article titled ““Otkliki Voin’ii- Chto zhe molchit Evropa?” (Responses to the War-Why does Europe Stay Silent?), introduced horrible facts about Japanese cruelty. The author of the article referred to “brutal taunts over Russian wounded soldiers and disfigured corpses of Russians with cut ears and noses...” All those were noted “in telegrams and correspondence and documented in official protocols with photos,” the author claimed.

⁷⁶⁰ “V Tihom Okean. Otkliki voin’ii”(In the Pacific Ocean. Responses to the War), in *Niva* 1905/vol.15, p. 294

⁷⁶¹ Shishko, Ya.U. “V Port Arthur. Vpechatlenia ochevidts’ii” (In the Port Arthur. Witnesses’ Perceptions), in *Niva* 1905/vol.22, 427-436pp.

⁷⁶² Ibid.p.427

⁷⁶³ Ibid.436

That change in tones and images, from highly negative in 1904 to an overtly positive one in the fall of 1905, besides authors' personal predispositions to Japan and the Japanese might also indicate a sudden realization that Japan and Russia would soon be simply peaceful neighbors. That is, "*enmification*"⁷⁶⁴ or intentional distortion of the image of the enemy would not serve best to Russian interests in the Far East. Since mid 1905, gossips about recent halt of belligerences were already intensely circulating in the Russian and Western press. Such sudden change in Russian images of Japan also comes to prove that the images of the "other" nation are open to additional attributes and could undergo a drastic alteration under certain conditions. Russia's row of losses and Japan's tenacity, well-drawn strategy and organization provoked even a "conservative" journal, like the Petersburg intellectual magazine *Niva*, to change its perceptions and attitude towards the other belligerent country – from imagining Japanese as "barbarous" and "malevolent" to presenting them as "gentle," "brave," and "cordial" a year later. It must be admitted, however, that contrary to most Russian "conservative" journals conducting the government wartime ideology, *Niva* rejected the war from its very beginning and declared it as "inhumane and destructive."

In contrast to the "moderate conservative" press, the "moderate liberal" and "populist" press took care of the changing situation on the battlefield when conducting images of the belligerent countries. Thus, Japanese happened to be more often praised for their exemplary reformed state with excellent army than Russians for their heroic deeds.

More specifically, the journals *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, *Russkaya M'isl* and *Russkoe Bogatsvo* reviewed here, presented the views of the "moderate liberal" and "democratic" intellectuals, as well as "progressive bourgeoisie" and "liberal- minded gentry."

When the war burst out, the Petersburg journals *Vestnik Evrop'ii*⁷⁶⁵ and *Russkoe Bogatsvo*,⁷⁶⁶ and the Moscow journal *Russkaya M'isl*,⁷⁶⁷ like all the other press, reprinted in full the Tsar's

⁷⁶⁴ "In analyzing the process of *enmification* (imagining the enemy), scholars have introduced a variety of constructs: the view of the enemy as "devil," the perception of the "incorrigibly malevolent" adversary, misrepresentation through "mirror imaging," and "diabolical images of the enemy." (see Mikhailova, Yu. "Images of Enemy and Self: Russian "Popular Prints" of the Russo-Japanese War", *Acta Slavica Iaponica* N.16 (1998) <http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicatn/acta/16/a-16.html> On the process of *enmification*, see Rieber, R. W., Robert J. Kelly, "Substance, and Shadow," in Rieber, R.W. (ed.), *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*, New York, Plenum Press, 1991:5-20

⁷⁶⁵ *Vestnik Evrop'ii* was a liberal- bourgeois press organ, whose political demands did not spread beyond the insistence on the necessity of reform in the Russian society as well as implementation of a moderate Constitution after the Western European model.

⁷⁶⁶ Since 1892 *Russkoe Bogatsvo* took a liberal-populist turn into its ideology under N.K. Mikhailovskii and V.G.Korolenko's editorialship, and became a center of the legal populism. It was published in both St. Petersburg and Moscow from 1879 to 1918.

Manifesto, published by the *Pravitel'stvenii Vestnik* of 28 January (10 Feb.) 1904, announcing the news of the war with Japan. Naturally, as *Russkaya Mi'sl* noted, all Russia followed the news from the battlefield with deep worry. Private sacrifices increased, organs of local self-governance sent patriotic proclamations and money.⁷⁶⁸ In contrast to the “conservative” press, however, the “liberal” *Vestnik Evrop'ii* and *Russkaya M'isl* did not go into explicit anti-Japan propaganda. Instead, they tried to find an explanation of the current situation through a review of great powers' regional interests and Russian foreign policy strategies.

As V.A.Gol'tsev, the editor of the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M'isl*, noted “France and Germany acted together with Russia against Japan in the war of 1894-5, therefore, now they could only stay neutral. While England kept provoking Japan against Russia”⁷⁶⁹ According to him, such “European competition could be disastrous to all” since it secured opportunity for Japan “to gain hegemony over the yellow races.” In his argument, Europe should worry about her colonies after the awakening of Africa and Asia.⁷⁷⁰ The Moscow journal blamed the European great power game in the region for the outbreak of the war.

In a bit different way interpreted the start of the war the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*. In the series “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), under the editorship of the active “Liberal,” the Professor of History M.M.Stasyulevich, the journal argued, “Japan did a row of outrageous attacks over Russian commercial and military ships which were interpreted to be in contra to the international law.” Therefore, in the journal's conception, “it was understandable that Russian public looked forward to the quick punishment of Japan.”⁷⁷¹ Nevertheless, the Petersburg “liberal” journal kept its policy to present Russia as a peaceful country. In its terms, “War started at the moment when we firmly declared in our just sent note to Tokyo our decision to preserve peace.” What came to the surprise to most Russians, as the journal pointed out, “It appeared that peace does not depend entirely on us?”⁷⁷² Japan

⁷⁶⁷ Since the late 1880s, *Russkaya M'isl* turned into an organ of the so-called bourgeois intellectuals. It started upholding a highly moderate liberal constitutional program. Nevertheless, the second chief editor, V.A. Gol'tsev true to his ideational eclecticism, allowed intellectuals from various ideological movements to publish in the journal.

⁷⁶⁸ Gol'tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Foreign Affairs Review), in *Russkaya M'isl* 1904/02 (247-253pp.), p.247-9

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid, p.251

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷⁷¹ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1904/3 (345-360pp.), p.345

⁷⁷² Ibid.

has raised to a position “her voice to be heard,” as the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* also noted.⁷⁷³

Vestnik Evrop'ii, in turn, criticized Russian diplomats and government for neglecting all the signs and warnings coming from Japan. The journal gave a two-page account of numerous Japanese notes, telegrams, moves, and preparations for a war, which Russian foreign office was obliged to take into consideration and yet, somehow all that remained unnoticed or neglected.⁷⁷⁴ In addition, the “liberal” journal referred to Professor Fedyor F. Martens, Russian leading expert in Law, who stated, “the strongest has always the right- *inter arma silent leges*, and hence, there is not always a need of a declaration of war once the relations are declared broken.”⁷⁷⁵ All that pointed out that some Russian intellectuals were still bifurcated in their views on their attitude to Japan and the war against her. The Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii* had highly praised reformed Japan and her position on the international arena since 1894. Once the belligerences started between Russia and Japan, it became more difficult to the “Liberals” to praise Japan, which turned into the “enemy” that attacked outrageously their Fatherland. Hence, those “Liberals” in their covering the events from the battlefields sought some intermediary positions to interpret the war and Japan at least in the first half of 1904 when the country was still under the capture of patriotic enthusiasm to punish the “enemy.”

The Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M'isl* also tried to keep a more balanced view on the war and the belligerent parties. It stated, “Our official news from the theatre of war, in contrast to the Japanese ones, is distinguished by its reserved tone and accuracy.”⁷⁷⁶ Still, its editor V.A.Gol'tsev pointed out, “we expect victories since war started, homeland should win.”⁷⁷⁷

On the other hand, the other Moscow “liberal” journal *Nauchnoe Slovo* did not go into blame of either Japan or Russia for the disastrous situation. Its political observer M.Kovalenskii in his article “Iz Iaponskoi istorii” (From the Japanese History) attempted to explain Japanese

⁷⁷³ Yuzhakov. S.N. “Politika- O prichinah Voiny” (Politics- About the Causes of the War), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1904/3 (125-136pp.),p.127

⁷⁷⁴ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1904/3 (345-360pp.), p.354-5

⁷⁷⁵ Martens, F.F., “Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo”(Contemporary International Law), 1883, volume II, p.472, qtd. in Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1904/3 (345-360pp.), p.355

⁷⁷⁶ Gol'tsev, V.A., “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M'isl*, 1904/3 (206-212pp), p.207

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid

motives and acts instead. According to him, firstly “Japanese military reforms along with the obligatory military service secured her with a first class artillery and military fleet, second only after Britain.” Japan’s necessity of territorial expansion and fights for markets was “in accordance with her new economic development,” argued the author. In addition, Japan had to “fight for her national independence under the threat of colonization by America and Europe.” And the final justification of Japan’s acts, that M.Kovalenskii presented, was that “the intensive development of militarism” in Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 could be explained by “Japanese desire for revenge because of Russia’s act in 1895”.⁷⁷⁸ Such writings were proclaimed by the “conservative” press as justification of Japanese aggressiveness, and betrayal to the Fatherland.

Two months after the outbreak of the war, the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl* announced that in Europe there was ongoing a discussion on possible intermediary “talks about peace by various European representatives.” The formal editor of the journal, Vukol M. Lavrov, however, reminded about the announcement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (printed in *Pravitel’svenii Vestnik* of 16 April 1904) that “after Japan’s mean attack, no peace intermediary is possible.”⁷⁷⁹ In the next issue of “Review of Foreign Affairs,” however, the *de facto* editor of *Russkaya M’isl*, V.A.Gol’tsev stated that “Russia did not want the war,” and made an allusion that it was possible to negotiate with Japan. The picture of the other belligerent country, Japan, which V.A.Gol’tsev drew, was a comparatively positive one. He referred to a study of Victor Berard’s, according to which “Japan comprises within herself two contrasting sides of Asia- the fruitful and the cruel ones.”⁷⁸⁰ It seemed that if the press projected the enemy in a less negative light, then it was possible to argue for start of peace talks with her. Even more so, since, in his argument, “Japan seemed to lose her belief in a quick victory over Russia.”⁷⁸¹

In April 1904 the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* also hoped for a recent halt of the belligerences. In its interpretations, “Sooner or later Japan would have to establish again friendly neighborhood relations with us. The maintaining of such relations would be very

⁷⁷⁸ Kovalenskii, M. “Iz Iaponskoi istorii” (From the Japanese History) in *Nauchnoe Slovo*, Moskva, 1904/4 (89-120pp), p.120

⁷⁷⁹ Lavrov, M.V. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/5 (232-238pp.) p.232

⁷⁸⁰ Berard, V. “La Revolte de L’Asie (Asians’ Revolt), qtd. by Gol’tsev, V.A., “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl* 1904/6 (227-232pp), p.229

⁷⁸¹ Ibid, 1904/04 (275-280pp), p.274

important to us.”⁷⁸² It expressed deep regrets that “according to the specialist in military affairs the war could be prolonged two or more years.”⁷⁸³ The journal appealed Russian and Japanese governments to “use the chance of compromise when it comes up...to cease the bloodshed.”⁷⁸⁴

In May 1904, that is only three months since the start of the war, the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* issued an article presenting Japan in exclusively positive light. As the author stated, “in the face of Japan, we should admit that Russia was unlucky to have as “enemies” people not only European educated, but also as brave as knights and devoted to their homeland’s interests.”⁷⁸⁵ Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, which ended with damaging for Japan interference of Russia, France, and Germany, argued the author, “we could have foreseen that the young energetic, quickly progressing Country of the Rising Sun would wait for the first convenient political combination to advance her so forcefully interrupted demands.”⁷⁸⁶

To the blames of the principal “conservative” press towards the “liberal-minded” intellectuals for lack of patriotism and inciting sympathy and comprehension mainly to the “enemy,” the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* retorted ironically, “We are not short of patriotic feelings. Unfortunately, the naïve and really sympathetic [to Russia] ones go unnoticed among the false expressions of press adventurers.”⁷⁸⁷

During the whole Russo-Japanese War, there were ongoing debates among the principal “conservative” and “liberal” press on who was to be blamed and who was to be supported in the ongoing war. The “liberal” *Vestnik Evrop’ii* defended the “completely passive role” which Russian society played since “nobody could define what our targets in Manchuria and Korea were, and how important to us was the timber concession along the river Yalu.”⁷⁸⁸ The war kept being unpopular and hardly understood among Russian society. The general feeling as *Vestnik Evrop’ii* pointed out was, that “the war could hardly bring us any benefits even in a case of victory on land or sea, nothing more than few contributions...Korea would gradually

⁷⁸² “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1904/4 (800-810pp), p.802

⁷⁸³ Ibid, p.801

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid, p.802

⁷⁸⁵ “K Russko-iaponskoi voine” (About the Russo-Japanese War), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1904/5 (130-147pp) p.141

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid,p.140

⁷⁸⁷ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, (355-367pp), p.362

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid, p.365

become Japanese anyway.”⁷⁸⁹ What Russians should take care about, in its argument, was “that our neighborhood relations would remain in the future with the ambitious and enterprising Japan”⁷⁹⁰

The Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl* followed the same line of thought, and in the heat of the war published several articles presenting peaceful traditional Japan.⁷⁹¹ The author of one of the articles titled “Iz Iaponskoi zhizni” (Japanese Lifestyle), A.Cherevkova, visited the country twice in 1890 and 1896, and wrote a detailed description of Japan’s festivals, rice plantations, traditions, and nature, along with a calendar of the most famous Japanese festivals.⁷⁹² That image of peaceful and quiet Japan did not fit well in the current wartime descriptions of bloody battles and accounts of preys in the Russian press. Yet, its publishing matched with the “moderate liberal” press tradition to avoid denigration and mockery, but demonstrate respect to the “other” belligerent party.

Russkaya M’isl continued its presentation of the war and Japan in its next issue citing in a Tolstoy style G. Solomin’s article “Bog smirennoi lyubvi” (God of Humble Love). In accordance with the biblical refrain, “love your neighbor,” G.Solomin stated, “after the war we all have to live with our neighbors, the Chinese and the Japanese. Victory would affect both sides...There would come time when yellow and white races would perceive each other not as enemy, but ...as merely human beings.”⁷⁹³ An example of Russian common people’s compassion to Japanese families, late to evacuate from Blagoveshchensk, was given to support the author’s argument on the necessity of mutual love and help. Russian peasants at the station, “seeing for the first time their “enemies,” wrote G.Solomin, “at the sight of the families with little sweet children, started giving them food and money, crying together with the Japanese, whispering “poor people””.⁷⁹⁴ A similar event happened in Kobe with the wounded Russian sailors from the sunken battleship “Varyag.” “After medical treatment at a POW camp, they were sent to Kobe where locals met them with food, smiling and bowing at them, not taking

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid

⁷⁹¹ Veilerze, G., “Iaponia v nashi dni. Sotsiologichski etyudii” (Japan nowadays. Sociological Review), *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/08; and Gesse-Vartet Ernst, “Iaponia i iaponst’ii” (Japan and the Japanese), *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/10; also Bekon, A., “Zhenshtina v Iaponii” (Women in Japan), *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/06

⁷⁹² Cherevkova, A. “Iz Iaponskoi zhizni” (Japanese Lifestyle) in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/7 (61-75pp)

⁷⁹³ Solomin, G. “Bog smirennoi lyubvi” (God of Humble Love) qtd. by V.A.Gol’tsev, in *Russkaya M’isl* 1904/8 (195-200pp)

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid, p.197

money from their “enemies.”⁷⁹⁵ Those events prove that direct perception of the “other” leads to construction of images different from the constructed by official propaganda “inhuman” images of the other belligerent party.

Another interesting point about “moderate liberal” journals publications about Japan and the war so far was that all of them consistently projected a comparatively positive image of the Japanese, and expressed hopes for recent cease of fire, as well as re-establishment of peaceful neighborhood relations. In addition, they did not go into details of war destructions or into explicit criticism of Russian government approaches and strategies as the more revolutionary minded “Liberals” and “Social Democrats” did. The so-called “moderate liberal” press conducted a temperate policy about Japan in the first half of 1904 instead.

In August 1904 the siege of Port Arthur had just started, when the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* neglecting that highly commented by the press event, published an article titled “Epoha velikih reform v Iaponii” (Period of Great Reforms in Japan), written by the historian A.Nikolaev. The presentation of the Japanese successes in state reformation ended up with author’s appeals towards Russian intelligentsia. A. Nikolaev gave Japanese educated vanguard as an example of a reformation social force. “During her transition on the front came up the intelligentsia- it first reacted against the old regime and insisted on crucial reforms. It first bore the burden of those reforms. An external push simply activated broader strata,” argued A.Nikolaev. The article overall presented a well-disguised anti-government agitation targeting incitement among the reform minded educated elite in Russia.

Not towards opposition incitement but towards signing a peace treaty did the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* appeal. As it stated, “The unprecedented and fruitless battles around Port Arthur and Liaolyan invoked the thought of peace in our minds.” “It could be that we pay for our mistakes,” pointed out the journal.⁷⁹⁶ Moreover, in its interpretation, “the war was forced upon us; from the very beginning it was purposeless to us.”⁷⁹⁷ It criticized Russian “chauvinists” for insisting on “Russia’s obligation to defeat Japan at any price without caring about human casualties, with the only aim- to keep our image [of great power] in Asia and Europe.”⁷⁹⁸ If Russia did not manage to prove that, “it would appear that our cultural mission in Asia etc. was some tragic-comical misunderstanding...,” the “liberal” journal pointed out

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid

⁷⁹⁶ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), *Vestnik Evropii*, 1904/9 (345-358pp), p.354

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid,p.354

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

sarcastically. It referred to the article “Malenkie Pisma” (Brief Notes) in the Petersburg upper-bourgeois newspaper *Novoe Vremya* where the “monarchist” A.Suvorin played with the words “defeat or be defeated, our existence or humiliation.” That was “vain pathos” in the “liberal” journal’s understanding. As it clarified, “Russia was a great power before her overtaking of Port Arthur, and she would be such even if she was forced to give it back to China.”⁷⁹⁹ That is, defeated or not, Russia would keep to be a great country. Russians echoed that refrain, especially after the rows of defeats Russia experienced. Some simply did not want to give up their beliefs in the “invincibility” of their homeland thinking of all kinds of excuses and justifications of the current situation. While others constructed a psychological barrier, behind which they felt secure in front of the shame and humiliation that usually followed defeats.

Japan was again praised by the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evropii*, this time for her “military and cultural advantages over Russia.” Yet, in September 1904, the editor of the Petersburg “monarchist” newspaper *Novoe Vremya* in his article “Malenkie Pisma” (Brief Notes) argued, “Japan is pitiable and insignificant” regardless of her victories over Russia.⁸⁰⁰ That could be another reason why some Russian intellectuals maintained the opinion that even in case of defeat, Russia would keep being a great power. In contrast, *Vestnik Evropii* confessed, “Japan manifested such national energy and means, such qualities and capabilities that we did not suspect her to possess.”⁸⁰¹

The Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl* also admitted not to have known Japan well. Its editor V.A.Gol’tsev who usually praised Japan a lot in his articles, this time presented another “less known” side of Japan. He cited the Tokyo correspondent of *Le Temps*, Charl Petit, who argued: “Japanese education is overwhelmed by militaristic spirit and teaches cruelty.” In addition, at theatre performances “women and children often watch plays of battle scenes with realistic horror, agony of dying, bloodshed, shouts and cries...Now the most popular performance is when Japan defeats Russia,” stated the correspondent.⁸⁰² However, from this article it did not become clear for what purpose V.A.Gol’tsev decided to show the “cruel” side of Japan. It could have been a warning that Japan was preparing psychologically for a long fight at any price or it could have been some kind of late demonstration of patriotism by presenting the “enemy” as a “bloody beast.” The last was least possible though, having in

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid, p.355

⁸⁰⁰ qtd. from Ibid.p.356

⁸⁰¹ Ibid, p.356

⁸⁰² Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), *Russkaya M’isl*, 1904/9 (215-224pp), p.217;219

mind the highly positive image that the Professor of Law V.A.Gol'tsev had constructed of Japan and the Japanese in his articles before and during the war campaign. It shows, however, that projecting images of “bloodthirsty” Asiatics was not a sole activity of the conservative press.

Another interesting point is that similar to Japanese theatrical performances were held in Moscow and Petersburg theatres. In the first couple of months after the outbreak of the hostilities, a musical set against a huge map of East Asia put on “Glory to All for the Faith, the Tsar, and the Fatherland” at the Moscow Popular Theatre. In 1904, St. Petersburg actors put on the stage “The Heroes of Chemulpo, and Port Arthur”, as well as “War with Russia” - the last two of which turned into big spring and summer hits in 1904.⁸⁰³ Patriotic fervor cooled down in the second half of 1904 when Russia’s row of defeats made public display of patriotism highly inappropriate.

On the other hand, Japanese row of successes received the due respect in Russian “moderate liberal” journals. According to the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evropii*, “Japanese military plans are fulfilled accurately, and consequently, with meticulousness...”⁸⁰⁴ The journal commented with sharp mockery chauvinistic articles like the one in *Russkii Invalid* of 22 April 1904 announcing that “the battle of Tyurenchen demonstrated the feat of invincible Russian might.”⁸⁰⁵ In addition to the preys at Tyurenchen, “more than 40 000 people died at Liaolyan ... But that bloody battle also did not contribute to any solution,” commented *Vestnik Evropii*. It found some Russian “patriotic” press comments on the battle “pretty cheap.” “Those patriots boldly set up a parallel between the battle of Liaolyan and the one in Borodino (against Napoleon) and dared to predict a recent defeat of enemy’s army,” bitterly announced the “liberal” journal. It criticized the “upper- bourgeoisie” newspaper *Novoe Vremya* of 3 September 1904, which published an announcement in highly elevated tone about Russia’s chances of victory after that decisive battle.⁸⁰⁶

The Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* instead of comparing the capabilities and chances of both belligerent parties went into a comparison of their targets in the Far East. Japan was pointed as “good at calculations,” and therefore she was expected to prefer “a

⁸⁰³ Smith, A. *Popular Theatre and Society in Tsarist Russia*, Berkeley, 2002: 125, 163, 167

⁸⁰⁴ “Inostrannoe obozrenie”, in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1904/6 (792-805pp), p.796

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid, p.797

⁸⁰⁶ “Inostrannoe obozrenie,” in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1904/10 (891-797pp), p.795

humiliating for Russia peace” to “risking everything in a continuation of the war.” While Russia’s interests lied in expansion of her influence in the Far East, Japan’s target was to enter the great power system, and exert her influence there in accordance with her power, wealth, and civilization, argued the active “Populist,” “*Narodnik*”) the Professor of Sociology S.N. Yuzhakov. “Russia does not need to prove that while Japan does. That Japanese dream is no peril to Russia,” concluded the professor.⁸⁰⁷ The peril that the political observer predicted was “Japanese capitalism” about which “other capitalist states should worry.” There followed a typical “populist” propaganda on the suffering of peasants and workers forced to go on strikes in capitalist states. The war had brought many changes and halted many others on the world arena. Japanese growing capitalism and the internal pressure for reforms in Russia were further challenged by the development of the war. The international configuration also fluctuated with the Americans and Germans taking either Japanese or Russian sides according to the press. As S.N. Yuzhakov pointed out, “Great powers did their best to keep the war local...The problem now is to secure a peace treaty that would not lead to new problems.”⁸⁰⁸

The peace treaty, however, was still far ahead. The rows of battles exhausted both Russia and Japan. Russian society was not prepared for the war but even more so it was also not prepared for losses once the conflict started. As *Vestnik Evrop’ii* noted, “Russian newspapers predicted imminent defeat of Japanese army, wrote about our Cossacks’ future victories, and threatened to conclude peace when we reached Tokyo. The real development of the war did not justify those expectations and suggestions.”⁸⁰⁹ The series of victories of “David over Goliath” (as the western press used to call “tiny” Japan and “mighty” Russia) for the last eleven months since the start of the war incited Japanese society to demand a complete victory over Russia and insist on continuation of the war. On the other hand, “Goliath’s defeats” had exhausted and devastated Russian society. The fall of Port Arthur on 20 December 1904, (2 January 1905) was the final drop that provoked mass indignation in Russia, which would turn soon into civil disobedience.

By the end of 1904, more and more Russians were getting disappointed at the Autocracy’s inability to cope with the external and internal affairs. The series of lost battles accompanied by senseless losses of thousands of human lives as well as the clumsy ill-planned military strategies provoked numerous negative reactions towards the Autocracy among Russians at all

⁸⁰⁷ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika”, in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1904/12 (174-192pp), p.187

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid, p.190

⁸⁰⁹ “Inostrannoe obozrenie”, in *Vestnik Evrop’ii* 1905/1 (371-388pp), p.373

social levels. “Moderate Conservatives” and “Moderate Liberals” were under great public pressure due to those external and internal events to join “Radical Liberals” and “Social Democrats,” and lead the public unrest or firmly dissociate from it.

Chapter VIII 1905- Defeats, Revolution, and Peace Treaty

VIII.1. Grand War Defeats and the Revolution of 1905

Public discontent in Russia had been long time fueled by the “Social Democrats” and “Socialist Revolutionaries” active anti-government, and (since 1904) anti-war propaganda. Civil unrest in Russia had started in 1902 (and continued into 1906), manifesting itself in peasant uprisings, strikes, demonstrations, and political assassinations. It had numerous internal causes: economic depression; a series of poor harvests; horror at the pogroms of 1903; increasing frustration at the government’s inability or unwillingness to implement social and political reforms; and last but most importantly, the rows of Russia’s defeats by “tiny” Japan.

In the first days of January 1905, there were workers’ strikes and peasants’ revolts all over the country further ignited by the fall of Port Arthur in Japanese hands. The public discontent blew out of proportions then. In St. Petersburg, the big public disorder began on 22 January 1905, leading to the massacre known as “Bloody Sunday.” On that day, hundreds of demonstrators, mainly workers with their wives and children, were shot down in front of the Winter Palace. They were lead by the priest Georgi Gapon and the leaders of the Society of Factory and Plant Workers on their way to hand in a petition to the Tsar.⁸¹⁰ The repercussion of that bloody event was so strong that throughout the spring and the summer of 1905, there were strikes, civil disturbances, such as the Lodz Uprising, and assassinations of important political figures among whom were the Interior Minister Viacheslav Pleve and the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich Romanov. In June 1905, a couple of weeks after the destruction of Russian Baltic fleet in the grand battle at Tsushima, the so-called “Potemkin mutiny,” broke out aboard on the battleship Kniaz Potemkin Tavrichesjii of the Black Sea Fleet and affected other units in the army and navy.⁸¹¹ From December 1904 until the end of August 1905, revolutionary activities ebbed and flowed all over Russia, accompanied by cries for cardinal reforms. Since the fall of Port Arthur, Russian reformist-minded intellectuals also increasingly insisted on conclusion of peace with Japan, and on carrying urgent reforms at all levels.

⁸¹⁰ “The petition combined class-centered demands for higher wages and shorter hours with a liberal political program that included a constitution and free elections based on direct, universal suffrage.” See Freeze, D.L. (ed.), *Russia. A History.*, Oxford University Press, 1997: 214-5

⁸¹¹ The data on the Revolution of 1905 is taken from Kowner, R. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, N.29, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, Oxford, 2006: 317-18

The started Revolution of 1905 had unequivocal repercussions on Russian-decision making during and after the war, argues the German historian Rotem Kower.⁸¹² According to him, “the revolution exerted a detrimental effect on motivation at the front and necessitated the mobilization of troops to maintain public order in the rear. It consequently affected the general capability of Russia’s military power and influenced the Tsar’s willingness to end the war and join the Portsmouth Peace Conference.”⁸¹³

However, as central press announcements demonstrate, the Tsar’s willingness for peace and compromise was provoked not so much by the start of the revolution but rather by the result of the consecutive decisive battles at Mukden and Tsushima. In addition, the so-called “patriots” among Russian “conservative” intellectuals, until the very end of the war, kept exerting pressure on the government insisting on continuation of the war until Japan’s defeat or her request for peace. That put the government in front of the dilemma to continue the war until Japan’s full exhaustion and run the risk of losing control over the internal unrest or to cease the belligerences and sign a humiliating peace with Japan. The history showed that the Tsar placed big trust on General A.Kuropatkin and Admiral Z.Rozhdestvenskii for the exit of the war and preferred to wait for the decisive battles on land and sea.

VIII.2. Intellectuals’ Concluding Sketches on the War of 1904-5

It was the fall of Port Arthur,⁸¹⁴ which spurred first much speculation about the possibilities of peace in the Far East. In search for a clarification of the issue, the political observer of the Petersburg “neo-populist” journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, Professor S.N. Yuzhakov referred to the Moscow newspaper *Novosti* whose representative interviewed Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs about the chances of concluding peace with Japan. The Minister replied, “We could

⁸¹² Kowner, R. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, N.29, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, Oxford, 2006:317

⁸¹³ Ibid

⁸¹⁴ The Siege of Port Arthur (1 August 1904- 2 January 1905), the strategic Russian deep-water port and naval base at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria was one of the longest and most vicious battles during the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese casualties numbered 57,780 and Russian ones-31,306. After nearly another month of artillery bombardments, the General of the Fort Anatoly M. Stoessel decided, on humanitarian rather than military grounds, that the garrison should surrender rather than subject the troops and the civilian population, both Russian and Chinese, to further misery and bloodshed. See Glukov, V.P. “Oborona Port-Artura” (Defense of Port Arthur), in Rostunov, I.I. (ed.), *Istoriia russko-iaponskoi voiny 1904-1905 gg.* (History of Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905), M., Nauka, 1977:204-36; also Menning, B.W., *Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914*, Bloomington, 1992,2000: 160-69

firmly state that Russia did not raise the issue of peace. We are convinced that peace is still very far ahead...For Japan now it is the best time to undertake some steps for it...yet, Japan has also not undertaken any formal steps for this.”⁸¹⁵ Professor S.N. Yuzhakov also cited the telegram of 11 (24 Feb.) 1905 from Petersburg to the Russian Embassy in Washington as another source confirming that recent peace negotiations were still in the spheres of rumors. Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador in Washington, declared to have received a categorical announcement that the war would be continued vigorously, and that General A. Kuropatkin was trusted to lead the autumn campaign. Count Cassini attributed the rumor for peace to Japan, which was looking for new financial loans.⁸¹⁶ Having in mind the development of the war so far, the political observer of the “populist” *Russkoe Bogatsvo* expressed his full confidence that “both sides could rely on a complete victory over the enemy only at the expense of enormous losses- human and material.”⁸¹⁷

Russian government obviously anticipated Japan first to run out of recourses and request peace. On the other hand, Russians cherished big hopes for the hero from the Russo-Turkish War 1877-8, General A.Kuropatkin. His fame of a skillful military leader gave extra courage to Russians at all levels that the good chance in the war could be turned to Russian side.

There were others, however, that found the fall of Port Arthur “the last straw” of all the defeats that Russian had suffered so far, and started insisting on peace. The “liberal” publicists defended the Commander of Fort Port Arthur, General A.M. Stoessel, claiming that “we should not put Port Arthur under such a prolonged cruel suicide ...it would not improve our position.”⁸¹⁸

In contrast, the “patriotic” conservative press such as *Novoe Vremya*, *Grazhdanin*, and *Peterburgskie Vedomosti* perceived the fall as great disaster and put all the blame on the Commander of the Fort General A.M. Stoessel. The General was declared “bandit in the uniform of General” and “Japanese spy and provocateur.”⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁵ Minister’s interview for the *Novosti* was cited by Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika” (Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, SPb, 1905/2 (89-109pp), p.106

⁸¹⁶ Count Cassini cited in *Ibid*, p.106

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid*.

⁸¹⁸ see the Petersburg liberal journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) 1905/2 (834-849pp), p.836

⁸¹⁹ cit. from Votinov, A.P. *Iaponskii espionage v russko-iaponskuyu voynu 1904-1905gg*, (Japanese Espionage in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5), M., 1939: 59

After the fall of Port Arthur, the propaganda for peace was undertaken earnestly by the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, under the editorship of Professor M.M. Stasyulevich. According to the journal, “the fall of Port Arthur under such circumstances should make us honestly recognize ourselves defeated...The poor state of our military-bureaucratic organization does not allow any changes in the situation...Now we have the chance to conclude peace more or less with dignity, giving up Chinese land and handing Korea to the Japanese.”⁸²⁰ The journal kept arguing that Russia’s “energy and money should not be all spent in a bloody suicidal war for the sake of foreign to Russian people interests.”⁸²¹ It preached a peculiar kind of “defeatism” according to which even defeated, Russia would still be a great power. According to *Vestnik Evrop’ii* “The honor of Russian people is not ruined by losses in the war, and mistakes of our bureaucracy; our people, the soldiers, do their duties with patience and sacrifice.”⁸²²

Its interpretation of the fall of Port Arthur presented implicit anti-government propaganda. In the “liberal” journal’s argument, Japan defeated Russia in a “one to one base, not because Japanese are stronger or more gifted.” It was because “they live and develop freely in their country, have adapted the best political and administrative order, treat with responsibility their national duties, do not suffer from despotism, and feel citizens whose voices are heard in national matters.”⁸²³ To the image of Japan as a Power “civilized” and “modern,” was contrasted the image of Russia as a Power “backward” and “semi-feudal.” As the journal stated, “we after every step ahead did two steps back and often destroyed every nice thing our ancestors had built, going back to some lawless and darkness.”⁸²⁴ Such contrasting images were not explicit priority to Russian “Liberal-Constitutionalists” but also constructed by the “Social Democrats” and the “Socialist Revolutionaries” to mobilize Russian public towards more active opposition to the government.

In addition, “Liberals” perceived the continuation of the war as dangerous to Russia since “Japan’s military victories are not occasional.”⁸²⁵ Moreover, as the “liberal” *Vestnik Evrop’ii* argued, “More dangerous [to Russia] than the current military condition” was that “hatred to Russia is loudly spoken not only by England and North America, but also by Germany, and

⁸²⁰ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1905/2 (834-849pp), p.836-7

⁸²¹ Ibid, p.837

⁸²² Ibid, p.838

⁸²³ Ibid, p.836

⁸²⁴ Ibid

⁸²⁵ Ibid, p.839

even by the friendly to us France.”⁸²⁶ Under those conditions, it was dangerous for Russia to keep all her forces “in Chinese lands and neglect her position as a great European country,” the “liberal” journal argued.⁸²⁷ As it seen from this announcement, the image of Russia was disturbed but not ruined. Russia was obliged to take care of her image and interests in Europe, argued the Western minded “Liberals” such as the Professor of History and editor of *Vestnik Evrop’ii* M.M. Stasyulevich.

Nevertheless, by the end of 1904, Russia and Japan’s positions in Western press presentations switched places. Russia turned into a “greedy barbarian” while Japan became a “civilized” force defending “Asian East.” In this regard, the Professor of Law V.A.Gol’tsev, the editor of the Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl*, criticized sharply “America and Western Europe for lack of sympathy and their hostile blames on Russia for her aims at territorial expansion.”⁸²⁸ Russia was simply following the international practices of expansion. Then Japan should also bear such accusations from the “West,” according to the professor. He referred to an interesting document supposedly written by Baron Komura (although Japan rejected its existence). This document disclosed, “Japanese plans for protectorate over China, capture of Korea, the French Indo-China, Philippines, etc. Undoubtedly a lot of Japanese chauvinists share such ambitions but to it is a long way to their fulfillment,” concluded his statement V.A.Gol’tsev.⁸²⁹

One of the negative images of Russia in the “West” that originated from her ill- bred military campaign, however, seemed to be unchangeable. Nevertheless, according to some Russian “patriots,” the good image and dignity of the Russian army could still be defended in the next decisive battle in the Manchurian field. They cherished big hopes in the coming fight against Japan since the Russian army was going to be lead by the famous General Aleksey Kuropatkin.

Indeed, the next grand fight, the so-called “The Battle of Mukden” [6 (19) February – 27 February (12 March) 1905] turned to be the final major land engagement and the largest single battle of the war. General Aleksey Kuropatkin was said to be too eager to take the offensive, before the Japanese forces were augmented. The General had at his disposal the three

⁸²⁶ Ibid

⁸²⁷ Ibid, p.840

⁸²⁸ Golt’ssev, G.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl* 1905/01 (182-187pp), p.183

⁸²⁹ Ibid

Manchurian Armies along an unprecedented broad front of 145 kilometers.⁸³⁰ Russian armies, however, stayed mostly in defense. After Russia's defeat in the battle, her Headquarters fell under the severe criticism for the bad commandment. Gathering of forces led to the effect, that "the greater the number, the weaker the army was," explains the defeat the Russian historian Oleg Airapetov.⁸³¹ After Russian armies' defeat at Mukden, they were ordered to leave Mukden, and thus the period of active military battles on land ended.

Russia's defeat and retreat from Mukden was met with roar of indignation from all social strata in Russia. The sorrow of majority of Russians for the losses, however, seemed deeper than their anger. The editor of the "liberal" *Russkaya M'isl*, V.A.Gol'tsev expressed his "deep regret for Russia losing 50 000 people at Mukden."⁸³² "Even the conservative "patriotic" press such as *Moskovskie Vedomosti* "got sober after their appraising of the war. Now they are turning against the "*Mensheviki*" who are insisting on reforms," pointed out V.A.Gol'tsev.⁸³³

Search for "enemy," both "external" and "internal," served well to the interests of those monarchists who tried to distract public attention from the Autocracy's mistakes. In addition, Russia's defeat was justified by them mainly on the base of Japanese advantage of fighting close to their main sources of supply.

Under the subtitle "Catastrophe at Mukden," Professor S.N.Yuzhakov, the political observer of the Petersburg "neo-populist" journal *Russkoe Bogatsvo* announced, "The horrible fifteen-day battle at Mukden turned into the event that changed immediately the political situation." "What could we now hope for," he exclaimed.⁸³⁴

The Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, in turn, criticized Russian military commanders. The journal also admitted the cardinal change in the situation. It insisted that Russia "should raise the issue of peace before our 400 000- army is defeated so that we could still put demands on the Japanese."⁸³⁵

⁸³⁰ See Kowner, R. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest, N.29*, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, Maryland-Toronto-Oxford, 2006:244

⁸³¹ Airapetov, O.R. (ed.) *Russko-iaponskaya voina 1904-1905 Vzglyad cherez stoletie*, (Russo-Japanese War. A View After a Century), Moskva, Tri Kvadrata, 2004: 12

⁸³² Gol'tsev, V.A. "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Russkaya M'isl* 1905/3 (224-230pp), p.225

⁸³³ Ibid

⁸³⁴ Yuzhakov, S.N. "Politika"(Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1905/3 (138-163pp) p.138-9

⁸³⁵ "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1905/3 (375-389pp) p.379

Some “monarchists” such as the economist A.Suvorin, the editor of the Petersburg conservative newspaper *Novoe Vremya*, insisted on Russia’s victory over the enemy first, and then start talking about peace. “Otherwise we would not be real patriots...” “Still, our generals, with 400 000 army, many times tried to subordinate the enemy to our will, but it did not happen not because of lack of patriotism,” commented sarcastically the conservatives’ patriotism *Vestnik Evrop’ii*.⁸³⁶ A year since the war started and all the defeats that Russia had suffered so far, there were still “patriots” like the editor of *Novoe Vremya* and his supporters, who still did not want to recognize the hopeless situation into which Russia got involved. Russia’s fruitless acts due to her “lack of unity, and expediency at the theatre of war,” as the “liberal” *Vestnik Evrop’ii* stated, were persisting from the very beginning in the Russian war campaign.⁸³⁷ “The fall of Port Arthur and the battle of Mukden should have convinced everybody about who should be blamed, argued the liberal journal. ⁸³⁸

The catastrophe at Mukden demonstrated that “Japan’s success and triumph became a complete fact,” also pointed out the “Populist” S.N. Yuzhakov. Hence, according to him, the question now was “whether Russia could continue the war.” It was extremely difficult to call up army of another 500 000 reserves in a country shaken by strikes and riots, argued the “Populist” observer. He appealed for end of the war, since it was “irrational from the very beginning.” “We should stop the war. We promised Korea to Japan before the war. We promised to China to withdraw from Manchuria. Then what do we fight for?” In Professor S.N. Yuzhakov’s perceptions, “even if Russia somehow won the war, Japan would still be there and would prepare for a new war.” After all Russia’s losses, the war against Japan, according to the professor, seemed more in vain than ever and its further prolonging unnecessary.⁸³⁹

In a brief note [of 3 March 1905], the editor of the Petersburg monarchist newspaper *Grazhdanin* Prince Meshterskii also admitted that Russia was confronted with serious dilemma. It was “to continue the war without any hopes for success and risk internal revolt; or to cease the war and under the burden of the peace demands to find some energy to save the Fatherland.”⁸⁴⁰

⁸³⁶ Ibid

⁸³⁷ Ibid, p.376

⁸³⁸ Ibid

⁸³⁹ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika”(Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1905/3 (138-163pp), p.142

⁸⁴⁰ Prince Meshterskii cited by Yuzhakov, S.N., Ibid, p.140

Another “monarchist” newspaper, *Severozapadnoe Slovo*, insisted on halt of belligerences. It referred to a meeting of the Ministers, on which the Chair of the Committee S.Yu.Witte had admitted, “how terrible the war was. Future historians would be horrified by all the heavy conditions encompassing her.”⁸⁴¹ With the rows of catastrophic defeats, the ex-Minister of Finances S.Yu.Witte who started Russia’s expansionistic policy in the Far East seemed to be in a hurry to transfer the burden of the disastrous war on somebody else. He was among those who insisted on cease of fire and sign of peace treaty with Japan long before the Mukden catastrophe.

The Moscow “upper-bourgeois” newspaper *Novosti* (of 12 March 1905, N.63) announced that there was held a committee meeting in the Moscow stock market building. At it, some big industrialists like the kerosene factory owner Nobel appealed for “immediate halt of the hostilities even at the expense of Sakhalin and Vladivostok; others preferred paying contributions than giving up land. Yet, one is shared: War is not desired, everybody wants peace.”⁸⁴² The prolonged war had exhausted great amount of material resources and damaged Russia’s image on the international arena. In addition, the internal unrest further provoked by the followed defeat was hard to contain. All those imminently reflected on the business of the large-scale industrialists and made them openly come up with a declaration for peace in March 1905.

“Conservatives” and “Liberals” alike started seriously entertaining the thought of peace negotiations with Japan after the Japanese destroyed the best Russian armies at Mukden. The “liberal” V.A.Gol’tsev summarized the notes and opinion of various publicists, who even before the war, had proven “the irrationality of Russian overtaking of Manchuria.” As he stated, majority of Russians felt that “Russia’s life interests are in Europe. We would never become “an ugly naval state” [a Russian joke about Britain] in the Pacific. USA and England would not allow us.” Although defeated in a number of times by Japan, to some “Westerners” as V.A.Gol’tsev, Russia should care more about the attitude of the West instead of Japan’s.

Ceasing the war disaster for the sake of Russian people, not for the sake of Russia’s image or good relations with Japan, appeared to be the most repeated refrain among the Russian

⁸⁴¹ all cited by Professor S.N. Yuzhakov in “Politika, loc.cit.,p.140-41

⁸⁴² *Novosti* (12 March 1905, N.63) cited by Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika”, in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1905/3 (138-163pp), p.141

“Populists.” For that purpose, “we should get rid of our self-confidence and find how to correct our mistakes,” argued Professor S.N.Yuzhakov.⁸⁴³

“Fourteen months already passed and nothing but losses and big pain did the war bring to us,” also stated “Liberals.” In this aspect, Professor V.A.Gol’tsev kept arguing that “Liberals” have always been against Russia’s advances in Manchuria.⁸⁴⁴ “War was lead [by Russia] somehow by itself, without purpose or sense, in full dependence on the enemy’s decisions and actions, without any hope for a victory but with the full intention to fight until the chance to withdraw appeared,” kept the argument on the useless war the “liberal” *Vestnik Evrop’ii*.⁸⁴⁵ On the other hand, “Liberals” accused the “patriots” from *Novoe Vremya* and *Moscovskie Vedomosti* for accepting easily any Russian military losses and even finding in them some inciting stimuli to go into internal struggle against the government opposition.

In addition, the “patriots” still carried propaganda for continuation of the war, dreamed of influence in the Pacific, and argued for the impossibility of concluding peace with Japan before defeating her for the sake of Russia’s image and dignity.⁸⁴⁶ Instead of focusing on the defeats and the ineptness of Russian commandment, “patriots” focused on Russian soldiers’ heroism. In their perceptions those heroic deeds proved the capability of Russian soldiers sacrificing their lives for the Fatherland. As *Vestnik Evrop’ii* pointed out, “our “patriots” seemed unperturbed by the situation in the Far East. They kept claiming that Japan only ruined herself financially by all those victories, and that she just waited for a chance to conclude peace.”⁸⁴⁷

In turn, some reform-minded intellectuals, realizing that directly they could not alter the course of the war, used actively the war events instead, to criticize the Autocracy and to propagate ideas for the necessity of urgent political reforms. The series of Russian defeats only administered their political arguments. Others, greedy for fame, simply used the occasion to come up on the front line of the central press.

⁸⁴³ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika”, loc.cit, p.1

⁸⁴⁴ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl* 1905/3 (224-230pp) p.225

⁸⁴⁵ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii* 1905/4 (829-842pp), p.834

⁸⁴⁶ *Novoe Vremya* and *Moscovskie Vedomosti* of 1905/3 cited in Ibid

⁸⁴⁷ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii* 1905/4 (829-842pp), p.833

In the Petersburg “monarchist” newspaper *Rassvet*, the reformist minded publicist L.M. Klyachko, (with penname “L’vov”) criticized bitterly the Autocracy’s inability to cope with the war.⁸⁴⁸

The same line of thought followed the liberal F.A L’vov. In his pamphlet “Lihodei byurocraticheskogo samovlastiya kak neposredstvenn’ie vinovniki pervoi russko-iaponskoi voinii (Evil Doers in Bureaucratic Autocracy - Immediate Culprits for the First Russo-Japanese War), he disclosed the inside intrigues and games within the Russian Ministries in relation to Russia’s Far Eastern endeavors. F.A L’vov put all the blame for the disastrous for Russia war so far on the waste of finances, neglect of obligations, and acts behind the scene for personal benefits.⁸⁴⁹

Similarly, the “Populist” publicist, Professor S.N.Yuzhakov, argued that Russia’s defeat at Mukden and Liaolyan happened “because Russia let to be ruled by bureaucrats and now she picks up the fruits of this rule.”⁸⁵⁰

There were some intellectuals such as the “moderate conservative” economist and publicist A.N. Gur’ev, who blamed exclusively the ex-Finance Minister S.Yu. Witte for the war. In Gur’ev’s perceptions war started because of Witte’s expansionist policy in the Far East.⁸⁵¹

Others, like the “liberal” publicist Professor M.M.Stasyulevich, accused the Headquarters Commandment and especially General A.Kuropatkin for his “clumsiness and inaptness” demonstrated at Mukden,⁸⁵² as well as the Foreign Minister Baron Lamsdorf for his “prolific” efforts in the Far East.⁸⁵³

What nobody expected, however, was that the biggest disaster for Russia was yet to come. In May [14 (27) - 15 (28) May 1905], at the Tsushima Straits, the Japanese destroyed Russia’s last

⁸⁴⁸ L’vov, *Rassvet*, 10 (23) March 1905, N.10

⁸⁴⁹ L’vov, F.A. “Lihodei byurocraticheskogo samovlastiya kak neposredstvenn’ie vinovniki pervoi rusko-iaponskoi voinii,” (Evil Doers in Bureaucratic Autocracy to be the Direct Faults for the first Russo-Japanese War) in *Vladivostok*, 7 (20) March 1905

⁸⁵⁰ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika” (Politics) in *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1905/4 (81-97pp), p.84

⁸⁵¹ Gur’ev, A.N. “O vozniknovenii Rusko-iaponskoivoin’ii” (About the origin of the Russo-Japanese war), in *Russkia Vedomosti*, 18, 20, 25, 27 May 1905; also “*Istoricheskoi missii Russii v Azii* (Russia’s Historical Mission in Asia) in *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 25 April (6 May), 25 April (8 May), 27 April (10 May) 1905

⁸⁵² “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1905/4 (829-842pp), p.832

⁸⁵³ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1905/11 (375-392pp), p.378

hope in the war- a fleet assembled from the navy's Baltic and Mediterranean squadrons.⁸⁵⁴ The Japanese fleet under Admiral Heihachiro Togo destroyed two-thirds of the Russian fleet under Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski. Casualties from Japanese side were 117 dead, 583 injured, 3 torpedo boats sunk while from Russian side they accounted to 4380 dead, 5917 injured, 21 ships sunk, 7 captured, and 6 disarmed.⁸⁵⁵ That striking difference in the human and material losses left no doubt in Russians that the battle at Tsushima was supposed to be the final act of the war. Even the press remained speechless for a while, mainly sad songs and poems such as V.Bruisov's "Tsushima"⁸⁵⁶ were created and broadly repeated in mourn the loss of Russia's heroes. Japan's victory over the Russian Navy deeply divided Russian military establishment and triggered a series of accusations against the officers who took part in the battle.

Publicists seemed too shocked to comment on the battle of Tsushima. The "populist" S.N. Yuzhakov merely admitted, "Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvenskii's fleet is weaker than Admiral Togo's."⁸⁵⁷

Only the conservative *Russkoe Slovo* printed the right-wing "conservative" leader Siromyatnikov-Sigma's appeal to Russians, aiming to boost up their patriotism. As he wrote, "Brothers, do not lose courage, at least be citizens, not villains. Not all is lost yet. The last hope in a miracle [that could turn the war in Russia's advantage] is only lost. It makes our task to save our Fatherland more urgent."⁸⁵⁸ Siromyatnikov-Sigma perceived Japan's victory over Russia at Tsushima as the turning point that "changed the position of the states in the Far East." Because of it, he predicted "either a Japanese protectorate over European colonies in Asia or a coalition of states against Japan, into which Russia should take the responsibility of guarding their interests, as it happened in the Napoleon wars."⁸⁵⁹ For the role of the leader, Russia needed cardinal reforms at all levels, argued the "reform-minded conservative." As true follower of the Easterner's idea, he reminded, "Russia stands between Europe and Asia." In his

⁸⁵⁴ Curtis, G.E. "Imperialism in Asia and the Russo-Japanese War", in Curtis, G.E., (ed.), *Russia: A Country Study*, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1996

⁸⁵⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tsushima

⁸⁵⁶ V. Bruisov used images of ancient Rome to express his indignation at the Tsushima defeat, and disclose the inadequacy of Russian political and military leadership. He believed in Russia's historical mission to be the "Third Rome" destined to defend the Christendom from the "Barbarians". Yet, the "barbarians" managed to destroy Rome. Bruisov, V. "Tsushima" in *Bibliographia*, 1993. N. 3; also See Bruisov, V. *Sobranie sochinenii v 7 tomah* (Collected Works in 7 vols), Vol.1, Moskva, 1973:423

⁸⁵⁷ Yuzhakov, S.N., "Politika", in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1905/3 (138-163pp), p.139

⁸⁵⁸ Sigma in his "Zametki pisatelya.Tsushima" (Writer's Notes.Tsushima) in *Russkoe Slovo*, N.154, 19 May (1 June) 1905

⁸⁵⁹ Siromyatnikov-Sigma, "Zametki pisatelya. Writer's Notes XXYI, in *Russkoe Slovo*, N.157, 22 May (3 June) 1905.

viewpoint, Russia had betrayed her Asian brethren with her coalition against China. Thus, Russia had forgotten her mission and duty towards Asian nations. According to Siromyatnikov-Sigma, after the battle at Tsushima Russia got confronted with a big dilemma: “either to be driven out of Asia, as it was now driven from the European council, or to unite honestly with Japan in defense of the interests of the continent, and request from Japan peace and union (which Baron Itoh offered to us in 1901 and which we with doubts rejected).”⁸⁶⁰ A decade of studying Asian nations drove Siromyatnikov-Sigma to the idea of Russia’s union with Japan and China instead of Russia’s participation in a European coalition, as he admitted. In his perceptions, the creation of proper Russo-Asiatic policy was the life necessity for Russia. Russia’s position in Europe depended on her position in Asia not *vice versa*, argued the “Easterner” publicist.⁸⁶¹ He saw in Russia’s defeat in Tsushima a possibility for the halt of the war. The possibilities were either Russia to conclude humiliating peace with Japan or to request from Russian people further reserves and capital to guard Russian boundaries in the Far East. However, the war could be prolonged, and after Japan, there might come, China, Afghanistan, and so on, and it would turn into an endless for Russia fight in Asia. Therefore, the Autocracy should do her best to save the Fatherland by choosing the best way for Russian people, presumably a union with Japan.⁸⁶² Historians would later confirm that the battle at Tsushima marked the change of the balance of power in the Pacific in the early twentieth century, and would substantiate Russia’s conclusion of secret treaties and alliance with Japan (from 1907-12-16) as Siromyatnikov-Sigma predicted.

The successive Russian defeats on land and sea in 1904 and 1905 placed a growing strain on the Russian political and economic structure and engendered a sense of national humiliation. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 in its fateful and fatal course of development signified the ruin of Russian hopes and illusions about Russia’s capabilities as a military and intellectual power. The Russian humiliation was further increased by the fact that Russia, a giant empire, was defeated by a small, not well-known so far country. “David has won the battle against Goliath.”

Meanwhile, in every defeat of Russia by Japan, some revolutionary circles in Russia such as Lenin’s “*Bolsheviki*,” and the “Anarchists,” saw a destiny sign of social justice. They perceived the war as a social clash of the reactionary system (Russia) with the progressive

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid

⁸⁶¹ Ibid

⁸⁶² Ibid

system (Japan) - a country with a public participation in the government. Under the influence of such positive propaganda about the Japanese, Russian revolutionary women and girls enthusiastically greeted and hugged the first Japanese POWs brought via the river Volga.⁸⁶³ A group of revolutionary Russian university students even sent a telegram to Mikado with their honest greetings and wishes for a quick victory over the bloody Russian Tsar and his despotic regime.⁸⁶⁴

The majority of Russians, however, interpreted Russia's defeats at Mukden and Tsushima as "great shame." A few days after the battle of Tsushima the liberal *Vestnik Evropii's* finally spoke, "it was shame to give Russian ships to Japanese."⁸⁶⁵ To "Liberals," Russia was defeated on land and sea "not by Japan outnumbering us, or by Japan's military genius, but because of our government's ignorance, chasing for centuries any valuable thoughts or plans, because of its passivity, and clumsiness, and [the originating of it] low level military command..."⁸⁶⁶

"Liberals" also came with open criticism of the "patriots" from the Petersburg "conservative" newspaper *Novoe Vremya*, for their insistence on continuation of the war.⁸⁶⁷ Giving up one's ideals is a slow and hard process through which an individual goes when forced by the conditions. With every Russia's defeat, Russian nationalists found it hard to maintain their ideal of Russia's military might and intellectual superiority over the "Asiatics." Due to all the defeats that Russia suffered in Japanese hands, according to the majority of Russian intellectuals, Russia's place in the dialogue of the European social progress was seriously challenged by the emergence of Japan as a competitive military and an intellectual force. Nevertheless, there were still few "Patriots," among the "Conservatives," who kept insisting that Russia's image and dignity required proper defense until the very end of the war. Their "patriotic" fervor, however, was negligible compared to the start of the war.

What is more, since the Battle at Tsushima, the focus of Russian intellectuals, "Liberals" and "Conservatives" alike, fell on the surmounting internal unrest. Naturally, a number of

⁸⁶³ See *Karel Kramarzh's Memoirs*- a Cheh liberal, qtd. By Airapetov, O. "Army, Society, and Colonial War", *Rodina* N.1, 2004, <http://lwww.japon.ru/?aText&ID=41685>

⁸⁶⁴ Ustryalov, N.V. "Patriotica", *Smeh Vekhi*, Prague, 1921, re-printed in I.A. Isaeva, (ed.), *V poiskah puti. Russkaia intelligentsiia i sudby Rossii* (In Search for a Road. Russian Intelligentsia and Russia's Fate), Moskva, Russkaya kniga, 1992:252

⁸⁶⁵ "Inostrannoe obozrenie" (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1905/7 (350-364pp), p.351

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.350

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.358

prominent intellectuals did their best to rein the public pressure in administering their own political targets. The final grand defeats that Russia suffered assisted the unification and strengthening of the anti-war and anti-government opposition. People from various ideological movements and schools of thought united in their demands for immediate halt of belligerences and urgent social reforms. The public pressure for peace and reforms increased immensely after Russia's grand defeats on land and sea.

VIII.3. Reactions to the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905

The bloody exhausting battles for over a year between Russia and Japan and the disturbed balance in the region convinced all great powers that peace was more than necessary. The peace initiative was undertaken by the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt and his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, George von Lengerke Meyer. At the beginning of February 1905, President Roosevelt sent messages to Russia stating his readiness to serve as a peace mediator.

On 8 March 1905, before the Battle of Mukden, the Japanese War Minister Terauchi Masatake called up the American Minister in Tokyo, Lloyd Griscom, and asked him to inform the American President Theodore Roosevelt that Japan was ready to negotiate a peace. Nevertheless, in Russia, the turning point regarding the termination of warfare occurred after May 1905, that is, after the Battle of Tsushima.⁸⁶⁸

On 7 June 1905, President Roosevelt met with the Japanese diplomat, Kaneko Kentarō, and on 8 June 1905, he received Nicholas II's consent for peace talks. Then the American president sent to Petersburg and Tokyo official invitations to attend peace talks and suggested Portsmouth as a convenient neutral place for a meeting. Baron Komura and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Takahira Kogorō, presented the Japanese side while the ex-Minister of Finances and the current Chair of the Committee of the Ministers Count Sergei Yu. Witte and the Russian ex-Minister in Japan Baron Roman Rosen presented the Russian side. Twelve sessions were held between 9 August and 30 August 1905 until both sides finally agreed upon Russian compromise with land and contribution. During that time, there were numerous speculations in the Russian press about the possible Japanese demands and Russian compromises.

⁸⁶⁸ see Kowner, R. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest, N.29*, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, Maryland-Toronto-Oxford, 2006: 302

Reactions to the Japanese peace demands and the conclusion of the peace treaty came in different tones and forms. The “liberal” V.A.Gol’tsev argued that “Japan *de facto* gained protectorate over Korea...She overtook Sakhalin and would like to keep it. Japanese visions spread to Vladivostok, Amour, and Usury region. It is highly doubtful that our government would agree upon territorial compromise.”⁸⁶⁹ To “Liberals,” the most important question was defense of Russia’s interests in Siberia for which they appealed for setting up the State *Duma* to decide it.⁸⁷⁰ Nevertheless, “Liberals” applauded the start of the peace talks, and the choice of Baron Komura and Sergei Witte. As the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii* stated, “Japanese representatives are the best diplomats lead by Baron Komura...Witte’s appointment is due to his personal qualities and knowledge of the situation.”⁸⁷¹ The journal criticized the “patriots” from *Novoe Vremya* who called the peace talks “shame.” “Why did not they see the shame of this war but they see the shame of this peace?” asked *Vestnik Evrop’ii*. Still, perceptions differed as much as observers differed.

During a meeting of the *Zemstvo* and cities’ representatives in Moscow on 7 August 1905, it was decided to present the following address to the Tsar: “Russia, your Imperial Excellency, suffered a terrible defeat because of the nasty crimes and forgeries of the advisors of Your Imperial Throne. Our army has no power to crush the enemy, and our navy was destroyed. In addition, there is coming a riot in the empire, [which is] more threatening than external enemies are...” *Zemstvo* and members of other city councils insisted, “On summoning immediately people’s representatives,” that is, the State *Duma*. The Tsar together with those representatives was expected to solve “the urgent problem about the war and peace, as well as the conditions of the peace treaty...” The two hundred and fifty members who signed this petition to Tsar Nicholas II assumed that Tsar’s act together with people’s representatives “would give the present war a national character; would cease the internal revolt, and would gather people under the imperial flag with inexplicable joy...”⁸⁷²

By the end of August 1905, however, the Autocracy seemed to have recovered its political stance without the assistance of people’s representatives. The Portsmouth treaty ended the war,

⁸⁶⁹ Goltsev, V.A, “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl* 1905/6 (162-68pp),p.162

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid

⁸⁷¹ *Novoe Vremya* of August 1905, cited in “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1905/08 (782-796pp), p.782;784

⁸⁷² Petition reprinted in “Yaponia i Rossia”, *Kobe Daily News*, Saturday, 8 July 1905

and the rescript on the *Bulygin Duma* divided the “liberal” opposition. To some “Liberals,” as the Petersburg “liberal” journal pointed out, “reforms and freedom turned to be fictitious.”⁸⁷³

Popular unrest in the periphery still worried the government but until it did not get to the centers like Petersburg and Moscow, it did not present big threat to the Autocracy either.⁸⁷⁴ Compared to the riots in Lodz, Baku, or Poland, the capitals seemed relatively stable with some hot debates mainly focused on the peace treaty demands.

The Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 5 September (28 August O.S.) 1905 included Russia’s recognition of Japan’s hegemony over Korea, which made it *de facto* a Japanese protectorate. In addition to the control over the Kwantung territory, Japan won the southern half of Sakhalin Island, and the territory leased to Russia and her railway rights in the Liaodong Peninsula, including Mukden, Port Arthur, and Dal’nii.⁸⁷⁵ Besides, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed on 12 August 1905, and expanded to provide mutual support if either was attacked by a single power instead of two and was extended to India. Britain recognized the Japanese dominance of Korea in return for a Japanese pledge not to threaten Singapore.

Nevertheless, the majority of Japanese considered those gains and guarantees to be insufficient for all their losses in the war. On 30 August 1905, there was an unrestrained outrage in the Japanese press at the news of the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth - some papers even advocated the assassination of the Cabinet. On the next day, Japanese ultra-nationalist groups from the Anti-Peace Society opposed openly the Treaty of Portsmouth. From 5 to 7 September there followed riots in Hibiya Park in Tokyo protesting against the Portsmouth Treaty, and riots in Yokohama and Kobe, as well as some smaller rallies nationwide. Over 1000 people were killed or injured during the three-day Hibiya Park Riot, which led to the summoning of Martial Law in force until November 1905.⁸⁷⁶

In contrast, in Russia the treaty provisions about the ceding the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the complete withdrawal of Russian army from Manchuria received moderate attention.

⁸⁷³ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1906/1 (361-373pp), p.365

⁸⁷⁴ Kassow, S.D. *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*, Univ. of California Press, 1989:237

⁸⁷⁵ Kowner, R. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest, N.29*, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, Maryland-Toronto-Oxford, 2006:300

⁸⁷⁶ see Okamoto, Sh. *The Japanese Oligarchy, and the Russo-Japanese War*. Studies of the East Asian Institute. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970

Count S.Yu. Witte's acts as a plenipotentiary naturally also enjoyed some attention.⁸⁷⁷ Numerous minor mutinies by demoralized Russian troops returning from the Far East on the Trans-Siberian Railroad were mainly because of Russia's war losses than because of the peace treaty compromises. Russia's row of defeats in Japanese hands, which proved the Autocracy's weakness and inability to cope with the situation, not the concessions in the peace treaty, triggered Russian internal unrest. Peoples' beliefs in the power and rightness of the almighty Tsar were seriously shaken. In addition, the necessity of political reforms⁸⁷⁸, which became more obvious after the grand defeats, created a united opposition front against the government. The pressure from all social strata for reforms was such that the Autocracy was forced to do some compromise. On 30 October 1905, in the wake of an immense countrywide general strike, the "October *Manifesto*" ended the unlimited Tsarist Autocracy in Russia – Count S.Yu. Witte was assigned the Premier. The Autocracy also undertook some partial reforms regarding the civil rights and Russia's future governing as well as Russia's policy in the Far East. The "October *Manifesto*" granted many of the reforms that "Liberals" were denied in early 1905 but by then "Liberals" were unwilling to abandon the "militant hostility toward the government" and the civil unrest continued through 1906.⁸⁷⁹

Nevertheless, the majority of Russians were relieved that the great burden over them –the horrible war against Japan- was put to an end.

The press organ of the "Populists" *Russkoe Bogatsvo* announced "with deep satisfaction" and "immense joy" that "the horrible war ended." Its editor S. Yu. Yuzhakov also expressed "his sense of vicious insult" because the Autocracy involved Russian people into "a war not only incredibly horrible, but also incredibly useless and vain."⁸⁸⁰ Professor S.N.Yuzhakov expressed hopes that "the military censorship ended." In a "Populist" tone, he sharply criticized Russian bureaucrats for "wasting millions of people and money instead of using those funds to feed the hungry ones."⁸⁸¹ In contrast to the majority of Russians, some "Populists" were very much content that Japan received the Southern part of Sakhalin, the richest with natural resources. "When it was under our rule, it was a place of exile and suffering. It would be a place for

⁸⁷⁷ Esthus, R. "Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War," in the *Russian Review*, Vol. N.40, Oct.1981,p.411

⁸⁷⁸ Ivo Spector argues that the revolution of 1905 was "a people's or national revolution, with a constitution as its main goal." See Spector, I., *The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall Inc., 1962: 23

⁸⁷⁹ See Ascher, A. *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray*, Stanford University Press,1988

⁸⁸⁰ Yuzhakov, S.N., "Politika" (Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo*, 1905/8 (185-204pp), p.184

⁸⁸¹ Ibid

wealth and cultural development in Japanese hands.”⁸⁸² “Populists” insisted on a deep explanation of whom and why was to be blamed for all Russia’s losses so far “because our Fatherland, in the real sense, is in danger.”⁸⁸³ The perception of approaching a big external danger was substituted with that of an internal one once the war ended. In contrast to the “right wing” conservative intellectuals, who perceived the reform-minded “Liberals” and “Revolutionaries” as the new internal threat to Russia, the “Populists” perceived the Russian government as the biggest danger to Russian people “since it sacrificed its own people and material resources for mere whims.”⁸⁸⁴

The Petersburg “upper-bourgeois” newspaper *Novoe Vremya* had obviously consented to peace with Japan even without a crushing victory over the “enemy.” It started insisting, “It would be highly feasible if Russia came up with a peace proposal ...” “To continue the war because you do not know what the peace treaty would be is futile and dangerous...,” *Novoe Vremya* argued. Hence, if Japanese demands were unacceptable, the war might be continued, which in the newspaper’s perceptions seemed not to be desirable. *Novoe Vremya*’s perceptions of Japan had also undergone a cardinal change- from “a mean enemy that deserved proper punishment,” Japan had turned into a powerful force “that could pacify everybody with all her huge successes.” The author referred to a diplomat’s confession in front of a *Neue Freie Presse* after the halt of belligerences. According to him, “Japanese influence in East Asia is beyond any doubt.” Nevertheless, Japan was expected to obey the laws of political balance established by Europe, the “conservative” *Novoe Vremya* argued⁸⁸⁵

Russian formal policy newspaper *Grazhdanin* (owned by Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii, the Tsar’s personal adviser), also changed its stance when the war ended. It started to criticize unmercifully “Bezobrazov, Vogak, Abaza, and their close followers for their adventures for commercial profits in Yalu which brought Russia to a catastrophe through the war.”⁸⁸⁶ The series of disastrous defeats for Russia provoked both “Liberals” and “Revolutionaries” as well as a big part of the loyal to the government “Conservatives” to look for scapegoats and insist on public war-trials.

⁸⁸² Ibid

⁸⁸³ Ibid,p.185

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁸⁵ “O Mir” (About Peace) *Novoe Vremya* of 25 May 1905, reprinted in “Yaponia i Rossia”, *Kobe Daily News*, Thursday, 10 August 1905:4

⁸⁸⁶ *Grazhdanin* cited in “Yaponia i Rossia”, *Kobe Daily News*, Thursday, 10 August 1905:6

The other “monarchist” newspaper *Rassvet* owned by Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii, had also changed its position towards the war and Japan after Russia’s final defeats. As the “monarchist” Ardov wrote in *Rassvet* of 31 May 1905: “We believed in everything [we were told] and obediently repeated: “our enemy is insidious and mean,” and our hearts earned for revenge. However, we did not know that insidious were not they, those modest yellow people who with iron patience bore the insults we inflicted them in our unjustifiable Bezobrazov’s way...”⁸⁸⁷ Ardov pointed out “Bezobrazov, Vonlyarskii, Abaza at all” to be the only guilty for Russia’s catastrophe and insisted on their bringing to trial. On the other hand, the recent “insidious enemy” Japan had become one that had the complete right to attack Russia. As Ardov wrote, Japanese advantage “is not in their power but in their *right*...”⁸⁸⁸

In turn, the “liberal” V.A.Gol’tsev pointed out in *Russkaya M’isl* that “the text of the Peace Treaty triggered in Japan hostile to the government demonstrations. At home [in Russia] the so much desired peace did not provoke any joyful feelings.”⁸⁸⁹

Meanwhile some “Populists” and some “Conservative Monarchists” like the “Black Hundreds” lead by L.A.Tikhomirov started looking for “internal enemy” in Russia. In turn, “Liberal-Constitutionalists” like V.A.Gol’tsev neglected Japan and kept insisting that England was Russia’s “major rival in the East.”⁸⁹⁰ Although in practice Japan defeated Russia, most “Liberals” believed it impossible without the assistance of Britain and USA. According to them, those were the biggest rivals to Russia in the Pacific. Nevertheless, they seemed troubled by Japan’s victory over Russia and the change of her status in the “East.” In V.A.Gol’tsev’s view, the “horrible war ended with Japan’s heavy peace demands in Portsmouth.” Japan’s settling foot in Korea, her overtaking part of Port Arthur and all South Manchuria, as well as half Sakhalin were perceived as “too big gains” by the “liberal” V.A.Gol’tsev. In addition, “Japan gained the largest and the richest fishing zones. Anglo-Japanese alliance supports her gains.” Moreover, “from Japan depends whether China would turn into [Russia’s] dangerous enemy,” stated the “liberal” publicist. Russia might not be able to cope alone with all those. Therefore, he recommended Russia’s return to Europe, which “could be hastened now when our Fatherland would become a constitutional state.”⁸⁹¹

⁸⁸⁷ Ardov, *Rassvet* of 31 May 1905, cited in “Yaponia i Rosia”, *Kobe Daily News*, Thursday, 10 August 1905:7

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁸⁹ Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl* 1905/9 (260-264pp), p.261

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid, p.261

⁸⁹¹ Gol’tsev, V.A. “1905 v politicheskii plan” (1905 in Political Aspect), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1906/1 (161-165pp),p.161

Other “Liberals” such as M.M.Stasyulevich, a professor of History at the Petersburg University and editor of the “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, “with great relief accepted the news about peace on moderate conditions, without payment of contributions and the loss of only south part of Sakhalin.”⁸⁹² *Vestnik Evrop’ii* noted “two great dates” in Russian history- “August 6, 1905 when the internal peace was reached, and August 16, 1905 when the external peace was established.”⁸⁹³ Japanese demands on land and contribution from Russia were perceived as “badly calculated” by *Vestnik Evrop’ii*. “It is strange to pay a contribution for ending a war on a foreign territory. And the issue of Sakhalin created the impression of something artificially designed to interfere the talks,” commented the Japanese demands the Petersburg “liberal” journal.⁸⁹⁴ Japan was still perceived in the role of a “greedy pagan” by some Russians although she finally agreed on moderate compromise from Russia. Nevertheless, *Vestnik Evrop’ii* welcomed the “end of the awful nightmare- the bloody war, and the followed it worries around the issue of peace demands.” Similar to the other central press, the “liberal” journal focused its argument not so much on the peace treaty but on “the necessity of cardinal reforms to change all the state system which is leading Russia to catastrophes by an uncontrollable *clique* of autocratic intriguers [visioning “Bezobrazov’s *clique*”]⁸⁹⁵

In contrast, the “monarchist” newspaper *Rassvet* owned by the “Easterner” Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii, presented an interesting interpretation of the situation in the Far East, and insisted not only on peace but also on special alliance with Japan. As the “monarchist” and keen “Easterner” Stroev wrote in *Rassvet* of 1 July 1905, “Peace, whatever it is, is better than an insane useless war. We have to accept heavy peace contributions. However, is there other choice? Yes. It is not only peace, but also profitable for both sides alliance with Japan. Such a political combination begs for itself and its profitable consequences are innumerable.”⁸⁹⁶ He saw Japan as the new continental state close to Russia. “The “yellow” and Slavic races came across each other...friction is unavoidable,” Stroev commented. In his prediction, Japanese trade and manufacture would invade Korea, Manchuria, and the rest of the Far East. China would also eventually fall under Japanese influence or would follow her own way of cultural progress. Under those conditions, it was more profitable to conclude an alliance with Japan

⁸⁹² “Inostrannoe Obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii* 1905/9 (365-377pp), p.365

⁸⁹³ Ibid

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid, p.367

⁸⁹⁵ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii* 1905/11 (375-392pp), p.378

⁸⁹⁶ Stroev in *Rassvet* of 1 July 1905, Reprinted in “Yaponia i Rossia”, *Kobe Daily News*, Thursday, 10 August 1905:7

instead of involving the whole Russia's efforts to guard 10 000 verst (30 500 000 ft) common boundary, according to Stroev. He envisioned two opportunities for Russia: "either [Russia] gives up Asia, or she enters into the closest alliance with the Asians." Like the owner of the newspaper, Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii, Stroev argued for Russia and Japan being "racially akin" which could assist a further alliance between them. What is more, as Stroev stated, "We need alliance with Japan, a free reformed country, that is, to go with the progress, not with old China... we need to reform our country, to go along a new political and social lifestyle." In his understanding, only such a contract "could be a guarantee for Japan and a necessity for Russia's future."⁸⁹⁷ Russian Asianism or the so-called "Easterners' idea" of Russia's racial and civilization kinship with Asia was resurrected again once the war ended. Farsighted entrepreneurs close to the government, such as Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii and his circle, hurried to re-introduce the idea of the beneficiary in economic, strategic, and political aspect alliance with Japan after the Portsmouth Peace Treaty became a mutually recognized fact.

On the other side of the civilization spectrum, there were some "Westerners" and "Slavophiles," who approved the signing of the peace treaty but objected any alliance between Russia and Japan. In retort to "Easterners," they resurrected the idea of the "Yellow Peril" this time in the face of Japan as the unifier and guide of Asians against the "white colonization." They were well aware of the repercussions that the Japanese victories over Russia had in East and South Asia. Prince M. O. Men'shikov, Prince Dolgorukov, the publicists L. Slonimski, L.F. Marx, and V.Ya Svetlov, all proclaimed the possibility of the awakening of China after the war and her union with Japan, which would turn into an invincible force against Europe.⁸⁹⁸ As the "moderate conservative" journal *Niva* stated, "After Japan, multimillion China incited and supported by Japan, would come next against us...After Japanese victory, the yellow people felt their power and first started speaking about their human rights."⁸⁹⁹ *Niva* advanced this argument in order to support her claim of "the necessity of cardinal reforms at the military and naval administrations."⁹⁰⁰

The idea that Russia could not afford to lose another war against the "Asiatics," that is, against China, or a union of China, Japan, and Korea, and therefore had to take measures from the moment of signing the peace treaty with Japan, was still shared by some Russian pro-West

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid

⁸⁹⁸ on the "Yellow Peril" see Chapter IV of this study

⁸⁹⁹ "V chayanii zheltoi opasnosti. Politicheskoe obozrenie" (In Expectation of 'Yellow Peril'. A political Observation), in *Niva*, 1905, N.20, p.400

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid

minded intellectuals. It demonstrated that some old stereotypes of the “Asiatics” as “hypocritical,” “cunning,” and “aggressive” were still shared among Russian society, even more so after Japanese military intelligence won its name as “extremely skillful and cunning,” and contributed most to Russian war losses.

Contrary to those arguing for a “Yellow Peril” that would come again from “Asian East,” other Russian intellectuals claimed that Japan seemed to be satisfied with her current position in the region. According to the Petersburg “liberal” journal *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, “the peace treaty secured to Japan a ten year- master position in the East giving her the whole Korea...Japan had no further motif to continue the war.”⁹⁰¹ Still, the end of the war and the successful end of the peace talks were attributed by some “Liberals” as V.A.Gol’tsev from *Russkaya M’isl* to be “either due to Japanese financial difficulties or to the cunningness of Russian representatives [at Portsmouth].”⁹⁰²

The Tsar’s “*Manifesto*” of October 1905, which announced the signing of the peace treaty and the reforms that are going to be undertaken in Russia, happened to receive bigger attention from Russian intellectuals than the Japanese treaty demands.

The Moscow “liberal” journal *Russkaya M’isl* similarly to most Russian press reprinted in full the “*Manifesto*” of October 1905. The Autocracy evaded dexterously any concrete explanation of the causes of the war and Russia’s motifs for the peace, limiting itself to the appraisal of the heroism of Russian armies. In *Manifesto*’ terms, “Due to mysterious God’s will, Russia had to undergo heavy sufferings and ordeals in a bloody war distinguished for the numerous heroic feats – example of the self-sacrifice, bravery, and limitless loyalty of our armies in their fight with a brave and strong enemy.”⁹⁰³ It announced the formal end of the war with deep relief, not missing the chance to remind that the peace became possible because the war was as much burden to Russia as to Japan. As it pointed out, “to the heavy burden to all of us is put an end.” According to it, “our state again turns to the East looking for a peaceful proliferation and good neighborhood relations with the friendly again to us Japanese empire.”⁹⁰⁴ The “liberal” V.A.Gol’tsev, editor of *Russkaya M’isl*, welcomed most that part of the “*Manifesto*,” calling it “memorable.” “Liberals” had long entertained the thought of friendly relations and exchange

⁹⁰¹ “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1905/10 (780-794pp),p.780

⁹⁰² Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs) in *Russkaya M’isl* 1906/1 (361-373pp), p.369

⁹⁰³ *Pravitel’stvenii Vestnik* of August 23 (O.S.), 1905, and “October *Manifesto*” cited by Gol’tsev, V.A. “Inostrannoe obozrenie” (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Russkaya M’isl*, 1905/10 (175-180pp), p.175

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid

of ideas with progressive Japan. On the other hand, Professor V.A.Gol'tsev interpreted the Tsar's "October *Manifesto*" with its elusive language to be "the top of politics of adventure, and imperialistic dreams of our true Russians- the greedy and ambitious egoists." He insisted on a trial for "the people who brought us into this war," but also welcomed the announced by the Manifesto broad internal reforms. To the "Westerner" V.A.Gol'tsev, with the broad reforms Russia was "to become a European state in the full and noble sense of this word."⁹⁰⁵

The "conservative" newspapers *Novoe Vremya*, *Goloss Moskv'ii*, and *Rech* kept insisting on Russia's foreign policy to consider the fact that Russia was a Slavic country. Hence, her future major strategic plans in conservative intellectuals' visions were to be designed for the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, not Asia.⁹⁰⁶

A similar pro-European propaganda carried the Petersburg "liberal" journal *Vestnik Evrop'ii*. It argued, "Russia should give up any active policy in the Middle Asia and the Pacific..." since it was "a waste of money and human force."⁹⁰⁷ Russia's place, in the journal's understanding, was in Europe. Hence, Russia was expected to take care of recovering her ruined image there first. In contrast to the Tsar's "*Manifesto*," *Vestnik Evrop'ii* admitted openly Russia's defeat. As it stated, "We are fully defeated in the long persistent rivalry with Japan on land and sea. Nobody now looks for Russia's political support, or asks her as an arbiter in disputes."⁹⁰⁸

Russia's complete defeat by Japan, however, kept being a disputable issue in Russia long years. A great number of Russian "patriots," mainly among the "pro-monarchist" and "conservative" circles, claimed that regardless of the peace treaty that proclaimed the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the war was far from decided. Russia had at her disposal enormous human and material resources, which though with some difficulties, could have been transferred in portions to the Far East until the full exhaustion of Japanese army and resources. Still, even the "patriots" had to accept the fact that with the peace treaty Russia admitted Japan's military superiority and agreed to be ousted from Southern Manchuria.

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid,p.176

⁹⁰⁶ *Goloss Moskv'ii*, 1908/1 and 1908/10; also *Rech* 1908/1; 1908/3; 1908/10 all cited in Zadoin, A.G., *Vneshnaya politika Rossii:natsional'noe soznanie i natsional'nie interes'ii* (Russia's Foreign Policy: National Consciousness and Interests), Moskva, 2002:104

⁹⁰⁷ "Inostrannoe obozrenie", (Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop'ii* 1905/10 (750-794pp), p.784

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.785

At the formal level, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was treated as some kind of a temporary compromise acceptable to both Russia and Japan. Some details of the treaty were settled two years later. The treaty could be also considered a trial to create some balance in the Far Eastern rivalry for influence with the assistance of USA and Britain.⁹⁰⁹ Japanese gains and image after the war of 1904-5 were bigger than she had initially planned when she started the war. The war gave Japan a dominant position in Korea and rights in Manchuria. In addition, Japan gained recognition in international politics, expanded her markets in Asia, and further developed her light industry. Hence, Japan confirmed her place among the great powers' influence in the region.⁹¹⁰

On Russian side, the treaty again secured Russia some time to “gather her strength” to fight successfully on the domestic and international stages, and recover her international image (as it had happened after the Crimean War of 1853-6). Because Russia moved from a war to a revolution, the conflict with Japan became in Russian minds a sign of passing old order.⁹¹¹ Most intellectuals saw the result as a victory for constitutionalism over the Autocracy. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 also proved to be a part of the system of means for international pressure for reaching national goals, siding successfully along with political and economic means. Russia and Japan recovered their diplomatic relationships signing also a secret ally treaty between themselves two years later.⁹¹²

⁹⁰⁹ A similar opinion shares J.A.White who argues: “It was a peace in a relative sense. It was more like a truce which left open the prospect that each party might by further diplomacy to improve its position as circumstances permitted.” See White, J.A. “Portsmouth 1905: Peace or Truce?” – a paper presented at the Conference on Peace Research in History with the American Historical Association, N.Y., Dec.29,1966:36

⁹¹⁰ The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, together with the Peking Treaty of December 1905, and a Protectorate Treaty over Korea negotiated by Itō Hirobumi at Seoul in November 1905, established Japan's foundation on the continent. See Esthus, R. A. *Double Eagle and Rising Sun, The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 1988:195

⁹¹¹ The poets Boris Pasternak, Osip Mandelstam, Velimir Khlebnikov, Igor' Severianin and others, as they reviewed Russian historical experience, all saw the Russo-Japanese War as a border crossing, a metaphor for the old order and its demise. (Boris Pasternak, ‘9-a ianvaria’, ‘1905’, in his *Stikhotvoreniia i poemi v dvukh tomakh*, ed. V.S. Baevski and E.B. Pasternak (Biblioteka Poeta, bol'shaia seriia, 3rd edn. Leningrad, 1990, vol.1, pp. 228-9; 250, 252, 262; Osip Mandelstam, “Kogda v dalekuiu Koreiu”, in his *Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh*, ed. G.P. Struve and B. A. Filippov, vol. 1, Washington, 1967, pp. 178-9) all quoted by Wells, D. in “*The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*”, ed. By David Wells and Sandra Wilson, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999:109

⁹¹² Under a secret section of the first agreement, signed in July 1907, Russia and Japan agreed to divide Manchuria between them, with Russian rights preponderant in the north and the Japanese in the south. Further, Russia recognized Japan's control in Korea and Japan recognized Russia's special interest in Outer Mongolia.

See Marinov, V.A. *Russia i Iaponiia pered mirovoi voiny (1905-1914): ocherki istorii otnoshenii* (Russia and Japan before World War I (1905-1914):Outline history of their relations), Moscow, 1974; also Kutakov, L.N. *Rossia i Iaponiia, Moscow, 1988*, p.276-324; and Price, E. B. “*The Russo-*

The battles at Port Arthur, Tsushima, and Mukden remained in the Russian historical memory with their horror and bloodshed as much as with Russian sacrifices and heroism there. The sad refrain of the waltz “Na sopkah Manchurii” (On Manchurian Hills), and the couple of grand military history novels written a few years after the war by participants in it, such as V.I.Semenovich’s *Rasplata* (Retribution, SBP., 1909) and A.S.Novikov Priboi’s *Tsushima* (M., 1935) keep Russian memories about the horrible defeat that Russia suffered in Japanese hands in 1904-5 alive.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 also remained in Russian history as the first grand military conflict of the twentieth century. It still attracts the attention of military specialists and historians with its new for the time strategies, tactics, and weaponry. Moreover, it turned to be the first grand battle between a European great power and an Asian one. In addition, it turned into a sign of the beginning collapse of the Russian empire and demise of its Autocracy. Finally yet importantly, it led to the re-grouping of the powers on the world arena, and confirmation of a new great power in the East.

While scholars have extensively researched the military, political, and economic aspects of Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, its cultural aspect remained little investigated. This study has managed to uncover a considerable part of the Russian visions about Japan at the informal level demonstrating that Russian educated elite entertained various images of Japan, yet, the majority of them were positive even during the Russo-Japanese War.

Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia”, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933

IX Conclusion and Contribution of the Study

IX.1. Tendencies in the Intellectuals' Interpretations on Japan in the Period 1855-1905

This study examined Russian journalists, writers, and scholars' writings on Asia in general, and on Japan, in particular, dating from the first Russo-Japanese formal agreements in 1855 to the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. A considerable amount of various primary resources in Russian, and some secondary resources in English were analyzed in order to present a broader idea of that stratum of Russian educated elite's attitudes towards Japan. More specifically, this study disclosed Russian writers, journalists, and scholars' perceptions and images of the witnessed by them Japan's reformation and rise to power through her wars against China and Russia consequently. In addition, the base of the study presented the big regional events involving both empires at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Thus, it revealed International History through its cultural and political aspects in order to manifest the connection between the big regional events, formal Russo-Japanese relations, and Russian perceptions, images, and attitudes at the informal level provoked by them.

In the period 1855-1905, Russo-Japanese relations underwent through contrasting stages: from the first Russo-Japanese friendly commercial and diplomatic agreements to the Russian participation into the "Triple Intervention" against Japan in 1895; from the common participation of Russia and Japan in the suppression of the "Boxer Rebellion" of 1900 to their war against each other in 1904-5; to end up again with re-established friendly relations. Such complex relationship could not but reflect upon Russian perceptions and images of Japan both at the formal and informal levels. With the development of Russo-Japanese relations and the chain of big events in the Far East into which Russia and Japan were the main players, came to the fore various, at a time contrasting images of Japan in Russian intellectuals' discussions. Along with some old negatives stereotypes of Japan, numerous positive images of the post-reformed nation emerged in Russia.

The conclusion below offers a summary of the main factors and events, which influenced Russian images, as well as some peculiar similarities, and striking differences among those images.

IX.2. Factors Which Influenced Russian Perceptions and Images of Japan

Russian images of Japan were refracted through their creators' cultural prisms, educational background and accumulated life experiences. Hence, Russian attitudes to Japan and responses to the wars of 1894-5 and 1904-5 were based on their personal perceptions of reality and not on objective reality;

In addition, Russian attitudes to Japan were also refracted consciously or subconsciously through their self-perceptions. Thus, their images of Japan were also results of a comparison between their own country, Russia, and the "other" country, Japan. More specifically, Russia's marginal geographic and cultural position, and Japan's unique embodiment of the "East" and "West," were among the reasons for the ambiguous or contrasting attitudes among Russian elite towards Japan and Russo-Japanese rivalry in the Far East. Thus, "Westerners", "Easterners," and "Slavophiles" were found to entertain as much contrasting images of Japan as of their Fatherland.

Russian diversified political thought during that period further contributed to the variety of Russian perceptions and attitudes to Japan. Intellectuals' belief systems, that is, the ideological baggage they brought to bear on their perceptions also affected their images of Japan. "Liberals", "Populists," "Social Democrats," and "Socialist Revolutionaries" had more favorable attitudes to the westernized and modernized Japan and entertained predominantly positive images of her (although they focused on different sides of Japanese reformation) while "Conservative Monarchists" were more critical towards her as a whole.

Intellectuals' direct contacts with the Japanese, and their personal predispositions to Japan had also their big impact on their perceptions of the Country of the Rising Sun. Russian visitors to Japan treated her with deeper respect and their observations were more balanced. They gave equal attention to both "good" and "bad" sides of Japan, in contrast to the majority of writings based on second hand sources. What is more, their direct perceptions contributed to a higher degree of objectivity and demystification of some previously constructed denigrating images of Japan in Russia.

Russian images were also influenced by the changes in Japan's stance on the international arena. Russian intellectuals viewed Japan in different ways during her seclusion, reformation, regional advances, and wars against China and Russia. Their images during the years varied- from a "distant backward outsider" to a "model for a successful state reformation," from a

“friend” to an “aggressive “rival,” from a “mean but brave enemy,” to an “ally” and “teacher of the East”

Finally, it was also established that a group sheared historical memory about Mongolian invasions has turned into another factor that brought to some negative images of Japan in Russian minds. Such visions were resurrected in the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War to support the idea of the “Yellow Peril” to European civilization.

On the other hand, the changes of Russian state of mind regarding Japan in the period 1855-1905 were found to have exerted limited influence on Russian perceptions at the informal level. Russian public showed little interest in the Far East and Russian foreign policy there. Hence, Russian government endeavors in the region met little understanding and support among Russian public in contrast to the Japanese public.

IX.3. Events That Provoked New Images of Japan in Intellectuals’ Minds

Big historic events such as Meiji reforms, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the “Triple Intervention,” the “Boxer Rebellion,” the “Manchurian Crisis,” and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 provoked some cardinal changes in Russian intellectuals’ perceptions of Japan and gave birth to contrasting images of Japan.

The most significant discovery of that study, however, is that Russian intellectuals’ images of Japan during the studied fifty years were predominantly positive. Russian images of Japan became highly positive since the Meiji reforms along the European model. Next, Japanese victories in the war of 1894-5 further incited high admiration of Japanese military and intellectual superiority over the “decaying” China among Russian intellectuals. What is more, after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 Russian publicists prescribed to Japan to be the reformer and modernizer of the “East.” Nevertheless, she was still perceived by them as too small and “weak” to be the maintainer of the regional balance. Russia’s initiative for the summoning of the World Peace Conference III in Hague incited the Petersburg “Liberals” to present their Fatherland as the main peace bringer in the world. Hence, although “liberal” intellectuals recognized Japan’s growth of influence in the Asian East, they saw Russia not Japan as the peace mediator in the region.⁹¹³

⁹¹³ “Inostrannoe Obozrenie”(Review of Foreign Affairs), in *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1898/06 (810-820pp), p.816

Interestingly, Japanese ardent protests against the demands of the “Triple Intervention,” and later against Russia’s concessions in the region at Japan’s expense did not provoke the majority of Russian publicists to start perceiving Japan as a serious threat to Russia.

Still, some disturbances in the Far East such as the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900 against the foreigners in North China incited fear in few intellectuals. The rebellion provoked two prominent religious philosophers V. S. Solov’ev and L. A. Tikhomirov to announce the start of a “barbarian invasion” from the Asian East towards Europe. Those prophesized visions were taken seriously neither by the court nor by intellectuals’ circles at least until 1904. It was the “Manchurian Crisis” after 1900, which inflamed ardent debates among Russian publicists- from defending Russia’s advances in the region to condemning them.

On the other hand, Japanese public pressure on the government for a more aggressive approach towards Russia’s advances in the region in 1903 found its resonance in some Russian publicists’ reports on the Russo-Japanese rivalry provoking them to come up with some justification of Russia’s presence there.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, which followed, brought to the forefront some negative images of Japan mainly among Russian “conservative” publicists close to the government. However, contrary to the typical wartime attitudes between the belligerents, the war of 1904-5 did not change the positive predisposition towards constitutional Japan which Russian reform-minded intellectuals’ immensely cherished. On the contrary, it deepened the public discontent towards the government of their own Fatherland and triggered the Revolution of 1905.

IX.4. Characteristic Features of Intellectuals’ Direct Observations on Japan

4.1. Common Views on Pre-reformed Japan

Russian writings on Japan in the early nineteenth century are characterized with their strongest dualism. Russians saw Japan as an integrative part of the “Orient,” which bore with it the attributes of being backward but with hidden potential- that charmed and scared at the same time Europeans. On the one hand, Japan was perceived by Russian intellectuals as “exotic”

(implying “beautiful” but “primitive”), and Japanese were described as “polite” but “naïve.” Yet, they were praised for being “cunning,” “energetic,” “skillful,” and “curious” to everything new, which opened big future in front of them.⁹¹⁴;

Russian first writings on Japan put great emphasis on some contrasts between Japanese and Europeans- as a behavior, appearance, and lifestyle. Still, there were some idiosyncrasies, which were admired as much as envied. The impact of the Edo era, of what was perceived as the “good” qualities of “Old Japan” fell upon the world of senses. “Old Japan” was viewed as a land of ascetic superiority and sensuality. The images of samurai, and geishas captured the imagination of some Russian artists and poets.

Meanwhile, some Western stereotypes of Japan with negative connotations such as the “smallness” of everything in Japan and the “feminineness” of Japanese men were also repeated by Russian visitors to Japan during that period.⁹¹⁵ Japanese people were criticized for being “mean” and “witty,” “concealing well their true feelings and thoughts.” On the other hand, the most highly valued characteristics were Japanese “politeness,” “cleanness,” and “orderliness” in everything.

Two prominent Russians who were also among the first Russian visitors of secluded Japan were V. Golovnin and I. Goncharov. Their fame increased after they published the anthology of their travels to the East. They both saw Japan during her isolation and yet, predicted her quick development soon. While I. Goncharov perceived Japan due to her long seclusion to be a “child” who needed the guidance of the more civilized- the United States or Russia, V. Golovnin foresaw Japan quickly catching up with Europe, and soon turning into her rival. They both created various positive and negative images of the Japanese in their writings which being among the first Russian observations of Japan exerted considerable influence on generations in Russia.

⁹¹⁴ Examples for such duality present Vassilii Golovnin⁹¹⁴ and Ivan Goncharov’s direct observations of Japan during her seclusion. A possible explanation could be that before the successful end of Meiji reforms, Japan did not fit into the European set of standards to measure civilization. see Goncharov, I., *Frigate “Pallada”. Ocherki puteshestvia v dvuh tomah*, (Frigate “Pallada.” Anthology of Travel Notes in Two Volumes), Ornatskaia, T.I., and D.B. Oznobishin, eds., Leningrad, izdatel’stvo “Nauka,” 1986, 3rd edition;

Chapter I- “Russians in Japan at the end of 1853 and the beginning of 1854”, 1986:261

⁹¹⁵ Such ideas could have been evoked to express the notion of Japanese men being physically and spiritually inferior to the Europeans, and thus, easy to deal with.

4.2. Common Views on Meiji Japan before the War of 1894-5

Japanese reformation along the European model challenged Russian perceptions of Japan, and some negative images of theirs were substituted with positive ones.

In contrast to Russian images of Tokugawa Japan, positive images turned to prevail in the few Russian writings on Meiji Japan.⁹¹⁶ Russian visitors to Japan tried to present the combination of “Old Japan” (the secluded one) and “New Japan” (the reformed one) in a balanced way in their writings without “loading everything Japanese to the skies.”⁹¹⁷

After the successful Japanese combination of the spirit of the “East” with the knowledge of the “West,” some Russian intellectuals started foreseeing material and spiritual profit from an alliance between Russia and Japan.⁹¹⁸ The so-called “*Vostochniki*” (“Easterners”) argued ardently on the special kinship between Russia and Asian nations. The fact that Russia and Japan signed their first commercial and diplomatic treaties without any bloody enforcement (in contrast to the United States and England’s) was in “Easterners’” interpretations due to the racial and civilization closeness between the two empires.⁹¹⁹

Others perceived modernized Japan as a “special center of the “East.” They prescribed to awaken Japan the role of a “teacher in East Asia” that had been carried for centuries by China. Few intellectuals interpreted reformed Japan to pursue aggressive regional ambitions.⁹²⁰ Nevertheless, there remained some peculiar idiosyncrasies of Japanese lifestyle and behavior, which were found somewhat “incomprehensible” by all Russian visitors of Japan in 1890s as seen from the reviewed above writings.⁹²¹

⁹¹⁶ While the denigration of Japanese military state and lifestyle was notable for I.Goncharov’s writing on Japan in 1853, the followed westernization and modernization of the state was so successful that brought next Russian visitors to her high admiration.

⁹¹⁷ See Prince Esper E.Ukhtomskii’s observations after his visit to Japan in 1891.

⁹¹⁸ For example, being a member of the imperial court, Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii, during his visit to Japan in 1891, was more interested in the political and commercial dividends that Russia could derive from Japan). see *Travels in the East of Nicholas II., Emperor of Russia : When Cesarewitch, 1890-1891* / written by order of His Imperial Majesty by Prince E. Ukhtomsky ; translated from the Russian by Robert Goodlet; edited by Sir George Birdwood, Westminster : Archibald Constable, 1896-1900, 2 v.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid, p.437

⁹²⁰ Prince E.E.Ukhtomskii was among the first Russian intellectuals who put forward the idea of a possible East Asian alliance, which could threaten the “West,” Ibid, p.433

⁹²¹ Ibid, p.409

4.3. Russian Visitors to Japan in the Period 1895-1900

Russian visitors reviewed here perceived Japan as the “winner” not only in the war against China but also on the internal front in modernizing her society. They acknowledged to have been influenced by P. Loti’s novel *Madame Chrysanthème* that conducted the image of a primitive mysterious Country of the Rising Sun. On their arrival to Meiji Japan, Russians were surprised to see the high level of technology and industrialization of Japanese society, which they openly praised in their travel notes. They contrasted Tokugawa Japan to Meiji Japan to explain some old stereotypes that were entertained in Russia.⁹²² Yet, they did not reject everything from the secluded Japan. Instead, they looked for a distinctive beauty in both the “Old” and the “New” Japan. Majority of Russian intellectuals who visited Japan in the late 1890s perceived her as a nation with a “unique” culture, capable of adoption of foreign cultural elements to enrich her cultural wealth, and at the same time of preserving her own originality. In order to emphasize the high level of Japanese reformation success, they exclusively compared Japan during her seclusion and reformation.

In addition, all of the reviewed here Russian visitors during that period admitted that Japan turned into military and intellectual challenge to Russia. They praised openly Japanese governmental, educational, and military organizations. Some even expressed views that Russia could follow such a model of reformation. Others mostly noted the finesse and simplicity in Japanese Art and poetry, which had already created a new artistic wave in Europe, called “*Japonisme*.”⁹²³ Still others did not acclaim Japanese Art, literature, and architecture due to the great impact over them of the European Renaissance. In contrast, they praised mostly Japanese traits such as Japanese “national spirit,” “sense of curiosity,” “vigorousness,” and “sense of loyalty” to the suzerain.

⁹²² E.g. one common Old Russian stereotype about ‘bloody barbarous’ Japanese had arisen from Russian fears of bloody Mongolian invasions. Another stereotype referred to old Japan, presenting her as a ‘semi-wild’ state in the Far East.

⁹²³ Exhibitions of Japanese art were organized in Russia by Sergey Kitaev since 1896. Russian artists Kandinskii, Chagall, A. Ostroumova-Lebedeva and V.Falifeev, and the Russian symbolists Vl.Solo’ev, V. Bruisov, A.Bely were all fascinated and influenced by Japanese art and poetry in 1900s.b see Goreglyad, Vl. N., “Russian-Japanese Relations: Some Reflections on Political and Cultural Tendencies”, in J.Thomas Rimer (ed.) *A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford, 1995:198; and Heldt, B., ‘“Japanese” in Russian Literature’, in *A Hidden Fire. Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, ed. Thomas Rimer, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 1995:177-8

In brief, Russian intellectuals who visited Japan in the period 1895-1902 entertained predominantly positive images of the country and the people there.⁹²⁴ Few, such as the Tsar's personal adviser, Prince E.Ukhtomskii, and the diplomat G.De-Vollan as political leaders considered carefully Japanese military capabilities and predicted a possible "peril" to Europe because of Japanese growing regional ambitions.

More specifically, Russian visions of Japan during that period followed a peculiar tendency—from defining some Russian images as being old negative stereotypes to substituting them with new positive images. The opportunity to observe changing Japan directly, assisted them in their re-assessment, and gave some objectivity to their works, as well as attracted to their works a bigger reading public.

Another common characteristic of the reviewed here Russian works of Japan was their general descriptive character and lack of specific focus. The information gap that existed in Japan around that time must have invoked Russian intellectuals to present as broader as possible description of Japan and the Japanese. In contrast to the West, Russian interest to Japan had just begun.

IX.5. Similarities and Differences in the Indirect Perceptions of Japan (1855-1905)

5.1. According to Civilization School of Thought

Some of the reviewed above Russian intellectuals were identified to be Western-oriented while others more or less Eastern oriented in their interpretations of Japan. The so-called "Westerners" ("*Zapadniki*") took European civilization as a standard, and viewed Asia in general and newly opened to foreigners Japan in particular, more critically or even negatively compared to the "Easterners" ("*Vostochniki*") claiming civilization kinship between Russia and Asian nations. After Japan's reformation along European model, "Westerners" started viewing Japan in a more positive light. Interestingly, "Easterners" began insisting even more ardently on Russian alliance with Japan, in their terms, with "the progressive force," not with China, "the decaying one."

⁹²⁴ For example "energetic," "cunning," "polite," "loyal," "humble," and "delicate," were among the few repeated positive characteristics that Russian intellectuals gave to the Japanese)

Moreover, reformed Japan turned into a mirror to Russian self-perceptions, inciting Russian intellectuals from all schools of thought to agitate more actively for urgent reforms in Russia at all levels.

5.2. According to Political School of Thought

According to their political lines of thought, Russian intellectuals' images of Japan were also distinguished clearly among "Liberals," "Populists," "Social Democrats," and "Conservative Monarchists."

The reviewed here "Liberal" and "Populist" publicists expressed their surprise at Japanese boldness to attack huge China in defense of her regional interests in 1894. Regardless of Japan's reformation, initially they did not believe in Japan's capabilities to defeat China. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, they admired openly the growth and power of rising Japan, and highly acclaimed her victories over China. In their comments on the war, they praised Japanese excellently trained army along the European model, their modern weaponry, and perfect organization. Reform-minded "Liberals" and "Populists" even eulogized Japan, interpreting the war between Japan and China to be between the "progressive force" and the "decaying one."⁹²⁵ What is more, both Moscow and Petersburg "Liberals" reviewed here justified Japan's interference in the Sino-Korean relations through the "civilization discourse," perceiving Japan as the "civilizer" and "modernizer" of the "East."⁹²⁶ They prescribed to Japan another historic mission -to fight on behalf of the "West" against the barbaric China, which was threatening Russia's interests and security in the Far East.⁹²⁷

In contrast, "conservative" monarchist publicists during the Sino-Japanese War maintained negative images of Japan, perceiving her as "cruel barbarian," because of her sporadic bloody invasions in Korea and China in the past. They saw Japanese growing ambitions in the region as threatening to destabilize the Far East. Some even propelled the idea of "barbarous invasion" coming from the "East" after Japanese victories over huge China, which provoked fear and uncertainty for the future of the region. Japan was proclaimed a "traitor" to her racial "brethren," and the war was referred as an evidence for her "greediness."⁹²⁸

⁹²⁵ *Russkaya M'isl*, 1894/09(185-194pp), p.194; and *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1884/10, (839-850pp), p. 839;

⁹²⁶ *Vestnik Evrop'ii*, 1884/09,(367-381pp), p.380;

⁹²⁷ *Ibid*;

⁹²⁸ "Sovremennoe obozrenie.Politicheskaya hronika" (Contemporary Observation. Political Review), in *Nablyudatel'*, 1894/10 (1-13pp), p.1, 2, 3;

After the successive rows of Japanese victories over China, however, even “conservative” monarchists started showing some respect to Japan as a military power. At the end of the war, they began praising Japanese military organization and disciplined army, which was interpreted to be due to her reformation.⁹²⁹

5.2.3. “Liberal” and “Conservative” Publicists about the “Triple Intervention” of 1895

Both “liberal” and “conservative” journals reviewed here presented Japan as a newly developing state that had to obey the “Triple Intervention” in 1895 for the sake of preserving the regional balance. Japan was prescribed the role of a “disciple” that still had to learn the “rules of the civilized world.”⁹³⁰ This meant that Japan’s place among the great powers in the “East” was still questionable in Russian minds. What is more, “liberal” and “conservative” publicists alike defended Russia’s interference as a *just* act to perform for the sake of maintaining regional peace.

In brief, Russian intellectuals’ images of Japan around the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 varied- from extremely negative ones, originating from some kind of social Darwinism, to highly positive ones placing Japan as a successful state model and assigning her either the role of a reformer of the “East” or a disciple that still had to learn civilization rules.

5.2.4. “Liberal,” “Populist,” and “Social Reformist” Publicists in 1900-1904

After the “Boxer Rebellion” of 1900 and the followed Russian occupation of Manchuria, Russian publicists’ interests in the Far East imminently increased. Contrary to formal elite’s visions on Russia’s national interests, a great number of “Liberals,” “Populists,” and “Social Reformists” argued against Russia’s advance in the Asian East at the expense of Russians, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. They warned about the high risk that Russia was running of destroying her relations with the other great powers interested in the region as well as provoking hatred in the locals. Interestingly, regardless of the increased Russo-Japanese regional rivalry, majority of “Liberals,” “Populists,” and “Social Reformists” reviewed here, expected the biggest challenge to Russia to come from Japan supported by England, or by the United States, while only few predicted a Japanese union with China and Korea as a “peril”

⁹²⁹ *Nablyudatel*, 1894/11 (1-11pp), p.3-4;

⁹³⁰ *Nablyudatel*, 1895/05(1-14pp) p.8; and *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1895/05 (410-423pp), p.410

from the “East.” Russian publicists often pointed out Japan’s superiority over Russia in a comparison of Russian and Japanese present state of economic, political, and military development. They envisioned Japan as an invincible power due to her excellent fleet and well-trained and equipped army.⁹³¹ “Liberals” and “Populists” both perceived Russian profit from the Far East to be negligible, and therefore it was needless to fight over it. Instead, they sympathized to Japan’s worries for her security. However, Russian “liberal” and “populist” press kept insisting that the matter of Russian presence in Manchuria was no concern of Japan, but only of Russia and China.

Nevertheless, “liberal,” “populist,” and “social reformist” publicists cited in the study prescribed special missions to Japan in the region due to her successful reformation: a bringer of enlightenment in the Far East; a significant supply center for Russian ships; an important political partner to Russia and her connecting link to Korea and China,⁹³²

5.2.5. “Conservative” Publicists in 1900-1904

In a complete contrast, conservative publicists close to the government justified Russia’s regional endeavors in Asia seeing Russian imperial expansion as natural organic process and expecting mainly profits of it. They believed in Russia’s capability to find a beneficiary solution of the issue between Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea.⁹³³ “Conservative” publicists doubted Japanese success in a possible fight with Russia referring to Russia’s glorious past and her numerous military successes. They perceived Japan, regardless of her geographic proximity to Manchuria, to have a less chance against mighty Russia since Japan had experienced one serious armed conflict so far.

Although “Populists,” “Liberals,” and “Social Reformists” reviewed above, prescribed to Japan slightly different roles to play in the region, they all recognized Japan as a growing economic and political power in the region. There was a hint in their writings that Japan might

⁹³¹ Yuzhakov, S.N. “Politika” (Politics), in *Russkoe Bogatsvo* 1903/11, (134-145pp), p.136; and *Vestnik Evrop’ii*, 1904/01 (378-390pp), p.378

⁹³² see A. Mezier’s introductory notes in Baron fon Zibold, A. *Epoha velikih reform v Iaponii* (Era of Great Reforms in Japan), transl. and notes by A. Mezier, S.Peterburg, typ.F.Vaisberg and P.Gershuin, 1902: 5-6; also “Iaponia v sotsial’nom i politicheskom otnoshenii” (Japan -Socio-political Review) in *Mir Bozhii*, December 1902 (37-80pp), p.79

⁹³³ *Novosti Dnia*, 29 September (12 October new style) 1903; and “Iaponia” (Japan), in *Pravitel’svenii Vestnik*, SPB, 13 October (30 Sept. O.S.) 1903

soon dare to challenge Russia. Nevertheless, at least until 1903, it was Britain, not Japan, which most of them perceived to be a big peril to Russia's interests in the region.

Alternatively, some conservative intellectuals argued that the great geographic [strategic] and economic significance of Manchuria for Russia should not be neglected. Although conservative intellectuals also admitted that Russia's occupation of Manchuria was "a dangerous crisis," creating worries in both Asian "East" and the "West," they firmly believed in Russia's capability to pacify the situation, and kept neglecting Japan as power until 1904.

IX.6. Predictions for a War – "Liberal," "Conservative," and "Populist" Press of 1903

In the first half of 1903, "liberal," "conservative," and "populist" journalists alike was highly skeptic about the possibility of a war between the two empires. They all treated Western warnings for an approaching war in Russia as simply provocations or insinuations. Besides, they all shared firm beliefs in a beneficiary development of the Russo-Japanese negotiations over Manchuria and Korea.

Nevertheless, in the second half of 1903, with the worsening of the Russo-Japanese relations all central press expressed fears of the imminence of an armed clash between Russia and Japan. Intellectuals started entertaining various rumors on possible alliances with or against Russia. Numerous warnings for an approaching armed conflict between Russia and Japan were reprinted from western and Japanese press in the second half of 1903 and the beginning of 1904. Still, there lacked a single official confirmation on both sides as all the reviewed here publicists noted.

Different schools of thought and political movements in Russia created different interpretations and issued warnings about the increased Russo-Japanese rivalry since the second half of 1903. Opposite to Japanese public opinion, however, none of the Russian intellectuals reviewed here, regardless of their ideological belongings, supported the idea of a war over Manchuria or Korea. It was after the burst of the Russo-Japanese War, when Russian society divided into "oppositionists," insisting on halt of belligerences, and "patriots," demanding from Russia crushing victory over the "mean" Japan.

IX.7.Parallels and Contrasts in Beliefs and Responses to the War of 1904-5

7.1. Common Attitude among Russian Intellectuals

Russians had initially a strong sense of national pride and patriotism because of the vast size and military power of the Russian empire as well as her incandescence in numerous battles, which led to the absence of sense of threat in them. A great number of intellectuals doubted that “tiny” Japan would dare to turn her arms against “mighty” Russia. Once the war burst out, they noted themselves by paying attention to the changing situation on the battlefield when conducting images of the belligerent countries. Publicists focused their attention mainly on Russia’s regional and international position, her preparedness for the war, and the Autocracy’s inability to cope with the internal and international situations. That is, they often neglected Japan, although being the “other” belligerent country, in their discussions even during the war, and used the war topic for reflections on progress, the fate of the world, and Russia’s politics and society instead.

When reporting on the war and Japan, they restrained from the savage hatred or contempt of the “enemy” so typical for boulevard press and popular prints. Naturally, some intellectuals appropriated the war extensively to propagate actively their ideological understandings such as “Social Democrats” and “Liberal-Constitutionalists.” All Russians, however, regardless of their political inclination expressed their deep sorrow for Russia’s great human losses. In contrast to the sharp protests of Japanese elite to the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, majority of Russian intellectuals met the news about the indemnity Russian had to provide with slight indignation but applauded the end of the hostilities.

7.2. “Conservative” Publicists in 1904-5

During the Russo-Japanese War, “conservative” publicists noted themselves with their interpretations on the “West” and the “East” in their extreme duality: “civilized” versus “barbarian,” “good” versus “evil,” “true” believers versus “pagans.” They entertained the Russo-centric religious idea of Russia being the “Third Rome” saving Europe along with the idea of defense of Russia’s image and dignity in the first couple of months of the war. A great number of them referred to the Japanese with the term “Asiatics”- comprising a number of negative attributes to the image of Mongolian invaders in Russian common mind. Their aim

was to enforce the image of the Japanese as “bloody barbarians” not knowing any nobility. In the first half of 1904, they all contrasted to the grandiose images of Russia denigrated images of Japan. In addition, under the influence of western press, the term “Yellow Peril” was released into circulation⁹³⁴ In this aspect, some resurrected the prophesy of the late Russian religious philosopher Vl. Solov’ev and his *Three Conversations*, with “A Short Tale of the Antichrist” as warnings against a possible European subjugation under new Mongolian yoke.⁹³⁵

In the second half of 1904, “conservative” press introduced the idea of Russia’s mission to stop the “barbarian invasion” with the one of defending Europe from the “Yellow Peril” with her “breast.”⁹³⁶ Regardless of their negativism towards the Japanese, “conservative” publicists did not attack upon the “enemy’s” religion although the Japanese were labeled “pagans” or “barbarians” (in contrast to Russian responses to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8).

After the row of Russia’s defeats, “conservative” publicists focused their writings on Russian heroic deeds instead of criticizing the Autocracy as the “liberal” press did.

Some “Patriots” among the “Conservatives” led active propaganda against “Pacifists” about Russia’s proper stance in the Far East. In 1905, due to Russia’s lack of single victory over Japan, even “Patriots” became more restrained in their attacks to the “enemy.” What is more, some started viewing Japan with more respect after the big Russia’s defeats by “tiny” Japan. Thus, along with the initial negative images of Japan, there came into existence some positive ones.⁹³⁷ From their writings of 1905 stream their deep disappointment from the fall of Port

⁹³⁴ On the one hand, the disintegration of China and the Chinese influx of immigrants was the “yellow peril” which Russian intellectuals, similarly to the American ones, predicted. On the other hand, the awakening of the “Asiatics” because of Japanese victories over Russia was fear to bring to a union against the “West.” See *Novoe Vremya*, *Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti*, and *Moskovskie Vedomosti* of 1904.

⁹³⁵ see Solov’ev, V.S. *Tri razgovora* [Three Conversations] (01/1900), transl.(New York, 1954), pp. 193-195; Also Berdyaev, N. A. “Problema Vostoka i Zapada v religioznom soznanii Vl. Solov’eva” (The Problem of East and West within the Religious Consciousness of Vl. Solov’ev) (1911-#53) in *O Vladimire Solov’eva* (About Vladimir Solov’ev), Publishing House Put’, Moscow, 1911, p. 104-128

⁹³⁶ The idea of the “Yellow Peril” was further elaborated by the ethnographer I.S.Levitov, the Professor in Medicine I.A. Sikorsky, the religious philosopher L.A.Tichomirov, the conservative publicist Colonel P.N.Dubenskii (with penname P.Vozhin), the reactionary conservative Prince M. O. Men’shikov, the moderate liberal publicist L. Slonimski, and the populist S.N. Yuzhakov, as well as the poets symbolists Andrei Bely, Valery Bruisov, and Konstantin Belmont. All they, belonging to various ideational schools of thought, however, referred explicitly not to Japan but to China or a union between China and Japan as the real threat to Russia and Europe. See Chapter VIII of this study.

⁹³⁷ For example, C.Lukashevich’s writing presents a typical example of Russian dual treatment of the issue of the “other” as “enemy.” While in the beginning of the war, Russians claimed, “the giant [Russia] was bitten by the mosquito [Japan],” a few months later, they had to admit, “Japanese fleet is

Arthur, and the enormous losses in the two final grand battles –at Mukden and Tsushima. Those final grand defeats made a big part of “conservative” intellectuals join the opposition front in insistence of cardinal reforms in Russia. Only few chauvinistically kept asserting Russia as a great power, condemned Japan as a “barbarian” posing a potential threat to European civilization, and maintained the idea of Russia’s special mission as a savior of Europe and unifier and guide of Asia in 1905.

7.3. “Liberal,” “Populist,” “Social Democratic,” and “Socialist Revolutionary” Publicists in 1904-5

In contrast to “conservative” publicists, “liberal,” “populist,” “social democratic,” and “socialist revolutionary” ones sympathized deeply to reformed constitutionalist Japan. They all shared the widespread disapproval in Russia of the “remote and useless war.” “Moderate Liberals” drew a distinction between the government and the people, condemning the “clumsy” Russian government but supporting Russian common soldiers.

Quite the opposite, one faction of Russian “Social Democrats,” the so-called “*Bolsheviki*” supported Japan openly and opposed both the Autocracy and the army.

Most “liberal” and “revolutionary” writings, however, lacked the official devotion and love for the Tsar, Faith, and Fatherland so typical for Russia’s previous wars. Instead, they denounced openly Russian imperial adventurous endeavors in “Asian East.” Majority of reform-minded intellectuals reviewed here perceived reformed Japan as a progressive state, and Russia as a backward one needing badly reformation. They started active agitation for the necessity of carrying urgent reforms in Russia at all levels after the first rows of Russia’s defeats by Japan. To demonstrate Russia’s poor state, they praised more often Japan as an exemplary reformed state and army than Russian soldiers for their sacrificing heroic deeds did. Besides, those reform-minded intellectuals considered the extreme chauvinistic and religious propaganda in the popular broadsides and cartoons as “rude and cheap.” In contrast, they depicted Japan as a worthy adversary. “Liberal,” “populist,” “social democratic,” and “socialist revolutionary” publicists alike insisted on an immediate halt of the “useless and disgraceful” for Russia war.

powerful, and Japan has an excellently trained army.” Japanese series of victories provoked Russian respect to the “enemy.”

7.3. “Pacifists” in 1904-5

“Pacifists” unconditionally opposed the Russo-Japanese War as a “senseless murder” of thousands of innocent people from both sides. They did not seek any political dividends from their propaganda but opposed the war due to their moral or religious beliefs. Some like Count L. Tolstoy interpreted literary the meaning of the Biblical Commandments and preached them with great devotion. Tolstoy’s followers advocated non-violence and non-resistance to Russian soldiers “in the heat of the war”- an act considered a betrayal to the Fatherland by “patriots.” “Pacifists” as a whole were very much concerned with human drama since the war exerted huge effect on the psyche and the attitudes of its witnesses. They often equated the war to madness and depicted colorfully its effect on both civilians and combatants. Some of them used the war to pose important existentialist questions on the meaning of life and death. “Pacifists” proclaimed to be against Russian and Japanese governments but for the common deceived people dying in this “useless war.” They criticized sharply the poor state of Russian army and the cruel inhuman treatment of the common soldiers, and demanded immediate cease of fire.

To sum up all of the above, the discourse and content analyses of Russian writings on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 demonstrated that various members of widely differing schools of thought appropriated the war to put forward their own particular ideas. Various images of Japan were entertained at the informal level, from extremely negative to highly positive. Yet, Russian views were exceptionally self-centered. Hence, Japan although being the “enemy” in 1904-5, often remained in the periphery or even out of their comments on the war. Thus, the “enemy” which was colorfully described in popular wartime prints often missed from Russian intellectuals’ debates. Their focus primarily fell upon Russia’s proper course of action on the world and domestic arenas, and search for scapegoats after each Russia’s loss. In wartime, the image of the “other” usually turns into the image of the “enemy,” and starts to be perceived as an evil, threatening, and insidious menace. The image of the “enemy,” however, turned to be abstract in most Russian intellectuals’ writings about Japan in 1904-5, while in others, the Japanese were highly admired as brave skillful soldiers. Few were those intellectuals introducing negative images of Japan and the Japanese even during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

IX.8. Originality and Contribution of the Study

As seen from all of the above-written, this study runs around Russia and Japan- two key players in international relations not merely in Asia, but also in the world. They make an interesting pair of contrasting great-power neighbors for a study. Russia, the most “Asian” of Christian European powers, and Japan, the most structurally “Western” of the East Asian states present atypical case in the theory of “Orientalism” (the construction of the “East” by the “West”) which makes it interesting for a study.

In addition, while most studies of Russo-Japanese relations from that period focus mainly on the history of diplomacy or the naval history of Russo-Japanese War, this study explores the evolution of Russian perceptions of Japan at the non-formal level in a period of fifty years (1855-1905). Besides, in its biggest part, this period turned to be most peaceful in Russo-Japanese history of relations.

The significance of the study also stems from the argument that perceptions and images originate at an early stage of cross-cultural encounters and tend to persist throughout history for a long time unless confronted by grand historical events. In order to understand present perceptions, social sciences go back to the past in search for their roots. Thus, we could see their origin and follow their historical evolution. Moreover, perceptions about other countries and regions are precious source of information for the cultural and political minds of the countries. Hence, the study of the Russian social elite's past perceptions of Japan may be of considerable importance for the further development of the Russo-Japanese relations.

My research has established that no substantial analysis in defining Russian perceptions and images of Japan from 1855 until 1905 has been undertaken. Exception present few articles briefly mentioning the Russian or Soviet perceptions of Japan, in general, or revealing mainly images of Japan as an “enemy” in cartoons, poetry, or novels, or in few revolutionary press articles.⁹³⁸ These somehow created tendency Russo-Japanese mutual perceptions to be seen mostly in negative light.

⁹³⁸ See Chapter I of the study, Literature Review [Mikhailova, Yu. "The Image of Japan in Russo-Soviet Japanese Studies," *Japanese Studies Bulletin, Australian Association of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1993, pp. 59-74; Verbitskii, S.I., "Russian Perceptions of Japan," in: Goodby, J.E., V. Ivanov, and N. Shimotomai (eds.), *"Northern Territories" and Beyond*, Westport and London, Praeger, 1995, pp. 63-69; Heldt, B, ““Japanese” in Russian Literature”, in Rimer, Th. (ed.) *A Hidden Fire. Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, and the Woodrow

In contrast, this study refers to Russian journal and newspaper articles, telegrams, letters, diaries, memoirs, public lectures written by prominent Russian intellectuals during the period 1855-1905 in order to demonstrate the fullest possible picture of Russian attitudes towards Japan. For that purpose, here there have been reviewed a considerable number of archival documents from Russian, Bulgarian, and Japanese libraries and internet sites in order to be extracted the maximum of the so scarce information on Russia and Japan about this issue. As a result, this study has managed to demonstrate that Russian reform-minded intellectuals entertained predominantly positive images of Japan, and they kept that positive stance of theirs even during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

Secondly, this study is not limited to analyzing the Russo-Japanese relations and the regional events in which the two empires were involved as most studies do. It has also detected and analyzed Russian perceptions, images and attitudes to Japan and the Japanese, demonstrating their origin, ideological base, and historical evolution. For that purpose, it has comprised both content and discourse analyses of the collected primary sources. That is, once detected, Russian intellectuals' perceptions and images were placed in a larger ideational discourse (civilization, racial, political, etc.) to see how they originated, what spoken and unspoken assumptions they contained, who shared them, or why they differed. Consequently, the study has examined the larger ideological context that produced them to demonstrate on what basis they were justified and what insights they could provide about the Russian visions on Asia, in general, and Japan, in particular. The theoretical point of this exercise is to argue for a greater degree of sensitivity to cross-cultural encounters and the born of them mutual perceptions when interpreting international history.

Thirdly, since Russia and Japan are not isolated players on the world arena, this study has also portrayed the most important historical events, the multilateral and bilateral state relations on international and regional levels during that period, as well as Russian social elite's perceptions and attitudes to them in general, and to Japan's role in them in particular.

Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 1995:171-183; also Swinton, E. S. *Russo-Japanese War Triptychs: Chastising a Powerful Enemy*, in *Ibid.*, p.114-133 ; Shimazu, N. "Love the Enemy": Japanese Perceptions of Russia, in Steinberg, J. W., at al., (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero*, BRILL, Leiden-Boston, 2005, (365-384pp)]

It must be admitted, that some Western and Russian scholars on Russo-Japanese relations have written about some of the issues that are discussed here. For example, Ivan Goncharov and Vassilii Golovnin's travel notes, Sergei Uvarov and Esper Ukhtomskii's Asianist turns, the so-called "Otsu Incident," are among the most often reviewed topics. However, this study combines them with author's original interpretations of those issues and incorporates them in a broader picture along with plenty of other issues related to the main topic. For instance, it has detected parallels in the perceptions of five prominent Russian intellectuals' ideas on Asia and grouped them under the denominator "Easterners." In contrast to other scholarly works on Russian Asianism, here under this term there are incorporated only intellectuals who argue for Russia's unification with Asian nations not against them.

What is more, in this study the author includes her translations and interpretations of a number of primary Russian sources, which have not been analyzed so far. Some of the most obscure and interesting sources found out, translated and analyzed here are:

- E. Ukhtomskii and E. Bulgakova's travel notes; Russian press about the Sino-Japanese War and the Manchurian question; Lev Tikhomirov's pre-war and wartime writings; Russian press warnings of 1903-4; L. Tolstoy's telegrams, and "patriots" reactions to them;" Moderate Liberals," "Populists" and "Social Democrats" reactions to the Russo- Japanese War and Japan, to mention but a few.

This study also traces back the origin of the term "Asiatics" and the ideas of "the Third Rome" and "Yellow Peril" in Russian historical memory. In contrast to previous Russian and Western writings on the "Yellow Peril," it demonstrates that Russian publicists echoed the idea of Japan being the "Yellow Peril" to the "West" from the Western press in 1904-5. Moreover, the term referred not to Japan alone, but to China in union with Japan and Korea, or to China alone. In addition, the study reveals that the term "Asiatics" comprises a number of negative attributes to the image of bloody Mongolian invaders preserved in Russian historical memory. Later the term was broadened to include all people from Asia who somehow threatened with their invasions Russian lands. Some Russian "conservative" intellectuals invoked that denigrated stereotype again during the Russo-Japanese War along with the idea of "Yellow Peril" to Christian civilization.⁹³⁹ This study also manifestes that the idea of Russia being the "Third Rome" destined to protect Europe from barbarous invasions from the "East" was not a sole

⁹³⁹ see Chapter 6, p.213, 227

inspiration of Russian poets but also of a number of famous Russian academicians and journalists in 1904-5.⁹⁴⁰

Besides, this study establishes interesting parallels and striking differences in Russian images within one sub-period as well as within the whole period of fifty years, which has been done previously neither by Western nor by Russian scholars.

On the other hand, it manifests that under the influence of the reviewed above events and factors during the period 1855-1905 some negative Russian images of Japan were replaced by new positive images and *vice versa*, while some negative stereotypes remained unchanged. In this respect, a great number of Western and Russian studies on Russia and Japan argue that Russians and Japanese have entertained predominantly negative mutual images. Moreover, scholars argue that Russians who witnessed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 interpreted her through a negative racial discourse in their writings.

In contrast, this study demonstrates that although Russian intellectuals' images of Japan varied at times, their positive images of the country prevailed. Japan's reformation and her confirmation as great power due to her victories over China and Russia provoked respect and admiration among Russian reform-minded intellectuals. Few were those Russians, mainly some "conservative" intellectuals, who kept entertaining denigrating images of Japan regardless of her successes on domestic and international arenas.

Furthermore, negative racial treatment of Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was observed in very few "conservative" Russian intellectuals' writings on the war. In fact, the majority of Russian intellectuals sensed Russia's backwardness compared to the "West" and even to Japan, and paid bigger attention to Russia's domestic and international position arguing for the necessity of Russia's urgent reformation and modernization. Instead of mockery or hatred, so typical of wartime literary sketches on the "enemy," a great number of Russian intellectuals who wrote on the war of 1904-5 admitted either implicitly or explicitly that Japan had turned into an intellectual and military challenge to Russia, and showed deep respect to her.

Last but not least, by presenting a variety of Russian writings over a period of fifty years, this study draws a broader and at the same time, more detailed picture of Russo-Japanese encounters and their effects for both states, as well as discloses several generations' attitudes towards Japan and the Japanese. Some of the images that are discussed here comprise fears,

⁹⁴⁰ Chapter 6, p.211-238

prejudices, and beliefs unique to early twentieth-century Russia, besides the imagined division between the “progressive West” and “tradition-bound East.” Therefore, by providing information on Russian perceptions and images of Japan, the author hopes to make a modest contribution to the understanding of the prevailing among the Russian social elite’s visions and attitudes toward Japan in 1855-1905.

Finally, this research could also provide a base for a further discussion on Russian images of Japan in present days since historical memory and stereotypes turn to be persistent through generations unless challenged by grand historical events. Inasmuch as most studies dealing with the Asia-Pacific Rim area focus on political and socio-economic history rather than on evolution of mentalities, perceptions, and images, this issue is highly innovative.

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