"The 17-Point Agreement"
The full story as revealed by the Tibetans
and Chinese who were involved*

Introduction

After the occupation of eastern Tibet's provincial capital, Chamdo, the People's Republic of China (PRC), on May 23, 1951, forced Tibet to sign the 17-point "Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet". The alternative, the occupying forces said, was immediate military operation in the remaining parts of Tibet.

Commentaries in Chinese official publications maintain that the "agreement" reflected the Chinese government's recognition of Tibet's unique and distinct historical, political, and cultural status in relation to the PRC at that time. The PRC did not feel the need for such an "agreement" with any other area liberated by it.(1) In the recent years, political analysts have referred to this "agreement" as a blueprint of the PRC's current "one-country, two-systems" formula.(2)

Whatever the case may be, Tibetans opposed this "agreement" as nothing less than a death warrant of their centuries-old history of independence. They were particularly indignant with the circumstances under which their delegates had been forced to sign it. In fact, Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa clearly told Chinese Representative Zhang Jingwu in 1952 that the Tibetan "people did not accept the agreement".(3)

Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama decided to work with the invading forces "in order to save my people and country from total destruction". For eight years, he tried to abide by the terms of this document. China, on the other hand, showed no inclination to honour its own part of the "Agreement"; its People's Liberation Army (PLA) immediately set out to inflict unbelievable atrocities upon the Tibetan people in order to hasten the occupation of Tibet and destruction of its distinct identity.

By 1959, the Dalai Lama realised that it was impossible to work with the Chinese authorities any longer. In March of that year he fled Tibet and, on his arrival in India, repudiated the "17-point Agreement" as having been "thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms".

Invasion of Tibet and fall of Chamdo

On October 1, 1949 the People's Republic of China was founded. Soon after, Radio Beijing began to announce that "the People's Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan." In response, the Tibetan Foreign Office wrote to Mao Zedong on November 2, 1949 to say that "Tibet has from the earliest times up to now been an independent country whose political administration had never been taken over by any foreign country; and Tibet also defended her own territories from foreign invasions."(4) The Foreign Office letter asked for direct negotiations for the return of Tibetan territories annexed by China's earlier governments. Copies of this letter were sent to the Government of India, Great Britain and United States. But these governments advised Tibet to enter into direct negotiations with China as any other course of action might provoke military retaliation.

In the meanwhile, the PLA marched into eastern Tibet and circulated a ten-point document, asking Tibetans to cooperate with China in "liberating" Tibet from foreign imperialists. This struck as a curious statement to the Tibetan government who knew that there were fewer than ten foreigners in the country. It responded by making a series of radio announcements stating that there were no foreign imperialists on Tibetan soil, that Tibet had never been part of China, and that if China invaded Tibet just as big insects eat small ones, Tibet would fight back even if it were reduced to the female population.(5)

At the same time, the Tibetan government decided to send a delegation, consisting of two senior officials--Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa and Tsechag Thubten Gyalpo--and five assistants to negotiate with the PRC in a third country, possibly the USSR, Singapore or Hong Kong. China suggested Hong Kong as the venue, to which the Tibetan government agreed and directed its delegation to discuss the Foreign Office letter to Chairman Mao Zedong and the threatening Chinese radio announcements about an imminent "liberation of Tibet". The government also instructed the delegation to secure the Chinese assurance that the territorial integrity of Tibet would not be violated, and to drive home the point that Tibet would not tolerate Chinese interference.(6)

On March 7, 1950 the delegates reached Kalimpong en route to Delhi. On reaching Delhi, they ran into an unforeseen problem: the British would not issue them the visas to travel to Hong Kong, probably because they did not want to antagonise China as the visa would have to be stamped on the passport issued by the Tibetan government. Thus, in June 1950 the Tibetan government instructed its delegates to hold negotiations in Delhi. The Chinese did not want this and suggested that the Tibetans should come to Beijing after a preliminary round of talks in Delhi with their new Ambassador to India.(7)

In the course of the negotiation, the Chinese Ambassador, Yuan Zhong Xian, demanded that the Tibetan delegation accept a three-point proposal: i) Tibet should be recognised as part of China ii) Tibetan national defence will be handled by China; iii) Tibet's political and trade relations with foreign countries must be conducted through China. They were then to proceed to Beijing in confirmation of the "agreement".

The Tibetan government instructed the delegates to reject the Chinese proposal, particularly the first point. So the negotiation was suspended. By then China had already started its military offensive on Chamdo, eastern Tibet's provincial capital. It happened on October 7, 1950 when Commanders Wang Qimei and Zhang Guohua led 40,000 PLA troops from the South-West Military Region in an eight-pronged attack on Chamdo. The Tibetan force, numbering 8,000 troops, engaged the PLA troops in fierce battles. By October 19 the Tibetans had fought 21 battles and lost over 5,700 men.(8) Chamdo fell to the PLA and Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, provincial governor, was captured.(9)

The Chinese aggression came as a rude shock to India. In a sharp note to Beijing on October 26, 1950, the Indian Foreign Ministry wrote: "Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace."(10) A number of countries, including the United States and Britain, expressed their support for the Indian position.

Back in Lhasa, the Tibetan Government decided to secure the UN mediation on Tibet's behalf. It wrote to the UN Secretary General on November 11, 1950, appealing for the world body's intervention. The letter said, in part: "Tibet recognises that it is in no position to resist the Chinese advance. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government...Though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to war, we understand that the United Nations has decided to stop aggression wherever it takes place."(11)

The Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session and requested the Dalai Lama, only fifteen (12) at that time, to assume full authority as head of state and move his government temporarily to Dromo (Yatung), near the Indian border, so that he would be out of personal danger. At the same time the Tibetan Foreign Office issued the following statement: "Tibet is united as one man behind the Dalai Lama who has taken over full powers ... We have appealed to the world for peaceful intervention in (the face of this) clear case of unprovoked aggression."(13)

On November 17, 1950 the Dalai Lama assumed power at a formal ceremony and wrote to Mao Zedong: "The relationship between Tibet and China has deteriorated during my minority. Now that I have taken responsibility, I wish to revive the past harmonious relationship between us." The Dalai Lama asked Mao to release the Tibetan prisoners of war and withdraw Chinese troops from the Tibetan territory.(14)

On that very day El Salvador formally asked that the aggression against Tibet be put on the UN General Assembly agenda. However, the issue was not discussed in the UN General Assembly at the suggestion of the Indian delegation who asserted that a peaceful solution which was mutually advantageous to Tibet, India and China could be reached between the parties concerned. A second letter by the Tibetan delegation to the United Nations on December 8, 1950 did not change the situation.

Negotiations in Chamdo

In Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme and other captured Tibetan officials had undergone "re-education" in Chinese Communist Party policies on minority nationalities and lenient treatment for collaborators.(15) On the insistence of his captors, Ngabo sent two successive messages to Lhasa, requesting negotiations with China in Chamdo and offering his service as a negotiator. This, Ngabo assured, was the best means of preventing the military invasion of Tibet's remaining areas. He also assured that the PLA would not march into Lhasa or undermine the safety of the Dalai Lama whilst the negotiations were in progress.(16)

Having lost eastern and northern Tibet to the PLA and lacking active international support, the Tibetan government accepted Ngabo's suggestion and appointed a three-member delegation, consisting of Ngabo, and the Lhasa-based Khenchung Thubten Legmon and Sampho Tenzin Dhondup. On reaching Chamdo, Khenchung and Sampho handed the Tibetan government's two letters to Ngabo. One letter named Ngabo as the leader of the delegation and instructed him to insist on Tibetan independence and the withdrawal of PLA troops from the Tibetan territory.(17) The second letter was a five-point agenda for negotiations:

1. There is no imperialist influence in Tibet; the little contact Tibet had with the British was the result of the travels of the 13th Dalai Lama to India. As for the relationship with the United States, this was only commercial.
2. The Tibetan territories seized by earlier Chinese governments and later occupied by the PLA must be returned to Tibet.
3. In the event of foreign imperial influence being exerted on Tibet, the Tibetan government would appeal to China for help.
4. Chinese troops stationed in Kham and northern Tibet should be withdrawn.
5. In future, the Chinese government should not listen to trouble-making rumours of the Panchen Lama and Reting factions.(18)

When Ngabo presented the content of this letter, the Chinese responded with their own five-point position statement:

1. It is clear that the British and Americans have interfered in our affairs. This is evident from the fact that they prevented the Tibetan negotiating team (in India) from proceeding to Beijing.
2. The defence of the Motherland is the prime objective and troops must be dispatched.
3. After the dispatch of our troops, we will ensure equality of nationalities and regional autonomy. The Tibetan army and the Dalai Lama's position will not be changed. The Dalai Lama should not go to a foreign country. He should retain the traditional position.
4. When the national regional autonomy is granted to Tibet, the Dalai Lama's traditional position will continue; there will be no change in this.
5. Regarding the relationship between different factions in Tibet, we will discuss and decide this in the interest of unity. We do not harbour vindictive desires.(19)

Negotiations in Beijing

Since the positions of the two sides were completely at variance, it was apparent that there was no point in continuing the negotiation in Chamdo. In view of this, Ngabo requested the Tibetan government to shift the venue of negotiations, either to Lhasa or Beijing. The Kashag decided on Lhasa. Shortly afterwards, however, the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi sent a message to the Dalai Lama's temporary headquarters in Dromo, proposing Beijing as the venue. The Dalai Lama accepted this proposal and sent a five-member negotiating team, consisting of the three delegates in Chamdo, plus Kheme Sonam Wangdu and Lhawutara Thubten Tenthar from Dromo. The team was to be assisted by Takla Phuntsok Tashi as the Chinese interpreter and Sadhutsang Rinchen as the English interpreter. While the delegates in Chamdo were asked to proceed directly to Beijing, those in Dromo were asked to take the sea route via India. They were instructed to refer all the important matters back to Dromo for final decision and were expressly not given the plenipotentiary authority to conclude an "agreement".(20) They were given a five-point directive for negotiations:

1. The religious country of Tibet has been independent from an early time; the close priest-patron relationship between Tibet and China, which has been in existence from an early time, should be continued and further strengthened.
2. The Tibetan government will continue to have the same kind of relationship with new China as it did with the Kuomintang government.
3. The Chinese representative and his staff-members in Tibet should not exceed 100; their security will be the responsibility of the Tibetan army.
4. Tibetan territories up to Dhartsedho (Ch: Kangting) must be returned to the Tibetan government, and all the Chinese civilian and military personnel must be withdrawn.
5. The Tibetan army will be responsible for defending Tibet's frontiers.(21)

On March 29 Ngabo's party left Chamdo. The journey took nearly a month, during which Baba Phuntsok Wangyal (head of public relations affairs of the 18th Army) Lu'o Yus-hung (Baba Phuntsok Wangyal's assistant), Deng Xiaoping and other Communist ideologues indoctrinated them on the virtues of Chinese Communist Party policies on minority nationalities and United Front efforts.(22)

On April 22 they reached Beijing railway station to a tumultuous welcome by several hundred Chinese, including Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice-premier Gou Moru, Secretary of the Chinese People's Government Lin Beiqu, and United Front and Nationalities Affairs Commission Minister Li Weihan.(23) Four days later, on April 26, the delegates from Dromo arrived at Beijing railway station and were received by Lin Beiqu, Li Weihan, other Chinese leaders, students, Ngabo's party and officials of Tashilhunpo Monastery.(24) The Tibetan negotiators were lodged in Beijing Hotel and isolated from any contact with the outside world.(25)

On April 28, 1951 Li Weihan invited the Tibetan delegates to the Nationalities Affairs Commission office to discuss the "organisation, time and agenda of the negotiation". During the meeting, the Tibetans were given copies of the ten-point document, circulated earlier in eastern Tibet. They were asked to study this document as the agenda for discussion:(26)

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland--the People's Republic of China.
2. Tibet shall have the right to exercise national regional autonomy.
3. The existing political system of Tibet will not be altered; the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama will not be altered; officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.
4. Religious freedom and monasteries will be protected; Tibetan people's freedom of religious belief, customs and tradition will be respected.
5. Without altering the existing Tibetan military system, the Tibetan army will be made part of the national defence force of the People's Republic of China.
6. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be promoted.
7. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be developed.
8. In matters relating to reforms in Tibet, the people and leaders of Tibet shall discuss and make decisions on the basis of people's wishes.
9. In so far as former pro-British, pro-America and pro-Kuomintang officials completely severe relations with them and do not engage in resistance and sabotage, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.
10. The PLA of China entering Tibet will strengthen national defence; the PLA will abide by the above-mentioned policies; the entire military expenses will be provided by the Central People's Government; the PLA will be fair in all buying and selling.(27)

On April 29, 1951 the two sides met for the first round of negotiations at the military headquarters in Beijing.(28) The Chinese delegation was headed by Li Weihan, and included Zhang Jingwu (director of the People's Armed Forces Department), Zhang Guohua (leader of the 18th Army), and Sun Zhiyuan (political commissar of the South-West Military Region). Baba Phuntsok Wangyal and Lu'o Yus-hung assisted the Chinese team.(29)

Li Weihan opened the negotiations by presenting the ten-point document and stated that this should be the agenda for discussion. The Tibetan delegation rejected the Chinese proposal and asked for discussions on the five points proposed by its government. In addition, Ngabo complained that the PLA troops from Xinjiang and Amdo (Qinghai) were moving towards Lhasa and Ngari, and that this would make it difficult for the Dalai Lama to live in Tibet. He asked for Beijing's assurance to halt the PLA's advance.(30) Li Weihan said he would refer the question of PLA advance to the "Central Government", but refused to discuss the Tibetan government proposal. The meeting ended after half an hour.

At the second meeting, on May 2, Ngabo pressed the Tibetan position and stated that "Tibet had been an independent country and the past relationship with China had been one of priest and patron relationship."(31) He stated that the PLA's continued advance on Tibet was the most crucial issue, and that unless there was a clear decision to halt this, the negotiation would run into problems.(32)

Li Weihan pointed out that the question of the status of Tibet was not under discussion, and Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was non-negotiable.(33) He said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the 10-point proposal and no other issues should be added to the agenda. He added that the decision to deploy PLA troops in Tibet had been made by the Central Government. The PLA's advance on Tibet, he said, was beneficial to Tibet as well as to the whole of China. He claimed that the Chinese Government was there to liberate the minority nationalities and counter imperialist aggression. Particularly, it was necessary to have a strong national army to protect Tibet's frontiers. He added that Britain and India recognized Tibet as part of China. Li went on to say that the PLA's advance on Tibet was China's internal affairs and that Britain and India had no right to interfere in this. He further added that China recognized the Dalai Lama's traditional position and that Chairman Mao had congratulated the Dalai Lama when he assumed Tibet's political power. Li threatened to strip the Dalai Lama of his position if he left for India.(34)

As the Tibetans continued to stick fast to their position, the Chinese delegates assumed more and more threatening postures. At one point, Zhang Jingwu jumped on his feet, livid with anger. He said with the air of finality that the ten points for the liberation of Tibet was the Party's unanimous decision made at the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Thus, the second meeting ended in utter disappointment for the Tibetan delegates.(35)

The third meeting, on May 7, was no more encouraging. The Tibetans had no opportunity to speak; they were reduced to listening to a stream of threatening monologues from the Chinese interlocutors.

The fourth meeting, on May 10, held yet another surprise for the Tibetans. Li Weihan started by commenting belligerently on the proceedings of previous meetings. Then, he unveiled Beijing's decision to establish a Military-Administrative Commission in Tibet upon the conclusion of the "agreement". The Tibetan delegates were completely taken aback. Lhawutara asked what would be the function and purpose of this Commission. Li stated that it would be the apex body to decide all political and military affairs of Tibet. Lhawutara countered if this would not undermine and contradict the position and powers of the Dalai Lama. Li flew into a fit of rage, and demanded to know who had told them that there would be no change in the power and position of the Dalai Lama. He asked the Tibetan delegates if they meant to oppose the establishment of the Commission. He told the delegates that if they did not agree to the proposal, they could return home any day, either before or after the armed liberation. The PLA troops, he said, were already stationed on Tibetan soil and that all it took to put them back into action was a simple telegram from Beijing. He asked the delegates to decide whether they wanted a peaceful liberation or an armed liberation.(36)

In the following few days, there was no meeting. During that time, the Tibetan delegates met several times in Ngabo's room, and expressed concerns over how the negotiations might end in the light of the Chinese delegation's constant use of threats and bullying tactics. Ngabo said, "Now, we are in Chinese hands; they can beat or kill us. If they bully us like this, there cannot be any agreement."(37)

For over three weeks, since the Tibetan delegates' arrival in Beijing, the Chinese authorities had prevented them from having any contact with their government or with anyone who could communicate with their government. The Chinese said that the nature of the negotiations was very sensitive and that communicating with Lhasa or Dromo would compromise the confidentiality of the negotiation. The Chinese also stated that the facilities for communication with Lhasa were not adequate. Because of this, the delegates did not even know whether the Dalai Lama was still in Tibet or had left the country.

On May 14 the fifth meeting was held. By now, there was no doubt that if the Tibetans did not agree to the Chinese demand, the PLA would immediately resume its march into Tibet and bring death and destruction. Under the circumstances, the Tibetans decided that it was best to agree tentatively to the Chinese draft of the "agreement".(38) But they had one condition: if the Tibetan government and the Dalai Lama did not accept the "agreement" and if the Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet, they would need a guarantee that his power and position would be restored to him in the event of his return after four or five years. The Chinese agreed to this condition, but maintained that it should not be included in the main "agreement" since it could create unwelcome speculations when the document was announced to the world. Instead, the Chinese wanted this to be part of a separate, secret "agreement".(39)

At the same time, the Chinese came up with a new proposal. They said that the differences between the Tibetan government and the Panchen Lama should be discussed, resolved and included in the "agreement". Ngabo replied that the Tibetan government had directed "us" to discuss the issues between Tibet and China, and not the internal matters of Tibet. He stated that the Panchen Lama issue should be discussed and resolved in another forum. The Chinese were adamant that if the internal issue of Tibet were not resolved, there was no point in signing the "agreement". Ngabo replied that if this were the case, the Tibetan delegates had no business in Beijing. "I request the Chinese government to see to the safe return of the four other delegates, including Kheme, to Tibet. As for me, I am a subject of Chamdo Liberation Committee. You can command me to return to Chamdo or to stay in Beijing." Turning to his four colleagues, he said, "Now that it has become impossible to sign the agreement, you may return to Tibet. I have requested the Chinese government to ensure your safety. As for me, I am obligated to do whatever they tell me." Thus, the negotiations broke down for a few days.(40)

Whilst the negotiations were in abeyance, Sun Zhiyuan and Baba Phuntsok Wangyal visited Ngabo's hotel to persuade him to agree to the inclusion of the Panchen Lama issue in the "agreement". Ngabo adamantly opposed Sun's suggestion and argued all day long. Finally, Sun suggested that they should agree to the phrasing that the status and functions of the Panchen Lama should be the same as when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Lama had been in friendly and amicable relations with each other. Ngabo agreed and this became the sixth point of the "agreement".(41) Informal sessions like this were frequently held to exert pressure on the Tibetan delegates, who, according to Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, bargained hard for their own government's position.(42)

The 17-point "agreement"

On May 21 the Chinese finalized the drafts of the main "agreement" and the separate, seven-point secret document. The main "agreement" was more or less the same as the 10-point document proposed in the beginning. It had 17 points and a lengthy preamble, claiming Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. The Tibetan delegates saw the preamble for the first time on that day. Although the Chinese government has not released the contents of the separate, seven-point document, some of the clauses that Ngabo, Kheme and Takla Phuntsok Tashi have referred to in their statements and books are:

• If the Dalai Lama escapes from Tibet and returns after four or five years, his power and position will be restored to him. During the Dalai Lama's exile, the Tibetan government will provide for all his personal needs.
• About one jun (20,000-men military division) of PLA will be stationed on the frontiers of Tibet. One or two Tibetan ministers will be given the rank of deputy commander of the PLA troops in Tibet. (The Tibetans then did not have any idea of how many men were there in one jun).
• The Tibetan government shall continue to retain 500 bodyguards for the Dalai Lama and 1,000 security personnel in various regions of Tibet. (This has reference to point 8 of the main "agreement")
• The Tibetan Foreign Office shall be merged with the Chinese foreign relations branch office to be established in Tibet. The Tibetan Foreign Office personnel shall be given suitable positions in the Chinese foreign relations branch office. (This has reference to point 14 of the main "agreement")

The Chinese delegates made it plain that the terms, as they now stood, were final and amounted to an ultimatum. No further discussion was permitted. The Tibetan delegation did not even get to contact its government for instructions.43 It was given the choice of either signing the "agreement" on its own authority or accepting responsibility for an immediate military advance on Lhasa.

The signing ceremony

On May 23, the Tibetan and Chinese delegates signed what came to be known as the "Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet". Since the Tibetan delegates were not authorised to conclude an agreement, they did not have their government seal; all they had were the seals of their respective positions in the government. However, they denied having them in order to indicate their disapproval of the "agreement".(44) The Chinese then improvised wooden seals inscribed with the names of the delegates, and affixed them to the document. At that time, the Tibetan delegation warned the Chinese that they were signing the "agreement" only in their personal capacity and had no authority to bind either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government to it.

On the next day the delegates had a meeting with Mao Zedong, during which he made a long speech, proclaiming his love and concern for Tibetans. He said that the Communist Party's aim was to serve the cultural and economic development of Tibet and not to act as masters. "If the local Chinese officials oppress you, you must complain directly to us...This agreement is a matter of pride for both the Tibetans and Chinese." He added that the Tibetans could even become the presidents of China and control Beijing.(45) The delegates also met Zhou Enlai during which he gave his response to Ngabo's earlier letter, asking for the unification of Tibetan areas in Kham and Amdo under the existing Tibetan administration. Zhou Enlai said that since there were historical differences among the different Tibetan areas, it was not the right time to unite all the Tibetan areas under one administration. He, however, agreed that the Tibetan areas could unite after some years through dialogues between the two sides.(46)

Tibetan government's disapproval of the "agreement"

On May 27, 1951 Radio Beijing broadcast the full text of the "agreement". This was the first time the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government heard of the document; their reaction was one of shock and disbelief.47

Later, when the Tibetan government received a telegram from the delegates to confirm this news, it immediately sent a reply, reprimanding them for signing the "agreement" without consulting it. The government instructed the delegates to wait in Beijing for further instructions and to send the text of the 17-point Agreement and the seven-point secret agreement.48 But the Chinese government told the Tibetan delegates that it was inconvenient to transmit the message telegraphically, and that, moreover, sending the 17-point agreement would lead to the loss of state secrets.

The delegates then proposed to travel to Dromo, via India, to report the "agreement" to their government. The Chinese objected to Ngabo's travel via India, citing risk to his life from foreign agents.49 Thus, the delegates left in two groups: Ngabo and Khenchung Thubten Legmon went home through Chamdo, along with Zhang Guohua and Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, while the remaining delegates travelled via India.

In the meantime, the Tibetan government received a telegraphic message to say that the Chinese Government representative, General Zhang Jingwu, was on his way to Dromo, via India. Some Tibetan officials suggested that the Dalai Lama should leave for India for safety. After a great deal of argument, everyone agreed that he should wait until the Chinese general arrived.50

In Dromo, Zhang Jingwu and his colleagues asked the Tibetan government to send a telegram, congratulating the Chinese government for the "agreement". The Tibetan ministers ignored his suggestion and switched to the discussion on protocols concerning his meeting with the Dalai Lama on the following day. Zhang insisted that, as a representative of the Central Government, he should meet the Dalai Lama on equal terms. When the meeting took place, he asked the Dalai Lama to send a telegram to Mao to welcome and accept the "agreement". His Holiness ignored this suggestion. Hao Guangfu, Zhang Jingwu's telegraph operator, later reported that some high-ranking Tibetan officials and even some delegates of the negotiating team opposed the circumstances and terms of the agreement.51

When the Tibetan delegation members, Kheme and Lhawutara, arrived in Dromo, they reported the circumstances of the "17-point Agreement" to the Tibetan ministers and requested an audience with the Dalai Lama. The ministers refused them audience to indicate their displeasure with the "agreement".52 When Zhang Jingwu insisted repeatedly on the congratulatory telegram regarding the "agreeement", the Kashag said that it would telegraph its reaction after meeting Ngabo in Lhasa. Zhang said that an earlier reaction would help to enhance the Dalai Lama's reputation among the Chinese people. On July 20 the Kashag sent a telegram to China, stating that it would give its reaction after the arrival of Ngabo with the original text of the "agreement" and after discussing it in the Tibetan National Assembly.53

On July 21 the Dalai Lama left for Lhasa. Zhang Jingwu followed two days later and arrived in Lhasa on August 8. He expected the two prime ministers to come for his reception. 54 But the Kashag sent two lower-ranking officials, Kalon Lhalu Tsewang Dorje and Kastab Thubten Rabyang, to drive home the message that Tibet did not consider itself a part of China. This point was not lost on Zhang, who immediately set himself the task of implementing the "United Front" work, aimed at consolidating the Communist Party influence by enlisting the support of prominant members of the Tibetan society.55

Zhang visited the two prime ministers repeatedly and asked them to radio their acceptance of the "17-point Agreement". During one such session, Prime Minister Lukhangwa said, "Ngabo's responsibility was to discuss a peaceful solution. He was not given the authority to discuss military matters. The 17-point Agreement is beyond our imagination. When Ngabo returns, he will report to us the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement. We will discuss the agreement after hearing his report. ...Tibet is a peace-loving, religious country. Therefore, it will be better for you to send an intelligent and competent representative rather than an army. China is a populous and powerful country. But it must work within its limits. If pushed beyond the level of tolerance, even a sleeping man will wake up and fight."56

The Dalai Lama reached Lhasa on August 17. On September 9 around 3,000 Chinese troops, under the command of Wang Qimei and accompanied by Ngabo and Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, arrived in Lhasa. From September 24-26 Ngabo and the four other delegates addressed the Tibetan National Assembly to give a detailed account of how the "17-point Agreement" had been signed.57 Lhawutara said that if the agreement was not seen to be beneficial to the government and people of Tibet, the delegates were willing to accept any form of punishment since "we signed it without asking for the approval (of the government)".58 The National Assembly, while recognizing the extenuating circumstances under which the delegates had to sign the "agreement", asked the government to accept the "Agreement", provided the following conditions were fulfilled:

• There should be a limit on the number of PLA troops to be stationed in Tibet and that the soldiers should not converge on Lhasa, but proceed directly to the borders.
• The Tibetan government should have the right to raise with the Chinese authorities such points as are found to be unacceptable in the course of implementation.
• The powers of the Military-Administrative Commission should be confined to the maintenance of the PLA discipline.
• Matters relating to developmental activities, (e.g. mining), and border security should be decided according to the situation in Tibet.
• Whenever the Chinese government violates any provision of the "agreement", the Tibetan government should have the right to intervene.59

On the basis of this recommendation, the Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that it would radio its acceptance of the "agreement", provided China agreed to three conditions:

• The powers and functions of the Military-Administrative Commission should be defined vis-a-vis the powers and functions of the Dalai Lama;
• Only a limited number of PLA troops should be stationed in Tibet; the responsibility for defending the important borders should be entrusted to the Tibetan army;
• All the Tibetan-inhabited areas should be united under the Tibetan government; Chamdo and other areas of Kham should be returned to the Tibetan government.60

Zhang Jingwu ignored the first two points. Referring to the third point, he said that this should be decided later through a referendum conducted among the Tibetans in Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan, and Qinghai.61

Soon, about 20,000 additional PLA troops came to central Tibet and occupied the principal cities of Ruthok and Gartok, and then Gyangtse and Shigatse. With this, the military control of Tibet was virtually complete. From this position of strength, China refused to reopen negotiations, and the Dalai Lama effectively lost the ability to either accept or reject any Tibet-China "agreement". Now the only option before the Dalai Lama was to work with the Chinese and make the most of the "agreement" in the interest of his people. On October 24 Zhang Jingwu sent to Mao Zedong a telegram in the name of the Dalai Lama to express support for the "agreement'. Four days later, on October 29, a large contingent of PLA came to Lhasa under the command of Zhang Guohua and Tan Guansen.

At the same time, people's resentment against the "17-point Agreement" was increasing. Their resentment was fuelled further by the arrival of tens of thousands of Chinese troops and the resulting ten-fold increase in food prices, which raised the spectre of first famine in Tibet's history. The angry populace snapped the Chinese power and telegraph lines, threw rocks at the residences of the Chinese officials, spat on and beat up stray Chinese military or intelligence personnel. Posters came up at night, denouncing the Chinese occupation of Tibet.62 Resistance movements were formed, which the Chinese were determined to crush with brutal force.

On March 31, 1952 Mimang Tsongdu, People's Assembly for resistance, was born. On April 1 about 1,000 members of Mimang Tsongdu picketed Zhang Jingwu's residence and shouted slogans for Tibetan independence and the withdrawal of the PLA from Tibet. The Chinese immediately blamed the two prime ministers and "foreign imperialists" for inciting this. The Tibetan government was pressured to ban Mimang Tsongdu and force the resignation of the two prime ministers.63

Now, there was no doubt in the minds of the Chinese leaders that Tibetans looked upon the "agreement" with sheer contempt. On April 6, 1952 Mao Zedong said, "Not only the two Silons (i.e. prime ministers) but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out... As yet we do not have a material base for fully implementing the agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum." 64

The Chinese leaders promptly set out to undermine the powers and positions of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government: First the existing political and regional divisions were exploited and institutionalised in order to create rival centres of power. Secondly, new "Central Government" organs were created alongside the existing Tibetan institutions. Backed by the PLA, these new organs systematically wrested all powers from the Tibetan government. Thirdly, communist reforms were introduced in Kham and Amdo against the wishes of the Tibetan people; the Tibetan way of life was forcibly changed and hundreds of Tibetan religious and cultural institutions were razed to the ground. The Tibetans reacted by taking up arms against the Chinese. Thousands of Tibetans died in skirmishes; many went to jail and were never seen again. The resistance gradually spread to central Tibet, culminating in the national uprising in Lhasa on March 10, 1959 and the escape of the Dalai Lama to India.

On his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama issued a press statement in Tezpur, Assam, on April 18, 1959. In it, the Dalai Lama stated that the "17-point Agreement" had been signed under pressure from the Chinese government. Then, on June 20, he issued another press statement from his new headquarters in Mussoorie, in which he repudiated the "Agreement", describing it as having been forced upon Tibet by invasion, threat and deceit. The International Commission of Jurists stated that through this repudiation Tibet legally "discharged herself of the obligation under the Agreement".

* This write-up is based primarily on the accounts of Zhang Guohua, Lu'o Yus-hung, Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, Hao Guangfu, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Sampho Tenzin Dhondup, Kheme Sonam Wangdu, Lhawutara Thubten Tenthar, and Takla Phuntsok Tashi.

• Zhang Guohua was a member of the Chinese team in Beijing.
• Lu'o Yus-hung was an assistant of the Chinese team.
• Baba Phuntsok Wangyal was a translator for the Chinese team.
• Hao Guangfu was a telegraph operator of Zhang Jinwu, China's first representative in Tibet.
• Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Sampho Tenzin Dhondup, Kheme Sonam Wangdu and Lhawutara Thubten Tenthar were members of the Tibetan negotiating team in Beijing.
• Ngabo later became a vice-chairman of the Chinese NPC, whereas Lhawutara became a member of the Chinese Political Consultative Committee.
• Takla Phuntsok Tashi was a translator of the Tibetan team.