



Federal Ministry  
of the Interior

# 2008 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution



[www.bmi.bund.de](http://www.bmi.bund.de) | [www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)

**Impressum:**

Editor: Federal Ministry of the Interior  
Alt Moabit 101 D, 10559 Berlin

Note: The 2008 Annual Report is also available on the Internet:

<http://www.bmi.bund.de>

<http://www.verfassungsschutz.de>

## Contents

<b>Organisational Data .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>I.      Organisational Data pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Federal Act on          the Protection of the Constitution (<i>BVerfSchG</i>) .....</b>	<b>9</b>
1.      Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) .....	9
2.      Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) .....	9
<b>II.     Other organisational data .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Protection of the Constitution and Democracy.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>I.      Protection of the Constitution under the Basic Law .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>II.     Offices for the Protection of the Constitution: Tasks and powers.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>III.    Supervision of the authorities responsible for the protection of the          Constitution .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>IV.    Report on the Protection of the Constitution.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>V.      Protection of the Constitution through information and awareness .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>VI.    Organisations banned by the Federal Ministry from January 1990 to          December 2008 (in chronological order) .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Politically motivated crime .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>I.      Defining politically motivated crime .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>II.     Politically motivated crimes .....</b>	<b>26</b>

---

<b>III.</b>	<b>Politically motivated crime with an extremist background, by category .....</b>	<b>27</b>
1.	Right-wing crime with an extremist background .....	27
1.1	Overview .....	27
1.2	Targets of right-wing violent crimes with an extremist background .....	29
1.2.1	Violent right-wing crime with an extremist and xenophobic background .....	31
1.2.2	Right-wing crime with an extremist and anti-Semitic background .....	32
1.2.3	Violent crimes by right-wing extremists against actual or supposed left-wing extremists .....	33
1.3	Breakdown of violent crimes by <i>Land</i> .....	34
2.	Left-wing crimes with an extremist background.....	37
2.1	Overview .....	37
2.2	Targets of left-wing violent crimes with an extremist background .....	39
2.2.1	Violent crimes by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists .....	41
2.3	Breakdown of violent crimes by <i>Land</i> .....	42
3.	Politically motivated crimes by foreigners .....	45
3.1	Overview .....	45
3.2	Breakdown of violent crimes by <i>Land</i> .....	47

## **Right-Wing Extremist Activities and Suspicious Cases ..... 49**

<b>I.</b>	<b>Overview .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>Ideology .....</b>	<b>49</b>
2.	Developments within right-wing extremism .....	50
3.	Organisations and following .....	52
4.	Periodical publications.....	54
5.	Right-wing extremism on the Internet.....	54
6.	Right-Wing Extremist Demonstrations .....	56
<b>II.</b>	<b>Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence.....</b>	<b>57</b>
1.	Right-wing terrorism .....	57
2.	Right-wing extremist skinheads.....	57
<b>III.</b>	<b>Neo-Nazism.....</b>	<b>59</b>

<b>IV.</b>	<b>Political parties .....</b>	<b>64</b>
1.	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) .....	64
1.1	Ideology and strategic approaches .....	64
1.2	Organisation and development .....	78
1.3	Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) .....	86
2.	Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union) .....	88
2.1	Goals and methods .....	89
2.2	Organisation and development .....	94
<b>V.</b>	<b>Right-wing extremist music .....</b>	<b>96</b>
1.	Right-wing extremist concerts .....	96
2.	Right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters .....	98
3.	Distributors of right-wing extremist music .....	100
<b>VI.</b>	<b>Intellectual activities in right-wing extremism .....</b>	<b>101</b>
<b>VII.</b>	<b>Anti-Semitism .....</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>VIII.</b>	<b>International connections .....</b>	<b>113</b>
1.	Events with international participation .....	113
2.	The "Islamification of Europe" as a campaign issue .....	114
3.	International revisionism .....	116
<b>IX.</b>	<b>Unaffiliated publishing houses and distributors .....</b>	<b>119</b>
	<b>Left-Wing Extremist Activities .....</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>I.</b>	<b>Overview .....</b>	<b>124</b>
1.	Left-wing extremist developments .....	124
2.	Organisations and following .....	126
3.	Publishers, distributors and periodicals .....	128

<b>II.</b>	<b>Violent left-wing extremism .....</b>	<b>130</b>
1.	Autonomists .....	131
1.1	Following and self-definition .....	131
1.2	Activities .....	133
1.3	Autonomist structures .....	138
2.	Traditional anarchists .....	140
<b>III.</b>	<b>Political parties and other groups .....</b>	<b>141</b>
1.	DIE LINKE. (The Left Party) .....	141
1.1	General developments .....	141
1.2	Openly extremist structures in the party .....	143
1.3	Cooperation with left-wing extremists outside the party .....	146
2.	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and associated groups .....	149
2.1	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) .....	149
2.2	Organisations associated with the DKP .....	153
2.2.1	Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend (SDAJ, Socialist German Workers' Youth) .....	153
2.2.2	Marx-Engels-Stiftung e.V. (MES, Marx–Engels Foundation, reg'd society) .....	154
3.	Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany) .....	155
4.	Trotskyist groups .....	157
5.	Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society) .....	159
<b>IV.</b>	<b>Areas of activity .....</b>	<b>161</b>
1.	Anti-fascism .....	161
2.	Anti-repression .....	165
3.	Anti-militarism .....	167
4.	Anti-globalisation .....	169

## **Islamist / Islamist Terrorist Efforts and Suspected Activities . 172**

<b>I.</b>	<b>Overview.....</b>	<b>172</b>
1.	Developments within Islamism.....	172
2.	Organisations and followers .....	174
<b>II.</b>	<b>International Islamist terrorism .....</b>	<b>176</b>
1.	Current developments .....	176
2.	Al-Qaeda (The Base).....	181
3.	Regional mujahidin groupings.....	184
3.1	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) .....	184
3.2	Ansar Al-Islam Group (AAI, 'Defenders of Islam') .....	185
3.3	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).....	187
4.	Use of the Internet .....	189
5.	Chart of particular Islamist terrorist attacks.....	193
<b>III.</b>	<b>Islamism .....</b>	<b>195</b>
1.	Of Arab origin .....	195
1.1	Hizb Allah (Party of God) .....	195
1.2	Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT, Islamic Liberation Party).....	197
1.3	HAMAS (Harakat Al-Muquawama Al Islamiya, Islamic Resistance Movement).....	200
1.4	Muslim Brotherhood (MB, Gama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) .....	202
2.	Turkish origin - Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e.V. (IGMG, Islamic Community of Millî Görüş, reg'd society) .....	205
3.	Others.....	214
3.1	Iranian influence on Shiites living in Germany .....	214
3.2	Tablighi Jama'at (TJ, Community of Preaching and Mission) .....	215
3.3	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) / Chechen Separatist Movement (CSM) .....	217

## **Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security – identified and suspected cases (excluding Islamism) ..... 221**

<b>I.</b>	<b>Overview .....</b>	<b>221</b>
1.	Developments in the field of extremism of foreigners (excluding Islamism) ....	221
2.	Organisations and followers .....	223
<b>II.</b>	<b>Goals and main activities of individual groups .....</b>	<b>225</b>
1.	Kurds .....	225
1.1	Overview .....	225
1.2	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) /Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê (KADEK, Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan) /Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA GEL, People's Congress of Kurdistan) /Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK, Union of the Communities of Kurdistan) /Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK, Union of the Societies of Kurdistan) .....	226
1.2.1	General situation .....	227
1.2.2	Organisational situation .....	229
1.2.3	PKK propaganda .....	230
1.2.3.1	Propaganda via media close to PKK .....	230
1.2.3.2	Demonstrations and mass events .....	231
1.2.4	Activities of Komalen Ciwan .....	235
1.2.5	Financial and business activities .....	235
1.2.6	Criminal proceedings against PKK functionaries .....	236
2.	Turkish nationals .....	238
2.1	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front) .....	239
2.2	Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists-Leninists) .....	242
2.3	Marksist Leninist Kommünist Partisi (MLKP) .....	245
3.	Iranians .....	247
3.1	Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran) .....	248
3.2	Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI) .....	251
4.	Tamils .....	253
5.	Sikhs .....	255



<b>III.</b>	<b>Overview of other noteworthy organisations.....</b>	<b>256</b>
	<b>Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities .....</b>	<b>257</b>
<b>I.</b>	<b>Overview.....</b>	<b>257</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>The intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).....</b>	<b>258</b>
1.	Structural developments, current situation and tasks of the services within the Russian state .....	258
2.	Intelligence targets and priorities .....	260
3.	Intelligence-gathering methods.....	261
3.1	Legal residencies of the Russian intelligence services .....	262
3.2	Activities under central control.....	264
4.	Intelligence and security services of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) .....	265
<b>III.</b>	<b>Intelligence services of the People's Republic of China .....</b>	<b>266</b>
1.	Developments in the People's Republic of China .....	266
2.	Structures and tasks .....	266
3.	Intelligence targets and priorities .....	267
4.	Intelligence-gathering methods.....	268
4.1	Intelligence gathering in Germany .....	268
4.2	Fighting the "Five Poisons" in Germany .....	269
4.3	Activities in China .....	270
<b>IV.</b>	<b>Activities of the intelligence services of other countries.....</b>	<b>270</b>
1.	Intelligence services of the Islamic Republic of Iran .....	270
2.	Intelligence services of the Syrian Arab Republic.....	271
3.	Intelligence services of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya .....	272
4.	Intelligence services of the Republic of Sudan .....	272
5.	Intelligence services of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea).....	273

<b>V.</b>	<b>Proliferation .....</b>	<b>275</b>
<b>VI.</b>	<b>Cyber attacks.....</b>	<b>277</b>
<b>VII.</b>	<b>Protection of industry .....</b>	<b>279</b>
<b>VIII.</b>	<b>Arrests and convictions .....</b>	<b>280</b>
	<b>Security of Classified Information and Counter-Sabotage .....</b>	<b>281</b>
	<b>The Scientology Organisation (SO) .....</b>	<b>284</b>
1.	Background and objectives .....	284
2.	Public relations .....	290
3.	Court action by the SO against observation by the BfV .....	293

---

## **Organisational Data**

### **I. Organisational Data pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG)**

#### **1. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)**

Federal funding for the BfV was € 155,238,306 in 2008 (2007: € 144,555,652). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution had a total of 2,529 staff members (2007: 2,503).

#### **2. Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD)**

Federal funding for the MAD was € 70,325,121.22 in 2008 (2007: € 69,188,992). The Military Counterintelligence Service had 1,230 staff members (2007: 1,242).

### **II. Other organisational data**

At the beginning of the year 2009, the data holdings of the Federal Administration (*Bund*) and the *Länder* (federal states) in the Nachrichtendienstliches Informationssystem (NADIS - Intelligence Information System) totalled 1,349,258 entries of personal data (beginning of 2008: 1,172,797), of which 924,667 entries (68.5 %) were obtained in connection with security checks or background checks under the provisions of the Act on Aviation Security (*Luftsicherheitsgesetz*).

---

## Protection of the Constitution and Democracy

### I. Protection of the Constitution under the Basic Law

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, known as the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*, GG), guarantees German citizens a variety of basic rights. People who reject our free and democratic order also enjoy the same basic rights. But limits to these rights must be clearly set wherever it becomes obvious that they are being misused in order to undermine the free and democratic order and thereby destroy the foundation on which these same rights are based.

Drawing on the painful lessons learnt from the failure of the Weimar Republic, the principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values has been anchored in the Basic Law.<sup>1</sup>

"A strong  
democracy" <sup>1)</sup>

This principle is characterised by three essential features:

- **commitment to values**, i.e. the state recognises its attachment to certain values it considers especially important and which are therefore not negotiable;
- the **readiness to defend values**, i.e. the state is willing to uphold these most important values against extremist positions; and
- preventive action to **protect the Constitution**, i.e. the state does not wait to react until extremists have violated the law. In other words, the protection of the Constitution functions as an early warning system for our democracy.

The principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values is clearly expressed in a number of the Basic Law's provisions:

- Article 79 (3) provides that fundamental principles of the Constitution – including the inviolability of human dignity under Article 1 (1) and the principles determining the fundamental order of the state (democracy, federalism, rule of law, the welfare

---

<sup>1</sup> Thiel, Markus, *Die „wehrhafte Demokratie“ als verfassungsrechtliche Grundentscheidung*, in: Thiel, Markus, ed., *Wehrhafte Demokratie* (2003), p. 1 et seqq.

---

system) as set out in Art. 20 - are unalterable and thus may not be modified by legislative process.

- Under Article 21 (2), political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free and democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany may be declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG).
  - Article 9 (2) provides that associations whose aim or activities violate criminal laws or oppose the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding shall be prohibited (see Section VI).
  - Under Article 18, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) may declare certain basic rights to be forfeited if these rights are abused to attack the free and democratic basic order.
  - Articles 73 No. 10 *litt. b* and 87 (1) 2<sup>nd</sup> sentence provide the basis for the establishment and operation of the Federal and *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution.
-

## **II. Offices for the Protection of the Constitution: Tasks and powers**

**Functions** Pursuant to the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*, BVerfSchG), a main task of the federal and *Land* authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution is gathering and analysing information on the following:

- activities directed against the free and democratic order or against the existence or security of the Federal Republic or of one of the federal states (*Länder*), or intended to unlawfully hinder federal or *Land* constitutional bodies or their members from carrying out their official duties;
- intelligence activities or those that endanger state security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power within the area of the territorial application of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG);
- activities in the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which – by actual, or preparations for intended, use of force – threaten the foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany;
- activities within the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which are directed against the idea of international understanding, in particular peaceful co-existence.

**Information-gathering** The agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution gather most of the information needed for fulfilling their tasks from publicly accessible sources. Where this is not possible or effective, they may, within the limits of defined legal powers and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, use intelligence methods for covert information-gathering. These resources include, in particular, confidential sources, surveillance, video and audio recordings, and interception of correspondence, mail and telecommunications in accordance with the Act (adopted by virtue of Article 10 of the Basic Law) to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts and Telecommunications (*Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses* - short title: *Artikel 10-Gesetz*, abbr. G 10).

---

The powers of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) were extended under the Act to Fight International Terrorism (*Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz*) of 9 January 2002.<sup>2</sup>

Among other things, the Act gives the BfV the right, under narrowly defined conditions, to gather information from financial enterprises, airlines, postal services, telecommunications services, and teleservices providers.

**No police powers** In carrying out their duties, the agencies for the protection of the Constitution have no police powers, i.e. they may not perform arrests or searches or seize any property.

**Security vetting** An additional task of the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution is to help with security clearance checks of people entrusted in the public interest with classified information, or who are to be granted access or can access such information and who hold, or are recruited for, a security-sensitive post within a facility vital to civil and military needs. The BfV's powers in this context are governed in detail by the Security Clearance Check Act (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz*, SÜG).

**Co-operation with German security authorities** Within their area of responsibility, the authorities for the protection of the Constitution help to ensure the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany. As provided by law, they work closely, on a basis of trust, with other security authorities, in particular the other federal intelligence services: the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), responsible for the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr); and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), responsible for foreign intelligence; and with police and criminal prosecution authorities. The creation of a joint anti-terrorist database of federal and state police authorities and intelligence services, and the possibility of maintaining joint incident-related project files, has helped improve information sharing by simplifying the existing procedural regulations for data exchange. The anti-terrorist database went into operation on 31 March 2007.

**International cooperation** In view of the increasingly international nature of threat phenomena, the BfV also maintains active contacts with its partner services abroad.

Above all, the BfV cooperates closely with EU states, the USA and Canada. Given the need for information in the field of international

---

<sup>2</sup> Originally, the regulations were set to expire on 10 January 2007, but were extended for another five years by the Act amending the Counter-Terrorism Act, which entered into force on 5 January 2007. As to substance, they correspond largely with the results of a prior evaluation.

---

terrorism (e.g. on countries of origin, terrorists' travel movements), this cooperation also extends to other states outside the EU. In terms of quantity and quality, the character of contacts with foreign intelligence services often varies greatly.

In view of an integrated and strategic approach to fighting international terrorism, multilateral cooperation in international bodies has become increasingly important. The priority of such cooperation lies in the analysis of the causes and origins of a terrorist threat, a forecast of developments and the development of counter-measures.

Among others, the BfV is represented in the Counter-Terrorist Group (CTG), a cooperation forum of European national intelligence services. The CTG maintains contacts with the European Joint Situation Center (SitCen) and supports the EU in fighting terrorism.

---



### III. Supervision of the authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution

<b>Federal Government</b>	The activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are subject to supervision by the Federal Government and control by the German Bundestag. The
<b>Parliamentary Control Panel</b>	Parliamentary Control Panel established for this purpose is to be regularly provided with comprehensive information on the general activities of the BfV, MAD and BND and on incidents of special significance, and about other incidents at its request (Section 2 of the Parliamentary Control Panel Act ( <i>Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremiumsgesetz</i> , PKGrG)). This panel must be permitted by the Federal Government to inspect records and files, and to conduct staff hearings. The Parliamentary Control Panel appoints the
<b>G-10 Commission</b>	independent G-10 Commission which, always in advance of any such operations, will consider the permissibility and necessity of restrictions of the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications in accordance with Article 10 of the Basic Law. Similar provisions apply to the rights under the new Counter-Terrorism Act to demand information from postal services, telecommunications services, and teleservices providers (see Section II).
<b>Monitoring by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (BfDI)</b>	The Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG) as well as other special legal regulations affecting the tasks of the BfV, e.g. the Act on Setting up a Counter-Terrorism Database (ATDG) or the Act on the Central Aliens Register (AZRG), contain a large number of provisions pertaining to data protection. On this basis, the BfDI continuously checks the BfV's compliance with data protection rules and regulations.
<b>Right to demand information</b>	The BfV is legally obligated to provide data subjects, upon request, with information about their personal data files free of charge, if such persons provide reference to specific information and can demonstrate a particular interest in such information (Section 15 (1) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution). Disclosure of information will be denied only if any of the reasons for refusal as listed in sub-section 2 of Section 15 of the BVerfSchG applies.
<b>Supervision by the courts</b>	Should a person (data subject) claim that measures taken by the BfV have violated his or her rights, these measures are subject to judicial review.

#### IV. Report on the Protection of the Constitution

**Purpose of the  
Annual Report on  
the Protection of the  
Constitution**

The Annual Report is intended to inform the public and increase general awareness about anti-constitutional activities in the Federal Republic of Germany. This report is based on intelligence collected by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in the course of its legally assigned duties, in co-operation with the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. This report cannot give an exhaustive overview but provides information about the essential findings made in the year under review, and analyses and evaluates significant developments and correlations.

**Groups and  
associations**

It should also be noted that the Annual Report does not provide an exhaustive list of all associations that the agencies for the protection of the Constitution may consider relevant.

With regard to the associations (political parties, organisations and groups) described in this report, the legal prerequisites for monitoring by the BfV have been met. However, the intelligence situation for the associations described may vary greatly depending on the scope and detail of information gathered. Assessing a certain association as “extremist” does not always imply that all of its members pursue extremist aims. “Suspicious cases” are those in which groups or associations display concrete signs of anti-constitutional activities, though they are not yet clearly extremist.

All figures given for the potential membership of the associations mentioned in the report refer to the Federal Republic of Germany and are in some cases estimated and rounded off. Also, it should be pointed out that the agencies for the protection of the Constitution do not have individual intelligence regarding all members of these associations. This follows from the fact that the main mission of these agencies is to observe organisational structures; this does not require detailed intelligence on all individual members of the observed groups or associations.

The English version was provided by the Translation Services of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. **Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are translated from the German.**

---

## **V. Protection of the Constitution through information and awareness**

At the federal level, the task of protecting the Constitution by providing information and raising awareness is carried out jointly by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV); at the state level it is the responsibility of the *Land* Ministries of the Interior and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. Maintaining a dialogue with citizens about the tasks of the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution is a central focus of this effort. In working with the public, these agencies provide information about their intelligence in order to enable each individual to make up his or her own mind regarding the threats anti-constitutional forces pose to the rule of law in our country.

Extremism and terrorism, in particular Islamist terrorism, as well as racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and violence are a constant challenge to a democratic and social state based on the rule of law. Fighting all forms of political extremism wherever they appear is therefore a priority of domestic policy.

The Federal Government considers it extremely important to prevent and fight such phenomena.

The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence (Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – gegen Extremismus und Gewalt) founded by the Federal Government on 23 May 2000 plays a special role in strengthening civil society and consensus on the values enshrined in the Constitution. This alliance combines and mobilises forces in society to fight every form of extremism, xenophobia and violence. One of the alliance's key tasks is to create a network bringing together civil society efforts on behalf of democracy and tolerance and to publicize such efforts (for more information visit [www.buendnis-toleranz.de](http://www.buendnis-toleranz.de))

Another instrument for countering xenophobia, racism and violence is the Forum Against Racism (Forum gegen Rassismus, FgR). This body was established in March 1998, and its membership now includes some 90 organisations and public agencies, including 60 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating at the national or regional level. The forum sees itself as a platform for sharing experience and for a dialogue among its members concerning issues related to fighting racism.

---

In order to preserve the free and democratic order, it is necessary to continually confront the various forms of extremism on a political and intellectual level. Therefore, it is an important task of the agencies for the protection of the Constitution to provide thorough information and raise awareness about the nature and scope of extremist activities.

As part of its public information activities, the BfV disseminated information on its fields of activity and current findings on its website, at numerous exhibitions and fairs, via a wide range of publications and by answering a large variety of questions from the general public.

In 2008, the public continued to show great interest in the BfV's travelling exhibitions. In the course of the year, about 150,000 people visited the 26 exhibitions of the BfV organized throughout Germany.

An exhibition on right-wing extremism, "The brown trap – a right-wing extremist career" (*DIE BRAUNE FALLE – Eine rechtsextremistische 'Karriere'*), was shown in eight federal states on ten different dates. The exhibition "Protecting democracy - Against extremism in Germany" (*Es betrifft Dich! Demokratie schützen - Gegen Extremismus in Deutschland*) was shown ten times in six different federal states. The exhibition "The abuse religion – Islamists in Germany" (*Die missbrauchte Religion – Islamisten in Deutschland*) was shown five times in four federal states.

In addition, the BfV took part in the educational fair *didacta* in Stuttgart. The dialogue with one of the most important group of multipliers - teachers - gave the BfV the possibility to provide them with information about the agency's intelligence for use in classroom instruction. Most of the numerous questions addressed to BfV staff at the fair stand referred to right-wing extremism.

Staff from the BfV were present at all exhibitions and fairs. The possibility of obtaining information first-hand was used by numerous individual visitors, but mainly by school classes.

In 2008, the BfV printed and distributed a total of roughly 64,000 brochures.

**Providing  
information to  
prevent industrial  
espionage**

To prevent industrial espionage, information is released and measures are taken to raise awareness. To complement these awareness-raising activities, the BfV has added to its website and provides information on economic protection against industrial espionage and publishes a newsletter and brochures. For example, in 2008 the federal and Land agencies for the protection of the Constitution jointly published the brochure "Wirtschaftsspionage:

Risiko für Ihr Unternehmen“ (Industrial espionage: a risk for your business?). Together with some Land agencies for the protection of the Constitution, the BfV took part in the fair “Security Essen” in October 2008 and provided a wide range of information on how German businesses and companies could protect themselves against industrial espionage (see Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities, Section VII).

- Prevention against proliferation** To support awareness-raising measures in the field of proliferation, the agencies for the protection of the Constitution published the brochure *Proliferation - Das geht uns an!* (Proliferation concerns us), which is also available on the BfV website (see Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities, Section V).
- Information portal** The Internet site of the BfV, which is visited by some 2,300 Internet users every day, is an important instrument to inform the public. The website at [www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de) contains detailed information on the BfV's responsibilities and fields of activity. The primary focus is on roughly 20 publications which can be downloaded. Under the heading *Thema* (topic) and *Zahlen und Fakten* (facts and figures), website visitors are informed about the different areas of extremism and Islamist terrorism. In addition, news and dates concerning the BfV can be found under *Aktuell* (news) and *Presse-Info* (press releases).
- Point of contact** For all questions regarding the protection of the Constitution, please do not hesitate to contact the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) at any time:

**Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)**  
**Merianstrasse 100**  
**50765 Cologne**  
**Phone: +49 (221)-792-0 oder 03018-792-0**  
**Fax: +49 (221)-792-2915 oder 03018-10-792-2915**  
**E- mail: [poststelle@bfv.bund.de](mailto:poststelle@bfv.bund.de)**

On the Internet, the BfV can be found at:

**[www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)**

---

## VI. Organisations banned by the Federal Ministry from January 1990 to December 2008 (in chronological order)

### Measures against any type of extremist activities

Organisation	Date of ban	Reasons for the ban	Status	Type of extremism
<b>Nationalistische Front (NF)</b>	26 November 1992	– The aims of the NF were opposed to the constitutional order.	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities
<b>Deutsche Alternative (DA)</b>	8 December 1992	– The aims of the DA were opposed to the constitutional order.	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities
<b>National Offensive (NO)</b>	21 December 1992	– The aims of the DA were opposed to the constitutional order.	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities
<b>Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)</b> and sub-organisations, <b>Föderation der patriotischen Arbeiter- und Kulturvereinigungen aus Kurdistan in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V. (FEYKA-Kurdistan), Kurdistan-Komitee e.V.</b>	22 November 1993	– Activities violated criminal law and are a threat to the public order and security and to the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany abroad.	Not subject to appeal	Extremist activities by foreigners
<b>Wiking-Jugend (WJ)</b>	10 November 1994	– The aims of the WJ were opposed to the constitutional order.	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities
<b>Kurdistan Informationsbüro (KIB) also known as Kurdistan Informationsbüro in Deutschland</b>	20 Februar 1995	– Substitute organisation of the legally banned Kurdistan-Komitee e.V.	Not subject to appeal	Extremist activities by foreigners
<b>Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (FAP)</b>	22 Februar 1995	– The aims of the FAP were opposed to the constitutional order.	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities

Organisation	Date of ban	Reasons for the ban	Status	Type of extremism
<b>Revolutionäre Volksbefreiungspartei-Front (DHKP-C)</b>	6 August 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activities violate criminal law and pose a threat to internal security.</li> <li>Substitute organisation of Revolutionäre Linke (Devrimci Sol) which was banned on 9 February 1983.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Extremist activities by foreigners
<b>Türkische Volksbefreiungspartei-Front (THKP/-C)</b>	6 August 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activities violate criminal law and pose a threat to internal security.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Extremist activities by foreigners
<b>Blood &amp; Honour (B&amp;H) with White Youth</b>	12 September 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The aims of B&amp;H were opposed to the constitutional order and</li> <li>opposed to the idea of international understanding.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities
<b>Kalifatsstaat and 35 sub-organisations</b>	8 December 2001/ 14 December 2001/ 13 May 2002/ 16 September 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activities were opposed to the constitutional order and the idea of international understanding.</li> <li>Propagated the use of violence as a means of achieving political goals.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities
<b>Al-Aqsa e.V.</b>	31 Juli 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activities were opposed to the idea of international understanding.</li> <li>Supported an association outside the Federal Republic of Germany, which initiates attacks against persons, through financial support for social associations of HAMAS.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities

Organisation	Date of ban	Reasons for the ban	Status	Type of extremism
<b>Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT)</b>	10 January 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activities were opposed to the idea of international understanding.</li> <li>Supported the use of violence to enforce political interests.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities
<b>Yeni Akit GmbH</b> Publishers of the European issue of the Turkish newspaper <i>Anadoluda Vakit</i>	22 February 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publicly denied or trivialized the Holocaust in a way that incited hatred.</li> <li>Spread anti-Semitic and anti-western propaganda.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities
<b>Bremer Hilfswerk e.V.</b>	The organisation dissolved on 18 January 2005 and was deleted from the register of associations on 29 June 2005.		The Federal Ministry of the Interior sought to ban the organisation and initiated an investigation under the law governing associations on 3 December 2004. Before a ban could be put in place, the organisation had dissolved.	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities
<b>YATIM-Kinderhilfe e.V.</b>	30 August 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Follow-up organisation of the banned al-Aqsa e. V.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities
<b>Collegium Humanum (CH) with Bauernhilfe e.V.</b>	18 April 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The aims of CH oppose the constitutional order.</li> <li>Activities violate the criminal law.</li> </ul>	A legal case is pending before the Federal Administrative Court.	Right-wing extremist activities



Organisation	Date of ban	Reasons for the ban	Status	Type of extremism
<b>Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocaust Verfolgten (VRBHV)</b>	18 April 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The aims of VRBHV were opposed to the constitutional order.</li> <li>– Activities violated criminal law.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Right-wing extremist activities
<b>Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S, Roj TV A/S, VIKO Fernseh Produktion GmbH</b>	13 June 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Activities violated criminal law and were opposed to the idea of international understanding.</li> </ul>	A legal case is pending before the Federal Administrative Court.	Extremist activities by foreigners
<b>Al-Manar TV</b>	29 October 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Spread anti-Semitic and anti-western propaganda.</li> <li>– Activities were opposed to the idea of international understanding.</li> </ul>	Not subject to appeal	Islamist/Islamist-terrorist activities

## Politically motivated crime

### I. Defining politically motivated crime

**Defining politically motivated crime** At the decision of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the *Länder* (IMK), a new system for defining “politically motivated crime” was introduced effective 1 January 2001. In accordance with this system, the following crimes are classed as politically motivated:

1. **All** criminal offences constituting an **offence against the security of the state**, even if no political motivation can be established in the individual case. Offences against the security of the state are those referred to in the following sections of the Criminal Code (StGB): Sections 80-83, 84-86a, 87-91, 94-100a, 102-104a, 105-108e, 109-109h, 129a, 129b, 234a or 241a.
  2. Politically motivated crime normally classed as general crime (such as homicide and bodily injury offences, arson, resisting authorities, property damage) if, **when assessing the entire circumstances of the crime and/or the attitude of the offender**, there are indications that the crime was committed out of **political motives**, i.e. it
    - was intended to influence the democratic process, achieve or hinder political objectives or prevent the implementation of political decisions;
    - violated the principle of liberal democracy or any of its key features, threatened the continued existence or security of the *Bund* or a *Land*, or was aimed at unlawfully impeding the administration of office by members of the constitutional bodies of the *Bund* or a *Land*;
    - jeopardises foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany through the use of violence or preparatory actions for the use of violence,
    - was directed against a person because of their political beliefs, nationality, ethnicity, race, skin colour, religion, world view, origin, or because of their appearance, disability, sexual orientation or social status (hate crime); this also includes
-

criminal activity directed against an institution/property or thing for the same reasons.

All facts of the crime are evaluated from various perspectives, paying particular attention to the nature and seriousness of the crime, the motive, and whether it has any international or extremist elements. At the same time, the catalogue of violent crimes was expanded and standardised nation-wide.

With this differentiated presentation, data can be analysed according to specific needs, providing a foundation for targeted use of appropriate measures for deterrence and prevention.

The figures quoted in this Annual Report on politically motivated crimes with an extremist background are based on information from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

---

## **II. Politically motivated crimes**

In 2008, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 31,801 politically motivated crimes (2007: 28,538). This figure includes 16,063 (50.5%) propaganda offences (2007: 15,306, or 53.6%). Another 2,529 of these (8.0%) are categorised as politically motivated violent crimes (2007: 2,541, or 8.9%).

**Classifying politically motivated crimes** In 2008, 20,422 politically motivated crimes were classified as “right-wing” (2007: 17,607), 6,724 were classified as “left-wing” (2007: 5,866), and 1,484 were classified as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners” (2007: 902). In 3,171 cases (2007: 4,163) it was not possible to assign the offence to a particular category.

**Extremist criminal offences** In 2008, 24,605 (77.4%) criminal offences were classified as extremist (2007: 20,809, or 72.9%). Of these, 19,894 (2007: 17,176) were classified as “right-wing”, 3,124 (2007: 2,765) as “left-wing” and 1,312 (2004: 747) as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners”. In 275 cases (2007: 121), there were indications of an extremist background, but the offences were recorded without further classification.

### **III. Politically motivated crime with an extremist background, by type**

#### **1. Right-wing crime with an extremist background**

##### **1.1 Overview**

**Rise in right-wing extremist crime** Crimes motivated by right-wing extremism constitute a subset of the class of right-wing politically motivated crime. In 2008, 20,422 criminal offences were classified as right-wing politically motivated crime (2007: 17,607). Of these, 14,283 (2007: 11,954) were propaganda crimes pursuant to Sections 86, 86a of the Criminal Code (StGB) and 1,113 (2007: 1,054) were violent crimes. In this area, 19,894 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2007: 17,176), including 1,042 violent crimes (2007: 980). The number of criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background thus rose by 15.8%, while that of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background rose by 6.3%. Violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background made up 5.2% of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background (2007: 5.7%). Of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background, 82.6% (2007: 83.9%) were either crimes involving illegal propaganda activities (14,262; 2007: 11,935) or incitement to hatred and violence against individuals or certain segments of the population (2,173; 2007: 2,472). Overall, 358 offences (2007: 294) fell into the category of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists, and 76 offences (2007: 78) fell into the category of violent crimes against other political opponents.

---


<b>Crimes with a right-wing extremist background <sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Violent crimes:</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
Homicide	0	2
Attempted homicide	1	4
Bodily injury	845	893
Arson	24	29
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	1	0
Breach of the public peace	37	46
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	7	4
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	1
Robbery	11	10
Extortion	4	6
Resisting public authority	50	47
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>980</b>	<b>1,042</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	821	1,197
Coercion, threat	146	144
Illegal propaganda activities	11,935	14,262
Desecration of cemeteries	18	32
Other criminal offences, esp. incitement to hatred	3,276	3,217
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,196</b>	<b>18,852</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>17,176</b>	<b>19,894</b>

\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while breaching the public peace, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

## **1.2 Targets of right-wing violent crimes with an extremist background**

In 2008, 395 right-wing violent crimes, or 37.9%, showed an extremist and xenophobic background (2007: 414). Another 358 (34.4%) violent crimes were directed at real or supposed left-wing extremists (2007: 294, or 30.0%).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by type*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
Only the most important types are included.



### 1.2.1 Violent right-wing crime with an extremist and xenophobic background

Violent right-wing crime with an extremist and xenophobic background*		
	2007	2008
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	1	3
Bodily injury	377	361
Arson	17	17
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Breach of the public peace	7	5
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	3	2
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	5	2
Extortion	1	3
Resisting public authority	3	2
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>395</b>
<p>* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while breaching the public peace, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.</p>		

### **1.2.2 Right-wing crime with an extremist and anti-Semitic background**

In 2008, a total of 1,477 right-wing crimes with an extremist and anti-Semitic background were reported. This represented a decrease of about 4.2% from the previous year (1,541). The number of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist or anti-Semitic background fell from 59 in 2007 to 44 in 2008. Overall, 3.0% of all violent right-wing crimes had both an extremist and an anti-Semitic background<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

---

### 1.2.3 Violent crimes by right-wing extremists against actual or supposed left-wing extremists


Violent crimes by right-wing extremists against actual or supposed left-wing extremists		
	2007	2008
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	0	0
Bodily injury	263	322
Arson	4	5
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Breach of the public peace	20	24
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	1	1
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	1
Robbery	3	4
Extortion	1	1
Resisting public authority	2	0
Sexual crimes	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>358</b>

\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while breaching the public peace, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### **1.3 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land***


In absolute terms, the highest number of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background occurred in North-Rhine/Westphalia (165 registered offences); in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents, however, North-Rhine/Westphalia lies towards the bottom of the scale. It is followed by Saxony (126, in second place as a proportion of total population) and Lower Saxony (111, in the middle of the scale as a proportion of total population), Saxony-Anhalt (100, at the top of the scale as a proportion of total population) and Berlin (78, in seventh place as a proportion of total population) and Brandenburg (71, in third place as a proportion of total population) and Bavaria (68, third from the bottom as a proportion of total population).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*per 100,000 residents and Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and population data from the Federal Statistical Office (as at 31.12.2007).

## **2. Left-wing crimes with an extremist background**

### **2.1 Overview**

**Rise in left-wing extremist crime** Crimes motivated by left-wing extremism constitute a subset of the class of left-wing politically motivated crime. A total of 6,724 criminal offences (2007: 5,866), of which 1,188 constituted acts of violence (2007: 1,247), were classed as left-wing politically motivated crime. In this area, 3,124 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2007: 2,765), including 701 violent crimes (2007: 833).

The number of criminal offences with a left-wing extremist background thus rose by 13%, while that of violent crimes fell by 15.8%.

<b>Crimes with a left-wing extremist background*</b>		
<b>Violent crimes:</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	1	3
Bodily injury	384	359
Arson	51	62
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	2	0
Breach of the public peace	215	149
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	40	24
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	14	13
Extortion	2	2
Resisting public authority	124	89
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>833</b>	<b>701</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	1,142	1,468
Coercion, threat	52	57
Other criminal offences	738	898
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,932</b>	<b>2,423</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>2,765</b>	<b>3,124</b>



\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while breaching the public peace, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.



## **2.2 Targets of left-wing violent crimes with an extremist background**

Acts of violence with a left-wing political background included a total of 342 (2007: 389) cases assigned to the category “violent offences against right-wing extremists or supposed right-wing extremists”, 6 (2007: 14) offences assigned to the category “anti-globalisation” and 34 (2007: 14) cases assigned to the category of “campaign against nuclear energy”.

### Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\* *by type*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
Only the most important types are included.

### 2.2.1 Violent crimes by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists

Violent crimes by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists*		
	2007	2008
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	1	3
Bodily injury	226	220
Arson	10	20
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Breach of the public peace	94	54
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	13	6
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	9	12
Extortion	0	2
Resisting public authority	36	25
Sexual crimes	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>342</b>


\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while breaching the public peace, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### **2.3 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land***

In absolute terms, the highest number of violent crimes with a left-wing extremist background occurred in Bavaria (109 registered offences); in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents, however, Bavaria lies towards the bottom of the scale.


It is followed – in absolute terms – by Lower-Saxony (101, in eighth place in proportion to total population) and North-Rhine/Westphalia (86, in twelfth place in proportion to total population).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*per 100,000 residents and Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and population data from the Federal Statistical Office (as at 31.12.2007).

### **3. Politically motivated crimes by foreigners**

#### **3.1 Overview**

Politically motivated crimes by foreigners include the subset of politically motivated crimes with an extremist background. In 2008, 1,484 criminal offences (2007: 902) were classified as politically motivated crimes by foreigners; of these, 143 were classified as violent crimes (2007: 129). In this area, 1,312 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2007: 747), including 113 violent crimes (2007: 108).

The number of politically motivated crimes by foreigners with an extremist background thus rose by 75.6%, that of violent crimes in this area rose by 4.6%.

---

<b>Politically motivated crimes with an extremist background committed by foreigners*</b>		
<b>Violent crimes:</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	2	3
Bodily injury	54	63
Arson	17	11
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	2	0
Breach of the public peace	23	12
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	1	2
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	1
Robbery	3	3
Extortion	5	11
Resisting public authority	1	7
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	107	205
Coercion, threat	25	27
Other criminal offences	507	967
<b>Total</b>	<b>639</b>	<b>1,199</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>747</b>	<b>1,312</b>


\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while breaching the public peace, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.



### 3.2 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land*

The most politically motivated violent crimes by foreigners took place in Baden-Württemberg (41), followed by North-Rhine/Westphalia (27) and Berlin (14).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of politically motivated crimes by foreigners\***  
*by Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

## Right-Wing Extremist Activities and Suspicious Cases

### I. Overview

#### 1. Ideology

**Nationalism and racism** Right-wing extremist ideology is characterized by nationalist and racist beliefs and attitudes. It is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. This right-wing extremist notion stands in fundamental conflict with the Basic Law.

**Authoritarian state and Volksgemeinschaft ideology** Right-wing extremists typically advocate an authoritarian political system in which the state and the people – in their view an ethnically homogeneous group – join together as a single unit within a supposedly natural order. According to this ideology of *Volksgemeinschaft*, a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics, the state's leaders intuitively act in accordance with the supposedly uniform will of the people. Starting from this premise, right-wing extremists believe that a state based on right-wing extremist ideology can do without the essential controls of a liberal democratic system, such as the people's right to exercise state authority through elections, or the right to form an opposition and take action.

**Ideologically heterogeneous** Right-wing extremism in Germany is not a homogeneous movement but displays different elements of nationalist, racist and anti-Semitic ideology, resulting in different objectives. The worldview of right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence is marked by xenophobic and often racist and violent resentments. Such persons express themselves with spontaneous acts of violence and aggressive, inflammatory music. In doing so, they express their desire to "free" Germany from what they consider foreign influence.

Neo-Nazis' beliefs are usually oriented on National Socialist notions of a totalitarian state based on racist and anti-Semitic principles and led by a "Führer".

---

The right-wing extremist political parties, by contrast, represent more nationalistic positions. They consider the nation to be the supreme principle, taking precedence over human and civil rights. Their aim is to establish an authoritarian state that would do away with the liberal democratic order.

## 2. Developments within right-wing extremism

<b>A high level of right-wing extremist violence</b>	The number of right-wing extremist criminal offences and acts of violence rose in 2008 (see also Section III, 1, "Politically Motivated Crime") to the highest level since the current definition of politically motivated crime was introduced in 2001.
<b>Smaller right-wing extremist following</b>	The size of the right-wing extremist following shrank slightly (see 3 below), due to a smaller number of violent, subculture-oriented right-wing extremists and further membership losses by right-wing extremist parties. However, the number of neo-Nazis and sympathizers rose slightly.
<b>Right-wing extremist music</b>	Right-wing extremist music (cf. Section V) continues to be very important in building up and maintaining the violent right-wing extremist scene. Neo-Nazi groups known as <i>Kameradschaften</i> and right-wing extremist parties consciously exploit the impact of this music.  There were slightly fewer concerts in 2008. There were as many skinhead bands as in the previous year, although the number of music distributors was slightly lower.
<b>Changes in the subcultural scene continue</b>	Again in 2008, the influence of competing youth subcultures was increasingly felt. The scene's particular symbols are giving way to general trends in youth fashion, to hooligan style and the look of the "autonomous nationalists". As in the past, those in this scene are less interested in political activity than in subcultural activities like concerts.
<b>The neo-Nazi scene</b>	Despite their ideological shortcomings, the "autonomous nationalists" have become an integral part of the neo-Nazi camp. Their role in the greater propensity to violence is most obvious at right-wing extremist demonstrations like those in Hamburg and Dortmund, where in some cases only a massive police presence was able to prevent serious altercations between violent right-wing and left-wing extremists.
<b>Fewer NPD members</b>	Despite a slight drop in membership, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) currently has the most members of any right-wing extremist party in

Germany. Again in 2008, cooperation between the NPD and the neo-Nazi scene was marked by considerable tension.

- Real estate deals** Right-wing extremists attracted much media attention in 2008 by announcing plans to buy vacant hotels, restaurants or meeting halls to be turned into NPD training centres. In particular, the NPD's deputy national chairman Jürgen Rieger was frequently mentioned as a potential buyer.
- Attempts to make the movement more intellectual remained weak** Again in 2008, attempts to make right-wing extremism more intellectual were not particularly successful; the only one worth mentioning is the Kontinent Europa Stiftung (KES, Continent Europe Foundation), an international foundation whose membership includes well-known German right-wing extremists and which has good relations with the NPD. As the founder of the KES has moved from Sweden to Berlin, the foundation's activities, i.e. offering a forum for European scholars to take part in the "struggle for a new European order", are likely to concentrate increasingly on Germany.
- Association bans** On 7 May 2008, the Federal Ministry of the Interior banned the right-wing extremist organisations Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocaust Verfolgten (VRBHV, Society for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for disputing the Holocaust; cf. Section VIII, 3), Verein Internationales Studienwerk – Collegium Humanum e.V. (CH, International study association Collegium Humanum) and its subsidiary Bauernhilfe e.V. (Farmers' aid reg'd society) by order of 18 April 2008. Founded in 1963, the CH operated a right-wing extremist training centre in Vlotho, North Rhine-Westphalia, which focused on indoctrinating young people in particular (cf. Section VI).
- Anti-Semitism** Anti-Semitism remains a strong ideological element uniting the various right-wing extremist currents. In 2008, "political anti-Semitism", which claims that Jews have excessive political influence, played a greater role in the wake of the global financial crisis, and right-wing extremists also used the U.S. presidential election as a platform for similar statements.
-

### 3. Organisations and following

- Right-wing extremist following continues to shrink** At the end of 2008, there were 156 right-wing extremist organisations and associations in Germany (2007: 180). Membership of these organisations and the number of unaffiliated right-wing extremists totalled 30,000, down slightly from the previous year (31,000).
- Fewer violent right-wing extremists** The number of subculture-oriented and other right-wing extremists willing to use violence decreased slightly to 9,500 (2007: 10,000). This category includes right-wing extremists who support the use of violence but have not yet committed any violent crimes, as well as right-wing extremist skinheads whose subculture orientation clearly distinguishes them from other right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence, especially neo-Nazis.
- More neo-Nazis** The number of neo-Nazis rose by about 9% to 4,800 (2007: 4,400). The degree of organisation within the neo-Nazi scene has significantly decreased: 87 groupings demonstrated at least a minimum of organisational structure (2007: 107).
- Fewer NPD and DVU members** Membership of the right-wing extremist parties fell slightly: The NPD went from 7,200 members in 2007 to 7,000 in 2008, while the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union) went from 7,000 in 2007 to 6,000 in 2008.
- The number of other right-wing extremist organisations remained about the same at 65 (2007: 69). This spectrum has about 3,800 members/activists (2007: 4,000).
-

Right-wing extremist following <sup>1</sup>						
	2006		2007		2008	
	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
<b>Subculture-oriented and other right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence<sup>2</sup></b>	2	10,400	2	10,000	2	9,500
<b>Neo-Nazis<sup>3</sup></b>	108	4,200	107	4,400	87	4,800
<b>of which in parties</b>	3	21,500	2	14,200	2	13,000
NPD		7,000		7,200		7,000
DVU		8,500		7,000		6,000
<i>Die Republikaner</i> (The Republikaner, REP)		6,000 <sup>4</sup>		-/- <sup>5</sup>		
<b>Other right-wing extremist organisations</b>	69	3,800	69	4,000 <sup>5</sup>	65	3,800
<b>Total</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>39,900<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>180</b>	<b>32,600</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>31,100</b>
<b>After deducting multiple memberships</b>		<b>38,600<sup>4</sup></b>		<b>31,000</b>		<b>30,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.

<sup>2</sup> Most of the subculture-oriented and other violent right-wing extremists (mainly skinheads) are not affiliated with organized groups. The statistics list not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those right-wing extremists presumed on the basis of pertinent indicators to be prepared to use violence.

<sup>3</sup> After subtracting multiple memberships within the neo-Nazi milieu. This figure includes only those neo-Nazi groups and those of the 160 *Kameradschaften* that demonstrate a certain degree of structure and permanence.

<sup>4</sup> In 2006, there was not sufficient evidence of anti-constitutional activity by the REP to justify devoting a separate chapter to the party in the annual report on the protection of the Constitution. However, individuals and groups within the party continued to pursue or support right-wing extremist aims.

<sup>5</sup> Due to party developments in 2007, the REP is no longer categorized in the annual report on the protection of the Constitution as a right-wing extremist organisation or as including right-wing extremist sympathizers.

<sup>6</sup> Instances of multiple membership of political parties and other right-wing extremist organisations were subtracted from the overall figures (2008: 1,100).

#### **4. Periodical publications**

In 2008, the number of right-wing extremist publications fell to 78 (2007: 96, 2006: 86); 46 of these publications appeared at least four times a year.

#### **5. Right-wing extremism on the Internet**

The Internet continues to serve right-wing extremists as an important platform for disseminating their ideology, mobilizing their followers and recruiting new sympathizers. The overall number of websites run by German right-wing extremists remained constant at about 1,000, although individual right-wing extremist homepages are subject to a high degree of fluctuation. As in the past, special web pages are added to the Internet for specific events, such as demonstrations and campaigns.

Discussion forums, some of them with several hundred participants, are popular within the right-wing extremist scene. The quantity of news offered in such forums enables targeted access to specific information in structured form. Events and campaigns by the right-wing extremist scene are announced and thoroughly discussed afterwards. Both the large number of registered participants and the volume of comments indicate that this area of the Internet has become an important channel of communication for right-wing extremists. By setting up password-protected areas, website administrators hope to prevent unwanted visitors from viewing discussion content. This type of communication creates a feeling of community among the participants and often yields virtual relationships, and in some cases, Internet contacts between right-wing extremists lead to personal contact, even organized meetings of forum users.

**Virtual communities** Further, right-wing extremists are trying to break out of their social isolation and reach a wider audience by increasing their activity on non-extremist social networking websites. Sometimes the nicknames users have chosen for themselves indicate affinity with right-wing extremist ideology. In particular, reciprocal links among users encourage the growth of “communities” which can extend beyond the boundaries of the right-wing extremist scene. In this way, right-wing extremists attempt to disseminate their propaganda to a larger

---



audience and to influence the formation of political opinion by confronting Internet users with their ideology. The authors of such Internet content usually operate clandestinely and take advantage of all possibilities offered by the Internet to remain anonymous.

**Video platforms** Video platforms are especially popular with young people, so German right-wing extremists also take advantage of the possibility to upload their own videos. These are usually recruitment videos from individual *Kameradschaften*, own film footage from right-wing extremist demonstrations or music videos of right-wing extremist bands. The content of some of these music videos may be punishable by law. Such video platforms also offer a variety of videos with racist or violent content, or displaying anti-constitutional symbols, uploaded anonymously by users outside Germany. Although the terms and conditions of such websites generally prohibit such content and threaten to remove it, those responsible for hosting such sites do not always enforce these rules rigorously.

**Influence on young people** The threat posed by low-risk, anonymous dissemination of right-wing extremist propaganda via the Internet should be considered significant, in particular because such content offered in multimedia form (audio and video files) has a much greater influence on young people than conventional media coming out of the right-wing extremist scene. And the fact that Internet communities are not suspected of being run by extremists helps persons close to the right-wing extremist scene feel they can operate here safely and unobserved.

---

## 6. Right-Wing Extremist Demonstrations

**Neo-Nazi demonstrations** In 2008, the number of neo-Nazi demonstrations rose to 80, from 66 in 2007, though this number remained well below the high-water marks of 2005 (145) and 2006 (126). One reason for the rise may be that the scene has been increasingly successful – also with the help of litigation – in reversing bans or conducting spontaneous demonstrations without applying for permission beforehand in order to avoid the risk of bans.

As in the previous year, the larger number of events was accompanied by a trend towards smaller regional demonstrations, which also explains the smaller numbers of participants. These events typically focus on social issues and state repression.

**NPD demonstrations** In 2008, the NPD and its youth organisation Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) put on about 75 demonstrations and public events, up slightly from 70 held in 2007.<sup>4</sup> In 2008, the largest event in terms of attendance was a central demonstration in Nuremberg on 1 May, for which the NPD party executive applied for a permit; about 1,500 people took part in the demonstration, which used the slogan “Only national is social” (in 2007, six regional events with a total attendance of about 2,700 were held).

**Other events** Of the largest events in 2008, the following should be mentioned in particular:

- On 16 February 2008, 3,800 persons marched to commemorate the bombing of Dresden during World War II in an event organized by the right-wing extremist Junge Landsmannschaft Ostdeutschland (JLO, Young *Landmannschaft* of East Germany). The speakers at the event included Udo Pastörs, deputy NPD chairman for the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and chair of the parliamentary group in that state’s parliament.
- On 13 September 2008, about 1,100 people attended the third “Festival of peoples” in Altenburg, Thuringia, organized by the NPD association of Jena and “free forces” (attendance in 2007: approx. 1,400). The open-air event included appearances by the right-wing

---

<sup>4</sup> This figure does not include smaller events such as information stands or vigils without broader public resonance.

---

extremist bands White Law, Strappo and Sleipnir and numerous right-wing extremist speakers from Germany and abroad, including NPD party chairman Rieger.

## **II. Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence**

### **1. Right-wing terrorism**

Again in 2008, no evidence of right-wing terrorist structures was found in Germany. As in 2007, no debate over right-wing terrorism took place in the right-wing extremist scene in 2008.

**Fascination with weapons and explosives** However, the fascination of right-wing extremists, especially neo-Nazis, with weapons and explosives is a potential threat which should not be underestimated, particularly since directions for building bombs and explosive devices are available on the Internet.

### **2. Right-wing extremist skinheads**

**Right-wing extremist attitudes** Right-wing extremist skinheads have no consistent worldview; instead, they present themselves as a diverse subculture influenced by a variety of right-wing extremist attitudes and more interested in entertainment-type activities like right-wing extremist concerts. The crucial difference between this subculture and neo-Nazism is the lack of interest in political activity and the lack of an overarching ideology.

**Attractive to young people** Young people's initial contact with right-wing extremist ideology usually occurs via the Internet and right-wing extremist music. Young people whose character has not been fully formed are more vulnerable to xenophobic and nationalist ideas, and may join a group which displays aggressive attitudes in order to increase their own sense of self-esteem. And young people are often motivated by the desire to provoke mainstream society and by the thrill of engaging in forbidden or conspiratorial activities.

---

**Attitude reinforcement** After initial contact, young people may find their involvement in the scene increasing: for example, going with friends to right-wing extremist concerts, which have a special attraction due to their conspiratorial nature. Increasing involvement with subcultural right-wing extremist structures is accompanied by increasing acceptance of right-wing extremist ideology, which has a broad impact on social behaviour, increasing the propensity to break the law, in particular by committing propaganda offences or incitement.

**Acceptance of violence** Especially the influence of alcohol leads to aggression which is then released in spontaneous acts of violence. Victims of subcultural right-wing extremist violence are usually immigrants, homosexuals and increasingly political opponents.

The right-wing extremist skinhead scene is concentrated in certain regions in eastern Germany and in western German conurbations such as the Ruhr region.

**Political significance** In recent years, the classic skinhead subculture has shown a decline in popularity, while competing youth subcultures are exerting greater influence. This is also reflected in the musical styles of right-wing extremist bands and in the changing fashion trends in the scene. For example, bomber jackets and combat boots are no longer the informal uniform of the scene; instead, much of the milieu is following general trends in youth fashion, hooligan style and the look of the “autonomous nationalists” (cf. Section III).

**Successors to Blood & Honour** Begun in March 2006, an extensive investigation of members of the banned Blood & Honour skinhead group on suspicion of continuing a banned organisation and/or support for follow-up structures was largely completed and the case turned over to the responsible public prosecutors. The regional court in Halle, Saxony-Anhalt, returned the first verdict in the case in August 2008, issuing fines of up to €1,500 for four defendants on charges of helping maintain an association subject to a final ban. Charges against a third person were dropped after a fine was paid.

---

### III. Neo-Nazism

**Ideology and following** The neo-Nazi spectrum defines itself by its relation to National Socialist ideology, although this takes different forms. Whereas the majority of the neo-Nazi scene continues to regard the “Third Reich” as the ideal state, others in the scene criticize Adolf Hitler’s policies as turning away from the “pure teachings” of supposedly true National Socialism. The different *Kameradschaften* and regional leaders in Germany use differing interpretations of Nazi ideology as the model for their own political efforts. However, all neo-Nazis want to replace the Federal Republic of Germany – which they call “the system” – with an authoritarian, ethnically homogeneous state led by a “Führer”.

In 2008, the neo-Nazi scene comprised 4,800 persons, representing an increase of about 10% over the previous year.

**Acceptance of violence** In line with the historical National Socialist ideology, the neo-Nazi scene also demonstrates an obvious affinity to violence, as demonstrated by their weapons caches or war games. At the same time, however, activists usually claim to abide by the law in order to avoid confrontations with government authorities.

On 17 July 2008, several persons associated with the *Kameradschaft Sturm 34* (Storm 34) in the Mittweida region of Saxony, which was banned in 2007, set fire to an alternative youth centre in Rochlitz, Saxony, and attacked political opponents. On 6 August 2008, two former leaders of the banned group were sentenced to several years in prison on other charges (serious bodily injury).

**Forms of organisation and activity** Within the neo-Nazi camp, the prevalent form of organisation is the *Kameradschaft*, or small, informal group at local level. This model was developed following the association bans of the 1990s in order to keep the authorities from infiltrating and banning the groups. By creating networks of individual *Kameradschaften*, the scene is trying to increase its ability to take action and mobilize followers. Neo-Nazi associations with formal organisational structures and the “autonomous nationalists” play a much smaller role, at least in terms of their numbers.

Through public events, such as distributing flyers or holding rallies, members of *Kameradschaften* attempt to disseminate their ideas to the general public, but such endeavours rarely succeed due to the high level of public awareness. To try to get around their social isolation, neo-Nazis often draw on issues that are either of general interest or that do not appear at first glance to have any connection to right-wing extremist ideology. Two demonstrations referring to current issues can serve as examples:

- On 12 April 2008, a demonstration in Stolberg, near Aachen, was held in connection with the killing of a German youth by a youth of immigrant background.
- About 1,500 right-wing extremists demonstrated in Hamburg on 1 May 2008 under the slogan “Work and social justice for all Germans – Together against globalization”.

**Avoiding direct references to National Socialism** Both the number of rallies which refer directly to historical National Socialism and the number of persons attending such rallies have fallen. This is apparent from the numbers of participants in events commemorating the 21st anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s former deputy. In 2006 and 2007, about 1,200 people attended the various regional events that were organized in place of a central rally in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, which had been prohibited by the court; in 2008, fewer than 800 took part. A central event at Hess’s burial site in Wunsiedel was prohibited again in 2008. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected a complaint by the lawyer and NPD functionary Rieger, who for years has submitted the applications for the annual event.

**Indirect promotion of National Socialist ideology** But the fact that fewer events refer directly to National Socialism does not mean that Nazi ideology has become less important. One example is the largest neo-Nazi demonstration in 2008, in Dortmund on 6 September with attendance of nearly 1,200, to mark the fourth so-called national anti-war day. This annual rally is organized by

---

persons who can be considered part of the “autonomous nationalist” group; according to one participant, the rally was intended to thematize “imperialism” and “war-mongering by international high finance, which since 1939 has waged a military, economic and moral war on the free peoples of the world”.<sup>5</sup> The article goes on to refer to a “German war of self-defence against Poland” and “wars of aggression and attack by Americans and Israelites”.

These assertions follow the pattern of Nazi propaganda, which also described the German invasion of Poland in 1939 as a response to an alleged Polish attack and accused “world Jewry”, also called “international high finance”, of being responsible for World War II.

Reference to National Socialism is obvious from the use of a Hitler quote on the main rally banner: “Yes always to peace, no always to denial of German honour!”<sup>6</sup>

**“Autonomous nationalists” still lack ideology**

“Autonomous nationalists” have been active within the neo-Nazi spectrum since 2004. Although their number has grown to about 10% of the total neo-Nazi scene and although they initiated the takeover of the left-wing extremist model of “black blocs”, the “autonomous nationalists” have not been able to ground their activities in an independent ideology, as the author of the following article was forced to acknowledge:

*“The notion that this form of action is an imitation of radical leftist currents has unfortunately and wrongly taken root in our own ranks. Few attempts have been made to counter the prevalent opinion, for one reason: lack of theory. ... Only those who have internalized National Socialism will be able to live accordingly and promote it. ... It is finally time to give up walking the tightrope by trying to be as attractive as possible to young people. It is time to return to the necessary knowledge and values associated with the Volk. Young people who are not willing to internalize the theoretical principles of our movement should not fill our ranks simply for reasons of quantity.”*  
(Website of neo-Nazis from Gladbeck, 26 October 2008)

**Status and significance in neo-Nazism**

Despite their ideological shortcomings, the “autonomous nationalists” have become an integral part of the neo-Nazi camp. They also influence those parts of the scene which disagree with them; in particular, other right-wing extremists have copied the way they dress at demonstrations because of the anonymity it affords.

<sup>5</sup> Website of the Aktionsgruppe Ruhr-Mitte (Mid-Ruhr action group), 26 October 2008.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5.

**Willingness to use violence at demonstrations** The greater propensity to violence at right-wing extremist demonstrations is due to the entertainment orientation of the “autonomous nationalists” and the desire of other right-wing extremist elements to lend force – physical, if necessary – to their own aims. This was most obvious at the previously mentioned demonstrations in Hamburg on 1 May 2008 and Dortmund on 6 September 2008, where in some cases only a massive police presence was able to prevent serious altercations between violent right-wing and left-wing extremists.

**Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend** By contrast, the Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend – Bund zum Schutz für Umwelt, Mitwelt und Heimat e.V. (HDJ, German youth devoted to the homeland – Alliance to protect the natural and social environment and homeland, reg'd society) is very careful to portray its activities as lawful. The organisation, which is registered in Kiel and whose national executive is based in the Berlin area, says that its aim is non-political youth work. In 2008, a number of criminal investigations brought the HDJ to the public's attention. The HDJ has several hundred members, and its hierarchical structure, which is organized in a national leadership, central offices and units, extends across most of Germany. Sebastian Rübiger is the “national leader” (*Bundesführer*) of the HDJ.

Contrary to what its statutes say, the HDJ is engaged not only in youth work, but also in indoctrinating children, youth and young adults in neo-Nazi ideology and in providing basic war-game-type training.

A quote from an internal HDJ leadership manual (*Führerhandbuch*) makes this aim obvious. The manual, which contains racist ideology and glorifies violence, also includes a line from the Hitler Youth song *Uns're Fahne flattert uns voran* (Our flag flutters before us) written by the Nazi functionary Baldur von Schirach:

*“Our national flag displays a red flame surrounded by a circle on a black and white ground. The symbols and colours were not chosen at random, but have a meaning. ... The circle stands for the community, for a closed group of the same race. Everything together, the red flame in a circle on a black and white ground is YOU! Is US! Is GERMANY! The flag is holy it should be carried in front and held high. In many battles, the flag was held high even in defeat. Many songs sing of its value ‘The flag is more important than death’.”*  
(HDJ leadership manual, p. 33 f.)

---



- Investigation of HDJ** The Federal Ministry of the Interior launched an investigation of the HDJ on suspicion of violating the law on associations; extensive raids were carried out around the country on 9 October 2008.<sup>7</sup> A large quantity of evidence, including internal communications, right-wing extremist publications, Nazi memorabilia, weapons and weapons components, was found in the possession of 88 persons suspected of belonging or having ties to the organisation.
- Relations between the neo-Nazi scene and the NPD** Despite the ongoing close cooperation between segments of the “free forces” and the NPD, the relationship between them in 2008 was sometimes tense and characterized by mistrust. Nonetheless, the neo-Nazi scene still appears willing to continue what it regards as its difficult cooperation with the NPD, because it offers a realistic chance to convey at least some of its political ideas to a larger public.

---

<sup>7</sup> By order of the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 9 March 2009, the HDJ was banned effective 31 March 2009. The HDJ appealed the ban at the Federal Administrative Court with its statements of 28 and 30 April 2009.

---

## IV. Political parties

### 1. Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)

Founded:	1964
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Udo Voigt
Membership:	7,000 (2007: 7,200)
Publication:	<i>Deutsche Stimme</i> (German Voice), monthly; circulation: 20,000 (according to the party)
Subsidiary organisations:	Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats), Kommunalpolitische Vereinigung (KPV, Local political association), Ring Nationaler Frauen (RNF, Circle of nationalist women), Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund e.V. (NHB, National-democratic university alliance, reg'd society)

#### 1.1 Ideology and strategic approaches

**Racist nationalism as core ideology** The NPD's thorough orientation on a strictly racist nationalism has central importance for its ideology. This fundamental position largely determines the perception and processing of various topics, from the overall ideas on state and society, to economic and historical issues. For example, the NPD promotes its ideal of an ethnically homogeneous *Volksgemeinschaft* (the National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics) in opposition to parliamentary democracy in Germany. In applying its basic racist ideas to individual fields such as policy on foreigners, education, finance and the economy as well as history, the NPD gives expression to its xenophobic and racist attitudes which relativize or even sympathize with historical National Socialism. The party's fundamental statements therefore stand

in opposition to the free and democratic order. The party's activity and theoretical foundation are completely pervaded by ideology and thus a closed, right-wing extremist worldview.

**Racism and xenophobia** The NPD's nationalism is based on a strongly pronounced racism. The party strives to present its insistence on ethnically homogeneous, separate and equal races as a concept oriented on what it calls a "reality-based image of humanity", but the NPD's racism is not limited to wanting to bring together and preserve genuine "German-ness"; it also entails shutting out "the Other", i.e. those of "alien races". A number of NPD statements indicate that the party does not really believe that all ethnic groups are equal, but instead assumes a clear hierarchy. A theoretical article by Jürgen Gansel, an NPD member of the Saxony state parliament, on the status of Islam and Judaism in the multicultural society demonstrates the prominent role racist categories play for the NPD:

*"But [the European races] find their lives threatened by mass immigration from the Orient, Asia and Africa. The religious faith of these people is secondary. No normal European feels closer to a Negro than a Bosnian just because the first is a Christian and the second a Muslim. ... But for the majority of Muslim immigrants in Germany, the race and religion questions are two sides of the same problem. They represent a twofold problem, because as Orientals they are an alien race and Islam is an alien religion incompatible with the European intellectual tradition which also provides the mental tools for aggressive dissemination at the expense of 'unbelievers'."*  
(Deutsche Stimme, No. 9/2008 of September 2008, p. 22)

Further on in the text, Gansel explains the general opposition to Jews and Muslims in Europe as the result of their "alien race", which he says makes it impossible for them to live with native-born Germans over the long term. According to Gansel, Jews and Muslims should go on fighting each other as far as possible from Germany and Europe. The priority of race over religious affiliation is apparent in another text distributed by the NPD in Saxony-Anhalt which vehemently rejects the idea of allowing Iraqi Christians who face persecution at home to enter Germany:

*"Ethnically and culturally, the Iraqi Christians should be regarded no differently from the other Oriental foreigners from the underclasses who are currently making life difficult for us in the Federal Republic's conurbations. So Schäuble is willing not only to allow massive immigration into the social welfare system at the taxpayers' expense,*

*but also to make sure there is additional crime in the future."* (Website of the NPD in Saxony-Anhalt, 13 April 2008)

Thus the NPD is not only concerned with preserving the "racial purity" of the German people. The party sees this threatened above all because it ultimately regards persons of other ethnic origins as inferior and their presence in Europe and Germany as a direct threat to its existence, as numerous xenophobic statements by the party, some of which resort to aggressive and derogatory rhetoric, indicate. For example, at a district council meeting on 27 March 2008, Jörg Hähnel, chairman of the NPD's Berlin organisation, called immigration "biological warfare" and "genocide".<sup>8</sup> In a lengthy theoretical article, Karl Richter, an NPD member of the Munich city council, described homogeneity as the norm which he claimed was constantly being manipulated by the fraud of tolerance, "the intellectual immune deficiency of our time":

*"Certainly, for a while instincts can be suppressed and heterogeneity can be 'tolerated' as long as there is enough food and space [Lebensraum] for all. ... When great effort is made to manipulate behaviour and perception daily, with the aim of inuring the manipulated: by means of coloured newsreaders, black television detectives, dark-skinned models in fashion catalogues; ... The truth is: Tolerance is manipulation of the natural. This is obvious everywhere. Tolerance is demanded for foreigners, homosexuals, AIDS patients, drug addicts, criminals, psychopaths who had a difficult childhood and so on and so on."*

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 6/2008 of June 2006, p. 22)

Elsewhere, the NPD warns against growing "intellectual niggerization of the remaining German youth" by means of an "interchangeable mish-mash of hip-hop and McDonald's".<sup>9</sup> The NPD parliamentary group in the state parliament of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania even issued a statement claiming that a civil war was already under way between Germans and "alien civilian occupiers".<sup>10</sup>

**Volksgemeinschaft** In the NPD's view, *Volksgemeinschaft* is the only natural order appropriate to humans' true nature and is thus the only acceptable system of government. Although this term was used by the National Socialists, the NPD openly promotes it in all sorts of contexts. In the

<sup>8</sup> Website of the NPD Berlin organisation (15 April 2008).

<sup>9</sup> NPD website, 4 July 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Website of the NPD parliamentary group in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 2 October 2008.

racist interpretation of the NPD, *Volksgemeinschaft* means excluding outsiders and forced conformity for those within the community.

Already in the introduction to a draft programme, the party executive states that Germany must remain the country of Germans and that as a rule, foreigners should not have the right to remain. The NPD's racist orientation pervades every area of action. According to the party, a viable national identity is conceivable only on the basis of an ethnically homogeneous *Volksgemeinschaft*; the same applies to the possibility of a unifying culture. The party also rules out the possibility that a social welfare state could function in the absence of a *Volksgemeinschaft*; in its view, solidarity requires shared ethnic roots.<sup>11</sup> The extent of the NPD's fixation on racist perspectives is apparent in its stance towards integration. As it is generally understood, social integration is a process in which individuals and groups of different backgrounds contribute to and/or become involved in society on the basis of shared values, in order to encourage equal and widespread participation. In its draft programme, the NPD describes this task of society in absolute terms:

*"In the national-democratic view, integration is equivalent to genocide."*

(NPD draft programme of August 2008, p. 11)

The draft programme has not yet been completed; after party conferences devoted to the programme were postponed several times, its adoption is now planned for autumn 2009. If one compares the current draft to the NPD party programme adopted in 1996, it is obvious that the basic racist ideology has become more pointed and dominant, as indicated by the drastically formulated introductory sentence:

*"The 21st century will decide whether the German people and the German national and social welfare state will live or die."*

(NPD draft programme of August 2008, p. 1)

***Volksgemeinschaft  
and the social  
question***

In numerous statements on economic and immigration issues, NPD functionaries regularly bring up the notion of *Volksgemeinschaft* in connection with their slogan "Only national is social!" For the NPD's national chair, Udo Voigt, the social question is the key issue of the future, which he claims can be answered only when the Germans once again see themselves as a community. This is why, he says, the question of social justice is so closely linked to the issue of migration.

---

<sup>11</sup> NPD draft programme of August 2008, pp. 1 – 3, 6 f.

---

He goes on to say that only *Volksgemeinschaft* can cushion the impact of “asocial” globalization and immigration in general.<sup>12</sup> The NPD’s “economics expert” Per Lennart Aae also regularly refers in his articles to the supposed connection between *Volksgemeinschaft* and economic productivity. For this reason, he considers racial cohesiveness in what he calls a spatially oriented economy essential for solving current economic and social problems.<sup>13</sup> Given the general effects of the crisis, Gansel, the NPD’s party theorist, believes that the “hour of a national movement of solidarity and justice” has come. In doing so, he assumes that it will be necessary for tactical reasons to free the term *Volksgemeinschaft* from its Nazi connotations:

*“The chances have rarely been as good as they are today for reviving the spirit of Volksgemeinschaft and turning it into a desire which will move the masses. The timeless nature of this community ideal must be emphasized and freed from the context of National Socialism. The idea of Volksgemeinschaft should be freed from any old-fashioned connotations and must be introduced to the public as an ultramodern programme of solidarity and justice – as the only real anti-globalization programme.”*

*(Deutsche Stimme, No. 1/2008 of January 2008, p. 22)*

**Striving to  
“overcome the  
system”**

Due to its anti-pluralism, intolerance and xenophobia, *Volksgemeinschaft* defined in ethnic terms stands in opposition to the free and democratic constitutional order. The NPD is aware of this opposition. The NPD also makes sure to describe any problems as shortcomings symptomatic of the system, in order to question the “system”. Thus Gansel finds the social question very relevant, as it offers him a promising tool for “overcoming the system”. He asserts with satisfaction that constant social challenges have turned political apathy into apathy towards the system, which he says has turned into “average Germans’ contempt for the system”.<sup>14</sup> Speaking about the current financial crisis, in a parliamentary debate on 16 October 2008 Holger Apfel, deputy national chairman of the NPD and head of the NPD parliamentary group in the Saxony state parliament, stated that the crisis demonstrated once again: “The system does not have flaws, the system is the flaw!”<sup>15</sup> An example of this type of argumentation is offered by the statement of the NPD in Saxony-Anhalt concerning energy issues. Postulating a “holistic” approach, the statement argues that nationalizing the energy grid would

<sup>12</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 4/2008 of April 2008, p. 2, and No. 7/2008 of July 2008, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2008 of July 2008, p. 5, and No. 9/2008 of September, p. 19 f.

<sup>14</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 1/2008 of January 2008, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> NPD website, 17 October 2008.

only be the first step towards the so-called “system issue”. According to the statement, energy management and energy policy presented an “excellent starting position” for this approach.<sup>16</sup> With an eye to the parliamentary elections in Bavaria and local elections in Brandenburg on 28 September 2008, Voigt made clear:

*“Election day is payback time ... Germany needs a change of system.”*  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2008 of October 2008, p. 2)

**Favourable attitude  
towards National  
Socialism**

In order to be able to portray the notion of *Volksgemeinschaft* as a timelessly valid, uncompromised alternative to the current political order in Germany, the NPD occasionally calls on its followers to convey this notion detached from its context of historical National Socialism and without reference to an “old-fashioned symbolism”. In fact, however, statements from every level of the party regularly contain favourable references to supposed achievements and values of the “Third Reich” which they claim deserve to be emulated; such statements locate their own ideal order very much within the tradition of National Socialism. This is clear, for example, in a review Gansel wrote of a book by the respected historian Götz Aly published in 2008, *Unser Kampf. 1968 - ein irritierter Blick zurück* (Our struggle: 1968 – a look back in irritation). Gansel vehemently rejects Aly’s comparison of the student revolutionaries of 1968 with the National Socialist student association, because he finds it insults the latter:

*“It is absurd and ahistorical to compare the nationalist student association of the 1920s with flipped-out hash rebels, pseudo-revolutionary petty criminals and anti-family behavioural theorists. ... And the earlier student association protested against the intellectual destruction of leftist-socialist and Jewish professors (who were often one and the same), while the revolutionaries of 1968 plundered their ideas for destroying the German state and people from Jewish thinkers like Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Reich.”* (*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2008 of May 2008, p. 22)

Later in his review, Gansel mentions Joseph Goebbels in especially positive terms, despite his central role as Nazi propaganda minister, as though Goebbels were a historical figure who represented opinions worth emulating. Gansel claims that Goebbels was an exemplary, progressive thinker in the spirit of *Volksgemeinschaft* who considered the students in the 1920s as the vanguard of a new society in which solidarity was foremost.<sup>17</sup> NPD statements contain numerous casual

<sup>16</sup> Website of NPD in Saxony-Anhalt, 5 September 2008.

<sup>17</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2008 of May 2008, p. 22.

yet telling references to supposedly positive approaches taken by the “Third Reich”. The author of an article in *Deutsche Stimme* on the founding of the second German empire in 1870 stressed the life’s work of Otto von Bismarck while noting with regret the “tragedy of this epoch”, namely that at that time it was not yet possible to include the ten million German Austrians. In an obvious reference to Adolf Hitler, the author mentions “another great statesman” who later founded a greater German empire, thus overcoming this supposed tragedy.<sup>18</sup> In an interview in *Deutsche Stimme*, NPD theorist Aae described the family policy of the “Third Reich” as family-friendly, socially minded and above all successful.<sup>19</sup>

The NPD’s lack of distance to the Nazi regime is also apparent from the party’s regular and scathing criticism of scholars, media representatives and policy-makers who examine the Nazi past. In response to findings on National Socialism which are generally accepted by serious historical researchers, the NPD counters with revisionist arguments which seek to rehabilitate the Hitler regime. Gansel, the party theorist, has used especially pointed and derogatory language concerning the issue of dealing with German history:

*“Coloured by history pornography, the work of mourning and coming to terms determines the measure of national self-hate instilled in Germans which foreign and domestic powers absolutely need to achieve their anti-German objectives. ... Grotesquely, the psychopathological process of dealing with the Third Reich is not decreasing but increasing as the years go by. The past is simply not supposed to pass away, because Germany can only be kept down when the Federal Republicans freely indulge themselves in their desire to feel guilt and humiliate themselves in self-accusation. The disgusting dogma of this religion of guilt is ‘Remorse is my honour’.”*  
(NPD website, 1 July 2008)

Party speakers frequently refer to a “cult of guilt” in order to discredit what they see as the reprehensible treatment of National Socialism. This line of argument can also be found in the NPD’s draft programme of August 2008:

*“We National-Democrats say no to the state-ordered cult of guilt, which also serves the interests of foreign finance and encourages self-hate, especially among young people.”*(NPD draft programme of August 2008, p. 13)

---

<sup>18</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 1/2008 of January 2008, p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 9/2008 of September 2008, p. 19.

---



On 30 January 2008, the 75th anniversary of Hitler's election as chancellor, NPD members of the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament refused to stand for a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the Nazi regime. Udo Pastörs, chairman of the NPD parliamentary group, said that the NPD was not willing to take part in a one-sided "cult of guilt".<sup>20</sup>

The predominant stance in the NPD regarding the conservative resistance movement led by Claus von Stauffenberg and its failed attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944 makes clear how unwilling the party is to take a critical look at National Socialism. Commenting on the public oath taken by Bundeswehr recruits in front of the Reichstag building in Berlin on 20 July 2008, NPD party chairman Voigt stated:

*"Choosing to link the Reichstag as a symbol of the Reich, as an expression of the power of the people, dedicated to the German people, with the underhanded assassination attempt of 20 July was the choice of the organizers. After all, it was the Reichstag assembly, elected in free and secret voting, which elected Adolf Hitler as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933 and then gave him all the powers authorized by the Enabling Act [Ermächtigungsgesetz]."*  
(NPD website, 23 July 2008)

**Criticism of "re-education"**

The NPD regularly maligns the building of a democratic state under the rule of law after 1945, in conscious rejection of National Socialism, calling it a process of forced "re-education" which contradicts the true nature of the Germans and their real interests. According to the NPD, "re-education" is instead an instrument of the victorious Allies to ensure the lasting degradation of Germany.

At the party's national conference in Bamberg on 24 May 2008, Voigt stated:

*"We National-Democrats know that Germany is still occupied, has no sovereignty and its people are constantly re-educated in accordance with the victors' wishes; for this reason, we view the Federal Republic big-wigs who govern us and go along with this as collaborators and occupying powers."*  
(Address by the party chairman concerning his report at the 2008 national party conference in Bamberg, p. 6)

---

<sup>20</sup> NPD website, 1 February 2008.

---

Apfel, chairman of the NPD parliamentary group in the Saxony state parliament, describes an “ethnic fight for survival” in which Germans’ “mental immune deficiency” can largely be attributed to “re-education”:

*“Guilty above all are those generations of national-masochistic re-educators and long-term coming-to-terms who for decades have rigorously trained the native German population of our country to give up any desire for national survival – with reference to the Third Reich and its ‘unique’ crimes.”*

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 6/2008 of June 2008, p. 2)

Aae, who frequently discusses demographic issues, speaks of an “overall pathological context of German post-war history”. In his view, the self-mutilation of the German people was initiated immediately after the war, with the criminalization of German history and the “systematic cultivation of self-hate and hate for parents among German youth.” According to Aae, in the 1970s this process led young men and women to refuse to have children, resulting in a “degenerate family and social structure”. This situation, he says, then led to neglect, abuse and ultimately the killing of children.<sup>21</sup>

**Anti-Semitism** The NPD’s racist, xenophobic and revisionist statements are largely based on an implicit anti-Semitism which occasionally finds open expression. Gansel repeatedly draws on the anti-Semitic cliché of the Jewish character as “subverting the race”, which in his view means that Jews represented and still represent a serious threat to the “natural community order” advocated by the NPD. Referring to the U.S. presidential elections on 4 November 2008, ahead of which, according to Gansel, “Jews and Negroes” entered into an alliance which was tantamount to a “declaration of war” on all advocates of a biological *Volksgemeinschaft*, Gansel stated:

*“The old Jewish strategy of self-preservation, namely replacing native rights with minority rights and obscuring ethno-cultural differences between the native and the alien, is compatible with the interests of all minorities, half-breeds and uprooted persons in the melting pot of America.”*

(NPD website, 7 November 2008)

In a speech given on Ash Wednesday, 6 February 2008, the deputy national chairman of the NPD, Sascha Rossmüller, not only disseminated general anti-Semitic stereotypes, but also personally

<sup>21</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 1/2008 of January 2008, p. 1 f.

attacked the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany using racist and anti-Semitic language:

*“And it should finally be made perfectly clear who in our homeland has the right to make claims and who should just shut up or leave the country if they don't like it! ... How long can this chosen people stick their synagogue keys in everywhere? Mrs Knobloch should rather criticize her own people's moves in the Gaza Strip and finally leave us alone here.”*

(Website of the NPD in Bavaria, 7 February 2008)

Gansel and Rossmüller offer examples of the NPD's approach of defining Jewishness strictly in ethnic, rather than religious, terms. From this perspective, Jewish life in Germany constitutes an “alien” threat to *Volksgemeinschaft*, meaning that Jews should be tolerated only when they are on their best behaviour. Using highly discriminatory language, Rossmüller rhetorically excludes Jews as “insurmountably alien”. The call to “finally leave us alone here” and the comparison with militant Islamists are intended to lead his audience to the conclusion that Jews should be denied any right to live in Germany, as far as this can be put into practice.

**“Four-point strategy”** The NPD's strategy aims at undermining and ultimately overthrowing the political system by taking advantage of all possibilities for propaganda and agitation. The party's three point-strategy (“battle for the streets”, “battle for minds”, “battle for the parliaments”) was initiated in 1997. In 2004, a fourth point was added: the “battle for the organized will”. In order to reach “minds”, the strategy calls above all for further developing the racist programme, establishing links to other like-minded parties and putting its own stamp on certain concepts and ideas. The “battle for the streets” is aimed at creating public opposition and mobilizing as much of the public as possible, especially by organizing marches, demonstrations and information stands.<sup>22</sup> By regularly putting up candidates for election at every level of government, the NPD strives to steadily increase its representation in parliament. While representation in local governments primarily serves to anchor the party at regional level, seats in the federal and state parliaments help make the party appear legitimate and allow it to claim government funding. The NPD has seats in two state parliaments: Saxony, where it won 9.2% of the vote in 2004, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where it won 7.3% of the vote in

<sup>22</sup> Brochure of the NPD party executive: *Der Informationsstand: Hautnah am Volk. Von der Anmeldung bis zum Bürgergespräch* (The information stand: Face to face with the Volk. From registering to speaking with the public), 1st ed., February 2008.

2006. The “battle for the organized will” is intended to pool “national forces”. The NPD had some success in organizing a “right-wing popular front”, coordinating its campaign strategy with the DVU under the “Pact for Germany” and cooperating with the “free nationalists”. This fourth point played a key role in the NPD’s election victories in Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.

**Strategy of “speaking out”** One methodological approach in the “battle for the minds” is the strategy of “speaking out”. According to this strategy, the media’s exclusion or distortion of the NPD means that public events in particular should be viewed as an area where political opponents are vulnerable and as an opportunity to present the party in a more favourable light:

*“If NPD activists present themselves as self-confident, likeable and knowledgeable, then it will be a political success whenever they speak out at public gatherings. ... If, instead of the expected lunatics and ‘extremists’, NPD members who are polite, intelligent and sure of their arguments show up at an event organized by our political opponents, some of those attending the event may find their negative image of the NPD seriously shaken.”*

(Brochure of the NPD party executive: *Schweigespирale durchbrechen! Erfolgreiche nationale Wortergreifungen durchführen*, 1st ed., May 2008, p. 6)

For the NPD, the main objective of speaking out is to publicly expose the “incompetent democrat impostors”. The brochure adds that because regional media cannot simply ignore provocative NPD statements, their speaking out in any case results in free media coverage.<sup>23</sup>

According to the NPD, party activists successfully “spoke out” at an event in Dresden on 9 April 2008, organized by the local foreigners council with the slogan “Xenophobia and racism: The NPD as an inciter of hate and violence”. The NPD claimed that the “disciplined presence” of the NPD’s district party organisation was more persuasive for those at the event than the “hypocritical harangues by anti-German politicians” and representatives of public administration, the police and intelligence services. As a result, according to the NPD, the gathering led to the “unintentional unmasking of state-financed agitators and informers”.<sup>24</sup> The NPD saw the visit of

<sup>23</sup> Brochure of the NPD party executive: *Schweigespирale durchbrechen! Erfolgreiche nationale Wortergreifungen durchführen* (Breaking the spiral of silence: How to speak out successfully), 1st ed., May 2008, p. 15.

<sup>24</sup> Website of the NPD organisation in Saxony, 10 April 2008.

Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble to the border town of Zittau, Saxony, on 1 April 2008 as another opportunity to “speak out”, arguing for the re-introduction of border checks in opposition to the “globalization extremists” of “CDU and the Left”.<sup>25</sup> And two members of the local NPD disrupted a public gathering organized by the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) in Rheine, North Rhine-Westphalia, on 1 May 2008 by handing out flyers and chanting slogans such as “DGB betrays workers”. Michael Schäfer, chair of the NPD’s youth organisation JN (see also 1.3 below), and other NPD members took the opportunity offered by a rally of The Left party in Aschersleben, Saxony-Anhalt, where Gregor Gysi, the chairman of the party’s parliamentary group in the Bundestag, was speaking, to attract public attention by chanting “Stasi, lies, Left Party”.<sup>26</sup> On 9 July 2008, NPD activists in Sternberg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, attempted to disrupt an informational event entitled “Provocation on principle” put on by the local SPD organisation to discuss the NPD’s work and ideology; with constant interruptions, the NPD activists managed to divert the attention of others at the event. The NPD later referred to this event as a “perfect example” of the “vain and extremely undemocratic” attempt to demystify the National-Democrats.<sup>27</sup>

**Rigid agitation** However, the NPD is completely incapable of meeting its own standard of appearing calm, neutral and competent when “speaking out”. Its highly ideological approach and perception of problems, as well as its very polemical rhetoric, lead to its failure in this respect.

Ahead of the elections to the Bavarian state parliament, party chairman Voigt threatened that once the NPD was in government, it would check to see whether the ministers, members of parliament and civil servants had acted for the good of the German people. Thus, he said, there was good reason to fear being caught and punished one day.<sup>28</sup>

At an NPD demonstration in Wetzlar on 11 October 2008 which instrumentalized the issue of child abuse, one speaker described a representative of the party Alliance 90/The Greens as “still sucking at the tits of this sick and decaying system ... courted and paid from tax

---

<sup>25</sup> Website of the NPD organisation in Saxony, 3 April 2008.

<sup>26</sup> Published on the right-wing extremist news portal Altermedia, 11 June 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Website of the NPD in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 10 July 2008.

<sup>28</sup> NPD website, 17 July 2008.

---

revenues”; such people should be “lined up against the wall”, he said.<sup>29</sup>

The NPD directs especially vicious attacks against the democratic state under the rule of law in connection with the fight against right-wing extremism. In Gansel’s opinion, state-provoked acts of violence are intended to discredit the “national opposition”, and the reputation of individual communities has suffered because “the system’s henchmen have trained easily manipulated young people to be thugs”. Gansel also claims that, in this “republic of tramps”, the “fight against the right wing” uses increasingly “criminal methods”.<sup>30</sup> A text distributed by the NPD in Thuringia on the topic of confronting right-wing extremism makes the blanket accusation that such efforts are intended to defame the “only democratic opposition in Germany”. According to the text, the system aims “to stage a public protest with the help of the brainwashed masses of co-opted do-gooders”.<sup>31</sup>

**Focus on the social question** NPD party strategists attempt to remove the social question from its more left-of-centre context and redefine it in ideological terms. For example, with an eye to internal divisions within the leftist camp, JN functionary Matthias Gärtner stated:

*“So one can recommend allowing the leftists to fight in the trenches of the pre-political sphere, in order to ultimately assimilate the remaining fragments of anti-imperialism and the critique of capitalism under the banner of nationalism. The awareness that answering the social question necessarily goes hand in hand with political unity in the form of the nation shows every sign of becoming a widespread attitude.”*  
(*hier & jetzt. radikal rechte zeitung* (Here & now: Newspaper of the radical right-wing), No. 11, Summer 2008, p. 17)

---

<sup>29</sup> Published on the right-wing extremist news portal Altermedia, 20 October 2008.

<sup>30</sup> NPD website, 7 April 2008.

<sup>31</sup> Website of the NPD in Thuringia, 3 September 2008.

---

Gansel emphatically stressed the significance of social policy for the NPD:

*“The social question is the political battlefield where the future of the national opposition and thus of the German people will be decided. If nationalists fail in a time of social cruelty and unreasonable economic demands because they cannot give up their apolitical nostalgia and pseudorevolutionary posturing as the bogey of the middle classes, then they will be guilty with regard to our history. The (social) issues which can shake up societal relations are lying in the streets; the national opposition needs only to take them up and treat them seriously, sincerely and with regard to the people’s interests.”*  
(NPD website, 16 June 2008)

In an interview with *Deutsche Stimme*, Karl Richter, the NPD city council member in Munich, underscored the relevance of the “struggle for social justice”, adding that the NPD must demonstrate competence in this area and that it was obvious that the social question in western Germany was closely linked to the issue of foreigners.<sup>32</sup>

The key issue of economic and social policy – usually in connection with the slogan “Only national is social”, has in the meantime assumed a central role for all of the NPD’s action. It is frequently the focus of ideological policy papers, regularly serves as a slogan for marches, demonstrations and information stands, and is often mentioned by NPD speakers in the state parliaments of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony.

---

<sup>32</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2008 of March 2008, p. 3.

---

## 1.2 Organisation and development

**Membership trends** Although NPD membership declined slightly from the previous year (7,200 in 2007 compared to about 7,000 in 2008), the NPD remains the largest right-wing extremist political party. It thus has central significance within this ideological camp, especially due to its ongoing, if not always harmonious, cooperation with the neo-Nazi scene.

**Difficult financial situation and conviction of former treasurer** In 2006 and 2007, the NPD was required to return nearly €870,000 in state funding after having submitted inaccurate statements of accounts in the 1990s. The party is still suffering the impact, and its financial situation remains precarious.

The NPD's financial conduct came under special scrutiny after its former national treasurer, Erwin Kemna, was arrested on 7 February 2008 on the suspicion of embezzling from the NPD. Over the following months, the investigation revealed that Kemna, a close confidant of Voigt who had sole power of disposition, had for years diverted funds from party accounts to his now bankrupt kitchen-fitting business. After Kemna confessed, on 12 September 2008 the Münster regional court found him guilty of 80 counts of breach of trust involving transactions totalling €741,000 and sentenced him to two years and eight months in prison. The court found no evidence that the party executive had been aware of Kemna's actions but did find that the party's oversight mechanisms had failed miserably. The NPD, which has struggled with a tight budget for years, finances its election campaigns by borrowing significant amounts of money from members and sympathizers, sometimes on the basis of verbal agreements. When the NPD won the necessary number of votes to receive state funding, this money was then used to pay back the loans. Between 2004 and 2007, Kemna embezzled funds amounting to about one-quarter of the NPD's total annual income, which not only left a big hole in the party budget but also raised questions about party chairman Voigt's political responsibility and undermined his authority.

**Developments in the NPD's national executive** The NPD party executive was preoccupied with the Kemna affair for most of 2008. The party had originally planned to hold a programme conference in autumn 2007, but when they were unable to find a suitable venue, the conference was initially postponed until spring 2008. In view of the Kemna affair, however, the conference was further postponed until the following year. Instead, the NPD held a national party conference in Bamberg on 24–25 May 2008 to elect the party executive.

---



In his conference speech, Voigt declared his unqualified support for Kemna and was re-elected as national chairman with 90% of the delegates' votes. Voigt's previous deputies Apfel and Rossmüller were re-elected, while the lawyer and neo-Nazi Rieger was newly elected as the third deputy party chairman. Pastörs, chairman of the NPD parliamentary group in the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament, was also newly elected to the national executive. Despite media reports ahead of the conference speculating about a new national chairman, Voigt was re-elected to the post with strong support.

However, after Kemna was found guilty on 12 September 2008, there were increasing calls for the party leadership to take appropriate action. In his initial personal statement, Voigt said he was deeply disappointed and upset about the misconduct of his former close associate, now proven in court, but said he had no thought of stepping down.<sup>33</sup> After this perfunctory response largely met with disapproval among the party's base, Voigt found it necessary to make an additional, more conciliatory statement concerning the Kemna case in order to consolidate his threatened position.<sup>34</sup> He again refused to step down, saying that the NPD should not do its opponents the favour of engaging in destructive personnel debates and retreating from the political front during the 2009 election year. He said it was important not to be distracted from the struggle and not to allow the party to become divided.

By contrast, the lack of consequences at the executive level led Andreas Molau, member of the NPD Presidium and national party executive, to issue a statement on 6 October 2008 declaring his resignation from his national party offices.<sup>35</sup> Voigt's attempt to focus attention on the 2009 elections and thus allow the Kemna affair to recede into the background ultimately failed; instead, the majority of the party executive agreed at a meeting on 15-16 November 2008 in Wittenberge, Brandenburg, to hold new elections of the party executive at an extraordinary party conference no later than April 2009. According to the clear majority of the executive, the recent events concerning Kemna needed to be addressed ahead of the key state parliamentary elections in Thuringia and Saxony as well as the

---

<sup>33</sup> NPD website, 15 September 2008.

<sup>34</sup> NPD website, 18 September 2008.

<sup>35</sup> Website of the NPD organisation in Lower Saxony, 7 October 2008.

---

national parliamentary elections in 2009.<sup>36</sup> On 29 December 2008, Molau issued a announcement distributed over the Internet stating that, in consultation with Apfel, Pastörs, Rossmüller and NPD general secretary Peter Marx, he intended to run for the office of national chairman at the planned extraordinary party conference.<sup>37</sup> He said it was not his aim to overthrow Voigt, but to contribute to the competition among differing strategies. The “free forces” in particular had massive reservations concerning Molau’s candidacy.

**Developments at state level** In addition to internal debates over party officers at national level, there were also controversies in certain NPD organisations at state level, especially in eastern Germany, which led to resignations.

In the Thuringia state party association, where there has been conflict for some time between the two neo-Nazi wings led by Frank Schwerdt and Thorsten Heise, state party chairman Schwerdt was re-elected at a “two-step”<sup>38</sup> state party conference in April and May 2008 despite Heise’s opposition.<sup>39</sup> The internal conflict was likely caused by competition for good spots on the list of functionaries and candidates in the run-up to the state election in 2009, in which the NPD thinks it has a good chance of entering the state parliament if the DVU agrees not to run any candidates in that election.

Due to internal differences, almost the entire executive of the NPD party association in Saxony-Anhalt resigned in early September 2008. Since then, the former deputy state chairman, Matthias Heyder, has served as chairman. Personnel issues related to the local elections in 2009 likely played a role in this case.

After Ralf Ollert was re-elected on 9 November 2008 as chairman of the NPD association in the state of Bavaria, the neo-Nazi Matthias Fischer, chairman of the state JN association and of the NPD district association of central Franconia, resigned from his offices and left the party. Fischer and his followers gave Ollert the blame for the NPD’s poor showing in the Bavarian state elections on 28 September 2008, in which the party received only 1.2% of the vote, and saw no hope for revolutionary policy under Ollert.

**Relations with the** Again in 2008, cooperation between the NPD and the neo-Nazi scene,

---

<sup>36</sup> Cf. the letter of the NPD national manager, Eckart Bräuninger, on holding an extraordinary party conference, posted on the right-wing extremist news portal Altermedia, 24 November 2008.

<sup>37</sup> Published on the right-wing extremist news portal Altermedia, 2 January 2009.

<sup>38</sup> The first part of the state party conference on 12 April 2008 broke up prematurely; it was resumed on 31 May 2008.

<sup>39</sup> NPD website, 14 April 2008.

---

**neo-Nazi scene** part of the NPD's "popular front" since 2004 and the fourth element in its "four-point strategy" (see 1.1 above), was not entirely free of tension. Dependent on successful results, this alliance of convenience is still marked by fundamental differences between the NPD and the neo-Nazi scene based on their very different styles as a legalistic political party on the one hand and an action-oriented subculture on the other. Despite all their differences, their alliance is likely to continue as long as both are able to derive measurable advantages from it.

A good example of their differences is the open conflict between the "free forces" and the NPD leadership over the burial of Friedhelm Busse, a neo-Nazi and NPD member who died on 23 July 2008. After Voigt's graveside speech, Thomas Wulff, a neo-Nazi and former member of the NPD national party executive, unfurled a Reich battle flag bearing a swastika to cover Busse's coffin, which had already been lowered into the grave. In a statement of 31 July 2008, the NPD's party presidium distanced itself from Wulff's act, accusing him of having exploited the occasion to draw attention to himself.<sup>40</sup> This then provoked a rebuttal from the "free forces", which was distributed via the Internet, accusing the NPD leadership of hypocrisy and threatening to end their cooperation with the NPD (see also Section III).<sup>41</sup> This conflict reveals the fault lines in the alliance between the NPD and the "free forces". On the one hand, the NPD must publicly distance itself from Nazi symbolism and the use of violence in order to present a respectable appearance. On the other hand, however, it depends on the support of the "free forces", which are able to mobilize more people; without their support, the NPD's election campaigning would face major logistical problems. Already in 2007, the NPD declared its distance from the "Black Bloc" of "autonomous nationalists", causing tension in the cooperation between the NPD and neo-Nazis. Differences surfaced again in 2008, for example, about 80 "Black Bloc" followers were kept from participating in an NPD demonstration in Stralsund on 3 October 2008 after they refused to take off their sunglasses as specified in the demonstration permit.

**Demonstrations as part of the "popular front" strategy** As part of its "four-point strategy", the NPD continued its "battle for the streets" again in 2008. It carried out about 75 demonstrations and public events, often in cooperation with neo-Nazis and skinheads,

---

<sup>40</sup> NPD website, 1 August 2008.

<sup>41</sup> Published on the right-wing extremist news portal Altermedia, 5 August 2008.

---

slightly more than in 2007 (about 70) (see also Section I, 6).<sup>42</sup>

**Talks between the  
NPD and DVU on the  
“Pact for Germany”**

In 2008, the NPD grassroots in particular increasingly questioned the agreement between the NPD and DVU, known as the “Pact for Germany”, not to campaign against each other in state, national and European elections.

In a speech at the NPD national party conference in Bamberg, even Voigt conceded that, even though the “Pact for Germany” had proven useful, the term of five years was too long. Because the pact was aimed at achieving maximum success for nationalist policy, Voigt said, follow-up negotiations would be held for the Thuringia state parliamentary elections in 2009.<sup>43</sup> According to press reports, the DVU was in principle willing to refrain from campaigning in Thuringia, leaving the field to the NPD. On 7 October 2008, the party executive of the Thuringia NPD association stated that they welcomed the “willingness in principle” of the DVU national executive not to campaign in the Thuringia state election and that they would now make all the necessary preparations for a successful campaign; they added that they were relying on the support of the DVU state association in Thuringia.<sup>44</sup>

**Ring Nationaler  
Frauen (RNF)**

Founded in 2006, the Ring Nationaler Frauen (RNF, Circle of nationalist women) further expanded its organisation in 2008, and following the 2008 national party conference is now a subsidiary organisation of the NPD. According to the revised party statutes, the RNF chair, Gitta Schüssler, is now a member of the NPD national executive by virtue of her office.

At the RNF’s second national congress in Berlin on 27 September 2008, Schüssler was re-elected to her office as chair. Judith Rothe (Saxony-Anhalt) and Stella Hähnel (Berlin) continue to serve as her deputies; Hähnel also serves as press spokesperson.

**Task force of  
“Russian Germans”  
in the NPD**

The NPD has been trying for a number of years to increase its support among ethnic Germans from Russia. Since 2007, the party has been trying to involve these “Russian Germans” also in organisational terms.

---

<sup>42</sup> This number does not include smaller events with less public impact, such as memorial marches and information stands.

<sup>43</sup> Speech by party chairman Voigt on 24 May 2008, published on the NPD website, 26 May 2008.

<sup>44</sup> Website of the NPD in Thuringia, 8 October 2008.

---

On 23 February 2008, NPD functionaries and representatives of the Freundeskreis – Die Russlanddeutschen Konservativen (RDK, Friends of the Russian-German conservatives) met at the NPD's Berlin office, where they founded a task force of Russian Germans within the NPD.<sup>45</sup> According to the NPD, the task force is intended to reduce tensions between native-born Germans and newly immigrated citizens, and to involve Russian Germans more deeply in the party's work.<sup>46</sup>

**NPD (fake) real estate deals** Right-wing extremists, especially those linked to the NPD, attracted much media attention in recent years by announcing plans to buy vacant hotels, restaurants or meeting halls to be turned into right-wing extremist training centres. The communities affected found themselves under public pressure to exercise their right of first refusal and buy the properties in question themselves, at a price often well above fair market value. Although the NPD's dismal financial situation hardly left it in a position to buy real estate with its own funds, it was often mentioned as a prospective buyer, as was the NPD's deputy national chair, Rieger. In many of these cases, however, the right-wing extremists were likely collaborating with the sellers to drive up the price for properties that would otherwise have been very difficult to sell; in return, sellers agreed to give the NPD a percentage of what they took in if the community decided to buy.

According to news reports, in 2008 the NPD was looking nation-wide for an appropriate property to build a training centre. For example, the owner of a veterinary surgery in the Bavarian community of Straubing was supposedly offered to the NPD for a selling price of €2.3 million. According to reliable estimates, the property was actually worth about one-fifth of this sum. The NPD ended up renting the building rather than buying it. The media also reported that the NPD in Baden-Württemberg had been looking in several cities for a place to create a training and conference centre. The NPD appeared to focus on a vacant restaurant in Strassberg called Linderhof, for which it was allegedly willing to pay €540,000, well over the market value. The county and local council ended up buying the property for an undisclosed sum. And the Thuringia NPD's apparent offer of €650,000 for an office building in Bad Langensalza was well in excess of the estimated value of €310,000. The local council refused to make any significant investment to buy the property.

---

<sup>45</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 4/2008 of April 2008, p. 13.

<sup>46</sup> NPD website, 3 March 2008.

---

**The parliamentary groups in Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania**

The NPD has eight seats in the Saxony state parliament and six seats in the state parliament of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The MPs alternate between trying to appear to be serious politicians on the one hand and staging provocations calculated to attract media attention on the other. The chairman of the NPD parliamentary group in the Saxony state parliament, Apfel, explained the party's understanding of its parliamentary role:

*"The question why we nonetheless run for election is understandable, but every day that we confront the nonsense of the established [parties] confirms our sense of the need for the NPD to serve as the parliamentary arm of opposition devoted to the Volk. We were and are the thorn in the flesh of this run-down system, and at the same time, we use the parliamentary group to develop political strategies."*  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 12/2008 of December 2008, p. 3)

The motions of the NPD parliamentary group in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania above all demonstrate the extent to which the party's parliamentary activities are driven by ideology. For example, in its motion of 21 May 2008, the parliamentary group called for staging the play "Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod" (Garbage, the city and death) by Rainer Werner Fassbinder, a controversial work considered by some to be anti-Semitic, at the Staatstheater Schwerin, arguing that the media of the Federal Republic reported extensively on the Nazi book-burning in May 1933 but overlooked the rejection of undesirable books and films after 1945 in the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.<sup>47</sup> This argument trivializes the organized and systematic persecution of Jewish writers and those critical of the regime during the "Third Reich". In its motion of 10 September 2008, the NPD criticized the supposed political instrumentalization of the history curriculum in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, saying that it regularly conveyed a dogmatic worldview which in some cases was protected by criminal law. The motion's sponsors saw this as symptomatic of the state's low educational standards.<sup>48</sup> In its motion of 5 November 2008, "Fighting anti-Germanism", the NPD parliamentary group expressed its ideological slant in drastic terms. The original draft of this motion contains explicitly anti-Semitic passages referring to the official pogrom on 9 November 1938 which accuse Jews of extensive

---

<sup>47</sup> Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament, printed document 5/1485, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament, printed document 5/1787, p. 1.

---

complicity in their own persecution during the Nazi regime. Although the NPD deleted these passages from their generally racist motion at the insistence of the state parliamentary administration, they later published a statement on the Internet expressly declaring that they stood by their position.<sup>49</sup>

**Participation in elections** In 2008, the NPD participated in the state parliamentary elections in Hesse, Lower Saxony (both on 27 January) and Bavaria (28 September). The NPD received more than 1% of the vote in both Lower Saxony (1.5% and 52,986 of second votes) and Bavaria (1.2% and 123,273 votes), thereby becoming eligible for state subsidies. In Hesse, however, the party received only 0.9% of the vote (24,004 second votes) and thus failed to achieve this objective. But even the results in Lower Saxony and Bavaria were well below the party's goals expressed during the campaign of winning seats in the state parliaments. The NPD was unable to win voter support for its positions on the issues of social justice and policy on foreigners. As agreed with the DVU in the "Pact for Germany", the NPD did not participate in the city-state elections in Hamburg on 24 February 2008.

The NPD's results in the local elections in Schleswig-Holstein (25 May 2008), Saxony (8 June 2008) and Brandenburg (28 September 2008) were mixed. In Schleswig-Holstein, the NPD did not campaign throughout the state and received only 4,717 votes (0.4%), receiving one seat on a district council and one on a city council. In Saxony, the NPD won seats on all ten district councils. Overall, the NPD received 160,148 votes (5.1%) and more than tripled its seats from 13 to 45. In Brandenburg, the NPD ran in six of 14 districts and in the city of Cottbus. In all but one district, the NPD and DVU did not have competing candidates, in line with their "Pact for Germany". Overall, the NPD won 14 district council seats and two seats on the Cottbus city council. The party received 1.9% of the valid votes state-wide.

In the Bavarian local elections on 2 March 2008, the NPD did not campaign under its own name; its Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp (BIA, Citizens' initiative to stop foreigners) was relatively successful in the cities of Munich (1.4% of the vote and one city council seat) and Nuremberg (3.3% of the vote and two city council seats).

---

<sup>49</sup> Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament, printed document 5/1961, p. 2, and website of the NPD parliamentary group in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (19 November 2008).

---

### 1.3 Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats)

Founded:	1969
Headquarters:	Bernburg (Saxony-Anhalt)
National chairman:	Michael Schäfer
Membership:	400 (2007: 400)
Publication:	Central organ <i>Der Aktivist</i> (The Activist); regional publication <i>hier &amp; jetzt. radikal rechte zeitung</i> (Here & now: Newspaper of the radical right wing) (Saxony)

According to the NPD statutes, the JN is an “integral part” of the NPD. By virtue of his office, the JN national chairman is a member of the NPD party executive.

Despite its organisational ties, the JN tries to emphasize its autonomy. Elected in October 2007, the JN’s new national chairman, Michael Schäfer, made this clear already in late 2007 in an interview with *Deutsche Stimme*.<sup>50</sup> Schäfer, who comes from the independent *Kameradschaft* milieu, said that the JN needed to become a “modern and powerful nationalist youth organisation” once again, one that was not simply a “polite appendage of the parent party” but that maintained a critical relationship of solidarity with it. Schäfer said that the JN played a central role as the link between the party and more radical and independent activists, adding that the Nationaler Bildungskreis (NBK, National educational circle) created in 2007 made it possible to intensify training efforts among nationalist youth and to take greater advantage of the future academic potential from within the organisation’s own ranks (see also Section VI).

---

<sup>50</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 12/2007 of December 2007, p. 3.

---



Schäfer described the JN's ideology as follows:

*"We ... practise a liberation nationalism which is socialist with regard to economic matters, nationalist with regard to the state, race-focused with regard to culture, and liberal in our thinking."*

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 12/2007 of December 2007, p. 3)

The JN's extremist orientation is more pronounced in an article in its central organ *Der Aktivist* in which Sebastian Richter, a member of the publication's editorial staff, describes the JN as on its way to becoming a "youth movement with a transparent ideological orientation and great potential for action". However, he goes on, the struggle should begin with each individual in order to be able to claim the right "to straighten out an abhorrent system".<sup>51</sup> For his part, Schäfer appealed to his readers to share *Der Aktivist* with a broader audience, as he said Germany needed new fighters for the national struggle for liberation. In that struggle, he calls the JN an "integral part of the resistance to the hypocrites, exploiters and oppressors" in this "decrepit republic".<sup>52</sup>

The JN has difficulty in successfully performing its self-appointed function as a link between the NPD and the "free forces". Together with the "independents" in Weissenhohe, the JN state association in Bavaria, which is dominated by "free forces", organized a "national day for Franconia" on 7 June 2008 attended by about 250 persons; speakers included the NPD deputy national chairman Rieger and neo-Nazi Thomas Wulff. On the same day, the NPD state association put on a "Bavaria day" event in Günzburg. These conflicting events prevented the NPD from launching a coordinated campaign ahead of the Bavarian state parliamentary elections on 28 September 2008. Although the party must have been disappointed with its election results of only 1.2%, state party chairman Ollert was re-elected at the state party conference on 9 November 2008. In response, the new chairman of the JN state association elected at the JN's state congress on 27 April 2008, Fischer, who succeeded neo-Nazi Norman Bordin in that office, declared that he was leaving the JN and NPD and criticized Ollert's "bourgeois" line in general. The "free forces" supported Fischer and issued a statement saying that Ollert stood for a "wishy-washy course" and that under his leadership it would be impossible to achieve a revolutionary nationalist policy. With Ollert as

---

<sup>51</sup> *Der Aktivist*, 1/2008, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> See footnote 51, p. 3.

chairman, the “free forces” said they would no longer do any “campaign or socage work for the Bavaria NPD”.<sup>53</sup>

Despite the grandiose announcements of its chairman, in 2008 the JN was not involved in many activities which gained public attention. The JN state association in Saxony had planned to put on a “Day for Saxony” in Dresden on 21 June 2008 with the slogan “Young people need a future”, but the Federal Constitutional Court, as the court of last instance, did not grant permission. Persons planning to attend the event had already arrived in Dresden and staged spontaneous demonstrations around the city to protest “arbitrary action by the police and judiciary”. About 300 persons took part in the demonstrations, including the NPD members of the Saxony state parliament, Gansel and René Despang, and Pastörs and Andreas Theissen from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.

## 2. Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union)

Founded:	1987 <sup>54</sup>
Headquarters:	Munich
National chairman:	Dr Gerhard Frey
Membership:	6,000 (2007: 7,000)
Publication:	<i>National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ)</i> , weekly, circulation: approx. 33,000

The DVU’s membership continued to decline in 2008, not least due to the advanced age of most party members, which makes the party less attractive to younger people. Since its founding, the party has been led in autocratic fashion by its now 75-year-old national chairman, Dr Gerhard Frey, who also provides most of its funding. Frey is paying down the DVU’s deficit largely on his own: In the 1989 European parliamentary elections, the party received only 1.6% of the vote and was left with debts amounting to several million euros, which have not yet been paid off.

<sup>53</sup> Published on the right-wing extremist news portal Altermedia, 15 November 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Founded as a registered society in 1971; constituted as a political party in 1987; 1987-1991 DVU – Liste D.

Frey owns the DSZ–Druckschriften- und Zeitungsverlag GmbH (DSZ-Verlag) publishing company and is chief editor of the weekly *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National Newspaper/German Weekly), with one of the largest circulations of right-wing extremist publications in Germany.

## 2.1 Goals and methods

In its anti-constitutional efforts, the DVU essentially takes up the typical right-wing extremist issues from a hyper-nationalistic perspective. Although the DVU's party programme declares its "full and unreserved" allegiance to the free and democratic constitutional order, its xenophobic and anti-Semitic positions are apparent in statements by its leading functionaries and above all in the *NZ*.

Due to Frey's unlimited authority within the DVU and the lack of a party newspaper, the *NZ* can be regarded as the party's press organ which accurately reflects the party's programme. Sven Eggers, a member of the *NZ* editorial team, calls the newspaper the "mouthpiece for the decent people in this country", an "institution which publishes what the silent majority ... really thinks." According to Eggers, the *NZ* "without a doubt" does more to "stabilize true democracy and truly democratic culture" than the "often worryingly conformist opinion industry".<sup>55</sup> Frey himself and other high-ranking DVU functionaries regularly contribute to the *NZ* by writing or editing articles. The newspaper underwent a redesign in mid-October 2008 and now presents itself in a new and more modern layout.

The editorial section of the newspaper often presents current political issues and events in a biased way to serve ideological ends. The newspaper devotes a great deal attention to the topic of foreigners in Germany. Another focus is biased and trivializing coverage of the Nazi past. Implicitly anti-Semitic articles encourage resentment of Jews, while other articles attack the democratic state under the rule of law and its representatives. The quantity and constant repetition of similar articles demonstrate that the authors are not interested in encouraging a democratic debate, but instead use generalizations and denigration to attack the essential principles of the free and democratic order.

---

<sup>55</sup> *NZ*, No. 51/2008 of 12 December 2008, p. 13.

---

**Xenophobia** The DVU's xenophobic attitudes are apparent in the *NZ*'s biased and stereotypical reporting on foreigners, crime by foreigners and asylum fraud. Aggressive, polemical headlines such as "Germany as a paradise for lawbreakers? Germans at the mercy of foreign criminals",<sup>56</sup> "Violent criminals abuse asylum law"<sup>57</sup> and "Who will stop foreign thugs? 'German arseholes' as victims"<sup>58</sup> are intended to imply that foreigners living in Germany are generally criminals, consciously foster prejudice and fear of foreigners and imply that foreigners living in Germany are a threat, also to individuals:

*"Abandoned by the ruling politicians, ordinary citizens especially are at the mercy of criminal foreigners".*

(*NZ*, No. 5/2008 of 25 January 2008, p. 4)

Other *NZ* articles attempt to fan fears of mass immigration and "excessive foreign influence" (*Überfremdung*) in Germany, which they claim is already underway.<sup>59</sup> The DVU hopes in this way to limit and undermine the inviolable principles of human dignity and equality as they apply to the foreign-born population:

*"In a Europe without borders, corruption and crime are now on the march. Bulgaria and Romania will soon join the Schengen agreement. The thought of roughly eight million dirt-poor gypsies living in those two countries who want to get to the fleshpots of Western Europe does not exactly make that prospect any rosier."*

(*NZ*, No. 32/2008 of 1 August 2008, p. 5)

*"Germany is the preferred destination; due to its generous social benefits, foreigners from all over the world think of Germany as a kind of 'cloud cuckoo land'."*

(*NZ*, No. 37/2008 of 5 September 2008, p. 7)

---

<sup>56</sup> *NZ*, No. 3/2008 of 11 January 2008, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup> *NZ*, No. 5/2008 of 25 January 2008, p. 4.

<sup>58</sup> *NZ*, No. 28/2008 of 4 July 2008, p. 1.

<sup>59</sup> *NZ*, No. 5/2008 of 25 January 2008, p. 1.

---

According to the *NZ*, Germany is supposedly threatened by *Umvolkung*, or replacement of the German population by other ethnic groups, and “loss of its identity”.<sup>60</sup> An article headlined “Policy on foreigners in ruins” says that integration is a failure, and goes on:

*“With all sympathy for Islam, it cannot be the solution for the Orient to expand throughout the Occident, ultimately leading conflicts to break out in Germany like those in Bosnia or Lebanon.”*

(*NZ*, No. 13/2008 of 21 March 2008, p. 9)

In the same vein, the *NZ* repeatedly focuses on what would happen if Turkey joined the EU:

*“Germany above all would then be hit by a new wave of Turkish immigration of unimaginable dimensions, which could turn the Federal Republic into a social and ethnic powder keg.”*

(*NZ*, No. 14/2008 of 28 March 2008, p. 11)

**Anti-Semitism** As the mouthpiece of the DVU, the *NZ* also spreads anti-Semitic propaganda. Articles regularly aim at stirring up anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli prejudices.

For years, it has tried to discredit the Federal Government by portraying it as dominated and run by Jews. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel is a particular focus of these efforts and is accused of “Nibelungen loyalty to the Jewish state”<sup>61</sup> and of “swearing one oath of loyalty and devotion to Israel after another”.<sup>62</sup>

*“By devoting herself to USrael, Ms Merkel has neglected the urgent needs of her own country. ... No, the Federal Chancellor of Germany and key members of her government had to travel to Israel for the ‘first German-Israeli government consultations’ in order to demonstrate their devotion in a manner just short of boot-licking.”*

(*NZ*, No. 15/2008 of 4 April 2008, p. 2)

*“She had no trouble making the leap from FDJ activist into the Chancellery of the Federal Republic, from being a Soviet communist agitator to making propaganda for the ‘Western community of values’ and being a vassal of Israel and the USA.”*

(*NZ*, No. 23/2008 of 30 May 2008, p. 5)

<sup>60</sup> *NZ*, No. 3/2008 of 11 January 2008, p. 5.

<sup>61</sup> *NZ*, No. 25/2008 of 13 June 2008, p. 6.

<sup>62</sup> *NZ*, No. 35/2008 of 22 August 2008, p. 3.

Further, the newspaper asserted that there was no doubt that “German politicians follow the interests of foreign powers”<sup>63</sup> and that Germany under Federal Chancellor Merkel was a “US satellite”.<sup>64</sup> With regard to the debate over the deployment of Bundeswehr combat troops in Afghanistan, the *NZ* criticized the government, saying that “it is probably obvious to everyone other than those in the highest circles of German politics that this useless operation, which has nothing whatsoever to do with German interests, creates terror threats in our own country.”<sup>65</sup>

**Fomenting anti-Semitic stereotypes** The *NZ* vehemently criticizes German restitution payments, reporting regularly and at length on “the full extent of the moral and financial exploitation of Jewish suffering by means of a ‘Holocaust industry’ ”,<sup>66</sup> in order to breathe new life into the anti-Semitic stereotype of the “money-grubbing Jew”. According to the *NZ*, the Jewish side issues new demands “as regularly as the sun rises in the morning”;<sup>67</sup> the Jewish Claims Conference, which the *NZ* claims is making “billions on restitution”,<sup>68</sup> is characterized as highly inventive:<sup>69</sup>

*“The further the end of World War II recedes into the oblivion of history, the more creative the Jewish Claims Conference (JCC) becomes at inventing claims for groups of victims who supposedly never received any or only inadequate compensation from Germany.”*  
(*NZ*, No. 34/2008 of 15 August 2008, p. 3)

**Relativizing the Holocaust** Although the party does not explicitly deny the genocide of the European Jews, it continues to relativize it, among others by questioning historical knowledge about the Holocaust with allegations of forgery or falsification of contemporary documents. The *NZ* also describes alleged Allied war crimes as a holocaust, repeatedly using the term with the aim of reducing the genocide of European Jews to just one incident among many.

<sup>63</sup> *NZ*, No. 3/2008 of 11 January 2008, p. 5.

<sup>64</sup> *NZ*, No. 42/2008 of 10 October 2008, p. 7.

<sup>65</sup> *NZ*, No. 5/2008 of 25 January 2008, p. 7.

<sup>66</sup> *NZ*, No. 14/2008 of 28 March 2008, p. 7.

<sup>67</sup> *NZ*, No. 31/2008 of 25 July 2008, p. 9.

<sup>68</sup> *NZ*, No. 17/2008 of 18 April 2008, p. 5.

<sup>69</sup> *NZ*, No. 23/2008 of 30 May 2008, p. 6.

**Revisionist critique  
of the “one-sided”  
representation of  
history**

The NZ also uses the technique of setting German suffering against that of Nazi victims (e.g. in headlines such as “Slaving and starving in victors’ concentration camps”<sup>70</sup> and “The Dresden massacre: The unatoned bombing holocaust of 1945”<sup>71</sup>), among other things by giving extensive coverage to the “terrorism of the victors, which claimed roughly 15 million victims”.<sup>72</sup> The newspaper also criticizes what it calls the “one-sided” process of dealing with the past:

*“While Merkel and her like-minded friends invoke ‘eternal German guilt’ in our day, the official historiography ignores the many unatoned crimes against the German people.”*

(NZ, No. 16/2008 of 11 April 2008, p.14)

*“It is intolerable that the suffering of the one is acknowledged while that of the other is denied.”*

(NZ, No. 35/2008 of 22 August 2008, p. 9)

The constant references to human rights violations in other countries, above all the U.S., but also Israel, serve the same goal of relativizing Nazi crimes:

*“The USA in any case did not have such scruples when it created a nuclear holocaust in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in a Japan that was ready to capitulate.”*

(NZ, No. 21/2008 of 16 May 2008, p. 11)

*“The work also focuses on the war crimes and crimes against humanity which have been committed by Israelis for decades and remain unatoned to this day.”*

(NZ, No. 21/2008 of 16 May 2008, p. 13)

<sup>70</sup> NZ, No. 2/2008 of 4 January 2008, p. 11.

<sup>71</sup> NZ, No. 7/2008 of 8 February 2008, p. 4 (first of a six-part series).

<sup>72</sup> NZ, No. 41/2008 of 3 October 2008, p. 10.

## 2.2 Organisation and development

**Organisational structure** The DVU is divided into 16 state party associations. Due to the national chairman's undisputed power within the party, however, they have little room for independent political work. Frey continues to set the party's ideological positions and goals, oversee the more important personnel decisions, including those made by the state party associations, and decides whether to take part in state parliamentary elections. The rest of the national party executive, which has only a few members, have almost nothing to do. There is an almost complete absence of democracy within the party.

**"Pact for Germany" with the NPD** Again in 2008, the DVU executive repeatedly stressed that it planned to continue the "Pact for Germany" with the NPD signed at the DVU national party conference on 15 January 2005 (cf. 1.2 above). According to this pact, both parties have agreed not to run against each other in state, Bundestag or European parliamentary elections up to 2009 and in some cases to include candidates from the other party in their lists of candidates.<sup>73</sup>

**Participation in elections** The DVU was the only right-wing extremist party to run in the Hamburg city-state elections on 24 February 2008. In line with the "Pact for Germany", the NPD did not campaign, nor were any NPD candidates on the DVU's candidate list, which was headed by Matthias Faust, the DVU's national manager who only recently left the NPD to join the DVU. His campaign received support from Hamburg neo-Nazi activist Christian Worch, among others, who is on good terms with Faust. Using slogans such as "St. Michael's instead of mosques", "The rich live it up while the poor starve", "Jobs instead of immigration" and "Money for Germans instead of the Bundeswehr abroad!", Faust tried to turn popular feeling into political success. But the DVU won only 6,342 votes (0.8%), a result it found disappointing, and failed to gain the 1% needed to qualify for reimbursement of its campaign expenses.

The DVU is now represented only in the Brandenburg state parliament, where it has six seats, enough to qualify as a parliamentary group. DVU members are also represented in a few

---

<sup>73</sup> On 12 January 2009, the NPD's state organisation announced on its website that, contrary to the terms agreed in the "Pact for Germany", it would participate in the state parliamentary elections in Thuringia on 30 August 2009 with Frank Schwerdt as its top candidate.

---



local councils, above all in Brandenburg, where the party's results (statewide average of 1.6%) in the local council elections in late September 2008 were better than those in 2003, though nowhere near the 6.1% reached in the 2004 state parliamentary elections and also behind the NPD's 1.8%. The DVU and NPD directly competed against each other in only one district, where the DVU lost its seat to the NPD.

The DVU's results in both Hamburg and Brandenburg show that the party has little popular support. Nor did the DVU members of the Brandenburg state parliament take advantage of the possibilities offered by their parliamentary activities; the parliamentary group reported extensively about its activities on its website and in the parliamentary group newspaper, but its efforts were mostly vague and unable to increase the party's popularity. So it is not clear whether the "Pact for Germany" will be continued, especially given the fact that the NPD's support in Brandenburg is significantly stronger.<sup>74</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> At its national party conference in Calbe, Saxony-Anhalt, on 11 January 2009, the DVU elected Faust to be its new national party chairman; Frey did not run again for the office. Faust plans to continue the "Pact for Germany" with the NPD after it expires at the end of 2009.

---

## **V. Right-wing extremist music**

**Significance of right-wing extremist music** Right-wing extremist music plays a central role by creating a sense of identity within the milieu. Right-wing extremists use the music to attract young people to their ideology. The makers of this music convey right-wing extremist attitudes and nationalist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic ideology either openly or implicitly through their lyrics, behaviour and personal appearance.

Neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften* and right-wing extremist parties take advantage of this music in order to reach out both to sympathizers and to young people with no contact to the milieu. Performances by right-wing extremist bands and singers are also a regular component of many events organized by the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany; cf. Section IV, 1).

**Changing right-wing extremist music scene** To ensure that this method remains successful and to continue reaching young people, the right-wing extremist music scene has changed in recent years to be more open towards other styles of music. Hard rock and heavy metal, which long dominated the scene, have given way to hardcore and “hatecore” trends among younger followers of the right-wing extremist scene. By setting its texts to this fast and aggressive style of music, the scene is attempting to appeal to current trends in youth subcultures. Unlike the typical skinhead subculture and its music, these texts express less hostility towards foreigners or those with opposing opinions and less glorification of National Socialism. Instead, the songs focus on social protest, environmental protection and criticism of globalization, sometimes with implicit nationalist/racist, anti-American and anti-Semitic content.

### **1. Right-wing extremist concerts**

**Slightly fewer right-wing extremist concerts** The number of right-wing extremist concerts has declined every year since 2006, and 2008 was no exception: During the 2008 reporting period, 127 concerts were held, as compared to 138 in 2007. Average attendance was 150, which was consistent with previous years. Most of the concerts had audiences numbering between 100 and 300; Eleven concerts had attendance of more than 300 persons (2007: 15 concerts), thus the trend towards smaller audiences continued in 2008.

---

- 
- Regional concentration** The number of concerts held in eastern Germany was higher than the average; the number of concerts held in Saxony continues to be noticeably high. Concerts tend to be concentrated in those areas where members of the right-wing extremist rent or own their own concert venues.
- State measures** Despite concert organizers' highly secretive preparation, intensive intelligence-gathering and checks by the authorities were able to prevent 17 concerts from taking place. After speaking with the authorities and finding out more about the nature of right-wing extremism, persons renting out the venues for such events often cancelled their rental contracts with concert organizers. As in earlier years, police broke up about 15% of concerts already in progress; there were a few cases of spontaneous resistance.
- Right-wing extremist musicians at other events** Right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters appear not only at concerts; they also perform at other right-wing extremist occasions, such as events put on by right-wing extremist parties. In 2008, music performers appeared at 50 such events, a significant decrease from the previous year (2007: 64) for no apparent reason.
- Role of the NPD** For years, the NPD has provided right-wing extremist musicians the opportunity to perform in public. Right-wing extremist musicians perform at NPD events. In this way, the NPD hopes to increase its appeal to younger people from neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften* and violent elements by signalling greater openness towards these segments of the right-wing extremist spectrum. For example, five German right-wing extremist bands played at the "Rock for Germany" event in Gera, Thuringia, on 19 July 2008 which was organized by the NPD district association and attended by about 750 people. Another major event was the "3rd Festival of Peoples: For a Europe of Fatherlands" on 13 September 2008, organized by the NPD district association in Jena and featuring bands from Thuringia, North Rhine-Westphalia, Italy and the U.K.; about 1,100 people attended.
- Right-wing extremist singer-songwriters** Many of the other events, most of them organized by the NPD, featured performances by right-wing extremist singer-songwriters. And right-wing extremist singer-songwriters put on 30 evenings of songs in 2008, more than in the previous year (2007: 23).
-

## 2. Right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters

**Right-wing extremist bands** A total of 146 right-wing extremist music groups were active in 2008, either giving concerts or producing recordings, the same number as in 2007. There appears to be a trend among right-wing extremist musicians to work together only on short-term projects, such as the production of a single CD.

Again in 2008, a number of German recordings featured punishable content. For example, the CD 9 mm by the band Rebellion includes songs with inflammatory lyrics.<sup>75</sup> The song *Hängt sie auf* (String them up) contains the following lyrics:

*“Pack of traitors and parasites, growing all the time. Rise up now to resist just as the world’s largest army once did. String them up! ... the pack of bloodsuckers! String them up! ... down to the last Turk! String them up! ... until none of them are left! String them up! ... ohh, that would be wonderful!”*

Like other CDs produced by German right-wing extremist bands containing punishable material, this CD was produced and distributed with foreign support.

The sampler *Blood & Honour – Voices of Solidarity* <sup>76</sup> also appeared in 2008, containing inflammatory lyrics by German right-wing extremist bands denying the Holocaust and glorifying National Socialism. For example, the song *Führer Adolf* by the band Sonderkommando Dirlewanger (SKD) contains the lyrics:

*“The good Nuremberg laws, oh how we need them now, when they are letting millions of parasites cross our borders. The anti-fascists want to stop us, our club has already burned, Roland Freisler pronounces judgement: We’re forcing you lot against the wall.”*

On 10 June 2008, the premises of suspected German producers and distributors of the CD in Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Thuringia were searched.

The cult and martyr status of Michael “Lunikoff” Regener, former singer and leader of the band Landser, continued unabated after his

---

<sup>75</sup> The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (List B, Federal Gazette No. 95 of 27 June 2008.

<sup>76</sup> The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (List B, Federal Gazette No. 198 of 31 December 2008.

---

release from prison in early 2008, after serving a sentence of several years on charges of forming and belonging to a criminal organisation. Regener took up his musical career again with the project *Die Lunikoff Verschwörung* (The Lunikoff conspiracy), launched before he entered prison. Shortly after leaving prison, he released the CD *Heil froh* (So glad). Worth noting is his appearance in Mallentin, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on 25 October 2008 before more than 1,000 fans.

**Right-wing extremist singer-songwriters** In 2008, 30 right-wing extremist singer-songwriters performed at right-wing extremist events or produced recordings with right-wing extremist content (2007: 26).

Frank Renniecke and Annett and Michael Müller are especially important, as they have long been active and are quite popular in much of the right-wing extremist milieu.

**National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM)** Along with skinhead music, hatecore and right-wing extremist singer-songwriters, proponents of National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM) also disseminate right-wing extremist content. Proponents of NSBM convey their Nazi worldview using neo-pagan and anti-Christian elements. Their right-wing extremist orientation is less evident from their song lyrics, which are mostly unintelligible, or their CD cover art than from their statements published on the Internet. Not only is NSBM discussed in right-wing extremist publications, but it also has its own fanzines which report on bands and new CD releases.

At the international level, the NSBM bands, distributors and fanzines cooperate within The Pagan Front organisation, among others. The Pagan Front has its own English-language website which disseminates nationalist, racist, anti-Semitic and anti-Christian ideas.

In late 2008, the best-known German NSBM band Absurd, a member of The Pagan Front and pioneer of NSBM in Germany, announced that it was discontinuing its activities. The band said that one reason for its decision was increased pressure from the security authorities. On 25 and 29 April 2008, the premises of German distributors of NSBM recordings in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania were searched; more than 4,000 CDs with punishable content were seized.

### 3. Distributors of right-wing extremist music

**Number of  
distributors again  
declines**

There are national and international networks to produce and distribute right-wing extremist music and propaganda materials. The number of right-wing extremist mail-order distributors of recordings, clothing and other propaganda items operating nation-wide fell for the second year in a row, from 83 in 2007 to 78 in 2008. This is likely due to rigorous measures taken by the law enforcement authorities in 2007 and 2008.

Most of these businesses have their own music or clothing labels (2008: 37; 2007: 39) under which the relevant products are sold. Members of the right-wing extremist scene also sell recordings and merchandise of right-wing extremist bands at concerts, in Internet forums and via e-mail. And there are numerous shops, especially in eastern Germany, that serve as favourite meeting-places for right-wing extremists and where such items are sold.

The business of selling right-wing extremist merchandise brings in revenue of several million euros annually. Although revenues and profits vary widely depending on the size of the operation, some distributors are able to support themselves and in some cases even employ members of the scene as staff. The more involved individual distributors are in the right-wing extremist scene, the more likely they are to provide financial or logistical support to right-wing extremist organisations, individuals or campaigns.

Again in 2008, law enforcement authorities were able to seize large quantities of punishable propaganda materials while investigating distributors and producers of right-wing extremist music. A few examples:

- On 16 January 2008, police in Saxony, Brandenburg, Berlin, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Baden-Württemberg searched the premises of owners of right-wing extremist mail-order businesses and shops as well as band members. The suspects were identified as responsible for producing and/or distributing the second version of the CD *Gift für die Ohren* (Poison for the ears) by the Berlin band D.S.T. and the Brandenburg band Burn Down. About 1,000 copies of the CD were seized.
  - On 5 February 2008, as part of an investigation of a case of serious bodily injury, the police searched the home of a right-wing extremist mail-order distributor and producer as well as the premises of a club
-

used by a violent right-wing extremist group in Wismar, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. By coincidence, the police found more than 800 CDs with punishable content; most of them were already subject to confiscation orders.

- On 27 August 2008, police and judicial authorities in Denmark and Finland, with the help of Federal Criminal Police (BKA) officers, searched the homes and businesses of several persons who had long been active in the right-wing extremist music scene. Two suspects were arrested on European arrest warrants issued by the Frankfurt (Main) municipal court. In Finland, the homes and businesses of persons responsible for the Finland-based distributor Werwolf Records were searched. In addition to several thousand right-wing extremist CDs, computers, data storage media, cutting and thrust weapons as well as files were seized as evidence of the German suspect's responsibility for operating a mail-order business based in Denmark and Sweden.

## **VI. Intellectual activities in right-wing extremism**

In the Federal Republic of Germany, right-wing extremism has always demonstrated a lack of intellectual sophistication, not least the result of its social stigma as the legacy of the Nazi period (1933 to 1945). As a result, a number of more educated right-wing extremists have been trying since the early 1980s to raise intellectual standards in the right-wing extremist milieu. To this end, reading groups were established, new books and journals published and conferences organized. The long-term goal is to establish the intellectual and cultural superiority of right-wing extremism preliminary to ushering in a new political system.

Although many of the political actors regard the theoretical underpinnings of right-wing extremist ideology provided by so-called intellectuals as central to identity and praxis, attempts to make right-wing extremism more intellectual have so far been mostly unsuccessful, due to the lack of intellectual leaders and of viable structures to successfully convey ideological concepts.

**Efforts by unaffiliated organisations** Organisations of intellectual right-wing extremism which are not affiliated with any political parties reveal a mixed picture: None of the relevant groups even came close to achieving their ideal of influencing the public discourse or participating in public debates through their education, training or publications. Nonetheless, again in 2008 new associations were formed and other organisations expanded.

**Thule Seminar  
founds Förderkreis  
der Argonauten**

This trend is illustrated by the example of the Thule-Seminar e.V. (Thule Seminar, reg'd society), founded in Kassel, Hesse, in 1980 and one of the first intellectual circles devoted to right-wing extremism in Germany. In 2008, unlike 2007, the Thule Seminar did not produce any publications worth mentioning, not least due to its financial situation. The head of the Thule Seminar, Dr Pierre Krebs, therefore founded the Förderkreis der Argonauten (Argonauts' circle of friends), apparently to raise funds for publishing projects. Krebs is a popular speaker in right-wing extremist circles and still makes a few appearances at their events. For example, he spoke at an event on 30 August 2008 to mobilize support for the "fourth national anti-war day" organized by the "autonomous nationalists". He also spoke in Switzerland on 8 March 2008 before activists of the Partei National Orientierter Schweizer (PNOS, Party of nationalist Swiss). In that speech, his racist views were plain:

*"Race chaos is spreading in Europe and threatens to extinguish our culture. ... Europe alone believes the dogma of a planet of half-breeds."*

*(Der ZeitGeist. Die Monatsschrift der Partei National Orientierter Schweizer (ZeitGeist: Monthly of the Partei National Orientierter Schweizer, March 2008 edition, p. 15)*

**Deutsche Akademie  
a co-founder of SdV  
international  
network**

The Deutsche Akademie (German academy), founded in 2000 as an inter-organisational group and largely inspired by Jürgen Schwab, the NPD's former chief theoretician, continued to offer seminars and training on "state theory educational measures". In early 2008, and together with organisations from Switzerland and Austria, it announced the founding of the nationalist revolutionary international network Sache des Volkes (SdV, A matter for the people). Network participants include persons from the neo-Nazi spectrum. In its "statement of principles", the SdV, which is dedicated to "social-revolutionary nationalism", called for "overcoming capitalism".<sup>77</sup> In addition to its focus on theory, the network is supposed to carry out "actions in the public space", such as distributing flyers, holding memorial marches and small-scale rallies, and "instrumentalizing opponents' events".<sup>78</sup> In fact, however, SdV activists only organized a few, local efforts to distribute flyers criticizing working conditions in

<sup>77</sup> SdV website, 24 February 2008.

<sup>78</sup> "Bericht über die 6. Arbeitstagung 'nationalrevolutionär heute' in München" (Report on the 6th conference of nationalrevolutionär heute (Nationalist and revolutionary today) in Munich), SdV website, 2 April 2008.



German companies. The Deutsche Akademie was unable to expand its influence despite the newly founded network. Only Schwab was able to maintain his role as initiator of some new ideas for right-wing extremism, thanks to his good relations with the NPD and the neo-Nazi camp.

**Kontinent Europa Stiftung** The Kontinent Europa Stiftung (KES, Continent Europe foundation) was founded in Jönköping, Sweden, in June 2004. This network of intellectual European right-wing extremists is aimed at “creating and working on a common European identity”.<sup>79</sup> The organisation is based on the assumption that cultural and economic globalization led by the U.S. threatens to wipe out the unique character of Europe and its peoples. For this reason, the network says that “the old European peoples” must work together. The foundation therefore aims to bring together European scholars in order to intervene in the “struggle for a new European order”. The ultimate objective is for Europe to regain its “old supremacy” that it had until the 19th century, according to the foundation. The KES aims to assert a strategic influence on the social discourse in order to achieve cultural hegemony over the long term:

*“In principle, it is a popular opposition movement which aims to change society at its roots, sort of like a cultural revolution.”*  
(KES website, 11 November 2008)

The KES has an international executive which includes well-known German right-wing extremists like the NPD functionary Molau. The KES has close ties to the NPD. For example, numerous members of the NPD parliamentary group of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania took part in a KES event in Schwerin on 7 – 8 August 2008. KES founder Patrik Brinkman moved from Sweden to Berlin in June 2008; as a result, the foundation’s future efforts are likely to focus more strongly on Germany.

**Internationales Studienwerk – Collegium Humanum e.V. banned** On 7 May 2008, the Federal Ministry of the Interior banned the Verein Internationales Studienwerk – Collegium Humanum e.V. (CH, International study association Collegium Humanum) and its sub-organisation Bauernhilfe e.V. (Farmers’ aid reg’d society) with the order of 18 April 2008.

Founded in 1963, the CH has its headquarters in Vlotho, North Rhine-Westphalia, where it has run a training centre for many years. The aim of the CH was providing right-wing extremist “education” targeted especially at young people. The CH organized seminars and lectures

<sup>79</sup> KES website, 11 November 2008.

at its premises in North Rhine-Westphalia and at a restaurant in Thuringia. It also published a twice-monthly magazine, *Lebensschutz-Information LSI – Stimme des Gewissens* (Information to protect life – Voice of conscience). With a print run of 1,700 to 3,000 copies, the publication was distributed well beyond the immediate circle of CH members and subscribers. Led by Ursula Haverbeck-Wetzel and influenced by Holocaust denier and former left-wing terrorist Horst Mahler, the CH increasingly focused on disseminating revisionist propaganda denying the Holocaust and thus violating criminal law. Leading members of the CH faced repeated fines for incitement due to articles published in the *LSI*. But the publication continued its agitation, reported on criminal proceedings on charges of Holocaust denial and called for financial and moral support for the perpetrators. The CH also opposed the constitutional order and glorified National Socialism. For example, in 2008 the CH distributed a text which described all the law passed under the Nazi regime – including the Nuremberg laws depriving all Jews in Germany of their rights – as still valid:

*“To begin with, the only thing that counts is the constitution and laws of the German Reich as of 23 May 1945. ... As soon as the organs of the Reich can take over the actual state authority, this constitution and all the laws pertaining to it will go into effect for the entire people.”*

(Bernhard Schaub, *Der Weg zum Reich*

(The path to the Reich), Dornach, Switzerland, 2007, pp. 20 and 23).

The group's agitation efforts also included attempts to intimidate political opponents and judicial authorities. For example, during the discussion surrounding the impending ban, on 30 January 2008 Haverbeck-Wetzel published an open letter threatening the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany with a new pogrom:

*“It is enough, I say, not only for my German people and in the name of my God ... If you continue on as before, there could be a new and terrible pogrom, compare the many threats of the LORD.”*

The *LSI* commented on the conviction of lawyer Sylvia Stolz due to Holocaust denial during criminal proceedings as follows:

*“The participating judges, lay judges and public prosecutors may have to answer for their actions after a system change. Their names are known and we have had a number of system changes already.”*

(*LSI*, No. 1, January/February 2008, p. 12)

The ban went into effect on 7 May 2008, the same day another organisation was banned, the Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen

---

Bestreitens des Holocaust Verfolgter (VRBHV, society for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for disputing the Holocaust) (cf. Section VIII, 3). In connection with the ban, premises in several states were searched, above all North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and Lower Saxony, and extensive text and propaganda material and considerable assets were seized, including the CH seminar building in Vlotho, most recently the property of the sub-organisation Bauernhilfe e.V. The extensive financial assets of the CH and Bauernhilfe e.V. were seized as well.

Unlike the ban on the VRBHV, the bans on the CH and Bauernhilfe e.V. are still open to appeal. With its decisions of 25 August 2008, however, the Federal Administrative Court has rejected applications by the CH and Bauernhilfe e.V. to restore the suspensive effect of appeals against the ban and refused to issue interim orders during temporary relief proceedings.

**Intellectual orientation in the NPD** Already in the early 1990s, right-wing extremist parties were promoting a more intellectual orientation within their cadres. From about 1998, the NPD was able to win the support of pioneering theoreticians in the right-wing scene. The party continued its attempts to broaden its intellectual base also in subsequent years. For example, various projects were initiated in connection with the NPD parliamentary group in the Saxony state parliament, although their ambitions were ultimately disappointed, as in the case of the Dresden School.<sup>80</sup> Only the party publication *Deutsche Stimme* has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to an intellectual orientation, apparent from the large number of articles on philosophical, programmatic-ideological and strategic issues as compared to other right-wing extremist periodicals.

**JN founds Nationaler Bildungskreis** The NPD youth organisation Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) has also been trying for some time to improve the training of its cadres. The Nationale Bildungskreis (NBK, National training circle) was founded for this purpose in 2007 and aims to raise the intellectual level of the JN and NPD (see also Section IV, 1.3). It describes its goal as offering the supposedly “disproportionate number

<sup>80</sup> The Dresden School was founded in early 2005 and is a loose association among party intellectuals. It is intended as an explicit contrast to the Frankfurt School of the Institut für Sozialforschung at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt (Main).

of comrades who are studying at university an appropriate platform”.<sup>81</sup> The NBK is also intended to “promote the discussion of theory beyond the boundaries of the JN”:

*“The Nationaler Bildungskreis supports this group of students and the JN with strategy papers, training courses and political lecture evenings. It also offers the opportunity to network and make contact with other like-minded university students and graduates and sees itself as an integrative element of the Dresden School.”*  
(JN website, 29 May 2008)

The NBK offers training for JN cadres and members of the NPD and neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften*. The NBK succeeded in forming a second student group at a university in Saxony-Anhalt.

**New editor-in-chief for *hier & jetzt*** The JN organisation in Saxony also produces the quarterly *hier & jetzt. radikal rechte zeitung*.<sup>82</sup> The publication describes itself as a “right-wing radical” periodical which maintains its independence from the NPD. It publishes articles by well-known right-wing extremist intellectuals and NPD functionaries writing for a more educated audience. The magazine covers a broad range of topics, with articles about artists, philosophers and writers, as well as reviews of books by both right-wing and democratic authors. After the tenth issue was published in spring 2008, there was a change in the editorial staff: Angelika Willig, who has a doctorate in philosophy and had previously worked for conservative magazines, became the editor-in-chief.

Efforts to raise the intellectual level of right-wing extremism continue to have mixed success. First and foremost, the NPD can point to greater efforts at training cadres, which is evident from the content of the party publication *Deutsche Stimme*. Apart from the KES, however, the organisations not affiliated with a political party are not likely to assume greater importance in the future.

<sup>81</sup> Website of the JN association in Saxony-Anhalt, 12 November 2008.

<sup>82</sup> The first nine issues appeared under the title *Hier & Jetzt. Gesellschaft – Politik – Bewegung* (Here & now: Society – politics – movement).

## VII. Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism is the central ideological element shared by the entire right-wing extremist spectrum and thus serves as a link between the various currents.

### Definition and forms taken

Anti-Semitism means attributing negative characteristics to Jews in general in a defamatory and discriminatory way, in order to “justify” in ideological terms their denigration, discrimination, persecution or even annihilation. Right-wing extremists explain their anti-Semitic attitudes with various and combined reproaches; Anti-Zionist and “secondary anti-Semitism” are especially strong at the moment. Politically and socially based anti-Semitism have also become more significant.

Anti-Semitism based on religious or racist grounds tends to be less frequent.<sup>83</sup>

The virulence of anti-Zionist anti-Semitism parallels the status of the Middle East conflict and uses political and social criticism – sometimes in drastic form – of actions and decisions taken by the State of Israel to defame the state as a whole and question its right to exist. In this way, right-wing extremists hide their fundamental antagonism towards all Jews. By describing Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians as equivalent to the crimes of the Nazis, they try to relativize the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust.<sup>84</sup>

“Secondary anti-Semitism” is also based on this line of argument, which accuses “the Jews” of exploiting Germany’s responsibility for the Holocaust to blackmail Germans into accepting their financial and political demands. This accusation is frequently combined with

<sup>83</sup> For definitions and descriptions of the various forms of anti-Semitism, see Armin Pfahl-Traughber, *Antisemitismus in der deutschen Geschichte* (Anti-Semitism in German history), Opladen 2002; Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (ed.), *Argumentationsmuster im rechtsextremistischen Antisemitismus. Aktuelle Entwicklungen* (Patterns of argumentation in right-wing extremist anti-Semitism: Current developments), Cologne 2005; and Henrik Berger, “Antisemitismus im Rechtsextremismus – zwischen subtiler Anspielung und offenem Hass” (Anti-Semitism in right-wing extremism: From subtle references to open hate), in: Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed. *Neuer Antisemitismus? Judenfeindschaft im politischen Extremismus und im öffentlichen Diskurs* (New anti-Semitism? Antagonism towards Jews in political extremism and the public discourse), Cologne 2006, pp. 54-74.

<sup>84</sup> On distinguishing between anti-Zionist anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel, see Aribert Heyder, Julia Iser and Peter Schmidt, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus” (Criticism of Israel or anti-Semitism? Opinion-formation between the public discourse, media and taboos), in W. Heitmeyer, ed.: *Deutsche Zustände* (German circumstances), third series, Frankfurt (Main) 2005, pp. 144-165.

attempts to relativize the number of Holocaust victims, or to deny the Holocaust entirely. Like the “social question”, “social anti-Semitism” is becoming more important in right-wing extremist discourse. Regardless of their actual socio-economic status, “the Jews” are accused of accumulating power and wealth at the expense of all non-Jews. Many right-wing extremists combine this with elements of “political anti-Semitism” to come up with conspiracy theories which accuse “the Jews” of excessive political influence. In 2008, the global financial crisis in particular inspired statements in this vein.

**Open anti-Semitism** Many right-wing extremists tend to express themselves rather carefully, because of the basic public consensus that anti-Semitism is unacceptable and because the law enforcement authorities are paying close attention. But members of the neo-Nazi and skinhead scenes are openly anti-Semitic, and their music groups disseminate song texts which in some cases are extremely aggressive. Such recordings are often produced abroad and imported to Germany.

For example, the song *Nicht nett!* (Not nice!) by the band Sturmkommando on the split CD *Noten des Hasses* (Notes of hate) contains racist lyrics referring to the gassing of Jews during the Holocaust:<sup>85</sup>

*“Look at that scum in the streets – crooked noses everywhere, but we’re not joking, we want to see them in the showers.  
But we’re not joking, we want to see them in the showers. Yesss!”*

The lyrics of the song *6 Millionen mehr* (6 million more) by the same band on the same CD are just as openly revisionist and call for eliminating the Jews:

*“Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! The world doesn’t need any more Zionist lies.  
Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! The only solution is to kill them all. 6 million more!  
6 million more!”*

The band Racial Hatred uses the same kind of agitation in its song *Hate!* on the CD *Macht die Augen auf!* (Open your eyes!):

*“Dirty jews are in the government, we have to pay them without end.  
But we will raise our hands up high and unmask the 6 million lie!”*  
[original text in English]

<sup>85</sup> The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (List B, Federal Gazette No. 66 of 30. April 2008).

The band views its music as a “weapon against Zionists, Turks and communists” and threatens: “If they don’t leave on their own, Zyklon B will help us!”<sup>86</sup> in a reference to the systematic gassing of Jews during the “Third Reich”.

**Implicitly anti-Semitic remarks**

Even when their intention is clear, anti-Semitic references are usually not punishable by law. But they are understood by right-wing extremists and take advantage of latent anti-Semitic attitudes. For example, anti-Semites often try to blame Jews themselves for anti-Semitism and argue that Jews actually benefit from anti-Semitism, as in the following magazine article:

*“It is understandable that Knobloch is afraid of anti-Semitism. But sometimes one cannot help but have the impression that this threat is intentionally inflated in order to take on the fictitious role of victim, all the better to get one’s way.”*

*(Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte (Nation & Europe, German monthly) No. 6/2008, p. 60)*

This reversal of victim–perpetrator roles is often linked with assertions of Germany’s moral and political straitening and financial exploitation.

Holger Szymanski, deputy editor-in-chief of *Deutsche Stimme*, wrote the following in an article about a financial scandal during the Weimar Republic:

*“At a time when the leading political figures of the Federal Republic immediately jump into action when the Central Council of Jews utters a new demand, it is hardly surprising that Jews are only portrayed as victims and the public memory of very unpleasant members of the race has almost systematically been erased.”*

*(Deutsche Stimme, No. 9/2008 of September 2008, p. 23)*

In a reference to Germany’s new naturalization test, another *Deutsche Stimme* article proposed that “future citizens [should be required to] give up their old faith and adopt the new state religion of self-flagellation, ceremoniously expressing this ... by repeating 100 times: ‘I am guilty, I am ashamed!’ ” A “practical test” would have to show whether “the delinquent could crawl nicely” and “renounce his own interests at any time in favour of this or that central council”.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Racial Hatred, *Das Unheil* (Disaster) on the CD *Macht die Augen auf!*

<sup>87</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2008 of August 2008, p. 7.

Another common variation of implicit anti-Semitism involves emphasizing the actual or alleged Jewish background or ties of unpopular figures of the past and present. One example is a campaign by the *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly) during the U.S. presidential elections, which surprisingly came out in favour of Barack Obama. The newspaper claimed that Obama's competitor within the Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton, was a puppet of the "Israel lobby"<sup>88</sup> and that the Republican candidate John McCain and his designated vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, had the support of "Jewish circles":

*"U.S. politician Joe Lieberman, who is entirely oriented towards Israel, is working passionately on behalf of the Republican presidential candidate McCain. ... According to the Israel Nachrichten [Israel news], the Orthodox Jew has many relatives in Israel and visits Jerusalem at least once a year."*  
(NZ, No. 36/2008 of 29 August 2008, p. 4)<sup>89</sup>

Nonetheless, after Obama won the election, the NZ focused on "influence" by the "Israel lobby", publishing a photo showing Obama wearing a kippah and posing the "fateful question":

*"Can Obama (shown here visiting the Western Wall in Jerusalem) distance himself from the Israel lobby, and does he want to?"*  
(NZ, No. 47/2008 of 14 November 2008, p. 2)

Other right-wing extremists also pointed to supposed Jewish influence on the U.S. elections. For example, the German-English right-wing extremist website National Journal reported that Palin belonged to the "so-called 'evangelicals' in the USA ... created by the lobby" that was also known as "'Jesus for Jews'". According to the website, the "lobby" depended "on 200% vassals ... for its planned World War III" and did not want "to count on an obsequious Negro". The website article also noted with anti-Semitic intent that Palin's "son-in-law to be" was a "certain 'Levi Johnston'!"<sup>90</sup>

**Conspiracy theories** Conspiracy theories make up a large part of the anti-Semitic agitation by right-wing extremists. According to such theories, there is a conspiracy to increase Jewish influence and ultimately establish

<sup>88</sup> See NZ, No. 6/2008 of 1 February 2008, p. 4; NZ, No. 8/2008 of 15 February 2008, p. 6; NZ, No. 11/2008 of 7 March 2008, p. 5; and NZ, No. 15/2008 of 4 April 2008, p. 2.

<sup>89</sup> See also NZ, No. 37/2008 of 5 September 2008, p. 7; NZ, No. 40/2008 of 26 September 2008, p. 5; *Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, No. 3/08, p. 31 and No. 5/08, pp. 5 – 11.

<sup>90</sup> National Journal website, 14 September 2008.



Jewish world domination. “The Jews” supposedly provoke wars, disasters and epidemics in order to destabilize existing power relations. As “proof”, conspiracy theorists repeatedly cite “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion”.<sup>91</sup> They dismiss the fact that the “Protocols” is a forgery, claiming this is a lie put about by interested parties.

Right-wing extremists often use terms such as “big business”, “U.S. East Coast”, “Zionist lobby” and “international high finance” as code words for what they regard as Jews pulling the strings. They often imply that persons of the Jewish faith or of Jewish background in key positions play an influential role in society and the economy and accuse “Jewish circles” of exerting excessive influence. Right-wing extremists view the Trilateral Commission, Atlantik-Brücke and Bilderberg conferences as a nest of Jews plotting global conspiracy and use these names as synonyms for “the Jews”. In their eyes, contact with these organisations amounts to evidence of Jewish influence.

**Jews accused of  
controlling the  
global financial  
crisis**

Right-wing extremists used the banking crisis and subsequent turbulence in global markets to disseminate anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

The right-wing extremist National Journal website published classic anti-Semitic arguments accusing “the Jews” of wiping out other races and being the controlling force behind globalization. For example, an article on the website stated that “the Jews” had “actually destroyed almost all areas of life”, not only the financial sphere. According to the article, the “global death plan” included “the notion of multi-culturalism as part of globalism” as well as “race destruction”. The article said that the result matched the prophecies in the “Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion”. The authors refer to an “internal Jewish power struggle” which they see expressed in the fact that the U.S. government “allowed the world’s largest Jewish investment bank to go broke”.<sup>92</sup> However, the authors added, the Jews went too far, and now one could expect “the death of the lobby” and the “fall of Zion”.

<sup>91</sup> “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion” is an anti-Semitic forgery which right-wing and Islamist extremists as well as Arab nationalists continue to use today as “proof” of the existence of a world-wide Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. Cf. Wolfgang Benz: *Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion. Die Legende von der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion: The legend of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy), Munich 2007.

<sup>92</sup> National Journal website, 24 September 2008.

Another article stated:

*“The collapse of the Jewish system of global finance also brought down the Jewish survivors’ policy, the mechanism for oppressing the world. The collapse of the survivors’ programme will naturally also drag the Holo-Republic of Germany into the abyss.”*

(National Journal website, 1 October 2008)

Right-wing extremist Horst Mahler commented on the banking crisis in similarly explicit terms, saying that if one looked more closely at the “few hands” that are “more powerful than all the nations combined”, then one would discover “that they are the hands of Jews”. Mahler said he was certain that the crisis constituted a “corrective crash” from which only one “winner would emerge: Jewry or National Socialism.”<sup>93</sup>

**Ties to Islamist extremism** Anti-Semitism is also an element of Islamist ideology. In particular, Islamist extremists regard the Holocaust as the “founding myth” of the State of Israel and therefore dispute its historical accuracy.

Reference is often made to the shared destiny of Germans and Palestinians. Right-wing extremists often organize events to publicize their solidarity with the “people of Palestine”. They make their anti-Semitic orientation clear with slogans such as “Israel – never again” and “Jews out of Israel”. Right-wing extremists also attempted to draw parallels between Israel’s settlement policy and Nazi atrocities committed against Jews with the demonstration slogan “No solidarity with Israel – Stealing land is genocide”.<sup>94</sup>

Many right-wing extremists see a strategic advantage in Islam as a religion and Islamist extremism as an ideology. Outside Germany, they view both as a welcome adversary for the U.S., but this does not change their basic xenophobia within Germany. For example, in an interview with *Deutsche Stimme*, Frank Krämer, member of the band Stahlgewitter, stated:

*“All intellectual currents which deny the differences between races create chaos and destruction and therefore express true contempt for humanity. Muslims have the same right to live in Germany and Europe as the Jews have to live in Palestine, namely none at all. I think that Islam in the Arab world is a useful counterweight to Americanism and Zionism.”*

<sup>93</sup> Website of the Völkische Reichsbewegung (Nationalist Reich movement), 8 October 2008.

<sup>94</sup> Demonstration by the Nationaler Widerstand Dortmund (Dortmund national resistance) on 29 March 2008.

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2008 of May 2008, p. 17)

Although right-wing extremists stress the right of Muslims in Muslim countries “to practise their faith as they see fit”,<sup>95</sup> they repeatedly point to the domestic threat of “ethnic” and religious alienation posed by Islam.

### **VIII. International connections**

Right-wing extremists cooperate across national borders on public rallies and memorial events as well as lecture events, for example. Their counterparts in other European countries come to Germany to demonstrate on behalf of shared goals. They also meet to evaluate current political developments. As could be expected, the right-wing extremist parties have further stirred up the discussion of an “Islamification of Europe” in many countries. Systematically fanning such fears also helps increase support from the mainstream in the upcoming European parliamentary elections. A number of events in Austria and Belgium, for example, tried to prepare the public for the supposed threat of a culture war. Representatives of right-wing extremist and populist organisations in seven countries had agreed to attend an “anti-Islamification conference” to be held in Cologne on 20 September 2008. After widespread protests, however, the conference had to be discontinued prematurely (see also “Left-Wing Extremist Activities”, Section II, 1.2 and Section IV, 1).

Right-wing extremist circles are currently discussing the option of closing ranks with their Russian counterparts; this option too ultimately serves the purpose of upholding traditional right-wing extremist values. Cooperation with Russia is now considered essential for the survival of the continent and the white race.

#### **1. Events with international participation**

The following is a list of some of the events organized by German right-wing extremists with participation from abroad:

- On 16 February 2008, the right-wing extremist scene, with major assistance from the Junge Landsmannschaft Ostdeutschland (JLO, Young *Landmannschaft* of East Germany) – state association of Saxony/Lower Silesia, organized a memorial march through the

---

<sup>95</sup> NZ, No. 3/2008 of 11 January 2008, p. 5.

centre of Dresden to commemorate the 63rd anniversary of the bombing of Dresden. About 3,800 persons took part. A Scottish speaker greeted those present; marchers carried banners from Spain, the U.K., France, Austria, Sweden, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands.

- On 1 May 2008, right-wing extremist *Kameradschaften* and the NPD gathered for several local events around Germany which were attended by a total of about 3,900 people. In Hamburg, Constantijn Kusters, the chairman of the right-wing extremist Nederlandse Volks Unie (NVU, Dutch People's Union), spoke to a crowd of 1,500. Spanish right-wing extremists travelled to the event in Nuremberg.
- On 6 September 2008, about 1,200 right-wing extremists, including 300 to 400 violent "autonomous nationalists", demonstrated under the slogan "Against imperialist warmongering and wars of aggression" in Dortmund. Guest speakers came from Austria, Bulgaria, the U.K., the Czech Republic and the Netherlands.
- On 13 September 2008, the NPD put on its third "Festival of peoples" in Altenburg, Thuringia, with the slogan "For a Europe of fatherlands, Europe stands up for freedom". About 1,500 people attended, including roughly 110 right-wing extremists from Bulgaria, the U.K., Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia, Spain and the Czech Republic, each represented by a speaker.

## **2. The "Islamification of Europe" as a campaign issue**

Ahead of the European parliamentary elections, right-wing extremist and populist parties in several EU countries asserted the threat of an "Islamification of Europe", which they turned into their central campaign issue. An alliance founded in Antwerp, Belgium, on 17 January 2008 is intended to plan and coordinate international activities to "raise public awareness". Key members of the alliance, called Städte gegen Islamisierung (Cities against Islamification) include the Belgian party Vlaams Belang (VB), Austria's Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) and Germany's Pro-Bewegung (Pro-movement). Already in late 2007, it was reported for the first time on the Internet that an international "conference" was to be held in Cologne. According to the report, the aim of the conference was to protest against "Islamic parallel societies" and the construction of major mosques, and to provide a forum for groups and publishers critical of Islam. The Bürgerbewegung pro Köln e.V. (pro Köln, Popular movement for Cologne, reg'd society), which is being

„Bürgerbewegung  
pro Köln e.V."  
(suspicious case)

monitored by the authorities for the protection of the Constitution due to concrete indications of right-wing extremist activity and in view of its international “anti-Islamification” campaign, then applied for a permit to hold the event, scheduled for 19 – 21 September 2008, and announced various activities to accompany the conference as well as a central demonstration in the centre of Cologne. Major advertising activities were launched in the following weeks in the Cologne area and surrounding regions. The organizers were expecting about 1,000 sympathizers to take part. The list of speakers included well-known right-wing extremists from a number of countries and initially raised expectations that large segments of the right-wing extremist scene would attend.

However, from early on there was a major mobilization effort in both the democratic and the left-wing extremist camps.

Some Muslim countries also reported critically on the “anti-Islamification conference” and called for it to be banned. Although it was announced shortly before the conference that some of the invited speakers would not attend, including Nick Griffin, head of the British National Party (BNP), Jean Marie Le Pen, head of France’s Front National, and Hans-Christian Strache, chairman of the FPÖ, pro Köln went ahead with the preparations, with major assistance from the Belgian party VB.

Due to massive protests, however, the “anti-Islamification conference”, originally scheduled for three days, proved impossible to carry out. Already the press conference on a ship on the Rhine on 19 September 2008 was attacked by left-wing autonomous forces and was ended under police protection. On 20 September 2008, it was nearly impossible to get to the site of the planned rally, because protesters had blocked all access routes. Protest actions left about 200 foreign right-wing extremists stranded at the Cologne airport and unable to reach the city centre by tour bus or public transport. After the police had denied permission for a right-wing extremist “sightseeing tour” of neighbourhoods with a largely immigrant population on 19 September, the main conference which opened on 20 September – with only about 50 persons in attendance – was also banned on the basis of the Act concerning Assemblies and Processions. While the small number of conference participants exited the venue, some of them under protest, an improvised press conference was held at the Cologne airport under the supervision of pro Köln chairman Markus Beisicht, after which the foreign guests who had been stranded there departed.

---

The pro Köln organisation has taken legal action against the ban issued by the Cologne police and has announced that it will repeat the conference in May 2009.

### **3. International revisionism**

One of the most important topics of right-wing extremist agitation continues to be historical revisionism. This refers to above all to efforts to trivialize or justify historical National Socialism by portraying it in a one-sided or falsifying manner. Because the criminal nature of National Socialism makes right-wing extremist positions socially unacceptable, right-wing extremists try to create doubts about the accepted and research-based historical reception of the period. In formal terms, they claim to revise existing knowledge with the help of new sources of information. Right-wing extremists who call themselves revisionists do not conduct impartial research, however. Their efforts, with their barely disguised bias, are intended to re-interpret historical events while maintaining the appearance of scholarly research.

**Methods** Revisionists use the following methods to manipulate and deceive:

- falsifying documents or consciously interpreting them in a one-sided way;
- failing to reference sources that provide evidence of Nazi wrongdoing;
- basing their arguments on pseudo-scientific sources;
- emphasizing supposedly “positive” aspects of National Socialism;
- trying to relativize Nazi crimes by comparing them to other crimes.

Revisionism in the broader sense refers to efforts to correct the history of World War II and the “Third Reich” to favour National Socialism. Revisionism in the narrower sense refers to denying the Holocaust, which is a crime in the Federal Republic of Germany (Section 130 (3) Criminal Code).

**Revisionism in Germany** The main area of revisionist agitation in the broader sense is numerous books published by right-wing extremist publishers which try to cast doubt on the Nazi regime’s responsibility for starting World War II.

---

For example, in his book *Polen ein Ärgernis?*, Hans Meiser primarily accuses Poland of having started World War II:

*“One of the most infamous as well as sophisticated lies is that HITLER had long planned the destruction of Poland. On the contrary, the German government tried from 1934 to 1939 without ceasing to make things easier for Poland by making a number of generous offers.”*  
(Hans Meiser, *Polen ein Ärgernis? Die Geschichte einer gestörten Nachbarschaft* (Poland an outrage? The history of troubled neighbours), Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 2008, p. 226)

Right-wing extremists’ reference to the German victims of World War II often conceal a revisionist intent. By mentioning large numbers of German victims, they hope to relativize Nazi atrocities. For this reason, the report by a commission of historians stating that no more than 25,000 people died in the bombing of Dresden caused outrage among right-wing extremists. Gansel, an NPD member of the Saxony state parliament, criticized this result in a press release, calling it a “whitewash” by “court historians” of the Federal Republic. Gansel himself said the number of victims was many times higher.<sup>96</sup>

For fear of prosecution, few right-wing extremists in Germany openly deny the Holocaust. Those who do receive a great deal of support from others who share their beliefs; these supporters accompany them to court, gather donations and announce their solidarity with the prisoner, for example in letters. Right-wing extremist publications report on what they see as an injustice and try to depict the criminals as martyrs.

**Verein zur  
Rehabilitierung der  
wegen Bestreitens  
des Holocaust  
Verfolgten (VRBHV)**

Until it was banned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on 7 May 2008, the Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocaust Verfolgten (VRBHV, Society for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for disputing the Holocaust; see Section VI) served as the organisational platform for these supporters. Founded in 2003, the group organized support for Holocaust deniers in Germany, working closely with the Collegium Humanum (CH; see Section VI), which has also been banned. The CH publication had a special section in which it reported on VRBHV projects. The VRBHV also provided financial support for individual Holocaust deniers, paid for from the membership fees of its roughly 200 members and from donations. The group’s co-founder, Mahler, received regular payments from the VRBHV. The ban is not subject to appeal.

<sup>96</sup> NPD website, 2 October 2008.

**Sentences for key players** Mahler, who has few followers left, even among staunch revisionists and anti-Semites, is still doggedly pursuing his abstruse agitation in court and in various Internet publications. For example, he was sentenced by the Erding municipal court on 28 April 2008 on charges of incitement, slander and displaying symbols of anti-constitutional organisations to ten months in prison without the possibility of remission.<sup>97</sup>

The lawyer Stolz was sentenced by the Mannheim regional court on 14 January 2008 on four counts of denying the National Socialist annihilation of the Jews as well as other charges to three and a half years in prison. The court also barred the defendant from working as a lawyer for five years. In its decision of 2 December 2008, the Federal Court of Justice upheld parts of the Mannheim court's decision. Although the court found Stolz not guilty of certain charges, it did confirm the decision to bar her from practising her profession. As a result, the Mannheim regional court must revise the sentence.

Ursula Haverbeck-Wetzel, former chair of the CH, was again convicted due to her revisionist statements. Because she again doubted the Holocaust in the CH publication, the Bielefeld regional court as court of appeal sentenced her on 21 October 2008 to a fine of €1,800.

On 1 October 2008, Dr Fredrick Töben, a German right-wing extremist living in Australia, was arrested at a London airport on a European arrest warrant issued by the Mannheim public prosecutor's office. Töben is accused of disseminating criminal revisionist and inciting content on the website of the Adelaide Institute, which he heads. At the decision of the responsible court of 29 October 2009, however, he was freed on bail of £100,000 and ordered not to leave the U.K. and remain at the disposal of the British judicial authorities.

**Activities based abroad** Revisionists operating outside Germany appear to have been seriously weakened, not least due to the increased pressure of government prosecution across Europe. Based in the U.K., Castle Hill Publishers (CHP) was run by Holocaust denier Germar Rudolf until he was arrested and extradited to Germany in 2005. In 2008, CHP published a volume called *Auschwitz forensisch untersucht*.<sup>98</sup> The volume is merely a reprint of the 1993 *Rudolf-Gutachten* (Rudolf

<sup>97</sup> Following Mahler's appeal, the Landshut regional court confirmed this sentence on 11 February 2009, adding to it the charge of defiling the memory of the dead.

<sup>98</sup> Cyrus Cox, ed.: *Auschwitz forensisch untersucht* (Auschwitz: A forensic study), Uckfield, U.K.: CHP, 2008.



report), indicating the difficult financial and staffing situation at the publishing company. In early 2008, CHP discontinued publication of its journal *Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung* (Vffg, Quarterly journal for independent historical research). This was the only German-language publication which had explicitly concentrated on denying the Holocaust since its first issue in 1997. And the Belgian organisation Vrij Historisch Onderzoek (V.H.O., Free historical research), which had played a key role for international Holocaust deniers, announced that it was forced to discontinue its activities.

*“After the arrest of Ernst Zündel and Germar Rudolf and the many legal proceedings against revisionists, it has become quieter on the enlightenment front. The attempt to intimidate the revisionists has apparently had some success.”*

(Fact sheet by the Uncensored History Publishers, 15 November 2007)

As its successor, the V.H.O. designated a “task force” called Uncensored History Publishers (U.H.P.) located at the CHP address in the U.K.

Propaganda denying the Holocaust continues to be published on numerous websites. Texts denying the National Socialist murder of European Jews can also be accessed in Germany via the Internet. German law enforcement authorities have a difficult time prosecuting such websites, because they are usually based on servers located abroad.

**Revisionist scene  
seriously weakened**

The international revisionist scene has been seriously weakened by the pressure of government prosecution and the banning of key organisations. However, denying the Holocaust remains a high priority for all currents of German right-wing extremism.

## **IX. Unaffiliated publishing houses and distributors**

In 2008, about 36 right-wing extremist publishers and distributors not formally affiliated with a political party or organisation were active in Germany (2007: about 36).

These unaffiliated publishers and distributors demonstrate a variety of organisational structures. Some are larger enterprises with a broad publishing programme, while others are smaller publishers or distributors with limited or specialized offerings. They distribute books, periodicals, recordings, DVDs and video cassettes they have

produced themselves which are intended to disseminate right-wing extremist ideas and views of history. According to these materials, the accepted, research-based historical reception of the “Third Reich” rests on falsified evidence and is the result of re-education by the Allies. A large number of publications depict the Federal Republic of Germany as a lackey of the U.S. and as having no national pride or political autonomy. Other publications are devoted to a supposed Jewish world conspiracy.

Many businesses continue to sell calendars, posters and jewellery with folkloric or Germanic-mythological motifs. And items for everyday use bearing right-wing extremist slogans and signs are intended to demonstrate the buyer’s convictions.

Nation Europa Verlag in Coburg, Bavaria, Grabert-Verlag in Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Arndt-Verlag in Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein, and Verlagsgesellschaft Berg in Inning am Ammersee, Bavaria, are some of the best-known among right-wing extremists.

**Nation Europa Verlag** Nation Europa Verlag owes its key role in the right-wing extremist publishing world to its journal *Nation & Europa - Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation & Europe: German monthly), now in its 58th year. With circulation of about 18,000, the journal is an influential medium for the right-wing extremist scene. The editorial team led by Harald Neubauer writes on current events as well as issues of strategy and theory which show an ideological affinity to the NPD. As in previous years, the journal published anti-American and anti-globalization articles based on right-wing extremist ideology again in 2008. One example of xenophobic agitation is an article by Karl Richter, member of Munich’s city council for the Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp (BIA, Citizens’ initiative to stop foreigners), a group with ties to the NPD:

*“On the other hand, Munich ... today is the city with the highest proportion of foreigners in Germany, one of the cities with the highest per capita debt and once a year ... the German capital of gay men and lesbians. All in all, a mixed, questionable result. After 17 years ... the era in which Munich shone is over. Munich is dirty, ill and shows every indication of its native population being replaced, as is apparent elsewhere.”*

*(Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte, No. 6/2008, p. 16)*

---

Richter also seeks to incite fears of “excessive foreign influence”:

*“No one can expect an ethnic group (‘Volk’) to allow itself to be pushed out of its traditional area of settlement and replaced by others. In the best-case scenario, it will defend its territory; in the worst case, majorities will become minorities and terror against those who remain will become the rule ....”*

*(Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte, No. 3/2008, p. 47)*

**Grabert-Verlag / Hohenrain-Verlag** Run by Wigbert Grabert, in 2008 the publishing enterprises Grabert-Verlag and Hohenrain-Verlag again offered a number of books trivializing the Nazi period, denying the Nazi leadership’s responsibility for starting World War II, disseminating a racist worldview and rejecting a united Europe.

In addition to books, the right-wing extremist publisher also produces two periodical publications. The bi-monthly newsletter *Euro-Kurier. Aktuelle Buch- und Verlags-Nachrichten* (Euro courier: Book and publishing house news), now in its 19th year, mainly offers brief commentaries on current issues and advertising for its own publications. The revisionist quarterly journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (DGG, Germany in history and the present) is now in its 56th year and mainly publishes theoretical articles on contemporary issues. Since mid-2007,<sup>99</sup> the journal’s editor-in-chief has been Dr. Rolf Kosiek, a long-time editor at the publishing house and former chairman of the right-wing extremist cultural organisation Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik e.V. (GFP, Society for free journalism, reg’d society).

**Arndt-Verlag** Run by Dietmar Munier, the Arndt-Verlag publishing house has an extensive mail-order catalogue; again in 2008, it offered books on cultural, historical, contemporary and political issues, along with calendars, videos and memorabilia devoted to the former German territories of Silesia and East Prussia. One of its few publications was a revisionist volume by Werner Landhoff, *Die Opfer des 20. Juli 1944. Kollateralschaden einer höheren Moral?* (The victims of 20 July 1944: Collateral damage of higher morals?). The publication is distributed by various right-wing extremist book services and mail-order operations and advertised in right-wing extremist magazines.

The book’s author attempts to defame those who took part in the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, for example by condemning resistance to National Socialism as treason:

<sup>99</sup> DGG, No. 2, June 2007, p. 1.

*“As everyone knows, in all countries of the world treason has long been one of the most shameful crimes and is subject everywhere to the most severe punishment.”*

(...)

*“Even worse, with their treasonable acts some of the resisters of 20 July knowingly supported an enemy whose goal was to destroy Germany, a moderate European power that had become too strong.”*

(Werner Landhoff: *Die Opfer des 20. Juli 1944. Kollateralschaden einer höheren Moral?* Kiel: Arndt-Verlag, 2008, pp. 13 and 226)

Again in 2008, the publisher continued its series of volumes of large-format colour photographs, *Zeitgeschichte in Bildern/Zeitgeschichte in Farbe* (Recent history in pictures/Recent history in colour), which convey a misleading impression of the supposedly impressive and attractive aspects of the Nazi regime.

Arndt-Verlag also has on its backlist the book *Göring. Eine Biographie* by Holocaust denier David Irving.<sup>100</sup> By focusing on the biographical depiction, the book attempts to draw a sympathetic portrait of the Nazi functionary, thereby relativizing National Socialism in a broader sense.

**Verlagsgesellschaft Berg** Headed by Dr Gert Sudholt, Verlagsgesellschaft Berg is the result of a merger of three independent presses: Druffel, Türmer and Vowinkel. The Sudholt mail-order bookseller is also part of the enterprise. The publishing house produces the journal *Deutsche Geschichte. Europa und die Welt* (German history, Europe and the world) every two months, now in its 19th year, as well as revisionist and military history books. One notable book newly published in 2008 was a work by revisionist Hans Meiser, *So wurde Stalingrad verraten*, which denies Germany's responsibility for the war and asserts that it was not Hitler's policy of conquest, but Roosevelt who was responsible for what happened at Stalingrad during World War II.

The book also defames the resistance as traitors and blames them for helping to defeat Germany; the book thus ignores the fact that the resistance was aimed at an illegitimate regime:

*“The spectacular assassination attempt of 20 July 1944 revealed an abyss of high treason about whose background the German people found out very little. Not until after the war, when surviving participants boasted about their deeds ... was the actual extent and consequences of the treason apparent. ... This included not only the immediate*

<sup>100</sup> David Irving: *Göring. Eine Biographie* (Göring: A biography), Kiel: Arndt-Verlag, 2007; originally published in English by Focal Point Publications, 1991.

*betrayal of state secrets to the enemy, but also each measure of sabotage and suppression of reports or information in aid of such treason, especially when these measures meant accepting, or were aimed at causing, the death of German soldiers or the loss of entire units, or even the defeat of one's own country."*

(Hans Meiser, *So wurde Stalingrad verraten. Dokumentation und Richtigstellung* (How Stalingrad was betrayed: Documentation and correction), Stegen am Ammersee: Druffel & Vowinckel-Verlag, 2008, pp. 182 and 206)

The Druffel & Vowinckel-Verlag organized its eighth "Experience history" weekend in "early October in southern Germany", according to the publisher;<sup>101</sup> the weekend focused on "the end of the war in 1918 and its consequences – a summing-up after 90 years". As in earlier years, authors well known for their works published by unaffiliated right-wing extremist publishers spoke at the event.

**Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik e.V.** Founded as early as 1960, the Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik e.V. (GFP, Society for free journalism, reg'd society) is the largest right-wing extremist cultural organisation, with about 500 members, most of them publishers, booksellers, writers and editors. The chairman of the GFP is Molau, the top NPD candidate in the Lower Saxony parliamentary elections in 2008.

The group held its annual convention in Suhl, Thuringia, from 11 to 13 April 2008 on the topic "Forty years of destroying the *Volks!* The consequences of 1968". Speakers included Molau, Richter, Kosiek and Sudholt as well as Jürgen Schwab, former NPD ideologist and head of the right-wing extremist Deutsche Akademie (see Section VI), and Swiss Holocaust denier Bernhard Schaub, former chair of the now-banned VRBHV (see Section VIII, 3).

In addition to publishing the annual convention proceedings in printed form, the GFP also puts out a quarterly publication called *Das Freie Forum* (The free forum).

<sup>101</sup> See also *Deutsche Geschichte*, special supplement II/2008, p. 5.

## **Left-Wing Extremist Activities**

### **I. Overview**

#### **1. Left-wing extremist developments**

Depending on their ideological orientation, left-wing extremists want to replace the existing social system and system of government with a socialist or communist society or an anarchist society "free of rule"; their political activities are based either on revolutionary Marxist or anarchist ideologies.

**The objective: to overthrow the system** Ultimately, left-wing extremists are applying their commitment and resistance to achieve their objective: to overthrow the system. Revolutionary Marxist groups are engaged in a long-term class struggle; autonomists are seeking a self-determined life in "areas without rule".

Left-wing extremists usually use overt means of agitation such as flyers, posters and left-wing publications or seek covertly to gain influence on non-extremist groups. However, that is not to say there are not also those left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence, especially in the autonomist scene, who are trying to achieve their "political" goals by means of violence or violating the law. This is reflected in the continued high numbers of assaults and the increase in arson attacks, often causing a great deal of damage (see Politically Motivated Crime, Section III, 2.). Some autonomist groupings commit serious violent offences, including numerous arson attacks.

In early 2008 left-wing extremists attempted to consolidate the new "momentum and power" that purportedly arose in the anti-globalisation movement in Germany in the course of protests against the June 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) so as to capitalise on it in the future to motivate supporters. The first beginnings of this were in evidence in the second half of 2008 when mobilisation currents developed, some of which cooperated with each other, in order to coordinate protest actions

---

against the April 2009 NATO Summit in Baden-Baden (Baden-Württemberg) and Strasbourg (France).

Left-wing extremists refocused their attention on their traditional areas of activity, such as "anti-fascism", "anti-repression", "anti-militarism" and "anti-racism", after these had been superseded by efforts to mobilise supporters against the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm.

- "Anti-fascism"** The left-wing extremists' "anti-fascism work" is only superficially directed at fighting right-wing extremist structures. In fact, the left-wing extremists' true goal is to overcome the free democratic basic order in order to eliminate the roots of fascism that are supposedly deeply ingrained in the "capitalist system". The activities of violent left-wing extremists were directed against "Nazi marches", and actual or purported members of the right-wing extremist scene or their structures. During right-wing extremist marches, left-wing extremists sought direct confrontation with their "political" opponent.
- "Anti-repression"** The area of activity known as "anti-repression" continues to be a focal point of left-wing extremists' political agitation. Their criticism is primarily directed against what in their view is an excessive state surveillance apparatus. In their opinion the state has "legalised the curtailing of civil rights in the form of online searches and data retention"; sections 129 et seqq. of the Criminal Code (StGB) provide the state with a "strong weapon against unpopular political groups".
- "Anti-globalisation"** Whilst the activities of German left-wing extremist anti-globalisation campaigners did not target the July 2008 G8 Summit in Japan, there were initial indications in 2008 that supporters were being mobilised to attend the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy. Left-wing extremist groupings initiated an international campaign called "Bring down the European security architecture!"
- The Left Party** In mid-June 2007 Die Linkspartei.PDS (The Left Party.PDS) merged with the non-extremist Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (WASG, Labour & Social Justice – The Election Alternative) to form DIE LINKE. (The Left Party). The Left Party held its first party conference in Cottbus (Brandenburg) in May 2008. Despite presenting an ambivalent picture, there is still evidence to suggest that the Left Party is engaged in extremist activities.
- DKP continues to staunchly advocate Marx, Engels and Lenin** The Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) adopted a new programme in 2006, but still staunchly advocates the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Its objective is to gradually establish a socialist society by overthrowing the existing

social system by revolutionary means. In September 2008 the DKP held an event to celebrate its 40th anniversary.

**MLPD underlines its revolutionary demand** The Maoist/Stalinist-oriented Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany) continues to remain committed to the revolutionary goals of Marx and Engels, according to which "capitalism cannot be reformed, but must be superseded by socialism". Socialism can only be achieved by "smashing the bourgeois state power". In autumn 2008 the MLPD organised its VIIIth Party Conference, under conspiratorial circumstances at a secret location.

**Trotskyists** Trotskyists seek to gain influence by infiltrating other, usually competing, political parties and associations on a targeted basis in order to instrumentalise them for their own purposes (a policy known as "entryism").

## **2. Organisations and following**

**Slight increase in left-wing extremist following** In 2008 the structure and forms of organised left-wing extremism showed only little change from 2007. The total number of supporters and active members increased slightly.

In late 2008, after deducting cases of multiple membership, around 31,200 people (2007: 30,800) were members of organisations and other associations where there is evidence to suggest that left-wing extremist objectives are being pursued.

- In late 2008 the spectrum of left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence, mainly members of anarchist groups, comprised around 6,300 people (2007: around 6,300), including up to 5,800 (2007: up to 5,800) autonomists.
  - Membership of Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist and other revolutionary Marxist associations comprised around 25,200 people (2007: 24,800), the first slight increase since 2003. That figure includes supporters of the Kommunistische Plattform der Partei DIE LINKE. (KPF, Communist Platform of The Left Party).
  - Some left-wing extremist groups are supported by organisations that were founded or infiltrated by extremists and which are as a consequence under considerable influence from them (organisations influenced by left-wing extremism). Since not all the members of such organisations are pursuing extremist objectives, this group of persons was not included in the total following.
-



<b>Left-wing extremist following<sup>1</sup></b>						
	<b>2006</b>		<b>2007</b>		<b>2008</b>	
	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
Left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence <sup>2</sup>	69	6,000 <sup>3</sup>	70	6,300 <sup>3</sup>	67	6,300 <sup>3</sup>
Marxist-Leninists and other revolutionary Marxists <sup>4</sup>						
– Core and subsidiary organisations	40	25,000	41	24,800	40	25,200
– Organisations influenced by left-wing extremism	17		17		16	
<b>Total</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>31,000</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>31,100</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>31,500</b>
<b>After deducting multiple memberships<sup>5</sup></b>		<b>ca. 30,700</b>		<b>ca. 30,800</b>		<b>ca. 31,200</b>
<sup>1</sup> Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off. <sup>2</sup> The statistics not only include those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those left-wing extremists presumed, on the basis of pertinent indicators, to be prepared to use violence. Only groups with established structures that have been active for some time have been included. <sup>3</sup> The scene can potentially mobilise an additional several thousand people. <sup>4</sup> Including the Kommunistische Plattform der Partei DIE LINKE. (KPF, Communist Platform of the Left Party) and members of other left-wing extremist groups in the Left Party. <sup>5</sup> The figures do not include members of organisations influenced by left-wing extremism.						

The Left Party presents an ambivalent picture and has therefore not been listed separately here. It has 76,100 members (The Left Party.PDS/The Left Party 2007: more than 71,700).<sup>102</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Membership as at 30 September 2008; published on the Left Party website, 27 February 2009.

### 3. Publishers, distributors and periodicals

In 2008 more than 20 publishers and distributors disseminated newspapers, journals and other publications with at least some left-wing extremist content. These publishers and distributors put out a total of nearly 200 (2007: around 220) publications.

Numerous publications put out by members of the autonomist scene – some of which are produced and disseminated conspiratorially – regularly publish statements claiming responsibility for certain actions, position papers, calls to take part in demonstrations and other items relevant to left-wing extremist debate and practice. Most of these publications are primarily of regional significance, for example *Swing* (Frankfurt/Main), *Zeck* (Hamburg), *incipito* (Leipzig) or *göttinger Drucksache* (Göttingen Printed Papers). *INTERIM*, which is published fortnightly in Berlin, continues to be of national relevance.

**Left-wing extremist daily newspaper *junge Welt* (jW)** One important printed medium in the left-wing extremist scene is the national daily newspaper *junge Welt* (jW, young world). The newspaper was already published in the former GDR by the SED's youth organisation Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ, Free Democratic Youth) and is now published by the Berlin-based independent publishing house 8. Mai GmbH. It is majority owned by the Linke Presse Verlagsförderungs- und Beteiligungsgenossenschaft junge Welt e.G. Some of the editorial staff and quite a considerable number of the regular and guest contributors belong to the left-wing extremist spectrum. The paper adheres to a traditional communist orientation. It describes itself as an "independent, high-circulation Marxist daily newspaper" with a daily print run of more than 17,000 copies<sup>103</sup>; it propagates the establishment of a socialist society. The costs for a subscription to the newspaper are described as a "voluntary revolutionary tax".<sup>104</sup>

The political and moral justification for the former GDR also has a key role to play in efforts to establish a socialist society. One author of an article that appeared in *jW*, for example, described the autobiography of the last head of the GDR border guards as a book that had raised an "honourable memorial" to the thousands of border guards. He described the sentencing of the former head of the border guards to six and a half years in prison after the fall of the Berlin Wall as a

---

<sup>103</sup> *jW*, No. 40, 16/17 February 2008, p. 16.

<sup>104</sup> *jW*, No. 167, 19/20 July 2008, p. 16.

---

miscarriage of justice "out of dominant, openly declared hostility towards the GDR". In the former GDR, he went on, "border violators" had "in a suicidal manner" and "sometimes extremely persistently" caused firearms to be used on account of their own conduct.<sup>105</sup>

Various articles published in *jW* portrayed violence as a legitimate means in the fight against capitalism and imperialism. For example, it published, without comment, a statement claiming responsibility for a paint attack against the House of Journalists and the former editor-in-chief of *Der Spiegel* (The Mirror), Stefan Aust, on 25 September 2008. Stefan Aust is the author of the book *Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex* (The Baader-Meinhof Complex). The following is taken from that statement, which bore the heading "The Stefan Aust Complex":

*"We express critical solidarity with the history of the armed practice and policies of the RAF, the 2nd June Movement and the Revolutionary Cell/Red Zora. Despite all the criticism of their strategic mistakes, some counter-productive actions that had devastating consequences both for innocent victims and from a revolutionary perspective, we regard highly the initiative they took of organising the armed struggle against the FRG."*

(*jW*, No. 229, 30 September 2008, p. 8)

Movements such as the Basque separatist terror organisation ETA<sup>106</sup>, the Colombian terrorist guerrilla organisation FARC-EP<sup>107</sup> and armed Afghan and Palestinian groups are justified as being "liberation organisations" or resistance movements. Their members and supporters are repeatedly given a platform on which to present their propaganda without their acts of violence being criticised or the publications distancing themselves from them.

---

<sup>105</sup> *jW*, No. 233, 6 October 2008, p. 15.

<sup>106</sup> Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom).

<sup>107</sup> Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia – People's Army).

---

## II. Violent left-wing extremism

In 2008, left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence, especially autonomists, continued to seek to enforce their political goals by committing numerous acts of violence and other violations of the law, thereby compromising the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany to quite a considerable degree. Their activities continued to focus on traditional left-wing extremist areas of activity, such as "anti-fascism", "anti-racism", "anti-repression" and "anti-militarism". At the same time, some groupings made intensive preparations regarding actions against the NATO Summit held in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden in early 2009 on the occasion of the defence alliance's 60th anniversary (see Section IV, 3.) and in regard to the July 2009 G8 Summit in the Italian city of La Maddalena. In August 2008 autonomists took part in the first joint "Anti-racist Summer Camp" and "Climate Camp" in Hamburg.

Some autonomist groupings that primarily adopt different names for different actions committed numerous serious acts of violence, in particular arson attacks. The militante gruppe (mg, militant group) was previously active mainly in the Berlin/Brandenburg region, but was responsible for no acts of violence in 2008 after executive measures were carried out in July 2007.

Structure:	Groups in almost all major cities, particularly in large conurbations such as Berlin, Hamburg, the Rhine-Main area, the Dresden/Leipzig region, as well as smaller university towns such as Göttingen and Freiburg
Supporters:	6,300 (2007: 6,300)
Publications:	More than 50 publications; <i>INTERIM</i> (published Berlin) is an important national publication

## 1. Autonomists

### 1.1 Following and self-definition

**Largest share of left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence**

Autonomists constitute the majority of the around 6,300 left-wing extremist following with a propensity to violence; in late 2008 they had a following of up to 5,800 in Germany (2007: 5,800).

Autonomists reject any kind of government-imposed or social norms. The fight against authorities and wage labour and the refusal to take part in the "capitalist exploitation process" are characteristic of the autonomist lifestyle.

At the heart of autonomist thinking is the idea of a free, self-determined life within "areas without rule" ("autonomy"). Autonomists thus react strongly to any real or supposed impending loss of such "free spaces".

In late May, for instance, autonomists held their "Days of Action for Free Spaces" in Berlin on the occasion of the suspected eviction from a squat called "Köpi" in Köpenicker Strasse in Berlin. After the eviction notice had been revoked and the rental agreements for the Köpi had been extended, the Days of Action were rebranded to focus on other "free spaces under threat" in the city. The following is taken from a statement claiming responsibility for damage caused to the offices of a real estate agency as well as arson attacks on luxury cars in Berlin in the run-up to the Days of Action:

*"for years now more and more spaces have been removed from the public domain in favour of commercial use, such as for instance the large-scale project 'media spree'. if it were down to the plans of the firms and corporations there would be no space left for non-commercial cultural and social locations (...). we are sick of that and will not be driven out! even though the köpi now has a contract and DER SPIEGEL has declared the fight for houses over, there are still many free spaces under threat from so-called 'improvement processes' and the accompanying gentrification (...).*

*The struggle continues!*

*We will all stay!"*

*(INTERIM, No. 673, 18 April 2008, p. 10)*

The autonomist movement is not homogeneous. The more or less established and independent groups are not pursuing a uniform ideological strategy. Their self-definition is based on diverse "anti-" attitudes ("anti-fascism", "anti-capitalism", "anti-patriarchalism"). Diffuse fragments of anarchist and communist ideologies (class struggle, revolution, anti-imperialism) form the basis of their often spontaneous activities.

**The objective: to overthrow the system** Like all left-wing extremists, autonomists are striving to overthrow the "ruling system". In a paper outlining their self-definition, for instance, one autonomist group from Magdeburg describes the need for "radical upheaval across the whole of society" and a new world that is governed by the "principles of anarchism":

*"We are not putting our faith in the state to change things, our vision is and remains the world-wide social revolution. (...) We show our solidarity with all left-wing and rev[olutionary] forms of resistance, so long as they are obvious to us and they continuously undertake a critical analysis of themselves and question themselves. We believe the global struggle is important in order to set a revolutionary process in motion."*

(RABATZ (Racket), No. 6, February 2008, p. 10)

**United in their readiness to use violence** Autonomists regard the use of violence – including against people – as a legitimate means to achieve their goals. They justify violence as a necessary means of fighting the "structural violence" of a "system of coercion, exploitation and oppression".

The following is taken from a paper published after the violent protests against the June 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania):

*"Various groups consciously overstepped the bounds of legality by means of various actions in regard to the issues addressed by the G8 protests. (...) The blockades and other protests were a demonstration of civil disobedience and rebellious resistance. They were – just like the smashed bank windows and stones thrown at the police, who are equipped as if for war and known for their brutality, during the demo on 2 June – a collective, decisive and aggressive intervention. The blockades in particular expressed the fact that many people are prepared to capture and take possession of independent spaces beyond the predetermined framework, including by ignoring the state monopoly on power."*

(INTERIM, No. 676, 30 May 2008, p. 22 et seq.)

In a statement claiming responsibility for an arson attack on a building belonging to an armaments firm in Hanover on 7 April 2008, autonomist "anti-militarists" wrote of the great breadth of means for taking up "the issues of war and militarism on all levels of left-wing radical criticism and practice":

*"But against the backdrop of war and military force, for us the debate about the means of resistance is over pretty quickly. Self-organised disarmament by causing fiery damage to property is an adequate form of disobedience. Our action is also a small contribution to the multifarious resistance against Germany's policy of war (...). Disarmament from the bottom up is possible!"*  
(INTERIM, No. 673, 18 April 2008, p. 10)

**"Anti-German" positions** Positions advocating the strict rejection of the German nation's right to exist and the resulting struggle to abolish the German state also have a special role to play within violent left-wing extremism. In contrast to traditional left-wing extremists, "anti-Germans" declare unconditional solidarity with the state of Israel and are thus positively inclined towards the United States, which is seen as Israel's protecting power. This stance is diametrically opposite to the traditional ideology of anti-imperialist groups. Alliances between the "anti-Germans" and other left-wing extremists are thus only formed on a case-by-case basis in the area of activity of "anti-fascism".

The "anti-German" trend has already passed the zenith of its influence on traditional left-wing extremism. Hardly any attention is paid to it in the left-wing extremist scene.

## 1.2 Activities

In addition to their "overt" political activity, such as agitation by means of flyers, posters, Internet calls for action and left-wing extremist publications, autonomists also engage in a broad range of militant activities. These range from violent demonstrations during which stones and other dangerous projectiles are thrown, to dangerous disruption of rail transport, to arson and bomb attacks.

**Violence against property and people** Autonomists use violence against property and people, for example against police officers, other supposed "henchmen" and "profiteers" of the "system", as well as against right-wing extremists and their structures, such as training facilities and "Nazi shops".

Militancy thereby not only serves as a "means of subjective liberation", but also as an "extremely effective tool" for expressing "antagonistic positions".<sup>108</sup> It is an expression of "anger at the system," the phrase that was used in a call to fight the impending eviction from a house at Rigaer Strasse 94 in Berlin:

*"The struggle for the threatened free spaces has for a long time not only been expressed through demonstrations that often become a parade of state repression on account of conditions imposed by the police. People give expression to their anger at various levels, by multifarious means. These include militant actions such as property damage and arson attacks. The gravity of the situation dictates the means."*  
(*INTERIM*, No. 678, 26 September 2008, p. 6)

For violent left-wing extremists, decisions regarding the target and form of a particular activity depend largely on the extent to which the motives and intentions behind such action can be communicated to the public. It is important that no-one they consider to be "uninvolved" is injured. The following, for example, is taken from a paper published as a follow-up to the "Days of Action for Free Spaces" in Berlin:

*"(...) decide yourself what ruins your day the most and attack it, (...) discuss your forms of action and your limits, test each other, don't give up after failing (...)!!!! keep asking yourselves why you are doing it? what you want to achieve by it? what is the right form of action? civil disobedience, even going as far as militant actions, should always be tested to check whether they can be communicated to the public, what form is appropriate in which situation, those who are not involved should not be affected, it is important to take responsibility for actions!!!"*  
(*INTERIM*, No. 678, 3 July 2008, p. 9)<sup>109</sup>

As a result, "imprecise" actions regularly come under criticism. The writers of the above paper recommend taking measures to preclude such criticism: "even though burning cars is the right reaction to an eviction", one should make sure to target the right cars. Perhaps it would be better to "wait another day if there is a small car parked next to the sought-after luxury car."

<sup>108</sup> "The Others: Reflexions on Rostock" (position paper on militancy during the protests against the June 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm), published on the website *dissentnetzwerk* (dissident network), 6 November 2008.

<sup>109</sup> The 3 July and 26 September 2008 issues of the left-wing extremist paper *INTERIM* were – most likely erroneously – published with the same issue no. 678.



**Street riots** So-called "mass militancy" (street riots that develop during or after demonstrations), a form of violence typically used by autonomists, is for some the most important expression of "militant politics". Militancy is to be portrayed as the "normal" strategy of political discourse; violence is to be expected at every demonstration. That is why what are known as "black blocs" of masked activists in uniform "battle gear" sometimes form during such demonstrations.

**"Revolutionary 1 May" in Hamburg** Riots are a regular occurrence during demonstrations on the "Revolutionary 1 May". In 2008, left-wing extremists focused their attention on Hamburg. The riots there were the worst for several years.

On the night of 30 April (known as Walpurgis Night), police officers came under massive attack, with bottles, stones and firecrackers being thrown at them. Violent demonstrators set up road blocks, set fire to rubbish and waste paper bins, and smashed the windows of a branch of a Sparkasse bank. Even before the demonstration began on the morning of 1 May 2008, small groups of left-wing extremists set fires in several places, including in a used tyre warehouse. Their intention was to divert the attention of the police officers and to stop right-wing extremist demonstrators getting to their rally on time.

Groups across the whole of Germany had mobilised supporters to take part in the demonstration. It was attended by some 6,600 people, up to 1,000 of whom had travelled there, including from abroad. A total of up to 2,200 people prepared to use violence took part. During the demonstration some 1,200 autonomists separated off and threw bottles, stones and fireworks at police officers in the areas around routes taken by the demonstrators. In addition, they set up barricades and formed groups to stage sit-ins. After the end of the demonstration, small groups caused further considerable property damage in various districts in the city. They set up barricades, set fire to rubbish bins and cars, damaged the windows of shops and banks, as well as of the cars the right-wing extremists had used to make their journey. In total, the police provisionally arrested 50 people and took more than 200 into custody.

Up to 700 left-wing extremists were involved in further clashes in the Schanzenviertel district of Hamburg that went on into the early hours of the morning. The violent offenders threw fences and rubbish onto the street. In the vicinity of the "Rote Flora" meeting place a number of barricades, rubbish bins and even vehicles were set alight.

---

A protest march in Frankfurt/Main on the night of 2 October 2008 (called "Night Dance Demo") is another example of mass militancy which up to 1,000 people took part in. Even before the event began bottles and stones were thrown at police officers. Seven police officers were injured.

**Against right-wing extremists** Serious rioting, often involving physical assaults, frequently also occurs during protests against right-wing extremist marches.

For instance, left-wing extremists committed violent offences and set up blockades in protest at the "Anti-Islamisation Conference" that was organised by the Bürgerbewegung pro Köln e.V. (Citizens' Movement pro Cologne, reg'd society) in Cologne on 19/20 September 2008 (see Right-Wing Extremist Activities, Section VIII, 2.). pro Cologne had planned to hold an international press conference at the start of the conference, but this was obstructed by some 100 to 150 demonstrators, who threw stones at the ship moored on the River Rhine where the event was to be held. They then forced the captain to cast off and for several hours prevented the ship from docking. On the evening of 19 September 2008 some 2,500 people, including left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence, demonstrated in Cologne city centre. The demonstrators lit fireworks, set fire to rubbish bins and blocked the S-Bahn (suburban railway) to the airport. During the night two sets of railway signals were destroyed using incendiary devices placed between Cologne and Frankfurt. This resulted in considerable disruption to rail traffic.

On 20 September 2008 around 5,000 people, including several hundred autonomists, took part in protests and blockades. The demonstrators, some of whom were masked, attempted to remove police cordons, they set up barricades, set fire to rubbish bins, and threw stones and petrol bombs at police officers. They also tried to steal the police officers' service weapons. The police established the identities of or arrested a total of more than 1,000 people. Six officers were slightly injured during the clashes. In the end the police banned the conference for security reasons. Left-wing extremists called the protests one of the "most successful over the past few years in Germany".<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> Posted on the Indymedia Internet platform, 21 September 2008.

---

**Clandestine activities** In contrast to mass militancy, clandestine militant activities (attacks by small groups that are prepared and carried out in secret) are much more carefully planned and involve a greater degree of criminal energy. Such attacks are especially directed against property, and are often described and justified from a political perspective in letters claiming responsibility that are sent to daily newspapers or press agencies or posted on the Internet.

For instance, on the night of 14 June 2008 unidentified perpetrators carried out an arson attack that destroyed a luxury car and caused considerable damage to three other cars on the premises of a car dealership in Sangerhausen (Saxony-Anhalt). The damage caused to property amounted to more than €100,000. The unidentified perpetrators wrote "Fight the power" and drew the symbol of an outstretched arm making a fist in front of the entrance to the dealership.

During the "Days of Action for Free Spaces" that took place in Berlin in late May, alleged autonomist violent offenders alone destroyed or damaged more than 50 vehicles by setting them alight, caused damage to a further nine properties and squatted three houses. The total damage caused to property amounted to well more than €1million. Some examples:

- An arson attack on a 60-tonne telescopic vehicle crane on the building site of a residential project in Berlin-Friedrichshain (27 May 2008). The damage caused to property amounted to around €200,000.
- An attack on a building belonging to a software development company in Berlin-Mitte, in which 18 display windows were destroyed (28 May 2008). The reasons for the attack given in the statement claiming responsibility were that the company developed software for security authorities and military organisations such as NATO and the Bundeswehr and was thus co-responsible for exploitation, repression and war.<sup>111</sup>
- Incendiary devices were thrown onto the business premises of a car rental firm in Berlin-Neukölln (29 May 2008). Twelve transporters and 24 vehicles (including 17 vehicles belonging to the car rental firm) were damaged, some of the severely. The damage caused to property amounted to more than €1.1million. In

---

<sup>111</sup> *INTERIM*, No. 678, 3 July 2008, p. 13.

---

a letter claiming responsibility, the perpetrators accuse the car rental and removal firm of being involved in evictions and forced removals, and thus of being "part of the repression of alternative forms of living on account of 'district improvement'".<sup>112</sup>

**Media** Numerous publications produced and disseminated by the autonomist scene, some of them conspiratorially, regularly publish statements claiming responsibility for actions and position papers on militant theory and practice.

Autonomists also use modern means of communication such as the Internet and mobile phones in a targeted fashion to exchange information in a protected environment. This furthers the largely conspiratorial behaviour of the left-wing extremists and makes it more difficult for the security authorities to investigate them.

### 1.3 Autonomist structures

Some structures within the autonomist scene are characterised by their high propensity to violence.

**"no-name" militancy** Members of these small, clandestine groups live a life that looks perfectly normal to the outside world. They leave behind few traces that could help the authorities identify them and as a rule sign each of their letters claiming responsibility for an attack with a different name, or no name at all, in order to avoid criminal prosecution ("no-name" militancy). Other groups, by contrast, operate under the same "brand name" to indicate continuity, so as to be recognisable and to provide a point of contact. For all of them, however, militancy is an indispensable, direct expression of their opposition to the "system" and characteristic of their attitude to life. This was expressed as follows:

*"Militant practice is an expression of a political attitude: irreconcilability, incompatibility with the prevailing system. We do not want a different, better life based on the current rules. We want a different, better life! (...) We will not allow the political practice, the path we choose, to be censured and regimented. We discuss the means again and again, depending on the political situation and political strength."*

(*INTERIM*, No. 679, 10 October 2008, p. 17)

---

<sup>112</sup> See footnote 111.

---

**Attacks** In 2008, small groups prepared to use violence again committed criminal offences that caused some quite considerable damage to property:

- In the early hours of 1 July 2008, unidentified perpetrators carried out an arson attack against two official cars belonging to the Foreigners' Authority in Essen that were parked in a car park in front of the authority. Both vehicles were used, among other things, to deport people; they were destroyed in the attacks. In a statement sent to several newspapers, a group calling itself "Freies Fluten Ruhr" claimed responsibility for the act and gave as their reasons the current foreigners and asylum policy:

*"In order to bring the current practice to people's attention, in the hope that at least a few deportations can be stopped, in the expectation that there will be numerous copy-cats and in solidarity with the 'Day without Deportation' that various groups have called on supporters to mark on 30 August 2008, we today set fire to the two deportation vans owned by the Foreigners' Authority in Essen."* (INTERIM, No. 678, 26 September 2008, p. 23)

- On the night of 6 October 2008 unidentified perpetrators set fire in Frankfurt/Main to a police bus that was parked on the enclosed premises of a workshop. The bus and a private coach parked next to it were practically completely destroyed. The damage caused to property amounted to €700,000. At the time of the offence, 18 busses were parked on the premises, including eight that could easily be identified as police busses on account of their paintwork and blue lights.

Even though no statement claiming responsibility for the attack was sent, the attack was most likely carried out in connection with the "Night Dance Demo" that left-wing extremists had registered to take place in Frankfurt/Main on the night of 2 October 2008 (see 1.2 above).

**Proceedings against alleged members of the militante gruppe (mg)** On 25 September 2008 three alleged members of the left-wing extremist militante gruppe (mg, militant group) went on trial at Berlin Court of Appeal. The accused are charged with membership of a criminal association. They are also accused of having attempted to set fire, on the night of 30 July 2007 in Brandenburg/Havel, to three heavy goods vehicles belonging to the Bundeswehr. The police were able to remove the incendiary devices from the vehicles before they went off and

arrested the accused near the scene of the crime.

Since 2001 the *militante gruppe* (mg) has claimed responsibility for numerous arson attacks, mainly in Berlin and Brandenburg. The damage caused amounted to a total of around €840,000. Within the framework of what it calls the "militancy debate", the group has also for many years endeavoured to network militant group structures and has moved forward the debate about the legitimacy of "more drastic" forms of action that go beyond mere property damage. Since the arrests in late July 2007 the militant gruppe (mg) has not carried out any more attacks.

Solidarity groups in the left-wing extremist scene have carried out multifarious actions throughout the trial, such as monitoring the proceedings, and organising information events and demonstrations. For instance, demonstrations attended by some 1,500 people were held in Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg on 12 and 13 December 2008.

## **2. Traditional anarchists**

The spectrum of traditional anarchists in Germany includes the anarcho-syndicalist *Freie Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter-Union* (FAU, Free Workers Union), the German section of the *Internationale Arbeiter Assoziation* (IAA, International Workers Association). These continue to pursue anarchist strategies, reject the existing social system and system of government, and want to replace it with a social system based on self-administration that is supposedly without rule.

**FAU-IAA** The FAU-IAA has some 300 members in Germany, and operates in syndicates, branches and local groups. The "anti-capitalist struggle" on the shop floor and in trade unions is of key importance to them. Members of the FAU-IAA engage in "direct actions" such as strikes, boycotts and sit-ins to achieve their goal – the establishment of a self-organised economy.

In 2008, for example, anarcho-syndicalists took part in the global day of action against an international coffee house chain, in efforts to mobilise supporters to take part in a national day of action against the "surveillance state", as well as protests against conditions of work in the temporary employment sector.

The FAU-IAA publishes the newspaper *Direkte Aktion* (DA, Direct Action). It has a print run of 3,000 copies every two months.

---

### III. Political parties and other groups

#### 1. DIE LINKE. (The Left Party)

Founded:	December 1989, when name was changed from SED <sup>113</sup> to SED-PDS; in February 1990 name was changed from SED-PDS to PDS <sup>114</sup> ; in July 2005 name was changed from PDS to Die Linkspartei.PDS; on 16 June 2007 the party merged with WASG <sup>115</sup> to form DIE LINKE. (The Left Party)
Headquarters:	Berlin
Chairmen:	Lothar Bisky, Oskar Lafontaine
Membership <sup>116</sup> :	76,139 (late 2007: 71,711); of which 25,684 (late 2007: 20,658) in the western <i>Länder</i>
Publications (selection):	<i>DISPUT</i> (Dispute), monthly; <i>Mitteilungen der Kommunistischen Plattform der Partei DIE LINKE.</i> (Bulletin of the Communist Platform of the Left Party), monthly; <i>Marxistisches Forum</i> (Marxist Forum), at irregular intervals

#### 1.1 General developments

**1<sup>st</sup> Party Conference** The Left Party elected a new party executive at its 1<sup>st</sup> Party Conference in Cottbus (Brandenburg) on 24/25 May 2008. Thirty-seven out of the 44 people in the new party executive had been members of the old party executive since the party conference in

<sup>113</sup> Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)

<sup>114</sup> Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)

<sup>115</sup> Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (Work & Social Justice – The Election Alternative)

<sup>116</sup> See footnote 102.

Berlin on 16 June 2007, at which the Left Party was created following the merger of two other parties. The two chairmen, Lothar Bisky and Oskar Lafontaine, were re-elected, as was the Member of the European Parliament Sahra Wagenknecht (Member of the National Coordination Council of the Left Party's Communist Platform (KPF)). Three members of Trotskyist organisations are also still members of the party executive.

**Elections** In the *Land* parliamentary elections in January and February 2008 the Left Party gained 11 seats in the Lower Saxony parliament (7.1% of the votes), six in the Hesse parliament (5.1%), and eight seats in the Hamburg parliament (6.4%).

**Membership** According to membership figures,<sup>117</sup> the party had 76,139 members in Germany on 30 September 2008, 25,684 of them in the western *Länder*. In the first nine months of 2008 the Left Party gained a total of 7,364 new members, mainly in the western *Land* associations.

Although numerous members of the eastern *Land* associations were originally members of the former SED, many in the western *Land* associations were originally members of communist groups. Since September 2008 members of the Trotskyist Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative; see 4. below) have joined the Left Party in order to establish a "Marxist wing in the party".

**Youth organisations** The Left Party supports the party's youth organisation Linksjugend [*solid*] (Left Youth [*solid*]). According to the Left Party, as of late September 2008 it had more than 8,200 (active and passive) members.<sup>118</sup>

The party's student organisation DIE LINKE.Sozialistisch-demokratischer Studierendenverband (DIE LINKE.SDS; The Left Party.Socialist-Democratic Student Association) comprises 60 student groups at universities and colleges (2007: 25 groups)<sup>119</sup> and is, according to its statutes, a working group with special status and thus formally a part of the Left Party's youth organisation Left Youth [*solid*].

---

<sup>117</sup> See footnote 102.

<sup>118</sup> Published on the Left Party website, 17 October 2008.

<sup>119</sup> See footnote 118.

---



**Party presents an ambivalent picture**

The Left Party continues to present an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, the party wants to be perceived by the general public as a reform-oriented, new left-wing force. On the other hand, there is still a lot of factual evidence to suggest that the party engages in left-wing extremist activities. For instance, quite well-known sections of the party are pursuing the objective of restructuring the Federal Republic of Germany politically in a manner that is incompatible with certain decisive features of the free democratic state as defined by the Basic Law. In addition, statements made by the party, taken as a whole, and the party's extremist groupings do not distance themselves from the former GDR or the Republic of Cuba as is required under the Basic Law; instead they argue in favour of showing solidarity with the latter. Furthermore, an analysis of documents pertaining to the party's practical work provides evidence to suggest that the party continues to have contacts with and provide political support to extremist organisations in Germany and abroad.<sup>120</sup>

## **1.2 Openly extremist structures in the party**

The party continues to accept and support groupings even if they openly pursue extremist objectives. After most of these structures were able to provide proof of support from within the party by means of the relevant signatures, they were officially recognised by the party executive as national groupings in January 2008.<sup>121</sup> Openly extremist forces are represented on important committees within the party, send delegates to party conferences as nationally recognised groups based on established keys, and regularly receive financial support based on the party's financial budgeting.

The most important openly extremist groups within the party are the Kommunistische Plattform der Partei DIE LINKE. (KPF, Communist Platform of the Left Party), the Geraer Dialog/Sozialistischer Dialog (GD/SD, Gera Dialogue/Socialist Dialogue), the Sozialistische Linke (SL, Socialist Left), the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Cuba Sí (Working Group 'Cuba Si') and the Marxistisches Forum (MF, Marxist Forum).

---

<sup>120</sup> See judgement of Münster Higher Administrative Court of 13 February 2009 (file no.: 16 A 845/08), p. 52 et seq.; the judgement has not yet become final.

<sup>121</sup> Decision by the party executive of 28 January 2008, newsletters of 31 January and 21 February 2008.

---

**Kommunistische  
Plattform der Partei  
DIE LINKE. (KPF,  
Communist Platform  
of the Left Party)**

The KPF has 961 members<sup>122</sup> in 16 *Land* associations and is thus the largest openly extremist group within the Left Party. It remains committed to Marxist/Leninist traditions and continues its struggle to overthrow capitalism in order to achieve its goal of establishing a socialist system.

The following is taken from an interview with Sahra Wagenknecht:

*"We want to overthrow capitalism, that much is clear. (...) We want to drive back private ownership of the means of production (...)."*  
(Cicero, 18 September 2008, p. 1)

When asked "You would expropriate BMW?" she answered: "Yes, (...)."

At the 1st Session of the 14th National Conference in Berlin on 26 April 2008, the national speakers' council of the KPF re-emphasised the need for socialism and called for a change in the political system. The KPF declared that one of its priority areas of action was its "efforts to firmly establish the clear social alternative to the capitalist social system".

In spring 2008 the national speakers' council refused to revise a statement made in August 2001 regarding a "Statement by the PDS Party Executive on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall". Among other things the statement had claimed that it had been necessary to erect the Wall "as a matter of the survival of the GDR and to maintain peace, at least in Europe".

The National Conference emphasised that it intended to step up its cooperation with Marxist-oriented forces within and outside of the party and made it clear that, particularly in view of the current attempts to isolate the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party; see 2. below), it would be cooperating with that party in a show of solidarity.

The KPF also emphasised that it would intensify its solidarity with socialist Cuba.

---

<sup>122</sup> KPF-Mitteilungen (KPF Bulletin), issue 12/2008, May 2008, p. 25.

---

- Geraer Dialog/  
Sozialistischer  
Dialog (GD/SD, Gera  
Dialogue/Socialist  
Dialogue)** The GD/SD has 122 members in eight *Land* associations and continues to be a collecting point for extremist elements within the Left Party.
- The general meeting in Kassel (Hesse) on 9 February 2008 voted to fight for a 21-st century Marxism.
- In a statement published on 29 February 2008 the national speakers' council emphasised the GD/SD's task of "getting involved" in debates on the party programme "in the spirit of Marxism/socialism" and also reaffirmed its intention to continue cooperating with the DKP.
- Sozialistische  
Linke  
(SL, Socialist Left)** The SL has around 550 members in 10 *Land* associations. It was constituted in Kassel on 8/9 December 2007 as a nation-wide group within the Left Party. Nearly a dozen members of the SL are reported to be members of the 44-strong national party executive.<sup>123</sup>
- The SL comprises communists as well as members of the former Trotskyist organisation Linksruck (LR, Shift to the Left; see 4. below), that was constituted in September 2007 and is now part of the Marxist network marx21. That is what a member of the national speakers' council who is also a member of the party's programme committee declared in August 2008 in the left-wing extremist daily newspaper *junge Welt* (jW, see Section I, 3.).
- During a debate organised by the SL's Saxony group on 23 February 2008 a member of the national party executive emphasised that one had not yet gained power when one was part of the government; that was why one had to think about "strategies to bring about social change".<sup>124</sup>
- Arbeitsgemein-  
schaft Cuba Sí  
(Working Group  
'Cuba Si')** The Working Group 'Cuba Si' was founded in 1991 and continues to be a key player when it comes to solidarity work for Cuba. It has more than 400 members in 10 *Land* associations.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> *Avanti* (Forwards), July/August 2008, p. 8.

<sup>124</sup> Published on the SL website, 23 April 2008.

<sup>125</sup> *DIE LINKE.Newsletter*, 31 January 2008; published on the Left Party website, 12 February 2008.

---

In March 2008 the Working Group – together with, among others, the DKP party executive and the *Kommunistische Arbeiterzeitung* (KAZ, Communist Workers Paper) – backed a call to support socialist Cuba:

*"Solidarity with Cuba! (...) It is clear what these henchmen of US state terrorism mean to do, namely to overthrow the Cuban government and the socialist system! We call on the friends of the Cuban people and its socialist government to defend Cuba's independence and sovereignty!"*

(jW, No. 62, 13 March 2008, supplement *literatur*, p. 7)

In April 2008 the Working Group ran an advertisement in a newspaper entitled "Viva la Revolución!" (Long Live the Revolution!) for a "Special trip on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of victory in the Cuban revolution" from 30 December 2008 to 16 January 2009.<sup>126</sup>

**Marxistisches  
Forum (MF, Marxist  
Forum)**

The MF is a group of orthodox communist members and supporters of the Left Party. The group has 58 members in Germany. It thus does not have the quorum required under section 7 of the National Statutes of the Left Party to be recognised as a national group. It therefore receives no financial support from the party. It is, however, endeavouring to be recognised by the national committee.

### **1.3 Cooperation with left-wing extremists outside the party**

**Open lists of  
candidates**

In the *Land* parliamentary elections in January and February 2008 numerous representatives of left-wing extremist parties and groups were included in the Left Party's lists of candidates. Some of them gained seats in the *Land* parliaments.

For example, in the elections to the Lower Saxony parliament, the number four on the *Land* party list and member of the Rote Hilfe e.V. organisation (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society; see 5. below), Patrick-Marc Humke-Focks, was elected to the *Land* parliament, as was the number nine on the *Land* party list and member of the DKP district executive committee, Christel Wegner (see 2.1 below). After making excusatory remarks regarding the building of the Berlin Wall and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, Ministry for State Security) of the former GDR, Wegner was expelled from the Left Party parliamentary group on 18 February 2008.

---

<sup>126</sup> *Neues Deutschland* (New Germany), No. 86, 12/13 April 2008, p. 15.

---

Janine Wissler, a supporter of the Marxist network marx21 (see 4. below) and member of the national party executive, was elected to the Hesse *Land* parliament after being listed number three on the *Land* party list of candidates.

Christiane Schneider, number three on the *Land* party list, was elected to the Hamburg parliament. She is responsible under press law for the newspaper *Gefangenen Info* (Information on Prisoners) that is published by the GNN Gesellschaft für Nachrichtenerfassung und Nachrichtenverbreitung, Verlagsgesellschaft in Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg mbH. It reports on the prison conditions of so-called "political prisoners" (see Section IV, 2.).

**Cooperation with the DKP** Both criticism and solidarity continue to be a feature the Left Party's relations with the DKP, which are based on the two parties' common traditions. The Left Party has not yet explicitly distanced itself from the DKP on account of the latter's indisputably unconstitutional objectives. The parties have multifaceted relations, ranging from delegates being sent to party conferences and press events organised by the parties' newspapers, to joint meetings. In connection with the amendment of the law governing candidates on open lists, it was decided at the 1st Party Conference of the Left Party in Cottbus on 24/25 May 2008 that only party members and independent candidates would in future be allowed to be listed for European, Bundestag and *Land* parliamentary elections. In regard to local government elections, however, it would in principle be possible, even desirable, to list candidates from other parties, in particular the KPD.

The Marxistische Arbeitskreis zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung bei der Partei DIE LINKE. (Marxist Working Group on the History of the German Workers' Movement in the Left Party) traditionally organises a joint colloquium with the Geschichtskommission beim Parteivorstand der DKP (History Committee in the DKP Party Executive). On 14 June 2008 they held their 28th Colloquium in Berlin on the topic of 'Walter Ulbricht in his time'.

**Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society)** In January 2008 several Left Party members of the Bundestag and *Land* parliaments joined the RH (see 5. below). According to their declaration of membership,<sup>127</sup> the members wanted to demonstrate

<sup>127</sup> "Für Solidarität eintreten! Wider Repression und Duckmäusertum!" (Stand up for Solidarity! Against Repression and Cowardice!), published on the Left Party website, 10 January 2008.

their support for the RH and thus to contribute to strengthening the extraparlimentary movement.

**Solidarity with Kurdistan** The Left Party continued to take up the concerns of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party), which has been banned from all activity in Germany, and those of its successor organisation, Kongra Gel (the Kurdistan People's Party; see Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State [excluding Islamism], Section II, 1.2), in order to provide political support.

## 2. Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and associated groups

### 2.1 Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party)

Founded:	1968
Headquarters:	Essen
Chairman:	Heinz Stehr
Membership:	4,200 (2007: 4,200)
Publications:	<i>Unsere Zeit</i> (UZ, Our Time), (central organ), weekly, Circulation: ca. 7,000 (2007: ca. 7,000); <i>Marxistische Blätter</i> (Marxist Papers), (theoretical organ), six issues per year

The DKP continues to adhere to its long-standing ideological/political orientation and, according to its 2006 programme, to socialism/communism. The party chairman, Heinz Stehr, emphasised that:

*"The importance of the DKP lies in the fact that its politics are based on scientific socialism; that – in my opinion – it is the only political party that is working towards a revolutionary break when it comes to its strategy and tactics."*  
(UZ, No. 32, 8 August 2008, p. 2)

The *Land* parliamentary elections in Lower Saxony on 27 January 2008 were an important event for the DKP. The DKP member Christel Wegner gained a seat in the Lower Saxony *Land* parliament after being placed on the Left Party's open list of candidates (see 1. above), and was fêted as the first communist in a *Land* parliament in the Federal Republic of Germany since the "reconstitution" of the DKP 40

years ago. On 14 February 2008 Wegner justified the building of the Berlin Wall and the MfS in the former GDR on the TV programme *Panorama*. She refused to give up her seat, despite repeatedly being called on to do so. In a personal statement, Stehr encouraged Wegner to take up her seat:

*"(...) the campaign against socialist and communist positions and people is no coincidence; it was planned and controlled accordingly. (...) It is not the interview with Christel Wegner that is the scandal. What was scandalous was the pieced-together anti-communist item Panorama produced."*

(DKP Darmstadt website, 8 September 2008)

**18th DKP Party Conference** On 23/24 February 2008 the DKP held its 18th Party Conference in Mörfelden (Hesse). The 176 delegates confirmed the appointment of the party chairman, Heinz Stehr, and of his deputy, Nina Hager, and for the first time elected a second deputy party chairman, Leo Mayer.

The party-internal tensions between "reformers" and "traditionalists" that have been in evidence for some time again came to light at the party conference. They in particular became apparent in regard to the assessment of the party's internal state and Leo Mayer's election as deputy party chairman. Mayer most likely represents a traditionally Marxist course within the party.

The current crisis within the DKP was described in a set of "Guidelines for Action" developed by leading party members as an alternative to the party executive's suggestion regarding "2008/2009 Work Projects" but that was then put forward by the Hamburg group:

*"In the DKP's 40th year it is obvious that the communist party is fighting for survival. Membership is dropping, the party is too old, its financial problems are increasing and resignation is spreading among active comrades. The disintegration of its organisational structures is particularly dramatic."*

(DKP Berlin website, 16 October 2008)

The recommended counter-measure was to concentrate on key areas of activity, namely work on the shop floor and in trade unions, as well as local government politics. In addition, there were calls for greater efforts to be undertaken to restructure the party.

The majority of the delegates rejected this motion on account of its being incompatible with the party programme; there was no crisis within the DKP, it was claimed. Instead, the overwhelming majority of

---



delegates voted for the party executive's main motion, which was entitled "The DKP in the Fight against War, The Dismantling of the Welfare State and Democracy – Raise Our Profile – Strengthen the DKP".

**Preparations for elections to the German Bundestag and European Parliament in 2009**

In regard to the upcoming elections to the European Parliament and the German Bundestag, agreement failed to be reached within the DKP on whether it should endeavour to have its own candidates across the whole of Germany or whether to form an election alliance with the Left Party. The DKP Ruhr-Westphalia Regional Chairman, Patrik Köbele, for instance, declared that standing for elections was a tactical issue, that the parliament was a stage and its cast revealed the "level of maturity of the proletariat". Having an own candidate gave it the chance to emerge stronger from election campaigning and to be present in the electorate's awareness.<sup>128</sup>

By contrast, at a conference of active DKP members held in Munich on 24 July 2008, the deputy party chairman, Leo Mayer, argued that the DKP could conduct an election campaign with or without its own candidates. People would not become aware of the party when they were able to find names on a ballot paper, but rather on account of its presence and usefulness in real movements. Political changes could, anyway, only be achieved "from the bottom up, namely by means of real struggles,"<sup>129</sup> he said.

**40th anniversary of the DKP**

The DKP celebrated its 40th anniversary in Recklinghausen (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 27 September 2008. The party has used the term "reconstitution" since its foundation on 25 September 1968. It clearly indicates the continuity, which is also perceived by its members, in terms of both personnel and content between the DKP and the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD, Communist Party of Germany), which was banned by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in 1956. Around 400 mostly elderly people, including representatives from communist parties in Cuba, Venezuela, Georgia and Cyprus, took part in the event, which comprised music and speeches and an exhibition on the history of the DKP.

In his speech the party chairman, Heinz Stehr, emphasised that in view of the international financial crisis the question of ownership had become more important than ever. It was capital itself that raised this question every day. He was convinced, he said, that it was sufficient

<sup>128</sup> *Theorie & Praxis* (Theory & Practice), No. 15, August 2008, p. 13, and *UZ*, No. 31, 1 August 2008, p. 8.

<sup>129</sup> *UZ*, No. 31, 1 August 2008, p. 8.

to have one single bank and one single insurance company subject to "democratic, public control".<sup>130</sup>

**Difficult financial situation** The party's financial situation continues to be extremely problematical. The majority of the party members are pensioners, whose financial means of supporting the party are limited.

The party's central organ, *Unsere Zeit* (UZ), is also in a precarious financial situation that is threatening to jeopardise its survival as a weekly newspaper. The decline in the number of subscribers and advertising revenues created a financial gap of several thousand euros. On 14/15 June 2008 the party executive decided to set up a working group called "Workshop on the Future of *Unsere Zeit*". It has been tasked with carrying out a business analysis on how to increase the efficiency of its work and finances, and to implement those measures the analysis reveals to be necessary to safeguard the paper's future.<sup>131</sup> The working group comprises three people, who took up their work on 13 July 2008.<sup>132</sup> The first discernible measure to be implemented was the introduction of UZ donations vouchers in the amount of €5,<sup>133</sup> the profits of which are to accrue to the newspaper.

In an open letter entitled "40 Years of the DKP/Boost the Fund for the Struggle!" dated 19 September 2008, Heinz Stehr addressed the readers of UZ and supporters of the party, and emphasised:

*"Today the DKP is the best of what the revolutionary workers' movement has to offer in Germany, a party (...) that never loses sight of its goal of creating a socialist Germany. But the public is only aware of the DKP to a limited degree. It is not strong enough to meet all the necessary political requirements. That has to do with its membership, as well as its financial clout. The DKP needs more members and more money."*  
(UZ supplement, No. 38, 19 September 2008)

He called on readers to take out membership, to take out a subscription to the UZ, or to support the "DKP's Fund for the Struggle" by making a donation, becoming a sustaining member or paying in a refundable amount of at least €500.

<sup>130</sup> jW, No. 228, 29 September 2008, p. 4.

<sup>131</sup> Published on the DKP website, 15 October 2008.

<sup>132</sup> UZ, No. 28, 11 July 2008, p. 16.

<sup>133</sup> UZ, No. 33, 15 August 2008, p. 2.

## 2.2 Organisations associated with the DKP

### 2.2.1 Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend (SDAJ, Socialist German Workers' Youth)

The SDAJ has around 300 members in Germany and continues to have close links with the DKP. Despite being formally independent of the party, it acts as a kind of youth association. In accordance with its Marxist/Leninist orientation, it remain committed to its core ideological demand of establishing a socialist society in the Federal Republic of Germany:

*"All our demands are directed against those in power in this society, against the capitalists. We can only realise them in a society without capitalists – in socialism."*

(SDAJ Thuringia website, 9 September 2008)

**40th anniversary of the SDAJ** On 3 May 2008 the SDAJ held a reception at the Karl Liebknecht School in Leverkusen (North Rhine-Westphalia) to celebrate the anniversary of its foundation on 5 May 1968, the 150th birthday of Karl Marx. The SDAJ was founded by young members of the KPD, which had been banned in 1956 by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) for being a "revolutionary socialist youth organisation", in order to get involved in the social movements that had arisen in the aftermath of the student protests of 1968. The founding member Rolf Priemer was national chairman of the SDAJ from 1968 to 1974 and later, after holding various other functions within the DKP, was deputy chairman of the DKP up until February 2008. He reminded readers in an article in the *UZ* entitled "Gemeinsam sind wir unaufhaltsam" (Together we are unstoppable) of the rapid growth of the SDAJ, which – by its own account – had had more than 24,000 members in 1972. That was down to its "activities that had created effective publicity and were full of ideas," he said.<sup>134</sup> After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the organisation came under massive criticism, which manifest itself in a rapid loss of members and the dissolution of numerous local groups and regional and *Land* associations. The SDAJ has not yet recovered.

<sup>134</sup> *UZ*, No. 17, 25 April 2008, p. 3.

**Mobilisation against the 2009 NATO Summit** Since autumn 2008 the SDAJ had been mobilising supporters, via its website, to take part in protests against the celebrations to be held in Baden-Baden and Strasbourg in spring 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of NATO.

The following is taken from an article entitled "SMASH NATO 2009":

*"The protests can help tear the NATO states' imperialist mask from its humanitarian visage. We want to help make sure the NATO conference does not go by without any disruptions."*

(SDAJ website, 10 September 2008)

### **2.2.2 Marx-Engels-Stiftung e.V. (MES, Marx-Engels Foundation, reg'd society)**

**Influenced by left-wing extremism** The MES was founded in Wuppertal (North Rhine-Westphalia) in November 1979 and continues to pursue its goal of "conducting research into the scientific work of Marx and Engels and its historical validity" and to interpret it in the light of current circumstances. The majority of the around 40 members of the society are members of the DKP or of other traditional left-wing extremist groups. In addition, some 500 people are members of the MES's development fund, which supports the society by means of donations.

The MES, in cooperation with *jW* and *UZ*, organised a conference in Munich on 15 March 2008 to mark the 125th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. In his speech at the conference, the chairman of the MES, Dr Werner Seppmann, stressed that:

*"Globalised capitalism appears even less capable today of being sustainable than it has over the past 100 years. And the need to work at overthrowing it – for the sake of the survival of human civilisation – is now even greater. Nothing is more topical and more pressing than calling into question a social-destructive social system that has outlived its need to be abolished."*

(*Marxistische Blätter*, issue 2-08, p. 79)

---

### 3. Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany)

Founded:	1982
Headquarters:	Gelsenkirchen (Central Committee)
Chairman:	Stefan Engel
Membership:	2,300 (2007: 2,300)
Publications:	<i>Rote Fahne</i> (RF, Red Flag) (central organ), weekly, Circulation: 8,000; <i>Lernen und Kämpfen</i> (LuK, Learn and Fight) (members' magazine), several times per year; <i>REBELL</i> (Rebel) (magazine of the youth organisation of the same name), bi-monthly; <i>Galileo</i> (newspaper of the MLPD's university groups), every six months

**MLPD reaffirms its ideology/politics** In 2008, the Maoist/Stalinist–oriented MLPD remained true to the ideology/politics it has adhered to for decades. In a call to take part in protests on 1 May it underlined its revolutionary demand:

*"The MLPD remains committed to the revolutionary insights of Marx and Engels, namely that capitalism cannot be reformed but must be superseded by socialism."*  
 (RF, No. 18/2008, 30 April 2008, p. 4)

The party chairman, Stefan Engel, emphasised:

*"There is no way to achieve socialism without crushing the bourgeois state power and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. That is why our conclusion in regard to the work we must do over the coming period is a tactical offensive to establish real socialism."*  
 (RF, No. 38/2008, 19 September 2008, p. 11 et seq.)

The MLPD remains isolated even within the left-wing extremist spectrum.

**VIIIth Party Conference** In autumn 2008, the MLPD held its VIIIth Party Conference – as always under extremely conspiratorial circumstances. According to the party chairman "10 delegations of the international Marxist–Leninist and workers' movement from four continents" took part.<sup>135</sup> According to Engel, the previous 16 members of the central committee were re-elected.

In addition, he said that the party's organisational restructuring into seven *Land* associations and 50 district associations, which had been started at the VIIth Party Conference in 2006, had now been completed.<sup>136</sup>

Engel also announced that in the 2009 election to the Bundestag candidates would be standing for the MLPD on open lists in all 16 *Länder*.

**Getting youth organisations more involved** According to Engel, the two youth organisations ROTFÜCHSE (Red Foxes) and REBELL (Rebel) are to be increasingly involved in the life of the party:

*"Marxist–Leninist youth work must become a school for life for the mass youth when it comes to the proletarian way of thinking and help them to cope with the petit bourgeois/anti-authoritarian way of thinking, especially that expressed in the wide-spread animosity towards the organisation. (...) The future party structure stands or falls on whether Rebel can again become the main reservoir from which the MLPD draws its members."*

(RF, No. 38/2008, 19 September 2008, p. 15)

Young people are taught the party ideology:

*"The MLPD takes responsibility for the all-round education of the youth organisation, so that the rebels learn to develop their spontaneous rebellion against the prevailing conditions in a targeted fashion for socialism. As regards ideology, Rebel is directed by the party leadership. That comprises learning the MLPD's ideology/politics as well as its entire way of thinking, feeling and acting."*

(RF, No. 19/2008, 9 May 2008, p. 9)

<sup>135</sup> RF, No. 38/2008, 19 September 2008, pp. 11, 17.

<sup>136</sup> See 2006 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, p. 189.

#### 4. Trotskyist groups

Twenty international Trotskyist umbrella organisations with 28 sections or splinter groups were represented in Germany in 2008. The number of activists stagnated at 1,800, in groups ranging in size from very small groups to viable structures with several hundred members.

**Strategy of entryism** The concept of 'entryism' refers to the targeted infiltration of other, usually competing, parties and associations in order to gain influence, to disseminate one's own ideology and, finally, to instrumentalise the affected organisation for one's own purposes. *marx21* and the SAV were particularly important practitioners of this method applied by Trotskyist groups. It mainly affected the Left Party (see 1. above).

**marx21** The most active of the Trotskyist organisations is the Marxist network *marx21*, the German section of the international Trotskyist umbrella organisation International Socialist Tendency (IST), which has its headquarters in London. The network arose out of the Trotskyist organisation Linksruck (LR, Shift to the Left), which formally dissolved itself during a general assembly in Frankfurt/Main on 1/2 September 2007 in order to be able to establish *marx21* within the Left Party. However, the members remain committed to ideological activities based on Trotskyism within the Sozialistische Linke (SL, Socialist Left). The SL constituted itself as a national group within the Left Party at its general meeting in Kassel (Hesse) on 8/9 December 2007.<sup>137</sup>

Former members of LR hold prominent functions within the Left Party. For example, Christine Buchholz and Janine Wissler, two active Trotskyists, are members of its national party executive. Former LR members are also represented on other committees within the Left Party.

The organisation uses the magazine *marx21* as its platform. The articles published in the magazine clearly show the network's leanings towards Trotskyism:

---

<sup>137</sup> *jW*, No. 289, 11 December 2007, p. 5.

The following appeared in that publication:

*"With (...) the new, nation-wide Left Party we have the chance to combine the extraparlimentary struggle with parliamentary presence on a sustainable basis and to shift the social balance of power to the left."*

(marx21, No. 4, February 2008, p. 53)

As did the following:

*"We are arguing that our attention should focus on the class struggle and on creating a counter-power. A basic parliamentary orientation is widespread within the party (N.B.: The Left Party), that is a standpoint that aims to bring about political change by winning parliamentary majorities. (...) We need strikes and mass demonstrations to achieve our demands. These could well bear fruit in the run-up to the elections to the Bundestag."*

(marx21, No. 6, June 2008, pp. 28, 30)

**Sozialistische  
Alternative (SAV,  
Socialist Alternative)**

The SAV has around 400 members. It is the German section of the international Trotskyist umbrella organisation Committee for a Workers' International (CWI), whose headquarters are in London. As set out in its statutes, the SAV sees itself as a "revolutionary, socialist organisation in the tradition of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and Liebknecht". In 2004 the SAV had decided to implement the strategy of entryism in the non-extremist WASG party, as it was then called.

On 11 September 2008 the national party executive of the SAV published a call for SAV members to join the Left Party across the whole of Germany.<sup>138</sup> The party executive wrote that it had decided to join the party nation-wide – including in eastern Germany and Berlin. The plan was to "build up the Left Party and the youth organisation Left Youth [solid] and to strengthen forces within the Left Party that support a strictly anti-capitalist policy." They had taken up the struggle "to establish a combative and socialist mass party". "The prerequisite for a policy in the interests of the working class" was "the willingness to engage in combat with the capital, (...) and to go beyond the bounds of the capitalist system – as the starting point for overthrowing capitalism and the struggle to establish a socialist democracy". The SAV supported the "establishment of a Marxist wing" within the Left Party.

<sup>138</sup> Published on the SAV website, 11 September 2008.



Smaller Trotskyist groups such as the Revolutionär Sozialistische Bund (RSB/IV. Internationale; Revolutionary Socialist Alliance/IVth International) and the internationale sozialistische Linke (isL; international socialist left) and their few members engaged in activities of hardly any note. Nevertheless, Thies Gleiss, a member of the isL, is also a member of the Left Party national party executive.

## 5. Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society)

Founded:	1975
Headquarters:	Göttingen (National Secretariat)
Membership:	5,000 (2007: 4,300) in 40 (2007: 35) local groups
Publications:	<i>DIE ROTE HILFE</i> (Red Aid), quarterly

**RH sees itself as a left-wing organisation that offers protection and solidarity**

The members of the RH are left-wing extremists of varying ideological/political orientations. As outlined in its statutes, the RH defines itself as a "non-partisan, left-wing organisation spanning various movements that provides protection and solidarity". Its "political" work is thus focused on "anti-repression" (see Section IV, 2.).

The RH sees its priority area of activity as providing political and financial support to members of the "left-wing" spectrum where these have committed criminal offences for "political reasons" or have become the victims of "state repression". Upon application, these people are generally given a 50-per cent subsidy towards legal fees and expenses and fines. The organisation spends around half of its revenue from membership fees and donations on such work. The RH also supports demonstrations, organises information and discussion events on topics such as "legal aid" and "state repression", and publishes texts on relevant issues.

In 2008 the RH was mainly involved in a campaign regarding the current "section 129a proceedings", i.e. for the case against the alleged initiators of the "militant campaign" against the 2007 G8

Summit in Heiligendamm (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) to be dropped.

From October to November 2008 the RH, in cooperation with the "Committee against Section 129", organised "information events" across Germany. The events dealt with the case that opened on 17 March 2008 before Stuttgart Higher Regional Court against five members of the Turkish Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front; see Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State [excluding Islamism], Section II, 2.1), which the RH describes as a "political show trial". The RH is here agitating against "repressive developments" in Germany.<sup>139</sup>

**"Day of Action  
for the Release of all  
Political Prisoners"**

On 18 March, the day on which the left-wing extremist scene every year marks the "Day of Action for the Release of all Political Prisoners", a special edition of *DIE ROTE HILFE* (Red Aid) was published as a supplement to the left-wing extremist daily newspaper *junge Welt*. The following is taken from the foreword:

*"The majority of the work that Red Aid has to do today is not directly linked to prison and prisoners. Nevertheless, solidarity with people who are in prison on account of their political convictions and activities is one of Red Aid's core concerns. Prison is still the most conspicuous height of state repression. Locking away political people, the attempt to rob them of all means of taking action and to tear them away from their social environment – that is still the ultimate consequence of political repression."*

(Red Aid website, 27 February 2008)

In response to an interpellation tabled by the Left Party (see 1. above) in the Hesse *Land* parliament, the RH in July 2008 published a statement regarding the draft Tenth Act Amending the Hesse Act on Public Security and Order (*Zehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Hessischen Gesetzes über die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung*).

<sup>139</sup> Published on the Red Aid website, 25 October 2008; published on the website Info tour No. 129, 27 October 2008.

The RH published the following comment in regard to the planned regulation governing the automatic recording of vehicle number plates:

*"Particularly in view of the escalating fervour with which left-wing extremist groups are being investigated and criminalised, this new law would open the floodgates to the mass annulment of basic rights."*  
(statement by the RH national party executive, 21 July 2008)

**Increase in number of members** In the run-up to the national delegates conference in Straussberg (Thuringia) on 20/21 September 2008, the then national executive of the RH admitted that there had been an "extremely positive" increase in its membership. The number of new members by far exceeded the number of members leaving the RH. The continuous growth of – at least paying – members was due to the successful "membership drive" that had been agreed at the last national delegates conference in 2006. However, the group still had to step up its recruitment of new "active" RH members.<sup>140</sup>

#### IV. Areas of activity

##### 1. Anti-fascism

**Most important area of activity for left-wing extremists** "Anti-fascism" continues to be the most important area of activity of left-wing extremist groupings. It is geared only superficially to fighting right-wing extremist activities. Rather, left-wing extremists are fighting the free democratic basic order, what they call a "capitalist system", in order to eliminate the roots of "fascism" that are purportedly intrinsic to this social system. The following is taken from a publication by members of the left-wing extremist scene with a propensity to violence:

*"Anti-fascism was and is for us a suitable approach for simultaneously bringing together left-wing radicals and putting them in a position to act, to intervene in pressing social conflicts, and for educating the public in regard to left-wing radical theory and practice beyond a close-knit circle of left-wingers and across generations. (...) Anti-fascist resistance is above all also a concrete necessity in order to maintain and to fight for the left's room to manoeuvre in society"*

<sup>140</sup> Reader zur Bundesdelegiertenversammlung 2008 (National Delegates Conference 2008: Reader).

*against fascist attacks. (...) Anti-fascism is particularly suited to calling the legitimacy of state action into question and to teaching people about the need for direct forms of action."*

*(Antifaschistisches Info Blatt [Anti-fascist Info Leaflet], No. 79/Summer 2008, p. 38 et seq.)*

More theoretically oriented left-wing extremists focus their "anti-fascist work" on their struggle against the "capitalist system". In a call to take part in an "anti-fascist" demonstration entitled "No peace with Germany and its Nazis" in Bad Lauterberg (Lower Saxony) on 18 January 2008, proponents said:

*"This is not about erroneously dismissing bourgeois society as entirely fascist and thus getting away without having to examine it more closely. Following such an analysis we need to criticise the whole of capitalist society, with all its power structures and regressive elements, and to push ahead with no less than its abolition. Criticism of the so-called 'new Germany' that is merely playing at being cosmopolitan and anti-fascist is the first step in that direction."*

*(göttinger Drucksache, No. 594, 11 January 2008, p. 1)*

**Militant activity** By contrast, more actionistically oriented left-wing extremists focus their activities on direct confrontation with "fascists" and their activities, as well as on confrontation with individuals and right-wing extremist facilities and structures.

One example of this kind of action occurred on the night of 25 August 2008, when unidentified perpetrators set fire to a carport belonging to the deputy chairman of the Barnim/Uckermark NPD Regional Association in Biesenthal (Brandenburg); two vehicles were also damaged. In a statement sent to the *Berliner Zeitung* (Berlin Newspaper), "autonomist groups from brandenburg" claimed responsibility for the attack.

**Mass militancy** Furthermore, violent left-wing extremists often try to prevent or at least to interfere with right-wing extremist marches by using what they call "mass militancy" or small group tactics.

The following are examples of typical militant activities left-wing extremists engage in against right-wing extremists:

- On 19 January 2008 around 1,000 people took part in protests in Frankfurt/Main against a right-wing extremist gathering. Once the protests had ended, a group of around 200 people, some of whom were masked, took part in a spontaneous demonstration. Some of those in the group caused damage to various properties in the city
-

centre. Large rubbish bins were set on fire and several of the windowpanes of one shop were smashed.

- On 1 May 2008 some 6,600 people took part in a demonstration in Hamburg. Up to 1,000 of them had travelled to the city, some of them from abroad. The motto of the demonstration was "Get out and take part in the anti-fascist 1 May – Don't give Nazis an inch". A total of around 2,200 people prepared to use violence took part in the rally. During the demonstration up to 1,200 autonomists separated off and attacked police officers with bottles, stones and fireworks along the route the right-wing extremists were taking. Some of them managed to directly attack right-wing extremists. Individual demonstrators in small groups also caused considerable damage to property. They set fire to barricades, rubbish bins and some cars and also damaged the windows of shops, banks and vehicles used by the right-wing extremists to travel to the city. The police provisionally arrested 50 people and took more than 200 into custody.
- On 20 September 2008, 5,000 people, including several hundred autonomists (e.g. from Berlin, Frankfurt/Main and Nuremberg), directed actions against an "Anti-Islamisation Conference" planned by, among others, the Bürgerbewegung pro Köln e.V. (Citizens' Movement pro Cologne, reg'd society; see Right-Wing Extremist Activities, Section VIII, 2.). The demonstrators, some of whom were masked, tried to remove police cordons, set up barricades, set fire to rubbish bins, and threw stones and petrol bombs at the police. In addition, they tried to steal the officers' service weapons. The night before the conference began, around 2,500 people had already attempted to demonstrate against the event, some of them using violence. Members of the left-wing extremist scene said the protests were a success (see Section II, 1.2).

**Research** Further focal points of "anti-fascist work" are uncovering right-wing extremist structures and outing actual or supposed members of the right-wing extremist scene. As part of what they call "research", left-wing extremists print information in their publications on right-wing extremist functionaries, training facilities, meeting places, "Nazi shops" and other logistical facilities. They also post such information on the Internet in preparation of militant counter-activities.

The following was posted on the Internet in connection with an issue of the research brochure *Antifa-Blickpunkt* (Anti-fascist Perspective) in spring 2008:

*"This brochure is intended to provide committed individuals with assessments and starting points for sustainable, anti-fascist activities, as well as to provide residents and multipliers with information on what right-wing extremist parties in the district are up to."*

(Indymedia Internet platform, 4 March 2008)

**Direct confrontation** Members of the left-wing extremists scene prepared to use violent do not shy away from physically assaulting both actual or purported right-wing extremists:

- On 15 January 2008 several masked perpetrators stormed a "right-wing" shop in Rostock (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) which had already been attacked several times in the past, and punched the owner. They sprayed butyric acid on items of clothing and vandalised the inside of the shop.
  - On the night of 26 April 2008, a group of around 20 members of the autonomist spectrum followed two purported right-wing extremists. They called them "Nazis" and "Faschos" and punched them. One victim was beaten and kicked while lying defenceless on the ground.
  - On 7 November 2008 in Wiesbaden (Hesse) the NPD district chairman was abused by two masked – alleged – members of the violent left-wing extremist scene. She was then hit in the face and kicked in the back several times until she fell to the ground. The victim suffered grazes and bruising to the face.
-

## 2. Anti-repression

- Of key importance to left-wing extremists** "Anti-repression" continues to be key when it comes to the "political" activities of left-wing extremists. Their criticism focuses on what they claim is the steady expansion of the state surveillance apparatus. The "state's frenzy of repression" was primarily directed against the "left" in Germany. In their opinion the state had over the past few months "legalised the curtailing of civil rights in the form of online searches and data retention" and that it had a "strong weapon to use against unpopular groups", namely sections 129 et seqq. of the Criminal Code (StGB).<sup>141</sup>
- Organisers of "Anti-repression Campaign"** The main group responsible for the left-wing extremist "Anti-repression Campaign" is the Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society; see Section III, 5.), the key organiser of events and publisher of relevant publications. In addition, the anti-imperialist initiative Libertad! (Liberty!), which is organised by members of the autonomist scene, is also active in this field. Temporary solidarity groups are formed on a case-by-case basis, for example for the duration of criminal proceedings. Such groups support those who have allegedly suffered state repression. Members of such solidarity groups often belong to autonomist and anti-imperialist groupings. Ahead of demonstrations during which conflicts with the police are to be expected, so-called "investigative committees" are often established as central collecting and coordination points to provide information on "repressive" measures.
- Significant incidents** The following are examples of demonstrations in the field of "anti-repression":
- On 29 January 2008 some 400 people took part in a rally against the 11th European Police Conference in Berlin. The motto of the rally was "Security Costs Us Our Freedom". A broad-based alliance comprising left-wing extremists of various ideological orientations, including autonomists from Hamburg and Berlin, mobilised supporters to take part in the event.
  - On 15 March 2008 some 200 people took part in a demonstration in Berlin organised by autonomist groups. The motto of the demonstration was "Freedom for all Political Prisoners World-

<sup>141</sup> Published on the website *altemeierei* (old dairy-farm), 10 March 2008.

wide". It was part of the annual "Day of Action for the Release of all Political Prisoners" that left-wing extremists mark each year on 18 March.

- On 12 July 2008 several small-scale protest rallies were staged in front of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin and a demonstration was held in Hamburg. Both were in support of an "anti-repression demo" in Tokyo on the same day. The motto was "Fight G8 – Fight Capitalism!" Around 180 autonomists – mainly dressed in black – took part. In Hamburg demonstrators clashed with the police at the end of the rally.

**Solidarity with imprisoned left-wing extremist violent offenders** One main focus of left-wing extremist "anti-repression work" is providing support to imprisoned "comrades". In that context the monthly publication *Gefangenen Info* (Information on Prisoners) provides a forum for various solidarity and support groups. It was published for the first time on 16 February 1989 to provide "information on hunger strikes" on the occasion of the "10th collective hunger strike" of imprisoned members of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction). Imprisoned comrades at home and abroad are given the possibility via this medium of publicising the "repression" they have allegedly suffered.

**Militant perspective** A few militant groups operating in secret also take up the area of activity of "anti-repression" to achieve their goals. The following is taken from an article entitled "G8 Summit and Militancy, Repression and Solidarity", which dealt with the "militant campaign" during the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and the proceedings based on section 129a of the Criminal Code (StGB) against three alleged members of the militante gruppe (mg):

*"Those who, like the critics of the G8, are fighting for a different, better world must reach an understanding about the possible means and ways of achieving that. Those who want to abolish power must fight the Bundeswehr, because it is an instrument of power. Defending and taking up what state repression has set its sights on, enlisting support and standing up for the need for militant practices is a consistent, decisive and aggressive, i.e. militant form of political solidarity."*  
(INTERIM, No. 676, 30 May 2008, p. 21 et seqq.)

**Militant activities** On 5 August 2008 unidentified perpetrators set fire to a refrigerated truck belonging to a food wholesalers in Oranienburg (Brandenburg). The fire spread to another truck; both vehicles were completely destroyed. In a statement sent to the *Berliner Zeitung* on 8 August 2008, an unidentified group calling itself Gruppe FFA (FFA Group)



claimed responsibility for the attack. The statement was only three sentences long and said, among other things, that the company that had been attacked sold "inedible food at very high prices"; the action was an expression of "protest against a system in which private firms make profits by means of incarcerating people". The last sentence in the statement was: "Down with all institutions of coercion".

### 3. Anti-militarism

**"Anti-militarism" again becomes focus of left-wing extremist activity**

The area of activity of "anti-militarism" was forced to take somewhat of a backseat over the past few years on account of supporters being mobilised to take action against the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and emphasis being placed on "anti-fascism". It has now regained in importance within the left-wing extremist scene.

On 23 February 2008 an unnamed group organised an event called "We're really interested in military equipment" at which the "legitimacy for and necessity of anti-militarist resistance and direct intervention in the sense of self-organised disarmament was to be put to the debate".<sup>142</sup> A preparatory "anti-militarist brochure" called for both "open-faced" and "covert" activities to be discussed in order to achieve broad acceptance for militant activities.<sup>143</sup> One of the topics debated at the event attended by around 200 people – mainly from the autonomist scene – was "anti-militarist blockades and sabotage in Europe". Activists from Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany reported on their sometimes militant activities.

On 9 February 2008 around 3,000 people took part in a demonstration co-organised by non-extremists against the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy, which took place in Munich from 8 to 10 February 2008. These included, among others, members of the DKP (see Section III, 2.1), the SDAJ (see Section III, 2.2.1), the MLPD (see Section III, 3.), the FAU (see Section II, 2.) and the Trotskyist RSB/IVth International (see Section III, 4.). Up to 500 violent left-wing extremists formed a "black bloc" of largely peaceful protesters.

Left-wing extremist "anti-militarism" traditionally focuses on the United States, including its allies, and thus also the Federal Republic of

<sup>142</sup> Published on the website [veranstaltung-kriegsgeraet-interessiert-uns-brennend](#) (event-we're-really-interested-in-military-equipment), 28 February 2008.

<sup>143</sup> See footnote 142.

Germany. Against the backdrop of the Bundeswehr's mission in Afghanistan, in particular however in view of the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden on 3/4 April 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the defence alliance, an increase in left-wing extremist agitation and activities in the field of "anti-militarism" was noted from mid-2008 onwards. Left-wing extremists of various ideologies increasingly mobilised their followers to take part in protest actions against the NATO Summit.

**2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden** Initial – at first still unstructured – efforts to mobilise supporters against the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden were already noted following the previous meeting in Bucharest from 2 to 4 April 2008. Several mobilisation movements subsequently arose in the second half of 2008, some of which cooperated with each other:

**"No NATO Campaign"** The "No NATO Campaign" initiated by groups associated with the "peace movement" and by the Bundesausschuss Friedensratschlag (BAF, German Peace Forum), which is influenced by left-wing extremism, held a national working meeting in Frankfurt/Main on 7 September 2008 and on 4/5 October 2008 held an "International Preparatory Conference for NATO Activities". At those events agreement was reached on a large-scale international demonstration, an alternative summit and activities in regard to "civilian disobedience" (e.g. blockades) and a protest camp.<sup>144</sup>

**"Bye-bye NATO" alliance** The "Bye-bye NATO" alliance was founded on the sidelines of the 31st National Conference on Internationalism held in Dortmund from 9 to 12 May 2008. According to information posted on the Internet, it comprises mainly "left-wing to radical left-wing" groups. The alliance comprises organisations from the autonomist spectrum, such as the anti-imperialist initiative Libertad! and the Rote Aktion Kornstrasse (RAK-Hannover, Red Action Kornstrasse), which is part of the Interventionistische Linke (IL, Interventionist Left), the non-extremist anti-globalisation network ATTAC, diverse "groups against nuclear power stations" and groups belonging to the "peace movement".<sup>145</sup>

The IL alliance comprises several groups within the militant autonomist spectrum, several revolutionary Marxist organisations and a few long-term, not exclusively left-wing extremist activists. At its national meeting in Hanover on 5/6 July 2008 the organisation decided to get involved in efforts to mobilise people to protest against

<sup>144</sup> Published on the website clownsfreiheide (clowns' free heath), 16 October 2008.

<sup>145</sup> Published on the website gipfelsoli (summit soli[darity]), 18 August 2008.

the NATO Summit. The goal of "radical" mobilisation was to "delegitimise NATO and the Bundeswehr", to adopt an uncompromising position against war and torture, the "end of solidarity with European and US war efforts" and no "complicity with power".<sup>146</sup>

#### 4. Anti-globalisation

**"Days for Future Prospects" in Berlin** In early 2008 left-wing extremists of various ideologies were involved in the attempt that was also initiated by non-extremists to consolidate the new "momentum and power" that had arisen in the course of protests against the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) so as to capitalise on it in the future when mobilising supporters.<sup>147</sup> At an event entitled "Stay on the ball! What now after Heiligendamm?" held during the "Cross-Spectrum Days for Future Prospects" in Berlin from 17 to 20 January 2008, up to 600 anti-globalisation campaigners, including numerous left-wing extremists, discussed the possibility of "establishing a long-term, effective resistance".<sup>148</sup> They adopted a "Blueprint for a timetable of activities for 2008/2009", although only the beginnings of it were subsequently implemented.<sup>149</sup>

**5th European Social Forum (ESF) in Malmö (Sweden)** The 5th European Social Forum (ESF) took place in Malmö (Sweden) from 7 to 21 September 2008. It was above all intended to serve to network non-extremists and left-wing extremist anti-globalisationists at international level. Whilst the organisers had reckoned with around 20,000 participants, it is believed that only 8,000 to 10,000 people from across Europe attended the meeting.<sup>150</sup> The around 250 seminars, workshops and meetings primarily dealt with socio-political issues. Events were registered by, among others, the DKP, the group Left Youth [solid], the anti-imperialist initiative Libertad! and the Interventionistische Linke (IL), which comprises revolutionary Marxists, non-extremists and groups from the autonomist spectrum.<sup>151</sup> Reports posted on the Internet spoke of a "definitely very small" number of German participants, and apologetically referred to

<sup>146</sup> Published on the website dazwischengehen (get in the way), 18 August 2008.

<sup>147</sup> *analyse & kritik – zeitung für linke Debatte und Praxis* (analysis & criticism – newspaper for left-wing debate and practice), No. 523, 14 December 2007, p. 9 et seq.

<sup>148</sup> Published on the website perspektiventage (days for future prospects), 20 January 2008.

<sup>149</sup> *jW*, No. 17, 21 January 2008, p. 5.

<sup>150</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, No. 223, 22 September 2008, p. 7.

<sup>151</sup> Published on the website esf2008.org, 19 July 2008.

competing events to mobilise supporters that were taking place in Germany;<sup>152</sup> some of the coaches hired to take participants to Malmö were apparently only half full.<sup>153</sup> In a final declaration the "general meeting" of the ESF among other things made reference to the planned protests against the NATO Summit in Baden-Baden and Strasbourg on 3/4 April 2009.

After the event, left-wing extremist critics described the ESF as "a big forum for talking past one another". Participants ranged "from social-democratic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to environmental hippies to revolutionary Marxists", and that had alone made it difficult to find a common denominator – for example in the form of concrete plans to mobilise supporters.<sup>154</sup>

The ESF 2008 Action Network, which is influenced by anarchism, organised the "autonomous spaces" event to run alongside the actual ESF. It was intended to be an "anti-capitalist, radical and autonomous equivalent to the ESF". Several hundred people – mainly from the autonomist spectrum – probably took part.<sup>155</sup>

**2009 G8 Summit in Italy** In regard to the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy, several groups – some of them active in the left-wing extremist area of activity of "anti-repression" – published a joint suggestion in March 2008 regarding an international campaign "Bring down the European security architecture!" The call was not initially discussed within the left-wing extremist spectrum and was then updated in July 2008. The campaign was subsequently to be directed against the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy, against the April 2009 NATO Summit in Baden-Baden and Strasbourg and against the Swedish EU Presidency in the second half of 2009. The goal was to engage in "European anti-repression work" that "went beyond mere criticism and scandalising of police power", that had to take seriously "new forms of social control" "as an integral point of reference for radical movements". The G8 Summit in Italy thus provided a conspicuous "opportunity to publicise and criticise police coordinated action at international level against summit protests".<sup>156</sup>

The discussion of opportunities to "support the movement in Italy against the G8 Summit at local level" was one of the items discussed

---

<sup>152</sup> Published on the website Sozialforum in Deutschland (Social Forum in Germany), 29 September 2008.

<sup>153</sup> Posted on the Indymedia Internet portal, 23 September 2008.

<sup>154</sup> See footnote 153.

<sup>155</sup> Posted on the Indymedia Internet portal, 21 September 2008.

<sup>156</sup> Published on the website gipfelsoli, 22 July 2008.

---

at the "2nd Cross-Spectrum Days for Future Prospects" that were held in Hamburg from 2 to 5 October 2008. No more than 150 people took part in the event, however.<sup>157</sup>

---

<sup>157</sup> Published on the website [perspektiventage](#), 14 October 2008.

---

## **Islamist / Islamist Terrorist Efforts and Suspected Activities**

### **I. Overview**

#### **1. Developments within Islamism**

Germany continues to be part of the worldwide danger area and lies within the immediate focus of Islamist terrorist groupings. The threat posed to German interests at home and abroad remains on a high level.

In the view of violence-prone Islamists, Germany belongs to the supporters of the USA and Israel. Islamists justify their activities with Germany's participation in the worldwide countering of Islamist terrorism. In particular, Germany's involvement in Afghanistan has increasingly come into the focus of Islamist terrorists' attention. Besides, Germany's current security situation is determined by the situation in Iraq and Middle East (see Section II, 1). The situation in these jihad zones also has an influence on Islamists living in Germany.

The Internet serves Islamists and Islamist terrorists as the most important propaganda medium (see Section II, 4). The dissemination of propaganda also in the German-speaking world is directly aimed at influencing the population, in particular at radicalizing Muslims living in Germany. Undeniable are their attempts to especially approach young people / adolescents. In this context, an increasing professionalization of propagandist activities can be established.

Despite the numerous successes in revealing and thwarting attack plans, the international Islamist terrorist spectrum could not be weakened with a lasting effect.

On 9 December 2008, one of the accused in the so-called suitcase bomb trial was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (OLG).

On 2 September 2008, the three suspected Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) adherents arrested in September 2007 were charged before the

---

Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court. The group is accused of having planned explosive attacks in Germany, especially against US targets.

Also Islamist organisations which are not involved in terrorist activities in Germany pose a threat to internal security that is not to be underestimated. These organisations basically aim at replacing the existing state and social systems in their countries of origin by a state strictly based on the Islamic legal system (sharia). Long-term objectives are in some cases the worldwide spread of Islam and the establishment of a global caliphate by simultaneously removing state borders.

One of these organisations, for instance, is Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HuT, Islamic Liberation Party). As its activities are directed against the concept of international understanding and it advocates violence to achieve political aims, HuT has been banned in Germany.

The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Lebanese Hizb Allah ('Party of God') can also be classed as belonging to this spectrum. Both organisations act violently against the state of Israel and deny its right to exist. In 2008, their adherents in Germany mostly kept a low profile as far as public activities were concerned.

Moreover, the adherents of the North Caucasian Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) / Chechen Separatist Movement (CSM), for instance, are striving for an Islamic state independent from the Russian Federation and based on the sharia. So far, the adherents in Germany have only been involved in propaganda and support activities, whereas the CRI/CSM – in its home country – has also spread its combat activities to neighboring regions like the Republic of Ingushetia and the Republic of Dagestan.

Other Islamist groupings, which mostly see themselves as representatives of large parts of the three million Muslims living in Germany, pursue a broader strategy.

They, too, strive to change the power structure in their countries of origin in favor of an Islamic state. At the same time, through a "legalistic" strategy they aim at providing scope for their adherents in the Federal Republic of Germany to lead a life in conformity with the sharia. This modus operandi may contribute to the establishment of parallel societies and initiate radicalization processes.

The Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Millî Görüs, reg'd society) is the Islamist organisation with

---

the largest membership in Germany. The IGMG tries to present itself as an organisation willing to integrate and adhering to the principles of the free democratic basic order. However, its efforts oriented towards strengthening its own religious and cultural identity and protecting itself from assimilation into the German society seem to be capable to foster the development and expansion of Islamist environments in Germany.

The Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD, Islamic Society in Germany, reg'd society) is the organisation with the largest membership of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) adherents in Germany. By exerting influence on politics and society, the IGD tries to make it possible for its adherents to lead a sharia-oriented life.

The transnational mass movement Tablighi Jama'at (TJ) strives for a worldwide "Islamization". Its intensive missionary activities as well as the propagated uncompromising understanding of Islam may develop a disintegrative and radicalizing effect.

Also Salafist preachers may encourage radicalization. In a strict and doctrinaire form, Salafists are orientated towards an idealized role model from the early times of Islam. They call upon their adherents to isolate themselves from non-Muslims as well as from non-Salafist Muslims, who partly are declared infidels. For quite some time, Islam courses have been held by Salafist preachers in Germany. Both the nationwide spreading and the number of training courses held by this group of people has been growing over the last years.

Moreover, these days converts have increasingly attracted attention within the Islamist spectrum in Germany. Current examples are the German national Eric Breininger and the two German members of the so-called Sauerland Group. A particular increase has been determined regarding the converts' percentage of the "homegrown" spectrum (see Section II,1).

## **2. Organisations and followers**

Late in 2008, 29 (2007: 30) Islamist organisations were active on a nationwide level. With 34,720 members/adherents (2007: 33,170) there was a slight increase in the number of Islamists in Germany.

With some 28,580 individuals (2007: 27,920), Turkish groupings made up the largest percentage of adherents. The largest organisation, with

---





## **II. International Islamist terrorism**

### **1. Current developments**

Despite numerous successful search operations, Islamist terrorism still is among the greatest threats posed to the international community of states and to Germany's internal security. Germany is part of the worldwide danger area and lies within the immediate focus of Islamist terrorist groupings.

**Developments in Germany** On 2 September 2008, the Federal Public Prosecutor brought a charge against two Germans and one Turkish national at the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court. The members of the so-called Sauerland Group had been arrested in Medebach-Oberschledorf (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 4 September 2007. The accused i.a. have been charged with membership of a foreign terrorist organisation (Islamic Jihad Union - IJU; see 3.3 below), the preparation of an offense involving the use of explosives resp. conspiracy to commit a murder and an explosives offense. According to the Federal Public Prosecutor, the accused had aimed at carrying out explosive attacks in Germany, in particular on American nationals and facilities. The attacks were to be carried out before the German Parliament's decision on the prolongation of the German Armed Forces' Afghanistan mission on 12 October 2007.

On 18 September and 22 October 2008, one German and two Turkish nationals were arrested in the Frankfurt/Main area, i.a. on suspicion of having supported the IJU by providing equipment and funds. Besides, the arrested persons have been charged with maintaining links to the accused individuals mentioned above.

On 20 November 2008 – against the same background – a German national was extradited from Turkey to Germany. He is said to have i.a. been involved in obtaining a total of 26 detonators seized on 4 September 2007 in the framework of the arrests. On 15 December 2008, the Federal Public Prosecutor charged him at the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court with membership of a terrorist organisation and with preparation of an explosives offense.<sup>158</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> On 22 April 2009, the trial was instituted against the four accused before the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court.

---

On 9 December 2008, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced one of the perpetrators - who had tried to commit attacks on two regional trains of the German Federal Railway (DB) – to life imprisonment for both attempted murder in many cases and for having attempted to cause explosive attacks. His legal defense has lodged an appeal. The attacker's accomplice had already on 18 December 2007 – in Beirut (Lebanon) – been convicted to 12 years imprisonment. The Muhammad cartoons published also in the German media early in 2006 were the decisive motivation for the attempted attacks. The cartoons which had initially been published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in September 2005, had caused vehement – in the Islamic world partly violent – protests.

<b>Complexity of the Islamist terrorist spectrum in Germany</b>	The Islamist terrorist spectrum in Germany ranges from groupings closely linked with Islamist organisations abroad to independent and very small groups or self-motivated perpetrators acting alone. Only in a few cases can an organisational affiliation with al-Qaeda be established.
<b>"Homegrown" networks</b>	<p>Of particular concern are those structures or early stages of structures which are composed of members of the second or third generation of immigrants and of radicalized converts. While the majority of the individuals belonging to this spectrum of perpetrators were born and/or raised in European countries, they oppose our system of values because of religious, social, cultural and psychological factors. A common feature of this circle of individuals is their being influenced by the al-Qaeda ideology which is of a pan-Islamic orientation.</p> <p>"Homegrown" structures pose a special challenge to the security agencies, in particular since the percentage of networks - the members of which for the most part meet "homegrown" criteria - has also in Germany been steadily rising in recent years.</p> <p>Within these networks, the percentage of converts and individuals of Turkish origin has increased.</p>
<b>Radicalization processes</b>	A general course of radicalization and recruitment processes does not exist. In part, the nature and importance of factors conducive to radicalization (e.g. the social situation, cultural background and personality structure) differ significantly. While radicalization processes precede potential recruitments, they do not necessarily lead to terrorist activities.
<b>Terrorist training camps</b>	More recently, an increased number of travel movements of individuals belonging to the Islamist spectrum in Germany towards Pakistan has been established. Some of these individuals are

---

suspected of having undergone terrorist training in the Afghan-Pakistani border area. There are also training camps in the Maghrib. This is i.a. demonstrated by a propaganda video entitled *Be ready!* – posted by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM; see 3.1 below) in a jihadist Internet forum on 29 April 2008. If returning to Germany, this circle of individuals may carry out activities posing a threat to security or endanger German or foreign interests, e.g. in Afghanistan resp. Pakistan. Also members of the Sauerland Group are reported to have stayed at a IJU training camp in the Afghan-Pakistani border area in 2006.

**Developments in Europe** Also in other European countries (i.a. in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Spain) Islamist terrorist structures have been revealed with planned attacks being thwarted. On 12 February 2008, for instance, an attack against one of the Muhammad cartoonists was prevented in Denmark. After the thwarted attack, one of the cartoons was published again by Danish newspapers on 13 February 2008. However, reactions comparable to those of 2006 could not be determined afterwards. In May 2008, in France, the Netherlands and Germany several individuals were arrested on suspicion of supporting Islamist terrorism. In June 2008, individuals of primarily Maghrib origin were arrested in Spain; they are accused of supporting the AQIM.

**Terrorist attacks by Islamist terrorists worldwide** Since the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) was renamed "al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib" in January 2007 and linked up with al-Qaeda, the AQIM has expanded its sphere of action to the neighboring states of Algeria and committed numerous attacks. In August 2008 alone, nearly 20 attacks including seven suicide attacks were carried out, with more than 120 people killed – mainly Algerian police officers and soldiers. At least 50 individuals were injured. Nevertheless, the AQIM has also been focussing on civilians and, increasingly, on foreign citizens.

**Situation in Afghanistan** In 2008, the significance of Afghanistan as the Islamist terrorists' theatre of operations increased again. Several thousand people died in the course of numerous combats and attacks. Also members of the Federal Armed Forces were killed. Three German soldiers died in attacks carried out in Kunduz (North Afghanistan) on 27 August and 20 October 2008. The Taleban claimed responsibility for the attacks on the Internet.

**Situation in Iraq** For the first time since the official fighting in Iraq ceased in May 2003, the country's security situation has largely improved. The number of terrorist attacks in Iraq has considerably decreased since late autumn

---

2007. Besides the coalition forces' (armed forces of the USA and its allies, i.a. Great Britain) and Iraqi security forces' improved concepts of operation, this was due to the decline in conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites – based on religious differences.

The formation of Sunni tribal militias, such as Anbar Awakening, Sahwa Councils or Sons of Iraq in central Iraq has turned out to be an effective means of countering terrorist structures. In their respective tribal areas, these militias – equipped and funded by the coalition forces – have already since mid 2007 been successfully acting against Sunni terrorist structures existing there, in particular against the Salafist jihadist al-Qaeda in Iraq (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidain – TQJ). According to estimations, the number of tribal members regarded as belonging to the Sons of Iraq is more than 70,000. These individuals are to be gradually integrated into the Iraqi security architecture (in particular the police and the National Guard). In November 2008, for the first time members of the "Sons of Iraq" were officially paid salaries by the Iraqi government.

**Al-Qaeda in Iraq** Since October 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq has officially appeared under the name 'Islamic State in Iraq' (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil-Iraq) – a (virtual) Islamist emirate. It considers the militias of the Sons of Iraq – besides the coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces – its greatest enemies. Late in 2007, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the so-called emir of the Islamic State in Iraq, had announced the setting up of specific "combat troops" (al-Siddiq brigade), which in particular were intended to kill the Sunni tribal militias' leadership for being guilty of apostasy (falling away from faith) and betrayal of the Iraqi jihad.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Islamic State in Iraq, al-Baghdadi substantiated the new concept of the enemy in an audio message posted on the Internet on 24 September 2008 ("God's Promise"):

*"By Allah, to kill an apostate is more preferable to me than a hundred Crusaders' heads."*

Thus, the attacks carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq during 2008 were increasingly directed against leading figures of the tribal militias.

Broad sectors within the Sunni terrorist resistance have turned away from al-Qaeda in Iraq. The terrorist groupings which used to co-operate with al-Qaeda in Iraq especially oppose its claim of being the only legitimate representative of Sunni interests. In particular the

nationalist and national Islamist groupings are against any subjugation to its leadership. As a response to the violent efforts of al-Qaeda in Iraq to push through its claim to hegemony, various groupings joined forces in umbrella organisations. Early in September 2007, for instance, the nationalist Jihad and Change Front was set up - with the 1920 Revolution Brigades - as the leading group.

Against the background of these developments, al-Qaeda in Iraq has been faced with serious difficulty for the first time since it was founded in 2004 by the Jordanian national Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaila alias Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. On 7 June 2006, Al-Zarqawi was killed in a well-targeted air attack by the US Armed Forces. Through wrong strategic decisions and violent acts directed against the population, his successor, the Egyptian national Ayyub al-Masri alias Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who holds the position of "war minister" within the organisation, has also contributed to the current situation of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Nevertheless, the crucial strategic guidelines are still set by al-Masri and his immediate leaders. The interests of these so-called Foreign Fighters, who are convinced advocates of the global jihad, are – unlike those of the local fighters of al-Qaeda in Iraq – not only limited to Iraq.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in Iraq being forced onto the defensive has increasingly fallen back on female suicide attackers. The women in Iraq, who are veiled by tradition, are capable of hiding the explosive belt under their clothes, and they are only insufficiently controlled by the chiefly male security staff.

In particular, the intention of al-Qaeda in Iraq to unite the whole Sunni terrorist "resistance" under its leadership resulted in a decline in international support of the jihad in Iraq. This is reflected by a downward trend in funding and in providing logistics as well as by the decreasing number of volunteers willing to join the jihad.

However, Islamists and jihadists worldwide regard the coalition forces' prolonged presence in Iraq as "western belligerence". With reference to an alleged duty to defend the Islamic world – supposed to be threatened by the "infidel crusaders" – they continue to vehemently call for waging the jihad in Iraq, which partly has a substantial radicalizing and mobilizing effect on young Muslims worldwide.

---

**Recruitment networks in Germany for the jihad in Iraq** Various Islamist terrorist networks active in Germany render support to the "resistance" in Iraq through occasional recruitment activities and the smuggling of humans as well as through funds. But the number of "jihadists" recruited by them is rather low – compared to the "volunteers" from the Middle East.

**Situation in Yemen** In the first six months of 2008, it could be established that the Jund al-Yemen Brigades (JaYB) – the suspected operational arm of al-Qaeda in Yemen – were gaining strength. I.a. institutions of the Yemeni oil industry moved into their target spectrum. On 30 May 2008, an attack on a refinery in Aden was carried out and on 25 July 2008 a suicide attack on a police station in Sayun.

The attack directed against the American Embassy in Sanaa on 17 September 2008, which claimed at least 16 lives, has made it obvious that also western interests are in the JaYB's focus. The Yemeni authorities' executive measures in the early autumn of 2008 resulted in the organisation's weakening.

**Situation in Lebanon** In Lebanon, the security situation remains tense. While in mid-2007, the organisational structure of the Islamist terrorist Fatah al-Islam (FaI) was mainly broken up in the framework of violent clashes with the Lebanese army in the Palestinian refugee camp "Nahr al-Barid", Salafist groupings attracted attention through several attacks against the Lebanese army in 2008.

## 2. Al-Qaeda (The Base)

Founded:	In the mid-1980s
Leader:	Usama BIN LADIN
Members/adherents in Germany:	No exact figures available

Over the past years, the organisational form and structure of al-Qaeda founded by Usama Bin Ladin was subject to continuous change. At present, al-Qaeda seems to be pursuing a dual strategy: on the one hand, through numerous propagandist activities it is acting as a "virtual" organisation giving impetus to those actually involved in activities; on the other hand, it is increasingly striving to restore its

operational capacity to act. By means of terrorist attacks and calls for waging the violent jihad, al-Qaeda is aiming at implementing its main objectives, namely to suppress western influence on Muslim countries and to bring down the governments in Middle East and North Africa which al-Qaeda considers "apostates". Worldwide, it has adherents who follow al-Qaeda's ideology; the number, however, is difficult to assess.

A centrally oriented leadership by Core al-Qaeda – especially represented by Bin Ladin and his deputy al-Zawahiri – continues to be very difficult due to Bin Ladin's and al-Zawahiri's constant escapes, however, in recent years the Afghan-Pakistani border area has more and more become a planning and training base for al-Qaeda and its associated groupings.

Numerous successful search operations in countering international Islamist terrorism have continuously put al-Qaeda under pressure. For instance, in April 2008 American authorities confirmed the death of the high-ranking al-Qaeda operative Abu Ubaida al-Masri in Pakistan. On 28 July 2008, the explosives expert Abu Khabab al-Masri was killed in an attack carried out by the US Armed Forces and was later publicly praised as a "martyr" by Mustafa Ahmad Abu al-Yazid – the person then responsible for "al-Qaeda in Afghanistan". According to press reports, Al-Yazid himself was killed in August 2008 during fighting with the Pakistani armed forces.

**New Internet messages** In 2008, as in the years before, the al-Qaeda leaders made several statements.

On 19 March 2008, Bin Ladin addressed the "wise men of the European Union" in an audio message which mainly dealt with the republication of the Muhammad cartoons in Europe. Bin Ladin considered them "part of a new crusade".

In an audio message published on 16 May 2008 on the occasion of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the "Israeli occupying state", Bin Ladin blamed the media for their inadequate objectivity in the coverage of the Middle East conflict and announced the continuation of the fighting "against the Israelis and their allies".

On 4/5 June 2008, an audio message was published, in which al-Zawahiri in particular elaborated on the situation in Palestine. In the framework of an "open interview" (see 4 below) published on the Internet, al-Zawahiri was asked numerous critical questions about al-Qaeda's commitment in the "Palestine issue".

---



In a video of 16 August 2008 – entitled *A message from Sheikh Aiman al-Zawahiri* – al-Zawahiri directly addressed the "Pakistani armed forces and the Pakistani people". A new phenomenon of this message was the use of the English language – initially referred to by al-Zawahiri as "the enemies' language". Nonetheless, al-Zawahiri regards the use of the English language<sup>159</sup> as an effective means to directly communicate with the Pakistani people.

**Arrests and convictions** On 24 January 2008, a German-Moroccan national was sentenced by the Schleswig Higher Regional Court to five years and nine months' imprisonment. The Court considered it proven that the accused had supported a foreign terrorist association (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and founded a foreign terrorist association under the umbrella of al-Qaeda, with the aim of carrying out terrorist attacks in Sudan.

On 19 June 2008, the Celle Higher Regional Court sentenced an Iraqi national, who had been living in Germany since 1996, to three years' imprisonment for approaching individuals and recruiting members or supporters of the foreign terrorist associations al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Court considered it proven that the accused had spread statements issued by the leaders of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in Iraq – i.a. by Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri – in a jihadist chatroom.

In the reasons for the judgment, the Celle Higher Regional Court underlined the importance of the Internet as a propaganda platform to al-Qaeda and its activities. As it was stated, in particular the chatrooms serve to radicalize and recruit new members or supporters and through his activities the accused individual acted as a disseminator on behalf of al-Qaeda.

On 24 September 2008, the Schleswig Higher Regional Court sentenced a Moroccan national to four years' imprisonment for aiding the setting-up of a terrorist association abroad and for supporting the foreign terrorist association al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Court found the accused guilty of having participated in the recruitment and smuggling of Islamist fighters from Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of their getting involved in Iraq.

On 1 December 2008, a trial was instituted before the Koblenz Higher Regional Court against a German national of Pakistani origin, i.a. for membership of a foreign terrorist association. He is accused of having recruited individuals for being trained in al-Qaeda camps in the

---

<sup>159</sup> Besides Urdu, English is the official language in Pakistan.

Afghan-Pakistani border area as well as of having provided funds and logistic support to the organisation.

On 12 September 2008, a Turkish national who is said to have assisted the accused in obtaining cash and equipment, had been arrested.

### **3. Regional mujahidin groupings**

Besides al-Qaeda under Bin Ladin's leadership, international Islamist terrorism also comprises mujahidin who primarily see themselves as members of regional Islamist organisations and groupings. These groupings are especially active in Central and Southeast Asia as well as in the Maghrib. Through personal contact, there are links with other mujahidin networks. Moreover, structures have to be mentioned which are not directly but ideologically affiliated with the aforementioned organisations and which have been operating in small or very small groups.

#### **3.1 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM)**

Founded:	In Algeria, late in the 1990s
Leader:	Abdalmalik Darduqal alias Abu Mus'ab Abdalwadud alias Drukdal
Members/adherents in Germany:	No exact figures available

Late in the 1990s, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Call and Combat) had splintered off from the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group). In 2003, the GSPC was i.a. responsible for the kidnapping of 32 tourists, including 16 Germans, in the South of Algeria.

After the GSPC had been trying to approach al-Qaeda in ideological respects for quite a while, GSPC's joining of al-Qaeda was officially stated on 11 September 2006. Since January 2007, it has called itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM). Since it joined al-Qaeda, it has been applying new attack strategies, which in particular include

---

suicide attacks and a target spectrum that has been extended to foreign nationals and institutions.

For instance, the AQIM first used suicide attackers in April 2007 when carrying out attacks in Algiers and Casablanca. The AQIM applied this modus operandi with a total of 16 attacks, the last time in September 2008.

Furthermore, the attacks were increasingly directed against western foreigners or enterprises in Algeria.

In June 2008, for instance, during an attack on a French construction firm, a French employee was killed. On 20 August 2008, eleven Algerian workers died in an attack directed against a Canadian company.

Examples for the "internationalization" of AQIM's sphere of action are the attack on a building of the United Nations (UN) in Algiers on 11 December 2007 and the shooting at the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott (Mauretania) on 1 February 2008.

However, the Algerian state and security machinery still constitutes AQIM's main target of attacks, as it was illustrated by the wave of attacks carried out against Algerian police and military facilities in August 2008. On 19 August 2008, for instance, at least 50 police officers were killed in a suicide attack on one of the largest police barracks in Algeria.

### **3.2 Ansar Al-Islam Group (AAI, 'Defenders of Islam')**

Founded:	In Northern Iraq, in December 2001, as the successor organisation of Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam)
Leader:	Abu Abdallah al-Shafi'i alias Abu Abdallah al-Hasan Bin Mahmud
Members/adherents in Germany:	No exact figures available

In 2001, the AAI emerged from an amalgamation of various Kurdish splinter groups in Northern Iraq with a Salafist jihadist orientation. After having repeatedly been renamed, last – in the summer of 2006 –

in Ansar al-Sunna Group, it has again appeared as AAI since late November 2007.

Since autumn 2003, the AAI has considered itself part of the Sunni terrorist "resistance" in Iraq. Its original objective, the setting-up of an Islamic state in the Kurdish part of Iraq, was initially pushed into the background. The AAI has largely adapted itself to the objectives of the Sunni terrorist "resistance", the activities of which have primarily been focused on both the fighting against the coalition forces and the violent elimination of the state of Iraq.

In an audio message of 18 November 2007, the so-called Emir of the AAI, Abu Abdallah al-Shafi'i alias Abu Abdallah al-Hasan Bin Mahmud, substantiated the following objectives:

*We will continue our struggle against the American occupying forces and their supporters until we have purged the Muslims' country of its atrocities and restored the umma's pride and honor.*  
("Jihadist" Internet forum, 7 December 2007)

Also the fight against secular Kurdish parties – referred to by the AAI as the coalition forces' "collaborators" – continues to be an objective of the AAI.

In a statement of 20 March 2008, al-Shafi'i praised the jihad which the mujahidin had waged in Iraq thus far:

*Five years have passed and the flames of the war are still burning – the war between right and wrong, in which the brave mujahidin with their heroic deeds have gone down in history and the country of glory has been soaked in their blood.*  
("Jihadist" Internet forum, 20 March 2008)

The AAI, like most of the Sunni terrorist structures operating in Iraq, has a propaganda division, which regularly disseminates statements – made on the leadership level – in Internet forums. In May 2008, the AAI announced the founding of the media organisation al-Ansar. AAI's propaganda work plays an important part in enabling the organisation to provide orientation and an ideological role model to its adherents – also in Germany.

**Adherents of the AAI in Germany** AAI's adherents in Germany who are almost exclusively of Kurdish origin mostly orient themselves towards the guidelines of the terrorist core group in Iraq. They support the core group's objectives in particular through the provision of funds (mainly fundraising campaigns) and the transfer of the money to Iraq. Besides the actual

---

financial support, the donations transferred from Germany have also a symbolic significance. They illustrate that the AAI adherents in Germany still have close links with the core group in Iraq and identify themselves with its objectives. However, it has been determined that isolated cases of recruitment of "volunteers" for the jihad waged by the core group in Iraq have further declined; the AAI seems to have a sufficient number of "fighters".

The regional focuses of AAI's adherents in Germany are in particular in southern Germany as well as in North Rhine-Westphalia. Besides, almost across the whole of Germany there are a lot of single individuals sympathizing with the AAI.

However, also through the measures which have increasingly been introduced by the German security agencies since late in 2003 a further development and strengthening of the AAI adherent scene's structures could successfully be counteracted.

**Criminal  
proceedings against  
AAI adherents in  
Germany**

AAI's violent activities have so far been limited to Iraq. Nonetheless, a threat posed to Germany's internal security by AAI adherents who have been living in Germany or have returned from Iraq is still existing. This is demonstrated by the attack planning in the context of the state visit made by the former Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to Berlin in December 2004. On 15 July 2008, the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court sentenced three AAI adherents from Berlin, Stuttgart and Augsburg to seven years and six months' resp. eight and ten years' imprisonment for membership of a foreign terrorist association in concurrence with their involvement in the planned assassination of Allawi.

### **3.3 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)**

Founded:	In 2002
Leader:	Nazhmiddin Zhalolov
Members/adherents in Germany:	No exact figures available

The IJU is a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); it first appeared in 2002. After the IJU initially concentrated on setting up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, meanwhile it has extended

its sphere of activity also to Europe – for the purpose of the global jihad.

IJU's founding members had already in the 1990s fought against the Uzbek government but had due to its countermeasures been driven to the Afghan-Pakistani border area, where they formed an alliance with the Taleban and got involved in their combat in Afghanistan. Through joint stays in terrorist training camps, the IJU also established contact with Pakistani groupings and the Core al-Qaeda.

By the suicide attacks directed against the Israeli and American Embassies in the Uzbek capital Tashkent on 30 July 2004, the IJU for the first time acted against western facilities.

Also Germany has come into the focus of that grouping's attention. In North Rhine-Westphalia, on 4 September 2007, three suspected IJU members were arrested, who are said to have planned explosive attacks directed in particular against American nationals and facilities (see 1 above). Then, on 11 September 2007, on an IJU-oriented website, the IJU called the arrested individuals "brothers" and announced further attacks against the USA and its allies.

One example is the suicide attack on a US military base in the east of Afghanistan, which was carried out by the German-born Turkish national Cüneyt Ciftci on 3 March 2008. On the Internet, in mid-March 2008 the IJU claimed responsibility for that attack, in which five people were killed.

Just like Ciftci, the German convert Breininger was in contact with the Sauerland Group. Early in September 2007, Breininger went to Cairo for language studies and from there probably on to a terrorist training camp. On 28 April 2008, two videos showing Breininger – suspected to be released by the IJU – were published on the Internet. In one of these videos, he spoke German and called for waging the violent jihad. This was followed by an interview with Breininger on the Internet on 23 May 2008, during which he justified possible attacks in Germany or against German interests abroad by Germany's military presence in Afghanistan. On 21 October 2008, Breininger stated in the video message *Call from Hindu Kush* that Germany would be a target of attacks as long as German troops were deployed in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. The message was posted on a website considered to be oriented towards the IJU.

---

#### 4. Use of the Internet

The Internet is the most important communication and propaganda medium for Islamists and Islamist terrorists. The chances offered by this medium to set up "virtual" networks are actively used by jihadists and their sympathizers by establishing contact with like-minded individuals through discussion forums and chatrooms and communicating with each other via open or closed forums. The propaganda spread via the Internet can also initiate and foster radicalization processes. In an anonymous way, contacts can be established, ideological and military training courses can be offered and undergone and the way can be paved for recruitment.

On relevant websites, facts and events are made subjects of discussion beyond their own regional and linguistic areas. Many of the statements posted on the Internet also establish these global links. Both the propaganda disseminated on the Internet and the "virtual" networks forming there contribute to the circumstance that activists and sympathizers of the global jihad can see themselves as part of a sole movement, even if occasionally its objectives and motivation strongly differ from each other. What they have in common, however, is the fact that they ideologically orient themselves towards al-Qaeda.

**Dissemination of propaganda** For the purpose of publishing their propaganda on the Internet, jihadist groupings use a dissemination system that has been working well for several years yet. An important role in this context plays the media center al-Fajr, which has existed since 2006. It has acted as a central publication office for the most important jihadist groupings. This spectrum includes Core al-Qaeda's publications, in particular Bin Ladin's and al-Zawahiri's video messages as well as other propaganda films produced by al-Qaeda's own media production unit al-Sahab. Moreover, al-Fajr i.a. disseminates the publications of al-Qaeda in Iraq (see 1 above), AQIM (see 3.1 above) and AAI (see 3.2 above).

Al-Fajr does not have its own Internet presence. The media center rather makes use of several jihadist websites – authorized by itself – in particular jihadist discussion forums. Specific "correspondents" have exclusively been commissioned to post the material made available by al-Fajr in these forums. Thus, al-Fajr tries to ensure the authenticity of the released material. The various organisations transmit the material in a conspiratorial way to al-Fajr, most probably also via the Internet. Both the individuals behind al-Fajr and the "correspondents" involved remain

anonymous. Since this dissemination system seems to function reliably, jihadist groupings increasingly refrain from maintaining their own websites.

**Use of non-Islamist Internet providers** Besides, the scene of the jihadists' sympathizers makes use of non-Islamist Internet providers for disseminating their propaganda. In online contact networks or on video platforms, postings of jihadist groupings and their leaders as well as an increasing amount of propaganda material produced by sympathizers themselves can be found. The mass dissemination of relevant video material is favored by storage capacity made available by commercial providers which can be used anonymously and free of charge. Jihadist propaganda videos are partly stored there on hundreds of different locations so that permanent availability is ensured in case various websites should fail.

**Formats and content of jihadist propaganda** For disseminating jihadist propaganda on the Internet, manifold formats are being used. At regular intervals, videos, audio files, online magazines and online books are published. The publications i.a. include manuals and instructions for ideological and military training, claims of responsibility and statements of jihadists distancing themselves from attacks, interviews with leaders or members of jihadist groupings as well as tributes paid to so-called martyrs. Via interactive areas like discussion forums, chatrooms and visitors' books, members can provide material, spread information and make comments on their own.

Recently, in some Internet forums the users have been requested to submit questions which a senior jihadist ideologist is going to deal with. One example in this context is the "Open dialogue with Sheikh Aiman al-Zawahiri" called for by four al-Qaeda-oriented forums from December 2007 to January 2008. Al-Zawahiri answered the questions in two video messages in the spring of 2008 – a period of time which all in all was characterized by intensified jihadist propaganda activities on the Internet.

Just like other forum contributions, video and audio messages, also al-Zawahiri's answers provided insight into issues dealt with by users of jihadist websites and forums. Specific references to Europe were revealed by the categorical condemnation of the republished Muhammad cartoons (see 1 above), which – regarded as an insult to the Prophet – were instrumentalized again by al-Zawahiri for propagandistic purposes. In addition, al-Zawahiri underlined the significance which al-Qaeda attached to the media work and

---



commented on the situation in various regions of the Islamic world. Besides, inter-Islamic discourse and disagreement were dealt with. For instance, al-Zawahiri, gave his views on various Islamist groupings and criticized Iran as well as some Islamic scholars.

The disapproval of the established media, in particular in western but also in Muslim states, is a repeating issue in jihadist propaganda. These media are to be opposed with a particular jihadist "coverage" and media world by postings on the Internet. This criticism also formed the basis of the al-Sahab video entitled *Seven Years of Crusades and the Outcomes* – released on the occasion of the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

**Current tendencies of jihadist propaganda** Regarding the quality, the variety of languages and the content of jihadist Internet propaganda, new tendencies can be seen to emerge. On the whole, a professionalization of propaganda has become perceptible. In particular, the video messages of jihadist groupings have been produced in a more and more complex way and at higher quality. An intensified dissemination of propaganda in various languages has also become obvious. On the one hand, this has become apparent in discussion forums which besides Arabic-language areas also include e.g. English, French and Turkish ones. On the other hand, statements of jihadist groupings have quite promptly been translated into various languages. Turkish-language websites and forums have increasingly been gaining in importance .

As far as the content is concerned, new focuses can be determined, e.g. the production of so-called martyr videos in which members and leaders of jihadist groupings who died a martyr's death are praised and their biographies and – especially in the case of AQIM – their stays in training camps are portrayed. Another issue of focal interest which in particular is reflected in the statements made by the AQIM, the Taleban, the al-Qaeda leaders Abu Yahya al-Libi and al-Zawahiri, is the dismissal of accusations against jihadist organisations that they accept civilian casualties in attacks.

An increase in jihadist propaganda activities on the Internet could be established especially with the Taleban and the IJU (see 3.3 above). While the IJU makes use of Turkish-language websites for disseminating its propaganda, the Taleban resort to both Arabic and Turkish Internet forums – besides their own multilingual website. Last year, the Somali movement of the "Young Mujahidin" (Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin) appeared on the scene as the new protagonist disseminating numerous messages on jihadist websites.

Also with regard to the target groups, new tendencies have been determined. Although the jihadist Internet community, as a whole, is considered dominated by men, the women's presence and the discussion of their role in the violent jihad have intensified, in particular in the propaganda disseminated via Turkish and Caucasian websites. Moreover, pictures and video recordings – showing children trained by jihadist groupings in camps to become prepared for the armed struggle – were repeatedly presented on jihadist websites.

**Increase in  
Germany-related  
references**

In 2008, Germany-related references in Islamist publications increased. Some of the videos ascribed to the IJU show German sequences and German subtitles, in which "the brothers in Germany, Austria and Switzerland" are addressed. Besides, the German convert Breininger repeatedly called upon the Muslims in Germany to support the violent jihad (see 3.3 above). In a video posted in various jihadist Internet forums on 21 October 2008, Breininger responded to the German media coverage of him and stated that Germany would be a target of attacks as long as German soldiers were stationed in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

In several videos produced by the IJU, the preparation and implementation of the suicide attack in Afghanistan carried out by Ciftci, a German national of Turkish origin, was documented (see 3.3 above).

The Taleban published letters claiming responsibility for attacks against the Federal Armed Forces in Afghanistan – with often exaggerated statements on victims and property damage.

In 2008, a further increase in translations of jihadist propaganda – mostly from Arabic – into German could be determined. In this context, the activities of the German-language branch of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) are of special significance. In March and November 2007, the GIMF had attracted publicity through the release of threatening videos in which Germany and Austria had been called upon to withdraw their soldiers from Afghanistan. In that context, i.a. the individual responsible for the German-language GIMF and his wife had been arrested and – in Austria in March 2008 – sentenced to up to four years' imprisonment. However, the German-language GIMF was still active on the Internet in 2008.

## 5. Chart of particular Islamist terrorist attacks

Date	Incident	Casualties
26 February 1993	Bomb attack on the New York World Trade Center, the attack is linked with al-Qaeda	6 dead, more than 1,000 injured
7 August 1998	Attacks on the US embassies in Daressalam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya); attacks are attributed to regional al-Qaeda structures	223 dead, more than 4,000 injured
12 October 2000	Bomb attack on the US Navy destroyer <i>USS Cole</i> in the port of Aden (Yemen); the attack is linked with al-Qaeda	17 dead, 39 injured
11 September 2001	Suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the US Defense Ministry carried out by suspected al-Qaeda members	c. 3,000 dead, including 10 German nationals, c. 6,000 injured
11 April 2002	Attack on a synagogue located on the holiday island of Djerba (Tunisia); al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for that attack in June 2002	21 dead, including 14 German nationals, 24 injured
12 October 2002	Attacks on a discotheque and café in the Kuta seaside resort of Bali (Indonesia); the attack is linked with al-Qaeda	More than 200 dead, including 6 German nationals, more than 330 injured
28 November 2002	Suicide attack on a Mombasa (Kenya) hotel with mainly Israeli tourists; the attack is linked with al-Qaeda	16 dead, c. 80 injured
16 May 2003	Bomb attacks in Casablanca (Morocco)	41 dead, c. 100 injured

Date	Incident	Casualties
5 August 2003	Bomb attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (Indonesia); the mastermind behind that attack had links to al-Qaeda“	13 dead, c. 150 injured
11 March 2004	Bomb attacks on four suburban trains in Madrid	191 dead, c. 1,600 injured, including 1 German national
7 July 2005	Suicide attacks on three underground trains and one bus in London	56 dead, 528 injured, including 5 German nationals
2 June 2008	Suicide attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad (Pakistan)	8 dead, 15 injured
26 - 29 November 2008	Attacks on India's financial metropolis Mumbai; the attacks are linked with the Pakistani Islamist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT – Army of the Pure)	172 dead, including 3 Germans, 295 injured, including 3 Germans

### III. Islamism

#### 1. Of Arab origin

##### 1.1 Hizb Allah (Party of God)

Founded:	In Lebanon in 1982
Leadership:	Group of functionaries, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah
Members/ adherents in Germany:	900 (2007: 900)
Publications:	I.a. <i>al-Ahd</i> (The Commitment), published weekly (only in Lebanon); <i>al-Manar</i> (The Lighthouse), TV station (Beirut)
Ban on the activities of <i>al-Manar</i> in Germany:	Ban order issued on 29 October 2008

**Aims** The Shiite Hizb Allah was founded on Iran's initiative in 1982, following the invasion of Israeli military forces into Lebanon. Given their shared antagonism towards Israel, Iran and Syria intended to firmly establish the Hizb Allah in the political spectrum in Lebanon by means of their support. Both states have been exerting a financial and political influence on the organisation to this day. The organisation which initially had few members and was composed of different splinter groups quickly developed into a militant collective movement of radical Shiites. The Hizb Allah denies Israel's right to exist. Its most important objective is the armed fight against Israel as the "wrongful occupier of Palestinian territory", including also terrorist means. The initial aim of turning Lebanon into a republic following the Iranian example seems to have been pushed to the background by a rather pragmatic domestic Lebanese policy.

**Activities** In terms of domestic policy, the Hizb Allah therefore increasingly concentrates on its work in the Lebanese parliament, which it has been part of since 1992. The military wing of Hizb Allah, Al Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance), continues to play an

important role, though. It has been held responsible for several terrorist attacks carried out on Iran's instructions as well as for the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

**Killing of Imad Mughniya** On 12 February 2008, the head of the al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, Imad Mughniya, was killed by a car bomb in Damascus (Syria). It is still unknown who arranged for the attack. In a video speech shown during the mourning ceremony, Hassan Nasrallah not only accused Israel of arranging for the attack but openly threatened that there would be a – worldwide – retaliatory act.

*Our war with Israel takes place in our country, in Lebanon. The Israelis have crossed the borders by killing Mughniya outside of Lebanon. If Israel wants an open war, then let it be an open war, and the entire world is to listen to this.*

(Al-Manar broadcast of 14 February 2008)

On 16 July 2008, there was an "exchange of prisoners" between Israel and the Hizb Allah, during which Israel released five Hizb Allah fighters, including one terrorist convicted because of murder in several cases, in return for the handing over of two soldiers who had been kidnapped and killed by the Hizb Allah. The soldiers had been kidnapped during an attack against a military patrol in the Lebanese-Israeli border region in July 2006, which was followed by armed clashes between Israel and Lebanon. The Hizb Allah propagated the exchange of prisoners as a victory over Israel. During the welcome ceremonies held for the released, Nasrallah said: "This people will never be defeated".

**Activities of Hizb Allah adherents in Germany** The c. 900 adherents of the Hizb Allah in Germany have continued to keep a low profile as far as publicity actions are concerned, in order not to move into the focus of the security agencies. There were isolated and small-scale "victory celebrations" on the occasion of the anniversary of the Israeli army's withdrawal from Lebanon which is celebrated as the "Day of the Liberation" on 23 May. Also this year, some of these events were attended by Hizb Allah representatives of the Lebanese parliament.

**Ban imposed on the activities of the al Manar TV station** The Hizb Allah spreads its anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish propaganda i.a. via the Lebanese TV station al Manar which can also be received in Germany. Since the TV station's activities violate German criminal laws and are directed against the idea of international understanding, a ban on al Manar's activities in Germany was imposed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior with effect from 29 October 2008.

## 1.2 Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT, Islamic Liberation Party)

Founded:	In Jerusalem in 1953
Leader:	Ata Abu al-Rashta alias Abu Yasin (since April 2003)
Members/ adherents in Germany:	350 (2007: 300)
Publications:	<i>al-Khilafa</i> (The Caliphate; English/Arabic), <i>Hilafet</i> (The Caliphate; Turkish) and <i>Köklü Degişim</i> (Fundamental Change; Turkish), <i>al-Waie</i> (Consciousness; Arabic), <i>Expliciet</i> (Explicit; Dutch)
Banned in Germany:	With effect from 10 January 2003

The Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiaddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977), whose publication *Nizam al-Islam* (The system of Islam) is the ideological foundation of the organisation. From the viewpoint of the organisation, which considers itself to be a political party, Islam definitely settles all matters relating to society, politics and economy, but also those of everyday life:

*Islam alone is the effective solution (...)*  
(Leaflet of 7 October 2008 on a HuT website)

**Aims** The aim of the pan-Islamically oriented HuT is the unification of the Islamic community (umma) to form a single state and the abolition of the current national state borders:

*"The Muslim Ummah now needs a new political thinking and direction. It requires a new leadership that will unify the Ummah and utilize her resources to address these countless problems. This one day conference will address the obligation of unifying the Ummah under one leadership and discuss how political unity is the only practical way forward for the Muslim Ummah."*

(leaflet of the HuT Great Britain of 1 August 2008 on one of its websites dealing with its event in London on 16 August 2008: "Khilafah – The Need For Political Unity")

*"The economic chaos in the Muslim world can only be solved by establishing the Khilafah State."*

(Leaflet of 18 July 2008 on a HuT website)

This state under the leadership of the Caliph (Caliphate) is to be based on the Islamic legal system (Sharia):

*"Let Muslims establish the Sharia in their own lands!"*

(Declaration on a HuT website, 8 February 2008)

So-called administrative districts (wilayat) are to replace the national states in the Caliphate. Already today, the party has divided its sphere of activity into such administrative districts, among them e.g. the wilaya of Europe, the independent wilayat of Great Britain and Denmark and the wilayat of Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq.

A legal and social order based on the will of the people is rejected by the Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami.

*The participation in the National Council elections (comment: in Austria) is prohibited and constitutes a serious sin in Islam.*

(Leaflet of 26 September 2008 on a HuT website)

By denying the state of Israel's right to exist and considering the "liberation" of that territory one of its priority aims, the HuT contradicts the idea of international understanding. Due to its strong anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist basic attitude, the organisation also considers the use of violence a legitimate means:

*"Thousands of Muslims from across the UK marched today in London. The demonstrators issued a strong call to the armies of the Muslim world to move to defend the people of the region from the ongoing Israeli massacre that has been tacitly supported by Western governments and the dictators of the Muslim world. (...) Demonstrators condemned the rulers of the Muslim world for their complicity in Israel's crimes through their silence and inaction and called for the armies of Muslim countries to defend the people from this massacre and unify the Muslim world through the re-establishment of the Islamic Khilafah."*

(Declaration on a HuT website, 22 October 2006)

The HuT demands the "liberation" of the Muslim society from Western influence and therefore turns not only against the USA and its allies but also against most of the regimes of the Arab world, accusing them of collaborating with the West against their own population and of giving away the doctrines and regulations of Islam. These "states of

---



unbelief" ("kufr states"), according to the HuT, have to be fought against:

*Ever since, the Western colonial powers have been trying to propagate the myth of the human rights as the truth. Within these 60 years, though, Europe and the USA were responsible for the most brutal crimes violating the human rights. These also include the human rights violations committed by their vassals whom they have deployed in many different countries and whose dictatorships they have backed.*

(Declaration on a HuT website, 12 October 2008)

**3-phase model** The unification of the umma and the re-establishment of the Caliphate are to be implemented in three phases. The first phase is meant to be characterized in particular by recruiting new members, the second by educating the umma according to the HuT doctrines. For that purpose, the organisation is making particular use of the Internet in order to massively spread its own propaganda, e.g. in the form of leaflets or other publications. The third phase is meant to be characterized by a social revolution leading to the assumption of power and the establishment of the Caliphate.

**Activities abroad** The HuT carries out numerous activities abroad like demonstrations, some of them with large numbers of participants, and multinational conferences. In addition, the organisation tries to influence governments and other decision-makers, e.g. by means of "open letters" and by dispatching delegations.

**Ban in Germany** With effect from 10 January 2003, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) prohibited the HuT from carrying out its activities on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, i.a. because of its aims being directed against the idea of international understanding and because of its approving of violence as a means to achieve its political goals. Until the imposition of the ban, the Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami's activities mainly consisted of organizing lectures, participating in demonstrations and carrying out leaflet campaigns. The target group of the public relations work done mainly in university towns, many times leading to the recruitment of new members, was chiefly composed of students and academics.

Although the HuT has not appeared in public since it was banned in Germany, its activities, which it continues to carry out in other countries, extend to Germany via the Internet.

### 1.3 HAMAS (Harakat Al-Muquawama Al Islamiya, Islamic Resistance Movement)

Founded:	In the Gaza strip / today's autonomous Palestinian territory early in 1988
Leader:	Khaled MASHAL (headquarters: Damascus/Syria), Isma'il Haniya (headquarters: Gaza strip)
Members/ adherents in Germany:	300 (2007: 300)

HAMAS was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in early 1988, as the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB; see 1.4 below). In its Charta, dating from the same year, the organisation professes its commitment to the aim of establishing an Islamic state on the whole territory of "Palestine" – also by means of an armed fight. By "Palestine", HAMAS understands the area between the Mediterranean and the river Jordan, which includes the whole territory of the state of Israel.

Although HAMAS can be considered a coherent structure<sup>160</sup>, three HAMAS wings can be distinguished: The organisation is led by the political wing. Besides, there are the Izzaddin al-Qassam brigades as the military wing, which is responsible for numerous suicide attacks against Israeli targets. And there is the social wing whose extensive charity work with numerous humanitarian institutions is considered one important reason for HAMAS' popularity among the Palestinians. However, HAMAS also uses these social activities for the recruitment of new members: already in the area of child care and youth work, anti-Israeli propaganda is spread and the "martyr's death" in the fight against Israel is glorified.

Also in 2008, the activities of HAMAS were dominated by the internal Palestinian disputes with the secular Fatah movement. While the Fatah controls the West Bank, HAMAS has been in complete control

<sup>160</sup> Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), decision of 3 December 2004, BVerwG 6A 10.02.

of the Gaza strip since its violent assumption of power in June 2007. Mediation attempts made by Arab states have not produced any results so far.

In addition, the HAMAS is still trying to remove the Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip that has been maintained since its violent assumption of power. A high-profile success was achieved in January 2008 by violently breaking through the Egyptian border installations into the Gaza strip, which temporarily enabled numerous Palestinians to cross the border to Egypt.

The effects which the Israeli military action carried out against the HAMAS in the Gaza strip from late December 2008 until mid-January 2009 will have on the structures and future strategy of HAMAS cannot yet be established.

In Germany, more than 200 demonstrations, some of them with large numbers of participants, took place during the military action. Apart from participating in those demonstrations, there were no high-profile activities of the c. 300 HAMAS adherents in Germany in 2008.

**HAMAS fundraising** HAMAS finances the considerable costs of maintaining its humanitarian institutions through the worldwide collection of donations. Although most of the donations are said to come from countries of the Middle East, a considerable part is most likely collected in Western countries: While two organisations – al-Aqsa e. V. and Yatim-Kinderhilfe e. V. – have been banned in Germany because of such financial support activities, organisations still existing in numerous other European states give rise to similar suspicions.

In 2008, the Israeli authorities declared 36 organisations "unlawful associations" because of supporting HAMAS, among them several Europe-based organisations like the British Muslim Aid, a longstanding co-operation partner of the Munich-based muslimehelfen e. V., according to own statements<sup>161</sup>.

---

<sup>161</sup> Website of muslimehelfen e. V. (23 October 2008)

---

#### 1.4 Muslim Brotherhood (MB, Gama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin)

Founded:	In Egypt in 1928
Leader:	Muhammad Mahdi Uthman Akif (headquarters: Egypt)
Members/ adherents in Germany:	1,300 (2007: 1,300)
Publications:	<i>Risalat al-Ikhwan</i> (Circular Letter to the Brotherhood); <i>al-Islam</i> (The Islam; now only as an online version)

The Muslim Brotherhood which was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1909-1949) in Egypt in 1928 is considered the most influential Islamist movement. Often going by other names, different forms of the MB exist in almost all Muslim countries as well as in many non-Muslim states. The doctrines influencing the MB to this day, apart from those of its founder al-Banna, are those of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Sayyid Abu al-A'la al Maududi (1903-1979).

Numerous Islamist organisations like i.a. the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), the Tunisian al-Nahda, the Egyptian organisations al Gama'a al-Islamiya (GI) and al-Jihad al-Islami (JI) as well as the Palestinian HAMAS (see 1.3 above) are based on the MB ideology.

**History** Faced with spreading Western habits – also in Egypt occupied by the British in 1882 – many Muslims saw the necessity for reforms particularly for a return to religion. Among them was al-Banna who, by founding the MB, created an association that turned into a rallying movement of nationalist and anti-colonialist Islamists. The MB's initial aim was, as a first step, to achieve the sovereignty of Egypt on the basis of the Islamic principles, thus getting closer to a "truly Islamic" state. That development was meant to result in a federal, Greater Islamic empire led by a Caliph (Caliphate). The Sharia, as the Islamic order of rights and values created by God, was to be the only basis of that empire's social, political and private life. Because of God being the source of the state authority, it was argued, laicist or secular state systems were to be rejected. In 1948 the Egyptian government

---

imposed a ban on the organisation. The ban had far-reaching implications: the Egyptian Prime Minister at that time was murdered by MB members and, in retaliation, al-Banna was shot dead in Cairo on 12 February 1949, presumably by Egyptian security forces. He has been considered a martyr ever since. In 1950, the ban on the organisation was temporarily lifted. Since the imposition of a new ban in 1954, it has had to officially refrain from any political activities to this day. However, the MB has been running for parliamentary or local elections since the 1980s, either through "independent" candidates or as part of electoral pacts.

**Political defeats** On 8 April 2008, local elections took place in Egypt which had been repeatedly postponed by the government since 2006, not least because of the MB's success in the Lower House vote in 2005, where it had turned out to be the strongest opposition group. Numerous arrests and exclusion procedures left only a small percentage of the initially several thousands of MB members running as candidates for the total of 52,000 seats in the local parliaments. As a result, the MB withdrew its candidates and called for an election boycott, just as numerous other opposition groups had done before. Finally, it was the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) that gained the majority of the votes.

**Internal power struggles** Since the summer of 2008, the MB leadership has shown indications of a predisposition to split up. Single members of the "reform wing" allegedly accuse the deputy MB chairman Muhammad Habib, who belongs to the organisation's conservative camp, as well as the MB Secretary General Mahmud Izzat of deliberately excluding them from the elections to the executive bureau, the highest decision-making body. This way, they argued, the conservative wing had been able to fill the executive bureau with own candidates in an unlawful way, in order to also influence the election of the new MB chairman to its own advantage.<sup>162</sup> The MB chairman Muhammad Mahdi Uthman Akif had reportedly not been informed about this. Habib and Izzat rejected the accusations.

The election of the conservative members into the executive office indicates a possible return of the MB to "original" matters, i.e. religious and social activities. The reformers still advocate an active political work, though.

---

<sup>162</sup> English-language MB website (9 July 2008); online edition of the independent Egyptian daily newspaper al-Masri al-Yaum of 4 June 2008.

---

**MB in Germany** Since the founding of the Moscheebauinitiative München e.V. (Initiative for the building of mosques, reg'd society) in 1958, which erected the Islamisches Zentrum München (IZM, Islamic Center Munich) and from which the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V. (IGD, Islamic Community in Germany) developed, numerous other Islamic Centers have been created in Germany which are used by the MB adherents for their activities.

The IGD is a member of the umbrella organisation Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE) which is close to the MB and has its headquarters in Brussels.

Apart from its headquarters in Munich, the IGD maintains Islamic Centers in Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt/Main, Cologne, Marburg, Braunschweig and Münster, according to own statements.<sup>163</sup> The IGD pursues a strategy of exerting influence in the fields of politics and society in order to enable its adherents to adjust their lives to the Koran and Sunna. Apart from the 30<sup>th</sup> annual congress of the IGD held in Leverkusen and Berlin on 5 October 2008, celebrating at the same time the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the IGD's founding, the organisation has carried out only few public activities this year.

On 15 April 2008, the IGD chairman Ibrahim el-Zayat was given a 10-year prison sentence in his absence by an Egyptian military court. The court also imposed prison sentences on another 24 individuals who were also considered members of the MB.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup> Program of the 30<sup>th</sup> IGD annual conference 2008 of 5 October 2008.

<sup>164</sup> English-language website of the MB (15 and 24 April 2008).

---

## 2. Turkish origin

### **Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e.V. (IGMG, Islamic Community of Millî Görüş, reg'd society)**

Founded:	In Cologne in 1985, as the Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa e.V. (AMGT, Association of the New World View in Europe, reg'd society)
Chairman:	Osman Döring (known as Yavuz Celik Karahan)
Members/ adherents in Germany	27,500 (2007: 27,000)
Publications:	I. a. IGMG Perspektive, at irregular intervals; <i>Millî Gazete</i> (officially independent organ of the Millî Görüş movement)

The IGMG is a pan-European organisation with around 87,000 members, according to its own statements.<sup>165</sup> The European headquarters is located in Kerpen (North Rhine-Westphalia). The number of IGMG members in Germany is assessed to amount to c. 27,500 individuals.<sup>166</sup> Its numerous institutions and wide range of offers reach a much larger circle of people, though. According to its own statements, the IGMG has 514 mosque communities, 323 of them in Germany.<sup>167</sup>

The IGMG is led by Osman Döring (called Yavuz Celik Karahan within the organisation); on the outside, it is usually represented by its Secretary General, Oguz Ücüncü. The administration of the IGMG's extensive property holdings has been entrusted upon the Europäische Moscheebau- und Unterstützungsgemeinschaft e. V. (EMUG, European Mosque Building and Support Society, reg'd society) since 1995, whose executive director is el-Zayat, who is at the same time the chairman of the IGD (see 1.4 above).

<sup>165</sup> IGMG website (8 October 2008).

<sup>166</sup> It cannot be assumed that all members/adherents of the IGMG pursue or support Islamist aims.

<sup>167</sup> See footnote 165.

In connection with the Israeli military action against the HAMAS in the Gaza strip (see 1.3 above), the IGMG demonstrated its solidarity with the Muslim population there and, on 10 January 2009, organized a demonstration in Duisburg which was attended by c. 10,000 participants. In addition, the IGMG carried out a series of fundraising campaigns for the benefit of the Palestinian population.

**Ideological roots of the IGMG** The ideological roots of the IGMG can be traced back to the ideas of the former Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan who founded the Millî Görüş movement in the late 1960s.

The key concepts of political thinking established by Erbakan are "Millî Görüş" (National View) and "Adil Düzen" (Just Order). According to his point of view, each epoch is marked by irreconcilably opposed civilizations based either on fundamentally "just" or "void" premises. According to Erbakan, such orders that are based on the "divine revelation" are "just", while those that have been designed by men are "void". The current Western civilization thus is a "void" one, meaning according to Erbakan that it is based on violence, injustice and exploitation of the weak. This "void" system, he argues, has to be replaced by a "just order" oriented exclusively towards Islamic principles instead of "arbitrary rules" established by men. The central aims propagated by Erbakan are the creation of a "new Greater Turkey" in imitation of the Ottoman Empire, the overcoming of laicism and – with a claim to global validity in the end – the establishment of an Islamic social order. This view implies the rejection of Western democracies.

The adherents of the Millî Görüş movement in Turkey are politically organized in the Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party).

Erbakan and other representatives of the Millî Görüş movement used to denounce capitalism, imperialism and racism on a regular basis, criticizing not only the USA itself but also its "collaborators", mainly the Turkish government party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party – AKP).

---



At an SP conference in Istanbul in April 2008 dealing with the political perspectives in Turkey, the deputy SP chairman Mete Gündogan described the role of Millî Görüş as follows:

*There is the Millî Görüş, wishing to establish a Greater Turkey that is worth living and whose development is secured, as well as a new world based on law and justice; the Millî Görüş which is the hope of all the oppressed of the world and which has called into being the D8 project<sup>168</sup>. The form of the New World Order will be designed by the work of those who represent the (views of ) Millî Görüş. (Millî Gazete of 7 April 2008, p. 2)*

In a column of the Turkish daily newspaper *Millî Gazete* on the D8 meeting held in Istanbul on 15 June 2008, Gündogan explained:

*Even if they (the imperialists) try to conceal their intentions, we have to reveal them and to establish a New World on a foundation of justice. For we are on the threshold of a new conquest. Conquest means a new phase. A new phase means a new world. A new world means Millî Görüş. Millî Görüş stands for our noble people. Our noble people stands for victory. The victory is ours and the victory is forthcoming. (Millî Gazete of 16 June 2008, p. 17)*

During an event of an SP subbranch in Ankara in March 2008, Gündogan underlined that Millî Görüş had always had an anti-imperialist attitude and had never been a "collaborator" (of the West). While the AKP was focussing on Washington, Millî Görüş concentrated on Anatolia, he said.<sup>169</sup>

Fatih Erbakan, SP functionary and son of Necmettin Erbakan, declared at several SP congresses in Turkey that the worldwide riots were to be blamed on the "racist imperialists":

*The Millî Görüş will never need the approval of the USA and its supporters. The Millî Görüş is the nightmare of the racist imperialists and their collaborators. (Millî Gazete of 22 April 2008, p. 9)*

---

<sup>168</sup> The "Developing Eight" (D8), which Erbakan has been aiming to establish in vain since 1977, is an alliance of the largest states whose population is for the most part composed of Muslims (Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Nigeria) following the example of the G8.

<sup>169</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 25 March 2008, pp. 1 and 2.

---

**IGMG and  
the Millî Görüş  
movement**

The Millî Görüş movement includes several components held together by a joint ideological-religious orientation and the bond with Erbakan. In Turkey, it is the SP, the daily newspaper *Millî Gazete*, the TV station TV 5, the youth organisation Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (AGD, Association of the Anatolian Youth) and the Ekonomik ve Sosyal Arastırma Merkezi (ESAM, Economic and Social Research Center) that can be considered to belong to Millî Görüş. In Germany or Europe, the Millî Görüş movement is represented by the IGMG, which is why the IGMG is of central significance for Erbakan's adherents living outside Turkey.

Numerous IGMG members still revere Erbakan as the founder and spiritual leader of the Millî Görüş movement. Although he is not allowed to assume any official party function in Turkey due to being banned from politics, he continued to keep in touch with his adherents in Europe in 2008, i. a. by means of video and audio messages in the framework of IGMG events.<sup>170</sup>

A number of examples prove the still close ideological and personal exchange between SP and IGMG. For example, also in 2008, high-ranking representatives of the SP acted as speakers during SP events on a regular basis.

The Secretary General of ESAM, Arif Ersoy, lectured at a conference organized by the IGMG in Bad Homburg (Hesse) in May 2008 about the issue "The view of Islam on the welfare state and on economy".<sup>171</sup> The SP functionary and former Turkish Minister of Justice Sevkret Kazan<sup>172</sup>, too, participated in several IGMG events during 2008.<sup>173</sup>

The deputy SP chairman Numan Kurtulmus underlined at an event held on 30 March on the occasion of the 33<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of the IGMG Bremen that "our compatriots" had to be represented "within the ranks of the (German) state". At the same time, he underlined: "Mankind and the world need you. While completing these tasks, (though), you may not forget Turkey, its power and its potential."<sup>174</sup>

<sup>170</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 12 March 2008, p. 10, of 18 February, p. 10, and of 31 March 2008, p. 20.

<sup>171</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 8 May 2008, p. 10.

<sup>172</sup> From June 1996 to June 1997, Kazan was the Turkish Minister of Justice in a government of Erbakan backed by the Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party), a banned predecessor party of the SP.

<sup>173</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 3 April 2008, p. 20, of 21/22 June 2008, p. 11, and of 16 June 2008, p. 16.

<sup>174</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 12 March 2008, p. 10.

In so-called educational seminars in Germany, functionaries of the Millî Görüş movement from Turkey impart the aims of the movement. For example, the deputy chairman of the AGD, Baki Öztürk, lectured on ways of communication and the aspects requiring the leadership members' special attention during a seminar of the IGMG Hanover in June 2008. Afterwards, the IGMG chairman Karahan emphasized that such seminars were of utmost importance for the motivation of the IGMG members.<sup>175</sup>

On numerous occasions, IGMG delegations travelled to Turkey. Part of the regular programme of such trips were visits to the SP, the Millî Gazete, and TV 5, as well as meeting SP functionaries. A personal conversation and/or a visit to Erbakan were always considered highlights.<sup>176</sup>

**"Millî Gazete"** An important connection between the single components of the Millî Görüş movement is provided by the formally independent Turkish daily newspaper Millî Gazete. As the movement's organ, it is of special significance.

The Millî Gazete editor in chief, Necdet Kutsal, in a column on the 36<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the newspaper, declared that the Millî Gazete had started its reporting with the aim of being "a voice of the Millî Görüş". The Millî Gazete, he explained, was a pioneer for the Millî Görüş' ideology:

*Millî Görüş is much more than the slogan of a political party. (...) Contrary to all the other creatures, the Lord God has provided man with reason, and gave him the order: "Be completely honest, as you were told". That means, that you have to honestly complete your duties as a servant of God. It begins with the jihad. The jihad includes all efforts that are necessary in order to do what Allah told you, and in order to keep at a distance what Allah prohibited. The key aim of jihad is the establishment of a just world. When Millî Görüş talks about a "new world", it refers to this aim. The Millî Gazete is the vanguard of the thought of our ancestors, who entrusted us with this territory. For 600 years, they used to be the basis for a life in a just world. We used to be great. That is why we say: "Back to a Greater Turkey".*  
(Millî Gazete of 12/13 January 2008, pp. 1 and 8)

---

<sup>175</sup> Millî Gazete of 3 June 2008, p. 16.

<sup>176</sup> Millî Gazete of 4 April 2008, p. 11, and of 19 May 2008, p. 10.

---

The spreading of the *Millî Gazete* is deliberately supported by the movement's adherents. For example, the SP chairman of Elazığ (Turkey) explained at a local event held by the newspaper: "People who do not read the *Millî Gazete* cannot be *Millî Görüş* adherents."<sup>177</sup>

Apart from imparting ideological views, the *Millî Gazete* often gives statements on religious issues. As a regularly publishing author, particularly Mehmet Sevkett Eygi imparts a restrictive interpretation of Islam. In an article addressing the "Muslim youth", he deals with the question of how religious communities and groups are to educate the youth. In that connection, his anti-integration reservations against non-Muslims are remarkable. According to Mehmet Sevkett Eygi, the religious communities have to see to it that the young people "show leniency, goodness, tolerance, forgiveness and patience towards the Muslims, but reserve towards the unbelievers". The young people are not to be the instruments of the unbelievers, not to fall for their intrigues and not to be caught in their traps.<sup>178</sup>

In another column, Eygi represented nationalist views by explaining, under the heading of "What I wish Turkey and what I don't":

*I want that people stand up for and preserve my country's national identity, its national culture and national character. I do not want them to fall victim to destruction, degeneration and erosion.*

(...)

*I do not want my people to be subjected to alienation.*

(*Millî Gazete* of 26 February 2008, p. 12)

In Germany, the European edition of the *Millî Gazete* can be purchased which, apart from reports on the *Millî Görüş* movement, also deals in particular with the IGMG and its events. Accordingly, the *Millî Gazete* is an important source of information for the organisation's adherents, together with the monthly publication *IGMG Perspective*.

The closeness of IGMG and *Millî Gazete* manifests itself in many ways. For example, IGMG delegations travelling to Turkey regularly visit the newspaper's offices<sup>179</sup>; the *Millî Gazete* is regularly represented by own stands at IGMG events.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>177</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 28 August 2008, p. 8.

<sup>178</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 7 August 2008, p. 4.

<sup>179</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 20 March 2008, p. 6.

<sup>180</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 23/24 February 2008, p. 20.

The regional chairman of the IGMG Berlin's department for press and media demanded at a meeting of IGMG responsables for press and media in Berlin that those present reinforce their commitment to the *Millî Gazete* and support it by gaining new subscribers.<sup>181</sup>

**Youth and  
educational work of  
the IGMG**

In 2008, the IGMG has taken additional steps to further amplify the youth and educational work which continues to be of high priority to it.

According to own statements, the IGMG is running seven centers in the field of youth education.<sup>182</sup> The head of the Braunschweig educational center explained at an anniversary event that it was the primary aim to "impart their cultural identity" to the young people and to enable them to pass a "good education".<sup>183</sup> The contents imparted in the IGMG summer academy courses included e.g. "The holy Koran" and "The art of reciting the Koran".<sup>184</sup>

Based on its ideological self-concept, the IGMG considers particularly the young people who are close to it to be permanently exposed to an identity conflict in a "multi-cultural society".<sup>185</sup> Thus, IGMG functionaries regularly underline the alleged problems and dangers to the development and maintenance of an "Islamic identity" existing in the respective host society.

In the framework of preparing the annual "summer schools" held by the IGMG, the chairman of the IGMG's department of education, Mehmet Gedik, criticized that "the children living in Europe" were undergoing an "identity crisis" and that "the governments" had "no solutions to offer". For a successful education, he said, it was essential that the children did not forget that they were Muslims.<sup>186</sup>

At the annual IGMG mass event held on 31 May in Hasselt (Belgium), the so-called "Day of Brotherliness and Solidarity", the IGMG chairman Karahn in his speech also underlined the necessity to impart an Islamic identity. A movement that was not based on an Islamic identity would come down at the first blow, he said. The key to this identity was the knowledge of the main sources of Islam. Moreover, the

<sup>181</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 5/6 April 2008, p. 10.

<sup>182</sup> Webpage of the IGMG (11 August 2008).

<sup>183</sup> Website of the IGMG (11 August 2008).

<sup>184</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 6 June 2008, p. 20.

<sup>185</sup> Website of the IGMG (16 June 2008).

<sup>186</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 28 May 2008 p. 10.

Muslims had to be made aware of the fact that the fulfillment of the religious duties was their most important task.<sup>187</sup>

At an IGMG Bremen event in March 2008, Karahan explained that "in view of the change of values in Europe and in the world", everything would be done in order to prevent "the Muslims living here" from forgetting about "their Islamic identity".<sup>188</sup>

In the spring of 2008, the youth commission of the IGMG women's association initiated the "Fit 4 life" project. Different working groups were meant to answer the question how a young person of Muslim identity could live in Europe in spite of many problems and prejudices.<sup>189</sup>

In August 2008, the chairman of the IGMG Paris also dealt with the situation of the Muslims in Europe during an event and explained that the latter were exposed to "a risk of assimilation that has been constantly growing recently". The main task of Millî Görüş was, he said, to protect the young people from this danger. For that purpose, the organisation offered i. a. "educational camps" where 130,000 young people were looked after all over Europe.<sup>190</sup>

According to the IGMG, "the religious and cultural heritage" has "of course to be imparted by adequate pedagogical and didactical means in the light of the revelation."<sup>191</sup>

As to its educational work, the IGMG uses, apart from Koran and Sunna, numerous self-designed documents, among them three schoolbooks published by the organisation (*Grundwissen*, Basic knowledge).<sup>192</sup> It orients itself towards the Islam interpretation and aims of the Millî Görüş movement, partly in evident contradiction to the readiness for integration it displays outwardly.

The IGMG youth work is closely linked to the Millî Görüş movement. For example, Millî Görüş representatives act as guest lecturers at seminars in Germany<sup>193</sup>, and the IGMG youth visits Millî Görüş

---

<sup>187</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 2 June 2008, pp. 1 and 12.

<sup>188</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 12 March 2008, p. 10.

<sup>189</sup> Website of the IGMG (18 May 2008).

<sup>190</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 13 August 2008, p. 11.

<sup>191</sup> Website of the IGMG (16 June 2008).

<sup>192</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 6 June 2008, p. 20.

<sup>193</sup> *Millî Gazete* of 19 February 2008, p. 20.

---

institutions in Turkey. Also the issues of the lectures at seminars, like "The basic principles of Millî Görüş" and "What has a Millî Görüş supporter to be like?" indicate a closeness of the IGMG youth work to the ideological concepts of the overall movement.<sup>194</sup>

The IGMG educational activities, though, are not only aimed at a religious education according to the ideas of the organisation, but also at an education of the own leaders. During a several-day seminar addressing students held at the IGMG headquarters in Kerpen (North Rhine-Westphalia in March 2008), Secretary General Ücuncü explained in his lecture:

*Our basic mission within this society is not to stick to each other but to try to gain a leading position within this society.*

(Millî Gazete of 10 March 2008, p. 20)

During an event of the IGMG Felsberg (Hesse) in April 2008, a lecturer proclaimed:

*In Europe, we are going to organize a good education for our children. We are going to have them study at universities. (And) we will try to make them become (our) representatives in parliaments and city councils. For only people who know our problems can represent us adequately.*

(Millî Gazete of 14 April 2008, p. 10)

**Assessment and outlook** The IGMG is not a completely homogeneous association. For some years, there have been indications of efforts undertaken particularly by some younger generation leaders to bring about a more independent organisation or a breaking away from the Turkish Millî Görüş movement. For example, apart from Erbakan's adherents most of whom are of a traditionalist orientation, pro-reform people have been established within the IGMG for some time. A symposium carried out by the IGMG in Bonn in late 2007, during which the Muslims' "self-perception and worldview" was discussed with specialists in Islam studies and representatives of social and political organisations from Muslim countries, revealed that the readiness to self-criticism and changes seem to partly exist. The still close links of IGMG with the Millî Görüş movement, however, create the impression that the pro-reformists do not yet have the necessary influence. The dogmatic sticking of important Millî Görüş protagonists to the ideological positions taken so far continues to question the IGMG's verbal

<sup>194</sup> Millî Gazete of 19 February 2008, p. 20, and of 19 May 2008, p. 10.

professions of loyalty to democracy and rule of law as well as a connected turning away from the political guidelines of Erbakan.

### **3. Others**

#### **3.1 Iranian influence on Shiites living in Germany**

In Germany, there is a number of centers of pro-regime Iranians subordinated to the Iranian state leadership. Those centers are tasked with propagating the theocratic state doctrine spreading the Iranian-style Islamic system which is firmly established in the Iranian constitution in the sense of an "export of the revolution" all over the world.

**Islamic Center Hamburg (IZH)** The Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (IZH, Islamic Center Hamburg) that was founded in 1962 and the connected Imam Ali mosque is the largest and most influential one of those centers. The close connection of the IZH to the Iranian leadership manifests itself i.a. in the fact that the leader of the IZH has to be an accepted Islamic scholar, nominated by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that he is considered to be a representative of the Iranian "revolution leader" – currently Ayatollah Khamenei – in Central Europe.

The IZH is the most important European contact point for Shiites of different nationalities, offering – apart from regular prayer events and religious celebrations – also seminars language classes and leisure activities. By means of such offers, as well as by providing organisational and financial support to Shiite associations all over Germany, the IZH tries to unite the Germany-based Shiites under its roof and to influence them according to its own ideas.

Outwardly, the IZH acts as a solely religious institution, not allowing any political activities within its direct sphere of activity. Accordingly, the current head of the IZH, Seyed Abbas Ghaem-Maghani, has continued his efforts to present the IZH as a non-political and co-operative center representing a moderate interpretation of Islam in 2008. Actually, however, as one of the most active propaganda centers of Iran in Europe, the IZH spreads the Shiite doctrine of Iranian interpretation. Its true task is the "silent propagation" of the Islamic state of God according to the Iranian example.

.

---



### 3.2 Tablighi Jama'at (TJ, Community of Preaching and Mission)

Founded:	In India c. in 1926
Leader:	World Shura Council
Chairman:	Maulana Ibrahim Saad
Members/ adherents in Germany:	700 (2007: 700)

**Transnational mass movement** The Islamistically oriented TJ was founded by the Islamic scholar Maulawi Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944) as an awakening and missionary movement in India c. in 1926. Ilyas demanded a far-reaching renewal and reanimation of the Islamic practice of belief in order to prevent a weakening of Islam. From the Koran commandment "to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong", he deduced the necessity to disseminate the Islamic message. Since then, the TJ has developed into a transnational mass movement with more than 10 million adherents all over the world. Wherever Muslims live, the TJ carries out missionary activities aimed at winning new adherents to join its way of life marked by a strict compliance with Islamic rules.

The TJ has a hierarchical structure and is led from bases in Raiwind (Pakistan), New Delhi (India), and Dhaka (Bangladesh). An essential center of the TJ in Europe is located in Dewsbury (Great Britain). In addition, the TJ runs national bases e.g. in France, in the Netherlands, and in Portugal.

**Ideological origin** Ilyas was an adherent of the Indian Dar al-Ulum Deoband (Arabic for: House of Knowledge in Deoband) that was founded in the Indian town of Deoband in 1867. The doctrine of the school of Deoband shows, apart from strong Salafist influences, also such of the Islamic mysticism (Sufism).

**Missionary work as a focal point** It is a characteristic feature of the movement that each TJ adherent is obliged to regularly and voluntarily undertake unpaid proselytizing tours in order to spread the faith and achieve an individual devoutness. The TJ's missionary efforts primarily address Muslims; a proselytizing of non-Muslims is not completely ruled out, though. Although the missionary activities are mainly carried out by male TJ adherents, women become increasingly active within the movement, too.

The TJ considers itself to be non-political. As concerns its missionary work, the movement mainly strives for the strict compliance with the Islamic laws and the establishment and application of those laws in social and political life. An exemplary practice of belief performed by each individual is meant to show the Muslims how to live a life that is strictly determined by the Koran and Sunna. According to the literal and strictly conservative interpretation of the Koran and its legal rules propagated by the TJ in that context, the compliance with religious rules has fundamental priority over the compliance with governmental laws. This particularly implies the rejection of any democratic constitution based on a separation of religion and state. A realization of the TJ's society model would i. a. bring about a discrimination of non-Muslims. Besides, the TJ's concept of women contradicts the constitutional commandment of equality of women and men.

**Catalyst encouraging "jihadist" recruitment efforts** A successful proselytization is often accompanied by a visible change in the social behavior of new adherents. In non-Muslim countries, such efforts may hinder the sociopolitical integration of Muslims and contribute to the development of parallel societies. This may in turn encourage radicalization processes and lay the foundations for single members to drift into the terrorist environment. There are indications suggesting that "jihadist" organisations have used the TJ as a recruitment pool, e.g. by trying to add a "jihadist" component to an individual's conservative TJ-influenced interpretation of Islam. In isolated cases, it has moreover been proven that members of terrorist groups and networks have used the TJ infrastructure for travel purposes.

**Activities of the TJ in Germany** The activities of the TJ in Germany are co-ordinated through a hierarchical network as well as through informal contacts among the adherents. There is no higher body in Germany which is authorized to issue directives. Some individuals, though, stand out from the other adherents because of their experience concerning missionary tours, their above-average knowledge of the Koran and their continuous dedication to the movement.

TJ institutions exist in Hanover, Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne, Friedrichsdorf (Hesse), Bochum, Munich, and Pappenheim (Bavaria). The relevant associations and / or mosques do not explicitly indicate the TJ in their statutes, though.

Assemblies of the organisation held on a regional, national or international level serve the purpose of a joint religious practice, the

---

co-ordination and control of the missionary work and the exchange of experience. An example was the three-day mass event in Saarbrücken in May 2008 with c. 1,000 participants from Germany and abroad, which was also attended by high-ranking TJ scholars from India and Pakistan. Immediately afterwards, groups that had been formed at the end of the event set off on proselytizing tours.

### 3.3 Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) / Chechen Separatist Movement (CSM)

Founded:	In the Caucasus, early in the 1990s
Leader:	Dokku Umarov
Members/ adherents in Germany:	500 (2007: 500)

The denomination Chechen Separatist Movement (CSM) is used by the security agencies as a working name. The organisation that was founded in the early 1990s in the course of the dissolution of the Soviet Union calls itself Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI).

**Aims** The CRI/CSM adherents pursue the aim of establishing a Sharia-based Islamic state that is independent from the Russian Federation. The fight against the Russian Federation, in the form of a "Holy War", is meant to enable the Chechen people to live a "free, self-determined life". The CRI/CSM pursues a strategy that approves of violence and goes against the idea of international understanding:

*The true path is as splendid as the moon and the sun. Other than the sun which is far away, the path leading to truth is close and accessible. (...) Today, the path to truth is the armed jihad leading to the praise of Allah.*

(Internet site close to CRI/CSM, 14 April 2008)

**Extension of the combat actions** The combat actions are no longer limited to the territory of Chechnya. The conflict with the Russian government has been extended to the neighboring Caucasus Republics, especially Ingushetia and Dagestan, where the CRI/CSM continues to carry out numerous attacks against military and civilian facilities.

**Jamaat Shariat** The most active group in this conflict seems to be the Dagestani Jamaat Shariat which presents itself in an aggressive form on its

Internet site and calls upon its compatriots to join the violent jihad.

In a press release, it announced the "destruction of the unbelievers and their allies" on the territory of Dagestan:

*Soon, very soon, our Dagestani brothers will witness great operations, and the apostates will be convinced by the strength and power of the mujahidin. (...) Nobody in Dagestan doubts the success of the mujahidin's fight and the establishment of the Sharia on this territory.*  
(Internet site close to CRI/CSM, 15 March 2008)

In another declaration of 7 December 2008, the Jamaat Shariat announced continued attacks against the Dagestani government as well as against government-led religious institutions:

*We will attack your houses with your women and children, as you do to the Muslims. We will kill you at daytime and at night, we will destroy you in any manner you can imagine, so that life will become a nightmare for you and your families! During daylight, your women and children will cry when they send you to 'work', and at night they will tremble until daybreak and wait for the attacks of the mujahidin like they wait for death.*  
(Internet site close to CRI/CSM, 7 December 2008)

In December 2008, the Jamaat Shariat reported on its website<sup>195</sup> that Umar Shaikhullayev had been appointed its new leader by Dokku Umarov, the "president" of the CRI and self-proclaimed "Emir of the mujahidin of the Caucasus". The Dagestani mujahidin welcomed this decision.

**Proclamation of the Caucasian Emirate** In October 2007, Umarov proclaimed the Caucasian Emirate. The territory is meant to include i. a. Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Ossetia.

In January 2008, Umarov once more propagated the intended unification of the Caucasus to form an Islamic state:

*Within the shortest time, the generation of the mujahidin has changed. Today, most of those who participate in the armed jihad are young Muslims. These fighters cannot imagine to do anything else but comply with the instructions of Koran and Sunna and to act under another banner than that of the prophet. They know very well that they do not fight the armed jihad in order to bring democracy to Ichkeria, but to establish the rules of Koran in the whole Caucasus.*

<sup>195</sup> Website close to CRI/CSM (5 December 2008).

(Internet site close to CRI/CSM, 5 December 2008)

A "commander" at the Eastern front of the Caucasian Emirate also underlined that Chechnya was not the only focus of the "fight of resistance":

*Today, the mujahidin do not only plan to establish Ichkeria. Ichkeria is only one region of our state; the mujahidin are everywhere – in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia – the whole Caucasus.*

(Internet site close to CRI/CSM, 25 April 2008)

In accordance with the aims of the CRI/CSM, the Caucasian Emirate strives to drive the "unbelievers" out of the Caucasus by means of a long-term guerilla warfare and to establish an Islamic state there. Besides the Russian Federation, Umarov also called the USA, Great Britain, Israel and "all those who wage war against the Islam and the Muslims" the enemies of the CRI/CSM.

Umarov's declaration seems to focus on the propaganda effect: The declaration is meant to increase the media coverage of the Chechnya conflict and the attractiveness of actively supporting the guerilla. In September 2008, Umarov called upon "all Muslims, also those who live abroad as refugees", to support the Caucasian fighters.<sup>196</sup>

The proclamation of the Caucasian Emirate, however, fuelled the splitting of the CRI/CSM that had been announcing itself for quite a while. The "pro-democracy wing" around Achmed Zakaev, former "Foreign Minister" of the CRI and its self-proclaimed new "Prime Minister" since November, criticized Umarov because of the latter's "unauthorized proceeding", which had been agreed neither with the population nor with the fighters. In a video message, Umarov replied in April 2008 that the proclamation of the Caucasian Emirate did not include anything new or revolutionary. It only disclosed the rules of Islam. Umarov's message illustrates the deepness of the disagreement:

*There are forces that are led by Achmed Zakaev (...); if these people think that our weapons are too weak to punish them, they are severely mistaken.*

(Internet site close to CRI/CSM, 27 April 2008)

---

<sup>196</sup> Website close to CRI/CSM (19 September 2008).

---

The mujahidin consider a fight that is limited to a political level only to be vain. It would only produce disagreement among the Muslims, they think. Peace was only possible if Russia withdrew its forces from the Emirate's territory and acknowledged the existence of the Islamic state. The conflict includes the potential to definitely split the CRI/CSM into the two groups around Zakaev and Umarov.

**Activities in Germany** C. 6,000 individuals of Chechen origin are living in Germany. The c. 500 supporters of the CRI/CSM in Germany have so far represented their interests without using violence. Their activities include propaganda work and fundraising for humanitarian projects as well as the financial and material support of the CRI/CSM and the clandestine collection and forwarding of donation money to Chechnya.

The proclamation of the Caucasian Emirate by Umarov is hardly discussed within the Diaspora in Germany. The majority of the Chechens in Germany can be considered to belong to the "pro-democracy" wing around Zakaev, since the independence of Chechnya seems to be of central importance to them. In addition, there are, however, single individuals who sympathize with Umarov and support his aims from Germany.

The low-profile the CRI/CSM is keeping in Germany is probably a result of tactical reasons. Acts of violence against Russian nationals or institutions in Germany have not been identified so far. An escalation of the disagreement in the hotspot of the North Caucasus may change the attitude of the CRI/CSM adherents in Germany, though, and bring about a direct impact on the security situation in Germany.

## **Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security – identified and suspected cases (excluding Islamism)**

### **I. Overview**

#### **1. Developments in the field of extremism of foreigners (excluding Islamism)**

The activities carried out by non-Islamist organisations of foreigners acting in Germany in 2008 were – like in the years before – mainly influenced by current political events and developments in the respective countries of origin. Most of these organisations consider Germany a safehaven from where to pursue their aims in their home country by means of agitation and to provide (i. a. material) support to their parent organisation.

**Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)** The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which also uses other names and whose activities have been banned, has been pursuing a dual strategy. On the one hand, it is engaged in an armed fight in Turkey and in the region bordering North Iraq while, on the other hand, it presents itself as mostly peaceful in Europe. Its central demand is for more political and cultural independence of the Kurds in their countries of origin, particularly in Turkey.

As a response to executive measures against the PKK in Germany – i. e. the ban imposed on the TV station Roj TV – the PKK's guerrilla units People's Defense Forces (HPG) kidnapped three German mountaineers in Eastern Turkey in July 2008 and kept them in their power for 12 days.

In October 2008, the PKK's allegation that its arrested leader Abdullah Öcalan had been mistreated by prison guards provoked numerous arson attacks and cases of property damage in several German towns. Responsibility for several of these actions was claimed by the Komalen Ciwan, the PKK's youth organisation.

---

- Left-wing extremist positions** Left-wing extremist organisations of foreigners continue to strive for the "revolutionary" destruction of the existing social order and for the establishment of socialist or communist systems in their home countries. In most cases, the ideology of these – predominantly Turkish – structures is usually rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Maoism.
- Turkish left-wing extremist organisations** The agitation of Turkish left-wing extremist groupings in 2008 was mainly directed against the Turkish social and state system, but also against the German immigration and social policy as well as against the German Federal Armed Forces' mission in Afghanistan. The long-standing secretary general of the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front (DHKP-C) that has been banned in Germany, Dursun Karatas, died in August 2008. His succession has not been settled yet.
- Nationalistic positions** Nationalist or predominantly nationalist organisations of foreigners give utmost priority to the "nation" in an ethnical-cultural as well as in a political-territorial sense and disdain the rights and interests of other peoples in their propaganda. They judge an individual's value by his / her belonging to a nation or race and thus fundamentally contradict the basic human rights and the idea of international understanding.
- Iranian opposition groups** Extremist Iranian opposition groups mainly direct their agitation against the political conditions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Adherents of the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK) and its political wing National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) that is acting in Europe continue to use intensive propaganda in order to achieve their organisation's deletion from the EU list of terrorist organisations.
- Asian separatists** The adherents of separatist Asian organisations, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sikh organisations, continue to focus their work in Germany on supporting their parent organisations by means of propaganda and fundraising activities. Their aims, i. e. the establishment of independent states by breaking away from Sri Lanka and India respectively have remained unchanged.
-



## **2. Organisations and followers**

As concerns the 45 non-Islamist organisations of foreigners that pose a threat to security and/or are of an extremist character, the number of members and adherents (24,750) differs only slightly from that established in 2007 (25,250): the number of members and adherents of left-wing extremist or predominantly left-wing extremist groups of foreigners (16,870 individuals) has almost remained the same, while the number of members and adherents of the nationalist groups of foreigners dropped to 7,880 (2007: 8,380).

---

<sup>1</sup> Numbers refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded up or down.  
<sup>2</sup> Banned groups included.

## **II. Goals and main activities of individual groups**

### **1. Kurds**

#### **1.1 Overview**

A constant number of c. 11,500 of the 500,000 to 600,000 ethnic Kurds in Germany are adherents of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). For years, central demands of the organisation have been for extended cultural and political rights of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and for the release of its leader Abdullah Öcalan and/or the improvement of his prison conditions. Time and again, the situation in the region has had a strong influence on the actions carried out in Germany. Military clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK's armed wing, the People's Defense Forces (HPG), are still frequent in the Turkish-Iraqi border region, while the activities in Germany focus on propaganda work and the logistical and financial support of the organisation as a whole.

**1.2 Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) /Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê (KADEK, Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan) /Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA GEL, People's Congress of Kurdistan) /Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK, Union of the Communities of Kurdistan) /Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK, Union of the Societies of Kurdistan)**

Founded:	As Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) in Turkey in 1978
	Other denominations:
	- Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê (KADEK, Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan)
	- Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA GEL, People's Congress of Kurdistan)
	- Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK, Union of the Communities of Kurdistan)
	- Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK, Union of the Societies of Kurdistan)
Leader:	Abdullah Öcalan
Members/adherents:	11,500 (2007: 11,500)
Publications:	<i>Serxwebun</i> (Independence), monthly; <i>Ciwanên Azad</i> (Free Youth), monthly and others;
Ban:	Banned with effect from 22 November 1993

### 1.2.1 General situation

The PKK whose activities were banned in 1993 and that has been listed as a terrorist organisation by the European Union since 2 May 2002<sup>197</sup> continues to pursue a dual strategy: the armed fight in Turkey and the region bordering North Iraq on the one hand, and its mostly peaceful self-presentation to the (Western European) public as well as its campaigning for political acceptance of the PKK's cause on the other hand. This ambivalent orientation has outlasted the renamings that the organisation has undergone since 2002 – turning into KADEK in 2002 and into KONGRA GEL in 2003. In 2005, the organisation started to use the name of Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK), and it has been called Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK) since 2007. Regardless of the PKK's changing names and of his own arrest, Abdullah Öcalan is the leader of the KCK. He is represented by the chairman of the KCK Executive Council, Murat Karayilin. The KONGRA GEL, currently the highest decision-making body within the PKK, is led by Zübeyir Aydar. The KONGRA GEL lays claim to parliamentary functions and presents itself as an organ of internal opinion-forming and decision-making.

The organisation's renamings have not caused any essential change in its structure and composition over the years. In 2005, the PKK announced the concept and founding of a "new" PKK. According to the founding declaration, this PKK was not meant to replace the KONGRA GEL but to assume the role of an ideological pioneer. In fact, however, the "new PKK" is composed of long-serving and particularly loyal organisation cadres. It is one of its essential aims to establish a confederation of all Kurds in the Middle East and, thereby, to increase their national identity. As of late, the existing state borders are to remain intact, according to own statements. This goes back to the PKK founder Öcalan's concept of a Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK, Union of the Communities of Kurdistan) whose implementation is endeavored these days in all the Kurdish territories of origin under the

---

<sup>197</sup> In September 2001, the European Council declared counterterrorism one of the EU's priority goals. Since then, individuals, associations and corporations can be "listed" in a EU list if a competent authority of one of the member states holds evidence or convincing indications of its involvement in terrorist acts. Decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council can also be taken into consideration. One particular effect of the – regularly checked – listing is the freezing of funds and assets of suspected terrorist individuals and organisations.

---

denomination of Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK, Union of the Societies of Kurdistan).

**10<sup>th</sup> Congress** From 21 to 30 August 2008, the PKK held a party congress in the Kandil mountains in North Iraq. The main topics were the condemnation of deficiencies at cadre level and the decision to take remedial measures. Accordingly, each cadre is obliged to live as a self-sacrificing militant and to fight until the release of the leader Öcalan and the settlement of the "Kurdish question".

Since the calling off of what the PKK called a unilateral cease-fire in 2004, there have repeatedly been armed clashes with the Turkish military. An escalation came about in the autumn of 2007, after the Turkish military had suffered heavy losses from attacks by the PKK's armed wing HPG. In October 2007, the parliament basically approved of cross-border operations of the armed forces against positions of the armed PKK units. In February 2008, Turkish ground forces marched into North Iraq for the first time. Though the organisation's headquarters that have been located in North Iraq for years were obviously not seriously affected, the invasion provoked numerous protest actions in Germany and other European countries.

In July 2008, the HPG which is operating in Turkey and in the region bordering North Iraq, kidnapped three German nationals and kept them in their power for 12 days before setting them free. The kidnapped tourists had been staying near the Ararat mountain in Eastern Turkey. The kidnappers justified the act by Germany's policy regarding the Kurdish issue and said that the concrete reason had been the ban Germany had imposed on the TV station Roj TV which is close to the PKK.

**Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons)** In February 2008, the Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons) – listed as a terrorist organisation<sup>198</sup> by the EU since 21 December 2006 – declared that they were ready to strike again after a fairly long pause (autumn 2006). According to their own statements, the TAK have emerged from the HPG. They made their first appearance in August 2005 when they claimed responsibility for several attacks – mainly against tourist targets – in Western Turkey. The TAK claimed responsibility for the attacks in Mersin and Izmir (both in Turkey) on 19 and 21 August 2008; in the former, the attacker was killed and 12 policemen were injured; 16 individuals were injured in the latter attack.

---

<sup>198</sup> See footnote 197

A TAK declaration said:

*Whether by day or at night, whether openly or in secret, every place where our enemy is is a place of action to us, and any time is the time for action. Whatever it costs, to punish our enemy as he deserves it, every path is fine with us.*

(TAK website, 22 August 2008)

### 1.2.2 Organisational situation

In Germany, a ban has been imposed on the PKK since 1993 in accordance with the Law Relating to Associations that also applies to KADEK, KONGRA GEL, KKK and KCK. At the same time, a ban was also imposed on the organisation's political wing Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan (ERNK, National Liberation Front of Kurdistan), including its new denomination Civata Demokratîk a Kurdistan (CDK, Kurdish Democratic Co-ordination), which has a considerable influence on the PKK activities in Europe.

The senior functionaries of the CDK – headed by a leader and an executive committee consisting of several members – are mostly staying in European neighboring countries. The responsible cadres in Germany, who are usually in charge for a limited period, are mostly assigned by the CDK leadership. Functionaries who for the most part act in a conspiratorial way pass internal instructions and guidelines on to subordinated levels according to the principle of order and obedience.

**5<sup>th</sup> annual CDK Congress** The 5<sup>th</sup> general assembly of the CDK, which was held in Southern France from 5 to 9 May 2008 and attended by c. 200 individuals, underlined in its final declaration that the first stage of the "Êdî Bese!" ("It's enough!") campaign had been successfully completed thanks to the resistance of the guerrilla and the people. Stating that the current conditions were favorable for opening a new chapter, the assembly decided to enter into a new phase of action and organisation. Finally, the assembly elected a new executive council and a new disciplinary committee.

**Another structural change in Germany** The general assembly also decided in favor of a new organisational structure of the PKK in the Federal Republic of Germany. The CDK territory in Germany is now divided into three so-called Sahas, also known as Serits, i. e. the North, the Middle and the South, each being led by a leading functionary. A total of 28 areas are subordinated to these Sahas. This decision revised the reorganisation that had been

decided by last year's general assembly, according to which one functionary was responsible for the PKK structures all over the Federal Republic.

**YEK-KOM** Most of the activities of the PKK and its adherents in Germany take place in the local associations that are close to the organisation. According to statements of the organisation, 53 of these associations are currently united under the umbrella of the Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland e.V. (YEK-KOM, Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany, reg'd society).

**Mass organisations** In addition, PKK adherents from different professional groups and groups of interest are organized in quite a number of so-called mass organisations. Particularly active are the youth organisation Komalen Ciwan (approximate meaning: "Community of the Young"), the Kurdish Women's Movement in Europe (AKKH) and the students' organisation Association of Students from Kurdistan (YXK). Mention should also be made of the organisations Yekitiya Rojnamevenan Kurdistan (YRK, Union of Kurdish Journalists), Yekitiya Mamosteyen Kurd (YMK, Union of Kurdish Teachers), Yekitiya Huquqnasen Kurdistan (YHK, Union of Kurdish Lawyers), Yekitiya Niviskaren Kurdistan (YNK, Union of Kurdish Writers), Yekitiya Malbaten Kurd (YEK-MAL, Union of Kurdish Families) and of the religious communities Ciwaka Islamiye Kurdistan (CIK, Islamic Community of Kurdistan), Demokratik Aleviler Federasyonu (FEDA, Federation of the Democratic Alevites), Kürdistan Aleviler Birliği (KAB, Union of Alevites from Kurdistan), Federasyona Komelen Ezidiyan (FKE, Federation of the Yezides of Kurdistan) and Yekitiya Ezidiyen Kurdistan (YEK, Union of Yezides from Kurdistan).

### 1.2.3 PKK propaganda

#### 1.2.3.1 Propaganda via media close to PKK

For its propaganda activities, the PKK uses an extensive media apparatus through which it informs its adherents about events that are relevant to the organisation and mobilizes them, but which also continues to provide the organisation's functionaries with a public platform for an outward representation of the organisation's interests.

Of special significance to the PKK adherents are the daily newspaper *Yeni Özgür Politika* (YÖP) that is issued in Germany with almost

---



10,000 copies, the satellite TV station Roj TV received in Europe as well as in the Kurdish settlements in the Middle East that broadcasts with a Danish license and produces its programs in Belgium, and the Kurdish news agency Firat News Agency (ANF) that is based in the Netherlands. To an increasing extent, specific information for PKK adherents is also spread via the Internet. The GerillaTV website was added in August 2008. It glorifies the armed fight and offers videos showing important representatives of the organisation for download.

**Roj TV / VIKO  
Fernseh Produktion  
GmbH**

On 19 June 2008, the Federal Minister of the Interior banned the Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S company based in Copenhagen (Denmark) from carrying out activities in Germany that are related to the TV station Roj TV; a ban was also imposed on Roj TV and on the VIKO Fernseh Produktion GmbH as one of its branches. Owner of the Danish TV license for Roj TV is the Danish Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S company. The VIKO Fernseh Produktion GmbH was the German production studio in Wuppertal (North Rhine-Westphalia) from where also live programs were broadcast.

According to the ban order, Roj TV violates German criminal law and contradicts the idea of international understanding. The TV station serves as a PKK organ and spreads propaganda that serves the organisation's purposes. The TV station's activities foster the solidarity within the banned PKK as well as the PKK's continued existence. Its reports propagate violence as a means to support the PKK's efforts towards gaining autonomy and aim at recruiting guerrilla fighters for the armed conflict in Turkey.

**Mezopotamien  
Verlag und Vertrieb  
GmbH**

Main responsibility for the spreading of publications which are close to the PKK continues to lie with the Mezopotamien Verlag und Vertrieb GmbH with its main office in Neuss (North Rhine-Westphalia). The publishing company spreads in particular the publications of Öcalan, i.a. also in German, and is represented at many PKK-related events with own sales and information stands. The MIR Musikverlag GmbH which is close to the PKK resides under the same address.

### **1.2.3.2 Demonstrations and mass events**

Centrally co-ordinated propaganda actions are one of the most important fields of action of the PKK in Germany. In the focus of such actions are the fate of PKK leader Öcalan who is serving a prison sentence in Turkey, the military conflict in the border area of Turkey

and North Iraq and state measures against institutions in Germany that are close to the PKK. Central elements of the propaganda are demonstrations and rallies which usually pass off peacefully, as well as panel discussions, petitions, hunger strikes, vigils and press conferences. This way, the organisation regularly manages to highly mobilize its adherents.

The PKK and organisations that are close to it responded with massive protests to the military intervention of the Turkish armed forces against HPG positions in North Iraq in February 2008. The Brussels-based European umbrella organisation of Kurdish associations, the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD), the YEK-KOM, the Komalen Ciwan and the chairman of KONGRA GEL, Zübeyir Aydar, published statements which severely criticized the Turkish way of proceeding. All over Germany, protest rallies took place, some of which were accompanied by violent incidents.

This year's celebrations of the traditional Kurdish New Year Newroz were again attended by a large number of individuals. Newroz (21 March) means "new day", and since the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Kurds have understood that day as a celebration of resistance against tyranny and as a symbol of the Kurdish fight for freedom. Apart from numerous parades, usually in the form of torchlight processions, the main celebrations were held as indoor events in Berlin on 23 March 2008. The day before, 50,000 individuals (according to the daily newspaper YÖP which is close to PKK) had attended events in Essen, Frankfurt/Main and Hamburg. Early in April 2008, the KON-KURD called for a boycott of tourism in Turkey. In a declaration that was spread in German and English, it was claimed that the money Turkey gained from tourism was spent on the "war against the Kurdish people". On 14 June 2008, the 4<sup>th</sup> Zilan Women's Festival took place in Gelsenkirchen and was attended by 4,000 participants from Germany and other European countries. Besides a cultural supporting program with folklore, music and literature, political contents were addressed, too. The main part of the event started with a minute's silence in memory of the women who had lost their lives in the "Kurdish fight for freedom".

The festival that has taken place every year – except last year – since 2004 is named after Zeynep Kinaci aka "Zilan" who is worshipped as a martyr. She blew herself up in the East Anatolian province capital Tunceli on 30 June 1996 and killed at least six Turkish soldiers.

In response to the ban that was imposed on the Kurdish TV station Roj TV in Germany on 19 June 2008, rallies, vigils and

---

demonstrations took place in Germany as well as in the European neighboring countries: starting in a rather restrained manner, these events developed into massive protests in July and August 2008 that criticized the ban as a limitation of the freedom of opinion and as a German-Turkish conspiracy but passed off rather peacefully and without incidents.

On 12 July 2008, as already in the years before, the traditional "Mazlum Dogan Youth, Culture and Sports Festival" took place in Cologne. C. 5,000 mostly young adherents of the organisation from Germany and the neighboring countries participated in the event. Apart from sports contests and a cultural supporting program, political issues were also addressed in the form of lectures. A speech of an HPG commander which was shown on video included a call upon the young people to "come to the mountains" and join the armed PKK units.

The festival is named after the PKK functionary Mazlum Dogan who is worshipped as a martyr. He killed himself in a Turkish prison in 1982.

Upon the kidnapping of three German nationals in Turkey, the YEK-KOM organized a press conference in Berlin on 17 July 2008 which was attended by its chairman Ahmet Celik, his deputy Mehmet Demir and Nilüfer Koc of the Kongreya Neteweyî Ya Kurdistanê (KNK, Kurdistan National Congress)<sup>199</sup>. They described the kidnapping – which they referred to as "taking into custody" – as a consequence of Germany's "pro-Turkish" Kurdistan policy and demanded that the Federal Government address Turkey and speak up against a continuation of Turkey's military operations against the PKK and for an abandonment of Turkey's "repressive" attitude towards the Kurds in Germany.

**16<sup>th</sup> International Kurdish Culture Festival** On 6 September 2008, the 16<sup>th</sup> International Kurdish Culture Festival organized by the YEK-KOM took place in Gelsenkirchen – like the year before – and was attended by c. 35,000 individuals from all over Europe. The event was organized under the motto "Peace for Kurdistan, Freedom for Öcalan" and dedicated to the PKK "martyr" Halil Uysal. The PKK propaganda spot producer who was born in Germany was a guerrilla fighter himself and was killed in late March 2008 during an armed clash in South East Turkey. Accompanied by a

---

<sup>199</sup> The KNK with its headquarters in Brussels considers itself to represent the interests of all Kurds with the aim of sensitizing the European politicians and the European public for the concerns of the Kurds. The KNK is composed of numerous political parties, organisations and individual representatives, but is believed to be dominated by the PKK.

---

cultural supporting program with music and dance shows, lectures were held that criticized the ban on Roj TV, the operations of the Turkish military and the European and particularly the German policy on Kurds. In addition, a message of Öcalan was read out.

Of particular importance within the PKK's spectrum of action is the anniversary of Öcalan's expulsion from his exile in Syria (9 October 1998). The organisation considers that event a part of the "international conspiracy" that finally led to Öcalan's detention in February 1999. In remembrance of that day, several hundreds of PKK adherents organized rallies, short-time hunger strikes, wreath layings and information stands in numerous German cities, i. a. Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, Cologne, Leipzig, Saarbrücken and Stuttgart, and at the same time called attention towards Öcalan's prison conditions in Turkey.

**Reaction  
to an alleged  
mistreatment  
of Öcalan**

In October 2008, media close to the PKK claimed that Öcalan had been mistreated in prison. This caused a massive protest wave of PKK adherents in Germany as well as abroad. For example, the organisation managed to mobilize c. 2,500 participants from all over Germany for a demonstration held at short notice in Cologne on 18 October 2008.

#### **1.2.4 Activities of Komalen Ciwan**

Among all sectors of the organisation in Germany, the PKK youth which usually appears under the name of Komalen Ciwan shows the highest publicly perceptible propensity for violence. A common modus operandi in this group's offenses are the so-called 'hit and run actions', i.e. arson attacks carried out in the streets or directed against premises – usually by means of improvised Molotov cocktails – and a fast escape afterwards.

On 19 April 2008, on the occasion of a rally carried out by Komalen Ciwan in Berlin on the issue of "Freedom for Öcalan", repeated cases of violation of the Law Relating to Associations and/or the Law Concerning Assemblies and Processions could be determined as well as isolated cases of aggravated breach of the public peace. Some demonstrators strongly aimed at initiating violent physical clashes with people of Turkish origin. Besides, their attacks were also directed against police officers, with twelve of them being injured.

In October 2008, after publishing the allegations of Öcalan's mistreatment with regard to his detention conditions, in several German cities numerous arson attacks were carried out as well as actions of property damage and dangerous interference with road traffic. Claims of responsibility for some of these actions were published on Komalen Ciwan's website.

Already in the run-up to these announcements, a more aggressive tone could be determined. In September 2008, Komalen Ciwan proclaimed a "phase of radical actions" and announced an action campaign to take place in October and November. Already before, in the March issue of *Ciwanen Azad*, the youth organisation's magazine, calls had been made upon young people to form "self-defense units". These "cells" were meant to work clandestinely and "make their own decisions on actions in compliance with the organisation's current perspective and political guidelines".

#### **1.2.5 Financial and business activities**

For maintaining its broad structures, but also for financing the armed struggle in Turkey and Northern Iraq, the PKK depends on the funds of its adherents. The annual fund-raising campaign for the benefit of

---

"Kurdistan's liberty" – initiated in September and usually lasting until March of the following year – takes place in all the European countries where the organisation is represented.

After the sums of money raised from donations in Germany had been showing a downward trend for years, they increased again in 2008.

Every year, during a meeting the European leading cadres set the fund-raising targets relevant for the respective sectors and sub-sectors of the organisation. The fund-raisers who frequently act in a team initially try to convince the donors to go beyond their previous year's donations. At a second meeting, the promised funds are collected and passed by the fund-raisers to other functionaries. At a further meeting, the donors get receipts for the amounts paid by them. This gradual procedure is applied by the organisation to make it difficult for the police to give evidence in their investigations and in order to protect the collected funds. Thus, either merely receipts or only cash can be seized during possible searches, as long as the fund-raisers keep to the organisation's security directives.

When collecting money, the PKK first counts on efforts at persuasion. If these are not as successful as expected, also threats are possible. Usually, the injured parties do not report these offenses to the police.

Further proceeds could be attained from the sale of publications, membership subscriptions and the money gained from events and activities.

The raised funds which have not been used in Germany, are mostly transferred abroad by cash couriers or partly forwarded to the PKK structures in Turkey or in Northern Iraq.

The so-called 'finance and business office' (EMB) is responsible for all decisions in connection with PKK's financial transactions in Europe.

#### **1.2.6. Criminal proceedings against PKK functionaries**

Also in 2008, a series of criminal proceedings were instituted against leading functionaries of the organisation:

- On 10 April 2008, a senior PKK functionary was sentenced to three years and six months' imprisonment for being the ringleader of a criminal association. The State Security Division of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt/Main fixed the sentence in accordance with the Federal Public Prosecutor's motion. The court considered
-

it a proven fact that the leading functionary - as the so-called *Serit* leader *South* - had been responsible for the party's organisational, financial and propaganda-related concerns in many parts of South Germany between July 2005 and August 2006, when he was arrested.

- Since 22 July 2008, another leading functionary has been held in custody. The arrest was based on a warrant of arrest issued on 17 July 2008 by the investigating magistrate at the Federal High Court of Justice i.a. on suspicion of being the ringleader of a criminal association. The accused is strongly suspected of having been the organisation's leader of the *Serit Middle* in 2007 and of having been responsible for Germany as a whole afterwards.
  - On 25 August 2008, a charge was filed before the Regional Court of Koblenz against a leading PKK functionary for suspected membership of a criminal association. His arrest in Münster on 26 March 2008 was based on preliminary investigations instituted by the Koblenz Public Prosecutor's office.
  - On 28 August 2008, the Federal Public Prosecutor brought a charge before the State Security Division of the Frankfurt/Main Higher Regional Court against two suspected PKK functionaries for membership resp. support of a criminal association (Section 129 of the Criminal Code/ StGB). On the basis of an arrest warrant issued by the investigating magistrate at the Federal High Court of Justice, one of the accused had been arrested in Berlin on 26 March 2008. The second accused is said to have detained a "disloyal activist" in Darmstadt (Hesse) in order to push through - under threat of physical violence - an unjustified monetary claim for the organisation. He is already serving a prison sentence for involvement in an arson attack in Esslingen (Baden-Württemberg) in March 2007.
  - On 22 September 2008, the trial against another four suspected PKK members was opened before the Regional Court of Koblenz. The Public Prosecutor's Office accuses them in their function as responsible functionaries and activists in the Koblenz area to have violated the ban imposed in connection with the organisation's activities. In their activities, the accused are said to have not even stopped at extortion and bodily injury.
  - During the night of 1 to 2 October 2008, the police arrested another suspected PKK functionary on the night train from Flensburg to Neumünster. The detention was based on a
-

European arrest warrant for membership of a terrorist association, aggravated arson and arson resulting in death. The suspected leading functionary is accused of having ordered and organized attacks on Turkish facilities in Germany in 1993/1994 in his function as leader of the then PKK region *South*.

- On 4 and 5 November 2008, a leading functionary had to answer to the State Security Division of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court. On 20 May 2008, the Federal Public Prosecutor had brought a charge against him for membership of a criminal association. The Court found that from June 2003 until July 2006 the functionary had been a leading cadre of the PKK, first in Düsseldorf and then in Cologne, and that he - on behalf of the PKK - had arranged the organisational, financial, personnel and propaganda-related affairs there. Based on the judgment of 5 November 2008, the accused who had made a confession was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on probation.

## **2. Turkish nationals**

The majority of the Turkish organisations being under surveillance have a left-wing extremist orientation. In terms of ideology, the groups refer to the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism – some of them to its Maoist character. What they have in common, is their intent to abolish the social order in a revolutionary way and to establish a communist state system in Turkey. In content, these groupings are no longer exclusively dealing with Turkey-related issues, but they are more and more taking up matters subject to the political discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany, in order to act as alleged advocates of migrants' and employees' interests – for instance, issues regarding the Immigration Law, counter-terrorism, and the legal status of migrants in Germany. In particular, they criticized the Federal Armed Forces' "imperialist" foreign missions in Afghanistan and at other places.



## 2.1 Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front)

Founded:	In Damascus (Syria) in 1994, after the split in the Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), which was founded in Turkey in 1978 and banned in Germany in 1983
Leader:	Secretary General Dursun Karatas, who died on 11 August 2008; succession unknown
Members/adherents:	650 (2007: 650)
Publications:	<i>Devrimci Sol</i> (Revolutionary Left), at irregular intervals; <i>Yürüyüş</i> (March), weekly
Banned:	On 6 August 1998

The Marxist-Leninist DHKP-C aims at eliminating the Turkish state and establishing a socialist classless society. It continues to propagate the armed people's struggle under its leadership. In Germany, it has been subject to a ban since 1998, and since 2 May 2002 it has been listed by the EU as a terrorist organisation. In the statement issued late in March 2008 in remembrance of the party's founding and the "killed party members", the continuation of this ideological orientation has been substantiated:

*The Party Front is the basic force, and it is due to its leadership that the red flag of revolution and socialism is still flying. (...) Being a socialist means defending an alternative system to capitalism and fighting for this system. (...) One day, we will come to power; and sooner or later the PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY POWER will be set up in this country. (...) The way of revolution in Turkey is the way that our party has been following. Our way is the way of struggling for our people's liberation.*  
(DHKP<sup>200</sup> Statement no. 38 dated 25 March 2008)

<sup>200</sup> Revolutionary People's Liberation Party, the political wing of the DHKP-C.

**Death of the  
Secretary General  
Dursun Karatas**

On 11 August 2008, Dursun Karatas, the founder of the DHKP-C, who had been its Secretary General for many years, died in the Netherlands. In a statement issued on the same day, the DHKP confirmed its striving for a continuation of the struggle:

*We will continue our struggle - following the way he showed us - until we have gained victory. One of the objectives which he devoted himself to was the people's revolutionary power. The people's power, for which he personally laid the foundations, will be set up in this country sooner or later. (...) We, as the Party-Front cadres, have to take care of the revolution and organisation, without wasting any moment; we have to fulfil the revolutionary tasks with great determination and even greater enthusiasm, in order to fill the gap he has left. This is our commander's last wish – his primary expectation from cadres of a revolution, the leader of which has died.”* (DHKP Statement no. 39 dated 11 August 2008)

To the Secretary General's death, the organisation's adherents reacted with commemorative ceremonies. The organisation did not make any statements on the succession or future leadership structures of the DHKP-C.

In Turkey, the DHKP-C still maintains smaller terrorist units, which – in accordance with the ideological objectives – are intended to pave the way for the revolution by means of the armed struggle. However, DHKP-C's terrorist activities in Turkey have lessened recently. Nevertheless, Turkish security agencies have carried out searches and arrests. Three DHKP-C adherents arrested in Istanbul in March 2008 were accused of having planned attacks on American companies in Turkey. Repeated bans – limited in time – were imposed on the DHKP-C publication *Yürüyüş*, to which the organisation responded with various renamings of the magazine.

**Protest against  
alleged "racist  
violence" in  
Germany**

In the spring of 2008, the Anatolian Federation, an organisation associated with the DHKP-C, brought forward the reproach that several apartment fires in Germany, in particular the house fire in Ludwigshafen on 3 February 2008, had resulted from racist-motivated attacks. In the framework of their campaign "Stop racist violence", about 50 adherents of the organisation demonstrated in Cologne on 15 March 2008. Even though a xenophobic background could be ruled out, the grouping adhered to its allegations. In October 2008, concerts took place in Cologne, Berlin and Hamburg, which were organized by the Anatolian Federation under the slogan "In a joint effort against

---

racism and exclusion".

On 19 April 2008, the DHKP-C held the traditional mass rally in Paris on the occasion of its founding. A political training camp initially intended to also take place in France was moved to Austria at short notice, after the police had taken measures against DHKP-C adherents in France early in June 2008.

**Criminal  
proceedings against  
DHKP-C  
functionaries**

On 17 March 2008, the trial has been instituted against five DHKP-C functionaries before the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court. The individuals are accused of membership of a terrorist association in Turkey since 2002 (under Section 129 in connection with Section 129a of the Criminal Code/ StGB).

In reaction to this trial, an 'Anti-Repression Alliance' – comprised of Turkish and German groupings – was formed, which i.a. organizes info sessions nationwide. It also includes the TAYAD Committee, an organisation associated with the DHKP-C, which in particular has been dealing with the propagandistic support of arrested DHKP-C adherents in Turkey.

On 9 December 2008, under Section 129a of the Criminal Code (StGB) the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court gave a female German national a one year and ten months' suspended sentence for having supported the DHKP-C in the late nineties. The judgment has become final. At that time, according to the Federal Public Prosecutor's charge, the convicted woman was responsible for the production and dissemination of publications and other propaganda material of the DHKP-C.

Besides, on 24 July 2008, the Federal Public Prosecutor brought a charge before the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court against a suspected DHKP-C functionary. The stateless person of Turkish origin is i.a. accused of murder, attempted murder, ringleadership of a foreign terrorist association and various explosives offenses. Until his arrest in Hagen on 8 April 2007, he allegedly was a member of the top level – the central committee of the DHKP-C. In that function, together with the other members of the central committee, he is said to have ordered eleven bomb attacks to be carried out in Turkey, i.a. from January 2001 to July 2005, during which a total of twelve people were killed, including five suicide attackers.

## 2.2 Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists-Leninists)

Founded:	In 1972 (in Turkey)
Members/adherents:	C. 1,300 in total (2007: c. 1,300)
The organisation is split into the:	
<b>Partizan group</b>	
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Members/adherents:	800 (2007: 800)
Publications:	<i>Özgür Gelecek Yolunda Isci Köylü</i> (Workers and Farmers on the Road to a New Democratic State), fortnightly; <i>Komünist</i> (The Communist), monthly
and the	
<b>Maoist Komünist Partisi (MKP, Maoist Communist Party) (until September 2002 called the East Anatolian Area Committee)</b>	
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Members/adherents:	500 (2007: 500)
Publications:	<i>Halk İçin Devrimci Demokrasi</i> (Revolutionary Democracy for the People), fortnightly; <i>Halk Savası</i> (People's War), monthly

In 1994, a split in the parent party resulted in the forming of two independent factions, the Partizan group and the Maoist Komünist Partisi (MKP, Maoist Communist Party).

Despite that development, both groupings have oriented themselves to the same ideology, i.e. Marxism-Leninism resp. Maoism:

*Let us take to the streets on May Day against the attacks of imperialism and those of its minion, fascist Turkey! (...) Long live proletarian internationalism! Long live Marxism, Leninism and Maoism! (...) Long live the people's war!*  
(Flyer published by the MKP, April 2008)

Both groups have been pursuing the objective of waging a people's war in their home country Turkey – ending in the 'people's revolution' which is aimed at setting up a communist social order. On the occasion of the TKP/ML's 36<sup>th</sup> founding anniversary, the Partizan group formulated its objectives as follows:

*For 36 years, our party has been the torch of communism that is still burning! (...) We are going to destroy the state of capitalist exploiters, heads/managers and estate owners and to establish the power of the people! (...) Long live the democratic people's revolution! Long live the people's struggle!*  
(Flyer published by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the TKP/ML, April 2008)

In order to achieve these objectives by force, the Partizan group maintains a guerrilla unit called Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (TIKKO, Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army); the MKP has the People's Liberation Army (HKO). In the past, both the Partizan group and the MKP claimed responsibility for terrorist actions carried out by their guerrilla units in their home country.

In Germany, both factions confine themselves to separate propaganda activities and, in particular, to the collection of funds in support of the parent organisations. Numerous adherents attend the annual commemorative ceremonies held in honor of the party founder Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, who already died in 1973. C. 1,200 individuals attended the event organized by the MKP in Cologne on 10 May 2008; c. 2,500 individuals participated in the commemorative ceremony of the Partizan group in Ludwigshafen (Rhineland-Palatinate) on 24 May 2008. Besides, the MKP tried to generate publicity for three other events scheduled to take place on that issue in various European cities.

---

In memory of the 17 MKP activists killed during a gun battle with the Turkish Armed Forces in June 2005, a Turkish article was published on the Internet:

*Mercan is history! History written in blood cannot be wiped out! Those killed in Mercan are immortal! Down with fascism! Long live our struggle!*

(Internet statement issued by the ADHK, 17 June 2008)

In addition to the party structures of the Partizan group and the MKP in Germany, which have mainly been acting in a conspiratorial way, there are also overtly agitating organisations associated with them. Regarding the Partizan group, on a European level, the Avrupa Türkiyeli İşçiler Konfederasyonu (ATİK, Confederation of Workers from Turkey in Europe) and in Germany, the Almanya Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (ATİF, Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany, reg'd society) are to be mentioned. The MKP, on a European level, has the Avrupa Demokratik Halklar Konfederasyonu (ADHK, Confederation for Democratic Rights in Europe) and, in Germany, the Almanya Demokratik Haklar Federasyonu (ADHF, Federation for Democratic Rights in Germany, reg'd society). Independent actions resp. demonstrations of the Partizan group, the MKP or its associated organisations could be determined only in isolated cases. Nevertheless, these groupings are regularly involved in May Day events and rallies.

Jointly with German left-wing extremist organisations, the ATİK published a call condemning the Federal Armed Forces' missions abroad. Under the heading "German troops abroad - get out!" it says:

*The German Armed Forces' missions abroad do not serve humanitarian purposes. It is a matter of securing large profits for big German companies and the German state through strategically important areas of influence and markets. In short, it is about imperialist interests. Germany has joined the imperialist powers' fighting for the largest areas of influence and strives to put its competitors in their place. (...) We respond to the capitalists' raids with international solidarity. We have a special duty towards the peoples exploited and robbed by German imperialism. So, we have to take to the streets and make every effort to succeed in realizing our claim for a withdrawal of all German troops from abroad!*

(Internet statement issued by the ATİK, 18 September 2008)

---

On 5 December 2007, the police carried out searches with TKP/ML adherents in various federal states. The measure was taken on the grounds of preliminary proceedings under Section 129b of the Criminal Code (StGB) on suspicion of having supported the guerrilla group TIKKO in Turkey. In protest against the searches, the ATIF made the following polemic statement:

*This state terrorizes and provokes the democratic organisations like the ATIF and the other immigrant organisations also through reactionary laws like the Sections 129 a/b. At the same time, this Section is not applicable to fascist and racist organisations. This is the German state's government policy (...) Down with imperialism, fascism and any other reaction! Long live the international solidarity!*  
(Internet statement issued by the ATIF, 22 April 2008)

In joint action fields, solidarity among the various associated organisations became obvious regarding subject and propaganda matters. In Berlin, on 20 September 2008, numerous groupings held a joint protest rally against the "occupation of Afghanistan". Under the slogan "Against imperialist attacks and occupation", several thousand people – including adherents of the ADHK and ATIK – demonstrated and called for the withdrawal of the troops.

### 2.3 Marksist Leninist Kommünist Partisi (MLKP)

Founded:	In Turkey in 1994, through the merger of the TKP/ML-Hareketi (TKP/ML Movement) and the Türkiye Komünist İşçi Hareketi (TKİH, Turkish Communist Workers' Movement)
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Members/adherents:	600 (2007: 600)
Publications:	<i>Atilim</i> (The Venture) weekly; <i>Internationales Bulletin der MLKP</i> (International Bulletin of the MLKP) monthly; <i>Partinin Sesi</i> (The Voice of the Party), bi-monthly

The MLKP with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, whose ideology shows a Stalinist variant, aims at overthrowing the state order in Turkey and establishing a communist regime.

The organisation legitimizes violence to achieve its aims. For instance, it claimed responsibility for an explosives attack in its home country:

*"In the night of 8 May, militants of our party bombed the local office of the ruling party AKP in the quarter Cakmak in Ümraniye, Istanbul. The AKP is responsible for the terror directed against the workers and employees on May Day. In a statement to the press, the MLKP militants who carried out that action claimed responsibility for the action as follows: 'We, the militants of the MLKP, have bombed the local AKP office in the quarter Cakmak, Ümraniye, in retaliation of what happened on May Day. Long live our Taksim resistance! We have taken revenge for the attacks and will continue to do so. Long live our party MLKP!' "*

(MLKP's website, 14 May 2008)

In 2008, MLKP's propaganda dealt with the Kurdish issue, the anti-imperialist struggle, the subject of "political prisoners in Turkey" as well as with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An article published in its party organ *Atilim* says in this context:

*The German chancellor Angela Merkel set out on a three-day journey to Israel to support Zionism (...). She emphasized that the Iranian nuclear program would entail a catastrophe and ordered to prevent such a disaster. It was conspicuous that Merkel referred to peace in her speech before the Knesset, but did not make a stopover in Palestine.*

(Atilim No. 201 of 22 March 2008, p. 9)

Two organisations in Germany, which are thematically associated with the MLKP, are the Avrupa Ezilen Göçmenler Konfederasyonu (AvEG-KON, Confederation of the Oppressed Immigrants in Europe) and the Föderation der Arbeitsimmigrant/innen aus der Türkei in Deutschland e.V. (AGIF, Federation of the Immigrant Workers from Turkey in Germany reg'd society), with their agitation being similar to that of the MLKP in political-ideological respect. Their statements are also about sociopolitical issues with Germany-related links. The AGIF, for

---



instance, comments on issues of counter-terrorism, the Immigration Law and migrants in Germany:

*On the pretext of countering terrorism, a series of laws were adopted, such as the Section 129b of the Anti-Terrorism Act, to intimidate and silence progressive migrants and refugees. The new Immigration Law was enacted, which in the name of the German Capital classifies migrants into useful and useless ones, thus preparing the ground for the unequal treatment of migrants. Language tests – the questions of which could not even be solved by German nationals – have to be passed by migrants who want to acquire German nationality. Countries like Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded in the name of democracy and human dignity. Palestine and Lebanon were bombed. Officially, the wars were waged in the name of 'democracy' and 'to counter international terrorism'. But of particular relevance were in fact the exploitation of raw materials and the geostrategic interests of the warmongering countries.*

(Flyer published by the AGIF, September 2008)

*Atilim* reported on the participation of AGIF and MLKP members in May Day demonstrations in Duisburg, Hamburg and Frankfurt/Main in 2008. In a flyer published by the AGIF on 26 June 2008, it protested against the ban imposed on the Kurdish television channel Roj TV. Germany was urged to stop that sort of "attacks" on the Kurdish people and their associations as soon as possible. In the flyer, the AGIF claimed its solidarity with Roj TV, which – according to the AGIF – is the voice of the revolting, oppressed Kurdish people and embodies the people's wishes and interests.

### 3. Iranians

One of the Iranian opposition groupings' main concerns in the Federal Republic of Germany is the public criticism of the political and social situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the adherents of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the largest organisation within this spectrum, did not only make Iran's internal state of affairs, such as the human rights situation, a subject of discussion but continued to call for the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran) to be definitely deleted from the EU's list of terrorist organisations<sup>201</sup>. To win over politicians, members of parliament and

---

<sup>201</sup> See footnote 197.

other distributors to their concern, they intensified their lobbying. Compared to the NCRI, the other Iranian groupings like the Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI) and its splinter factions have been developing much less activities.

### 3.1 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran)

Founded:	In 1965 (in Iran)
Headquarters:	Formerly in Baghdad; there are no registered offices in Germany
Leader:	Massoud Radjavi
Publications:	I.a. <i>Modjahed</i> (Religious Fighter), weekly
Outside the home region represented by the:	
<b>National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)</b>	
Founded:	In 1981 (in Paris); represented in Germany since 1994
Headquarters:	Berlin
Leader:	Spokesperson for Germany: Dr. Massoumeh Bolourchi
Members/adherents:	900 (2007: 900)

Due to its terrorist modus operandi practiced until early in 2002, the MEK is the most important Iranian opposition group. At that time, the fighters of its military wing – the National Liberation Army (NLA) – located in Iraq were responsible for numerous attacks on facilities and representatives of Iran. Since the NLA was disarmed in the course of the Iraq war in May 2003, the preconditions for carrying out terrorist activities in Iran have not existed for the time being. Against this background, the formerly propagated objective of a violent overthrow in Iran is unrealistic so far.

However, the future of the c. 3,500 MEK members who are still staying at the Ashraf Camp in Iraq is uncertain. In the summer of

---

2008, the NCRI, MEK's political wing, referred to ongoing negotiations between the coalition forces and the Iraqi government, which were aimed at immediately closing down the camp. Against this background, it seems to be more and more uncertain if the camp will continue to exist.

Given MEK's situation in Iraq, the organisation's activities have been focusing on political aims in Western Europe and the USA. The NCRI plays a key role in this context.

**NCRI's lobbying** The current actions of the NCRI continue to be characterized by an absence of violence. The organisation wants to be perceived as a democratic Iranian opposition movement, thus striving for the MEK to be deleted from the EU's list of terrorist organisations<sup>202</sup>. It has carried out intensive propaganda activities against the Iranian government and – through clever lobbying– has tried to influence public opinion and social and political decision-makers in accordance with its own interests. That strategy has also included attempts to establish contact with government and parliament members, in order to inform them about the organisation's alleged democratic objectives and to prompt them to render political support. A thematic approach in this context is in particular the strategy of the so-called "third way"<sup>203</sup> propagated by Maryam Radjavi – the wife of the MEK leader Massoud RADJAVI – who in 1993 was elected the "future president of Iran" by the NCRI.

**Listing of the MEK as a terrorist organisation<sup>204</sup>** By judgment of 4 December 2008, the European Court has annulled the EU Council Decision 2008/583 of 15 July 2008 with regard to the listing, as far as the MEK is concerned. On 26 January 2009, the EU Council adopted a new consolidated version of the terrorist list, on which the MEK is no longer registered.

In order to gain support for its concerns, the NCRI has also arranged demonstrations as well as information and propaganda events. In that context, it again used local groupings like the Rat der Iraner in Köln (Council of Iranians in Cologne) or the Exil-Iranische Gesellschaft in Berlin (EIGB, Society of Exiled Iranians in Berlin).

---

<sup>202</sup> See footnote 197.

<sup>203</sup> According to that, a change of the political circumstances in Iran can be brought about neither by military intervention of the USA (the "first way") nor by a "policy of appeasement" pursued by Europe (the "second way"); thus, the "third option" is the radical political change in Iran caused by the Iranian people and their "organized resistance", including the NLA as the 'Liberation Army'

<sup>204</sup> See footnote 197.

As in the previous year, NCRI adherents from Germany participated in the organisation's rallies in neighboring states, such as the prolonged demonstrations in front of the UNHCR office in Geneva, to protest against the possible shutdown of the Ashraf Camp in Iraq. Besides, NCRI members from Germany travelled to a mass rally of the organisation in Villepinte near Paris on 28 June 2008 – on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Maryam Radjavi's arrest in France (17 June 2003). As stated by the organisation, nearly 70,000 individuals attended that event which has taken place regularly since 2003. The large number of participants – even if exaggerated by the organisation – was i.a. due to the involvement of numerous individuals who did not belong to the organisation but who – in return for their participation – were offered a trip to Paris at a reasonable price.

**Fund-raising  
campaigns of the  
NCRI**

To finance its activities, the organisation i.a. carried out large-scale and professionally organized fund-raising activities under the cover of humanitarian aims, mostly in the form of street collections. The fund-raisers usually appeared in small groups, and also Iranians who had been systematically recruited in homes for asylum seekers before were employed under the guidance of experienced activists of the organisation. The fund-raisers presented information material on atrocities and violations of human rights in Iran – i.a. photos of tortured and executed individuals and of refugees and orphans – in order thus to encourage the people's readiness to donate money. Donators were caused to enter their names in donation lists and so to reveal their personal data or support political campaigns of the organisation by signing specially prepared lists. The groupings mentioned below took action in that context:

- the Menschenrechtszentrum für ExiliranerInnen e.V. (MEI, Human Rights Centre for Exiled Iranians, reg'd society), Düsseldorf,
  - the Menschenrechtsverein für Migranten e.V. (MIM, Human Rights Association for Iranian Migrants, reg'd society), Aachen,
  - the Hilfswerk für Menschenrechte im Iran e.V. (HMI, Relief Organisation for Human Rights in Iran, reg'd society), Dortmund,
  - the Verein für Menschen und Freiheit e.V. (VMF, Association for Humans and Liberty, reg'd society), Troisdorf – and
  - the Verein für Hoffnung der Zukunft e.V. (VHdZ, Association for Hope in the Future, reg'd society), Berlin.
-

### 3.2 Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)

Founded:	In 1991 as a splinter group of the Communist Party of Iran
Members/adherents:	250 (2007: 250)
The organisation is split into the	
<b>Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)</b>	
Leader:	Hamid Taghvai
Publication:	<i>API-Brief</i> (WPI Letter) monthly
<b>Worker-Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist (WPI-Hekmatist)</b>	
Leader:	Kurosh Modaresi
Publication:	<i>Komonist</i> (Communist), monthly
and the	
<b>Worker-Communism Unity Party (WUP)</b>	
Leader:	Ali Javadi
Publication:	<i>A better world</i> , weekly

After in August 2004 the Worker-Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist (WPI-Hekmatist) had split off the Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI), another faction broke away from the WPI in 2007. The Worker-Communism Unity Party (WUP), which developed as a result of that split, has been striving – like the WPI and the WPI-Hekmatist – for a revolution in Iran with a view to overthrowing the current form of government and replacing it by a socialist system.

A communiqué published by the WUP says:

*Worker-Communism Party struggles, in any situation, for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the immediate establishment of a communist society.*

(Internet statement published by the WUP, 7 November 2008)

Similarly, the WPI stated:

*"It is impossible for a radical, maximalist, revolutionary Party like ours to get to power in any way but revolution."*

(Internet statement published by the API, 7 November 2008)

Also the WPI-Hekmatist has been pursuing the same objective:

*The immediate challenge we are faced with is to build a political party and provide leadership in the society to topple the Islamic Republic as the first step in accomplishing the socialist revolution."*

('Komonist' No. 1, December 2005, p. 5)

All three organisations refer to the ideology - influenced by Marxism-Leninism - of Mansour Hekmat, the WPI founder who died in 2002. Differences at most exist with regard to strategic aspects. The WPI and WUP, for instance, advocate establishing a communist social system in the course of a revolutionary development brought about by the communist party alone, whereas the WPI-Hekmatist is willing to initially enter into political alliances with non-socialist forces.

In Germany, the WPI, WPI-Hekmatist and WUP strive to be accepted as social and political forces, in particular by the local Iranian exiles. Basically, their activities were limited to minor information sessions, with the violation of human rights in Iran being the main subject of discussion. In this context, especially the WPI and WPI-Hekmatist also use other associated organisations. To the WPI, these are in particular the Internationale Kampagne zur Verteidigung der Frauenrechte im Iran (International Campaign to Defend Women's Rights in Iran), the Internationales Komitee gegen Steinigung (International Committee against Stoning) and the Internationale Föderation Iranischer Flüchtlings- und Immigrantenräte (IFIRIC, International Federation of Iranian Refugees and Immigrants Councils). Due to the split, however, all three organisations again lost significance, with no conspicuous actions being attributable to them in 2008.

#### 4. Tamils

##### **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**

Founded:	In 1972 (in Sri Lanka)
Leadership:	Cadre for the German section
Members/adherents:	800 (2007: 800)
Publication:	<i>Viduthalai Puligal</i> (Liberation Tigers), fortnightly

The LTTE is aiming at setting up a Tamil state "Tamil Eelam" – independent of Sri Lanka and comprising the north and east of the island, the areas which are mainly populated by Tamils. The organisation has been pursuing this objective since early in the eighties, even by force of arms.

2008 again was marked by intensive military conflicts between guerrilla forces of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces. On 2 January 2008, the Sri Lankan government had unilaterally cancelled the cease-fire agreement with the LTTE concluded in 2001 through mediation of Norway. The cease-fire, which both conflict parties had actually ignored since July 2006, definitely terminated after a transition period of two weeks stipulated in the contract. Many people were killed during the fighting which became stronger on both sides and resulted in a tide of refugees from the war zones in the north and east of the island.

For the LTTE, the military situation very much aggravated in the course of 2008. By an offensive, the Sri Lankan armed forces tried to break LTTE's military resistance once and for all. The LTTE increasingly responded with bomb and suicide attacks against military and civilian targets. Thus, various attacks on public transportation can be ascribed to it. The LTTE is also said to be responsible for the killing of two ministers of the Sri Lankan government through well-targeted suicide attacks.

Since 29 May 2006, the LTTE has been included in the EU list of terrorist organisations<sup>205</sup>.

In Germany, its followers have been focusing on fund-raising campaigns and propaganda activities. While still in the previous year LTTE's military failures in Sri Lanka seemed to curb people's readiness to donate money in the diaspora, an increase in collected funds is to be expected against the background of the looming humanitarian catastrophe which the civilian population in the war zone will be confronted with. The organisation's appeals for funds have mostly been justified by humanitarian ends; nevertheless a large part of the raised funds is likely to serve military purposes.

At LTTE adherents' demonstrations in Germany, it has time and again been called for an independent Tamil state "Tamil Eelam" and human rights violations by the government of Sri Lanka have been criticized. On 28 June 2008, for instance, c. 3,500 individuals of Tamil nationality from all over Germany staged a demonstration in front of the North Rhine-Westphalian parliament in Düsseldorf under the motto "Recognition of the Tamils' right to self-determination". Posters showed photos of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan as well as LTTE symbols.

In Berlin, on 10 October 2008, c. 1,400 Tamils protested against the war waged in Sri Lanka. On posters, the Sri Lankan government was called upon to stop the bombing of the Tamil population. The organizer of both demonstrations was the LTTE-orientated Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC) with its headquarters in Oberhausen (North Rhine-Westphalia).

On 27 November 2008, the traditional "Memorial Day" with c. 6,000 participants took place in Dortmund. In his annual video message published on the Internet, the LTTE leader Prabakharan emphasized that the Liberation Movement of the People of Tamil Eelam would never accept Singhalese occupation or dominance over the Tamils' home country. The fighting would go on until the "Singhalese occupying forces" had been expelled. Besides, he urged the Tamils all over the world to get increasingly involved in the Liberation Movement. This formulation can also be judged as a call upon his adherents to donate further funds. Already in the previous year – in his speech on the occasion of the "Memorial Day" – Prabakharan had thanked the Tamil diaspora for its financial support.

---

<sup>205</sup> See footnote 197.

---



## 5. Sikhs

### **Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)**

Founded:	In 1978 (in India)
Leadership:	National executive
Members/adherents:	200 (2007: 200)

### **International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)**

Founded:	In 1984 (in the United Kingdom)
Leadership:	Split into three factions, each with its own national executive
Members/adherents:	550 (2007: 550)

### **Kamagata Maru Dal International (KMDI)**

Founded:	In 1997 (in the United States)
Leadership:	National executive
Members/adherents:	40 (2007: 40)

For decades, extremist organisations from the spectrum of the Sikh religious community have also been using terrorist means to fight for the establishment of an independent state of Khalistan on the area of the federal state of Punjab in Northern India. With attacks against members of the Indian government and terrorist attacks – mainly directed against facilities and targets in India so far – they have been trying to draw attention to their political concerns. Time and again, these attacks have claimed numerous civilian casualties.

In Germany, in particular the BKI and the ISYF – listed by the EU as terrorist organisations<sup>206</sup> since 2 May 2002 – with altogether c. 750 adherents have been active. Compared to that, the KMDI with its small number of followers and rather low level of activities has kept a low profile.

---

<sup>206</sup> See footnote 197.

These organisations have not yet carried out any terrorist activities in Germany.

The main objective of these Sikh groupings in Germany is to render propaganda-related and, in particular, financial support to their respective parent organisations in India. At regular events, they i.a. appeal for funds. Part of the funds raised might well be used by the parent organisations in India to finance their armed struggle. Besides, such donations serve to support the families of the organisation's "martyrs" killed in the armed struggle and to protect them financially or to provide legal assistance to fellow Sikhs in prison.

### III. Overview of other noteworthy organisations

Organisation	Members/adherents (partly estimated)	
	2008	(2007)
<b>Turks (excluding Kurds)</b>		
Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF, Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Hearths in Europe, reg'd society)	7,000	(7,500)

## **Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities**

### **I. Overview**

<b>Germany is an intelligence target</b>	<p>The Federal Republic of Germany is a very attractive target for foreign intelligence services on account of its geopolitical situation, the important role it plays within the EU and NATO, and the fact that numerous world-leading manufacturers of cutting-edge technology are based here. Its open and pluralistic society makes intelligence gathering easier for intelligence services. Key countries currently engaged in espionage activities in Germany are the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, as well as countries in the Middle and Far East and North Africa.</p>
<b>Presence of foreign intelligence services</b>	<p>Varying numbers of intelligence staff are assigned to the official or semi-official missions of these countries in Germany, where they run what are known as 'legal residencies'. The term refers to a base used by a foreign intelligence service in a host country under cover of one of its own country's official (e.g. embassy, consulate-general) or semi-official (e.g. press agency, airline) missions.</p> <p>The intelligence staff working under diplomatic or journalistic cover either themselves engage in overt or covert information-gathering activities or support intelligence operations run by intelligence operations from the services' central headquarters in their home country. Where it can be proved that these 'diplomats' have engaged in activities that are incompatible with their alleged status, the person in question may be expelled from Germany.</p>
<b>Intelligence targets</b>	<p>Intelligence services are under political control and fulfil tasks regulated by law. Their information-gathering activities are conducted in accordance with current political requirements or economic priorities set in their home countries. The foreign intelligence services' intelligence targets range from information-gathering activities in the fields of politics, business and the military, to spying on and infiltrating organisations and individuals in Germany that are opposed to the governments in their countries of origin.</p>

---

**Proliferation** In addition, some countries are continuing their efforts to gain possession of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of the related delivery systems, and to acquire the material and the know-how required for the manufacture of such weapons systems. Nations involved in proliferation, such as Iran and North Korea, are attempting to circumvent controls by having goods delivered via third countries and by procuring 'dual use' goods.<sup>207</sup>

**Cyber attacks** Internet-based attacks on businesses' and government agencies' computer systems are gaining increasing significance. Given the chosen targets and the methods applied, it seems very probable that these attacks are in many cases controlled or at least supported by intelligence services.

**Industrial espionage** Some intelligence services are expanding their investigations of intelligence targets in the fields of business, science and technology. Technologically less developed countries tend to be interested in technical know-how so as to save themselves the costs of conducting their own research and development, and to avoid paying any potential licence fees. More highly developed countries are, by contrast, interested in product ideas, complex production techniques, and corporate and marketing strategies.

## **II. The intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**

### **1. Structural developments, current situation and tasks of the services within the Russian state**

Dmitry Medvedev's election as the new President of the Russian Federation and the associated personnel changes in the country's leadership have had no major impact on the organisational structure and tasks of the Russian intelligence and security services. They continue to provide the foundation on which Russia's security architecture is built and are still regarded as reliable guarantors of internal security and state sovereignty.

---

<sup>207</sup> Products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes or those associated with proliferation.

---

The services undertake a wealth of tasks and engage in multifarious information-gathering activities at home and abroad in support of important domestic, foreign and power policy decisions taken by the government; they also have a part to play in promoting Russia's economic development and in asserting its interests at international level.

In a speech given in September 2008 on the occasion of the appointment of high-ranking military officials, the Russian President addressed the country's future security structure and also made reference to what would be required of the intelligence services. He announced that the armed forces would be undergoing extensive personnel and material restructuring and modernisation due to last until 2020, and called on the foreign intelligence services to step up their activities to expose external threats to national security.

The following intelligence services of the Russian Federation are engaged in activities directed against German security interests:

**SVR** The civilian intelligence service Sluzhba Vnyeshney Razvedki (SVR, Civilian Russian External Intelligence Service) is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence in the fields of politics, business, science and technology. It also investigates targets of and methods applied by Western intelligence services and security authorities. It has a staff of more than 13,000.

**GRU** Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravlenie (GRU, General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate) is Russia's military foreign intelligence service. It is subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defence and has a staff of around 12,000.

GRU intelligence activities target the fields of security policy and the military, including the Bundeswehr, NATO and other Western defence structures, as well as military technology.

**FSB** The domestic intelligence service Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB, Federal Security Service) has a staff of at least 350,000 and engages in an especially wide range of activities.

It is responsible for civilian and military counter-espionage, for monitoring political extremism and combating terrorism and organised crime. As well as being involved in 'combating terrorism' in the North Caucasus region, it is tasked with implementing measures to protect Russian industry against industrial espionage and organised crime, and to protect foreign investors against white-collar crime.

---

The FSB is also responsible for protecting the Russian national border and carrying out border controls, for ensuring the security of telecommunications, and for the security of information technology.

In addition, the FSB engages in intensive Internet surveillance in Russia. It has permanent access to data traffic routed through Russian providers. It also has permanent access to the databases of personal data and information on customers and their telephone calls maintained by Russian telephone companies. Foreign nationals may, therefore, come to the FSB's attention and be placed under targeted surveillance if they use the Internet or telephone via Russian providers or in Russia itself.

The FSB's counter-intelligence activities also include foreign intelligence gathering. For that reason foreigners in Russia must be prepared for the FSB to make attempts to recruit them as agents to that end.

In May 2008 President Medvedev appointed the head of the FSB's economic security unit, Alexander Bortnikov, to succeed the previous FSB Director, Nikolai Patrushev.

## **2. Intelligence targets and priorities**

The Russian leadership continues to engage in comprehensive intelligence-gathering activities directed at Germany. Intelligence activities by Russian foreign intelligence services were again registered in all target areas in 2008.

**Politics** These information-gathering activities continue to focus on political intelligence. Intelligence-gathering activities in this area cover all policy fields in which decisions that could influence Russian political interests are prepared or taken, including, by tradition, the alliance policies of the EU and NATO.

The services were, for instance, interested in the opinion held by political decision-makers following calls for Germany to commit more forces to Afghanistan. In the run-up to Kosovo's declaration of independence, they were required to collect intelligence on the West's attitude to this prospect and what impact the country's official recognition might have on the West's relations with the Russian Federation. Another focus of intelligence-gathering activities was the current Caucasus problem, especially the military conflict with Georgia in August 2008, and its impact on Germany's, the EU's and NATO's political relations with the parties involved in the conflict. The causes

---

of the financial crisis, measures to overcome it and to promote economic growth were another focus of attention.

As far as domestic policy is concerned, attention focused on political parties and their internal decision-making processes, as well as possible coalitions.

- The military** As regards the military, the services were interested in intelligence concerning security and defence policies, and the United States' plans to deploy an antimissile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The services were also interested in technical and civilian protection equipment that might also be used in the event of war.
- Business and the economy** The focus of attention in the fields of business and the economy is on alternative and renewable energy sources, means of increasing energy efficiency, European energy interests and Germany's economic situation against the backdrop of the current financial crisis.
- Science and technology** As regards science and technology, the services' intelligence-gathering activities focused on computer, telecommunications and security technology, and products in the fields of metrology and aerospace.

### **3. Intelligence-gathering methods**

Intelligence-gathering activities in Germany are mainly carried out by intelligence officers under diplomatic or journalistic cover. Intelligence-gathering operations are also conducted under direct control from headquarters in Moscow. Intensive communications intelligence-gathering operations are also carried out. Intelligence activities directed against Germany are, furthermore, carried out in Russia or on the territory of other states.

The Russian intelligence services gather the majority of their intelligence by analysing open sources such as the Internet and other media, by attending industry trade fairs and lectures, and through meetings with their contacts. However, they also use conspiratorial methods to acquire particularly sensitive information.

---

### **3.1 Legal residencies of the Russian intelligence services**

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Russian Federation provide the most important cover for the Russian services' intelligence-gathering activities in Germany. Within these government facilities as well as some Russian press agencies, a large number of posts are reserved for intelligence staff under diplomatic or journalistic cover, primarily staff of the SVR and GRU. These intelligence staff are employed in all areas, and, taken as a whole, constitute what are known as 'legal residencies' that are engaged in all types of intelligence service activities in a host country.

**Large number of intelligence personnel** In 2008, members of the Russian services made up a large share of the total number of staff employed in Russian foreign missions in Germany, and were clearly over-represented in comparison to other European countries. This clearly indicates how important an intelligence target Germany is. The SVR and GRU maintain their largest base in Germany at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Berlin.

Intelligence officers working under cover as diplomats benefit from the privileged status under international law enjoyed by foreign missions. Their diplomatic immunity generally protects them against criminal prosecution in their host country.

**Overt information gathering** When it comes to overt information gathering, intelligence officers maintain numerous contacts in all intelligence areas within the framework of their official duties.

From among this group of people they will select those who appear suitable as longer-term sources. Important criteria are the contact person's current access to relevant information and their career prospects, and a good overall rapport. Gradually, a network of contact persons is thus established that can be tapped into on a regular basis or as and when required without needing to be in closer contact with the intelligence services. The members of the intelligence services acquire even sensitive information or information regarding other interesting target persons and opportunities for accessing information by means of their adept conversational skills.

---



**'Semi-overt' information gathering** In the case of a few contact persons who, for example, appear especially valuable on account of their having access to information which the intelligence services deem to be sensitive, attempts are made to transform the overt means of extracting information into a 'semi-overt' contact with certain conspiratorial elements. This is a one-sided decision on the part of the intelligence officer.

The officer will, for instance, specify in advance the modalities and time-point of follow-up meetings, as well as alternatives. The intention is to avoid the need for additional contacts to agree meetings that could attract the attention of the offices for the protection of the constitution. For the same reason the officer will ask the contact person not to call him or her at the mission, quoting frequent absences, among other things. At the meetings, which mainly take place in restaurants, the officer will attempt to create a friendly atmosphere, and will offer material and immaterial benefits. Contacts are often given the impression that they are especially important.

Over time, the intelligence officer will not only extract general information verbally during these meetings, but will add concrete assignments that are initially described as a request for a favour. The Russian services call such long-term contacts 'confidential contacts'. They serve to acquire information in return for gifts in kind, money or other rewards.

**Agent handling** Some of these contacts are broadened to the extent of classic agent operations over the course of time if the contact person has access to especially sensitive information or is prepared to reveal that information, for example.

Since encouraging a person to betray sensitive information is in violation of diplomatic status, the intelligence officer needs to take greater precautions in regard to conspiratorial meetings and to ensure that all communication is carried out safely. The target person is also asked to take especial care, reference here being made to the confidential nature of the information. Even the most guileless persons will at that point realise that they have established contact with an intelligence officer.

Along with their own information-gathering activities, the legal residencies also assist their headquarters at local level and support intelligence operations run directly from Russia.

---

### **3.2 Activities under central control**

Information-gathering activities directed at Germany include operations run directly from the services' headquarters in Russia, particularly the FSB. However, the SVR and GRU also have units that recruit agents from among foreign nationals living in Russia.

The intelligence services have many options when it comes to seeking out target persons in their home country. These include, for instance, the FSB's border controls of those entering and leaving the country, its surveillance of German foreign missions, its strong presence in the economic and scientific sectors, and Internet surveillance and phone tapping for intelligence-gathering purposes.

The Russian intelligence services investigate their targets intensively before approaching them; the FSB in particular is responsible for finding out about any misconduct or personal weaknesses that can be used to persuade someone to engage in intelligence-gathering activities. Where appropriate, the intelligence officer attempts to win over the target person and recruit them by first striking up a friendship.

Operations are often controlled from the services' headquarters once someone has been successfully recruited. In some cases the same applies to agents who for various reasons are no longer controlled by the legal residency but by headquarters.

Communication in such relationships is conducted via agent radiocommunications, secret recording modes and dead-letter boxes (DLBs)<sup>208</sup> containing money or other intelligence tools.

Agent handlers make trips to the West to hold meetings. The former attaché to the Russian Trade Mission in Vienna, Vladimir V., for example, met with the German national G., one of the agents he was handling, in Austria and Germany, among other places. In June 2008 G. was sentenced to 11 months in prison suspended on probation, for activities as an agent of an intelligence service. He had sold items and documents relating to helicopter and aeroplane technology to V.<sup>209</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup> Caches (e.g. in the ground) used to exchange information and material or to pass on instructions and make payments to secret operatives.

<sup>209</sup> See the 2007 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, p. 294.

---

**At risk in Russia** The FSB focuses on foreigners who have entered the country and who regularly spend time in Russia for private or business purposes or for longer periods. The Russian intelligence services have many ways of benefiting from their 'home advantage' when it comes to this group of people, as they can seek out targeted means of establishing contact on their own territory and meet foreigners without arousing suspicion. Staff at German diplomatic missions, business representatives and freelancers or students in particular can expect to be approached by the intelligence services.

#### **4. Intelligence and security services of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**

**All CIS member states have intelligence services** Other members of the CIS<sup>210</sup> have their own intelligence and security services, which mainly emerged from the intelligence service structures of the former Soviet Union. Some of these primarily civilian services engage in foreign intelligence-gathering activities. However, the focus of their activities is mainly on internal security and counter-intelligence.

Some members of the CIS also have military intelligence services in order to protect their autonomy of state; their foreign activities are usually restricted to neighbouring countries. Targeted activities against Germany carried out by these services have only been registered on a few occasions.

**Cooperation with Russian intelligence services** Most of the CIS member states have established partnerships at intelligence-service level with the Russian intelligence services or have concluded formal cooperation agreements. At a meeting held in June 2008, for example, the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, and the new head of the Russian FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, agreed that the two countries' intelligence services would sign a cooperation agreement to safeguard economic security and to protect against external threats.<sup>211</sup>

<sup>210</sup> The CIS comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In August 2008 Georgia applied to leave the CIS. Its membership formally ends in August 2009.

<sup>211</sup> Homepage of the Russian information and news agency Novosti (24 June 2008).

Cooperation with the Russian services comprises information sharing, joint activities, and support from Russia when it comes to technical equipment and personnel training.

**Risks associated with visiting CIS member states** As a result of this - sometimes close - cooperation, information on foreign nationals spending time in other CIS countries for professional or private reasons who have come to the attention of the security authorities may be passed on to the Russian intelligence services.

Only a few intelligence services of the other CIS member states maintain legal residencies in their country's foreign missions on German sovereign territory and deploy staff as undercover diplomats. Belarus has the largest number of intelligence staff in this area. The staff at the legal residency are interested in Germany's assessment of the political situation in Belarus and in activities in Germany in support of the opposition in Belarus.

### **III. Intelligence services of the People's Republic of China**

#### **1. Developments in the People's Republic of China**

**Dictatorship and economic growth** Ruled by the Communist Party of China, the People's Republic of China is a one-party dictatorship that has developed into a global economic power after undertaking economic reforms. For years now China has had rapid economic growth and has been radically modernising its armed forces. The state is in the midst of a process of social modernisation.

**Olympics and repression** The government demonstrated what the system was capable of when it successfully staged the Olympic Games, although it also came under criticism from the international community for its persecution of minorities. This became apparent in March 2008, when the unrest in Tibet was forcibly quashed. Following several terrorist attacks, the Muslim Uyghurs, who live in Xinjiang Province, also fell victim to state repression.

#### **2. Structures and tasks**

Along with steady economic growth, the leadership gives absolute priority to maintaining social stability and keeping the Communist Party of China in power. It therefore has an extensive security

---

apparatus that is responsible for promoting its political and economic interests, for keeping social life under comprehensive surveillance and for persecuting dissidents in blatant disregard of the rule of law.

**MSS and MID active in Germany** Intelligence gathering in Germany is mainly the task of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the Military Intelligence Department (MID).

As a civilian intelligence service, the MSS has a wide-ranging intelligence-gathering remit. It is the most important of China's espionage agencies. The MSS has a large staff and dispatches employees all over the world.

The MID is part of the People's Liberation Army and is responsible for collecting important information and safeguarding technical means of communication between China and its foreign diplomatic missions.

### **3. Intelligence targets and priorities**

The intelligence-gathering activities of the MSS cover the fields of politics, the military, business and science.

**Industrial espionage** Economic growth is of key importance when it comes to maintaining stability in the People's Republic. For that reason, intelligence gathering focuses on obtaining information that can serve to promote the country's own business enterprises. Since insights into innovative production procedures serve to improve the competitiveness of Chinese businesses, employing the intelligence services provides a comparatively cost-effective means of acquiring know-how, especially since German firms are leaders in many fields (see Section VII).

**Fighting the "Five Poisons"** Fighting groups that the Communist Party of China sees as a threat to its power base and thus discredits, calling them the "Five Poisons", is a further main emphasis. The group includes members of the democracy movement, supporters of an independent state of Taiwan, members of Tibetan and Uyghur minorities (who are striving for actual autonomy and are thus suspected of being separatists) and members of the Falun Gong meditation movement.

**The military** The MID seeks to gather information that is of importance to the Chinese armed forces and to security policy. Against this background, it collects intelligence on German defence and security policy, the structure of the Bundeswehr, its commitment within NATO, and on the German armaments industry.

---

## **4. Intelligence-gathering methods**

### **4.1 Intelligence gathering in Germany**

**Legal residencies** In the performance of their duties, Chinese intelligence service staff go under cover in Germany by taking on jobs within the embassy or consulates-general, for instance. That way they can establish contact with German authorities, businesses and private individuals without arousing suspicion. Another means of covering up their activities is to cooperate with Chinese media agencies.

**Use of open sources** To avoid attracting any attention whatsoever when engaged in information gathering in Germany, intelligence staff mainly analyse open sources of information. To that end they analyse press reports and technical literature or go to lectures and industry trade fairs.

**Extracting information from contact persons** By taking part in diverse events they also get to know German insiders and discretely establish contact - purportedly showing an interest in technical issues. Not only do they enquire about generally accessible information, but they also extract sensitive information from their interlocutors.

**Building relationships** In addition, they step up their contacts, for example by inviting them to dinner or by going to events together. The aim is thereby to establish and maintain a good relationship, which can go so far as striking up an apparent friendship. The intelligence staff think more on a long-term basis and attempt to 'cultivate' their contacts so that they are prepared, at some stage, to do their supposed friend a favour and also pass on sensitive information.

**Non-professionals** The exchange of specialist staff on the basis of flourishing German-Chinese scientific and economic relations suits the intelligence services well when it comes to their efforts to obtain information in the fields of business and science. Chinese nationals make up the largest group of visiting students in Germany; Chinese scientists and interns are also working in numerous businesses and research institutions. Many of these persons, known as non-professionals, are open to being approached by the Chinese authorities on account of their patriotism or sense of gratitude for being given the opportunity to work in Germany. The intelligence services use that to their advantage. They maintain contacts to these insiders and attempt to get an

---

overview of their research projects. That way they can locate those who are prepared to reveal confidential information. This task is made easier by the fact that Chinese nationals living in Germany are highly organised in associations that are in part supported or influenced by the diplomatic missions.

## **4.2 Fighting the "Five Poisons" in Germany**

**Investigating the "Five Poisons"** Whilst the intelligence services are extremely cautious and guarded in their gathering of information in the fields of politics, the military and business, they are considerably more aggressive in their investigation and prevention of activities by the "Five Poisons". They take part in public events organised by these groups, which are considered hostile to the state, and at times document their demonstrations. In early 2008 they were above all interested in events involving supporters of the Falun Gong movement and Uyghurs living in Germany. The intelligence services were also very interested in the series of lectures given by the Dalai Lama in several German cities in May 2008 and in the demonstrations held by exiled Tibetans and their German supporters following the unrest in Tibet.

**Defamation** The Chinese intelligence services also attempt - partly in cooperation with diplomats - to bring these groups' activities into disrepute, calling them dangerous endeavours, and try to get the German authorities to take measures to prevent the events taking place. It was mainly the Uyghurs who were affected by such actions in the run-up to the Olympics, although, to Germany's knowledge, they had committed no acts of violence.

In March 2008 Tibetans living in exile demonstrated in front of the Chinese consulates-general in Munich and Frankfurt/Main after the suppression of the unrest in their home country; there were also physical altercations with staff at the consulates-general. However, these incidents were untypical for the otherwise peaceful nature of the events in protest against China's Tibet policy.

**Obstructing events** Further, in spring 2008 the Chinese Consulate-General in Munich made unsuccessful attempts to prevent the "Shen Yun - Chinese Spectacular", a show organised by the Falun Gong movement, from touring Germany by contacting the German promoter and threatening it with repercussions. The central theme of the show is the persecution of the association.

---

### 4.3 Activities in China

**Surveillance of the population and travellers** Those Chinese intelligence services active in Germany can also utilise the information they have gathered to carry out measures in the People's Republic. On their own territory they engage in the surveillance, in cooperation with the other security authorities, of their own population and of foreigners living in China. Travellers are thus again and again subjected to intensive border controls and kept under surveillance in their hotels. In addition, the security authorities monitor electronic means of communication.

**Cyber attacks** For several years now cyber attacks against IT infrastructures have been launched from within China. In some cases floods of emails with malware attachments have been sent to German addressees and German businesses in China (see Section VI).

## IV. Activities of the intelligence services of other countries

The espionage activities of countries in the Middle East, Far East and North Africa focus on classic information gathering, the surveillance of oppositionists from these countries and the infiltration of their organisations. Iran is particularly active in that respect.

### 1. Intelligence services of the Islamic Republic of Iran

**Iranian intelligence services** The intelligence services of the Islamic Republic of Iran are important pillars of the country's regime. Intelligence activities are mainly carried out by the civilian domestic and foreign intelligence service, the Vezarat-e Ettela'at Va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK, Ministry of Information and Security) and the intelligence service of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Department (RGID).

The Iranian intelligence apparatus focuses its activities on the intensive surveillance and combating of opposition groups at home and abroad. Intelligence gathering in the fields of politics, business and science in the West is of only subordinate importance.

**VEVAK** VEVAK is the most active of the Iranian intelligence services in Germany. Its surveillance and spying activities continue to primarily target the Iranian opposition in exile, the People's Mujahidin of Iran (MEK) and its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran

---



(NCRI; see Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State (excluding Islamism), Section II, 3.1).

VEVAK operates a legal residency at the Iranian Embassy in Berlin that is tasked with the surveillance of oppositionists living in Germany. It also provides logistical support to intelligence-gathering activities run from VEVAK headquarters in Tehran.

**Executive measures  
against alleged  
Iranian agents**

On 22 October 2008 the residential and business premises of a German-Iranian national were searched in Frankfurt/Main after the investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice issued a warrant based on the suspicion of activity as an agent for an intelligence service. The German-Iranian national was accused of obtaining data from a computer owned by a German national of Iranian origin on behalf of an Iranian intelligence service and then making the data available to the service.

The injured party claims that she was approached by the Iranian intelligence service while on a private visit to Iran and forced to sign a declaration of cooperation. The Iranian intelligence service had shown her personal documents to which only she and the accused had had access.

## **2. Intelligence services of the Syrian Arab Republic**

**Syrian security  
authorities**

The numerous Syrian intelligence and security services responsible for maintaining internal and external security are also responsible for keeping the authoritarian regime in power. They are subject to no rule-of-law controls. The power invested in them means they can pervade all areas of Syrian society.

The Syrian regime keeps under surveillance at home and abroad all those Islamist movements, Kurdish groups, oppositionists and dissidents considered to be a potential threat to its power base.

**Methods**

The Syrian intelligence services operate a legal residency at their country's embassy in Germany. Intelligence officers working under cover there utilise their own network of sources in Germany and seek to recruit new informants.

Those targeted by the services can expect to be intensively followed, issued with summons, arrested and - in some cases - subject to psychological and physical torture when they return home. The purpose of putting them under pressure in such ways is to get the

---

affected person to agree to work for the intelligence service or to admit his or her guilt.

**Agent sentenced in Germany** In March 2008 Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced a Syrian agent who had spied on oppositionists living in Germany on behalf of his agent handler to six months in prison suspended on probation. The sentence has since become final and has had no recognisable influence on the activities of the Syrian services in Germany.

### **3. Intelligence services of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**

**Political developments** Despite the fact that Libya has opened up economically, the country has not been able to solve its structural problems. Pseudo-democratic structures lacking legitimacy, the ineffective administrative apparatus, obscure political processes and corruption make the system unpredictable at the domestic and foreign policy level.

**Impact on intelligence services** The activities carried out by the Libyan intelligence services abroad reflect this internal situation. Power struggles are, for instance, raging between rival groups within the Libyan People's Bureau (Libyan Embassy) in Berlin, in which the intelligence service staff have a key role to play.

**Intelligence targets and methods** The Libyan intelligence services in Germany focus their activities on secular and religious Libyan oppositionists (groups and individuals). They have established a Europe-wide network of informers and informants so as to be able to combat activities by opposition groups. Germany is a prominent area of operations.

Intelligence activities are primarily carried out by the services' residents at the Libyan People's Bureau. However, agents are also handled by intelligence officers travelling around Europe under cover as business people.

### **4. Intelligence services of the Republic of Sudan**

Sudanese intelligence services are also engaged in intelligence activities in Germany.

An agent of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) arrested in 2007 following preliminary investigations by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) on suspicion

---

of activity as an agent for an intelligence service was sentenced in May 2008 by Berlin Court of Appeal to 18 months in prison suspended on probation. He had obtained information on human rights groups and oppositionists and their events, and had passed that information on to the respective residents at the NISS in the Sudanese Embassy in Berlin.

## **5. Intelligence services of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea)**

North Korea has numerous intelligence services that are responsible for maintaining internal order and supporting the ruling regime. They are all directly or - in his function as Party Leader - indirectly subordinate to the Chairman of the Defence Committee and the Party Leader, Kim Jong Il. The activities of the majority of these intelligence services are directed against South Korea. However, their tasks also include influencing public opinion in the West, which is intended to strengthen North Korea's international standing and to discredit the political system in South Korea. The Office 35 is the most important foreign intelligence service.

The following North Korean intelligence services are involved in information gathering from Germany:

**United Front Department** The United Front Department is subordinate to the Korean Workers' Party. In North Korea it is responsible for propaganda, among other things. Abroad, the service seeks to support, ideologically influence and recruit South Korean dissident groups.

**Ministry for State Security** The Ministry for State Security (MfSS) has representatives in every large business enterprise, in every government agency and university, and has a key role to play in maintaining internal order.

In Germany the MfSS is responsible, among other things, for ensuring the safety of personnel and material at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin. The resident at the MfSS is also responsible for all security issues relating to the North Korean delegation, students and visiting academics in Germany.

**Military Intelligence Department** The Military Intelligence Department is subordinate to the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. Its key tasks include the worldwide procurement of technology for the North Korean Army. The service trains special agents in the art of warfare, sabotage, assassination and kidnapping in case of war (against South Korea).

**Intelligence targets** The North Korean intelligence services focus their attention on German universities and research institutions on account of the high standard of technology available in the private sector and the level of technical know-how. The health sector is of especial importance - not least on account of Kim Jong Il's health problems.

In the private sector the services focus on, among other things, acquiring information about equipment used in the printing industry and metal processing that are, where specific requirements are met, listed in the EU Export List,<sup>212</sup> as well as medical equipment and medications.

Another task of the intelligence service staff is to put North Korean nationals living abroad under surveillance and to investigate their attempts to evade having to return to North Korea.

**Methods** The intelligence services use the North Korean Embassy in Germany in their information-gathering activities. In the course of their official duties, intelligence officers working under cover as diplomats establish contacts with people believed to be of interest, in particular to representatives of private-sector organisations, businesses, and colleges and universities.

North Korean students, interns and visiting academics living in Germany also provide a good basis for information-gathering activities from North Korea's perspective on account of their patriotism and great readiness to be used for such purposes.

Along with extracting information during meetings with contact persons, the intelligence services use generally accessible information sources with the help of North Korean visiting academics and students living in Germany. North Korean nationals living in Germany are generally obliged to remain in frequent contact with their embassy, which regularly organises ideological training courses and reminds them of their duties abroad.

---

<sup>212</sup> EU Dual Use Regulation of 22 June 2000, Annex 1 (Lists of EU goods which require authorisation before they can be exported).

---

## V. Proliferation

**Definition** The term 'proliferation' refers to the distribution of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the products used in their manufacture, including the required know-how and related delivery systems.

It is feared that countries involved in proliferation activities will use WMD during an armed conflict or will threaten to use them to achieve their political goals. Currently, these countries include Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan.

**Iran** The United States' intelligence services established in late 2007 that Iran had not been actively pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, at least not up until mid-2007, although that does not give cause to sound the all-clear.

Despite the public debate regarding the threat from Iran's nuclear weapons programme that was raised by a report published by the United States' intelligence services in early December 2007, the international community still wants to prevent Iran and its leadership being given any opportunity whatsoever to build a nuclear bomb.

So long as the Iranian leadership continues its uranium enrichment activities and refuses to comply with calls for an immediate end to its enrichment programme and for full cooperation and transparency, any activities Iran engages in on German territory to promote or support this proliferation programme must be kept under surveillance and - where possible - prevented.

**Procurement activities** Since some of the countries involved in proliferation activities do not have the technology and know-how required to (further) develop WMD, they must obtain the relevant items on the world market or, when it comes to specialist scientific knowledge, within the framework of their contacts in the international scientific community.

These countries are primarily attempting to meet their need for 'dual use' goods<sup>213</sup> in industrialised and newly industrialising countries<sup>214</sup> ('vertical proliferation').

---

<sup>213</sup> See footnote 207.

<sup>214</sup> The term 'newly industrialising countries' refers to countries classed as advanced developing countries on account of their considerable progress towards industrialisation based on their own strong economic

Furthermore, a few countries involved in proliferation activities themselves offer machinery, equipment or know-how or sell entire and ready-to-use rocket systems to launch these weapons, for instance, to other countries. Some of them are thus able to support each other in the manufacturing and development of WMD ('horizontal proliferation').

**Procurement methods** The restrictive EU export control regulations for the prevention of proliferation-relevant procurement in Europe, which were introduced some time ago<sup>215</sup> and which thus also apply to Germany, have had an influence on the procurement activities of countries involved in proliferation activities. Direct procurement is now the exception, as the risk of being discovered and the authorising authority prohibiting the export is now too great.

In order nevertheless to obtain the required products, countries involved in proliferation activities often choose to procure the goods via third countries (known as 'circumvention'), use cover businesses or provide incorrect information to the manufacturer or dealer in order to cover up the actual use to which the product will be put in the WMD programme.

**Knowledge transfer** Countries involved in proliferation activities use international scientific contacts and cooperation to, among other things, acquire basic and specialist scientific/technological know-how for their WMD programmes. They use covert methods too. Students or trained scientists, for instance, conceal from their host university or contacts the fact that they are members of an institution involved in proliferation activities in their home country.

**Raising awareness** The offices for the protection of the constitution approach both private-sector enterprises and educational and research institutions to provide them with information about and to raise awareness of the issue of proliferation and the risk to those concerned in Germany, for example the possible loss of reputation or economic losses.

**Cooperation** The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), the Customs Criminological Office (ZKA), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) cooperate closely in the area of counter-proliferation.

---

growth and their having greatly caught up to industrialised countries in terms of their level of development.

<sup>215</sup> See footnote 212.

---

## **VI. Cyber attacks**

**Definition** The term 'cyber attack' refers to a targeted measure using and against IT infrastructures, for instance information gathering and activities that are suited to damaging or sabotaging these systems.

Such activities include spying on, copying or changing data, adopting someone else's electronic identity, misusing foreign IT infrastructures and taking control of computer-assisted, network-based production and control facilities. The attacks can be carried out both externally via computer networks such as the Internet, or by gaining direct, non-network-based access to a computer, for instance using manipulated hardware components such as storage media.

IT security experts and the media have long pointed out the dangers of and techniques used for electronic spying. Attacks via the Internet represent an especial threat because they are relatively simple to carry out, entail a low level of personal risk to the perpetrator and have a proven high probability of success.

Foreign intelligence services use such techniques too. Dealing with attacks with an intelligence service background comes under counter-intelligence.

Large-scale cyber attacks originating in the People's Republic of China are currently being registered around the world. They are primarily directed against government agencies and business enterprises in industrialised countries.

**Activities registered in Germany** Broad-based attacks against authorities and business enterprises have also been registered in Germany since 2005. The most common method of attack is to send emails with an attachment that has been 'contaminated' with a damaging programme, known as malware.

The emails are sent to recipients who have obviously been specifically targeted and regarding issues that are of interest to the addressee. However, the topic of the email is only touched upon briefly in the email itself, with reference being made to the attached document regarding further details. These cyber attacks are clearly carried out after effective social engineering. They are designed to match the recipients' area of work or interests. To that end the attackers first collate information on potential target persons, for example business cards, areas of activity, professional and personal contacts/interests, and information sources used, such as newspapers or other

---

publications. In addition, they use forged email addresses to increase the credibility of the mails.

The malware that thus infiltrates a computer and which standard virus protection software cannot necessarily recognise, automatically installs itself and runs unnoticed when the document is opened. After installing itself the malware tries to make contact with a designated computer via the Internet. Once that has been successfully done, further commands in relation to the actual purpose of the attack are transmitted, for example to obtain certain information and subsequently transfer it to a specific location where the attacker has safe access to the data. However, it is also conceivable that 'sabotage commands' to change or delete data on the victim's computer are transmitted.

**Examples** In spring 2007 a cyber attack was launched against German business enterprises in China: an email was sent using a forged sender's name, the head of a German authority. The victims were employees of numerous firms that had obviously first been spied on. However, it was not possible to identify what the specific objective or focus of the attack was.

In addition, Europe-wide waves of emails were noted in 2007 that originated from the same attacker and that were mainly addressed to recipients in the political sphere, including addressees in Germany. The emails addressed foreign policy issues. Largely the same group of persons was attacked again in the same way in 2008.

The BfV assumes that such attacks from China and other countries will continue. Since probably only a small proportion of these cyber attacks will be detected, it is difficult to take countermeasures; the loss of information during such attacks generally goes unnoticed.

In response to such cyber attacks the offices for the protection of the constitution approach the affected authorities in order to inform them about and raise their awareness of the dangers posed by these attacks.

---



## VII. Protection of industry

**General problem** Germany's status in the world has for many years been based on its economic strength and the high standard of research and technology, among other factors. In the age of globalised markets, German businesses - international corporations as well as innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - are increasingly being exposed not only to legitimate business competition, but also to the risk of illegal knowledge transfer on account of industrial espionage and being spied on by competitors. The resulting damage adversely affects economic structures and even puts jobs at risk or destroys them. Protecting German businesses is thus the joint task of the state and the private sector.

**Definition** The offices for the protection of the constitution define industrial espionage as the investigation of business enterprises and operations that is controlled or supported by the state and carried out by foreign intelligence services. 'Spying on competitors', by contrast, is defined as one business enterprise spying on a competitor.

**Intelligence targets** Foreign intelligence services do not follow a standard approach to intelligence gathering, which depends on specific requirements and possibilities. More highly developed countries, for instance, are primarily interested in economic and economic policy strategies, while technologically less developed countries are more interested in information concerning concrete products and research findings.

The high standard of German science, research and technology and German firms' capacity for innovation makes them desirable targets for foreign intelligence services. Currently, the focus of spying activities is on German state-of-the-art technology in the fields of car manufacturing, renewable energy, chemicals, communications, optoelectronics, x-ray technology, arms, tool machines, composite materials and materials research.

**Intelligence services as clients** Spying activities in the area of trade and industry, science and technology are mainly ordered by the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China and of the Russian Federation.

China has set itself the goal of becoming the leading economic power by 2020. Achieving that goal will require an intensive transfer of state-of-the-art technology from highly developed industrialised countries.

---

The Russian economy also benefits from its intelligence services' spying activities. The services are obligated by law to support Russia's economic and scientific/technical progress (see also Section II, 2 and Section III, 3).

**Interdepartmental Panel on the Protection of Industry** The wide-ranging threat from industrial espionage has led to the introduction of a new strategy to protect business and industry. The Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has overall responsibility for coordinating the other federal ministries and security authorities within the Interdepartmental Panel on the Protection of Industry, which was established in 2008.

Information relevant to the issue of industrial espionage is shared with the Panel's cooperation partner, the Working Group on Security in Trade and Industry (ASW, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sicherheit in der Wirtschaft), and plans are jointly developed to protect German firms and operations. This has led to the creation of a new priority area of activity within the BfV: Industrial Espionage/Protection of Industry.

**Prevention through information** A key aspect of the strategy "Industrial Espionage: Prevention Through Information" is informing people about possible threats. Awareness-raising measures are organised and information published for the private sector, indicating ways to analyse and prevent security risks. The security-oriented behaviour of employees is of especial importance here, as are relevant IT and communication structures.

These awareness-raising activities are accompanied by new information material provided by the BfV regarding the protection of trade and industry (see the website [www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)).

## **VIII. Arrests and convictions**

In 2008, the Federal Public Prosecutor instituted 17 preliminary proceedings on suspicion of activity as an agent for an intelligence service or on charges of treason. Warrants were issued for the arrest of three people. Three suspects were convicted on charges of activity as an agent for an intelligence services (Section 99 Criminal Code).

---

## Security of Classified Information and Counter-Sabotage

- Security tasks** Security is absolutely essential to a democratic state under the rule of law. Security ensures that information and procedures remain secret and protected against unauthorised disclosure when their publication would threaten the existence, vital interests or security of the Federal Government and its agencies (*Bund*) or of any of the federal states (*Länder*).
- Classified material** Irrespective of their form, sensitive facts, objects or intelligence to be kept secret are classified material and must be marked with one of the following classifications: *STRENG GEHEIM* (Top Secret), *GEHEIM* (Secret), *VS-VERTRAULICH* (Confidential) or *VS-NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH* (Restricted).
- Physical security** Physical security provides the organisational and technical prerequisites for the protection of classified material. The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has primary responsibility for this task. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) must cooperate, pursuant to Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 3 of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*, BVerfSchG), by providing intelligence of possible relevance to the physical security of classified information.
- Personnel security** The central task is to protect classified material. The instrument used for that purpose is security screening of those who are to be entrusted with tasks of a sensitive nature.
- The security screening procedure is regulated in the Security Clearance Check Act (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz*, SÜG). The BfV's involvement is based on Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 1 of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution in conjunction with Section 3 (2) of the Security Clearance Check Act.
-

**Jurisdiction** The fact that personnel security is assigned to the BfV as a 'participatory task' means that the BfV does not have primary jurisdiction but that responsibility for security measures lies with the competent authorities. In the federal public service, this is generally the employing authority.

Classified government material requiring protection is handled not only by public institutions but also by private-sector enterprises, among others. In this case, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWt) assumes responsibility for ensuring the security of such material.

**Personnel-related counter-sabotage** Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage was introduced in the Security Clearance Check Act in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on the basis of the Counter-Terrorism Act (*Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz*) of 9 January 2002.

**Security clearance checks** Security clearance checks, which have proved an effective instrument in personnel security, are now being used to ensure that persons presenting a risk to security are not employed in key positions in sensitive areas. Current and prospective employees in vital or defence establishments are subject to security vetting.

**Vital facilities** Establishments are considered vital if their disruption could seriously threaten the health or lives of large segments of the population, due to the risk inherent in the nature of their operations. 'Risk inherent in the nature of operations' refers to risk inherent in the work process itself or in the materials used in production or work (e.g. danger of fire, explosion or contamination). Vital establishments also include those that are essential to the functioning of the community and whose disruption would cause panic or distress among large segments of the population, thus threatening public order or security. This includes public provision of postal and telecommunications services.

**Defence facilities** Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage also applies to important defence establishments beyond the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg). These include establishments involved in creating or maintaining defence preparedness and whose disruption could seriously jeopardise the functioning of the Bundeswehr, allied forces or civil defence. Such establishments also include key manufacturers in the defence industry and supplies industry as well as central transport and telecommunications facilities.

**Security-sensitive** For reasons of proportionality, measures to prevent personnel-related

---

**positions** sabotage apply only to security-sensitive positions within vital and defence establishments, i.e. the smallest organisational units working independently and protected against unauthorised access. Only persons employed in such positions must undergo security vetting. For counter-sabotage purposes, a 'simple security check' is required, i.e. a form of vetting that causes as little inconvenience as possible to the person being vetted.

**Statutory ordinance and guide** The Ordinance Establishing Security Vetting Requirements for Vital and Defence Establishments (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsfestellungsverordnung*, SÜFV) of 30 July 2003 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1553), amended 12 September 2007 and published as amended (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2292, 2294), gives a legally binding list of vital and defence establishments.

Together with the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWf), the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) and the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has drafted a guide to preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage in the private sector. It can be accessed on the Internet at [www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de](http://www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de).

**Consent** It should be emphasised that security clearance checks may only be carried out with the explicit consent of the persons affected.

---

## The Scientology Organisation (SO)

Founded:	in the USA in 1954; first Church of Scientology of Germany founded in 1970
Headquarters:	Los Angeles (Church of Scientology International, CSI);
Membership:	in Germany 5,000-6,000 (2007: 5,000-6,000)
Publications:	<i>FREIHEIT, IMPACT, SOURCE, Freewinds, INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY, NEWS, ADVANCE! THE AUDITOR</i> , among others.
Subsidiary organisations: them (selection)	In Germany, ten “churches”, among two “Celebrity Centres” and 14 “Missions”

### 1. Background and objectives

Since the foundation of the first “Church of Scientology” in Los Angeles in 1954, the Scientology Organisation publicly describes itself as a “totally new religion”. At the same time, it claims to be the first to truly apply scientific principles while utilising reason and logic in order to gain spiritual awareness.<sup>216</sup> Four years earlier, in 1950, the founder of the organisation, L. Ron Hubbard (1911 - 1986) published his book “Dianetics – The Modern Science of Mental Health” in the USA.<sup>217</sup> According to the SO’s Internet publications, Hubbard has solved the problems of the human mind with his “scientific method” of Dianetics.

According to the creed of Scientology based on the concepts of Dianetics, anybody’s “person” or “identity” is, for instance, not his/her

---

<sup>216</sup> SO website, as at 24 November 2008.

<sup>217</sup> Title of the original US edition: “Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health”

---

body or name, but the “thetan”, <sup>218</sup> the immortal spiritual being, which in its ideal state as an “operating thetan” is entirely the “being at cause over matter, energy, space, time and thought”, and not in a body. The thetan is the person himself, not his body or his name or the physical universe, his mind or anything else. It is that which is aware of being aware; the identity which is the individual, which has no mass, no wavelength, that is to say nothing concrete. In order to reach this state, the person has to undergo physical and spiritual cleansing in order to achieve the status of “Clear”.

A Clear is a person “who no longer has his own reactive mind” and therefore no longer is influenced by traumatic experiences (“engrams”) which had led to “aberrations” from rational thought before.

The key “method” to achieve the status of “Clear” is called “Auditing”, which helps to discover “engrams” and to eliminate their effects. Under this procedure, the “auditor” (one who listens, “a minister or minister-in-training of the Church of Scientology”) interviews the “preclear” (one who is not yet clear) while he/she is connected to an “E-meter”, a kind of lie detector. It measures “the mental state or change of state of a person” and helps the “auditor” “locate areas of spiritual distress or travail”.

In addition to “auditing”, the organisation offers a number of other seminars in Germany. Above all, these seminars give instructions for a successful way of life as understood by Scientology. The seminars and accompanying publications are offered for sale in a profit-oriented manner. This sales activity is one of the main tasks of the “churches” and “missions” in Germany.

**Unchangeable  
validity of the  
writings of Hubbard**

Scientology’s doctrine is based on the writings of Hubbard. The organisation regards them as binding and brings out unchanged new editions on a regular basis. The newly published books on SO basics brought out in 2008 are described by SO as the “essence of the source” and “the path to a fully developed “thetan”<sup>219</sup>

<sup>218</sup> All terms in quotation marks are original SO terminology. They can be found in a glossary published by Hubbard (German edition: L. Ron Hubbard, *Fachwortsammlung für Dianetics und Scientology*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Copenhagen, 1985.)

<sup>219</sup> *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS* Issue 37, 2008, p. 8.

Advertisements for basic seminars declared:

*If you study the books and the accompanying lectures in the chronological order in which they were published by L. Ron Hubbard, you will reach a state of clarity and understanding which surpasses everything that has been possible before. L. Ron Hubbard wanted all Scientologists to know the basics of Scientology from inside out. This aim has now been achieved.*

(Freewinds, special edition, 2008, p. 47)

The still binding character of Hubbard's statements is also reflected in the “Declaration on human rights and democracy” (see 3 above):

*“The above statements all are in line with the fundamental rules of the Church and directly follow from the creed and the superior guidelines of the Church, as they were written down by the founder of the Scientology religion, L. Ron Hubbard.”*

**Factual indications  
of anti-constitutional  
efforts**

The writings of the SO, in particular those of Hubbard, indicate that fundamental basic and human rights, such as human dignity, the right to free development of personality, and the right to equality, would not be guaranteed in a society formed in accordance with Scientology's beliefs and visions. In addition, Scientology aspires to a society without general and fair elections.

According to Hubbard's doctrine, “true democracy” is possible only in a nation of “Clears”. In his writings he calls for abolishing the main principles of a free democratic order and for creating a new civilization (composed of “operating thetans”) instead.

---



**Restricted validity of basic rights and no equality before the law** In one of his other publications, Hubbard described the new Scientologist civilisation he envisaged as a legal order under which the existence of the individual is subject to the SO's arbitrary discretion. Correspondingly, basic rights can be enjoyed only by those people who, after selection under the “auditing” procedure, are considered “honest” in the SO's view:

*“A person's right to survival is directly linked to his honesty. (...) Freedom is for honest people.” “There is personal freedom only for those who have the ability to be free.” (...) “But in order to get help as a PC<sup>220</sup> or Pre-OT<sup>221</sup>, one has to be honest to his auditor. (...) “HONESTY OPENS THE DOOR TO CASE GAIN. “...This is the path to mental health and true freedom...*

(L. Ron Hubbard, Einführung in die Ethik der Scientology [Introduction to the ethics of Scientology], new edition, Copenhagen 2007, pp. 51 and 67 f)

**Repudiation of the democratic rule of law** The SO rejects the democratic legal system and in the long term wants to replace it by its own (supposedly) “superior code of statutes”:

*“The Judiciary Dianetics covers the field of adjudication within society and among the societies of Man. It comprises, necessarily, the legal sciences and their legislation and sets up precise definitions and equations in order to ensure fairness. It is the science of adjudication. The main pillars of legal science and jurisdiction are right and wrong, and good and evil. Definitions of these are inherent in Dianetics: by these definitions a correct solution can be readied with regard to any action or action of man”.*

(L. Ron Hubbard, Dianetik – Der Leitfaden für den menschlichen Verstand“, new edition 2007, p. 481)

**World Institute of Scientology Enterprises (WISE) with own “courts”** The SO sub-organisation WISE – a union of Scientologists who are entrepreneurs – has established six “Charter Committees” in Germany. Within the Scientologist legal system they function as “courts”.

*Using unique procedures based on the Ethics Technology developed by L. Ron Hubbard, Charter Committees are able to resolve conflicts swiftly and fairly, which in the ‘normal’ legal system would go on for years and cost a lot of money.*

(SO website, as at 1 December 2008)

<sup>220</sup> PC = Preclear, see also footnote 218.

<sup>221</sup> OT = Operating thetan, see also footnote 218.

WISE members commit themselves to abide by the organisation's code, particularly not to bring any dispute before a court, but to rely exclusively on the internal procedure.

**Defamation of opponents and critics** The organisation deems everyone who criticises the SO or is opposed to its ideology as “ill and criminal”.

*“Those who criticize one for being a Scientologist or make snide remarks cannot stand a personal survey of past actions or motive. (...) We do not see a critic of Scientology that does not have a criminal background. (...) Those who oppose us have crimes to conceal.”*  
(*Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP Course), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 78 et seq.)

The worst criminals in the eyes of Scientology are psychiatrists, and therefore fighting psychiatry is the main task of the *Kommission für Verstöße der Psychiatrie gegen Menschenrechte* e.V. (KVPM, Commission for psychiatry's violations of human rights).

**Intelligence service which has absolute rule** Another actual indicator for SO's activities directed against human rights and the rule of law is the existence of the organisation's own intelligence service operating world-wide, the Office of Special Affairs (OSA). Its tasks include, among others, collecting information about opponents and critics of the SO and fighting them.

**Striving for absolute control** The totalitarian character of the organisation is also revealed by the organisation's striving to control its members as much as possible. For example, the organisation, warning of sanctions, orders its members to draw up “knowledge reports” and report misbehaviour of other group members to the Religious Technology Center (RTC) in the USA. Before they may accept medical help, members of the SO have to obtain prior approval of a responsible SO functionary<sup>222</sup>

**Long-term changes in the political system to be achieved by SO's “expansion”** In its messages to the public, the SO is anxious to present itself as an apolitical religious community that abides by the rules of democracy. Although the organisation is not openly involved in forming the political will of the people, the writings of its founder, which are the basis of all activities of the SO, reveal that the organisation's ultimate political goals are to be attained via a long-term strategy of expansion and increasing SO revenues as well as successfully defeating its detractors.

<sup>222</sup> L. Ron Hubbard, *Der neue Studentenhut Kurs*, 1996, p. 155 f.

The International Association of Scientologists (IAS), the official membership organisation of the SO, plays a major role in achieving this aim. It collects membership fees and campaigns for donations to finance major projects of the organisation.

The ISA has defined its objectives as follows:

*“By uniting our efforts under the flag of the IAS, we will create a new civilisation on earth.” (IMPACT, 118/ 2008, p. 9)*

**Creating a new  
civilisation with Ideal  
Orgs**

To create a “new civilisation” as envisaged by the Scientology Organisation, in their view it is essential to create large and expanding organisations everywhere.

*“The most important and most comprehensive strategy is that of establishing Ideal Central Organisations, i.e. organisations which are a living representation of LRH technology and guidelines (...)”<sup>223</sup>*  
(INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS, Issue 37, 2008, p. 30)

According to LRH, such “Ideal Orgs” are the ideal solution to expand fast enough to “actually clear the planet”.

**Ideal Org in Berlin**

According to the SO, the organisation has twelve Ideal Orgs worldwide, one of which was opened in the new Scientology headquarters in Berlin early in 2007.

*In a city which once was a symbol of the suppression of the world, our Ideal Scientology Church of Berlin now stands as a new symbol of freedom in the cultural heart of Germany.*  
(INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS, Issue 37, 2008, p. 33)

The Berlin representation of Scientology won the 2008 LRH<sup>224</sup> Birthday Game in the category of Class V Orgs; the trophy is awarded to the Ideal Org that expands fastest. According to the SO, the Berlin Church leadership has six Clears and eight OTs<sup>225</sup>

The SO claims that in addition to the Berlin branch other German Orgs would expand very fast, too. Of the ten of thirteen potential Ideal Orgs presented in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS, however, none is seated in Germany.<sup>226</sup>

<sup>223</sup> LRH is short for L. Ron Hubbard.

<sup>224</sup> See footnote 223.

<sup>225</sup> INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS Issue 37, 2008, p. 55.

<sup>226</sup> See footnote 225, there see pp. 35-45 and p. 62.

## 2. Public relations

- Scientology Library Campaign** To place their new editions of basic writings of L. Ron Hubbard in public libraries, the SO has continued its fund-raising campaign which was re-launched for that purpose in 2007. According to an internal report, a set of basic writings and publications was made available to the German National Library.<sup>227</sup> A Theta Books bookshop ad claims that all the basic SO publications are available in 50 of the 150 public libraries in Munich.
- Bookathon** An event organized to improve the dissemination of Scientology books in the public is the Bookathon; it is an internal competition among Scientologists in which German SO members also take part. A Bookathon is a bookselling campaign in urban public places, like pedestrian zones, where Scientologists try to entice as many passers-by as possible to get one of the books and publications of Scientology. Referring to the Bookathon, a leaflet with practical tips on how to start a successful sales talk says that every Org, every Mission and every Scientologist must give a hundred percent every day to disseminate the basic books and audio books.<sup>228</sup>
- Nationwide information campaign** Driven by the intention of presenting their world view as a religion, the Scientology Church of Germany (SKD) launched a nationwide information campaign in February 2008. The aim was to be recognized as a religion by German authorities. On 12 February 2008, when the competent court was to issue its ruling in the legal case Scientology vs. BfV (see 3 above), some 40-50 Scientology members staged a demonstration in Münster, waving the flags of various states and displaying a banner which read “What is the difference between Germany and these nations? – These nations have officially recognized Scientology as a religion!” They also distributed information leaflets. As part of this campaign the SO claims to have written to “hundreds of dignitaries of public life”<sup>229</sup> and sent them information material. In the brochure *Scientology – Religiöse Anerkennung in Europa & der Welt* (Scientology – recognition as a religion in Europe & the world), the SO lists 25 countries where it has (allegedly) been recognized as a religious community. Also in 2008, the SO distributed a flyer in which it tried to capitalize on a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights of 2007, following legal action taken

<sup>227</sup> *Planetary Dissemination*, issue V, 2008, p. 1.

<sup>228</sup> *Das Goldene Zeitalter des Wissens – Neuigkeiten aus der Öffentlichkeitsphase* (The golden age of knowledge – News from the publicity phase), 2008.

<sup>229</sup> SO website, as at 12 June 2008.

by the organisation against Russia.<sup>230</sup> The ruling was based on the Russian justice ministry's refusal to register the Church of Scientology Moscow as a religious community after amendments to the law; before that, the Church of Scientology Moscow had been granted this status.

Indeed, the court did not address the question whether the SO, its doctrine and activities generally fulfil the criteria of a religion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights; the court did not look into the question in terms of material law.

According to the court, Russia's refusal to re-register the SO as a religious community was based on errors of law. But, the court said, the SO had no right to conclude that the decision that Russia should re-register the SO as a religious community would imply that its doctrine had to be recognized as a religion.

**Vigorous advertising  
in the political field**

Especially by distributing a promotional DVD with the title “Scientology – an overview”, brought out in 2008, the organisation sought to gain ground in the political arena. The DVD comprises 80 videos in which the fundamental world views and most essential practices of the “Scientology religion” are presented, as well as a biography of their founder L. Ron Hubbard. The DVD also provides detailed information on the drugs rehabilitation and prevention programme “Narconon”, the educational programme “Applied Scholastics”, and the work of “Honorary Scientology Priests”. The DVD was distributed by the Church of Scientology International (CSI) and sent by mail directly to the heads of federal and state ministries, politicians and elected officials, together with a letter of CSI president Heber C. Jentzsch. Thus, according to the SO, “half a million DVDs were sent to those whose actions have an impact of half a billion people”.<sup>231</sup>

The “Operation: A Peaceful Planet, which was launched by IAS in 2007, has been continued. As part of this operation, the “Way of Happiness Foundation” mailed their booklet “The way to happiness” to politicians and state bodies, among others.

<sup>230</sup> See the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 April 2007, reference number 18147/02.

<sup>231</sup> *IMPACT*, 118/ 2008, p. 56.

An article in the IMPACT magazine refers to that operation saying:

*After we have contacted business companies and public authorities, we will now address our mailings to the backbone of society – small businesses and the service sector...*  
(IMPACT, 117/ 2007, p. 51)

**Activities by the KVPM** Through its global anti-psychiatry campaign, the organisation wants to raise political pressure:

*The systematic concept of the campaign (...) is such that it is addressed to important population groups – drawing attention to the relation between psychotropic drugs, suicide, and murder. (...) At the same time, the travelling exhibitions ‘Death, not help’ fan public outrage about psychiatric abuses and inspire legions of human rights activists in the field of psychiatry to raise the pressure on lawmakers to undertake reforms.* (IMPACT, 118/ 2008, p. 26)

In 2008, the KVPM (Commission for violations of psychiatry against human rights) continued to organise exhibitions with the motto “Psychiatry: Death, not help”. In Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt/Main, Hamburg, and Stuttgart, the interested public was able to find out about the €1 billion alleged fraud “by which psychiatry threatens the public health system and damages and destroys the lives of thousands of people”.<sup>232</sup>

German Scientologists also took part in a demonstration against the International World Congress for Psychiatry in Prague in September 2008.

In addition, the head of the KVPM Munich tried to participate under cover in a seminar at the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich to get information and find out about starting points for SO campaigns against medical clinics and their staff.

**Youth for Human Rights** Human rights in general, and drug education, in particular, were other key issues of SO propaganda. *Jugend für Menschenrechte*, the German branch of the US American organisation “Youth for Human Rights International”, was particularly active in this field, organising information stands and distributing flyers and booklets, mainly in Bavaria, Berlin, and Hamburg. The group says it receives support from the Scientology Organisation and its members.<sup>233</sup>

<sup>232</sup> KVPM website, as at 1 December 2008.

<sup>233</sup> *Jugend für Menschenrechte* website, as at 1 December 2008.

**The SO on the Internet** The SO presents an extensive network of meticulously designed, technically sophisticated sites on the Internet containing information on its history, aims, and subsidiary organisations. Since spring 2008, the SO has also operated its own Scientology and Dianetics video channel. Scientologists not only see it as “an additional dissemination channel”, but as “the primary communication line with the planet earth”.<sup>234</sup> The Dianetics video channel also includes an interactive navigation page. Moreover, the SO uses the Internet for presenting and promoting SO writings and courses. In addition, several hundred members in Germany openly acknowledge their adherence to the SO ideology and aims on their private homepages.

**Distribution of membership and activities remains uneven** In Germany, the most important regions, in terms of membership and activities, are Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, the greater Hamburg area and Berlin. In addition, significant numbers of members can be found in Lower Saxony and North Rhine/Westphalia.

### 3. Court action by the SO against observation by the BfV

**BfV observation of the SO is legal** On 12 February 2008, the 5<sup>th</sup> senate of the Higher Administrative Court in Münster dismissed the appeal of the Scientology Church of Germany (SKD) and the Scientology Kirche Berlin e.V. (SKB) against the decision by the Cologne Administrative Court of first instance of 11 November 2004.<sup>235</sup>

In March 2003, the SO brought an action before the court against monitoring by the BfV. The court found that the observation operations carried out by the BfV which were directed against the SKD and SKB with open and covert intelligence means were legal. The court said there was hard intelligence that the plaintiffs were working to undermine the free democratic order. With its decision, the Higher Administrative Court has confirmed and emphasised the authorities’ assessment laid down in their annual reports on the protection of the Constitution.

**The decision is now final** In April 2008, SKD and SKB withdrew their complaint against the inadmissibility of an appeal. The decision of the Münster Higher Administrative Court is therefore now final.

However, the SO seems to be looking for other ways to stop monitoring by the authorities responsible for the protection of the

<sup>234</sup> See footnote 231.

<sup>235</sup> Münster Higher Administrative Court, 12 Feb. 2008, case ref. number: 5A 130/05.

Constitution. With regard to their having withdrawn their complaint against inadmissibility of an appeal, SKD and SKB wrote in a letter addressed, among others, to the president of the BfV, that they “would like to put an end to the costly and time-consuming battles in court about the lawfulness of monitoring by intelligence services.” Therefore, they wrote, they had adopted a “Declaration on human rights and democracy” on 20 April 2008 which they said had also been integrated into their statutes.

**Declaration on  
Human Rights and  
Democracy**

In this declaration, the SO formally commits itself to respecting human dignity and the diversity of human co-existence, to accepting democracy and the rule of law as the ‘best system of government’, to respecting the state’s monopoly on the use of power, the separation of church and state, and religious tolerance as well as to abiding by the law. It emphasises its non-political character and that it has no interest in secular power.

These amendments to the Statute are limited to a more detailed formulation of existing provisions, according to which the members of the SKD “have always shared the view that the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the constitutions of the federal states (*Länder*) and the German laws must be respected.” With reference to these statements, the Münster Higher Administrative Court found that such a formal commitment to upholding the law did not rebut the numerous indications of the anti-constitutional character of the organisation.<sup>236</sup>

---

<sup>236</sup> See footnote 235.

---