PARALLELISM:
A HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL ANALYSIS

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*The Study of Revolution &
Hegemonic War*

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Parallelism is a theory of social processes. It represents an attempt at systematizing historical events. Other scholars have sought to employ similar approaches and methods (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1956; Lijphart, 1991; Barajas, 1992; Harrison, 1985; Wiarda, 1995). This has led in political science to the development of a series of theories and classificatory schemas. Scholars have attempted to classify revolutions, wars, social movements, political parties and their affiliates, etc.

Parallelism is different in that it examines what is called "macro" or long term processes by the use of comparison of discreet events. Parallel approaches seek to identify, classify, explain and predict historical events. This kind of approach assumes that such processes can not only be understood but manifestly justified and exposed through the use of predictive power. It assumes that macro historical processes repeat themselves in explainable and understandable ways. This is provided the process in question is left untampered with. Human relations have patterns, social and psychological, that can be explained and used to make predictions about action.

Currently this approach has identified two macro-historical patterns. The first is Revolution Pattern Type A, the second, Paternalistic Regime/Hegemonic War Pattern Type A. Sometimes these coincide with one another to form what is referred to as Revolution-Hegemonic War Pattern Type A. This last process in one in which their appears a popular revolution which leads to the militarization of a particular society. This country forms alliances and

international networks and embarks on a hegemonic war designed to topple existing hegemonic powers.

There are a number of instances in which this has occurred: 1) the period of the rise of Macedonia and Alexander the Great, 2) the period of the rise of Mongolia and Ghengis Khan, 3) the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon Bonaparte, 4) the Weimar Republic and Adolf Hitler. There are two models. In the ancient world there was the "hereditary" model of succession wherein a world conqueror rises to power by virtue of blood relations. The second may be characterized as the modern model in which a world conqueror comes to power by virtue of a political succession (i.e., election, coup de etat, etc.). In all instances they establish a mono-lithic paternalistic state. The Islamic Republic of Iran appears to be an example of a Revolution Type A, but only time will tell if it is a manifestation of the Revolution-Hegemonic War Pattern.

Parallelism argues that these various models are manifestation of the same "parallel" processes. Theory suggests that in all four cases there is an underlying "superstructure" which is common to all. Parallel theory is in some sense like architecture. Similar events (parallels) are the foundation of the macro-historical process, but similarities between these processes is obscured by certain "exter-nal" features of the building itself which hides the superstructure. Parallelism, in order to understand, explain and predict events, suspends differences between the events and instead focuses on the underlying similarities between cases. In this sense it is an extension of the comparative process.

While all four are examples of the Revolution-Hegemonic War Type A Pattern the outcome in all four cases is different. In the ancient models (Alexander, Ghenghis Khan) the world conquerors were successful in their efforts to topple the existing hegemonic powers of the day. In the modern examples (Napoleon, Hitler) the world conquerors were not successful in overturning the existing hegemonic powers. The reasons for this are varied, and are in part explainable by the reactions and actions of particular states, politi-

cal actors, etc. in the historical process. But this will be examined later in this work.

Methodology

Parallelism is itself an outgrowth of the comparative method which seeks to compare and contrast case studies, states, events, actors, etc. Parallelism, however, is an extension of this idea. For the purposes of uncovering "parallel" events, persons, etc., the quest to understand differences is broken off, and the analysis of differences is suspended temporarily. Parallel approaches first focus on similarities as signs of the underlying or hidden superstructure of the political, military, or cultural event being examined. A parallel, however, is more than a simple similarity, but, rather, represents an integral part of a distinct historical process. For example, while it may be true that all revolutions have similarities, these may not constitute parallels because the overall historical process is different in specific types of revolution.

Thus it can be said, that parallel events are those which meet three criterion: 1) they involve a macro and/or classifiable historical process, 2) involve a large number of uncanny similarities that proceed in the same time-order, and thus, 3) allow for predictive power. While nearly every conceivable event can be compared (or contrasted), very few meet these specific criterion. The parallels that occur in a historical process thus represent a unique and classifiable convergence of events.

This does not mean that dissimilar events should be disregarded when one is examining a macro historical process. In fact, it is the dissimilar events (or non-parallels) that often play a role in future events. For example, while Alexander the Great's war against Persia and the Napoleonic Wars are parallel events, they led to different post-war trends. In the case of Alexander, his victory meant the imposition of paternalistic rule over much of Greece and the Near East, and brought about a slow erosion of independent Greek

scientific thought, whereas Napoleon's defeat, meant a rise in nationalism, democracy, and a burgeoning of the modern scientific movement.

In a very real sense, parallel events and historical processes represent turning points. This is largely because they effect the "known" and/or dominant world. In the ancient worlds, the triumph of paternalistic states and their allies (Macedonia. Mongolia) led to the imposition of paternal rule. Paternal rule, because of its intrinsic characteristics, is often opposed to free thought, innovation, and scientific discovery. Thus the successor states were prone to erosion, corruption, and disintegration. This is often a long process, but is exactly what happened to both Greek and Mongolian successor states.

The purpose behind parallelistic analysis is two fold: 1) to uncover a macro-historical process, and 2) to classify said processes in a more meaningful way.

Types of Rule

Parallelism argues that there are a finite number of types of rule that have dominated historical processes since the ancient period (5000 B.C.). These are based largely on the patriarchal household. There are three main types, paternal, fraternal, and mixed. While there are other types of rule (sororital, maternal, egalitarian, etc.) these three have been historically predominate.

Paternal forms of rule are those consisting of some form of authoritarianism or totalitarianism (kingship, khanates, dictatorships, one party rule, etc.). Fraternal forms or rule are those governed by a collection of individuals (mainly males) that are selected or elected based on specific criterion and make decisions democratically. These include modern liberal democracies, slave-based democracies, some tribal relationships, etc. No true form of egalitarian democracy has ever existed at the macro level. Instead most are ruled by a "brotherhood" with special governance authority. This political fraternity of sorts operates according to the

principle of "democratic centralism" or consensus. At best, liberal democratic systems may be characterized as just such fraternal democracies. Mixed systems are ones which are a combination of two or more types of rule, normally paternalism and fraternalism. Transitional democracies, revolutionary states and the like are most likely to have some combination of fraternal and paternal elements.

In the Revolution-Hegemonic War Pattern both types of systems exist, but increasingly as time has passed, the war has taken on elements of a conflict between paternalism and fraternalism. This is particularly true of the most recent manifestations of hegemonic war, World War II, wherein modern liberal democracies did battle with totalitarian regimes. But even in this case, fraternal systems (US, Britain) formed alliances of convenience with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (Russia, China).

In the ancient world paternal systems were the predominate ones. This is in large measure due to the military success of paternal states (Macedonia, Mongolia, Persia, Egypt, Rome). In the modern era fraternal systems have proven to be militarily predominate due to technological innovations. In the same way paternal states like Macedonia and Mongolia were successful in crushing fledgling fraternal systems, so has the military victories of fraternal states (World War II) served to discredit and undermine modern paternal systems (Italy, Germany, Japan).

All revolutionary systems in the Revolution-Hegemonic War Pattern are of mixed origin, and all of their successor states are paternal in character. The political system led by the world conqueror are invariably absolutist paternal systems: kingships, dictatorships, totalitarian regimes.

The Parallels

In this process a series of parallels or similarities can be identified. Revolutionary regimes go through similar stages, have similar

internal and external conflicts, engage in similar types of wars, have similar types of leaders, and factions vying for power.

The same may be said for the paternal regime period and the hegemonic war itself. There are similar types of leaders with similar goals, similar geographic and political obstacles to overcome. These will be identified later in greater detail. Key events always proceed in the same chronological order.

The difference between this approach and others is that it points to the fact that there are specific types of revolutions and regimes. In this way parallel analysis leads to the development of classificatory schemes similar to those found in the hard sciences.

The Revolutionary State

The revolutionary state is the locus of the Revolution Pattern Type A. It is a state wherein a paternal system (kingship, etc.) is ousted or superseded by a mixed one. In all four cases the state is of mixed origin, meaning it has trappings of both paternalism and fraternalism, dictatorship and democracy. In the ancient model both cases of the form of rule were mixed kingships. Absolutist paternal power was represented in the king, whereas fraternal authority was reflected in the status and power of a fraternity of popular noblemen who restricted the power of the throne. In this sense the Kings of Macedonia and Mongolia were little more than "primus inter pares," first among equals.

In the modern models paternal power has been represented in constitutionally restricted executive branches (kings, committees, directories, presidents). Fraternal power has been represented in popularly elected bodies (conventions, assemblies, parliaments). In this way the chief executive was little more than a primus inter pares among the revolutionary elite.

The Paternal Successor State

In the Revolution-Hegemonic War Pattern Type A, all revolutionary systems are supplanted by a paternal system. This system is led by a world conqueror. It is a monolithic absolutist state. This state is militarily more powerful than the revolutionary state and, while an international underdog, is successful in building alliances and waging war. This is true even in cases where the conqueror fails to subdue the world.

The Hegemonic War and Aligning Events

It should be noted here that there is what is referred to as a "predictive epicenter" to the Revolution-Hegemonic War Pattern. The epicenter is the revolutionary/paternalistic state. Events and persons that occur within the boundaries of the state are easier to identify and predict than those outside the state.

Nevertheless there are what is known as "aligning events" which set the stage for hegemonic war. Some examples of aligning events would be the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Seven Years War, etc. These events set up the conditions for hegemonic conflict by causing disturbances in the balance of inter-state power. For example, disarmament treaties prior to World War II served to reduce the Allies ability to fight the German, Japanese and Italian forces. As the allied states reduced the size of their militaries, Germany upsized their own. Likewise the partition of Poland between Germany and Russia in 1939 served to provide Russia with a large buffer zone with which to protect itself. History may show that the collapse of USSR is a similar aligning event. Like the revolution of 1917, the collapse has served to push Russian borders back. It also serves to weaken the military and political might of Russia. Will Russian one day reclaim its lost territory the way Stalin did in 1939? Only time will tell.

Aligning events, while not true parallels perform similar func-

tions as they serve to align the world for hegemonic conflict. Any macro event that sets the stage for this conflict may be classified as an aligning event. Aligning events usually serve to undermine the political and military strength of the hegemonic world power(s). Thus a "window" of opportunity for the challenger state and its allies is created. There is a finite period in which the revolutionary/paternalistic state has to make its bid for would-be world hegemony.

Aligning events nearly always work to the benefit of the revolutionary/paternalistic state. One way in which they benefit the state is by making it easier to form alliances with other regions and/or states. In a very real sense, states become alienated by the existing hegemonic powers, and seek to join those challenging the status quo. Thus they are more likely to throw in their lot with the revolutionary/paternalistic state.

The Chapters

The following handbook constitutes Book One of a series of treatises on parallelism. This handbook provides an overview of how the theory works. Books Two and Three focus on the cases themselves. Book Two is an examination of the three known examples of Type A Revolutions (France, Germany, Iran). Book Three is an examination of the four known examples of Type A Paternalistic Regimes and Hegemonic War (Macedonia, Mongolia, France, Germany) and discusses the possibility of its recurrence (Iran).

Book One is divided into a number of sections and organized chronologically. Chapter One will explain the types of rule. Chapter Two will explain and expose the parallel processes present in the revolutionary system. Chapter Three will focus on the paternal successor state and the hegemonic war, and Chapter Four explore the possibility of present day manifestations of the Hegemonic War Pattern.

CHAPTER ONE

THE TYPES OF RULE

<u>Paternal Forms of Rule</u>

In his analysis of traditional political systems Weber (1978) argues that there are two main types of legitimate domination, *patriarchal* and *patrimonial*. Weber's patriarchal system is evidenced at the micro level, and is confined to the family, household, or kinship group. The household is tied to the master by virtue of personal relations and direct proximity; institutional structures are non-existent (Weber, 1978; Bendix, 1960; Bill & Springborg, 1994). This may be contrasted with the patrimonial system evidenced in large societies and characterized by an identifiable, specialized administrative structure, and overall complexity.

Since Weber's introduction of patriarchalism, there have been numerous additions to his ideas. While the differences Weber accents are important, other scholars have emphasized similarities, arguing that both patriarchal and patrimonial systems have similar sociological and psychological underpinnings (Bendix, 1960; Halpern, 1977; Ibrahim, 1978; Rugh, 1985). As Bill and Springborg (1994) have noted:

> The key to understanding the traditional process of leadership rests in the fundamental human relations that bind ruler and ruled. These were shaped in the patriarchal environment and were hardened and routinized in the patrimo-

nial system. In essence, the patrimonial form of rule repre-
sents an extension and expansion of the patriarchal system.
The relations that bind ruler and ruled, leader and led,
master and servant, and king and subject are fundamentally
the same in both Weberian categories. (p. 151)

Bendix (1960) also notes that patrimonial rule is little more than
an extension of the ruler's household in which the relation be-
tween the ruler and his officials is that of paternal authority and
filial dependence. This argument coincides with the psychoana-
lytic understanding of paternal rule except that within the Weberian
framework, there is little or no attempt to address the psychologi-
cal aspects of patriarchal domination and the means by which re-
lations in the household can be extended to the whole of society.

A number of scholars have sought to rectify this situation. In
his discussion of charisma, Halpern (1977) introduced the con-
cept of "relationships of emanation." Simply put, the leader ema-
nates great charismatic, almost mystical power, and the follower
responds by allowing his or her identity to be submerged into that
of the leader. Halpern regards this reaction as only semi-rational at
best, because the individual is in effect seeking to avoid personal
responsibility. There are certain advantages, however, to surren-
dering one's independence and individual identity, such as being
rewarded with a feeling of complete emotional and material secu-
rity; likewise, it allows the follower to avoid blame for any failures
that may occur in society.

This contention has much in common with psychoanalytic
explanations, particularly Freud's concept of idealization. From a
psychoanalytic perspective, "relationships of emanation" are ide-
alizations of the leader, the portrayal of the leader as a benevolent
and/or protective parent. The follower, in effect, transfers all the
feelings of love that he has for his own parent to the leader. Those
instances in which the leader is both idealized and the object of
transference are referred to by Freud (1927) as "positive transfer-
ences." He describes it in this way:

> When the growing individual finds that he is destined to
> remain a child forever, that he can never do without protec-
> tion against strange and superior forces, he lends those pow-
> ers the features belonging to his father . . . Thus his longing
> is a motive identical with his need for protection against the
> consequences of his human weakness. (p. 30)

Leaders try to facilitate positive transferences (that is, in lay terms, remain popular/legitimate) because without them they become illegitimate and fall from power. Thus they establish laws and traditions (totems/taboos) to justify their rule. The Christian concept of "divine right of kings" is an excellent example, one which, in effect, argues that those who govern do so by the grace of God. The "powers that be" are ordained by God; anyone who rebels against them rebels against the Almighty. Similar traditions have existed in paternal societies, large and small, all over the globe in nearly every time period.

Leaders who are the recipients of strong positive transferences emanating from the ruled govern stable paternal systems. However, in those instances in which the leader, either through incompetency, greed, corruption, or simply bad luck, fails to live up to the ideal of the benevolent parent, he or she can become despised by the group. Those instances in which the leader of group becomes hated (for semi-rational and/or irrational reasons) Freud dubs negative transferences. In *Totem and Taboo* he describes it this way:

> The importance of one particular person is immensely exag-
> gerated and his absolute power is magnified to the most
> improbable degree, in order that it may be easier to make
> him responsible for everything disagreeable. . . . [Ancient
> peoples] are really behaving in just the same way with their
> kings when they ascribe to them power over rain and sun-
> shine, wind and weather, and then depose them or kill them
> because Nature disappoints their hopes of a successful hunt
> or a rich harvest. . . . A son's picture of his father is habitually
> clothed with excessive powers of this kind, and it is found

> that his trust of the father is intimately linked with admira-
> tion for him. . . . [H]e is putting him into a position where
> he can blame him for all his misfortunes. (Freud, 1913, p.
> 63)

Weber's views are virtually identical, albeit expressed in terms of hereditary charisma. He provides us with an excellent example of what can happen in these instances:

> Even the old Germanic kings were sometimes rejected with
> scorn. . . . In China the charismatic quality of the monarch,
> which was transmitted unchanged by heredity, was upheld
> so rigidly, not only defeats in war, but droughts, floods, or
> astronomical phenomena which were considered unlucky,
> forced him to do public penance and might force his abdi-
> cation. If such things occurred, it was a sign that he did not
> possess the requisite charismatic virtue and was thus not a
> legitimate "Son of Heaven." (Weber, 1978, pp. 242-243)

Idealization serves to justify and legitimate all existing forms of paternal rule, let alone new manifestations that may arise in the future (e.g., theocratic totalitarianism, cyber-totalitarianism). In micro paternal societies, little or no transference may take place since the leader and father are one and the same, but in large societies it plays a critical role in deflecting the so-called "wrath of the ruled." Each system (be it patrimonialism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, totalitarianism) has its own manifestations of idealization and transference; nonetheless, general commonalities still exist. Traditional systems have complex sets of customs de-signed to legitimate the leader and facilitate positive transferences, whereas modern totalitarian systems employ massive propaganda campaigns to create "cults of personality." If transference is ex-tremely powerful, it may cease to be simple popularity, and, in-stead, become charisma. In this regard, blind devotion to the leader can be interpreted as strong positive transference.

If a paternal leader fails to cultivate a positive transference, he

becomes illegitimate and can rule only through fear and/or threat of force. Most paternal leaders rely on some combination of love and fear, but if they rely too heavily on the latter, they will eventually become illegitimate. This has been a recurring problem for leaders in the bureaucratic authoritarian societies and modern military dictatorships of Europe and Latin America, systems where political leaders have sought to rule at length in the absence of long standing traditions or without employing massive propaganda campaigns. Because of their reliance on fear, such regimes have tended to be unstable and prone to disintegration.

Paternal systems, thus, may be characterized by a kind of love/hate relationship between ruler and ruled. Freud refers to this situation as "feelings of ambivalence." These ambivalent feelings are common to all paternal (and parental) systems and serve to separate them from other forms of rule.

Family structure in paternal societies revolves around the father, who acts as leader. Extended family organization thus seems to be a major component of most, though not all, paternal systems. This is particularly true of Freud's primal family and Weber's patrimonial society wherein family and kin connections play a paramount role in who gets what, when, and where. This may be contrasted with fraternal and/or sibling societies in which the ruling group's power is achieved at the father's expense.

Masculine and feminine traits are clearly identifiable in paternal societies as well; they are characterized by what Freud terms *ichspaltung*, or splitting. Splitting is said to occur when the world is viewed in a dichotomy of good and evil. The ideal man should be tough, strong, macho, aggressive, powerful and decisive. A man's identity is directly tied to the image of the "good" father. A good father is one who provides for the protection and preservation of wife (mate) and children (offspring). In like manner, the ideal female prototype should be soft, virginal, pure, and motherly. A woman's identity does not exist outside of this virginal/maternal image. These perceptions often lead in many societies to otherwise irrational sexual divisions of labor, to the phenomenon of public

man and private woman, and, in extreme cases, to the covering and confinement of women (*purdah).*

Just as there are general characteristics that define "good" men and "good" women, so too are there traits that typify "bad" men and "bad" women. "Bad" men are those which display "feminine" characteristics such as softness, weakness, maternal behavior, whereas "bad' women display the so-called "masculine" traits such as sexual promiscuity, toughness, aggressiveness, decisiveness. This has led in many modern paternal societies to the development of a mother/ prostitute dichotomy. Freud ties this dichotomy to the Oedipus complex, which, he argues, is the origin of this mythology.

> The adult's conscious thought likes to regard his mother as a person of unimpeachable moral purity . . . [and the women he desires as] like a prostitute . . . This relation of the sharpest kind between "mother" and "prostitute" . . . in the conscious is found split into two pairs (which) often occur in the unconscious as a unity. Investigation leads us back to a time in a boy's life at which he first gains a more or less complete knowledge of the sexual relations between adults. (Freud, 1917, pp. 388-391)

Sometimes this division of individuals into categories of good and evil has led to the persecution of other groups regarded as deviants. It has also led to other dichotomies, many of which are religious in character, such as God and Satan.

Paternal systems have a number of characteristics and commonalities that set them apart from other forms of rule. These similarities occur at both micro (extended family, kinship, tribal) and macro (state) levels. Here I have borrowed heavily from Weber (1978), Bendix (1960), and Bill and Springborg (1994).

The first commonality is *personalism*. At the micro level, the father's primacy rests upon his personal relations with other family members, whether they be part of his immediate family, extended family (through marriage alliance), clan, clique, or political party. In tribal societies, Freud tied this kind of personal rela-

tionship to the Oedipal phase of development. Lacan (1981) explains it this way:

> [I]n establishing, in "The Interpretation of Dreams," the Oedipus complex as the central motivation of the unconscious, he recognized this unconscious as the agency on which marriage alliance and kinship are based. . . . Indeed, it is essentially on sexual relations—by ordering them according to the law of preferential marriage alliances and forbidden relations—that the first combinatory for the exchanges of women between nominal lineages is based. . . . (Lacan, 1981, p. 142)

What is true of the leader of the household is also true of the political leader, be he the leader of a political party, faction, or kinship group. He leads by virtue of his personal relationship with others. "Even when institutions such as formal bureaucracies have developed, the real business of ruling and political decision-making has resided in personal networks" (Bill & Springborg, 1994, p. 160). In patrimonial societies, personalism may have only a limited institutional basis, whereas in modern totalitarian societies there may be extensive institutional and bureaucratic elements to such personalism. This may include an elaborate administrative system or party apparatus, but ultimately it is the leader who makes the final determination concerning policy.

Benson (1990) refers to this situation as "partymonialism," an appropriate term. Partymonialism is a situation where politics permeates every sphere of society, creating the illusion of unanimous support for the political system. This precludes diverse groups from participating in an open, organized, or legal manner. This is accomplished because the leader acts as a symbolic father, a protector of society and its subjects. As Pye (1985) notes in his discussion of authoritarianism/totalitarianism in Asia, population growth and economic development have had only a limited effect on political systems constituted along these lines.

Convention holds that paternalistic authority can survive

> only in small arenas, such as tribes, feudal fiefdoms, outlaw
> bands like the Mafia, family enterprises, or companies oper-
> ating in backward environments. . . . Yet in Asian political
> cultures the establishment of the nation-state as the basic
> framework of politics and government has not weakened,
> and indeed in many cases strengthened, the ideals of pater-
> nalistic authority. . . . Chinese intellectuals stifle criticism
> because of their anxiety about attacking surrogate "father"
> figures. (Pye, 1985, p. 327)

A second commonality among paternal forms of rule is *access or proximity*. Simply put, those who are closest to the leader will have the greatest influence on his decisions. In patrimonial societies, close physical proximity is necessary; however, with modern technology (e.g., fax machines, phones, e-mail, internet), actual physical proximity is less important. However, it still plays a powerful role. One need note only two classic examples of totalitarian rule, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, to see the importance of access and proximity. In both instances, those who failed to maintain close ties to the leader (e.g., Roehm and Trotsky) fell from power. In patrimonial societies, proximity usually means family or kin relations (e.g., the Bonapartes); however, in totalitarian systems this may translate into party or professional membership. In this regard the party, professional organization, club, and/or faction may act as a symbolic extended family.

The third commonality is *informality*. Because personal relationships are valued over institutional arrangements, paternal systems are less formal than other political/social systems insofar as those in positions of power are not bound significantly by institutions or law. Although the leader may use law as a means to assert his authority, he, himself, is to varying degrees above the law. Likewise, power is exerted outside legal or institutional constraints. At the micro level the leader may owe his family certain debts; however, in day-to-day matters there is no way to enforce these obligations. In the extreme case of Freud's primal father there are no

obligations or restraints at all; he is free to pursue any course of action he desires. In traditional/authoritarian societies, on the other hand, the leader may be restricted by the bonds of tradition and obligation. In totalitarian societies, there may be formal bureaucratic/institutional constraints and/or constitutional obligations, but even here, the leader may overstep his authority and/or fail to carry out his obligations with little or no immediate legal or institutional consequences. On the other hand, failure to carry out basic obligations may lead to a loss of legitimacy.

The fourth similarity is *balanced conflict*. Balanced rivalry typifies all paternalistic systems because paternal authority is maintained through a strategy of "divide and rule." At both the micro and macro levels, rivalry is encouraged. Siblings, for example, might be encouraged to conspire against one another for the "ear" of their parents. Bill and Springborg (1994) provide an excellent example of the kinds of balanced conflict that occurs at the micro level in some large paternal societies.

> In Egyptian village society, for example, intense sibling rivalry is considered essential to a child's growth. Parents continually sharpen and intensify rivalry among children. . . .
> In one Egyptian family, for example, the elder brother was called "the stupid one," while the younger brother was nicknamed "the clever one." (Bill & Springborg, 1994, p. 167)

At the macro level, rivalry is encouraged as well. Since each of the leader's followers is a potential rival and/or successor, the leader must "play" his advisors and subordinates off against one another. As the oft quoted Arab proverb goes, "It is I against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin, my brother, cousin, and I against the world." The paternal leader is constantly under threat of attack from subordinates seeking to oust him thereby becoming master. Thus paternal leaders in macro societies (patrimonialism) have sought to create an administrative staff whose privilege is based entirely on their connection to the ruler. The leader can protect himself by having a group of officials who are totally dependent

upon him while at the same time playing this group off against other notables whose connection to the leader is less strong.

> We always meet with a *struggle* between the political or hierocratic lord and the owners and usurpers of preroga-tives, which they have appropriated as status groups. The ruler attempts to expropriate the estates, and the estates attempt to expropriate the ruler. The more the ruler suc-ceeds in attaching to himself a staff of officials who depend solely on him and whose interests are linked to his, the more the struggle is decided in favor of the ruler. . . . (Weber, 1946, p. 298)

This tendency towards conflict often leads to what has been described as the paranoid leadership style. Because individuals are continuously played off against one another, there is invariably a tendency towards conspiracy. This fostering of conspiracy at all levels of society ultimately leads to a rise in the level of paranoia. This as well can be seen in the proliferation of intrigue, conspira-cies, and counter-conspiracies, as well as conspiracy theories. Freud goes farther and argues that this can often lead to "delusions of persecution":

> The question of why the emotional attitude towards rulers includes such a powerful unconscious element of hostility raises a very interesting problem. . . . I have already hinted at the fact that the child's complex of emotions towards his father—the father complex—has a bearing on the subject, and I may add that more information on the early history of the kingship [in question] would throw a decisive light on it. (Freud, 1913,pp. 64-65)

The fifth similarity is the *glorification of power.* This character-istic Weber refers to as *military prowess*, but I have made it more general for the purpose of applying it to both the micro and macro levels of society. In paternal systems, might-or should I say vio-lence-makes right. Physical as well as military prowess are respected

and revered. In patrimonial or patriarchal societies, disputes are often settled by recourse to force not brains. In a letter to Albert Einstein and the League of Nations, Freud (1932) addressed this situation:

> You begin with the relation between Might and Right, and this is assuredly the proper starting point for our inquiry. But for the term "might", I would substitute a tougher and more telling word: "violence". . . . Conflicts of interest between man and man are resolved, in principle, by recourse to violence. . . . It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which man cannot claim exclusion; nevertheless men are also prone to conflicts of opinion, touching, on occasion, the loftiest peaks of abstract thought, which seem to call for settlement by quite another method. This refinement is, however, a late development. To start with [about 5000-8000 years ago], brute force was the factor which, in small communities, decided points of ownership and the question of which man's will was to prevail. . . . [In paternal societies] it is superior force—brute violence, or violence backed by arms—that lords it everywhere. (pp. 84-85)

The sixth similarity is *submission to hierarchy and status.* Hierarchies are strictly maintained in paternalistic societies. At the micro level, this can be seen in the differentiations in power between the father and the other members of the household. In Freud's primal family, this hierarchy is maintained by the expulsion of eligible young males who refuse to submit to their father's patrimony. In patrimonial societies this phenomenon is manifested in the development of status groups like cliques, clans, nobility, notables, and caste differentiations. Extended family membership is critical for the purposes of access in clan states. In totalitarian societies this is also critical; it determines the heights to which a particular figure may rise within the bureaucracy or party.

The importance of status cannot be over emphasized as it often governs access to the leader. Likewise, laws in paternal societies

are designed to reinforce such hierarchies and to protect the ruler(s) against "dangerous" social leveling. As a result, laws in paternal societies are weak and unstable because so much personal power exists outside of legal and/or institutional constraints.

> [I]n practice the situation [in paternal societies] is always complicated by the fact that, from the outset, the group includes elements of unequal power, men and women, elders and children, and, very soon, as a result of war and conquest, victors and vanquished—i.e., masters and slaves—as well. . . . Laws are made by and for the rulers, giving the servile classes few rights. Thenceforward there exist within the state two factors making for legal instability, but legal evolution, too: first, the attempts by members of the ruling class to set themselves above the law's restrictions and, secondly, the constant struggle of the ruled to extend their rights and see each gain embodied in a code, replacing legal disabilities by equal laws for all. (Freud, 1932, p. 86)

Lacan (1981) refers to these kinds of social relations as those of the *master/slave.* Status differentiations appear not only in legal and cultural frameworks, but in linguistic (i.e., symbolic) ones as well.

> The law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order of language. For without kinship nominations, no power is capable of instituting the order of preferences and taboos that bind and weave the yarn of lineage through succeeding generations. . . . Even when in fact it [power] is represented by a single person, the paternal function concentrates in itself both imaginary [i.e., transferential] and real relations [i.e., personal/political], always more or less inadequate to the symbolic [i.e., linguistic] relations that essentially constitute it. (Lacan, 1981, p. 67)

This adherence to strict hierarchies often results in economic inequality. In large agrarian patrimonial societies this has meant the development of a powerful landowning class, or in the case of

statist or corporativist societies, the development of a closed status group (e.g., bureaucracy, party, or state officials) which controls power, wealth, and/or the means of production. Within paternalistic societies, social mobility at the macro level is restricted by these structural constraints. This directly affects the nature of political recruitment, which, generally speaking, is done through such social networks as family, school, church, party, and/or other social ties. It is this lack of social mobility that can provoke rebellion. At the micro level, for example, if the father fails to provide the children with sufficient freedom of choice (i.e., the choosing of a mate or profession) it may lead to revolt. At the macro level, it is social immobility that often provokes revolt from a sub-stratum of society (counter-elite, civil society), and this can in certain instances, as Marx (1978) notes, take on class dimensions.

Since obedience is so critical to the maintenance of the paternal system, those who fail to *submit* to paternal authority and carry out orders are often ostracized and/or disavowed. This disregard for the value of obedience can mean for the rebel ostracization, expulsion, imprisonment, or death. In any case, this maintenance of strict hierarchy and status leads, by indirection, to the creation of the myth of the "hero-son" and the rise of fraternalism as an alternative form of rule.

The seventh similarity is *traditional* and/or *ideological justification.* Unlike the others, this similarity is historically a new development, but will be included nonetheless since it seems to typify human paternal forms of domination during the past 5000 to 8000 years. It seems that with the appearance of language there has been a tendency towards justifying domination. In Freud's micro society, the primal father does not justify his actions; he does not have to. It was only after his defeat by the company of brothers that domination must be justified and legitimated. The brothers usurp political power by means of force and must justify their actions. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the brotherhood creates the totemic god-head and feast to commemorate the occasion.

While this is largely a hypothetical scenario, since the ancient period, paternal leaders have apparently sought to justify their rule. For the band of brothers, religion is the justification. Weber refers to this as *religious rationalization.* However, with the rise of the modern secular state, there has appeared a new form of legitimation, *secular rationalization.* Both religious and secular rationalizations have served to justify paternalistic regimes. As Freud effectively argues, even secular, scientific, and atheistic discourses (e.g., nationalism, psychoanalysis, communism) have been used to justify the leader's right to rule.

Ideologies serve not only to justify paternalism; they also justify particular leaders and types of paternalism. Thus two predominately paternalistic ideologies (i.e., Fascism and Stalinism) may clash. In modern societies, this manifests itself in conflict between traditional such forms of paternalism like kingship, theocracy, and such western-inspired forms of paternalism as transformative military dictatorships, communism, technocracy, or corporatism.

Fraternal Forms of Rule

Authors such as Bill and Springborg (1994), Ibrahim (1978), and Rugh (1985) have suggested that one of the reasons why democracy has been unable to take root in particular cultures is because of the authoritarian nature of society's other social units.

> The comparative lack of vigor of participatory political organizations may reflect not only the continuing impact of the tradition of consultation rather than representation, but also the influence of nondemocratic authority structures that obtain in a wide variety of social settings, including families . . ."Social scientists," according to Egyptian sociologist Eddin Ibrahim, "have increasingly come to the realization that other societal institutions must provide a 'democratic infrastructure' for the political system if democracy is

> to succeed. The family, in particular, is cited as pivotal in this regard. Individuals socialized in an authoritarian type of family are not expected to enhance democratic practices in the political sphere of society at large." (Bill & Springborg, 1994, p. 237)

Rugh (1985) goes farther and argues that the character of the family not only inhibits the development of specific forms of rule, but it also serves to promote particular practices. In other words, patterns of behavior learned in the home impact upon political and social life. Political leaders, acting as father-figures, tend to take personal offense when their subordinates become unruly and unwilling to submit to their authority (Rugh, 1985). This is not to imply that all of the behavior patterns characteristic of small social units are reproduced unchanged in larger ones, but rather to argue that many of the ways in which individuals interact with political leaders is based upon what they learn in the home. This situation is not only true of authoritarian systems, but of fraternal democratic systems (both direct and representative) as well. Whereas paternal systems tend to rely on the extended family, fraternal social systems are organized along the lines of the so-called nuclear family. In this form of patriarchal rule, female power is expanded, though it is not equal to that of males.

Fraternal forms of rule are a by-product of the same kinds of psychological processes as those in paternal ones. In a micro society an actual brotherhood may rule, but at the macro level, the brotherhood is largely symbolic. This is not to argue that hierarchy disappears or that "true" equality exists in fraternal society; it does not. Instead, it is to argue that relations are based upon peer loyalty, not filial piety! As a result, the value of brotherhood is accented, while patriarchy is weakened and transformed but not eliminated. This sense of peer loyalty bonds members of the ruling group to one another, and they then dominate and defend the new political system of which they are the main beneficiaries. In speaking of the primal family, Freud explains it this way:

> As a result of decisive cultural changes, the original democratic equality that had prevailed among all the individual clansmen became untenable. . . . [A] fatherless society gradually changed into one organized on a patriarchal basis. The family was a restoration of the former primal horde and it gave back to fathers a large portion of their former rights. There were once more fathers, but the social achievements of the fraternal clan had not been abandoned. . . . (Freud, 1913, pp. 184-185)

In societies organized along fraternal lines, the father's role in family life, though still important, is diminished, and this has resulted in the transformation of family relations as well. Since, at a symbolic level, "the son" has been elevated, this symbolism undermines paternal authority. In modern societies this has led to the creation of the nuclear family in which the creation of rules and regulations has undermined fatherly power. Obedience to any particular father takes a "back seat" to loyalty to the laws and customs governing social, economic, and political interaction. Cooperation is valued over blind obedience, and individuals with complaints may bring their grievances before the ruling group or its representatives (e.g., courts, legislators). As political participation expands, rulers become increasingly more accountable and individuals no longer feel the need to rely on an arch-patriarch to either oversee them or protect their interests.

Like paternalism, fraternal forms of rule display defining characteristics and commonalities which are essentially reactions against paternal forms of domination and represent an attempt by individuals to distance themselves from the bonds of parental rule. As a result, fraternal forms of rule derive their legitimacy and power from social or cultural rules and regulations or legally defined powers.

The first commonality of fraternal systems is the supremacy of *impersonalism*. Weber describes it this way:

> The following characteristic must be considered decisive for

> our terminology: in legal authority, submission does not rest
> upon belief or upon sacred tradition. . . . Rather, submis-
> sion under legal authority is based upon an *impersonal* bond
> to the generally defined and functional "duty of office."
> (Weber, 1946, p. 299)

This impersonalism is an obvious reaction against the personalism of traditional parental forms of rule. To influence the decision-making process in a paternal society, one must be close to the leader, and it is this reliance on personalism that tends to restrict influence. As a result, there is a tendency within paternal systems towards consultation of the masses, as in consultative assemblies and parliaments, as opposed to their actual participation in the form of voting and/or legislative activities. Personalism, tied to both proximity and access, thus has a profound effect on the workings of the political system, while restricting participation of the population in the decision-making process.

This leads to the second characteristic of fraternal forms of rule, namely *diffusion* and/or *instutionalization of power.* To rectify problems arising from access and proximity, fraternal systems have diffused and dispersed power; this in turn diminishes the influence of any one person on the decision-making process. This is not to argue that access and proximity do not play a role in fraternal systems: they certainly do. The contention, rather, is that access and proximity are less important in fraternal systems, and that they exist largely outside of legal or socially acceptable channels.

A third commonality of fraternal systems is *formality*. Weber distinguishes this kind of formality from that existing under paternalism:

> One must, above all, distinguish between the *substantive*
> rationalization of administration and of judiciary by a patri-
> monial prince, and the *formal* rationalization carried out by
> trained jurists. The former bestows utilitarian and social ethi-
> cal blessings upon his subjects, in the manner of the master
> of a large house upon the members of his household. The

> trained jurists have carried out the rule of general laws ap-
> plying to all "citizens of the state." (Weber, 1946, pp. 298-
> 299)

As noted above, paternal systems are informal in character; individuals often work outside of official and/or institutional arrangements. Indeed, their personal influence may far outweigh power allotted to them by the system's rules and/or regulations. This contributes to what Bakhash (1985) refers to as the "dual character" of administrations. On the one hand, an official structure exists, but many important political decisions are made outside of formal bodies or institutions. This informality in all paternal systems makes it difficult to trace the course of the decision-making process, and simultaneously grants the leader the ability to deflect criticism and escape blame. It thus has a profound effect on the accountability of officials while enhancing opportunities for conspiracy and intrigue.

To counteract this trend, fraternal systems have come to rely heavily on formality. In fraternal tribal societies this means the development of ritualistic or religious laws and/or prohibitions (totem and taboo), whereas in industrial European societies this means the creation of formal law. Formal limits are placed on leaders; those who exceed them are subject to a variety of penalties and censures.

The fourth commonality is *consensuality* and/or *affective bonds.* In this case, we borrow largely from elite and consociational theory (Field, 1980; Lijphart, 1969). Symbolic brotherhoods are not simply products of transference, but they are also characterized by the presence of *affective* bonds. Freud called these aim-inhibited (desexualized) bonds and saw them as central to all forms of peer associations. It was this bond that led the brotherhood in *Totem and Taboo* to create a covenant in order to preclude the reemergence of a paternal tyrant. At the macro level this has manifested itself in the creation of political consensuality and consociationalism.

As Weber argues, confraternal medieval organizations are basi-

cally associative in nature, based on "mutual interest and common concern." Individuals who do not adhere to "rules of play" when competing for resources in the decision-making process are seen as betraying their brothers, and thus are outside of the fraternal system. If they violate their common trust, they are punished or ostracized. This affective bond manifests itself in the mythology of democracy. It is here that reference to Lasswell and Lerner (1965) is useful: "Turning briefly to indexes of affection, we note that in some societies doctrine emphasizes the significance of affection in human nature, and glorifies the ideal of congenial human relations (the family circle, and ever-enlarging circles, until the world community is itself included)" (Lasswell & Lerner, 1965, pp. 57-58). This affective bond is a reaction against the "divide and rule" tactics employed in the paternal system and results in shared power. If the leader within a paternal social system is successful in pitting subordinates against one another he can maintain power, but if his subordinates unite, forgetting and/or overlooking their differences, the paternal leader is in jeopardy. As the oft quoted saying goes, "united we stand, divided we fall."

A fifth commonality of fraternal systems is *acceptance of defeat/ glorification of cooperation.* This is a reaction against the glorification of power inherent in paternal systems. Lasswell and Lerner (1965) refer to this as the glorification of cooperation or shared rectitude. Generally, shared rectitude means shared values concerning "right" and "wrong," what "ought" to be done as opposed to what "is" or "could" be done. In fraternal societies, political groups or leaders who lose are expected to accept defeat and not employ their power in such a way as to crush opposition or to alter political outcomes. In like manner, political winners must respect defeated groups and not use their newly acquired institutional and legal power against their opponents; both victors and vanquished are expected to be cooperative in the transition of power. Failure to act in accordance with prevailing standards of political cooperation is met with both moral indignation and legal prosecution which are, in turn, enforced through disciplinary codes.

"Besides the criminal codes of the state, there are disciplinary provisions in most organizations, regardless of what value or values are their specialty" (Lasswell & Lerner, 1965, p. 57).

A six commonality is enhanced *social mobility;* individuals have greater opportunities for movement within the social or class hierarchy. Lasswell and Lerner (1965) argue that social mobility is a product of the underlying value of shared respect: "We speak of respect as shared in a community where the prevailing myth declares that individuals are worthy of respect because they are human, and also because of personal merit" (Lasswell & Lerner, 1965, p. 54).

Of course in most cases this *respect* applies only to members of the brotherhood, not to outsiders. This can be seen in Freud's primal family, in which the brothers were all given equal rights insofar as the females were concerned, but the women remained subordinate. It can also be seen in macro societies wherein universal suffrage was only reluctantly handed over to subordinate groups, and where social custom reinforced patterns of patriarchal domination.

Social mobility is tied to *myths of equality*. Fraternal societies are characterized by a double standard concerning equality, and it is this double standard that leads Freud to view modern democracy (indeed all fraternal systems) as both dangerous and *psychologically impoverished.*

> This danger is most threatening where the bonds of society are chiefly constituted by the identification of its members with one another [sibling equality], while individuals of the leader type do not acquire the importance that should fall to them in the formation of a group [merit-based hierarchy]. (Freud, 1930, p. 74)

This myth of equality is also noted by Lasswell and Lerner: "Note, for example, the perspective on equality among early settlers expressed in these lines from the operetta *Oklahoma!* by Rodgers and Hammerstein: 'I don't claim that I'm better than anybody

else, but I'll be damned if I ain't just as good!'" (Lasswell & Lerner, 1965, p. 54).

This leads us to the seventh commonality, *power sharing*. It is the sharing of political power that forms the greater part of the transition from parental forms of domination to their sibling counterparts. In speaking of the primal family, Freud argues,

> Though the brothers had banded together in order to overcome their father, they were all one another's rivals. . . . The new organization [of society] would have collapsed in a struggle of all against all, for none of them was of overmastering strength. . . . Thus the brothers had no alternative, but . . . to institute the law. . . . In this way they rescued the organization which had made them strong. . . . For a long time afterwards, the social fraternal feelings, which were the basis of the whole transformation, continued to exercise a profound influence on the development of society. . . . In thus guaranteeing one another's lives, the brothers were declaring that no one of them must be treated by another as their father was treated by all of them jointly. . . . It was not until long afterwards that the prohibition [of killing] ceased to be limited to members of the clan and assumed the simple form: "Thou shalt not murder." The patriarchal horde was replaced in the first instance by the fraternal clan. . . . (Freud, 1913, pp. 179-181).

The brothers made a covenant which laid out in no uncertain terms their rights and obligations. This is the first attempt at constitutionalism and division of powers. This division of power as defined by law, covenants, agreements, or constitutions is present in all fraternal social systems. It is one of most important defining features of every peer association whether it be the *polis,* confraternal medieval city-state, or modern liberal democracy. As Lasswell and Lerner put it, "The 'law' of a given body politic prescribes 'who' is authorized to decide 'what'" (Lasswell & Lerner, 1965, pp. 46-47).

Fraternal organizations are in many ways less malevolent than their paternal counterparts due to the fact that the father's power within the family is somewhat diminished. Likewise, at the political level there are checks and balances that restrict leaders from taking arbitrary action. Thus there is a rational element to fraternal systems which is lacking in paternal ones.

Power sharing within the fraternal system is often associated with themes of *rescue,* or myths of *liberation.* This is a reaction against the father's tyranny. His authority in both Freud's horde and Weber's household is supreme; loyalty and obedience are both expected and demanded. There is no "freedom from" the father, and it is only after the growth and success of the son that liberation occurs. In this regard, the son is played off against the father and is seen as a "liberator." Freud argues that this is the cultural origin of *messianism* and/or *millenarianism,* and notes that themes of rescue and liberation are common in all fraternal systems. The brotherhood, whether real or symbolic, is perceived as the only group that can, in the first instance, remove paternal authority, and, in the second, replace it with a more benevolent form of leadership. These myths of rescue legitimate the new social order in the form of ceremonies and historical rewrites

The eighth and final characteristic of fraternal systems is *ideological justification*. This has taken both religious and secular forms, and is the one that all of the various forms of rule seem to have in common. The most common form of fraternal secular rationalization in the modern era (1648-present) has been nationalism. In the ancient world (2500 B.C. to 1648), however, religious forms of rationalization played a major role in justifying both paternal and fraternal systems. Likewise, there have been numerous examples of the combinations of the two, the Islamic republic of Iran being perhaps one of the best examples.

Mixed Paternal/Fraternal Forms of Rule

Because both paternal and fraternal forms of rule are ideal-types, there are very few pure examples of either; instead, most political systems display elements of both as well as other forms of social organization like maternalism, sororitalism, and egalitarianism. However, because of the need for stability and legitimation, one form has tended to predominate.

Both paternal and fraternal forms of rule go through periods of relative *unity* and *disunity*; here I have borrowed and expanded upon elite theories (Field, 1980; Higley & Burton, 1989). The various systems are considered disunified when i) elites and/or the masses share few or no understandings about the properties of political conduct, and ii) engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional boundaries. There is deep fear and distrust and this results in punitive actions which are designed to protect factional interests (e.g., killing, imprisoning, banishing) (Higley & Burton, 1989). Disunified political systems are thus inherently unstable.

Unified periods are the opposite. Political violence is minimized and brought under control, and there are significant interactions across factional boundaries. They are essentially periods of relative stability. Unity is established in paternal and fraternal political systems in fundamentally different ways. A paternal political system may be regarded as unified if a leader i) effectively gains the submission of subordinates, and ii) minimizes and controls violent conflict among subordinates and/or between himself and subordinates. This is true in both micro and macro societies. Submission by subordinates is accomplished through many of the tactics already outlined: balanced conflict, carrot and stick approaches, fear, or by portraying actions as benevolent in order to be the recipient of a positive transference. In all of these, the leader's skills are central. If he fails to create a positive image and/or cannot maintain power by virtue of tradition, fear, or intimidation, the political system may be viewed as illegitimate.

In a fraternal political system, stability is established through consensual or consociational unity. At the elite level, individual members of the brotherhood accept certain rules of conduct and abide by them. At the level of civil society, it entails the acceptance and obedience to the laws and/or social customs established by the brotherhood. Members of the new elite agree to share or alternate power with one another. Field (1980) refers to this scenario as a *elite settlement.* In modern societies this has led to the creation of institutional and bureaucratic bodies. Because this form of rule is dependent upon the voluntary compliance of the members of the brotherhood, it can become disunified or unstable if certain factions and/or individuals fail to carry out their portion of the bargain. Thus fratricidal strife remains a threat to any fraternal form of rule. But this alone is not enough to insure unity. The ruling group must establish their right to rule and garner popular support. If they fail to convince the masses of their right to rule or to build a grassroots movement, then the system remains illegitimate and unstable.

When a paternal or fraternal system becomes disunified, it is said to be in a process of *disintegration.* Using paternal systems as our starting point, we can note three historical outcomes arising from such a disintegration. The first involves the triumph of paternal factions. In this instance, a paternal system remains in place with an existing leader or new leader gaining ascendancy. In the second instance, fraternal factions gain dominance, thereby establishing a fraternal form of rule. In both scenarios, a stable political system is established and the system is *consolidated.* A third outcome involves the establishment of a transitional or mixed system. Because mixed systems are inherently unstable, they are said to be *unconsolidated.* These outcomes are by no means determined; they simply reflect patterns of behavior. Theoretically, any system could be transformed into any other, but the most common outcome of a paternal disintegration has been the creation of the mixed system.

Power in mixed systems is allotted unevenly, with one indi-

vidual occasionally possessing powers over and above all others. To use Orwellian language, the revolutionary leader acts as "big brother," mitigating conflict between the various factions. The ancient Greeks had an expression for this form of leadership, *primus inter pares* meaning "first among equals." While an obvious contradiction in terms, it nonetheless seems applicable. The leader's role in this kind of a system is critical because paternal, fraternal, and mixed factions compete for power. Fraternal factions accent values of liberty, equality, and fraternity; paternal factions accent values like hierarchy, obedience and order, and mixed factions espouse some combinations of the two. For instance, they might accent liberty, fraternity, and obedience, or equality, liberty, and dictatorship.

Thus the leader of a mixed systems has the unenviable task of arbitrating disputes. A good example of this kind of system may be ancient Phillipian Macedonia where the king was a supreme guide to a brotherhood of powerful notables. In modern political systems it is manifested in the retention or creation of a strong central executive whose power is theoretically or constitutionally offset by democratic institutions. The executive may retain the right to declare martial law, disband parliament, call for national referenda and, if necessary, legislate or rule by decree. These powers, which are presumably designed to protect the new political system, are often used to dismantle it.

Thus, one of the main problems confronting transitional democratic political systems is the means by which power is dispersed and reallocated. Not all systems are successful at this task, and instead retain elements of informal paternalism. Power is both personal and impersonal. There exists both balanced conflict and cooperation. Power is concentrated in both private cliques as well as official offices. Understanding the ways in which power is distributed is thus critical if predictions concerning a given political system are to be made. Likewise, factions must also be examined. If there is a preponderance of paternal or mixed factions then the regime is likely to revert to paternal rule. On the other hand, if

fraternal factions are predominant than the system has a better chance of emerging from its transitional phase as a stable, fraternal democracy.

Transitional systems may be established in a variety of ways—through bachelor band-like revolt, mass revolution, abdication, coups, or political collapse. But because mixed systems are disunified and unconsolidated, they are plagued by a number of practical problems. One already touched upon is that of elite factional rivalry. Factions in mixed systems often possess different orientations (paternal, fraternal, mixed). Not only must fraternal factions compete with one another, but they must also do battle with mixed and paternalistic ones as well. As a result, fraternal factions may be forced to form temporal alliances with mixed factions in order to protect the political system. If mixed factions defect and form alliances with paternal factions, the system is in jeopardy. A second problem confronting transitional systems is the masses. This is particularly a problem for modern systems with universal or partial suffrage. If civil society is not predominately fraternal then fraternal elite factions are constantly under threat of being voted out of office. If the electorate is predominately paternal there is little chance of the system surviving. But if the electorate is mixed, elite fraternal factions have a fighting chance. They may be able to gain a majority and thereby establish a fraternal political system. More likely though, they will be forced to form temporal alliances with unreliable mixed factions. In times of revolutionary fervor, the masses may back fraternal factions; however, in times of crisis, they may shift their votes to paternalistic or mixed groups. If paternal factions gain a majority either through popular vote or by forming an alliance with mixed groups the system ceases to exist; thus the origin of the phrase, "One man, one vote, one time."

We can delineate two historical trends associated with transitional systems. The first can be described as systemic back-sliding; this entails a reversion to a paternal form of rule. In tribal systems, this can lead to a period of fratricidal strife and the recurring suc-

cession of the solitary paternal tyrant. In macro societies it has manifested itself in a loss of legitimacy and the collapse of revolutionary coalitions; as the saying goes "revolutions devour their own children." The collapse of coalitions into fratricidal strife has sometimes been referred to as *reigns of terror/thermidorian* reaction. Thermidorean reactions are periods during which fraternal and/or mixed factions grow increasingly weak and illegitimate, thereby allowing revisionist paternalistic factions the opportunity to seize power.

The second historical trend is the establishment of a predominately fraternal system based on consensual or consociational unity. In tribal societies, consensus can be established through the creation of totems and taboos, with each member of the brotherhood receiving equal rights. In larger more complex political and social systems, it has resulted in the creation of "working" constitutions and/or basic laws. In these systems respect for the rules of political conduct at both the elite and non-elite level plays a critical role. Probably the best examples are those cited by elite theorists: Britain, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, and Germany. From a historical standpoint, mixed systems have tended to be short-lived. Non-transitional systems, on the other hand, have tended toward longevity, lasting hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of years (e.g., the Egyptian, Sumerian, Persian, Chinese, and Roman Empires).

Historically, backsliding into paternalism has been the most common outcome. This is largely because i) mixed systems can be so easily paralyzed by paternal factions, and ii) mixed political systems usually arise in societies where the orientation of the masses is also mixed. In modern political systems, paternalistic factions have, generally speaking, gravitated to the wings of the political spectrum; for example right-wing paternalism (Bonapartism, Fascism, Nazism, Islamic capitalism) and left-wing paternalism (Babouvism, communism, Stalinism, Islamic socialism). These opposing wings, despite ideological differences, have a common interest in the demise of mixed and/or fraternal systems. They

essentially turn the political system and its laws against itself by gaining an electoral majority, forming makeshift alliances of convenience with other factions, refusing to work with other factions within the confines of the political systems, or installing themselves within institutions of the state such as the parliament, the executive, the bureaucracy, or the courts. They then use these institutions to undermine fraternal and/or mixed groups. Once the system is paralyzed, paternal factions can then attempt to gain control of the executive through such legal mechanisms as popular elections or preselection/designation of a successor, or such illegal means as armed revolt or coups.

Conclusion

By way of summary, paternal and fraternal systems can be differentiated on the basis of the psychological forces sustaining them: transference, splitting and idealization. In paternal societies, fathers and/or surrogate father-figures lead society. As Lacan (1981) argues, this transference appears in language with such expressions as: the father of the country, noble patriarch, patron, *pater familias,* etc. In fraternal societies, this transference is also manifested by the use of such terms as fraternity, brotherhood, equality, liberty, and justice. In mixed societies, all of these terms are used with relatively equal frequency.

In addition, each form of rule has certain characteristics which sets it apart from all others. Paternal forms of rule are based upon personalism, access, informality, balanced conflict, glorification of power, and submission to hierarchy. Fraternal forms of rule constitute reactions against paternalism and as such are based on informality, diffusion of power, formality, consensuality, cooperation, and social mobility. Mixed systems are a combination of both paternalism and fraternalism and thus have characteristics of both. Virtually all transitional democratic systems are mixed types.

While paternal and fraternal systems tend to be long lasting

and stable, mixed systems are short-lived, unstable and unconsolidated. If factions reach consensus and form a united front, then the system can become a stable form of fraternal rule; otherwise, it is transformed into paternal systems.

CHAPTER TWO

REVOLUTION TYPE A

There at least three modern examples of revolutionary system type A, France 1789-1799, Germany 1918-1933, and Iran, 1979-present. For practical purposes the following analysis will focus on these three examples and will not discuss the ancient models. The amount of documented history on the two ancient systems (Macedonia, Mongolia) is sketchy at best and as a result there would be a great deal of speculation involved. The information on the three modern examples however is quite extensive and detailed. Likewise as we noted previously, there are two distinct models, the ancient and the modern examples. The characteristics of the systems and their parallels will be noted, citing examples throughout.

Parallel #1: The System

The revolutionary systems in the three modern examples in all instances is of mixed character—and example of both paternalism and fraternalism. As a result it is inherently unstable. From a purely systemic perspective the system has manifestations of both contradictory leanings. On the side of fraternalism there are things like popular and/or elected parliaments, and division of powers.

On the side of paternalism there is the retention of strong central authority. In France for example there were the "special

revolutionary" powers of the Committees of Public Safety and General Security and these were later transferred to the Directory. Despite the existence of fundamental freedoms of speech and press, the central executive authority arrested, detained, and attacked dissidents, public gatherings, etc. It was with a "whiff of grapeshot" that the regime was preserved, and it was the extra-constitutional powers of the Committee of Public Safety that led to the crackdown known as the Reign of Terror.

In Germany there was also the retention of strong central power. The presidents of Weimar, by virtue of Article 48 of the constitution, had extensive powers. This was particularly true in the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch. Ebert in particular was noted for his excessive use of Article 48 and Hindenburg used it to rule by decree after 1930. The same is true of the Iranian system. The constitutional powers of the faqih are quite extensive and allow the chief executive to suppress debate on certain matters, block the efforts of the press, and use the repressive apparatus of the state against its citizenry. This power proved critical in the aftermath of the 1981 presidential impeachment crisis when Khomeini used these powers to smash the opponents of the regime, and is currently being used by Khamenei to suppress the press and reformist factions.

Nevertheless, all three systems also had popularly elected offices (parliaments, presidents, etc.). These bodies operated within a constrained environment but were not true rump parliaments. These represent the fraternal character of the regime.

In general these type of revolutionary systems are parallel in structure. They all have a divided executive (ie., multiple executives). In France there was first the Committees of Public Safety and Security, then later the dysfunctional Directory which consisted of five chief executives. In Germany there was the President and the Chancellor, and in Iran, the Faqih and the President, and at one point a Prime Minister as well. All have an elaborate court system and fraternal bodies (parliaments). The structure can be mapped diagramatically as follows:

Divided (Multiple) Executive (paternal)
Judiciary (paternal)   Legislative (fraternal)
Voting Electorate (mixed)

Parallel #2: The Revolutionary Leader

In all cases a revolutionary leader arises. In France, Robespierre emerged as the clear leader. In Germany, Ebert emerged, and in Iran Khomeini became dominant. All were nominated as chief executive by their revolutionary brethern and not popularly elected as such. In all instances the leader's ideological orientation was left of center. Robespierre was the leader of the leftist *Montagnards*, Ebert defacto head of the Socialists (SPD), and Khomeini effective leader of the *Maktabi/Musavi* faction.

The revolutionary leaders all performed a critical role in the revolution. They served to replace the ousted monarch as the most important person in the state. They served to unite the various revolutionary factions (left, center, right) behind them. As defacto leader of this overarching umbrella they kept the country from completely disintegrating into civil war. They also played a critical role in the institutionalization of the revolutionary system. Robespierre pressed for his republic of *Virtu,* Ebert for "liberty and justice for all", and Khomeini for a "just and holy government." Likewise all failed in their endeavor to "revolutionize" the population or to establish a truly fraternal political system. They all used excessive force to maintain power (Reign of Terror, Article 48, Wrath of God) which alienated the factions and the population.

Parallel #3: The Would-be Successor

In all instances another revolutionary leader emerged as a front runner for the position of successor to the revolutionary leader. In

France this was in the person of Danton. In Germany it was Wilhelm Marx, and in Iran the Ayatollah Muntazeri. In all cases this would-be successor was a political centrist. Danton was beheaded for his *moderatisme*, Marx was leader of the Catholic Center Party, and Muntazeri was commonly accused of being too "liberal." All three advocated for greater fraternal freedoms (speech, press, assembly) and a reduction in revolutionary terror. All were regarded as counter-revolutionaries for advocating an end to revolutionary excess. Danton was beheaded, Marx first forced to resign as chancellor and later lost his presidential election bid because of it, and Muntazeri was forced to resign shortly before the death of the Imam Khomeini. In all instances, the would-be successor fails to achieve the goal of succeeding the revolutionary leader.

Parallel #4: The Actual Successor

In all three instances, the more moderate centrist successor was defeated and surpassed by a pragmatic, conservative, rightist successor. In France, Barras came to dominate the Directory. In Germany, Hindenburg became a two term president, and in Iran Ali Khameni was elected faqih for life.

In all three instances the new successor was a political conservative. Barras was a former right-wing Jacobin. Hindenburg a conservative Junker with close ties to the counter-revolutionary Nationalist party. Khamenei is closely affiliated with conservative clerical factions (Hujjatis, Ruhaniyat). All ushered in a period of Thermidor in which there was a crackdown on the leftist factions of the revolution. Barras oversaw the crackdown on the Montagnards and Babeuvists. Hindenburg played a role in the political exclusion and suppression of the socialist SPD, and communist KPD. In Iran, Khamenei has led an attack upon the Maktabis and the exclusion of them from power between 1992-1998.

All three contributed to the erosion of the legitimacy of the

political system. Barras saw a steady erosion of his power leading up to Bonaparte's coup de etat. Hindenburg saw the creation of a coalition of negation between the communists and the Nazis against him. Khamenei has seen his authority increasingly challenged by reformist factions.

Parallel #5: The Factions

Unlike other revolutions (Cuban, Russian, Chinese), this type of revolution may be noted for the diversity of factions involved. The factions run the gamut from extreme polar left and extreme polar right. In France, the left was composed of the communistic Babuevists and socialist Montagnards. The center was composed of moderate Dantonists and Carnotists, and the right of monarchists, White Jacobins, Thermidoreans, and Bonapartists. In Germany, the diversity was just as broad. On the left was the communist KPD and socialist SPD and USPD. In the center was the Catholic Center Party, People's Party and the Democratic Party, and on the right were the Nationalist, and Nazis. In Iran the situation is similar. On the extreme left is the communist Mujaheedin-e Kalq and Tudeh, and socialist Maktabis and Ruhaniyoun. In the center are the moderate Muntazerists, Rafsanjanists and Khatamist (Iran Participation Front and Servants of Reconstruction). On the right are the Hujjatis, Grand Mujtaheeds, and Ruhaniyat.

In all cases the extreme polar factions (eg. Communists, Nazis, Bonapartists) are paternalistic in character. By the same token, the closer one gets to the center the more fraternalistic the factions become. This can be mapped diagrammatically as follows:

Left————Center————Right
Paternalism—Fraternalism—Paternalism

In all three cases fraternal and mixed factions were flanked by paternalistic groups set on the establishment of a dictatorship of sorts. Not only do factions do battle on economic and cultural

issues they also battle over how the state should be organized (paternally or fraternally). Parallel factions are listed in the chart below.

Parallel Factions

France	Germany	Iran
Babeuvists, Hebertists (left)	Communist Party (KPD) (left)	Mujaheedin-e Kalq, Tudeh (left)
Montagnards, Jacobins (left)	Social Democrats (SPD), Independent Socialists (USPD)	Maktabis, Ruhaniyoun, Mujaheedin of the Revolution (left)
Dantonists, Carnotists (center)	Catholic Center Party, Democratic Party (DDP), Peoples Party (DVP), (center)	Muntazerists, Islamic Iran Participation Front, Servants of the Reconstruction (center)
White Jacobins, Monarchists (right)	Nationalist Party (DNVP), Monarchists (right)	Conservatives, Hujjatis, Ruhaniyat (right)
Bonapartists (right)	Nazis (right)	unknown

The factional dominance follows the same pattern every time. The revolutionary coalition that ultimately gains ascendancy is left-center in orientation. In France the Montagnards and Dantonists formed a coalition and dominated the early days of the Jacobin Republic. In Germany the SPD and Catholic Center Party emerged as the major actors. In Iran the Maktabis and Muntazerists gained ascendancy.

This revolutionary coaliton is ultimately supplanted by right-center bloc. This is otherwise known as the Thermidorean bloc. In France, the Dantonists and Carnotists defected the Montagnards and formed a coalition with Barras and the conservative Jacobins. In Germany, the Nationalists rose to prominence and formed a friendly relationship with the Catholic Center Party and People's

Party. In Iran, the Khatamists, Muntazerists joined conservatives in Ruhaniyat.

This bloc is ultimately supplanted by a center-left bloc that does battle with rightists in the judiciary and executive branches. In France, the centrists defected Barras and rejoined a revived Jacobin movement (1797-98). In Germany, the Catholic Centrists defected the Nationalists and took up friendly relations with the SPD (1930). In Iran, the center formed the Islamic Iran Participation Front and joined leftist reformers who had moderated their stances (1996-98). In all cases the chief executive of state and the conservative judiciary opposed these moves.

Parallel # 6: The Faction Leaders

Like the revolutionary leader, would-be successor, and successor, faction leaders have parallels as well. These leaders perform similar functions during the course of the revolution. For practical purposes I will only focus on a few critical personalities.

The main leaders of the left in France were Marat and Babeuf. Marat served as the "Man of the People" advocating statist and socialist reforms. This role was assumed by Muller, defacto head of the SPD for most of its existence in Weimar Germany. In Iran, this role has been played by former Prime Minister Musavi, who has advocated for statist and redistributive policies. Babeuf played the role of a radical on the left, who called for communistic dictatorship. Thalman played this role in Weimar as leader of the communist KPD. Rajavi, as leader of the Mujaheedin-e Kalq has played this role for Iran.

There were 3 main leaders of the center. The first is the would-be successors, Danton, Marx, and Muntazeri. Next are their successors for leadership of the center. After Danton's execution Carnot emerged as a leader of the center groups. In Germany Streseman emerged as a major player. In Iran, Rafsanjani emerged as leading moderate. In all three cases these successors played the role of align-

ing the center with rightist faction(s), thereby ushering in the Thermidorean period. All of these successors were ultimately supplanted by a third generation of leaders. In France Merlin DeDouai was nominated to the Directory. In Germany, Bruening emerged as chancellor. In Iran Khatami emerged as leader of the reformists and was elected president. These three latter cases all played the role of distancing the center from the right and resumed friendlier relations with the left.

There are many more parallel personalities. Theory suggests that there are many members of the elite that have parallels who performed similar functions. This remains perhaps the most interesting (and disturbing) aspect of the theory of parallelism. On the following pages I have listed a number of parallel personalities.

Parallel Personalities

France	Germany	Japan
Robespierre (left)	Ebert (left)	Khomeini (left)
Danton (center)	Wilhelm Marx (center)	Muntazeri (center)
Barras (right)	Hindenburg (right)	Khameinei (right)
Marat (left)	Muller (left)	Musavi (left)
Carnot (center)	Streseman (center)	Rafsanjani (center)
M. Douai (center)	Bruening (center)	Khatami (center)
Seiyes (right)	Von Papen (right)	Nateq Nuri (right)
Lafayette (left)	Bauer (left)	Bani Sadr (left)
Mirabeau (left)	Scheideman (left)	Bazargan (left)
Babeuf (left)	Thalman (left)	Rajavi (left)
Napoleon (right)	Hitler (right)	unknown

Parallel #7: The Stages

All three revolutions seem to transform through the same staging process. Three distinct stages can be identified: Stage 1, The Battle for Power; Stage 2, The Height of Revolutionary Zeal; Stage 3, Thermidor.

It should be noted here that the stages are not simply a theoretical tool for understanding these revolutions but represent actual "parallel" break points in the revolution. More interesting is what I refer to as the chronology of events. Key events always occur in the same order in all revolutions. For example the would-be successor never succeeds the revolutionary leader and he is always discredited before the death of the revolutionary leader. The revolutionary coalitions always go from left-center, to right-center, to center-left, always!

The battle for power stage is the period from the successful revolt to the period wherein there is a major internal crisis which threatens the life of the revolutionary regime. In France this is the period from 1789 to the fall of the monarchy in 1792. In Germany it is the period from 1918 to the Kapp Putsch in 1920. In Iran it goes from 1979 to the presidential impeachment crisis of 1981. In all cases the diverse factional interests that seized power struggle for control of the course of the revolution.

Stage Two—Height of Revolutionary Zeal—is the period from these aforementioned political explosions to the death or ouster of the revolutionary leader. This stage always lasts until the death or ouster of the revolutionary hero. This is in large measure due to the fanaticism of the revolutionary leader who will not cease in his efforts to firmly establish the new regime. Therefore, it seems that his death or ouster is a critical event, in that he must die in order to be stopped. No backlash to revolutionary excess can succeed until he is gone. This is the period wherein the revolution is dominated by the left-center bloc. Once this period ends so does the dominance of the left.

Stage Three—Thermidor—is the period from the death or

ouster of the revolutionary leader to the end of the revolutionary period. Unlike stage 2, the successor does not necessarily have to die. He can be removed from power in some other way. This is probably due to the fact that he lacks the fanaticism of his forebear. This period begins with the rise of the first right-center or Thermidorean bloc. In this model or type of revolution, the Thermidorean bloc is always right-center. This period is marked by a battle for power among Thermidorean and non-Thermidorean factions. The rightists are true revisionists, but seek to portray themselves as heirs of the revolution. The most reformist factions are the center groups. The right fails in its efforts to completely usurp the revolution and is increasingly challenged by the center and left. The right maintains influence in the judiciary and executive branches, in all instances. The center-left dominate the legislature and have some influence in the executive. In France, the Jacobins resurged and the centrists abandoned Barras. In Germany, after friendly relations with the right, the center parties became closer to the SPD. In Iran Rafsanjani forged a coalition with the Hujjatis only to see it overturned by Khatami.

Parallel #8: External Conflicts

It would seem that there must occur an external crisis of some kind, like a foreign occupation or war. This serves in the early days as an external threat which justifies the crackdown on the counter revolutionary elements and leads to the militarization of society. The war/occupation has the effect of preparing the population for military conflict in the future. It also serves to deflect attention away from problems at home, and turn anger towards foreign opponents. In France there were the revolutionary wars. In Germany there was the conflict with Poland and the occupation of the Ruhr by France and its allies. In Iran there was the Iran/Iraq War.

There are undoubtedly other reasons for the war, i.e., the role played by these conflicts, but this remains difficult to isolate. It

should be noted however that some conflict always occurs while the revolutionary leader is still alive and he uses this as a pretext for mass mobilization and a greater and greater exercise of authority. For Robespierre there were the invasions of the Prussians and Austrians. For Ebert the occupation of the Ruhr, and for Khomeini, the Iraqi invasion.

The conflict can be protracted or not. The French revolutionary wars continued in some form after the death of Robespierre, but the Iran/Iraq war ended before Khomeini's death.

Parallel #9: The Chronology of Events

This parallel is similar to the stages but it is a little more complex. Theory suggests that there is a historical process or chronology of required events. These are events that must occur in the same order albeit in different time frames.

For example, the Battle for Power stage always proceeds the Height of Revolutionary Zeal stage. The nature of the coalition governments always proceeds in the same order (left-center, right-center, center-left). The would-be successor is always discredited before he can succeed to the throne, in all instances!

Within each stage there is a chronology of key events—eg., battles, conflicts in parliament, defeat of particular agendas, etc. These are too complex to go into here, but suffice it to say they will be addressed in future works.

Parallel #10: The Rise of the Paternalistic Right

In all instances a paternalistic right wing faction comes into existence. In France there was the rise of the Bonapartists. This group was composed of formerly right-wing Robespierrists. In Germany the Nazi party rose to prominence. It had strong ties to

the nationalist DNVP. In Iran similar types of right-wing Khomeinist factions are on the rise.

In the cases of France and Germany, the paternalistic factions ultimately rose to prominence and took over control of the state. In France it was by coup de-etat and in Germany by legal means (elections). The future will tell if a similar form of government will appear in Iran.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PATERNALISTIC STATE
AND HEGEMONIC WAR

Introduction

The paternalistic state, like the revolutionary one goes through various stages. Stage One, the "Consolidation of Power" is the period in which the regime is consolidated. Stage Two, "Preparation for War" is the period wherein the state begins to prepare for a future conflict. Stage Three, the "Hegemonic War" is the period in which the states embarks on a war to overturn existing world hegemonic powers. There are four known examples of this kind of state: Alexander's Macedon, Ghenghis Khan's Mongolia, Napoleonic France, and Hitler's Germany.

Parallel #1: The Leader

The first characteristic of the new successor state and government is its embodiment in the leader. In Macedon, Alexander assumed absolute control, in Mongolia, Ghengis Khan centralized and united the tribes. In France Bonaparte seized power through a coup de-etat and created the Consulate. In Germany, Hitler brought the various parties under the control of the Nazi regime.

In the ancient models, extended families dominated the new state. In the modern case of Germany, the Nazi Party came to dominate the government. The leader is highly charismatic. His charisma serves to unite the elite and the country.

Parallel # 2: The Stages

As mentioned previously the regime goes through three stages, Stage One "Consolidation of Power," Stage Two, "Preparation for War," and Stage Three "Hegemonic War."

Stage one begins with the rise to power of the charismatic leader. He can come to power by either peaceful of violent means. In the case of France, Bonaparte seized power in a coup de-etat. In the cases of Macedonia and Mongolia, Alexander and Ghenghis ascended to the throne through hereditary means. In the case of Germany, Hitler was nominated as chancellor because of his party's electoral success.

Initially the charismatic leader is forced to form alliances of convenience with political factions and other elites in order to gain power. Napoleon formed an alliance with conservative elements led by Seiyes and Ducos, both of whom became his co-consuls under the Consulate. Hitler formed an alliance with the Nationalist DNVP and conservatives like Von Papen. The initial cabinet was not dominated by the Nazis who held only 3 of 11 cabinet posts.

But this situation does not last long. Having the largest and most influential faction, the charismatic leader quickly pushes aside his political allies and weaker partners. In the case of France, Napoleon had himself proclaimed First Consul and replaced Seiyes and Ducos with Cambaceres and Lebrun who were easier to control. Hitler soon expanded the number of seats held by Nazis in the cabinet. He convinced Hindenburg to nominate him as his successor, and in January 1934, Hitler became president. He com-

bined the offices of chancellor and president in the office of the Fuhrer.

During this period there begins a crackdown on the various factions that might challenge the authority of the charismatic leader and his faction. In February 1933, Hitler moved to crush the communists, and uses the Reichstag fire as a pretext to smash the party. Ultimately all of the parties except for the Nazis are dissolved. After November 1799, Bonaparte leads an attack on the Babeuvists and errant Jacobins. It spells the doom for the Jacobins in French history.

This effort to gain absolute control of society continues throughout the history of the regime. Control of the population continues to increase at leaps and bounds. Napoleon installs his family and loyal confidants in positions of power. The Nazi party comes to dominate all aspects of German life, thereby creating a totalitarian state. The same is true of the extended family networks of Alexander and Ghenghis Khan.

The charismatic leader creates a rightist regime. In the modern cases, the economic structure can be best described as corporativist. Hitler forms an alliance with German industrialists, and moves to create a war time economy. His economic mastermind, Hjalmar Schacht leads this effort after 1935. Napoleon tries to attract back emigres who have fled the country. He continues the revolutionary policy of maintaining a war time economy. He continues to conduct campaigns in Germany and Italy. While little is known of Macedonia and Mongolia during this period, it is clear from historical accounts that capitalist trade and/or war time economies are maintained as well.

In Stage two, the "Preparation for War" the charismatic leader plans on embarking on a large scale conflict with his enemies. In order to do so, however, he needs to prepare for protracted war. He also needs to expand the territorial limits of the state. This territorial expansion serves two functions, 1) it increases the economic strength of the state, and 2) creates a buffer zone protecting the state from foreign attack.

In the case of Macedonia, Alexander invades Thrace and Greece in order to subdue and enlist the Greek city states in his campaign against Persia. In France, Napoleon launches invasions of Germany and Italy. In 1802 the consolidation is complete and he concludes a treaty recognizing French conquests. In 1936, Hitler re-militarizes the Rhineland. In 1938, he occupies Austria and the Sudetenland, and in 1939 seizes the rest of Czechoslovakia. During the same parallel period, Ghenghis Khan subdues errant tribes surrounding his kingdom.

The arrangements with hegemonic powers serves to buy time for the charismatic leader and his state. Napoleon uses the lull in fighting to reorganize his military. Hitler embarks on massive buildup, enlisting five times the troops specified in the Treaty of Versailles. Alexander enlists Greek military forces into his own. Ghenghis Khan not only consolidates the various tribes under the title of the "Mongols" but ultimately drafts the Hsa-Hsia kingdom as well.

Stage Three: The Hegemonic War

Parallel # 3: The Regions or Theatres of Operation

The hegemonic war occurs in what is referred to as the "known world," and is fought between the dominant and non-dominant powers. In the hegemonic conflict in question there are a finite number of regions or theatres of operation that play a role in the conflict. Region I comprises the "paternalistic state" and its satellites. Region II comprises the state's "historic rival" and its surrounding satellites. Region III comprise what is referred to as the "regional power" and its satellite regions/states. Region IV comprises what is referred to as "ally #1" and its satelittes. Ally #1 is close to the paternalistic state. Region V is the region dominated

by what is referred to as the "sea power" and its satellites. The sea power is the most powerful naval force in the world. Region VI comprises the "nuisance state" and "ally #2." It is often divided between pro-paternalistic state and anti-paternalistic forces. Region VII is referred to as the "peripheral" actors. It is comprised of actors that are can be both pro and anti-paternalistic state. It ultimately comes under the influence of the paternalistic state. Region VIII comprises what is referred to as the "behemoth" and its satellites. It is the major land power of the day. Region IX is called the "battleground" because it is an area in which the sea power and the paternalistic state can do battle.

Suffice it to say the way in which the regions are arranged is critical to the conflict. The first half of the war always proceeds in the same order. Region I attacks and defeats Region II. The war then spreads with Region I attacking and defeating Region III. At some point, Region IV, seeing the success of Region I steps up its support for the war effort. Region V being a sea power is relatively safe from attack by Region I and continues the war effort. The defeat of Region III is a major blow to Region V who have close political and military ties. The sea power is thus a critical actor in the conflict. As Region I, the paternalistic state, is largely a land power. The actions taken by the sea power at this point in the conflict are thus critical. If it chooses to give up the conflict then the war is most assuredly lost. If not the conflict can continue in Region IX.

Next the conflict moves to Region VI. This region proves to be a thorn in the side of Region I, the aggressor state. If it is united it will oppose the efforts of the paternalistic state. If it is composed of a variety of states some will support and some will oppose the aggressor state. In either case Region I will be forced to subdue or align with Region VI.

Next the conflict moves to VIII, the behemoth. Regarded as a hegemonic power, the paternalistic state along with its allies will attack and invade this great land power.

Stages of the Conflict

There are two stages to the conflict. Stage One, "The Challenge" encompasses the period from the attack on Region II until the attack on Region VIII. Stage Two "The Outcome" occurs sometime during the campaign against Region VIII, the behemoth and its satellites. The outcome of stage two is determined by the actions of the various regions and/or states. The paternalistic state (Region I) is incapable of challenging all of the world's dominant powers at once. It is thus incapable of fighting a multiple front war. If the sea power (Region V) and the behemoth (Region VIII) join forces then the challengers can expect to lose the conflict. But if the sea power drops out or doesn't join the war effort the behemoth cannot defeat the paternalistic state and its allies alone and is doomed to defeat.

The order of the conflict is constrained by geography. Region I (paternalistic state) always touches by land Region II (rival). This is to facilitate its being attacked first. Region III (regional power) always touches by land Region I (paternalistic state) or Region II (rival). This is so it can be attacked second. Region IV (ally #1) always touches by land Region I (paternalistic) or Region II (rival). This is so that the paternalistic state can dominate ally #1 once the conflict is underway. Region V (sea power) is always separated by sea and thus immune from land assault. Region VI (nuisance) always touches by land Region I (paternalistic) or Region II (rival). This is so it can be attacked next. Region VII (peripheral) is always isolated and thus relatively unimportant in the conflict. Region VIII (behemoth) always touches Region I (paternalistic), or Region II (rival), or Region III (regional power) so it can be attacked last. Region IX (battleground) can always be reached by sea if necessary, and this allows Region V (sea power) to continue the conflict.

The various numbers and coding system assigned to the various regions is not arbitrary, but is rather based on very specific criterion. Each region is defined by the characteristic of the state,

governing body, political body that dominates it. This is particularly true of the modern examples (France, Germany).

The second stage of the conflict is constrained by the geopolitical arrangement of the various regions. For this reason, each instance of hegemonic war needs to be examined separately.

Nevertheless, a couple of patterns/parallels can be noted. For one, no paternalistic state has been successful in its endeavor at world dominance when it had to fight both the behemoth and the sea power simultaneously. Secondly, in those instances in which the sea power was neutral or dropped out of the conflict, the paternalistic state was successful in its effort to subdue the known world. Thirdly, no paternalistic state has ever been successful in its attempts to invade the sea power. This is largely because it is a land power.

Thus it can be concluded that the relationship between the behemoth and the sea power is critical. If the paternalistic state can come between these two powers or sabotage their relationship, it can be victorious in its efforts. Likewise, if it could find a way to invade and conquer the sea power, it could also be victorious.

Characteristics of the Various Regions

The dominant state of Region I is the paternalistic state. It is always a right-wing paternalistic regime bent on world domination. Its foreign policy can best be described as expansionistic. It is the ultimate police state of the period. It has gone through a revolutionary transformation from an insignificant player on the international scene to a major actor. This transformation is rapid and goes largely unrecognized by the world community. It is a land power in all instances.

The dominant state or area of Region II is the rival. The rival is usually a paternalistic dictatorship, though this is not necessary. It is mainly defined by its relationship to the aggressor. It is a historic staging area for land invasions of Region I (the paternalistic

state). It thus represents a military and political threat to the paternalistic state. It has a history of conflict with the paternalistic state and has often proven to be a threat to ally #1. It is a land power.

The dominant region or state of Region III is the regional power. The regional power is defined by its relationship with the paternalistic state. It is seen as a region that is a threat to the paternalistic state, and is regarded as militarily superior to the rival. It has the reputation of having some of the best land forces in the world. It is largely regarded as invincible and rarely loses land conflicts. Like the rival and paternalistic state it is a land power. It has strong political and military ties to the sea power. The conquest of this state and its surrounding region is regarded as a great feat.

The dominant state of Region IV is ally #1. This may be one state or a collection of states with a shared heritage. Militarily it is weak, some combination of naval and land power. It is usually a peninsula and thus its mixed military. It is basically a junior partner in the conflict. It has mutual enemies with the paternalistic state, that is, the regional power, the rival. It is vulnerable to military attack from land and sea, thus its spreads its resources between land and sea military equipment.

Region V is dominated by the sea power. It is often times the hegemonic state of the period. In all cases it has the world's best navy. Its land forces are very good as well, but not as large as they would otherwise be due to geo-political constraints. Unfortunately because of its geo-political location, it is at a disadvantage logistically. It must transport troops to the conflict via sea and has problems with supply. This isolation however serves to protect it from the paternalistic state which is basically a land power.

Region VI is the most complicated because it is both pro and anti paternalistic. The region can be dominated by one major actor, the nuisance, or may be broken up into smaller entities. In both cases however, the region remains a thorn in the side of the paternalistic state. If it were wholly on the side of region I and the

paternalistic state, its full force could be used against the behemoth. However, its forces are always split. Thus it must be controlled by the paternalistic state and its allies.

Region VIII is dominated by the behemoth. This is geographically a very large state with much territory. The behemoth is formerly the worlds greatest land power. It comprises a large land mass. Its army is large, perhaps the largest in the world with numerous reserves. Its military however is weak due to things like purges, defeats, poor training, and a general lack of resources. Nevertheless, it is too powerful to be defeated by the paternalistic state alone. Therefore the paternalistic state must enlist other allies to support it in its efforts to defeat the behemoth. Historically, the behemoth has been a paternalistic regime, though this may not be required.

It should be noted that there are some differences between the modern and ancient models. In the modern examples (France, Germany, maybe Iran) the various regions are under the control of separate independent states. In some of the ancient models, these regions or theatres of operation are under of control of one or more states (Persia, China). In the case of Alexander the Great, a number of the regions were under the control of the Persian Empire. This reflects the fact that the overall trend of globalization is operating in reverse order. In the ancient world the process was one of diminishing globalization, whereas in the modern example the trend is towards increasing global integration. In this regard, it would seem that the revolution/hegemonic war pattern is a historical engine of change.

In the ancient world, Macedonia and Mongolia triumphed in the conflict thus creating a unified global system from a formerly multi-polar one. In the modern conflicts, the failure of the aggressor states (France, Germany) has prevented the establishment of a monolithic and paternalistic world system. However, there have been increasingly more trends toward globalization by peaceful means.

Sub Regions

Each region can be divided into sub-regions. In this regard, the larger regions need to be regarded as theatres of operation. Most regions are dominated by a major actor (military and political). These have already been discussed and will not be recapped here. It should be noted, however, that sub-regions play a role as well, particularly in the cases of France and Germany.

In Region I, the aggressor state is successful in drafting the support of surrounding regions/states. This enables it to engage in the war effort. It also enhances the economic and military strength of the paternalistic state. This drafting can be done through military occupation or through an alliance network.

In Region II, the rival dominates the area but is less successful in drafting the aid of sub-regions/states. There is an ongoing conflict between the rival and its satellites. These satellite regions look to the paternalistic state as an aid in their struggle against the rival.

In Region III, the regional power is clearly the superior military power. It dominates the region but is not particularly successful in drafting the aid of satellite regions/states. These satellites choose to remain neutral and may even look to the paternalistic state for aid and protection.

In Region VIII, the various sub-regions are satellite areas of the behemoth. They offer a buffer against invasion from other major powers. The behemoth occupies these regions in order to protect itself against attack from the paternalistic state and its allies.

Below is a chart noting parallels in the various regions and sub-regions.

Parallel Regions

	Region I			
The Paternalistic State	Macedonia	Mongolia	France	Germany
	Thebes-Achaia	Mongolian Tribes	N. Italy	Austria
	Thessaly	etc	Corsica	Czech repub.
	Arcadia	etc	Switzerland	Hungary
	Euboea (?)	etc	Papal States	Slovakia

	Region II			
The Rival	Phyrgia (Asia Minor)	Kin Empire	Austria	Poland
	Sardis, Greek City States	Hia Tangut Empire	Bavaria	E. Prussia

	Region III			
The Regional Power	Syria	Kara Khitai	Prussia	France
	Arabia	Karluks	Poland	Vich
	Cilicia	Naimans	Saxon	Belgium
	Cilicia	Uighur	Hanover	Netherlands
	Cappodocia (?)	Kirgiz (?)	W. Germany	Switzerland

	Region IV			
All #1	Athens	Korea	Naples	Ital

	Region V			
Sea Power	C prus	Japan	Britain	Britain/US

	Region VI			
The Nuisance #1	Sparta	Sung Empire	Spain	Yugoslavia
Ally #2	Messina	Sung Empire	Spain	Rumania
Ally #2	Elis	Sung Empire	Spain	Bulgaria
Ally#2	Argos	Sung Empire	Spain	Albania
The Nuisance #2	Troezen, Corinth	Kara Jang Empire	Portugal	Greece

	Region VII			
The Peripheral	Crimea	Kamchatka	Sweden	Norway
	Crimea	Kamchatka	Norway	Sweden
	Crimea	Kamchatka	Denmark	Denmark

	Region VIII			
The Behemoth	Persia	Persia	Russia	Russia
	Mesopatamia, Babylon	C. Asia	E. Europe, Poland	E. Europe, Poland

	Region IX			
The Battleground	Egypt	India	Egypt	Libya
	Egypt	India	Palestine	Egypt

Hegemonic War: The Stages

Stage One: The Challenge or the Five Major Campaigns

Stage one can be divided into 5 critical phases or campaigns. Phase one is "Battle with the Rival." In this phase the non-hegemonic states led by the paternalistic state move to challenge their regional rivals. The war always starts out as a regional conflict. Limited in scope, it gradually expands to world wide conflict. ***This a major identifying factor***. The reasons for this beginning is simple. The paternalistic state has learned from past experiences and by example that it can only be victorious by attacking its enemies piecemeal. It must defeat each enemy as quickly as possible to avoid fighting a combined force on multiple fronts.

The first state that is always attacked is the rival. The rival is a land power with limited capacity. Of the pro-hegemonic forces it is one of the weakest. Thus it is targeted. The paternalistic state isolates it by virtue of an alliance network. This inhibits other pro-hegemonic forces from intervening in the campaign. For example, Bonaparte attacks the weakest major power in Europe, Austria, first. He moves quickly before any other power can intervene. A rapid advance in Bavaria isolates the main Austrian force. He then captures Vienna quickly before the Russians can send troops. Once Vienna falls he is free to deal with the Russians and crushes them at Austerlitz. Hitler isolated Poland (rival) by forming an alliance with the Russians to split the country. This prevents a Russian intervention on behalf of the Poles. The rapid advance and capture of Warsaw prevents French and British forces from arriving in force. Alexander, after smashing Persian forces on the river Granicus, marches rapidly on Halicarnassus, cutting off a major Persian force from Phyrgia (rival). After the fall, he rapidly advances to Gordium before reinforcements can be sent. Ghengis Khan enlists Hsa-Hsia and obtains the neutrality of the Sung dynasty prior to his campaign against the Kin Empire (rival). He smashes through the great wall finally capturing Peking.

Phase two, "The Battle with the Regional Power" is next. The regional power is a land power. By the time the defeat of the rival, the conflict is still a regional one, not a world one. However, the paternalistic state's refusal to withdraw from the rival alarms other powers. The sea power and the regional power mobilize to challenge the paternalistic state. The paternalistic state thus sets about driving a wedge, political and military, between these two.

This was the case in Alexander's campaign. Syria (regional power) was regarded as unconquerable. Darius, the Persian King, was himself on hand to defend the region. It was regarded as being too far from mainland Greece to conduct a successful campaign. Likewise, Cyprus (sea power) was still under the control of the Persians, and the Cypriot navy dominated the eastern Med. Alexander attacked anyways, defying his critics. He defeated the Persian force at Issus and advanced rapidly, seizing the city states of Phoenecia. The Phoenecian allies of the Persians tried to hold out, but to no avail, as Alexander swept the ports of the Persian navy, capturing Damascus.

In the case of Ghenghis Khan, after subduing the Kin Empire, he moved to attack Kara Khitai. This state was regarded as the most fierce in central Asia and the empire stretched from Persia to Mongolia. Ghenghis invaded from the Naiman steppes and rapidly advanced through the country. The Kwarizm Shah does nothing to intervene in the conflict and the state is easily defeated.

In the case of France, Napoleon invaded N. Germany and smashed the thought-to-be invincible forces of Prussia (regional power) at Jena and Auerstadt. British allies in Hanover were swept aside. He then moved to seize the ports of the Baltic Sea to prevent British and Swedish aid being sent. In the German case, Germany invaded France (regional power) and the low countries, cutting British forces off from the main French army. In this way they cleared the northern ports of France thereby precluding effective British intervention and soon occupied all of northern France and Paris. The same is true, generally speaking for Mongolia's war against Kara-Kitai (regional power). Kara-Kitai had been able to fend it-

self off from Kwarizm Persian and was regarded as invincible. While little is known of the conflict, the advance was rapidly and conducted in blitzkreig fashion, thus precluding an intervention by Persia.

Phase three, "The Sea Power" begins after the campaign against the regional power. The defeat of the rival and regional power and their occupation serves to undermine the power of the sea power. Still possessing a powerful navy, it is largely immune from attack. At this point the sea power has to make a critical decision, that is, whether to drop out or fight the paternalistic state and its allies. The defeat of the rival and the regional power impresses states friendly with the paternalistic state. As a result they agree to contribute more forces to the conflict. The sea power is intimidated by this show of force. If it is so intimidated that it drops out of the conflict, the war is in probability lost. If it decides to fight on, it has a chance of emerging victorious. If it chooses to fight on, the battle moves to other theatres and/or regions.

This was the case with Alexander. Despite the loss of the ports in Syria, the Persian navy still dominated the eastern Mediterranean Sea. It used its superiority to subjugate Greek coastal cities. The main contingent of the navy was the Cypriots (sea power) under command of the Cypriot kings. Alexander, however, convinced the Cypriot kings to drop out of the conflict. Otherwise, he could expect resistance in Egypt. With the Cypriot/Persian navy out of the conflict, Egypt (battleground) fell without so much as a fight.

In the case of Mongolia, there was a similar development. Japan (the sea power) had seen the growth and expansion of the Mongolian Empire. Frightened that it might be next on the list of states to be attacked, it chose to embark on a friendly relationship with Ghenghis Khan. This freed up forces based in the Kin Empire, and Ghenghis dispatched reinforcements to Central Asia for an invasion of Kwarizm Persia.

The situation was different for Napoleon. France and England remained at war despite the defeat of the rival (Austria) and the

regional power (Prussia). Napoleon sought to convince England to drop out of the conflict and created the continental system and excluded Britain from it. He hoped that economic isolation would bring England around. The English (sea power) refused to drop out and continued to harass the coast lines of Europe. When the Spanish campaign (nuisance) began, England intervened. This made the war a serious thorn in Napoleon's side.

In the case of World War II, a similar situation developed. After the defeat of Poland (rival) and France (regional power), the Battle of Britain (sea power) ensued. It started as an air campaign designed to soften British defenses. Hitler wanted to launch a sea invasion, but when this proved impossible, he instead tried to bomb England into submission. Britain refused to succumb and continued to resist in Egypt (battleground) and intervened in Greece (nuisance). In both cases German forces had to intervene to prop up Italian (ally #1) forces.

In Phase Four, "The Nuisance" the paternalistic state is confronted with threats in the rear. These threats have to be dealt with if a campaign against the behemoth is to be successful. Otherwise, there will always be the threat of attack behind the front lines. This leads to a war with the nuisance(s).

In the case of Alexander, Sparta (nuisance) remained a thorn in the side of the war effort. Its pro-Persian (behemoth) sympathies were well known and it resisted participation in the campaigns in Phyrgian and Syria. Sparta also threatened the delicate alliance network that Alexander had in mainland Greece. The campaign against Sparta was short and it was soon defeated and occupied. This allowed Alexander to proceed with his plans to invade Persia proper.

In the case of Mongolia the situation was even more simple. The Sung Empire (nuisance) was a threat to Ghenghis Khan's rear. They could potentially mobilize and liberate the Kin Empire while Ghenghis' forces were concentrated in Central Asia. Ghenghis convinced the Sung Empire to stay out of the conflict. Their neutrality freed up garrison forces in the Kin (rival) and allowed him to

concentrate his forces against the Kwarizm Persian Empire (behemoth).

In the Napoleonic wars, France's rear was threatened by the formerly friendly Spain (nuisance#1). Napoleon, in an attempt to neutralize the threat, ousted the Spanish monarchy and put his brother Joseph on the throne. French troops occupied Spain, and soon Portugal (nuisance #2) as well. This allowed him to prepare for an invasion of Russia. He raised a Grand Army and massed troops on the Russian border. Unfortunately, the situation in Spain and Portugal worsened and turned into the Peninsular War, in which the British soon intervened.

In World War II, Germany's rear was threatened by the formerly friendly Yugoslavia (nuisance #1) and Greece (nuisance #2). Italy had unsuccessfully invaded Greece and the British had intervened. In Yugoslavia there was coup which ousted pro-Nazi forces. Hitler had to deal with the threat if the invasion of Russia was to be successful. He smashed both states quickly and occupied them. Unfortunately, they would remain thorns throughout the war. Partisans in Greece and Yugoslavia resisted the Germans and Italians, and the states had to have large garrisons.

Phase Five is the "Behemoth." Having established dominance in much of the known (or dominant) world, the conqueror seeks to impose his power over the behemoth. This is despite overtures to end the conflict. The invasion is the most massive one in the conflict as all available resources are thrown against the Behemoth in the hopes of defeating in quickly.

After subduing Egypt, Alexander sets out to invade the rest of the Persian Empire (behemoth). This is despite an offer from Darius to give him everything up to the Euphrates River. Alexander smashes a large Persian army at Arbela and rapidly advances through Babylonia to Persepolis. He confronts an army in front of the capital and defeats it thereby capturing the city. Darius is killed after fleeing the city and Alexander then marches through the rest of Persia.

Ghenghis Khan sets out to invade and defeat the Kwarizm

Empire (behemoth). This is despite recognition of his Empire from the Kwarizm Shah. Ghenghis Khan smashes into Central Asia capturing the major cities of the region, defeating a large Persian force. He captures the Persian capital and the Kwarizm Shah is soon killed by his own troops.

Napoleon assembles a Grand Army for the invasion of Russia. It is the largest yet assembled in the modern era. He smashes Russian forces at the border and advances on Moscow. In front of Moscow, he defeats the main Russian army at Borodino and occupies Moscow.

In the case of World War II, Hitler assembles an international force as well. It is the largest force assembled by Germany. In great battles of encirclement, the Red Army is swept aside. Hitler marches on the provisional capital at Stalingrad, and soon captures it.

Stage Two: The Outcome

Despite the high correlation of events in stage one, the outcome of the various hegemonic wars is different in the ancient and modern models. There seem to be a number of reason for this. For one, if the sea power drops out of the conflict or remains neutral, then the odds of the paternalistic state winning the conflict are better. In the cases of Alexander and Ghenghis Khan, the neutrality of sea powers (Cyprus, Japan) meant that they did not have to fight a two front war, and instead could focus the full weight of their forces against the behemoth (Persia, Kwarizm Persia).

In the two latter cases, both Napoleon and Hitler fell short of their objectives and were turned back. This is likely due to the fact that they had to leave forces behind to defend their respective coastal areas, thus in effect being forced to fight defacto two front wars. The sea powers (Britain, Britain and the US) were able to aid nuisance states (Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece) in fighting the paternalistic state and its allies. Likewise, they could fight as well in the battleground (Egypt). The paternalistic state's forces, used to main-

tain control of the situation, might have been better employed against the behemoth. Thus it is in the interests of the sea power to harass and tie down as many forces of the paternalistic state as possible.

Summary

In all instances, there were five main campaigns of the paternalistic state. These may be described by the dominant states the campaigns were directed against, the campaign against the rival, regional power, sea power, nuisance, and behemoth. Separately none of these powers is able to defeat the paternalistic state. Only by combining their forces can this be achieved. By the same token, no power has the capacity to defeat the sea power.

These five campaigns form the crux of the conflict and serve as a major identifying factor. Other campaigns may take place (peripheral, battleground) but they may be regarded as less important. This does not mean they are insignificant, but just that they are only significant insofar as how they effect the five major campaigns.

One of the major identifying aspects of this kind of hegemonic conflict is the overwhelming success of the paternalistic state in the early phases of the conflict. Indeed, if it were not for the state's desire to dominate the whole world in monolithic fashion, it could probably cut the conflict short and emerge as a major power. This is one of the strangest factors in the conflict, and it can be traced to the megalomaniacal tendencies of the charismatic leader himself. The conflict is in reality not one continuous/simultaneous affair, but rather a collection of wars or campaigns strung together chronologically. This is what differentiates this kind of hegemonic war from other types where campaigns occur simultaneously (eg., World War I). The campaigns always go in the same order. The weakest of the major regions (the rival) is always attacked first. Then the next weakest is attacked (the regional power). Since the sea power can-

not be attacked directly attempts are made to cut a deal with it. Then there is a cleaning up period, wherein the conqueror seeks to solidify his rear and flanks (the nuisance), in order to confront the most powerful land force (the behemoth).

Alliance Networks

Alliance networks allow the conqueror to pursue separate campaigns in a non-sumultaneous fashion. These networks are often delicate in nature. Alliances serve to neutralize interventions by hegemonic forces.

In the case of Alexander, he established the League of Corinth which served to passify the majority of Greek city states. Only Sparta refused to actively participate. It was thus isolated and defeated. In the case of Napoleon, he established networks in Italy which enabled him to place pressure on Austria. The creation of the Confederation of the Rhine inhibited Prussian and Austrian influence in western Germany. He used his international networks to create a Grand Army to invade Russia. Germany's creation of the Axis alliance prevented Italy from becoming involved in the conflict on the side of the Allies as it did in World War I. Hitler pressured other minor states into joining him in a war of revenge against Russia. Only Yugoslavia and Greece remained opposed to German hegemony in the Balkans. Isolated, they were quickly conquered and occupied.

This superior use of alliances is what enables the paternalistic state to isolate and annihilate its opponents. Poor cooperation between hegemonic and pro-hegemonic regions and/or states put them at a disadvantage militarily. Sometimes this lack of cooperation is due to geo-political constraints, such as region II is not adjacent to Region III, but often times it is due to political factors. The states simply do not take the threat from the paternalistic state seriously enough to cooperate in the way that they should.

The inactivity of the behemoth in the early stages jeopardizes the rival and the regional power.

For example, Russia's non-aggression pact with Germany prevented it from lending aid to Poland. It also prevented the creation of a two-front war against the Germans in 1940. Likewise, Russia's refusal to intervene against Napoleon in Prussia, meant the rapid defeat of the Prussian forces. It should have learned its lessons from the Austrian situation, and moved defensive forces into central Germany. Instead it abandoned Prussia. In the case of Alexander, the Persian King Darius did not take the threat seriously and did not even get involved in the conflict until Issus. Even then, Persian forces were well below what they normally were and thus were decisively defeated. The neutrality of the Kwarizm Shahs, meant that central Asia (Kara Khitai) was isolated. The situation was similar to that in the Napoleonic wars. It was aware of the rapid collapse of the Kin, yet failed to form an effective alliance with its neighbor.

Even when hegemonic and pro-hegemonic forces cooperate, their cooperation is poor. It was so in World War II, between French and British forces. The British forces were concentrated in N. France and thus easily cut off from the main French forces in the south. British forces in Hanover, played little or no role in coming to the aid of Prussian forces when attacked by Bonaparte.

It is only when hegemonic and pro-hegemonic forces cooperate that they are able to defeat the combined forces of the paternalistic state and its allies. This was the case in both modern instances, wherein Napoleon and Hitler were only defeated when the Allies got their act together and attacked as integrated units.

CHAPTER FOUR

MODERN VERSIONS OF

HEGEMONIC WAR PATTERN TYPE A

As noted in previous chapters, Iran fits the model of revolution type A quite well. The following question remains: Do all type A revolutions lead to hegemonic wars? Parallelism has identified at least two historical patterns that seem to coincide, a specific type of revolution followed by a specific type of hegemonic war. The question is, are these two distinct patterns inexorably linked, or is it possible that they could occur separately, that is, can one have a revolution with out a war or vice versa?

It is certainly conceivable that not all revolutions of this type lead to war. The obverse could be equally true. As a result, an analysis would have to be undertaken to see if the revolution was linked to the war. One way to do this is through a geo-political analysis of surrounding states to see if indeed the relevant actors are present. If there is no rival, regional power, sea power, or behemoth in range of the paternalistic or revolutionary state then one could conclude that the conditions are not present for a hegemonic conflict. If the various regions do not buttress one another according to the system developed then we could conclude that the conditions are not present. If a revolution type A occurred on an island we would conclude likewise.

On the other hand, if actors and regions can be identified then we can conclude that it is a *possibility* that hegemonic con-

flict might follow the revolutionary period. However, one must understand that at all times what we are examining is patterns of behavior, and behavior can change. This is particularly true if the behavior is known and recognized by the actors themselves, in this case, politicians, bureaucrats, elites, policy makers, voters, etc.

At this point we should note that we are convinced that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is in fact a manifestation of Revolution Type A (see case study). So the next question is: are the conditions present for hegemonic war? Are all the regions present? Do they buttress each other appropriately? Are the actors likely to respond in the manner that theory would project?

The Regions

First and most important, are all the regions present and can they be identified? The following charts show the various parallels. The final column is Iran.

Parallel Region Today

Region I

The Paternalistic State	Macedonia	Mongolia	France	Germany	Iran
	Thebes-Achaia	Mongolian Tribes	N. Italy	Austria	Pakistan
	Thessaly	etc	Corsica	Czech repub.	Afghanistan
	Arcadia	etc	Switzerland	Hungary	Kashmir
	Euboea (?)	etc	Papal States	Slovakia	Turkey

Region II

The Rival	Phyrgia (Asia Minor)	Kin Empire	Austria	Poland	Iraq
	Sardis, Greek City States	Hia Hsia Empire	Bavaria	E. Prussia	Kuwait

Region III

The Regional Power	Syria	Kara Khitai	Prussia	France	Israel
	Arabia	Karluks	Poland	Vichy	W. Bank
	Cilicia	Uighurs	Saxony	Belgium	Syria
	Cilicia	Uighurs	Hanover	Netherlands	Jordan
	Cappodocia (?)	Kirgiz (?)	W. Germany	Switzerland	?

Region IV

Ally #1	Athens	Korea	Naples	Italy	S. Arabia

Region V

Sea Power	Cyprus	Japan	Britain	Britain/US	US

Region VI

The Nuisance #1	Sparta	Sung Empire	Spain	Yugoslavia	India
Ally #2	Messina	Sung Empire	Spain	Rumania	China
Ally #2	Elis	Sung Empire	Spain	Bulgaria	China
Ally#2	Argos	Sung Empire	Spain	Albania	Bangladesh
The Nuisance #2	Troezen, Corinth	Kara Jang Empire	Portugal	Greece	Indo-China

Region VII

The Peripheral	Crimea	Kamchatka	Sweden	Norway	W.Europe
	Crimea	Kamchatka	Norway	Sweden	E. Europe
	Crimea	Kamchatka	Denmark	Denmark	Greece

Region VIII

The Behemoth	Persia	Persia	Russia	Russia	Russia
	Mesopatamia, Babylon	C. Asia	E. Europe, Poland	E. Europe, Poland	Central Asia

Region IX

The Battleground	Egypt	India	Egypt	Libya	Sudan
	Egypt	India	Palestine	Egypt	Kenya

The Revolutionary/Paternalistic State: Iran

Iran since the revolution has become a major regional actor. It is regarded as a regional threat and has pursued expansionist policies. It has close ties to other states in the region, namely Pakistan. This relationship is similar to that of Germany and Austria prior to World War II. This relationship is critical if Iran is to pursue hegemonic war. Pakistan has the potential to help Iran become a formidable international military power. Iran, despite it international isolation, has proved durable. As a state, it survived the Iran/Iraq War despite being outgunned and poorly supplied. Iranians soldiers proved fanatical even if they were ill equipped. Iran like all other paternalistic states is a land power, and as a result of the war has become a militarized society. It is not yet paternalistic in totality but comes increasingly closer everyday. If it can absorb or ally with other Islamic states in the region (Pakistan, Afghanistan) it can become a major actor.

The Rival: Iraq

Iran has a rival for regional hegemony. It is Iraq. The rivalry between Iran and Iraq is as old as the rivalry between Arab and Persian. In the modern era, it began shortly after World War II. Iran and Iraq, like France and Austria, waged a bloody war during the revolutionary period. While Iraq does have a large army and is a threat to its weaker neighbors like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates, it is no match for the Israeli military. As required it is a land power and is adjacent to the paternalistic state. It is an enemy of the state of Iran and is even regarded as a "lesser Satan."

The Regional Power: Israel

Like France prior to WWII, Israel is a land power regarded as invincible by its neighbors. Despite its small size, its military remains the best in the Middle East. As a result it dominates the region militarily, and its close connections to Washington make it an important political actor as well. In this way it dwarfs both Syria and Jordan.

Likewise, it has a history of rivalry with Iran. Since the revolution, Israel has been regarded as one of the lesser Satans. It is seen as an unnatural aberration that must be destroyed. A corrupt authority in control of the holy sites in Palestine. Like Prussian and France (1939) it is regarded as militarily invincible. As a result, neighboring Arab states have given up hope of destroying it. Like other regional powers it has close ties to the sea power (USA).

The Sea Power: The USA

There can be little doubt that the US is the most powerful sea power in the world today, and it is virtually immune from attack because of its friendly relations with its land neighbors (Canada, Mexico) and its separation by sea from its main and/or former rivals (Russia). It, like Britain (1939), has a formidable land force, though it is restricted in its ability to use these forces for logistical constraints. Forces have to be transported long distances by sea or permanently stationed in outlying areas.

The US has strong ties to the regional power (Israel) and weaker ties to the rival (Iraq). It is opposed to the paternalistic state (Iran) as we would expect, and is in fact regarded by that state as a Great Satan.

Ally # 1: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates

While Iran and these states have had mediocre relations throughout the revolutionary period, this has not always been the case. Rather, before the revolution, Iran was the protector of these states. This is similar to relations between Germany and Italy prior to WW I, when Germany and Italy were part of the Triple Entente. Nevertheless, when WW I came, Italy sided against Germany. This did not stop Italy from becoming close to Germany again prior to WW II.

Like Italy, Naples, Attica, Korea, the region is a peninsula and is thus forced to divide its defensive forces between land and sea units. This weakens it militarily by spreading its forces too thin. This was the case for all examples of Ally # 1. It thus needs protection, and Iran is ideally suited for this role. Likewise this region has had problems with both the rival (Iraq) and the regional power (Israel) making it a good ally.

The Nuisances: India and Indo-China

These regions have a history of opposition to the efforts of Iran and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have long been rivals for regional hegemony, and have fought numerous wars with one another. India's position is similar to Sparta's. It resents the rise of the region one (Iran and Pakistan) in Southern Asia and is highly independent. Like Yugoslavia it has strong ties to the behemoth (Russia). The same may be said for states in Indo-China. They are unlikely to want to join the efforts of Islamic states as well.

Ally # 2: China

China and Iran/Pakistan have a long history of cooperation. China has increasingly played a role in economic and military trade

with these states. Like the other allies (Rumania, Bulgarian, Messina, Elis) they resent the power and influence of the nuisance and have problems with them (India, Indo-China). This had led to border disputes, and battles. They also resent the power of the behemoth (Russia) and view it as a rival for hegemony in the region. Thus China is a good candidate for ally # 2. It is also a land power.

The Behemoth: Russia

As in the case of Napoleon and Hitler, Russia is the behemoth. Like the US, Russia is regarded by Iran as a Great Satan. The conditions that facilitate it as being identified as such in those conflicts, also facilitate it here as well. It remains a large state territorially with the potential to field a vast land army. In this way it is similar to both Persias in the ancient models. Formerly a hegemonic state, it has been weakened and is thus vulnerable. This is a product of the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the empire. This is similar to the German case wherein the Bolshevik Revolution weakened Russia prior to WW II.

As Iran and China have become more influential in Central Asia, Russian power has declined. Its military, one of the world's mightiest is a shadow of its former self. Still, when fully mobilized it is probably the most powerful land power in the world. It borders China and Iran and could theoretically be attacked by their combined forces.

Conclusions

So as we can see, the major regions central to a theoretical conflict are present and buttressed up against one another in a way that at least theoretically makes sense.

The question now is, if hegemonic conflict were to follow the revolutionary period, how would it develop? The first thing that

would need to occur prior to any conflict would be the consolidation of power and preparation for war phases in which Iran either absorbs, conquers, or forms alliances with other states in region I, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan (maybe Turkey). In all probability this would be in the form of an alliance network between Islamic states. This integration would increase the economic and military capacity of the paternalistic state and would be critical if it were to triumph over its rivals.

Stage One: The Challenge

Phase one would entail a war of revenge between Iran (paternal) and Iraq (rival). Regional in scope, it would start out small and escalate quickly. Any attempt to intervene by pro-hegemonic powers (US, Israel) would be prevented by an alliance network with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (ally # 1), and the neutrality of states in region III (Syria, Jordan).

Phase two would mean an escalation of the conflict, and the involvement of the state of Israel. Iran would have to convince Syria and Jordan to join the conflict or attack them in order to get at the regional rival (Israel). The defeat of Israel would shock the world and result in the mobilization and participation of ally #1 (Gulf states).

Phase three would be a confrontation with the US which would oppose the occupation of the Middle East by Islamic forces. The US could drop out at this point. If it does it would be disastrous for the war effort. If it continues to fight on it would probably have to pick a battleground (region IX). This could be in Africa as it seems likely, if Israel were defeated, other Arab states would likely join the conflict (Egypt, Libya, Maghreb, Sudan).

Phase four would be a clean up phase in which errant states like India and those of Indo-China are dealt with. Seeing the defeat of the rival and regional power, China (ally #2) would likely join the war effort. It would like to see the demise of its regional

rivals India and Indo-China (nuisances). This would be a prelude to phase five, war with the behemoth.

Phase five would be all out war with the behemoth, Russia. This would require the combined resources of the Iran, China, and its Arab allies. The outcome would be determined in large measure by the role played by the sea power (USA), and the speed of the attack on the part of the challengers. If they could defeat Russia quickly enough, then the war could be lost.

FINAL THOUGHTS

While there is no way of knowing for sure that these events will come to pass, what is apparent is that the conditions for it occurring are present. Only time will tell if Iran is a manifestation of the Revolution/Hegemonic War Pattern Type A. It may be that while the conditions are present, there will be intervening factors that may prevent this from occurring. Once again we are simply dealing with patterns of behavior, not immutable laws. In the end all of this speculation may be moot. However, it should be noted that we are fairly convinced that Iran is in fact a manifestation of the Revolutionary Pattern Type A. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this hypothesis has yielded results and allowed for the prediction of outcomes in the revolution. If theory holds and Iran is indeed a manifestation of the entire pattern, the model will continue to allow for the prediction of outcomes.

Truth be told, I hope that Iran is not a manifestation of the entire pattern but rather simply a type A revolution. Otherwise, the world may be headed for a great disaster. Indeed it is ironic that the inventor of a system should hope that his theory is flawed, but better it should be flawed, wrong, etc. than to actually be true. Irregardless of whether or not a hegemonic war ensues in the future, the conclusions and analysis of these hegemonic wars should not be discounted. The systematization of types of revolution and war can only be to the benefit of historians and political scientists. I stand by the conclusions and model developed here. There is enough evidence to convince me of the existence of a Revolution Type A. The question is: are we experiencing a repeat of the Revolution-Hegemonic Pattern type A or just a sub-pattern?

EPILOGUE: A CASE STUDY

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM:

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

The following represents an example of how parallelism is applied. The description is of the revolution and infant republic. The various headings are an example of how the chronological aspects of parallelism work. Other parallels (i.e., similarities between France and Germany at similar developmental stages) are noted in the text. This is only meant to be a guide to the reader on how to apply parallelism to historical phenomena.

Stage One: The Provisional Republic, 1979-1981

The Revolt

The Islamic Republic came into being following a massive revolt in 1978-9, but the storm had been approaching for some time. In 1963, a little known cleric by the name of Ruhollah Musavi-Khomeini had criticized the shah's reform efforts, and as a result, a collection of clerical, Islamist, and secular groups had subsequently emerged as opponents of the regime. Khomeini's main opposition centered on two key elements of Muhammad Reza Shah's policies. The first was land reform, his so-called White Revolution. The clerical hierarchy controlled large stretches of land, and thus re-

sented the shah's confiscation and redistribution program. The second and equally important reason was the growing secularization and "liberalization" of the country's educational system and legal codes (Preamble, Iranian constitution of 1979).

At this point it is important to note that in Islam, the clergy (*ulema*) function not only as religious leaders, but also as jurisprudents (lawyers and judges). Indeed, the holy book of Islam, the *Quran*, is to a large extent a legal code book which prescribes how every Muslim should live. In addition to the *Quran* there is the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, the *Shariah*, which includes the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and other collected statements. In Iran, this is complicated by Shia sectarianism which follows a practice known as *ijtihaad,* or interpretation. Unlike the Sunni sect of Islam, Shia law resembles not codified, but rather, common law. As a result, clerical judges have considerably greater liberty in terms of their interpretation of the law. In this regard, clerical control of the country's judicial system is all the more important. In a very real sense, the Shia courts of Iran historically possessed policy-making rights. When the shah tried to usurp these rights, it naturally led to opposition (Amuzegar, 1991; Arjomand, 1988; Bakhash, 1986).

The clergy's legal role is important because it explains in large measure why it has played such an active part in political opposition movements. Indeed an important parallel can be drawn between Shiaism's clerical jurists and those of Germany and France. In all three revolutions, jurists assumed a important role in opposing the monarch, and this was mainly on the grounds that he was not accountable to the law. As Weber (1946) suggests, the significance of jurists in "politics since the rise of parties in not accidental. The management of politics through parties simply means management through interest groups. . . . The craft of the trained lawyer is to plead effectively the cause of interested clients" (p. 94).

Contrary to popular opinion, Shia jurists perform similar functions to those of the secural jurist in the Western world. Because of

the interpretative nature of Shiaism, the clergy in Iran were able to argue that a revolt was justified because of the shah's violation of law. Khomeini, in particular, "built up his case against the shah carefully, often appealing to constitutional and legal arguments. The shah's rule was not legitimate, he said, because his father had established the dynasty at the point of the bayonet" (Bakhash, 1986, pp. 45-46). In other words, Muhammad Reza Shah was not a legally established ruler, and Khomeini thus labeled him "the criminal shah."

By early 1978, two main revolutionary blocs had emerged: the first consisted of secular republicans (SR) and liberal Islamist republicans (LIR), and the second of reform-minded fundamentalist Islamist republicans (FIR) (Ehteshami, 1995). The secular and liberal Islamist factions were diverse in character. Some desired the establishment of a democratic republic resembling those in the West, others wanted a constitutional monarchy and a restoration of the constitution of 1906-1907, and still others a Marxian-style dictatorship. The Islamists, on the other hand, desired the establishment of an Islamic republic. Most of its leaders were members of the clergy (e.g., Khomeini, Behesti, Montazeri, Rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani), though there were many Western-educated technocrats and professionals (e.g., Musavi, Nabavi, Raja'i, Velayeti), and *bazarris* (merchants) (Bakhash, 1986). This was very much like France and Germany where jurists had assumed a leading role, only to be supplemented by a collection of bourgeois and professional elements.

In January 1979, surrounded by chants of "death to the shah," Muhammad Reza Pahlevi handed over power to a Regency Council and fled the country. On February 1, 1979, Khomeini entered Tehran amidst massive popular acclaim. He promptly abolished the monarchy, established a Revolutionary Council and appointed a secular prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan (Arjomand, 1988; Bakhash, 1986).

The Paternal Tyrant: Muhammad Reza Pahlevi

The rise of the fundamentalists and the ousting of Muhammad Reza Shah was accompanied by significant psychological change within the country. As in France and Germany, there was initially great acclimation over the ousting of the tyrant. Indeed, the revolutionaries held no secrets about their desire to capture and kill the shah. In this sense the revolutionary cry, "death to the shah," was to be taken literally. Shortly after the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979, the revolutionaries announced that they would not return U.S. hostages until the "criminal shah" was returned and/or executed. As one diplomat put it, "The shah returned—or the shah dead—is the key to the problem" (as cited in Shawcross 1988, p. 333). When the shah died of cancer in Egypt on July 27, 1980, Tehran radio announced, "Muhammad Reza Pahlevi, the bloodsucker of the century, has died at last" (as cited in Shawcross, 1988, p. 405).

Nevertheless, as time progressed, the revolutionaries and the masses began to reveal signs of guilt and regret. Just like Freud's bachelor band, the revolutionaries created a number of *ideological justifications* which sought to replace Iran's self-proclaimed father, the shah, with a supreme paternal deity, Allah. As Section 1 of the constitution states, "The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in the One God . . . Divine Revelation . . . the justice of God in creation and legislation" (Article 2). Other articles and sections possessed a similar *messianic* and/or *millenarian* character. As Section 1 also states, the new system was established in the name of the Twelfth Imam (the messiah of Shia Islam) "with the hope that this century will witness the establishment of a universal holy government and the downfall of all others" (Article 1), or as Article 5 states, "During the occulation of the Vali al-Asr [the Messiah] (may Allah hasten his appearance), the leadership of the *Ummah* devolve upon the just and pious person. . . ."

As psychoanalytic theory would suggest, the revolutionaries tied their destiny to that of God. Out of a sense of guilt, the revo-

lutionaries had replaced their former father, Muhammad Reza Shah, with their exalted father-god, Allah. This naturally gave the movement a millenarian character. This binding of the revolution to God is a reflection of the rebel's *feelings of ambivalence*. As Freud (1913) explains:

> There was one factor in the state of affairs produced by the elimination of the father which was bound in the course of time to cause an enormous increase in the longing for him. Each single one of the brothers who had banded together for the purpose of killing their father was inspired by a wish to become like him. . . . Thus after a long lapse of time their bitterness against their father, which had driven them to their deed, grew less, and their longing for him increased; and it became possible for an ideal to emerge which embodied the unlimited power of the primal father against whom they fought as well as their readiness to submit to him. . . . [T]here developed at the same time, an inclination, based on veneration felt for particular human individuals, to revive the ancient paternal ideal by creating gods. (pp. 148-149)

It is indeed interesting to note that the word Islam, literally translated, means "submission," and more specifically entails "submission to God the Father." As Freud (1913) argues, "religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him. All later religions are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem" (p. 145). It was as if the revolutionaries were justifying their filial rebellion against the evil father, the shah, by making reference to their filial obedience the good father, God. This kind of *splitting,* as we have seen, is typical of the transition process.

Nevertheless, as the revolution progressed the population increasingly came to regret the ousting of the shah. Indeed, many began to long for a return to the "good old days" of the monarchy. As Farhang (1985) explains, "An ironic consequence of the Iranian

revolution is the emergence of a pro-Royalist sentiment in the country. . . . Now that Muhammad Reza Shah is buried, his reign has gained considerable public approval, something the late monarch never enjoyed during his lifetime. Given the destructive character of the fundamentalist rule, the growing economic hardship, and the massive deaths and misery caused by the Iran-Iraq war, it is not surprising that some participants in the 1979 revolution have come to regret their own victory" (p. 18). This sense of regret and remorse is reflected in popular culture by way of jokes and sayings. One joke which reflects the filial sense of guilt centers on a discussion between a war martyr (*shahid*) and Khomeini. The joke begins with a martyr inquiring as to the nature of paradise. Khomeini responds with a laundry list of benefits (the absence of war, plenty of electricity, heat, food and housing, and an abundance of recreation time). In the end Khomeini finishes by saying "well, to summarize, it is like the good old days of the shah" (as cited in Wright, 1989, pp. 177-178).

As Freud (1927) notes, jokes are often used to reveal "the truth" in an allegorical and amusing manner. Humor is a defense mechanism against the harshness of reality. The mind "refuses to be distressed by the provocations of reality or to let itself be compelled to suffer. It insists that it cannot be affected by the traumas of the external world; it shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more than occasions for it to gain pleasure" (p. 162). Popular jokes of this kind not only reveal "the truth" concerning dissatisfaction with the current regime, but also reflect the regret that many feel over the ousting of the shah and a longing for his return. As Freud (1913) says in relation to the brotherhood, "A sense of guilt made its appearance, which in an instance coincided with the remorse felt by the whole group. The dead father became stronger than the living one had been—for events took the course we so often see them in human affairs to this day" (p. 143).

The Covenant

Among the new government's first actions was to extend universal suffrage to the population and to establish a popularly elected constitutional assembly known as the Assembly of Experts. Original drafts of the constitution were to be drawn up by the Revolutionary Council and the prime minister's office and then submitted to the Assembly for review. Both versions suggested that the system was to be a presidential one based in large measure on the Gaullist model in France (Bakhash, 1986). While the draft laid out a general model on which the new system was to be based, dramatic changes occurred shortly after it was handed over to the Assembly.

Almost immediately, Khomeinists began calling for an Islamic constitution based on the principle of *velayet-e faqih* (rule of the jurisconsult). What this entailed was the creation of a political system which revolved around not only Islamic jurists (the clergy), but also one in which there would be one over-arching chief executive chosen from the clergy known as the faqih (jurisconsult). The position of faqih would supplant that of president in the Gaullist model. Khomeini joined the campaign, calling for the establishment of the faqih-principle.

> This right belongs to you. It is those knowledgeable in Islam who may express an opinion on the law of Islam. The constitution of the Islamic
>
> Republic means the constitution of Islam. . . . Pick up you pens and in the mosques, from the altars, in the streets and bazaars, speak of the things that in your view should be included in the constitution." (speech, as cited in Bakhash, 1986, p. 78)

A number of prominent clerics (Behesti, Meshkini, Montazeri) took up this call and soon *formalized* the principle of *velayet-e faqih* in the constitution of 1979. The constitution was then ratified in a popular referendum in March 1979 by 98.2% of eligible voters.

The institutionalization of *velayet-e faqih* did not mean that the constitution was not a fraternal document. On the contrary, when it was finally completed it closely resembled the constitutions of modern democracies. On paper, it abolished the *personalism* of the *ancien regime* through *power sharing.* For the first time in Iranian history, universal suffrage was established. Everyone over the age of 16 was entitled to vote in the parliamentary system, and candidates were to be elected individually within a district system similar to that of the United States. Following Western models, three branches of government, executive, legislative and judicial, were established (Section 1, Article 57). While the faqih would be appointed for life, beneath him there would be a popularly elected president, and a prime minister chosen from the legislature (Section 1, Articles 107-156). The parliament (*Majles*) would also be popularly elected (Section 2, Articles 71-106). Judges in the new system would have wide powers and would be appointed by the faqih. The most important court in the land was to be the Council of Guardians which would operate in accordance with the principle of *vesayet-e faqih,* or oversight of the jurisconsult. A kind of Islamic-style supreme court, it would insure that all laws passed by parliament were in accordance with both Islam and the constitution (Section 2, Articles 157-177). The strict *hierarchy* of the old system was thus replaced by a new one based upon *balance of power*.

Themes of brotherhood (*ikhwan*), independence, freedom, equality (*insaf*), and consensus (*ijma*) dominated revolutionary rhetoric. Khomeini frequently made use of sibling themes to drum up support for the constitution. As he put it, "My dear brothers and sisters, you know that those people who regard the clergy as reactionary are, ultimately, following the path of the shah . . . ," or "My dear military brothers . . . you should try to save this country from the enemies of Islam . . ." (Khomeini, 1980, pp. 22-25).

As Lasswell and Lerner (1965) note, there was an attempt to institutionalize *respect*. Indeed, Section 1 of the constitution speaks of the "the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom

coupled with the responsibility before God" (Article 2). And the Preamble states, "It is incumbent on all to adhere to the principles of this constitution, for it regards as its highest aim the freedom and dignity of the human race. . . ." Other reforms attacked *status*, and allowed for greater *social mobility*. As Article 3 notes, it is the duty of government to insure "the participation of the entire people in determining their political, economic, social and cultural destiny," and all offices (except for that of faqih) were now open to eligible citizens including women. It is both interesting and ironic to note that Islamic Iran had a female vice president before the United States did, and has, on average, a larger percentage (10-15%) of female representatives in their legislature.

This newly created mobility was invariably tied to *myths of equality*. As Section 1 states, "All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria" (Article 20). As Article 19 states, "All people of the country, whatever ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege." Basic protections common to all modern democracies such as freedom of speech, belief, press, expression (Articles 22-24), association (Articles 26-27), not to mention freedom from arbitrary arrest detainment and torture (Articles 32-38) were also present.

But while much of the new system was fraternal, there were retentions of paternalism. Undoubtedly the greatest manifestation lied in the "special" or "discretionary" powers of the faqih (Section 2, Articles 107-112). These give the faqih the right to issue decrees, declare war and peace, to appoint and dismiss all the judges in the land. Article 110 also gives the faqih power to resolve "problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods" and to delegate his authority any other person.. These articles, like Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, in effect allow the faqih to suspend personal liberty regarding freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and private property. In addition, the leader has the

right to engage in arbitrary searches and arrests, and the ability to monitor any and all correspondences within the country. As in the case of Germany, the revolutionaries were already institutionalizing the principle of *primus inter pares,* and creating a political office that could be used resolve disputes among the brotherhood (Iranian constitution of 1979). It would seem, that the revolutionaries already needed a "high command to make decisions for them, to which decisions they . . . bow with demur" (Freud, 1932, p. 94).

As in Weimar, the constitution was a compromise document. As a result, none of the various factions was particularly satisfied. Secular leaders felt that the document was too Islamist and vice versa. The traditional clergy (the grand *mujtahids* and their students) opposed Khomeini's faqih principle on the grounds that it violated those Islamic principles which prohibited clerical participation in the legislative and executive branches of government (Akhavi, 1985, 1987). Property owners, large industrialists, the traditional religious hierarchy and the *bazaaris* resented the fact that Islamic socialists had been successful in including provisions allowing for the confiscation and redistribution of property (Amuzegar, 1991). As a result, after 1980, the revolutionary coalition began to collapse, with secularist and liberal Islamists following the technocratic president Bani Sadr and Marxist groups like the *Mujaheedin-e Kalq* dissenting (Abrahamian, 1989). Increasingly they challenged the fundamentalists.

The Khomeinists responded by forming a political association known as the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). The IRP was an outgrowth of a collection of Islamic brotherhoods known as the Association of United Societies (*Jamiyyat-e Hayat ha-ye Motalefeh*). Khomeini and the IRP responded to the threats from Bani Sadr and the Communists by impeaching the president and banning the *Mujaheedin* for having been both "atheistic" and counter-revolutionary (Bakhash, 1986; Akhavi, 1987). Like the Jacobins and the SPD, the revolutionaries initiated a general crackdown on the radical left.

Between June and August 1981, Bani Sadr, with the backing of the Communists, attempted to seize power, but when this failed, he fled the country.

During the same period the regime was confronted by the traditional clergy on the extreme right who opposed Khomeini and his faqih-principle. One of Khomeini's main opponents was Grand *Mujtahid* Muhammad Shariatmadari. As he stated "It is not for the *ulema* to involve themselves in politics, that is for the government. . . . We must simply advise the government when what they do is contrary to Islam. . . . It is the duty of the government to govern. There should be no direct interference from spiritual leaders" (Sermon as cited in Hiro, 1985, p. 117). In April of 1982, Shariatmadari and his son-in-law were implicated in a coup attempt led by former foreign minister Gotbzadeh. Shortly thereafter, he was defrocked, stripped of his religious title by the elders of the Faiziya seminary.

In the impending struggle, Khomeini, like Ebert and Robespierre, was forced to employ his "special emergency" powers against opponents on the extreme left and right. Nevertheless, violence continued unabated. By the time the Khomeinists had gained the upper hand, 20 members of parliament, the president, the prime minister, the head of the supreme court, five deputy ministers, the majority of the IRP's central committee, and a string of local governors were dead. Already the revolution was devouring its children. As Freud (1913) notes, it seemed as if the brotherhood was already being "disintegrated by a bitter struggle between the victorious sons" (p. 142).

A new round of parliamentary and presidential elections had to be held and Hojat-al Islam Ali Khamene'i was elected president. Later, Khomeini would further bolster the regime by creating an organization known as the Expediency Council. Like the Committee of Public Safety, it was a collegial body consisting of all of the revolution's most important leaders. It was designed to restore a sense of *consensus* and *cooperation* to the brotherhood. It was also unconstitutional, established by virtue of revolutionary

decree. As in France and Germany, the revolutionary regime was born in illegality.

Stage Two: The Khomeini-Era 1981-1989

The ousting of Bani Sadr and the Marxists ushered in a period of revolutionary zeal. The Islamist in the IRP, having gained ascendancy, now took measures to solidify their power. Nevertheless, the new government was confronted with a number of major problems. In late 1980, the country had been invaded by Iraq, and a bloody conflict had ensued. Likewise, internal divisions amongst the revolutionaries had led to a proliferation of national liberation movements in the countryside, most notably in Kurdistan and Baluchistan. In addition, the regime now had to contend with a collection of counter-revolutionary groups some of whom were monarchists who desired a restoration of the throne, some who were Marxists like the *Mujaheedin-e Kalq,* and still others who were secularist (Bani-Sadrists) (Abrahamian, 1989; Akhavi, 1985; Bakhash, 1986).

The Masses

From the outset, the Iranian masses played a critical role in the revolution. As in France and Germany, the monarch's attempts to modernize rapidly had disrupted the social fabric of the country. Once again, the traditional family bore the brunt of change. With the transformation in economic relations had come a transformation in family structure. Nuclear-style middle class families became more prevalent, particularly in the cities, and had begun to supplant the large extended clans (Amuzegar, 1991; McMorris, 1978). Despite an overall population explosion with a growth rate of 2% to 3.5% annually, marital and extra-marital fertility was in the midst of an overall decline (McMorris, 1978, pp. 70-71). At

the turn of the century, family size was relatively constant at 9 or 10 persons, but beginning in the 1940s and 1950s it had begun to decline, and by 1978 had reached an all time low of 5 persons in urban areas (McMorris, 1978, p. 69).

The development of the nuclear unit was encouraged by the shah who saw it as a sign of modernization and development. The shah initiated the first family planning project in 1967, and by 1970 had committed the entire country to a the planning program. In order to convince the population to reduce the overall size of their families, the shah had to attack the "traditional attitude that stressed the importance of large families" (McMorris, 1978, p. 75). By 1972, the government had made contacts with 6.5 million women who had come to more than 2,000 clinics. The shah even went so far as to declare December 5 National Family Planning Day. These reforms soon led to an erosion of paternal power in the home.

It is indeed ironic, but it would seem that as the shah altered family size and structure, he undermined his own authority. In a very real sense, the shah was contributing to a decline in his own legitimacy. By encouraging the creation of the nuclear unit, he was attacking the power of the average Iranian father.

As a result, the importance of the mother and the son was enhanced. As Basu (1992) notes, historically women's independence has been inversely related to family size and marital fertility. As the family grows larger, female independence decreases, and she becomes increasingly associated with motherhood. But as family-size decreases, female independence has tended to increase, and this is largely because she is more able to follow other pursuits.

This phenomenon seems to be affecting current day Iran: As the demographics have changed, there have been reciprocal changes in the independence and status of women and children. This, in turn, is what led to the undermining of the shah's authority (which was based on the tradition of paternal privilege and filial piety). Muhammad Reza Pahlevi had drawn a parallel between his own power and that of the father, and this had facilitated a *paternal*

transference. But as the average father's power came to be challenged so did that of the shah. It is interesting to note that many of the most important revolutionary leaders in Iran come from non-traditional, nuclear or fatherless families (Bani Sadr, Khomeini, Montazeri, Musavi, Nabavi, Raja'i).

Following the ousting of the shah, the Iran/Iraq War accelerated the disintegration of the patriarchal clan. McClelland (1963) in his empirical study of Iranian and Turkish national character concluded that Turks were decidedly more democratic than their Iranian counterparts precisely because they were less patriarchal, and that the emancipation of sons in Turkey was achieved in part through the creation of a large army and/or through the waging of a prolonged conflict (World War I).

> The army helps a son to get out from under an autocratic father in two ways. If either a father or son goes into the army, the son escapes his father's absolute control. In fact, one of the curious side effects of a prolonged war in which many authoritarian fathers are called into the army is that a generation of sons may grow up with less than normal paternal control because fathers are away so much or are killed in battle. (McClelland, 1963, p. 174)

Similar events occurred in Iran during the 1980s. The war with Iraq soon degenerated into bloody World War I-style warfare, becoming the third bloodiest conflict of the twentieth century (after World War I and World War II, respectively). Before the war was concluded, there would be more than 1,000,000 Iranian dead, most of whom were young men. This has meant a proliferation of fatherless families in Islamic Iran. Indeed, the regime has gone so far as to set up a collection of organizations known as *bonyads* for war orphans and widows who cannot support themselves. The most important of these organizations is the *Bonyad-e Mostazafin* (the Foundation for the Dispossessed) (Wright, 1989, p. 133). Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s both sons and women have become steadily more important in revolutionary Iran, and, as recent elec-

tions show, exercise their new-found independence While the regime has encouraged war-widows to remarry and has eliminated the Family Planning Program of the shah, overall fertility and family-size continue to decline.

The revolutionary regime, hoping to avoid the pitfalls of the shah, has resorted to the employment of *fraternal* themes in its rhetoric. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, the regime connected the conflict to its *messianic* mission. Increasingly, the struggle was portrayed as a holy war (*jihad*) against infidels and the forces of evil. As a result, anyone killed in the conflict was a *shahid* (war martyr), who was immediately sent to paradise. Khomeini portrayed Iraq's ruler, Saddam Hussein, as a new paternal tyrant, an agent of the United States and the late shah, sent to destroy Iran. He even went so far as to refer to him as Saddam *Shaitan* (Satan). As he put it, "Islam does not allow peace between us and him [Saddam], between a Muslim and an infidel" (as cited in Bakhash, 1986, p. 233). In its quest to turn the struggle into a holy crusade, the regime even went so far as to establish an organization known as the *Bonyad-e Shahid* (Martyr's Foundation), which "duplicated and usurped the functions of the existing bureaucracy . . . [and] also constituted a formidable machinery for patronage, mass mobilization, ideological education, and a many-faceted repression" (Bakhash, 1986, p. 243).

Since the Iranian regime was established in the name of the *Mahdi* and/or the *Twelfth Imam,* the messiah of Shia Islam, anyone killed on the battlefield was insured a place in heaven. In this regard, Freud's postulation, that a martyr is nothing more than a disciple of a messianic figure who has fallen in battle against a paternal tyrant, is most compelling. The fact that themes of mayrtrdom permeated Iran during the Khomeini decade is evidenced in the cults that developed around assassinated tragic heros like former prime minister Raja'i, and Ayatollahs Behesti and Bahonar. To this day their icons are displayed in nearly every public celebration, and the regime has even gone so far as to establish a university dedicated to revolutionary martyrs known as Tehran's

Martyr Behesti University. Like the murdered leaders of France and Germany, the loss of these men was seen as an act of atonement for the expulsion of the paternal tyrant. "The crime which was thrown on his [the martyr's] shoulders, presumptuous and rebelliousness against a great authority, was precisely the crime for which . . . the company of brothers, were responsible. Thus the tragic Hero became, though it may be against his will, the redeemer" (Freud, 1913, p. 156).

Accompanying the changes in family structure resulting from modernization and the war, was legal reform. This first appeared in the 1979 constitution. IN typical fraternal fashion, the revolutionaries sought to show that they were more benevolent than the paternal tyrant. Not only was universal suffrage established, but a number of provisions concerning the protection of females and children were established. As Section 1 states, "The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects . . ." (Article 21). Women were to receive the same legal rights and protections as men, and children without guardians were to become wards of the state. Article 10, otherwise known as the "family principle," restricted the power of the father and allowed the state to reserve the right to intervene in cases of abuse and neglect. This was established to "safeguard the sanctity and the stability of family relations on the basis of law and ethics of Islam." As the Preamble states, "This view of the family unit delivers women from being regarded as an object or instrument in the service of promoting consumerism and exploitation." In addition divorce laws were liberalized, and women could now file for an annulment or separation from their husbands. While the father would still be the principal guardian of the children, joint custody settlements begun under the shah remained prevalent. Soon, Islamic divorce courts were established, and the divorce rate reached an all time high. From the position of Islamic jurisprudence, the new divorce laws were justified according to the Shia tradition of temporary marriage, a practice which allows persons to be married for a period anywhere between 1 day to 99 years. While this had traditionally

been used to legalize prostitution, the practice is now being used by Iranian feminists to enhance female independence (Wright, 1989).

Nevertheless, women are still not the equals of men in Iran. Indeed, the Preamble ties women's destiny to the home and motherhood. To this day, women are subject to a variety of restrictions in terms of dress (*hejab, chador*) and profession. As in France, gender egalitarianism was not the goal of the revolution; rather, the bachelor band was simply showing itself to be more benevolent than the former tyrant.

It is clear that the population possessed *mixed* values, something which is evidenced in Iranian voting behavior. In modern Iran, there is a significant portion of the public that seems to be fraternally-oriented, but unlike in the Western world, this has manifested itself largely within an Islamic context. This contention may seem odd to the Western reader who is accustomed to linking democracy and secularism, but it should be noted that this link is alien to the Middle East. As Pye (1985) notes, in the Islamic world, fraternalism has most often made its appearance within religious and not secular contexts. This is because of the fundamental egalitarian aspects of Islam (all men are equal before God) and those tenets which portray it as a "community of brothers" (*ummah, ikhwan*).

But as in France and Germany, there are equally large portions of the population that are either paternalistic or mixed in their orientation. The fraternal elements of Islam are offset by paternalistic ones which demand obedience and submission (which is what Islam means) to the arch father, Allah. As Pye (1985) writes:

> Thus at the heart of the Islamic concept of power lies a contradiction between authoritarian rule and populist democracy. . . . [T]he pattern of socialization produces a type of narcissism . . . but the ambivalence toward authority is based on conflicting sentiments toward a demanding "brotherhood" rather than a stern father. (p. 156)

As Weber (1946) notes, it was religious brotherhoods which spearheaded rationalistic democratic reforms in both the Western and Eastern worlds. "The Occidental sects of the religious virtuosos have fermented the methodical rationalizations of conduct. . . . The search for God of the early Christian monk as well as the Quaker contained a very strong contemplative element. . . . They found their counter-image in the brotherhoods of Islam, which were even more widely developed" (pp. 291-292). This development finds its parallel in the Fraternal Order of the Jacobins. It is interesting to note that the Jacobin Club in Paris derived its title from the church in which its meetings took place, and this may in part explain the religious character of that movement. In many respects, Khomeini's IRP resembled the Jacobin Club in that it was based on the fundamental tenets of freedom, brotherhood, equity and justice, and was an umbrella group that promised to establish a virtuous form of government.

In addition to the fraternally-minded segments of the population, there is clearly a segment that prefers *paternalistic* social structures. This would include a broad range of groups: monarchists desiring a restoration of the crown, Marxists desiring a dictatorship of the proletariat, and radical Islamists desiring an end to parliamentary procedure and a dictatorship of the faqih. In the context of voting behavior, they support the factions on the wings, whether they are supporters of Islamic socialists seeking to use the "discretionary" powers of the faqih to impose land reform or social equity or Islamic conservatives advocating corporativist economic policies (Akhavi, 1987; Bakhash, 1986).

Just as in France and Germany, there appears to be a significant number of voters who are of a *mixed* orientation. During the first 10 years of the republic, those of a fraternal and mixed orientation have supported the regime. The evidence appears in the elections to the first Assembly of Experts (constitutional Assembly). In these elections, revolutionaries espousing such principles as brotherhood, justice and equity triumphed. Of the 69 contested seats, 55 (79%) went to clerics associated with the IRP

(Hiro, 1985). Amazingly, the percentage of jurists contained in this constitutional assembly is higher even than that of either French or German counterparts. In a very real sense, this is a reflection of the public's desire for the rule of law. In contradistinction, secular elements gained little more that 10 seats (15%), and groups espousing the imposition of a Soviet-style dictatorship (the *Tudeh* and *Mujaheedin-e Kalq*) failed to capture even one (Bakhash, 1986, pp. 80-81). The outcomes of the first Majles elections were similar, with the IRP and its affiliates capturing more than 70% of the seats, thus insuring the survival of the Islamic Republic and the constitution (Schahgaldian, 1989).

Nonetheless, there are signs that those of a mixed orientation are beginning to waver in their loyalty to the constitution. Between 1979 and 1989, the undecideds backed the Khomeinists, but after the Imam's death, have become increasingly critical of the system. This was first evidenced in the 1992 Majles elections in which the conservative authoritarian right triumphed. Center groups abandoned the Khomeinist-left (the so-called *Maktabis*) and the center formed a parliamentary coalition with the Islamist right (the so-called *Hujjatis*). This wavering has also been evidenced in the 1996 Majles elections in which the radical left once again surged, and in the recent presidential elections in which the electorate rejected the faqih's hand-picked candidate Nateq Nuri, instead electing the reform-minded Muhammad Khatami by an overwhelming 69%. This event has been widely interpreted as a manifestation of the public's growing confusion and/or dissatisfaction with the current regime and existing constitutional order (Ehteshami, 1995; Sarabi, 1994; Wells, 1999).

Primus Inter Pares: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

The paradoxical nature of the political and social system in Iran is best reflected in its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Throughout the 1980s, Khomeini assumed the role of *primus in-*

ter pares, and, as a result, this period has become known as the Khomeini decade. Khomeini, like Robespierre and Ebert before him, was a classic *charismatic* leader. As Muslims put it, he possessed *barakah,* "the gift of God's blessing." As one of his followers, Moghaddam Maraghe'i, notes, "In 1,400 years, Khomeini is an exception;" or as Makarem-Shirazi put it, "Several centuries may pass before a man with his superior qualities and characteristics and [similar] conditions of time and place, arise again" (as cited in Bakhash, 1986, p. 84). As Arjomand (1988) explains, the revolutionaries accepted the "portrayal of the shah as the Anti-Christ and concomitantly took refuge in the comforting discovery of Khomeini as the messianic counter-image" (p. 111).

Like Robespierre and Ebert, Khomeini was clearly an object of both *transference* and *splitting*. Indeed, Khomeini remains one of the great enigmatic figures of the twentieth century. Admired as a saint by his followers and regarded as a fanatic by his enemies, the mere mention of his name elicits powerful emotions. The proof that Khomeini was/is a recipient of a positive transference appears in the collection of *idealized* titles assigned to him by his adherents. At various time he has been called the "Lofty Spirit," the "Idol Smasher," the "Unveiler of Secrets," the "Mahdi" (messiah) and even the "Father of the Islamic Revolution." Indeed, upon his death, massive crowds could be heard to chant, "We have been orphaned. Our Father is dead" (Wright, 1989, p. 204).

As Lacan (1981) notes, those who feel excluded from the dominant order often overcompensate by inventing a greater sense of purpose for their lives. Those who feel excluded often assume a father-role and this in turn justifies their existence. "Fatherhood can also fill this function for a man, insofar as he happens to feel disenfranchised, excluded by the Law" (Bracher, 1993, p. 109). This would seem to aptly apply to Khomeini who, excluded from the secular society of the shah, assumed the role of "Father of the Islamic Revolution." In fact, he often referred to the people as "his children" (Khomeini, 1980). Within the Shia religious hierarchy, Khomeini possessed great standing, being regarded as a *marja-e*

taqlid (source of emulation and imitation). A *marja* is one of the most outstanding jurists of his time who is supremely qualified to lead the community because of his arduous training in Islamic jurisprudence. Iran's particular brand of Islam, Twelver Shiaism, typically only has seven to ten *marjas* at any one time, and very few have possessed the political clout of Khomeini.

This adoration for Khomeini is offset by a strong negative transference. To this day, Khomeini is often referred to by a collection of derogatory titles: terrorist, fanatic, tyrant, or even murderer (Bakhash, 1986; Wright, 1989; Ehteshami, 1995). As the Egyptian interior minister Zaki Badr put it, "Khomeini is a dog, no that is too good for him. He is a pig" (cited in Pipes, 1990, p. 147). In the Islamic world there is no greater insult than to call someone a "pig."

But of all the titles associated with Khomeini, the most important one has been that of *Imam.* In Twelver Shiaism, the title of Imam is normally reserved for the Mahdi or Twelfth Imam, Islam's rough equivalent of a messiah. The Imam is the one who is sent to the world in its final days to wage a war against evil, to establish an Islamic World Empire, and, finally, to judge all men. Presently, the Twelfth Imam is said to be in a state of occulation (absent or hidden), but will one day return. In this regard, the assignment of the title to Khomeini implies that many saw him as the messiah sent to usher in a "Golden Age." It is interesting to note that the Islamic revolution occurred at the conjuncture of the turn of two centuries (the lunar Muslim and solar Christian), and this was seen as an omen of the approaching doom/salvation of mankind. The republic itself was established for the purpose of ushering in the Twelfth Imam. As Article 1 states in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the only legitimate leadership is that of a "just and holy jurist." Like Robespierre, Khomeini saw himself as this holy law-giver who would rescue society.

Khomeini's assumption of this title has naturally led to objections from the more traditional and conservative members of the religious hierarchy who regarded it as both blasphemous and po-

tentially schismatic (Abrahamian, 1993; Akhavi, 1985, 1987; Hiro, 1985). Many clergymen accused him of trying to transform Shiaism from a polyphyletic religion into a monolithic one. These include his fellow *marjas* and most high ranking ayatollahs. But to his followers, Khomeini was perceived as a messianic hero-son who alone could establish an international empire based on the moral principles of Islam. Nevertheless, Khomeini resisted the calls from his followers to declare himself the messiah, instead arguing that in establishing the Islamic Republic and the office of faqih, he was paving the road for an end to "the occulation of the Wali al-Asr [the Hidden Imam]" (Section 2, Article 1, Iranian constitution of 1979).

Khomeini's power, like Robespierre's and Ebert's before him, emanated largely from his position as revolutionary leader. As Weber (1946) explains, charismatic religious leaders have often employed messianic themes in order to enact political, economic and social reform. "The annunciation and the promise of religion have naturally been addressed to the masses of those who were in need of salvation. . . . The resurrected god [the messiah] guaranteed the return of good fortune in this world or the security of happiness in the world beyond. Among people under political pressure . . . the title `savior' (Moshuach name) was originally attached to the saviors from political distress, as transmitted in hero sagas (Gideon, Jephthah). The `Messianic' promises were determined by these sagas" (pp. 272-273).

Khomeini, like Robespierre and Ebert, had a self-proclaimed mission to which he demanded adherence. He vowed to establish an "ideal and model society on the basis of Islamic norms," and to operationalize the principle of *velayet-e faqih* (rule of the Islamic jurist). Society, he argued, should be led by a "just and holy person" trained in Islamic jurisprudence (Preamble, Iranian constitution of 1979). In a very real sense, he regarded himself as the defining voice of the Islamic Republic, and destroyed all those who opposed his notion of Islamic government (Abrahamian, 1993). Indeed, every group that has been destroyed in Iran has

been accused of opposing *velayet-e faqih.* In this sense, he has much in common with Robespierre who, acting as High Priest of the Cult of the Supreme Being, saw himself as the defining voice of republicanism in France.

Khomeini's preeminence has led a number of scholars (Arjomand, 1988; Amuzegar 1991; Bill & Springborg, 1994) to conclude that Khomeini was a virtual dictator, but not everyone agrees with this characterization; indeed, many scholars (Abrahamian, 1993, Bakhash, 1986; Akhavi, 1987; Ehteshami, 1995; Schahgaldian, 1989) argue that he promoted limited forms of populist and/or democratic reform. This confusion invariably arises from Western definitions which link democracy and secularism. In the Middle East such connections are weak at best. Much of the confusion concerning Khomeini's actions arises from the fact that he possessed *mixed* values. It would seem that his own confused value structure, which correlates so highly with that of popular Iranian society, has confounded scholarly observers.

There can be little doubt that Khomeini possessed strong *paternal* tendencies, perhaps more so than any other leader examined in previous chapters. In typical patrimonial fashion, Khomeini used his charismatic power to rise above petty factional disputes within the fundamentalist camp, and much of his power existed outside of *legal and constitutional constraints.* Like Robespierre, he dominated the political system through his personal *clan* network. Khomeini's *household* (*ahl-e bayt*)*,* which was run out of his home in the northern Tehran suburb of Jamaran, was an important power center. The household was run by the likes of son Ahmad, grandson Hosain, his brother Morteza Pasandideh, and son-in-law Shahab Din Eshraqi, all of whom controlled *access* to him. Interestingly, many of the regime's most important figures were directly related to the Imam (deputy speaker Kangarlou), tied by marriage alliance (former president Rafsanjani, formerly designated successor Montazeri), and/or were part of his extended *clan* network (current faqih Ali Khamene'i, prime minister Musavi, former prosecutor general Musavi-Khoeniha, former speaker of parliament Karrubi,

chief justice Musavi-Ardabili, grand *mujtahids* Musavi-Kho'i and Musavi-Golpaygani) (Hiro, 1985, pp. 125-130). In a very real sense, Khomeini was the arch-patriarch of a huge extended revolutionary family.

Likewise, Khomeini employed *balanced conflict* and sought to perpetuate his position through infighting. "In general Ayatollah Khomeini himself did not engage in factional politics until the latter part of the 1980s, when a crisis of institutional competition demanded it of him. . . . [This] often meant that he would exercise his power by passing judgement on major issues of the day. . . . By intervening to bolster the position of an individual, an institution or a line of thought against others, he in fact tended to fuel the factionalism and competitive nature of elite politics in the Islamic Republic" (Ehteshami, 1995, p. 4). As one U.S. official put it,

"His style of leadership has always been to lead from the rear. Khomeini is inclined to look and see which way the winds are blowing, and then endorse the strongest current, or what appears to be the strongest current" (as cited in Wright, 1989, p. 80).

It is clear that Khomeini dominated the overall political system, and exercised power beyond the limits of the constitution. One of the most obvious violations of the constitution was the establishment of a collegial body with special decree-making powers known as the Expediency Council, which was designed to resolve differences between the legislature and the judiciary. As Montazeri rightly observed in 1989, "it is an institute contrary to the constitution which was set up owing to the existing necessities of war" (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 35).

Even taking into account such necessities, Khomeini's paternalism has manifested itself in a noticeable lack of respect for political diversity. He underestimated the importance of *cooperation and consensuality*, had very little respect for *minority rights,* and had difficulty *accepting defeat*. Indeed, it "is the absence of political pluralism in its wider sense that worries observers of the Iranian political scene. The regime's violations of basic human rights have

been a subject and object of criticism by many international and Western-based agencies. . . . Factionalism and open political struggle in the Iranian case should not be mistaken for untrammeled political freedom; while voting is the major feature of the Iranian system, mass political participation in the country's affairs has remained restricted" (Ehteshami, 1995, pp. 72-73).

Khomeini's inability to accept defeat can perhaps best be seen in his policy of "war until victory." Despite Iran's international isolation and a U.S.-imposed arms embargo, Khomeini refused to sign a cease fire agreement with Iraq. As his former successor Montazeri noted, Khomeini's refusal to accept a cease-fire when Iran was winning the war not only deprived the government of bargaining power and extended the war unnecessarily, but also resulted in massive casualties and destruction. When Iran finally accepted U.N. Resolution 598 ending the war in July 1988, Khomeini compared the experience to "drinking hemlock" and said the he would have preferred "death and martyrdom" to defeat (Wright, 1989, p. 255).

Khomeini's paternalism is also reflected in his respect for and personal desire for *status.* Like many other prominent revolutionary leaders (Ardabili, Khoeniha, Musavi, Khamene'i, Khatami), he retained his Islamic title as a sayyed. This title signifies that he is descended from the Prophet Muhammad via the Shia holy leader, Imam Musa Sadr. Sayyeds are "those who are princely born." While they make up only 5% of the population of Iran, nearly a third of government officials are regularly sayyeds. At one point sayyeds made up 53 seats in parliament, held 12 cabinet posts, 23 provincial governorships, and controlled 70 of the top 120 industries in the country (Hiro, 1985). Most of the sayyeds are/were from Khomeini's clan, the Musavis. Sayyeds can be easily identified by their names (Hassani, Husseini, Musavi, Reza, Tabataba'i, etc.), and, within the religious hierarchy, by their black turbans. Like the French *anoblis* and *burghers* of Germany, it would seem that the revolutionaries in Iran were somewhat feudalized. Indeed, one of Khomeini's main criticism of the shah was that he sought to

eliminate all titles (Islamic or otherwise) in the country. In this regard, he was much like Robespierre who resented the fact that his noble status had not been duly recognized by the crown. As a result, he soon took up the "special mission" of battling the shah. As Weber (1946) writes, "The sense of dignity of socially repressed strata . . . is nourished most easily on the belief that a special "mission" is entrusted to them; worth is guaranteed or constituted by an *ethical imperative*, or by their own functional *achievement.* Their value is thus moved into something beyond themselves, into a "task" placed before them by God." (pp. 276-277)

In addition, Khomeini's revolutionary fanaticism resulted in a profoundly *paranoid leadership style*. As Abrahamian (1993) explains,

> During the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini found "plots," here, there, and everywhere. "The world," he proclaimed, "is against us." He even used the terms Left and Right to describe how the newly established republic was supposedly besieged by royalists as well as Marxists. "Satanic plots," lurked behind liberal Muslims favoring a lay, rather than clerical, constitution; behind conservative Muslims opposed to his interpretation of *velayet-e faqih*; behind apolitical Muslims who preferred the seminaries to the hustle-and-bustle of politics; behind radical Muslims advocating root-and-branch social changes; behind lawyers critical of the harsh retribution of the laws; behind Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkomans seeking regional autonomy; behind leftists organizing strikes and trade unions; and, of course, behind military officers sympathetic to the Pahlavis, the National Front, and even president Bani Sadr. (p. 122)

Khomeini's paranoia is perhaps best reflected in his Xenophobic fear of outsiders and desire to export revolution. As he stated, "We should try to export our revolution to the world . . . because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently . . ." (Khomeini, 1980, p. 22). In a classic example of *splitting*, he divided the world

into good and evil, regarding superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union as "Great *Shaitans* (Satans)" and regional states like Israel and Iraq as "Lesser Satans." As he noted in 1980:

> We are fighting against international communism to the same degree that we are fighting against the Western world-devourers led by America, Israel and Zionism. My dear friends, you should know that the danger from the communist powers is not less than America and the danger of America is such that if we show the slightest negligence we shall be destroyed. (p. 22)

From a purely psychoanalytic perspective, it seems plausible to argue that he was projecting his personal desires for expansionism and empire onto his enemies. Interestingly, he admits to having seen plots and *conspiracies* everywhere. As he said, "I see plots of the anti-revolutionary *shaitans* aimed at providing opportunities for the East or the West are increasing" (Khomeini, 1980, p. 23). The question that naturally arises with this kind of a statement is, were the plots or was it just his own paranoia?

Khomeini's *delusions of persecution* are evident in his fear of the various factions, and this resulted in his brutal crushing of political opponents. He justified preemptive attacks on his enemies on the grounds that they were plotting against him. It was on this basis that he smashed the communist *Mujaheedin* and *Tudeh* parties (Abrahamian, 1989, 1993).

Any group which he even suspected of opposing *velayet-e faqih* was subject to persecution. In his attempt to crush counterrevolution, Khomeini clearly stepped beyond the boundaries of constitutionality. In this regard, his employment of "special" powers to deal with the enemies of the regime was much like Ebert's employment of Article 48. Khomeini even used his "discretionary" authority to defrock one of Shiaism's most respected religious leaders, Grand *Mujtahid* Shariatmadari. Accused of plotting to murder the Imam, he was placed under house arrest in 1982. While no charges were ever proven, it was well known that Shariatmadari

had opposed the faqih principle as contained in the constitution and had called for an end to revolutionary excess (Wright, 1989, p. 106). Throughout the 1980s, Khomeini led a crackdown post-humously known as the "Wrath of God." Like Robespierre's "Reign of Terror," it resulted in the massive execution or death (nearly 30,000) of political prisoners and opponents (Ehteshami, 1995, p. 22). In addition to the crackdown, he allowed his followers, the Maktabis, to tamper with the 1984 and 1988 parliamentary elections so as to insure a victory, and was personally involved in the prosecution of Mehdi Hashemi and his followers. In 1989 he took the bold step of issuing a *fatwa*, a legal decree calling for the execution of British author Salman Rushdie for his blasphemous book, *Satanic Verses* (Pipes, 1990).

But of all of Khomeini's paranoid actions, his abandonment of his designated successor Montazeri is perhaps the most baffling. In many respects, the conflict between Khomeini and Montazeri resembles the battles between Robespierre and Danton, Ebert and Marx. In 1985, Montazeri had been elected as Khomeini's successor by the Assembly of Experts (the body designated to elect the faqih). He had developed a strong personal friendship with the Imam dating back almost 40 years, had been active in the revolutionary movement against the shah, and imprisoned for numerous years. Indeed, his selection as Designated Successor had been virtually forced upon the Assembly by Khomeini himself. In addition, Khomeini had led a drive to declare Montazeri a grand ayatollah (*ayatollah-e ozma*) (Bakhash, 1986). Yet, when Montazeri became involved in minor scandals (e.g., his activities in the U.S./Iran arms deal, contacts with terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and friendship with the discredited General Sayyed Shirazi), called for political reform, questioned the clergy's role in government and the merits of *velayet-e faqih,* Khomeini began to distance himself from Montazeri. When Montazeri refused to support Khomeini's death sentence (*fatwa*) against British-based author Salman Rushdie, the Imam took it as a sign of his successor's disloyalty and soon forced him to resign (Pipes, 1990, p. 144).

Shortly after Khomeini's death, Montazeri was placed under house arrest, and recently has been thrown into prison (December 1997). These developments have had a profound effect on the legitimacy of the regime, since it was Montazeri who had co-authored the Islamic constitution and strove to institutionalize the *faqih* principle on Khomeini's behalf (Ehteshami, 1995; Wells, 1999).

Nevertheless, for all of his paternal tendencies, Khomeini also espoused *fraternal* values. Most of Khomeini's fraternal beliefs were derived from two sources, his religious schooling/training in Islamic jurisprudence and the ethical foundations of Islam itself, which portrays all believers as equal siblings under the arch-father, Allah. As Pye (1985) notes:

> Briefly stated, Muslim socialization begins in an environment dominated by the mother, in which there is almost no contact with the father. . . . Suddenly at the age of five or so, the child is taken from the mother to spend his entire day in the "brotherhood" of an Islamic religious school. He must then learn to make his way in a situation that mixes stern discipline, protestations of friendship, and the intimidations of older children. The longing to capture the security of his early years becomes the basis of a form of secondary narcissism—the self is good and deserves to be honored rather than separated from the force that it had once been able to command. At the same time the child develops profound ambivalences about the concept of brotherhood— the ideal seems an acceptable alternative to the ties with the mother, but in practice one is not always treated as a true brother. Thus the Islamic ideal of authority becomes that of the brother. . . . (pp. 156-157)

Weber (1946) agrees and notes that the basis of unity within Islam is based almost entirely on "symbolic sibling relations." This has resulted in the development of collegial Islamic brotherhoods, particularly within the middle class. "The brotherhoods of the petty bourgeoisie [in the Islamic world] grew . . . in a manner

similar to the Christian Tertiarians, except they were far more universally developed" (p. 269). Like Robespierre, Khomeini professed to have a lasting and enduring respect for the law. Even in those instances in which he clearly stepped beyond his constitutionally guaranteed powers, he justified his actions by citing legal precedents.

More to the point, the Shia clerical hierarchy has traditionally been based on the ideas of fraternalism and consensuality. Unlike most Christian theologians, the clergy in Iran do not attain rank through appointment or selection, but rather rise in accordance with the number of followers they are able to attract. In other words, the more popular one is, the higher the rank one is able to achieve. In addition, there is no one over-arching figure, but instead a collection of relative equals at each rank, each with his own followers and lines of thought. At the summit sit the grand *mujtahids* (usually around 7 to 10), each of whom is equal in terms of overall status. As a result, Shia clerical politics have been characterized by a considerable degree of pluralism and collegiality. Khomeini was only able to achieve his status as a grand *mujtahid* because of the substantial amount of consensus that surrounded his ideas. In this sense, he was a popularly elected leader.

On a more political note, while the constitution gave Khomeini far-reaching powers he resisted the temptation to assume absolute power. In many respects, Khomeini seemed to be confused as to the role he should play in society. Some of his followers referred to him as a *maulana* (patron or master), a title usually applied to a scholar of Islamic theology of Khomeini's stature, and he often referred to himself as the "Father of the Islamic Revolution" and to the people as his "revolutionary children," but in the next breath could refer to the masses as his siblings ("my military brothers" or "my revolutionary brothers and sisters") (Khomeini, 1980, p. 22). His use of such contradictory terms reflects his underlying psychological dilemma. It would seem that he was uncertain as to whether he should assume the role of father or son.

While he occasionally employed paternal language, he often

appealed to fraternal themes like the brotherhood (*ikhwan, jamaat).* Likewise, he noted the Prophet Muhammad's egalitarianism (*musawaat-e Muhammadi*) and called for the establishment of political and social equity *(insaf)*. In spite of prodding from the Islamic left to employ "special power" in a dictatorial fashion, he refused. This irked the leftists who saw the powers of the faqih as a means of imposing social and economic equality. As one deputy put it, "This is an area for the exercise of the authority of the faqih. The faqih is the guardian [of the community] exercising his authority in situations where over-riding necessity requires extraordinary decisions to be taken" (as cited in Bakhash, 1986, pp. 206-207). Khomeini responded by stating that these were matters for parliament to "enact and implement" and not matters for the faqih (Bakhash, 1986, p. 207).

In like manner, he allowed for the popular elections to many important positions in government, albeit within an Islamic context, and, as a result, the overall system has been characterized by institutions and practices normally associated with liberal democracy. Indeed, the system championed by Khomeini has been as open and fair as either France 1789-1799 or Germany 1918-1933, both of which are generally regarded as fledgling democracies. As Ehteshami (1995) writes, "The Iranian system passes the first two tests of democracy [division of powers, responsibility to an elected parliament] . . . with ease and its leaders can claim to be governing the people by rule of law. . . . but the sticking point would be the issue of political pluralism" (p. 72).

Interestingly, Khomeini was defensive about accusations concerning the totalitarian aspects of Islam. When he was accused by the Western pressof exercising his authority in a tyrannical fashion, he responded by arguing that Islam precluded the possibility of dictatorship and was "populist" in nature. This reaction is not surprising in light of the fraternal themes inherent in Islam. As Pye (1985) explains:

> The Islamic concept of *shura,* or "consultation," holds that
> there should be community discussions about interpreting

> the Koranic law. Out of these and other theological con-
> cepts about the individual and the community have devel-
> oped the doctrine that the Islamic state should be a populist
> community, a "perfect democracy." (p. 156)

Khomeini contended that Islam's notion of the community (*ummah*) was far superior to any "amorphous" Western definition of democracy. As he stated, "to juxtapose 'democratic' and 'Islamic' is an insult to Islam, because when you place the word 'democratic' in front of 'Islamic' it means that Islam is lacking in the alleged virtues of democracy, although Islam is, in fact, superior to all forms of democracy" (Khomeini, 1991, pp. 337-338). In other words, Islam was the highest form of populist rule and was superior to Western democracy. Khomeini's drive to establish an Islamic state was fueled "by the ideal that a true Islamic brotherhood . . . could produce the dual, but contradictory, phenomenon of a strong (authoritarian) state and a populist democracy" (Pye, 1985, p. 156).

Like Robespierre and Ebert, Khomeini often defended his abuse of power by arguing that he was acting in the interests of national unity.

> There should always be jurisconsults in Islamic govern-
> ments. . . . If a person . . . cannot determine what is good for
> society, or cannot distinguish between suitable and unsuit-
> able persons, or in general lacks the wisdom in social and
> political issues, that person is not a jurisconsult. . . . I reiter-
> ate that since our country is in the reconstruction stage, it
> needs unity and camaraderie. (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995,
> pp. 20-21).

Like Robespierre and Ebert, he was obsessed with fraternal themes like *martyrdom* (*shahid*), and linked these to the revolutionary struggle. "Finally, after praying for forgiveness for the martyrs of the Islamic Revolution . . . it is necessary on this new year to express my congratulations to their relatives . . . [for] being able to train such lions and lionesses" (Khomeini, 1980, p. 25). He called

for consensus among the revolutionaries which should be done for the sake of the oppressed people and the martyrs. "Committed and responsible intellectuals, you should set aside dissension and schism and should think of the people . . . for the sake of salvation of the people, who have given martyrs" (p. 25). Khomeini's obsession with death and martyrdom was a manifestation of his own self-righteous egotism. Indeed, Talmon's (1960) description of the Incorruptible aptly applies to the Imam; he was the kind of person who divided reality into "watertight compartments and adopts contradictory attitudes to the same thing, making judgements wholly dependent on whether it is `me,' by definition representing truth and right . . ." (Talmon, 1960, p. 83). Martyrdom was perfectly acceptable, provided he was not the one being killed.

Khomeini's mixed character is also reflected in other ways. In an important sense, he provided the revolution with *religious rationalizations*, for example in using Islam as a force for unifying the country. He resolved moral dilemmas through simplicity: he *split* the world in half, one part good, the other evil. He claimed to have battled against an evil father, the shah, in the name of a good one, God. As he put it, "The noble nation should know that the entire victory [over the shah] was achieved through the will of almighty God. . . . If we forget the secret of victory and we turn away from great Islam and its holy teachings and if we follow the path of disunity and dissension, there is the danger that the bounty of God almighty may cease and the path may be laid open for the oppressors . . ." (p. 22). As Freud (1913) might argue, this situation is nearly identical to that of the totemic clan, which, after murdering the father, created a new one (the totem animal) in his place. "As in the case of totemism, psycho-analysis recommends us to have faith in the believers who call God their father, just as the totem was called the tribal ancestor. . . . [In both instances] the father is represented twice over . . . once as God and once as . . . victim" (Freud, 1913 p. 147).

The Brotherhood

Khomeini's attempts to control the revolution and smash the opponents of *velayet-e faqih* failed to bring stability to the state. Despite his expulsion of secular elements, Marxists, and "moderates," the political system remains unstable and disunified, and any attempts at *elite settlement* have failed.

Just as in France and Germany, the elite structure in Iran is male-dominated and bound by the principle of brotherliness. This is not surprising in light of the salvational character of Islam and its historic opposition to the secular political order. According to Weber (1946),

> The consistent brotherly ethic of salvation religions has come into an equally sharp tension with the *political* orders of the world. This problem did not exist for magic religiosity or for the religion of functional deities. . . . The problem of tensions with the political order emerged for redemption religions out of the basic demand for brotherliness. And in politics, as in economics, the more rational the political order became the sharper the problems of these tensions became. (p. 333)

In Shia Islam, this principle of brotherliness has led to the exclusion of women from the clergy. Interestingly, the IRP which came to dominate the system was simply an outgrowth of the Islamic brotherhood known as the Association of United Societies (*Jamiyaat-e Hayat ha-ye Motalefeh).* It was founded on the principles of "unity and brotherhood," which is not surprising in light of its Islamic character. This fraternal dominance has been solidified by a number of constitutional provisions (Preamble, Section 1, Article 1) which tie women to the home. While the contradictory character of regime policy had led to the increased participation on the part of women in government, there has been little substantive reform beyond that stipulated in the constitution. In addition, women have come under increasing attack from cultural conservatives seek-

ing to establish dress codes (the *chador*) and impose so-called standards of decency (Wright, 1989).

Shortly after the expulsion of Bani-Sadr, the IRP began to degenerate into fratricidal strife, which is not surprising in light of the *mixed* character of the organization. As Pye (1985) notes:

> [T]he Islamic ideal of authority becomes that of the brother, not the father figure, but it is an ideal that is not always fully trusted. Because the "brotherhood" can be a source of pain, aggression can be directed against the ideal, but that is wrong behavior and therefore the share of aggression must be suppressed. Leaders and followers are supposed to share a common destiny and to be united both religiously and psychodynamically in the ties of brotherhood; but one can never be sure whether the others are living up to the ideal—especially because one has experienced hostility toward the ideal oneself. (p. 157)

This lack of trust and tendency towards aggression led to the development of a number of major factions. As in France and Germany, three major political blocs emerged. Once again, these fall along economic and cultural lines.

The left is composed a number of prominent radical Islamic Socialists (i.e., Ardabili, Khoeniha, Musavi, Mohteshemi), known as the *Maktabis* (literally "the devout"—the Followers of Imam Khomeini's Line). The Maktabis, like the Montagnards and SPD before them, espouse essentially socialist/statist policies. There are two wings, one secular/technocratic, the other clerical. Throughout the war with Iraq, the Maktabis pressed for the confiscation and redistribution of royal and noble property, land reform, the centralization of the administration, price fixing and controls, regulated distribution of goods and services, and overall the nationalization (Islamization) of the economy. After the death Khomeini in 1989 and the collapse of the IRP in 1987, the Maktabis have coordinated their efforts through a political club network known as the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran (*Majma-e Ruhaniyoun*

Mobarez-e Tehran) or Ruhaniyoun. Of all the factions, this is the only one that can be truly classified as Khomeinist (Akhavi, 1987; Ehteshami, 1995; Sarabi, 1994; Schahgaldian, 1989; Wells, 1999).

A second group consists of more traditional conservative clergymen and bazaaris sometimes referred to as *Hujjatis* (literally "the proof of Islam"). Its main leaders are Islamic traditionalists (Jannati, Golpaygani, Tabataba'i-Qomi, Mahdavi-Kani, Nateq-Nuri, Tavakoli), and former conservative Khomeinists who support the bureaucratization of political power (Khamene'i, Mahallati, Sanei). Both groups espouse classical or neo-liberalism. They have been influenced by the ideas of such Islamic philosophers and thinkers as Mahmud Taleqani and Baqr Sadr, and favor *laissez-faire* capitalism. Like the DNVP or Girondins, they regard property as sacrosanct (Akhavi, 1985, 1987; Bakhash, 1986; Ehteshami, 1995; Wells, 1999). Their main political organization is the Society of Combatant Clergymen of Tehran (*Jameh-e Ruhaniyat-e Moarez-e Tehran*) or Ruhaniyat. Despite claims of being Khomeinists, this faction has increasingly revealed itself as reactionary and revisionist, and has been known to question the notion of *velayet-e faqih* (Akhavi, 1987; Abrahamian, 1993; Ehteshami, 1995; Wells, 1999).

A third major bloc constitutes the political center. Centrists are made up a group of "moderate" (Montazeri, Khatami, Shirazi) and "pragmatic" clergymen and technocrats (Rafsanjani, Hashemi). Their main political organization is the *Servants of Reconstruction*. At best this bloc can only be described as formerly Khomeinist, as it is reformist and seeks to dramatically overhaul the revolutionary system (Akhavi, 1987; Abrahamian, 1993; Ehteshami, 1995).

Between 1980 and 1987, these various blocs were contained within or affiliated with an umbrella organization known as the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). In many respects, the IRP resembles the Jacobin Club of revolutionary France in that it was comprised of a loose association of divergent groups bound together by feelings of consensuality and fraternity. Throughout the Khomeini decade, the Maktabis and centrists dominated the political sys-

tem, but shortly after Khomeini's death, the center defected, forming a coalition with the revisionist right. This is similar to Weimar, where shortly after the death of Ebert, the center parties defected the SPD only to form a coalition with the DNVP, as well as revolutionary France where moderate and conservative Jacobins formed the Thermidorean bloc.

Like their patron Khomeini, the Maktabis espouse *mixed* values. On the side of paternalism, they frequently refer to Khomeini as the "Father of the Revolution" and called on him to exercise his "discretionary" powers as faqih in order to impose social and economic equity on the country. They "favored strong government control of the economy at the expense of the private sector. . . . Their goal was to redistribute Iran's wealth in the name of `social justice'" (Wright, 1989, p. 137). As former Minister of Heavy Industry Nabavi put it, "We are not communists and ideologically we believe in private ownership. On the other hand we don't believe in the total dominance of the private sector. We are not going to allow entrepreneurs to run our government" (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 92).

As Bakhash (1986) notes, "Advocates of land reform and the distribution of wealth therefore sought increasingly in the doctrine of *velayet-e faqih*, and the jurist's discretionary powers, the mechanism through which to achieve their ends" (p. 212). Many of the Maktabis, such as prime minister Musavi, were Musavi-sayyeds and thus part of Khomeini's extended clan network (Hiro, 1985). They hoped to use this connection to establish a "temporary dictatorship" based on "overriding necessity" (Bakhash, 1986, pp. 212-214). Like Khomeini, they took *status* seriously, and were convinced of their "natural superiority" of Musavi sayyeds. Because Musavi sayyeds are the most common, they are also the poorest. This explains in large measure their attachments and defense of the so-called "barefoot of Islam, " and/or the "downtrodden and disinherited" (*mostazafin*).

When Khomeini refused to act on requests from the radical left to establish a dictatorship, many Maktabis chose simply to

violate the law and operated outside of established institutions in patrimonial fashion. According to Freud (1932) paternal societies are those in which "might makes right," whereas fraternal societies are ones in which "right" is determined by the community. If fraternal societies are to survive, the law has to be both recognized and obeyed by the members of the community. In this Weber is largely in agreement. A good anecdotal example of an individual lacking respect for the law is former Minister of Interior and presidential candidate Mohtashemi, who on numerous occasions, openly displayed his distaste for democratic principles and rule of law. As one cleric put it, "He is well-known for his hiring and firing; he regards himself as the only power. He neither consults the clergy, nor does he pay attention to the deputies. With regard to the law, he acts wherever he sees fit and in accordance with his will" (as cited in Wright, 1989, p. 194). Mohtashemi is closely tied to Tehran's University Student Organization which is led by the radical cleric Musavi-Khoeniha, the leader of the students who had stormed the U.S. Embassy in 1979. Both Mohtashemi and Khoeniha are Islamic socialists, and partisans of class struggle. As Majles deputy Badamchian stated in 1986, "Let us make it clear what we really want to do in this country. Do we want factories or not? If not, let us say that being an industrialist is an offense and anybody who has a factory should turn it over to the government" (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 88).

Like Khomeini, the Maktabis harbor *delusions of persecution* and possess a profoundly *paranoid style*. As Abrahamian (1993) has observed, "Khomeini's supporters were equally paranoid. A prominent cleric issued a proclamation reminding the faithful that . . . the Koran warned them not to befriend Jews and Christians" (p. 124). According to Abrahamian (1993), The paranoid style [of Khomeini and his followers] had far-reaching consequences. The premise that grand plots existed naturally led to the belief there were plotters everywhere—some obvious, others more devious. . . . Thus political activists tended to equate competition with treason, liberalism with weak-mindedness, honest differences of

opinion with permissiveness toward the enemy within. . . . The result was detrimental for the development of political pluralism in Iran. Political coalitions were difficult to launch, and when in rare cases they were launched, they could quickly be shipwrecked on the treacherous rocks of mutual distrust and widespread suspicion. (p. 130). Marxists, religious minorities like the Bahai'is and even conservative clergy were percieved as part of such conspiracies.

Yet, despite strong paternalistic elements, the Maktabis also harbor *fraternal* values. They support at least the limited implementation of *juridical/legal rules* normally associated with fraternity, and the "special" powers of the faqih, which they so often refer to, are *formalized* by the constitution. It should also be noted that, despite tampering, annulments and exclusionary policies of the regime, the elections occurring during the Maktabi era (1981-1985) were still more democratic than any of those under the shah or in Iranian history for that matter (Behrooz, 1991).

But the Maktabis are not the only group in Islamic Iran to possess a paradoxical value system. The traditional clerical hierarchy too possess a *mixed* character, one which is revealed by the elitism of the Hujjatis. Throughout the Khomeini era, the right's paternalism has manifested itself over the issue of private property. Despite the efforts of the left, conservatives have been able to forestall land reform and reverse the policy of nationalization initiated under prime minister Musavi. "Particularly effective was their protest that high taxation and efficient collection of taxes by the government might in fact undermine the authority of the religious establishment and reduce the flow of annual revenues to the mosque" (Ehteshami, 1995, p. 91). Shortly after Khomeini's death, they embarked on a policy of privatization and economic reform. Radical Maktabis naturally saw these as efforts to establish a bourgeois dictatorship and thus labeled them "the rich and exploitative" (*mustakbarin*). Musavi has even accused them of being "economic terrorists" who believe "in the capitalism of the 18th and 19th centuries" (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 9). Radicals of-

ten referred to the Hujjati as "medieval capitalists," and to their supporters in the business community as "bloodsucking bazaar mafiosos" (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 142).

Maktabi criticisms of the rightists, however harsh, are not without merit. Throughout the 1980s, the Hujjatis and the traditional clergy (Reza Golypaygani, Tabataba'i Qomi, Jannati, Safi, Mahdavi-Kani) have managed to illegally bloc legislation through their control of the court system. Nearly all of the high judges on the Council of Guardians, the nation's equivalent to a supreme court, are conservatives who regard property as sacred. During the Khomeini decade, these judges rejected as much as 48% of all legislation as either un-Islamic or unconstitutional with little or no legal justification (Ehteshami, 1995). As in Germany, conservative control of the court system in Iran has served to undermine the efficient functioning of the political system. Likewise, the right often questions the faqih principle, instead calling for the restoration of the old monarchical system, and/or *vesayet-e faqih* (clerical control of the nation's court system) as outlined in the constitution of 1906-1907. Their radical stance on cultural issues such as the veiling of women (*hejab*) has given them the reputation of tyrants.

Like the Maktabis, the right seems to long for *status.* As Hiro (1985) notes, most of the conservative leaders are sayyeds (Tabataba'is, Rezas) or former nobility who are "prosperous merchants, big landholders, affluent urban property owners, and rich ulema [clergy] . . ." (pp. 243-244). Indeed, shortly after gaining power in 1989, rightists embarked on a string of repressive policies, establishing new rules defining who was eligible to run for public office (one had to have a bachelors degree or equivalent credentials from a seminary college). Likewise, through their control of the Council of Guardians, they were able to ban as many as 60% their political opponents, many of whom were former parliamentary deputies, and to annul as many as 25% of all elections. In the 1996 elections, they were thus able to deprive the left of a parliamentary majority/plurality, and prosecuted a number of prominent Khomeinists (e.g., Karrubi, Khoeniha, Musavian,

Ghaffari) (Sarabi, 1994; Ehteshami, 1995; Wells,1999). In this way they showed their *lack of respect for minority rights* and an *inability to accept defeat* in democratic elections.

But the right is not solely paternalistic either, and possesses some fraternal tendencies as well. Their efforts to restore market freedoms has led them to advocate for corresponding political freedoms. Much of their criticism of the government revolves around the extensive powers of the faqih, which are somewhat paternal. Likewise, they are more sympathetic to secularization and rationalization of the state. As Shariatmadari put it, "In Islam there is no provision that the ulema must absolutely intervene in matters of state. . . . There should be no direct interference from spiritual leaders" (as cited in Hiro, 1985, p. 117). Other important leaders such as Grand *Mujtahid* Qomi-Tabataba'i have made similar statements: "Real clerics do not support those among the religious leaders who govern over us. The real task of the clerics is to enjoin and to enlighten the people" (as cited in Bakhash, 1986, p. 141). Still others like Ayatollah Sadeq Ruhani have gone so far as to declare the regime "Un-Islamic," with Shaikh Ali Tehrani accusing Khomeini and the Maktabis of violating both the constitution and Islam: "It appears as if, in order to retain power, you act contrary to your own religious decrees and Islamic principles. Many come to us and say that statements and attitude of Ayatollah Khomeini are causing our wives and children to turn against religion." In a similar vein, the well-known writer and essayist Ali-Ashgar Javadi declared, "The monster of fascism has been let out of the bottle" (as cited in Bakhash, 1986, pp. 141-140). These criticism of the regime are similar to those made against Robespierre and Ebert. It is correct to say that Khomeini and the Maktabis often exercised questionable judgments when it came to the "discretionary" authority of the faqih.

Having discussed the Islamic conservatives and socialists, it is important to also discuss the characteristics of the moderates and pragmatists comprising the center. Of the three major blocs, the center has been by far the most fraternal. Its position has been best

described by Khomeini's disgraced designated successor Montazeri. Like Danton and Wilhelm Marx, Montazeri has emerged as centrist and moderate in an otherwise radical movement. Unlike most, he foresaw Iran's approaching Thermidor. As he so eloquently stated in 1983, "There is a famous saying in the world that revolutions devour their children. Today, I feel the same thing is happening in our society. . . . a gradual and creeping coup is under way. (as cited in Akhavi, 1985, p. 10). Throughout his career, he has upbraided both Hujjatis and Maktabis for their factionalism and lack of fraternal unity—"[W]hat is being forcefully felt today is the danger of discord among forces, the feeling of isolation by competent and dedicated forces" (as cited in Akhavi, 1985, p. 4). He has been a champion of *jurisdictional competency*, and rationally established norms, enactments, decrees, and regulations.

On numerous occasions, Montazeri has scolded Musavi and the left as radicals (*tundru*) for their calls for an Islamic-style dictatorship (Akhavi, 1987). "Some people [the Maktabis] want others to obey them like dumb animals, and if they express an opinion, they will be rejected, even if they are believing, wise, and revolutionary. On the contrary, believing, independent, and brave people should find their way to the religious seminaries, the government, and the Majlis [Parliament]" (as cited in Akhavi, 1985, p. 9). By the same token, he criticized the Hujjatis for their unwillingness to form viable coalitions, and to participate fully in the system. As he put it, "unity between the wings inside the Iranian regime is clearly lacking" (New York Times, 1986. p.1).

In the late 1980s, Montazeri emerged as a spokesmen for amnesty and greater democratization in Iran. As Hiro (1985) has said, "He reminded them [the revolutionaries] that they had no arbitrary right to arrest and needed court orders to do so, and that mere suspicion of a 'plot against the government' was not enough to enter private homes and arrest individuals" (p. 265). He seems to have realized that the death of Khomeini would deprive the regime of much needed legitimacy, and that if the regime were to survive, it needed a new source of authority, that is rules of con-

duct and the law. As Weber (1946) notes, "With the death of the prophet or the war lord the question of successorship arises. This question can be solved by *Kurung,* which was originally not an `election' but a selection. . . . With these routinizations, *rules* in some form always come to govern" (p. 297). When in 1989, Montazeri sent an open letter to Khomeini criticizing the regime for making mistakes, and urged the "clergy to get out of government" and to hand over power to qualified experts, he was promptly fired.

Montazeri's defense of *consensus* and *cooperation* is clearly opposed by radicals on both wings; nevertheless, he has attracted a substantial following. In this sense he is like Danton in that he is a true "party leader." Since his arrest in 1989 and imprisonment in 1997, his cause has been taken up by other centrists like the former president Rafsanjani and the current president Ayatollah Khatami, who have consistently advocated for the establishment of an Islamic-style democracy. As Rafsanjani puts it:

> During the past 14 years. . . . the Islamic Republic of Iran has relied on referenda and the establishment of popular institutions as its main tools. In more than 12 elections with the participation of the people (men and women), the Iranians have elected their governmental system, president and Majles deputies and have ratified their constitution. They have elected in two turns the members of the Assembly of Experts whose duty it is to choose the faqih. The presence of representatives form religious minorities in the Majles with equal rights [is established] . . . and the guarantee of this right to the constitution signifies the depth of genuiness of our commitment to democracy. (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 72)

In his 1997 campaign platform, Khatami has called for the "prevalence of law and order" as well as "public participation and competition" and respect for "human rights and dignity" (Khatami, 1997, p.1). As Khatami put it shortly after his election, "All of

us—both government and the people—must strive to respect the
law. All of us must perform our duties within the framework of the
law. . . . No faction or group has the right to impose its will and
preferences, no matter how benevolent and well-intentioned they
may be, on other people outside the limits of the law" (Khatami,
1997, p. 1). As Lasswell and Lerner (1965) might argue, the Ira-
nian political center has clearly emerged as an advocate of toler-
ance, *respect* and *affection.*

But even the "champion of Islamic democracy" Montazeri has
displayed *paternalistic* tendencies. Shortly after the fall of Bani Sadr,
he established a private secretariat which he ran out of his office in
the holy city of Qom. He persuaded Khomeini to delegate some of
his "special" powers to him, and this gave him the ability to hand
out appointments to loyalists in the military, bureaucracy and the
courts. Like Khomeini, his office was dominated by his *personal
household* and extended family (Hiro, 1985). In addition, he occa-
sionally exercised authority outside of *legal and institutional con-
straints.* He engaged in secret and illegal negotiations with foreign
enemies (U.S.), and through an organization known as the *Global
Islamic Movement* maintained connections with "freedom fighters"
abroad (i.e., Lebanon, Israel) run by his relative, Mehdi Hashemi.
During the war, he took a number of important military leaders
under his wing (General Shirazi) and used his position as nominal
head of the Ideological/Political Bureau of the Armed Forces to
unofficially influence the conduct of the war. Nevertheless,
Montazeri, like Danton, has remained a voice for moderation and
fraternalism.

The End of the Khomeini Era

Between 1981 and 1989, Khomeini was unable to bridge the
gaps between the conservatives (Hujjatis) and radicals (Maktabis).
But like Ebert and Robespierre, Khomeini could not control the
fratricidal strife that was tearing the regime apart. Throughout the

1980s, in typical patrimonial fashion, Khomeini played favorites, and in so doing, alienated the Islamist right and center. When he forced Montazeri out of government, he not only lost the only member of the regime possessing sufficient rank to meet the constitutional requirements for the faqihship, but also the support of the pragmatists and moderates. As a result, he was forced to call for a constitutional committee to review the current document and enact reforms. Shortly thereafter, he died without a successor

In his drive to establish an virtuous Islamic republic based upon the faqih principle, Khomeini had angered many within the clerical hierarchy, and by allowing the Maktabis to attack the traditional religious establishment, he alienated the conservatives. The result was a massive power shift within the parliament, shortly after his death. The center, now led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, abandoned the radical Maktabis and formed a coalition with the conservative president Khamene'i and the Hujjatis. Together they formed the core of a political association known as Ruhaniyat. Shortly thereafter, the Maktabis were rapidly forced out of the government, thereby paving the way for Thermidor.

Stage Three:
Thermidor and the Rise of the Radical Right

The Revised Covenant

The immediate consequence of Khomeini's death was the political isolation of the Maktabis. While the Maktabis scrambled to transform their organization, Ruhaniyoun, into a viable political organ, a center/right Thermidorean coalition within an umbrella organization known as Ruhaniyat began solidifying its power. For the first time in recent Iranian history, the conservative clergy were playing an active role in government. The purged leftists, like the Montagnards and the SPD, resorted to the only tactic available to

them, the verbal denunciation of the Thermidoreans. According to Abrahamian (1993),

> As the Thermidor has accelerated, the radicals have no choice but to bide their time and to denounce the "betrayal of the revolution" from the few forums still available to them— from their ever-diminishing parliamentary seats, from the few religious foundations controlled by them, and from their two newspapers, *Salam* (Peace) and *Bayan* (Explanation). They protest that those demanding allegiance to the present Leader are scheming to put aside the teachings of the Revolutionary Prophet [Khomeini]. They charge that most of the new ministers and deputies had sat out the revolution whereas many of the purged militants had suffered for years in the shah's torture chambers. (pp. 141-142)

Nonetheless, they were powerless against the new coalition of forces that had united against them.

The center/right coalition quickly moved to distance itself from Khomeini-era policies (Sarabi, 1994, Ehteshami, 1995). Centrists moved to restore friendly relations with the West (Britain) and the Arab world (Saudi Arabia), dismantled the economic measures erected by the Maktabis, privatized large segments of the economy (industry, mines), deregulated the banking industry, reactivated the Tehran stock exchange, solicited foreign loans, established free-trade zones, devalued the Rial, and reduced government subsides. constitutional reforms eliminated the post of the prime minister thus depriving the left of its most important source of institutional power and the left's greatest leader Musavi of his post, institutionalized the powers of the Expediency Council, lessened the qualifications of the faqih, and expanded the powers of both the faqih and president (Ehteshami, 1995; Milani, 1992; Sarabi, 1994). In all 50 amendments were altered, with three new ones (Articles 109, 112, and 176) all dealing with the relationship between the faqih and the president being added. Shortly thereafter,

the conservative leader Ali Khamene'i was elected by the Assembly of Experts faqih, and the centrist leader Rafsanjani was elected president.

As Montazeri predicted in 1983, the revolution continued to devour its children. A number of prominent Khomeinists were brought to trial, including former presidential candidate Mohtashemi, former speaker of parliament Karrubi, former prosecutor-general and leader of the students who stormed the U.S. Embassy in 1979 Khoeniha, and former minister of heavy industry Nabavi (Sarabi, 1994). It would seem that Khomeini had set a dangerous precedent when he used the "discretionary" powers of the faqih to crush his political opponents. The Thermidoreans, now clearly in control of government, turned these powers on the Maktabis and their political club, Ruhaniyoun. In clear violation of the constitution, they moved to disqualify or ban a large number of Khomeinists from the upcoming parliamentary elections. In the end, the reformists banned nearly 60% of prospective candidates. The Thermidorean victory was solidified in the 1992 Majles elections in which Ruhaniyat won a resounding victory, taking nearly 70% of the seats (Sarabi, 1994). Just as in France and Germany, the death of revolutionary leader brought an end to the dynamic phase of the revolution and facilitated the Thermidorean reaction.

With the victory of the reformists, the regime began to tone down its revolutionary rhetoric. Phrases associated with revolutionary export like "Death to America" and the calls for revolutionary export, have become less common, and themes of messianism and martyrdom likewise have started to drop out of revolutionary slogans. More importantly there is considerably less reference i public speeces of brotherhood (*ikwhan)* and unity. In an open criticism of the Maktabis, Rafsanjani criticized claims that reform was unneccessary. He even attacked the notions of martyrdom espoused by the left. Maktabi's, he noted, were incorrect when they asserted that "There is no need for us to change our present situation. [They say] Let prices rise as they will; let the

people's problems mount up, irrespective of the burden, we are ready for martyrdom! This is not a correct view. It is not possible to organize the long life of a generation in this way" (as cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 29). Beginning in the early 1990s, there has been a movement to change the titles of a number of important ministries and foundations to reflect the regime's more moderate character. For example, the Ministry of *Jihad* (holy war) is now referred to by the more moderate title of Development, and while the name of Tehran's Martyr Behesti University was not officially changed, it is now referred to in common language as simply Behesti University (Ehteshami, 1995).

In addition, government propaganda now emphasizes "reconstruction," "realism," "work discipline," "managerial skill," "modern technology," "expertise and competence," "individual self-reliance," and "stability," at the expense of "martyrdom," "brotherhood," and "unity" (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 138). The changes in rhetoric has brought sharp criticism from the Maktabis. As Mohtashemi complained, it was as if the institution of *velayet-e faqih* was being used as a "club to beat revolutionary heads" (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 136).

The Successor: Ayatollah Ali Musavi-Khamene'i

The death of Khomeini and resignation of Montazeri facilitated the rise of Ali Musavi-Khamene'i. Since 1989, he has dominated the Islamic Republic, and has assumed the role of *primus inter pares* vacated by the Imam. Like Barras and Hindenburg, he is of noble lineage, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and a Musavi-sayyed, and a well known revolutionary figure. Throughout the 1980s, he served as the president of the Iran, though he was little more than a figure-head. Like Paul Barras and Hindenburg, he is also a revolutionary who had inextricably tied his destiny to that of the Republic, but one whose sympathies lie

with right-wing conservatives, and not the left-wing adherents of the former revolutionary leader.

Like Barras, Khamene'i is a decidedly un-charismatic figure, as can be seen by the fact that very few unacquainted with the intricacies of Iranian politics know his name or official position. He is rarely mentioned in the Western press or media, and few westerners even know his name. This lack of charisma is apparent not only in the world, but also within the confines of the Iran itself. This situation has led a number of scholars (Abrahamian, 1993; Bakhash, 1991; Ehteshami, 1995; Milani, 1992; Sarabi, 1994, Wells, 1999) to claim that his lack of charisma has led to an erosion of the regime's overall legitimacy. As Milani (1992) explains, "Ayatollah Khomeini's death created a serious crisis for the Islamic Republic. . . . Only Khomeini's decisive leadership had kept these factions united. Without him, the competition between them was bound to intensify" (p. 184). In the hopes of compensating for his lack of charisma, Khamene'i has sought to more firmly establish the republic through constitutional reform, hence to legitimate the clergy's claim to political leadership. As Weber (1946) notes, "the charismatic following . . . develops into a ruling caste. But in every case . . . power and those groups having interests vested in it . . . strive for legitimacy. . . . They crave for a characteristic which would define the charismatically qualified ruler" (p.252). Khamene'i 's "craving" has manifested itself in his attempts to portray himself as a prominent religious as well as political figure, and this desire to strengthen his religious standing has led him to claim to be one of the most outstanding jurists of his time and leader of Shia Islam, a *marja-e taqlid*.

Nevertheless, this has been opposed by most of the religious hierarchy whether anti-regime or otherwise. "The question of Marja`aiyat is highly relevant to the struggle for power. . . . While Khomeini was alive the Marja`a and the faqih were embodied in one office—his. With his death . . . a dislocation emerged between the constitutional status of the faqih and the traditional hierarchy and grid of the Shii system of rank and seniority" (Ehteshami,

1995, pp. 53-54). In other words, since the revolution, the clergy has been increasingly divided into revolutionary political and traditional apolitical wings, and this has naturally led to a corresponding split within the public. Khamene'i's response has been to isolate and discredit his main religious rivals, *marjas* Montazeri and Ruhani, and while this has failed, it has not prevented him from imprisoning both.

This kind of conflict is common to systems transitioning from charismatic legitimation to a future undetermined form. As Weber (1946) notes, "the hierocrat no longer rules by virtue of purely personal qualities. . . . [the successor] has been legitimized by an act of charismatic election. The process of routinization . . . has set in" (p. 297). At this critical juncture, the future form of rule is on the verge of being established. If the successor is successful in deriving his legitimacy from the laws governing society, the system becomes a stable fraternal form of rule; if, however, the leader derives his legitimacy from obeying the commandments of the charismatic leader, then the system becomes traditionalized, thus becoming a new form of paternal rule.

Khamene'i, like the other aforementioned successors, seems to harbor a number of *paternal* values. He maintains his ascendancy through *balanced conflict* and frequently employs *divide and rule* tactics. As Milani (1992) points out, "During the first few months of his rule, Khamene'i sought to gain the support and confidence of Khomeini's hard core followers, as well as the clerical establishment and the two rival factions [Maktabis and Hujjatis]. His first move was to gain control of Khomeini's vast personal networks inside government. . . . Finally, by making unity the main theme of his speeches, the new *faqih* stayed above factional politics, hoping not to antagonize either side" (p. 186). While he supported the efforts of the center/right coalition led by Rafsanjani and allowed conservative elements to attack former hard-liners, he has also sought to stabilize the regime by preserving remnants of the Khomeinists/Maktabis.

Like Khomeini and Montazeri, Khamene'i has surrounded himself with his own *household* and private staff, which is headed up by his brother Muhammad. He also maintains close ties to *unofficial* paramilitary organizations like *Ansar-e Hezbollah* (the Party of God). During his first six months in office, he established an elaborate system of patronage. As Milani (1992) has observed, "In short, as Khamene'i consolidated his rule and felt more confident about his new position, the power of the institution he holds increased. In the past year or so, he has made many new appointments, including many within the regular armed forces, Revolutionary Guards, and the clerical establishment. Thus, he is gradually solidifying his personal network" (p. 188).

Despite these paternal tendencies, Khamene'i has also displayed *fraternal* values, as evidenced in his support for the parliamentary system and desire to preserve the constitution. His willingness towards *cooperation* and *acceptance of defeat* can be seen in the 1996 parliamentary elections in which centrists broke away from Ruhaniyat, forming their own political organization known as the Servants of Reconstruction. In these elections, conservatives still contained within Ruhaniyat lost majoritarian control of parliament. Interestingly, Khamene'i allowed the center/left coalition of the Khomeini-era to be reconstituted. His fraternalism can also be seen in the fact that he allowed the 1997 presidential election to stand. In this election, his preferred candidate, speaker of parliament Nateq Nuri, lost to the centrist Khatami by more than a 2:1 margin (Wells, 1999).

It would seem that Khamene'i, like so many others in Iran, harbors *mixed* values, and it is these that have compelled him to simultaneously defend and violate the constitution. In fraternal fashion, he has sought to preserve the overall system. As he explains, "I am the successor of that great personality [Khomeini]. With all my power I will defend the *velayet-e faqih* doctrine, and will perform all the responsibilities delegated to me" (as cited in Milani, 1992, p. 188). But by the same token, he has allowed the

judiciary to illegally ban political opponents and to annul elections. In both the Majles election of 1992 and 1996, a large number of irregularities occurred (Sarabi, 1994; Wells, 1999). "Khamene'i endorsed the Council of Guardians when it rejected the credentials of numerous candidates, many of whom were from the purist [Maktabi] faction" (Milani, 1992, p.188).

Like Barras and Hindenburg, Khamene'i has the tendency to abide by the constitution only when it is to his benefit, and violates it when he feels himself threatened. In the course of a few short years, he has shown an alarming *lack of respect for minority rights* and parliamentary procedure. "In fact, during the Third Majles (1990-1992), Khamene'i was more critical of this institution [parliament] . . . than any other. . . . He said it was preoccupied with factional rivalry, not totally supportive of government, and even abusive of its powers" (Milani, 1992, p. 188). From these accounts, it would seem that Khamene'i does not understand the purpose of a duly-elected legislature.

For Khamene'i a number of questions remain. Will his mixed values and lack of charisma lead to his political isolation as it did for Hindenburg and Barras? Will he, like the other successors examined, increasingly come rely on his "special" powers to maintain his position? Will he have to establish a temporary dictatorship of the *faqih* and be forced to justify his abuse of office by making reference to his sworn oath to defend the Islamic Republic? Will he be able to preserve the Islamic constitution in its current form, or will his rule give way to a new paternal tyrant claiming to be the "fulfillment of the revolution?"

While these questions remain unanswered, what is clear is that Khamene'i has failed to provide the political system with any substantial degree of either *secular* or *religious rationalizations*. His attempts to portray himself as a *marja* has faltered, and he is under attack from both the both the anti-government right (the traditional/conservative clergy) and radical left (the Maktabis). After his questionable banning of opponents, his popularity has been in the doldrums, and this only contributes to the overall decline of

the political system's legitimacy. Nevertheless, he retains power by virtue of the fact that he is appointed for life, and can only be removed by virtue of an impeachment proceeding.

CONCLUSIONS

The Thermidorean coalition that came to power in 1989 hoped that the death of Khomeini would help to stabilize the regime. While the public still seems to support the idea of an Islamic form of government, a growing sub-segment has been advocating for reform of the constitutional and political system. As in France after 1794 and Germany after 1925, the legitimacy of the political system has been in steady decline since 1989. While fraternal groups continue to support the centrist factions, mixed groups are becoming increasingly confused. This is evidenced by the fact that the political system is rapidly becoming polarized, and growing public dissatisfaction with any group associated with government.

The first signs of public dissatisfaction appeared in the 1989 presidential and 1992 parliamentary elections in which the voters turned away from the Khomeinists and voted for Thermidorean factions. The well known reformist candidate Rafsanjani was elected president, in the process trouncing the Maktabi candidate, Mohtashemi. In like manner, Ruhaniyat, which housed the center/right coalition gained 70% of the seats in parliament. But a startling reversal occurred in 1996, when voters, dissatisfied with conservative efforts to impose a strict social code and economic liberalism, once again turned to the Khomeinists. A new center/left coalition emerged revolving around an umbrella group known as the Servants of Reconstruction, which succeeded in getting a compromise candidate, Khatami, elected president. Just as in Thermidorean France and Germany, the Iranian government swung right only to swing back left again. In all three instances, this occurred despite attempts by Thermidoreans to control the electoral process through a series of legal and illegal measures.

The question remains, what does this mean for the Islamic Republic? Does the revival of the Khomeinists signal an end to Thermidor, or is it simply the last gasp of the purists as it was for the Jacobins in 1797-1799 and the SPD in 1928-1930? At this point no one knows for sure, but it is safe to say that it could be the last chance for the Maktabis. This is not to imply that the Islamic character of the regime is in jeopardy; on the contrary, if there is one element of the system which appears durable it is its religious character. What does not appear durable, however, is its *mixed* character and its constitution, which now seem to be in grave danger. Growing public dissatisfaction with the regime's pseudo-democratic practices, coupled with the historical lack of faith in democratically determined outcomes, leads one to conclude that the regime and the constitution probably will not persist in its current form.

The Maktabis, having rebounded, are once again agitating for the removal of Khamene'i, and the election of their candidate, Montazeri. By the same token, the conservatives, who still control the courts and the faqihship (and thus the whole electoral process), are alarmed at the power shift and have begun threatening the center/left coalition with the powers of the faqih. If this situation is not resolved, then the system, much like Weimar Germany and Directorial France, is likely to disintegrate into a paternalistic dictatorship. Likewise, the situation is ripe for the emergence of new paternalistically-oriented factions. Indeed, the recent parliamentary elections have seen the emergence of a number of new factions (*Ansar-e Hezbollah* and Defenders of the Values of Islamic Revolution) advocating for a dictatorship of the faqih. If these groups are able to form a "unity of negation" as the communists and Nazis did in Germany or the Jacobins and Bonapartists did in France, then they could conceivably paralyze the entire political system. For this reason it is of the utmost importance to pay attention to the actions of the current faqih as well as to observe the behavior of the electorate.

What are the prospects for fraternalism in Iran then, in light

of this situation. Much of it depends upon the social-psychological orientation of the masses. In Iran, in general, democracy, in its fraternal/mixed form, has only a limited introduction. In writing of Asian social and political systems, Pye (1985) aptly describes the Iranian situation:

> If Asian concepts of power are beginning to work in support of strong national economic development, will this in turn lead to the advancement of democracy in the region? The conclusion which follows from our analysis of paternalistic authority is that the prospects for democracy, as understood in the West, are not good. At the same time, Asians are not insensitive to the value the world places on democracy. . . . Distaste for open criticism of authority, fear of upsetting unity of the community, and knowledge that any violation of the community's rules of propriety will lead to ostracism, all combine to limit the appeal of . . . democracy. . . . At best it is likely to be a form of democracy which is blended with much that Westerners might regard as authoritarian (pp. 339-340, p. 341)

The question is, can this kind of contradictory system survive? Can a system be both paternal and fraternal and still be stable? This theoretical model suggests not. In both France and Germany these kinds of systems failed, and there is little reason to believe that Iran will fare any better.

Much of the problem arises from the fact that the Iranian mass public, like that of Germany and France, is mixed. There are segments that harbor fraternalistic, paternalistic, and mixed values. Closer analysis of Iranian voting habits suggest that each group is supported by 30% to 40% of the voting electorate. In the first election to the Assembly of Experts (the Constituent Assembly), perhaps Iran's most open and free in its history, the left/center bloc housed in the Islamic Republic Party received approximately 70% of the votes. On the other hand, in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the Thermidorean center/right bloc housed in

Ruhaniyoun captured 70% of the votes. More recently, in the 1996 parliamentary elections, the reconstituted left/center coalition surrounding the Servants of Reconstruction gained a majority in parliament. The same coalition triumphed in the 1997 presidential elections, with Khatami capturing 69% of the popular vote. From these figures, it would seem that Iranian voting demographics have changed little over the past two decades.

Up until this point those of a mixed and fraternal orientation have managed to preserve the system, but there are real questions as to whether paternalistic factions are gaining the upper hand. The right controls not only the court system, but the highest office in the land, the faqihship. If those of mixed orientation defect and abandon the constitutional system as they did in Germany and France, then the system will revert to a paternal form of rule.

From a psycho-dynamic perspective, the revolution and war with Iraq may have exacerbated the situation. While family size has reached an all time low and the nuclear unit has emerged as a powerful force in society, the deprivations accompanying the revolution may be helping to solidify the traditional paternal family network. The poor state of the economy and the war have forced many to turn to the traditional family network for help. While this is not necessarily a negative development, it may serve to reinforce paternalistic traditions and values detrimental to fraternalism.

Likewise, the death of large numbers of young fathers in the war may also have a negative effect. From a psychological perspective, a dead or absent father is perfect; he can make no mistakes. As a result, to the child, he is often idealized, and incapable of tyranny, brutality, and oppression. As a result, there is a "longing for a return" of this perfect father. On the other hand, the father-substitute (i.e., the older sibling, brother, sister or mother) is omnipresent. These substitutes often makes mistakes (as we all do) and thus have the potential to become the symbol of unjust authority and the object of derision much in the same way paternal authority did prior to the revolution. In this way, the revolution

and the war may have the effect of bolstering the paternal ideal, and undermining the fraternal one. This is complicated by the fact that one only has to be 16 years of age to vote in Iran. If young voters choose to reject fraternal leadership on the basis that it is weak, disunified, the system is doomed.

It may be much simpler than this. Since the Maktabis and the centrists have been advocating fraternalism and democracy as the solution to Iran's problems and this has failed, the public may simply come to associate the factionalism and failure of their governments with the political system. In this regard, the public, lacking a full understanding of fraternalism, might choose to reject it and the constitutional system because of its obvious shortcomings. Since even the most fraternal members of the republic understand paternalism (even if they don't agree with its tenets), the majority may choose to revert to something they understand, even if it does mean a renunciation of independence and choice. This does not even address all of the practical problems associated with establishing a democratic system. As Pye (1985) argues, "An immediate, major problem for late-developing Asian societies is the lack of well-established models for their forms of political modernization. . . . they are still in a state of political transition with unresolved problems of legitimacy and succession. . . ." (p. 344). These are just some of the hurdles that Iran must surmount.

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