Expert-Checking The Security Debate Posted by The Editors

By Heather Hurlburt

Thursday night’s Fox News-Google debate offered presidential hopefuls the chance to present their vision on a range of important issues in foreign affairs. The discussion also revealed several surprising misconceptions about U.S. national security at odds with the views of nonpartisan defense and military experts:

• Pakistan. Conservatives, whose previous administration was found to have “no comprehensive plan” for Pakistan, now believe the U.S. can walk away from the country where Osama Bin Laden was found and killed.
• Israel. A month in which Israel’s foreign minister said he would embrace Obama’s UN speech “with both hands” and its Prime Minister said Israelis owed Obama “a special measure of gratitude” is a surprising time to accuse the President of selling out our ally.
• Supporting All Our Troops. The spectacle of an audience booing a uniformed American risking his life for his country, without rebuke from the candidates, poses fundamental questions for a conservative movement that claims to be the defenders of the U.S. military.

What The Experts Say

Pakistan: Military, bipartisan experts, former Cabinet officials say it’s wrong to think we can walk away. The successful targeting of Osama Bin Laden on Pakistani territory, and the killings of dozens of other top Al Qaeda leaders highlight the consensus among those who lead our counter-terrorism policy that backing away from Pakistan is not an option.CBS reported earlier this year, "[Chairman of the Joint chiefs of staff Admiral Michael] Mullen acknowledged that the two countries were in the midst of a ‘turbulent time,' but that both countries understand the importance of salvaging the situation. ‘I think that all of us believe that we cannot let this relationship come apart,' he said." Last year, a bipartisan Council on Foreign Relations "Pak-Af" task force chaired by Sandy Berger and Richard Armitage considered the alternatives and concluded, "Engagement, partnership, and investment-with markers of progress-in support of common objectives are more apt to encourage desirable results."

By contrast, the Government Accountability Office found that the Bush administration had “no comprehensive plan” to deal with the problem.  Instead, the Bush administration pursued a policy President Bush described as: “When [Musharraf] looks me in the eye and says there won’t be a Taliban and won't be Al Qaeda, I believe him.” [CBS News, 4/20/11. CFR,  11/10. GAO, 4/08 . George W. Bush via Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007.]

Israelis thank Obama; Foreign Minister endorses UN speech “with both hands.” Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman endorsed the president's speech at the UN this week, saying he would sign on to it with "both hands."   Less than three weeks ago, Prime Minister Netanyahu Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recognized the strong leadership of the United States, saying, "I would like to express my gratitude to the President of the United States, Barack Obama. I asked for his help. This was a decisive and fateful moment. He said, 'I will do everything I can.' And so he did. He used every considerable means and influence of the United States to help us. We owe him a special measure of gratitude. This attests to the strong alliance between Israel and the United States. This alliance between Israel and the United States is especially important in these times of political storms and upheavals in the Middle East." [Avigdor Lieberman via JTA, 9/22/11. Benjamin Netanyahu, 9/10/11] 

Military leaders express support for all men and women in uniform. Hearing a debate audience boo an American in uniform - with no rebuke from the candidates - is surprising and unprecedented, in particular because it flies in the face of the views of America’s military leadership. A year ago Admiral Mullen wrote about why he supported the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, saying, "It comes down to integrity -- theirs as individuals and ours as an institution." Maj. Gen. (ret) Paul Eaton, NSN Special Advisor, explained, “It's a matter of military discipline. All soldiers - gay, straight or otherwise - have the right to serve and to be held to the high standard of conduct currently applied to heterosexual service members. Ending ‘Don't Ask, Don't Tell' is the right thing to maintain the integrity of the military and the right thing for our security." [Admiral Michael Mullen via Washington Post, 2/3/10. Paul Eaton via NSN, 10/13/10]

 

Rick Perry's Deeply Clownish Pro-Israel Press Conference Posted by Michael Cohen

Nothing defines a modern presidential campaign like deep and pathetic genuflection to America's staunch and unyielding defenders of Israel; and apparently yesterday was Rick Perry's turn to prostrate himself. I have to say in an era of deeply clownish campaign performances this performance was really quite something. Andrew Exum has done a nice job of annotating the presser here, but there are a few things jumped out to me as well . . . like Perry's opening sentence: 

I am joined today by a diverse group of Jewish leaders from here and abroad who share my concern that the United Nations could take action this week to legitimize the Palestinian gambit to establish statehood in violation of the spirit of the 1993 Oslo Accords.

I guess no one told Rick Perry that Israeli settlement expansion (which has tripled since Oslo was signed) is also a "violation of the spirit of the 1993 Oslo Accords." Of course if someone had told Perry this is would have likely bounced right off him: after all as Christiane Amanpour reported Perry told her he has no problem with Israeli settlement growth, "Israel should be allowed to keep building (settlements)," said the Texas Governor.

This position is in opposition to 30-years of US policy - and contradicts the view held by a trio of GOP presidents. But hey, nakedly pandering to domestic constituencies is hard work. 

Speaking of pandering and appeasement Perry also said this, "It is time to change our policy of appeasement toward the Palestinians to strengthen our ties to the nation of Israel."

Honestly, this is one of the craziest things I've heard come out of the mouth of a American politician in quite some time. The United States is currently preparing to veto a UN Security Council Resolution creating a Palestinian state; it has been lobbying members of the Security Council and the General Assembly to vote against said resolution - in what alternate Texas-universe is this appeasement? Perhaps its the same Texas universe where scientists believe climate change is not real? If the United States was appeasing the Palestinians or even the Arab street (another charge by Perry) wouldn't the Obama Administration be supporting Palestinian statehood?*

It's almost as if Rick Perry believes that to prove America's fealty to Israel we have to veto resolutions that negatively affect Israel . . . and also have our diplomats tape kick me signs to the back of Mahmoud Abbas.

If Rick Perry truly believes that the Obama Administration is "appeasing the Palestinians" he either has no idea what is happening in the Middle East or he doesn't know what the word appeasement actually means. 

But then again the number of rank misstatements in Perry's remarks is something to truly behold:

"This administration encouraged the Palestinians to shun direct talks." - Actually that's why the Palestinians are going to the UN; there are no direct talks taking place.

"By injecting the issue of 1967 borders in addition to a construction freeze in East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements, the Obama Administration has put Israel in a position of weakness and taken away their flexibility to offer concessions as part of the negotiation process." - and yet in the same remarks Perry demands that "Palestinian leaders must publicly affirm Israel’s right to exist, and to exist as a Jewish state" AND "Abbas must persuade all factions including Hamas to renounce acts of terrorism and release kidnapped Israeli Gilad Shalit."

So Israel must have complete flexibility in negotiations . . . Palestinians must surrender in advance. Of course, considering that Perry believes "moral equivalency" between the Israeli desire to live in peace and Palestinians to have a state is a "dangerous insult" this contradictory position sort of makes sense.

Perry even makes nutty statements about countries in the region, "Who knows what the leadership of Iran would look like today if America had done everything in its power to provide diplomatic and moral support to encourage the growing movement of dissidents who sought freedom."

Ooh call on me - I know the answer! "Iran would look exactly the same." What do I win?

Of course, part of Perry's confusion might stem from the fact that he is blinded . . . by religious devotion.  According to Perry, “As a Christian I have a clear directive to support Israel . . . But that’s easy for me. Both as an American and as a Christian, I am going to stand with Israel.”

I don't even know what to make of this. It really isn't everyday that a politician seeking the White House would boast of the fact that they are basing foreign policy decision-making on religious faith. I'm not even sure Jews would make an argument like this. Someone really needs to update Rick Perry on this whole-separation-of-church-and-state thing.

Of course, it's fun to joke about this stuff, but in reality it's serous business - and indicative of how twisted debates about Israel have become in modern American politics. The assumption among Republican politicians - and a bevy of Democrats - is that the United States must unwaveringly support whatever the current Israeli government deems to be in its national interests . . . with little actual consideration of what US interests in the region might be.

That the support we are providing is emboldening the worst impulses of Israel's government is only turning political farce into national tragedy.

 

Hypocrite, Hypocrite, Two-Faced Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Atlantic, my good friend and colleague Josh Foust has a post up deriding those who advocated intervention in Libya and are not now doing the same in Yemen:

From almost every angle, I cannot see why tho se who demanded the world intervene to prevent an atrocity from happening in Libya are not doing the same on behalf of Yemen. Some say that Yemen is prohibitively complicated, but Yemen only seems more complex because we know more about it . . . Other argue that intervention in Libya had more international support, but there is broad international consensus that the Saleh regime needs to end. And the argument that the world had to stop an atrocity in Libya ring the most hollow of all: unlike in Libya, there are atrocities happening in Yemen right now, and they are by all accounts horrifying.

To be honest, I don't think this is really all that confusing - all you really need to do is read President Obama's speech justifying intervention in Libya from back in March:

Some question why America should intervene at all - even in limited ways - in this distant land. They argue that there are many places in the world where innocent civilians face brutal violence at the hands of their government, and America should not be expected to police the world, particularly when we have so many pressing concerns here at home.

It is true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention,we must always measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what's right.In this particular country - Libya; at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale.We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to stop Gaddafi's forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.

One doesn't have to agree with this - and in some parts I don't - nonetheless, the President makes what is a very clear and compelling case for why the US could and should have intervened in Libya . . . and why such an intervention can't necessarily be replicated everywhere else. In fact, while I had and have real concerns about our intervention in Libya I also  recognize that what made this war unique - and why it is different from Yemen or Syria - is that US interests and capabilities were very much in concert (and that doesn't happen very often).

There was an international coalition supporting the intervention (including backing from the Arab League); the US was not being asked to take the military lead or put troops on the ground; because of the unique geography of Libya it was possible to intervene and do so in such a way that a) saved civilian lives and b) turned back the enemy. Very few of these particular attributes exist in Yemen or Syria or anywhere else for that matter.

Indeed, there are many good arguments against intervening in Libya - it wasn't in our interests, we didn't understand the rebels we were supporting, we didn't think long-term about what would happen after the fighting stopped etc. But the argument that we shouldn't intervene in Libya because it would set a precedent we couldn't replicate is by far the least compelling argument. It's a basic recipe for inaction, even when the capabilities exist for the US and the international community to intervene in such a way that could be beneficial (and obviously one can disagree over whether our intervention in Libya was beneficial).

By the logical progression of Josh's argument we should not intervene to protect civilians that are risk of being killed . . . because we can't do it everywhere. As he says, "The problem is, Libya let the cat out of the bag. We sent that message that if you scream loud enough, we will step in. And now, when we choose not to, we risk looking like hypocrites." I don't see it this way at all. Countries choose to intervene or use military force all the time and as Obama suggests "we must always measure our interests against the need for action." That is a smart, pragmatic way to approach international issues and its one where consistency is a hugely overrated consideration. Who cares if the US is consistent if it comes at the expense of furthering the country's national interests? I don't mean to be flippant, but I tend to agree with old saw about consistency being the hobgobblin of simple minds (not that Josh is simple-minded!)

Of course, this doesn't mean that the US and the international community can't respond to what is happening in Yemen or Syria; but it doesn't necessarily mean that the response has to be one of military intervention. This is only hypocrisy if one views the response to humanitarian emergencies as exclusively that of military force. Clearly as the President suggests the places where the US should send troops in response to a humanitarian emergency is limited - and rightly so.

Exclusive: Amb. Dobbins Says Rabbani's Death Is Validation of Talks Posted by Jacob Stokes

Today former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani -- who as head of the Afghan High Peace Council was tasked with finding a political solution to the war in Afghanistan -- was assassinated by a suicide bomber. The bomber, who hid the bomb in his turban, posed as a member of the Taliban looking to discuss reconciliation with the government before blowing up himself and his target.

This tragic event is clearly a huge setback to the peace process, if for no other reason than it will further strain relations between regional and ethnic groups. Anand Gopal argues on the AfPak channel that Rabbani’s death is just the latest in a campaign to kill off players that aren’t amenable to a pro-Taliban deal.

But in an exclusive interview with NSN and Democracy Arsenal, Ambassador James Dobbins, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation and author of two landmark reports (here and here) on the process of peace talks in Afghanistan, explains that the attack shows the U.S. and the Afghan government are on the right track with negotiations. Amb. Dobbins explains:

Assuming that the assassination was in connection with [Rabbani’s] leadership of the Karzai Peace Council and his U.S.-backed efforts to launch a peace process, it suggests that some elements within the insurgency greatly fear this initiative, both because it has great public appeal throughout Afghanistan and because other elements of the insurgency have been seriously considering engaging in such a process. Tragic as Rabbani’s assassination is, I would thus see it as a validation of the course Karzai and the U.S. are on.

Remember, this week Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the network of the same name, said, “We would support whatever solution our shura members suggest for the future of Afghanistan,” meaning the Quetta Shura, or Afghan Taliban leadership. That was big news. Still is.

There’s no doubt that Rabbani’s death is a big blow, but we always knew the process would be prolonged at best. As Dobbins says, today's tragedy is in some ways a validation of the course American and the Afghan government have embarked on – not reason to depart from it.

Photo: ISAF

Wake Me Up When September Ends Posted by David Shorr

Given the long-looming specter of "September" -- by now a clichéd codeword for the Palestinian push for UN recognition and its ramifications for Middle East peace -- I was grateful for an invitation to join an AIPAC-organized delegation of policy experts for a visit Israel this month. As it turned out, Palestinian issues and the upcoming UN meeting were hardly the only grist for discussion. Other open questions for Israel's future include (in order of prominence during our visit last week):

• Relations with Egypt - where a late-night phone call from President Obama prompted an Egyptian commando operation to rescue Israeli staff trapped in their embassy by a violent mob
• Relations with Turkey - where the Erdogan government threw Israel's ambassador out of the country
• The Iranian nuclear threat - naturally
• The popular uprising against Syrian dictator Bashar Assad
• Recent domestic protests over social and economic conditions within Israel itself

This is only my first post based on the trip, but with world leaders descending on New York for the global debate on Palestinian statehood UN General Assembly general debate, that's a fine place to start. Various motives and aims have been ascribed to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, but the essential thrust of his initiative is to pursue an alternate venue to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It's fair to say the Palestinian leader is forum shopping, but not in the usual sense that forum shoppers maneuver for advantage. From his perspective, he's been a captive customer at the company store, and it hasn't been a very good deal for him. Just to press the analogy as far as possible, it doesn't matter to Abu Mazen that he can't actually obtain statehood from another outlet; he's a thoroughly dissatisfied Peace Process customer. (For an outline of the underlying calculation, Bernard Avishai recommends this paper from the Palestine Strategy Group.)

Given that this raises pointed questions about a negotiated path to a two-state solution, take a look at the excellent ForeignPolicy.com "Think Again" piece on the two-state solution by our own Michael Cohen. It is interesting to compare the assessment from Michael's recent visit to the region with what our group heard. To begin with, the West Bank's current relatively stable conditions mean that the outcome at the UN shouldn't be viewed as a simple non-zero dynamic for Israel. As one Israeli expert told our group, decisive success by the Palestinian Authority at the UN would be bad for Israel's interests, and decisive PA failure in New York would be bad for Israel's interests. In other words, Israel would hardly benefit from Abu Mazen's loss of credibility or political strength. (For a clue to the political stakes for Abbas, see Hamas' vehement opposition to his UN initiative.) 

And then there's the danger of the total collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Many of our meetings discussed the possible fallout that could result from a cut-off of funds for the PA. If the Israeli government overreacts to the UN vote with too punitive a response, it could jeopardize the current excellent cooperation between the PA and the Israeli security services -- as a consequence only heightening the threats Israel faces.

Like Michael, our group also heard about the deepening skepticism among leading Israelis about reaching a two-state solution with the Palestinians. One Israeli tried to put expectations in perspective by describing two attitudes about seriousness: one that expresses seriousness by promising resolution within two years and another that pledges to get serious and take the necessary steps to resolve the conflict within 30 years. In other words, do short-term timelines really square with a realistic picture for how peace will be reached? Since the failure to achieve peace for 45 years since the 1967 War or 20 years since Madrid / Oslo is one of the core problems, I'm reluctant to suspend all near-term hopes. Still, the question doesn't have an easy answer.

The Israeli views I heard on our trip differed from Michael's account on at least one score, and the difference could offer a hopeful path. Michael reports that:

Israelis are either blissfully unaware of, or not bothered by, the humiliation that is the hallmark of Israeli occupation. Hours spent at checkpoints, searches by Israeli soldiers, and transit roads that restrict movement and turn what should be quick trips into daylong excursions are just a few examples of the minor degradations that are a daily part of Palestinian life. 

Actually, we heard several Israelis emphasize these very indignities. Indeed, we discussed the possibility of Israel easing some of these harsh conditions separate and apart from a (non-) two-state solution. Of course, harsh punitive measures after the UN vote would represent a move in the opposite direction. 

As I say, I plan to offer further reflections from the trip in later posts.

Is The Two State Solution Dead? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Foreign Policy I have a new article looking at the question of whether the Arab-Israeli peace process is dead:

In the 18 years since the signing on the White House lawn of the Oslo Accords, which laid the groundwork for a negotiated end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the idea of a two-state solution has gained wide acceptance. According to a joint Israeli-Palestinian poll from March 2010, 57 percent of Palestinians support it; among Israelis the percentage is even higher -- 71 percent. In both Europe and the United States, it's seen as the natural end point of this six-decade conflict. As U.S. President Barack Obama said in May, the "United States believes that negotiations should result in two states -- with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine." Nonetheless, we have reached the point where the ideas of two independent states and a negotiated resolution to the conflict reside on life support.

Read the whole thing here

NSN-POMED Event: Experts Discuss The New Middle East, Iran And The United Nations [VIDEO] Posted by The Editors

Yesterday, the sixty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly opened in New York, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors convened for its second day, and reports out of Iran suggested modest yet significant progress on human rights and nuclear talks. Against this backdrop, the National Security Network and the Project on Middle East Democracy hosted a panel discussion of how the democracy movements sweeping the Arab world are interacting with regional dynamics to create new opportunities and challenges for the U.S. – and how this is playing out at the United Nations.

Watch the video here.

The discussion featured Dr. James Zogby, founder of the Arab American Institute, who reviewed AAI’s recent six-nation polls on Arab attitudes toward the U.S. and Iran; Geneive Abdo, fellow at The Century Foundation and the National Security Network; who discussed the internal politics of Iran and the country’s standing within larger regional dynamics; and Ted Piccone, senior fellow and deputy director for foreign Ppolicy at the Brookings Institution, who assessed the UN’s role, as demonstrated by how it has reacted to and influenced the Arab uprisings. Moderated by NSN Executive Director Heather Hurlburt, the panelists drew on their deep analytical expertise and field experience in the Arab world to explain how the international community can be most effective at supporting the Arab Spring and reshaping the global community for the better. 

Selected transcriptions from the call available after the jump. We will be updating with more transcripts over the next couple days, so if you're looking for more, go ahead and bookmark Democracy Arsenal. You can also check out POMED’s post on the event here.

The Delusions of Ryan Crocker Posted by Michael Cohen

Our new man in Kabul, Ambassador Ryan Crocker is making quite a name for himself - and not in a good way.

Yesterday Taliban insurgents waged an audacious and highly coordinated attack on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters that went on for 20 hours and killed more than a dozen people. Ryan Crocker's verdict on the bloodshed and the fact that insurgents were able to launch a brazen assault in one of the most protected areas of the city. Meh

“These were five guys that rumbled into town with RPGs under their car seats,” Crocker said. “This is not a very big deal, a hard day for the embassy and my staff, who behaved with enormous courage and dedication. But look, you know a dozen RPG rounds from 800 meters away — that isn’t [the] Tet [offensive], that’s harassment.”

If this is harassment I would hate to see what an actual attack looks like. But this apparently has become Crocker's diplomatic m.o.

Last week Crocker said in an interview in the Washington Post that Kabul's biggest problem wasn't security or insurgent attack . . . but traffic.

The situation he found in Kabul this summer, he said, is considerably better than what he saw in 2002, when he helped set up the first post-Taliban government.

“It’s better than I thought,” he said. “The biggest problem in Kabul is traffic. Out in the provinces, even in Kandahar, you see traffic jams there. Kabul is a more liveable city by far than the Baghdad I left in 2009.” And not only for Americans: Afghan school enrollment has risen from 1 million to 8 million — and from 0 to 2.5 million girls. Life expectancy has increased by 20 years in the past decade

This is reminiscent of Mark Sedwill's brain-dead comments last year about how children in Kabul are safer than they are in London or New York. And in reality according to Justin Forsyth of Save the Children, "Afghanistan is the worst place on Earth to be born a child -- one in four children living there will die before they reach the age of 5." 

And then there were the comments Crocker made on the anniversary of September 11th when he argued that even ten years later; even as there is no al Qaeda in Afghanistan; and even as the organization's top leadership has been slowly whittled down by drone strikes . . . we can't leave Afghanistan:

“If we decide to go home before it is ready, you could see a Talibanization of this country and a return to the conditions that existed pre-9/11. You will see regenerated al-Qaeda getting back into the global jihad business.”

"We are here so that there is never again a 9/11 coming from Afghan soil," said Crocker who also added that “I do not think that al-Qaeda is out of business because they lost Osama bin Laden. Not by a long shot.”

Putting aside the fact that these comments contradict the Secretary of Defense who has said that al Qaeda is on its last legs and near defeat, what does it say about the US presence in Afghanistan? After ten years of fighting; after billions upon billions of dollars spent, apparently if we leave too early the whole thing will collapse and the Taliban will take over. It begs the question: if we've been so unsuccessful for the past ten years in propping up an Afghan government that can defend itself why continue to throw good money after bad as clearly it won't do much to make a difference?  This is not to suggest that the US should leave tomorrow, but the argument that if we leave Afghanistan the Taliban will soon take over is a pretty direct refutation of everything that we've done there for the past 10 years. How Crocker squares that with his other claims of progress is hard to figure. 

These were the sort of false arguments about the Taliban and al Qaeda that we were hearing in 2009; it's rather amazing that the US Ambassador in Afghanistan feels the need to trot them out again.

Finally, Crocker even threw cold water on the idea of political negotiations:

The ambassador is dubious that the largest Taliban factions, whose leaders are in Pakistan, will be ready to seriously negotiate with Karzai’s government, or with the United States, anytime soon.

This of course contradicts the President who has said that he believes progress on political reconciliation is possible. Of course we also know that representatives of the Taliban have been in discussions with the United States and that Mullah Omar has blessed these talks. So the argument that the largest Taliban factions are not interested in negotiations seems false. But even if one believes that negotiations with the Taiban are not possible, if it's the position of the US government that political reconciliation is the best means for ending the war in Afghanistan . . . why is our top diplomat in Afghanistan so openly deriding the possibility?

Look I understand that one of Ryan Crocker's jobs is to spin the war in Afghanistan for US audiences - and that his inclination is to try to accentuate the positive. But there is looking on the bright side - and there is being mendacious. Crocker looks like he's doing far more of the latter than he is the former.

 

Postcard from Paris: Ten Years Later, French Thoughts Still with America Posted by The Editors

This guest post is by Leah Pisar, who serves on the boards of the French-American Foundation and the National Security Network.

PARIS -- Yesterday, Nicolas Sarkozy put a small dent into French protocol and made a solemn visit to his neighbor, U.S. Ambassador Charles Rivkin, just a few doors down from the Elysée Palace, to take part in a commemoration of the September 11^th attacks. (It’s unusual for a head of state to visit an Embassy.) Visibly moved, the French President expressed his country’s solidarity and friendship at this time of difficult remembrance.

Ten years after the terrorist attacks that shook the world and rallied the international community around America, a renewed sense of support and compassion is tangible throughout Europe. Many leaders have expressed it. President Sarkozy’s words echoed those of his predecessor, Jacques Chirac -- the first foreign head of state to visit Ground Zero and the White House in the immediate wake of the attacks. We all remember the unwavering support that poured in from across the Atlantic: For the first time since its creation in 1949, NATO invoked article 5 – which states that an attack on one member of the alliance shall be deemed as an attack on all.  And France’s leading newspaper, Le Monde, famously headlined: “Today, we are all Americans.”

It was downhill from there. European allies were supportive of the war in Afghanistan, but a dangerous schism developed as Washington and its motley “coalition of the willing” prepared to go into Iraq. France did not offer its support, nor did Germany. Relations with America’s oldest ally soured terribly, leading to such silliness as turning “French fries” into “Freedom Fries”.  Things eventually fell back into place, as the Bush administration realized that America cannot go it alone and rekindled the dialogue.

Today, tensions over Iraq are all but forgotten and France is again on good terms with Washington, the NATO operation in Libya being heralded as an important multilateral success. At the same time, there is a sobering realization that the nature of the transatlantic relationship has changed since the end of the Cold War and even more so since 9/11. Europe is no longer the main theatre for international crises: They have moved elsewhere, out of area. With that in mind, there is a lingering concern that America no longer looks to Europe the way it used to, that it is focused elsewhere – on the Middle East, on Asia, on its own internal challenges.

But there is a need for Europe and America to work hand in hand to tackle these problems, together. The 9/11 commemorations, with a great sense of solemnity and and vigils planned throughout Europe, remind the Old Continent that we’re all in this together, be it geopolitically or economically. There is a very live sense of vulnerability. Over the last 10 years, European capitals have been hit by terrorism on a huge scale. And the pervasive feeling is, that unlike traditional commemorations, where one focuses on a past even, here we are commemorating a threat that is still live.

Ten years later, seen from Europe, the symbolism of 9/11 is strong and the memories are still fresh. The press seems almost exclusively focused on, even obsessed with, coverage of this morbid anniversary. And while there is some recalling of the Bush Administration’s mishandling of things and cavalier attitude toward international law, there is an overwhelming sense of sympathy and concern. 

This weekend, everyone is asking the same question: Where were you on 9/11?  It seems that everybody suffered some sort of trauma at the same time and that the West’s collective psyche was deeply affected. That Le Monde was right, and 10 years later, when thinking back to 9/11, many Europeans still feel that “today, we are all American.”

Image: Seattle P-I

Is America Safer? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Atlantic I have a new piece up looking at the question of whether in fact the United States is living in a dangerous world. Not surprisingly I tend to think the fears of global threats are grossly overstated:

For all the warnings of imminent doom, rarely before in America's history has the United States been in less danger than it is today. And understanding that might be the single most effective tool for keeping America safe and secure in the 21st century.

The United States today faces no serious existential threat from a foreign actor, no great power rival, and no military competitor that imperils the American homeland. Part of this is the result of geography, but the larger reason is that no country that considers America a rival has much good reason to turn it into a potential enemy. After all, the backbone of our national security, the U.S. military, remains far and away the world's most powerful and fearsome . . .

Considering America's propensity to act rashly in the face of foreign "threats" understanding that the U.S. is, for the most part, a safe and well-protected country might be the single best tool for keeping America secure and resistant to the sort of over-reactions that made the last 10 years something of a lost decade.

You can read the whole thing here

 

The Washington Post Tries To Rewrite History . . . Again Posted by Michael Cohen

Here's a question for DA readers: if you were to pick the most extreme over-reaction from September 11th what might it be? Guantanamo Bay? Torture? Warrantless wiretapping? Sure those all would be on the list, but I have a feeling the number one pick for most observers of American foreign policy over the past ten years would have to be the decision to invade Iraq - a war of choice against a country that had nothing to do with 9/11 was not harboring al Qaeda and was not a direct threat to the United States. It was, of course, a conflict that did absolutely nothing to further US national security interests or substantially weaken al Qaeda.

Yet in an ongoing efforts to wash its hands of responsibility for cheerleading this singularly calamitous event in American history, the Washington Post editorial page seems to think that the disaster of Iraq barely rates a mention.  In an editorial arguing that the United States did not overreact to 9/11 - a unique position to say the least - it mentions Iraq only 4 times (twice in passing).

It has only this to say about the war:

"The United States went to war in Iraq on the basis of faulty intelligence and was arrogantly ill-prepared for the responsibilities of occupation once Saddam Hussein fell."

Now do you see what Fred Hiatt and his fellow op-ed writers have done here? According to their interpretation of history the fault for the decision to go to war in Iraq lies not with public officials and their enablers in the mass media; or the pressure that the White House put on intelligence agencies to support pre-determined conclusions about the threat from Iraq - but rather with the intelligence itself. 

In fact, as the 2008 Senate report looking at pre-war intelligence on Iraq demonstrated, Bush Administration officials made comments about the threat from Iraq not backed up intel estimates:

Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa'ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.

Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.

Indeed, Fred Hiatt has been trotting out this malarkey about "faulty intelligence" off and on for several years ago (I wrote about it here in 2008). It wasn't true then; it's not true now. 

Instead of acknowledging how alarmism about jihadist terror bred a desperate and ill-advised over-reaction that caused the US to squander precious resources on a misguided conflict - for which the Washington Post was more than happy to lustily support - the editors at the Post would rather focus on the positive:

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon alerted Americans to genuine dangers that only a relative few had noticed. We have lived safely for the decade since not because we misread those dangers but because we responded to them in a manner in which, on balance, Americans can take pride. 

Again, nothing that the United States did in Iraq made one American safer - rather it took the lives of more than 4700 Americans, wounded tens of thousands of others and killed an estimated 100,000 Iraqis. Along with the 10 year engagement in Afghanistan it diverted trillions of dollars in resources away from pressing national challenges (Think Progress has a nice rundown of how that money could have been more effectively spent)

There are a lot of words to describe this series of events.

Pride is most certainly not one of them.

The Politics of Terrorism . . . Ten Years Later Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Atlantic, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross rather counter-intuitively  argues that a decade after 9/11 the United States is less safe from terrorism. Considering that America's key jihadist enemy has been forced out of their safe haven, largely decimated from US military strikes and seen their ideology discredited across the Arab world and considering that the United States has improved intelligence sharing, strengthened homeland security and built up a hefty political will to deal with terrorist threats over the past ten years it seems a bit hard to imagine that America could possibly be safer. Nonetheless, Gartenstein-Ross has an interesting argument:

Safety is a product of our defensive capabilities and resiliency measured against an enemy's capacity to attack us. While al-Qaeda's capacity to attack us hasn't increased significantly, the United States has far weaker capabilities than it did 10 years ago: even if al Qaeda has experienced a decline in the past decade, then the U.S. has declined more steeply. 

The U.S.'s economic woes are well known. We have an economy in shambles and a national debt of more than $14 trillion. If this continues, we won't be able to maintain our current security apparatus and our ability to project power -- both seriously expensive enterprises -- forever. A decade ago, American safety came in part from the fact that we had the capacity, if needed, to ramp up resources to devote to the problem. In the coming decade, fewer resources will be available to devote to counterterrorism and to other problems the country faces.

The basic thrust of Gartenstein-Ross's argument is that the US has been so weakened by its overreaction to 9/11 that it lacks the capability, pocketbook and the will to respond appropriately to future attacks. "Our resilience has eroded in multiple ways," he argues.

I'm not seeing it. In the three years since the great crash, the US didn't cut back any resources or attention to the fight against "terrorism" - in fact the US largely increased them. President Obama sent nearly 50,000 additional troops to Afghanistan - doubling the number of American soldiers on the ground. Drone strikes against al Qaeda in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia have been significantly ramped up. And the pursuit of Osama bin Laden took on greater urgency. In fact, the United States even found time to launch a war in Libya that was largely tangential to US vital interests. Where is the evidence that the United States, even in a period of austerity and budgetary pressures, has faced any obstacles in "ramping up resources to devote" to counter-terrorism or war-fighting in general?

As for the issue of whether "we won't be able to maintain our current security apparatus and our ability to project power." Wouldn't that be a good thing? Isn't it generally accepted that the US wildly overreacted in response to 9/11 and that our ability to project power led to policies that weakened rather than strengthened the United States? Wouldn't it be better if the United States didn't feel a desperate need to seek out foreign monsters to destroy whenever we feel that our security might be at risk?  Indeed, Gartenstein-Ross wisely makes this point - that in the wake of 9/11 we devoted too many resources to counter-terrorism and overspent on homeland defense. So I don't really understand why he thinks it would be an actual problem if the United States felt somewhat constrained in how it responded to a future attack. Don't we all wish George W. Bush had felt a bit more constrained after September 11th?

As much as I would like to agree with Gartenstein-Ross's argument I don't believe that even in an age of austerity "fewer resources" will be devoted to the fight against terrorism. Even with budget cuts for the Pentagon looming on the horizon the last part of the defense budget that will take a hair cut is the counter-terrorism brief, for what should be obvious political reasons. Indeed, you could probably make so me pretty significant cuts to the defense budget and still not demonstrably weaken America's ability to wage an effective counter-terrorism campaign.

And if we're hit again, fugetaboutit. If that happens, there is no limit to what Congress and the President will spend to respond.  

In the end, I think - again unfortunately - that the notion of economic stagnation imperiling our reaction to the next terrorist attack misunderstands the politics of terrorism. If there is one lesson that we should have learned over the past ten years it is that the federal government can mobilize plenty of resources in the name of national security.

Creating jobs and spurring economic growth . . . not so much.

 

The Legacy 9/11: The Militarization of Foreign Policy Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at World Politics Review, I have a two-part series on how 9/11 sped up the proces of militarizing US foreign policy:

On Sept. 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 Americans were killed in the single deadliest terrorist attack in American history -- the work, not of a foreign army, but of al-Qaida, a nonstate actor. The U.S. wasted little time in responding. The Taliban government in Afghanistan that had provided safe haven for the terrorist group was quickly deposed by a combination of U.S. special forces and CIA operatives working alongside Afghan anti-government forces. The leadership and core followers of al-Qaida were pushed fleeing in disarray across the Pakistani border. Since 2001, the group has been unable to successfully launch another attack against the continental United States.

This could have been the end of the story: a horrific attack and a lightning U.S. response, followed by a comprehensive national effort to protect the homeland from future terrorist assault. Instead, the so-called War on Terror went on to dominate not just America's collective imagination but also its foreign policy objectives, while transforming the role of its armed forces.
 
Since Sept. 11, the United States has devoted trillions of dollars and thousands of lives to the fight against terrorism, with the Pentagon becoming the sharp end of the American spear.

Read the whole thing here and check out part 2 of the series on some of the steps that can be taken to reverse this trend.

Perry Tries to Split the Difference on ‘Military Adventurism’ Posted by Jacob Stokes

Rick Perry’s performance in the debate last night showed he continues to be midway through the transition from Tea Party governor to neoconservative candidate. The tension between those two schools of thought was drawn out by a specific question last night from Politico’s John Harris. Harris asked Perry: “You recently said, quote, ‘I do not believe that America should fall subject to a foreign policy of military adventurism.’ Looking back, do you think President George W. Bush was too quick to launch military intervention without thinking through the risks?”

Perry’s answer was, “I was making a comment about a philosophy; I don't think America needs to be in the business of adventurism.” And then he pivoted to, of all things, congratulating President Obama on nabbing Osama bin Laden. You know the man is flustered when he parries a question by praising Obama.

Harris tried to not let Perry off that easy though, following up with “it's hard to understand philosophy without understanding specifics. Where are some of the places where you think we've seen military adventurism?” In other words, say Iraq, say Afghanistan. Hell, even just say Libya.

But Perry wouldn’t. He responded to Harris’s second question with some boilerplate language about clear exit strategies and American interests. Harris let him slide after that.

Getting out of all our actual – as opposed to theoretical wars -- was the preferred stance last night. Santorum was the lone voice for American primacy. Bachmann gave a slight endorsement of the idea as she argued against defense cuts – “We have, for many years, maintained global order in the world with our United States military.” -- but her stance there was undermined by her lack of support for the Libya action.

Perry knows the wars aren’t selling. He also knows that his advisors were the architects of the sort of “military adventurism” of the last ten years that he was alluding to in his speech to the VFW, where the quote came from. Throwing them under the bus would have provoked a loud outcry—and likely desertion—from neocons in Washington. He tried to thread the needle, but I think it was one of his weakest moments of the night. If these issues have salience with the electorate, which the evidence suggests that they don’t, Perry looked very wishy-washy last night.

One other quick highlight: Jon Huntsman argued for incorporating the costs of military protection of transportation routes for oil into the price of gas: “When you add up the cost of troop deployments, when you add up the cost of keeping the sea lanes open for the importation of imported oil, the bulk and distribution and terminaling costs (ph), it's $13 a gallon, so says the Milken Institute. And I say the American people have had enough.” Savor that, because it’s an argument that’s unlikely to be heard in a presidential debate for a while.

In case you missed the debate, the full transcript of the main foreign policy exchange is below:

The Never Ending COIN Boosterism Posted by Michael Cohen

So to mark the 10th anniversary of September 11th, RUSI has an interesting compendium of pieces looking back on the significance of 9/11 from a national security perspective. John Nagl not surprisingly argues that as a result of 9/11 has now become the most capable counter-insurgency force in history - and used as his evidence the US military escalation in Afghanistan: 

Barack Obama, who had campaigned on refocusing attention on the war in Afghanistan, found the situation there so dire that he nearly tripled US forces during the first year of his presidency. For the first time, American commanders had sufficient troops to begin to implement classic 'clear, hold, build' counter-insurgency doctrine in southern Afghanistan. They made real progress on the ground, albeit marred by corruption in Afghan governance, and began handing over more secure parts of the country to Afghan security forces this past summer. Many made silent prayers that the Afghans were ready.

This is a bit like saying other than that how was the play Mrs. Lincoln? Missing from Nagl's analysis is that any progress US commanders have made on the ground is not sustainable because of a) the failures in Afghan governance b) the inability of the ANSF to take over security responsibilities c) and the lack of American staying power. Nagl's arguments acts like these are blips in the path to success as opposed to fundamental and unmovable obstructions that were of course evident when the President decided to escalate in December 2009. 

Also prayer is not a strategy.

The very fact that President Obama is basically pulling the plug on the COIN effort in Afghanistan by withdrawing troops is the most obvious example of COIN's larger strategic failure. By failing to take into account the lack of political will in the United States for an extended COIN fight - and the lack of an effective Afghan partner - counter-insurgency advocates have ensured that the tactical gains made on the ground won't be sustained. This has likely left Afghanistan in worse shape than if they had recognized this reality from the get go. The United States would have been far better off putting in place a strategy for Afghanistan that could be sustained for the long-term, both politically and militarily. Instead COIN advocates overreached, believing that they could convince the President to give them more time to implement a well-resourced COIN strategy. It didn't work out that way and the result is that now we are looking at the likelihood of a more precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan with the US having done little to lay the groundwork for our eventual withdrawal (and with even less political will to get things right before we leave). 

So while I suppose one can argue that the Army better understands how to fight COIN (a debatable concept and from a population centric standpoint probably untrue) -- the political myopia of COIN advocates has helped to ensure that it won't succeed in Afghanistan.

Then there is this: "The killing of Osama Bin Laden underlined the success the US had had in dismantling Al-Qa'ida around the globe, largely due to counter-terrorism efforts relying on drones and special operations forces, but aided by broader counter insurgency efforts."

I know that COIN is graduate school war so maybe it's over my head but I'm having a hard time seeing the connection between, say, the Marine offensive in Marjah and the death of Obama bin Laden. Here's a counter-factual: If President Obama had in 2009 decided "I'm going to listen to Joe Biden and put in place a CT strategy" would that have meant that the US would not have been able to get OBL in April 2011? I suppose it's possible, but I don't see it. if anything we might have gotten more security cooperation from Pakistan, which today is basically fighting a proxy war against the United States in Afghanistan. 

But hey far be it from me to get in the middle of a really good story.

Technical Problems Persist Despite Much-Hyped Advancements in Iran's Nuclear Program Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

The power plant at Bushehr was officially connected to the grid this weekend, squeaking out 60 megawatts of electricity during a test run on Sunday at midnight.

Iranian officials hailed this achievement, yet again, but failed to acknowledge the repeated technical setbacks the Bushehr plant has faced since construction first broke ground in the 1970s.

Bushehr is operated by the Russians, who are providing and taking back the fuel. This alleviates the most worrisome proliferation concern - as does the fact that Bushehr is under IAEA safeguards. The plant does not bring Iran closer to a nuclear weapon capability and is distinct from other facilities where activities cannot be verified. Bushehr is, however, indicative of the larger technical problems plaguing Iran’s nuclear program. In an IAEA safeguards report released last week, the Secretary General’s report noted that during a recent visit to Bushehr, “Iran explained that the reactor had been shut down for technical reasons and that it was planning to restart the reactor within the next few days.” This is pretty much par for the course. 

The updated IAEA report was widely circulated as proof that Iran is coming ever closer to achieving a breakout capability, and that may well be, but there’s more good news to this report than the headlines suggested.

While Iran is now operating a new generation of advanced centrifuges, it’s telling that it has taken this long to do so. Iran has installed IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, but it’s only using a few of them – putting them well behind their intended schedule. What’s more – Iran hasn’t installed any of these advanced centrifuges at its underground facility near the city of Qom, as it announced it would. That Iran installed IR-1 centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant is unusual. The Institute for Science and International Security reported that these are new IR-1 centrifuges, but even if that’s the case, it indicates some sort of delay and/or setback. In a recent piece, David Sanger notes how inefficient the IR-1 centrifuges are and points out that Ahmadinejad announced over five years ago that Iran would be pursuing advanced centrifuges:

The cranky IR-1 stands over six feet tall. Inside, a hollow rotor of aluminum spins uranium gas, slowly enriching the material in the rare isotope that can be turned into fuel for reactors and warheads. But the design is so antiquated and inefficient, that even Pakistan stopped using those centrifuges long ago. There are tales of catastrophic failures in the machines, which spin at supersonic speeds. The Stuxnet attack was designed to speed them up, and make them explode.

In an April 2006 speech, Mr. Ahmadinejad boasted that the nation was embarking on a new generation of more advanced centrifuges that would quadruple Iran’s enrichment powers. Those centrifuges were also based on a design obtained from Mr. Khan. Iran failed to obtain a very hard type of steel to make rotors for them. So, in secret, the Iranians developed their own, with the rotor made of carbon fibers.

The Arms Control Association’s Peter Crail further notes:

Iran’s slipping timeframe for the introduction of its more advanced machines is not surprising since its nuclear program deadlines are often fluid. However, it does appear to back official and independent assessments that Iran still faces problems developing these new centrifuges, including getting sufficient materials to build them in large numbers.

None of these setbacks, however, change the fact that Iran simply does not need the amount uranium it is currently enriching – particularly at the 20 percent level. It is getting harder and harder for Iran to justify this and damning conclusions like that which was announced by the IAEA on Friday – that “the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities” – only leads to an increasingly isolated Iran. And while evidence of a possible military dimension continues to pile up, so too does the string of technical setbacks.

They Never Learn Posted by Michael Cohen

In an ongoing effort to prove that the US foreign policy pundit class is seemingly incapable of engaging in deductive reasoning, check out Roger Cohen's piece on Monday trumpeting US intervention in Libya.

The intervention has been done right — with the legality of strong United Nations backing, full support from America’s European allies, and quiet arming of the rebels. The Libyan people have been freed from a crazed tyranny. Unlike in Iraq, burdens were shared: America flew the intelligence missions and did the refueling while the French, British, Dutch and others did most of the bombing. Iraq was the wrong prism through which to look at Libya. I’m glad I resisted that temptation. Another cycle has begun.

In the end, I think interventionism is inextricable from the American idea. If the United States retreats into isolationism, it ceases to be itself — a nation dedicated, however much it falls short, to a universalist ideal of freedom.

There are no fixed doctrinal answers — a successful Libyan intervention does not mean one in Syria is feasible — but the idea that the West must at times be prepared to fight for its values against barbarism is the best hope for a 21st century less cruel than the 20th.

First things first, it is simply not possible to describe the Libyan intervention as successful . . until the war, you know, actually ends. I mean obviously it is possible; it's just really foolish. We are still a very long way from being able to make the judgment that US intervention in Libya furthered US national security interests.

Second, Cohen is definitely right that interventionism is inextricable from the American idea; but if he wants to know why he might do well to consider the deeper meaning of his argument that "West must at times be prepared to fight for its values against barbarism is the best hope for a 21st century less cruel than the 20th."  It's this sort of exceptionalist mindset; this notion that the US has a responsibility - and the capabilities - to fight for its values; that is precisely the reason why America IS an interventionist nation. Cohen seems to miss completely the connection between American exceptionalist myth-making and failed US military interventions.

Don't believe me? Check out what Cohen says earlier in the piece. In describing Peter Beinart's argument that US military intervention operates in various cycles he makes the following statement:

Beinart describes how . . . he in time became sickened by the Vietnam analogy with its recurring prescription for inaction. Shaped by Bosnia, he backed the Iraq war. The pendulum had swung. Vietnam-induced excess of caution had given way to Bosnian-induced hubris.

I, too, fell under its influence. Mea culpa. Whatever the monstrosity of Saddam, and whatever the great benefit to the world of his disappearance, the war as it was justified and fought — under false pretenses, without many of America’s closest allies, in ignorance and incompetence — was a stain on America’s conscience.

Here's the beauty of this: Cohen recognizes that what led the US into Iraq was a certain "hubris" that came from intervention in the Balkans. (This by the way is almost certainly true and helps explain why so many liberal hawks supported the ill-fated Iraq intervention.) And yet he's completely blind to the fact that he is engaging in the exact same sort of hubris regarding Libya. Cohen seems to understand the connection between humanitarian intervention in the Balkans and Iraq, but is simply incapable of understanding how his own triumphalism on Libya might presage the next US military intervention.

To be sure it's not remarkable when foreign policy pundits fail to recognize or acknowledge the inconsistency in their views re: national security policy or US military interventions. it's rather amazing when they fail to recognize it in one 800 word op-ed.

Is it the End of History for Neonservatives? Posted by James Lamond

As Heather writes below, Peter Beinart has a very interesting piece up at the Daily Beast on the death of neoconservativism. His basic argument is that the Obama administration’s success at decimating al Qaeda leadership through counterterrorism operations rather than democracy promotion and nation building is evidence that the ideology is broken. Combine this with the culture of limits that is dominating Washington and the national debate, the ideology that rejects limits is not likely to survive. While, I wish this were the case, I think Beinart’s focus on post-9/11 neoconservatives ignores the movement’s ability to hype threats and reinvent the boogeyman.

Beinart writes: 

“Today, by contrast, it is increasingly obvious that the real successor to German fascism and Soviet communism is not Al Qaeda, whose mud-hut totalitarianism repels the vast majority of Muslims. It is China’s authoritarian capitalism, the first nondemocratic ideology since the 1930s to challenge the idea that democracy is the political system best able to promote shared prosperity. And not only is Al Qaeda sliding into irrelevance, its demise is being hastened by exactly the narrowly targeted policies that neoconservatives derided.”

Battling terrorism through nation-building is not the ideological foundation for neocons, just the most recent incarnation. In his history of the neoconservatism Justin Vaisse of Brookings identifies five pillars that transcend the various generations that have worn the neocon label: internationalism, primacy, unilateralism, militarism and democracy. This is what drove the Cold War hawks who criticized Nixon and Kissinger on détente and Team B-ed the intelligence on Soviet military threat and strategic objectives. These pillars can again be easily transferred to a new boogeyman. Including, the most likely candidate Beinart mentions: China. 

Beinart also points to the lack of a connection to the Republican Party as further evidence of the death of the ideology: 

"But to grasp neoconservatism’s demise, you don’t need to look at the Middle East. Just look at the Republican presidential race. None of the major candidates is attacking President Obama along neoconservative lines. None is focusing on his withdrawal from Iraq or his timetable for exiting Afghanistan or his refusal to bomb Iran. The one Republican candidate with a truly coherent foreign policy vision—Ron Paul—is attacking Obama for acting too much like a neoconservative. The other candidates don’t have any coherent critique at all, because while they know they’re supposed to call Obama an appeaser, they also know that even Republican voters have little appetite for the neoconservative agenda of continued war in the Middle East."

But neconservativism never had a wide political base, electoral force or popular movement behind it. As Vaisse writes, “nobody ever got elected on a ‘neoconservative platform.’” George W. Bush famously ran in 2000 pledging a “modest” foreign policy. As Beinart rightly points out, for what they have said about foreign policy thus far, the GOP presidential candidates tend towards the “modest” George Bush of 2000, versus the George Bush of 2003. But this is probably as much attributable the lack of a Tea Party foreign policy and a lack of a coherent world view from the broader GOP as anything else. And as Jake wrote earlier this month, Rick Perry -- a Tea Party candidate --  is being advised by Donald Rumsfeld, Doug Feith and Dan Blumenthal, all either widely considered neocons or longtime allies. 

I think Beinart is correct in many respects, particularly on the fact that the economic-centric national debate does not bode well for the movement without an economic outlook. But ultimately, even if post-9/11 neoconservativism is dead, that doesn’t mean we have heard the last from the group. 

"I'm not Dead Yet!" Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Peter Beinart has a thought-provoking article up this morning proclaiming the death of neo-conservatism.  I think he is at least premature, for several reasons:

Conservatives lack a coherent alternative.  Yes, Ron Paul is polling well and he has a coherent alternative which we wonks refer to as "offshore balancing;" and yes, neocon standard-bearers Sens. McCain and Graham are getting little resonance for their calls for a military response to Syria and more, faster military response to Libya.  But every time a GOP presidential candidate, declared or putative, has started to edge away from neocon orthodoxy on Afghanistan (Romney, Huntsman, Barbour) he has been pushed back to the standard GOP line -- or out of relevance.  The realist conservative foreign policy community is either quietly advising Huntsman, even more quietly trying to advise Romney, or just sitting back and wishing that Mayor Bloomberg, Governor Daniels or Governor Barbour would reconsider.  Recent reports that Governor Perry is reading Henry Kissinger and consulting with Don Rumsfeld; and that he opposes "military adventurism" but also thinks there might be "a military solution to a country like Iran" sum up conservatives' intellectual drift on the central questions of the nature and future of American power.

Tea Party lacks a foreign policy. It's become popular to say that neoconservatism is gone from the GOP because the Tea Party opposes it.  But that's not exactly true.  The Tea Party, being a movement rather than a political party, encompasses a variety of heterodox foreign policy views, from neoconservative to neoisolationist, as Josh Rogin and others have written. 

Bankruptcy is not the same as death.  Democracy Arsenal's own Michael Cohen wrote to me that neoconservatism died when Hamas won the Palestinian elections.  Commenters on Beinart's piece argue that it died a-borning in George W. Bush's first term.  But those were moments in which neoconservatism failed to deliver on its promises.  The gold standard, trickle-down economics, and others one could name are also intellectual approaches which still exert some considerable influence despite having been found wanting in the reality-based environment.   One can also make the argument that Center for American Progress' Peter Juul does, which is to say that the Bush Administration was not truly neoconservative, and that therefore the doctrine is not dead as it has never been tried.  (This last argumentcan also of course be made about Marxism...) 

Most dangerous when cornered.  Our neocon competitors in the intellectual sphere don't think they're defeated.  I don't hear them talking about moving to New Zealand or taking up organic farming as an alternative livelihood.  Indeed, they seem highly-motivated.  And in general it is dangerous to underestimate the staying power of determined, organized, savvy individuals -- or of simple, cheerful explanatory ideas in the US political psyche.  Remember, the neocon moment offered us a way to feel good about ourselves after national lows in the 1970s and on 9-11.  And if you don't think we're heading for a new low in the national psyche, I want some of what you're drinking.

Is Assad Next? Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

As events continue to unfold in Libya, commentary has turned to Syria and whether Assad is “next.” 

In her latest Foreign Affairs piece, Genieve Abdo argues that Assad is likely to stay in power, due in no small part to Iranian involvement. 

Abdo writes:

Assad's chances of staying in power are greater than were those of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. He may be forced to make some concessions to the protestors, but he still wields too much power to be removed from office completely. To date, there have been no significant defections within the Alawite-controlled military, which is key to his survival, and the Iranian-trained and supplied security forces have prevented the protests from reaching the levels of those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In Iran's view, much like the Tehran spring, the struggle for Syria is one of regime survival. Even if Assad should eventually fall, Iran will not stand idly by; Tehran will surely try to influence any successive government. 

Read the piece in its entirety here.

Experts Comment on What's Next for Libya, the Rebels and the Region Posted by The Editors

As more than 40 years of Muammar Qaddafi's corrupt and tyrannical rule appears to be drawing to a close, the National Security Network held a press call this afternoon with Heather Hurlburt, National Security Network Executive Director; Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress Senior Fellow and expert in U.S.-Middle East policy; and Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch Washington Director and recent visitor to Benghazi.

Listen to the call here.

Some highlights include:

Tom Malinowski detailed the spectrum of groups in the anti-Gaddafi movement [starting at minute 3:20] and their “healthy relationship” with the international community [9:55]; outlined revenge killings, prisoner executions and unsecured weapons facilities and government buildings as key operational and human rights concerns [5:42]; and explained that the anti-Gaddafi movement will require money and U.N. involvement but not foreign military peacekeeping forces to facilitate transition [18:27].

Brian Katulis explained the steps being taken to consolidate control of Libyan weapons [11:18]; examined the Arab Spring in light of U.N. General Assembly dynamics [13:02]; outlined pragmatism and judicious use of power as the two pillars of the Obama administration approach to the Arab Spring [14:43]; and insisted on a reassessment of the role of political Islam in the Middle East [16:33].

Heather Hurlburt explained that post-transition leaders’ understanding that the U.S. sides with them has been and will be key for achieving American interests in the long-run (12:10).

Selected transcriptions from the call after the jump:

Nukes and Dictator Survival Posted by David Shorr

Last night the guest host of The Last Word Chris Hayes did an excellent segment with Steve Clemons on how the overthrow of Qaddafi will affect other despots' survival strategies with regard to nuclear weapons. Bear in mind that Qaddafi agreed in 2003 to hand over the entire contents of his budding yet substantial nuclear weapons program in exchange for being let out of the rogue state penalty box and bettering relations with the US and others.

Recent events raise some important questions. With the benefit of hindsight, should Qaddafi regret his decision to abandon the pursuit of a nuclear arsenal? If he had continued to develop n-weapons, would other nations have intervened militarily at the risk of nuclear retaliation? And if nukes offer a dictator the most reliable way to shield themselves, does the possibility of intervention create perverse incentives for him to build a nuclear deterrent? In other words, did the US and NATO just undercut their own interests in nuclear nonproliferation? [By the way, that TV screen shot above is from the 2008 broadcast of an eerily prophetic speech to fellow Arab League leaders on the threat of being ousted, a level of candor you just never ever see (h/t The Atlantic Wire).]

Without question, there are clear trade-offs in the choice between seeking the removal of a dictator versus making a deal with him. In the Last Word segment, Steve portrays it as a sharp-edged either/or choice for foreign policy -- and the world -- as a whole. As he sees it, giving dictators perverse incentives to arm themselves runs directly counter to global nuclear nonproliferation, and President Obama has stepped on his own previously wise nonpro policy with this Libya intervention. While I see the problem, I don't see it in such stark terms. 

Confronted with a potential new nuclear-armed nation, it's vital to have your priorities clear. Speaking of incentives, no government in the world would agree to bare all in a nuclear "full monty" if they suspect an ulterior agenda of deposing them from power. For a potential proliferator, the only reasonable basis for an agreement is to bolster the longevity of their own governmental regime by emerging from international isolation and rejoining community of nations. In other words, if the US wants to remove the nuclear threat, it must be willing to tolerate the dictator. 

In the case of Libya in the early 2000s, the Bush Administration rightly pushed Qaddafi for a policy-change of verifiable disarmament -- with no hint that they would continue to treat a disarmed regime as a pariah. It's interesting to read Elliot Abrams last February in the Wall Street Journal, given that he's better known as favoring regime-change in other cases, recount the Bush Administration's rationale for treating nuclear weapons as the greater danger. For Greg Scoblete of RealClearWorld Compass Blog, that begged the question of why Bush didn't apply the same reasoning to Iran? Iranian leaders had little incentive to reach a nuclear deal with Bush when there were so many signs of an underlying objective of regime-change. And thus when the Tehran regime came under severe pressure after the June 2009 elections, the Obama Administration was at pains to cordon off the nuclear talks from the legitimacy question because of how the matter had become blurred under Bush.

With such strong arguments, then, for rewarding good nonproliferation deeds by bad leaders, why is it still okay sometimes to seek their removal. First, because the nuclear-arsenal-as-deterrent-shield isn't the rogue leader's only incentive calculation about nuclear weapons. If a government is clearly a high-value target for regime-change, then a deterrent could be crucial for survival. If an autocrat is relatively unlikely to be overthrown, however, then the international isolation, diplomatic pressure, along with any economic sanctions take their own toll. 

Second, I think we can differentiate between renegging on our end of the bargain as distinct from the other guys nullifying it. It's the same issue as with Egypt last winter: how far do the decades-old Camp David obligations extend, as a sclerotic elite continually resists reform and loses all legitimacy? Returning to the humanitarian premise of the intervention -- Qaddafi's threatened brutality against Benghazi -- we don't need to give dictators carte blanche in order to preserve the right nonproliferation incentives. If a de-nuclearized despot wants to stay in the international community's good graces, and thereby fend off forcible regime change from the outside world, all he has to do is refrain from mass atrocities. The emerging international norm of the Responsibility to Protect says that the very sovereignty of a government is contingent on exercising such self-restraint; so is any nuclear deal.

After the Fall, Continued Posted by Jacob Stokes

Last week I wrote about the need to plan for post-Qaddafi Libya. Now the country is in the thick of things. Stabilization must begin even as Qaddafi remains in a bunker somewhere, mourning his lost Condoleezza Rice photo album. The TNC, as well as other actors and the international community, will have to make choices quickly and with imperfect information. To inform that process, Brian Fishman of the New America Foundation has a piece out on what needs to be done to prevent the sorts of insurgencies we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He begins by noting that while Qaddafi didn’t have a lot of friends, some groups did benefit from his rule—and thus could form the basis of an insurgency. Fishman writes: “The triumph of Libya's rebels over Qaddafi loyalists in Tripoli and elsewhere represents a genuine victory by the Libyan people over a corrupt ruling elite. But the narrowness of Qaddafi's power base should not obscure the fact that there are losers in this revolution -- enough of them to plunge Libya into a protracted insurgency if the postwar period isn't handled properly.” Fishman offers five pieces of advice for preventing an insurgency:

1. Do not put Western boots on the ground.

2. Put people to work, especially soldiers and technical experts.

3. Treat the defeated leadership with respect.

4. Don’t forget about the police.

5. Buy back the guns.

He sums them up: “The key is to identify social and political groups with real power and allow them to negotiate Libya's future in a structured manner rather than impose a vision from abroad or allow narrow domestic factions to monopolize government authority.”

Building on many of the same themes, RAND’s James Dobbins and Fred Wehrey suggest:

Security should be the first priority. The United States' experience in Iraq shows that a critical window exists for the rebel leadership to establish its legitimacy, win the trust of the Libyan people, and prevent the onset of looting, vendettas, and warlordism. Societies emerging from conflict invariably have too many soldiers and too few police. The international community must help Libya quickly demobilize the combatants on both sides of the conflict and build a competent police force. Much will also hinge on the swift but magnanimous application of justice, which should emphasize reconciliation rather than retribution…

Libya's limited size, favorable location, relative wealth, and homogeneous population should help ease a transition to peace and democracy, but absence of both government institutions and an established civil society suggest that the road may nevertheless be long and rocky.

To use the newest (very true) cliché in international affairs, the hardest work is yet to come in Libya. These outlines seem like a good place to start.

Options for Gaddafi Posted by James Lamond

With the world sitting in anticipation for the news of Gaddafi's arrest it is worth taking a look at his options going forward. In June the International Criminal Court accused Gaddafi of inciting his troops to commit mass rape, and indicted him, his son Saif al-Islam and his intelligence chief Abdullah Sanussi with charges of crimes against humanity including the murder of hundreds of civilians, torture and the persecution of innocent people. Gaddafi could also face the consequences of his 41 year of authoritarian rule, his system of bribery, enriching himself and his family with the country's oil money and support for international terrorism. So what are the options going forward?

The exile option - a favorite for dictators - seems unlikely. Early on there were reports that South Africa might provide him with asylum. That has since been proven not to be the case. South Africa, as signatory to the ICC, would be required to arrest and extradite him. With 116 signatories to the ICC, there are few hiding places for the ousted Libyan leader. Zimbawe and Angola seem to be the most likely options, neither is a signatory. 

If Gaddafi does not make it out of the country and is in fact taken alive, he will have to face a trial. The big questions is whether this is tribunal from the ICC or if he will face a local Libyan court. Ideally it would be up to the Libyan people who would deliver justice to the man who persecuted his own people. This would provide closure, help with stability, and help provide legitimacy to both the legal process and the new government. The main problem, however is that the Libyan judicial system is essentially nonexistent after four decades of autocratic rule. 

Stewart Patrick makes a strong argument for ICC jurisdiction: 

“The problem, of course, is that a country must have a competent judicial system to undertake such trials in an unbiased and professional manner. The Rome Statute of the ICC accepts this logic, by embracing the principle of complementarity. That is, the Court can claim jurisdiction on one of only two conditions: when the country lacks a functioning judicial system, or when state authorities have manifestly failed to carry out a credible investigation into alleged atrocity crimes.

"If there were ever a strong case for ICC jurisdiction, it is Libya—a country with no functioning judicial system after four decades of arbitrary, dictatorial rule. Given the monumental governance challenges confronting the TNC, it could take years of international assistance before the Libyan state is capable of conducting a credible trial of Qaddafi and his henchmen. And yet there will be enormous pressure, given the understandable thirst for retribution, for the TNC (or its immediate successor) to fast-track Qaddafi to trial in a judicial proceeding that could become a farce.”

Meanwhile, U.S. policy is that the Libyan people will have to decide whether to try Gaddafi themselves for crimes against his people, or surrender him to the ICC. My thoughts are that the Libyan people have continued to step up to the plate beyond many people’s expectations and they may very well do so here. Column Lynch points out however that this is turning into a bit of a turf battle.

There are very serious concerns about a trial becoming a tool for revenge rather than reconciliation and justice. As Michelle Bowers warns regarding Mubarak's trial in Egypt: 

"The drive for retribution and punishment must not eclipse the need for truth telling, accounting, and transparency... While punishing the old regime for its crimes is necessary and important, the prosecution of deposed officials will ultimately prove an empty victory if the process does not help consolidate a new and meaningful democratic order that ends impunity, reconstructs state-citizen relations, and institutionalizes accountability and rule of law."

Two Sure Strategy Wins in Libya: European Action, Avoiding the Pottery Barn Posted by Jacob Stokes

Just as Tripoli was flooded with rebels, so the web has been flooded with Libya commentary. The battle for who won Libya and/or how it could’ve been done better/not at all is raging.

Some are defending President Obama’s strategy for the war. See Nick Burns, Ben Smith and Anne Applebaum in praise of the strategy. Others are, rightly, urging caution. See Spencer Ackerman’s very smart point that the war isn’t even over yet, so we might want to hold up on the Grand Pronunciations. The problem with drawing conclusions too early is that, as we found in Iraq and Afghanistan, the troubles often begin only once the old regime is forced from power. Steve Walt puts it succinctly: “Whether our intervention was necessary or wise, however, depends on how the post-Qaddafi Libya evolves.”

Those two lines of argument aren’t completely in opposition though. There are at least two aspects of the strategy that will be positive for U.S. interests, even if Libya doesn’t turn into Switzerland in the next year.

First, Obama managed to get European allies—however begrudgingly and with much complaining about how taxing the operation was for them—to shoulder much of the burden after the initial stages of the war. Nick Burns applauds that fact, and says it should extend to the post-conflict situation as well:

President Obama’s conviction that the United States should push the European allies to play the leading role in NATO’s bombing campaign should now be extended to the next stage of the Libyan people’s revolution. While the United States will be a leading actor in mobilizing international political support for the new government, European and Arab countries should bear the lion’s share of the burden of extending economic assistance to Libyans emerging from four decades of a cynical dictatorship. “Leading from behind’’ is a disastrous phrase that was never illustrative of what Obama was trying to achieve. It should be forever banished from descriptions of his policy and overall global outlook. But he is right to insist that countries that have greater historical, social, and economic involvement in Libya - France, Italy, Spain, and the Arab states - should do more. These countries must lead in assembling an international economic support package for the new Libyan government.

If Obama had gone all-in, as many argued for, that would have signaled once again to Europe that the U.S. will bear the load of any military operation, regardless of how peripheral it is to American interests, and therefore Europe should continue to feel little need to develop a robust defense capacity. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave a speech chiding the Europeans for building down last June. With the Libya operation, Obama has demonstrated to our partners on the other side of the Atlantic that, in fact, the U.S. can involve itself in an operation assuming the whole burden. So if Europeans want to call for military operations, they had better be ready to do execute them without U.S. assistance.

Secondly, both post-war Iraq and Afghanistan have been characterized by backlash among the citizens of those countries against U.S. actions in toppling the regime and then not bringing change and stability around quick enough, in addition to just plain resistance to any sort of occupation, however benign.

That’s the other benefit of the administration’s strategy so far: We’ve avoided the “Pottery Barn” rule: You break it, you buy it. At the risk of belaboring the metaphor, we (America, NATO) may have been in the store, but we weren’t the ones doing the breaking. Recently retired Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg put it this way, “The biggest factor to date is the fact that we [Americans] have not been the problem. People aren't saying the Americans are trying to do regime change. Whether in Tunisia or Libya or Egypt, we are seen as supportive of others. It's an obvious contrast with the previous administration.... And the fact that tyrants are not able to rally their people against us shows the nuance and skill of this. It's working." (This of course assumes we don’t offer ground troops to help stabilize, which is extremely unlikely.)

Whatever happens, these two aspects of the strategy align American actions and involvement with our interests in Libya and the broader Arab Spring.

Photo: Flickr