HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN
ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Towards inclusive security in Ethiopia

Inclusive security: conceptualized

In this piece, inclusive security is treated as an aspect of human security. At the heart of human security lies the relation between the state qua body politic and its citizens. Human security and state security are not mutually exclusive. They always depend on and complement each other. The Commission on Human Security's report *Human Security Now* has stressed that human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and interdependent, that without the one, the other cannot be attained. Although state security and human security are complementary and interdependent, state security does not always guarantee human security, nonetheless. The state plays a major role in guaranteeing human security, but may also be a threat to the citizenry's security.[1]

The concept of "inclusive security" can be traced back to divergent strands of theories in international relations. One is feminist international relations theory based on the works of scholars as diverse as Swanee Hunt, Ann Tickner, Sara Ruddick, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judith Shapiro, and others. This theory is concerned with debunking how international politics is "gendered," that is, run by men to serve their interests and interpreted by other men, consciously and unconsciously, according to masculinised perspectives. Feminist IR theory critiques realism for being based on a masculine world view whereby the key concepts of power and security are centred on notions of self-interest, objectivity, domination and the 'political man'. The absence of women is coupled with the belief that women are not well-suited to the demands, pressures and responsibilities associated with peace and security issues. Almost all feminist IR theorists affirm "the laudable goal of greater female participation in all aspects of foreign relations".[2]

Critical feminist theorists, such as Ann Tickner, Robert Keohane, Rebecca Grant and Fred Halliday, suggest that more gender neutral interpretations of what constitutes security and power must be brought into the field in order to achieve a non-gendered, inclusively human way of thinking about achieving security in the future. They argue that women treat conflict differently and place a premium on achieving consensus and reconciliation.

Arguing in favour of granting female agency rather than succumbing to the perception of women as "victims or problems", Tickner's critique draws on the work of Robert Connell to focus on "hegemonic masculinities," not essentialized men, and she recommends that we take inspiration from feminine characteristics rather than holding them as markers of female moral superiority.[3] Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa chime in tune with Tickner in that "inclusive security," as a concept, "emphasizes women's agency, not their vulnerability. Rather than motivated by gender fairness, this concept is driven by efficiency: Women are crucial to inclusive security since they are often at the centre of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), popular protests, electoral referendums, and other citizen-empowering movements whose influence has grown with the global spread of democracy. An inclusive security approach expands the array of tools available to police, military, and diplomatic structures by adding collaboration with local efforts to achieve peace."[4]

In the words of Swanee Hunt: "The idea of women as peacemakers is not political correctness run amok. Social science research supports the stereotype of women as generally more collaborative than men and thus more inclined toward consensus and compromise."[5] Inclusive security dictates that women should be at the centre-stage of the politics of war and peace, where they can bring their experience in peacemaking to bear. Even though there are more women MPs than used to be, women are still seriously underrepresented in the highest echelons of political and military hierarchies. The presidents, prime ministers, cabinet ministers, generals, diplomats, and party leaders, are overwhelmingly men. The national security process itself is dominated by a monolithic, strongly masculine world view. At its core, security policy-making is based on such premises as strength, power, autonomy and rationality – virtues which are typically associated with men and masculinity. In this gendered view, security and foreign policy are domains of policy-making least appropriate for women.

In view of the foregoing, the reason why I propose to treat inclusive security as an aspect of human security is because inclusive security advocates for full and equal participation of women in state security apparatus and for their protection against any possible threats to their security and beyond emanating from both within and without the state. Precisely because, unlike the traditional approach to security, epitomized by the realist school of international relations, that views territorial integrity and continued survival of the state as most sacred, and therefore trumping other security concerns, inclusive security in line with human security puts people first.

Policy framework for inclusive security in Ethiopia
The EPRDF-led Government has declared its commitment to gender equality first with the issuance of the National Policy on Women (NPW) in 1993, later with the promulgation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) in 1995, and finally with the formulation of a five year National Action Plan for Gender Equality (NAP-GE) in 2006 in keeping with the FDRE Constitution and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (BPA). Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees all persons equality before the law, and prohibits any discrimination on grounds of gender. Besides, Article 35 of same elaborates on the rights of women, conferring on them equal rights as men across the board, including equal rights in inheritance and marriage as well as rights to land and property. Moreover, women are entitled to affirmative action in order to heed them "special attention" and "so as to enable them to compete and participate on the basis of equality with men in political, social and economic life as well as in public and private institutions."[6]

A Women's Affairs Office with the rank of minister without portfolio within the Office of the Prime Minister was also established in 1992 with mandate to coordinate and facilitate conditions to promote gender equality and to formulate and follow up a gender equality policy. It was charged with responsibilities to oversee and coordinate activities leading to the effective implementation of the policy. Since 2005, the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) with the rank of minister with

portfolio has been established by virtue of Proclamation No. 471/2005. The NPW acknowledges that "the discriminatory political, economic and social rules and regulations prevailing in Ethiopia have barred women from enjoying the fruits of their labour". The first priorities of the government are thus: to improve the level of income of women by facilitating opportunities and women-friendly conditions in the work-place; to improve the health and nutrition of mothers and their children; and to upgrade and improve their education.

Beijing, Beijing +5 and 1325

In addition to the municipal policy framework, albeit in an all-too-sketchy manner, there is also an international policy framework for the full and equal participation of women in all aspects of public life, not excluding peace and security. The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) that emerged from the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, marks an important milestone in the international community's evolving recognition of women's rights and roles in peace and security. The BPFA states in pertinent part that "full participation [of women] in decision-making, conflict prevention and resolution and all other peace initiatives [is] essential to the realisation of lasting peace."[7] Besides, the BPFA recommends member states, inter alia, to increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and to promote women's contribution to fostering a culture of peace.[8] Moreover, the 2000 Beijing +5 Political Declaration and "Outcomes" document also reaffirmed member states' commitments to the BPFA.

In October 2000, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted unanimously resolution 1325 that recognized gender equality as an integral component of peace and security. UNSC 1325, being the first solemn recognition of the role of women in the hitherto male dominated 'high politics' of peace and security marks a watershed. This resolution is the most important commitment made by the international community with regard to women's participation in the maintenance of national and international peace and security. The resolution spells out actions needed by all actors, including governments and the UN, to ensure the participation of women in peace processes and improve the protection of women in conflict zones. It calls upon the Security Council, the UN Secretary General, member states and all other parties to take action in four interrelated areas: 1) the participation of women in decision making and peace processes; 2) integration of gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping; 3) the protection of women; and 4) gender mainstreaming in UN reporting systems and programmes.

Ethiopian policy limited scope

Although the National Policy on Women has been in place since 1993, the National Action Plan for Gender Equality (NAP-GE) had to wait until 2006. Even if gender equality has been constitutionally guaranteed since 1995, equality did not materialize, as it does not come by mere constitutional enshrinement. Besides, a constitutional scheme of affirmative action, aiming at reversing the effects of a history of gender injustice, can never realize its goals, insofar as it is far from being self-executing, until it is accompanied by elaborate statutes and action plans detailing quota, activities, strategies, time-line, and specific situations for implementation in all sectors, private or public. Moreover, the policy itself is not free of problems.

A closer perusal of the policy document reveals that its scope is limited. For instance, it fails to make a systematic analysis of the various ramifications of the absence of women from decision making positions in all sectors, especially in peace and security, although it talks of the need to get women into decision making positions. The NAP-GE, with its unprecedented emphasis on development and economic empowerment of women, again overlooks the recognition accorded to gender parity in the arenas of peace and security by UNSC 1325. Hence, Ethiopia's failure to draw up a national action plan to implement UNSC 1325 has sidelined the rights and roles of women in peace and security.

That said, despite the existence of a legislative and policy framework for gender equality, the ratio of women in public life is still low. Women remain to be underrepresented in decision-making positions at all levels of the federal and regional governments. The NAP-GE (2006-2010) attributes this gloomy reality to the following factors, to wit: No indication that a well-thought-ought policy, programme or action, to increase the number of women at decision-making and leadership positions exist; the constitutional commitment of the government to grant Affirmative Action has not been translated into concrete action at all levels; the number of elected women representatives is still low; more and more women are engaged in formal employment, but are underrepresented in middle and higher management positions; the number of women leaders and decision makers at the various level of the decentralized government structure is still very low; and the election law and electoral process is not gender friendly[9].

Gender equality in Ethiopia: implications for inclusive security

Following the first national and regional elections in 1995, out of 548 seats, in the House of Peoples Representatives 2.3% was occupied by women. The House of Federation, which had a woman as its speaker, consisted of 7 women among its 128 members. At the Woreda councils, the number of women in office reached 8%. The goals set for the second national and regional elections in 2000 were to reach 15% at the federal and 20% at regional level.[10]

According to the 2000 Election Commission Report, there were only 7.7% women parliamentarians in the House of People's Representative, 6% in the House of Federation, 12.9% in the Regional State Councils, 7.1% in the Woreda councils, and 13.9% in the Kebele Councils. Although the number of women in the national legislature has increased slightly, but had been below the expected 30%.[11]

The third national and regional elections of May 2005 in Ethiopia brought about a dramatic increase in the number of women parliamentarians in the House of People's Representatives and Regional State Councils. The proportion of women has risen to 21.2% in the House of People's Representatives, 50% in Tigray Regional State Council, 44% in Amhara Regional State Council, 38% in Oromia Regional State Council, and 33% in SNNP Regional State Council. . In the executive branch of the government (Ministers, Vice Ministers, etc), women constitute 13%. In the Civil Service, women occupied only 24.3% of the higher positions (Directors, Division Heads, Ambassadors, etc). In the judiciary, among judges of the Supreme, High and First Instance Courts of the Federal and Regional State governments, women represent 13% whilst they used to account for 25.5% in 2003.[12] In the Cabinet, at the top of the echelon, there was only one woman heading a line ministry (Education).

Ironically, according to Ms. Saba Gebrekidan, a prominent civil society leader, the dramatic rise in the ratio of women representatives in the Federal parliament or the Regional State councils was not an outcome of the government's legislative or policy measures at gender parity. Rather, it was a consequence of a decision by EPRDF qua party aiming to reach a critical mass of 30% women in the 2005 national and regional elections.[13] The fact that the increase was registered in four of the Regional States of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP which are dominated by the four members of the EPRDF coalition corroborates the claim.

The point I am trying to make here is that EPRDF, *qua* government, failed to achieve the 30% target that it, *qua* party, set in the 2005 elections, except in 4 regions (namely, Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR) which themselves have been nothing but the strongholds of 4 of the parties that form the EPRDF coalition (TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDF). However, the Ethiopian federation consists of 9 regions and one autonomous city administration (Addis Ababa), not to mention Dire Dawa, which, though unlike Addis Ababa has not been granted constitutional autonomy, enjoys autonomy de facto until the dispute (between the Somali and Oromia Regions) over title to the city is resolved by the House of Federation. In

other words, EPRDF has failed to achieve its 30% target in the remaining 5 regional and two autonomous city councils, in addition to the federal parliament. What more loss can one imagine than this? The sense of loss becomes keener only after we realize that it took Ethiopia more than 15 years to get where it is now. Moreover, the problem with the underrepresentation of women in public offices concerns not only elective offices, but also appointive posts, both in the executive and judiciary.

Notwithstanding a National Security Council (NSC), pursuant to Proclamation No. 257/2001 and a white paper, officially known as Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS), were constructed in 2003, neither the NSC involved a woman nor did the FANSPS recognize salience of the gender dimension of foreign and security policy. With respect to the involvement of women in the foreign affairs establishment Ethiopia saw very few women peacemakers, apart from a handful of women diplomats such as Ambassadors Sahlework Zewde, director general of the African Affairs Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has recently been appointed as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General heading the United Nations Integrated Peace Building Office (BINUCA) in Central African Republic (CAR), Konjit Sinegiorgis, Halima Mohammed, and Guenet Zewdie, a Cabinet-minister-turned-diplomat.

Conclusion

The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy must extend full recognition to the role of women in peace-making, peace-building, and security. The Government should demonstrate its commitment to the principles enshrined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. In this regard, the Foreign Ministry must come up with the long overdue action plan for the implementation of UNSC 1325. The UN Secretary-General as early as 2004 called upon Member States, including Ethiopia, to prepare their own national action plans to implement the resolution, which was again reaffirmed in a statement of the Security Council Chairman on 7 March 2007.

Consequently, it should recruit more qualified women to the diplomatic services; nominate more women to international diplomatic assignments, specifically to senior positions (UN special representatives, peace commissions, fact-finding missions, etc.); increase the percentage of women in delegations to national, regional and international meetings concerned with peace and security, as well as in formal peace negotiations; and include women in all reconciliation, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace building, and conflict preventive posts. Moreover, the Government should bring women into the National Security Council and Cabinet.

In closing, the Government should work aggressively to get a critical mass of women into leadership positions in contemporary Ethiopian political life in keeping with its commitments to the Constitution, the Beijing Platform for Action, and UNSC 1325. To that end, the Government must enact a gender conscious electoral law, and elaborate and workable appointment policy and procedures in the near future. The electoral law should impose an obligation on political parties in the form of a quota specifying the critical mass of women they must field and a legal sanction in the event of non-compliance in the form of withholding incentives, including party financing. Meanwhile, political parties, whether the incumbent or opposition, across the ideological spectrum should put forward gender-balanced lists of candidates to the National Electoral Board until the Government comes to realize and actually enacts a gender-sensitive electoral law..

Alemayehu Fentaw (LLB, MA in Peace and Conflict Studies, summa cum laude, Salzburg Global Fellow) is a Researcher at the International Law and Policy Institute, an Oslo-based independent Think Tank. He focuses on the Horn of Africa and the African Union Peace and Security Architecture.

1   UNESCO, Human Security: Approaches and Challenges, Stedi Media, Paris, 2008, pp. 73-75.

2   Francis Fukuyama, Women and the Evolution of World Politics, Foreign Affairs, Volume 77 No.5, September/October 1998, p.33.

3   Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 137.

4   Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa, Women Waging Peace: Inclusive Security, Foreign Policy, May/June 2001, P. 38.

5   Id, p.41.

6   Article 35(3) of the FDRE Constitution.

7   Fourth World Conference on Women, the Platform for Action; Global Framework, Article 23. New York: United Nations, 1996, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#framework.

8   Id.

9   National Action Plan for Gender Equality(2006-2010), Ministry of Women's Affairs, p.11.

10   Women Watch, United Nations, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ accessed on 16 January 2010.

11   National Action Plan for Gender Equality(2006-2010), Ministry of Women's Affairs, pp11-12.

12   Id.

13   Conversation with the author.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
Implications for human security in the Horn of Africa

Inclusive security: conceptualized

The issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which constitutes one of the most important waterways in the world, has attracted serious academic and policy attention in view of the grave challenge it poses for the peace, security and stability of the Horn of Africa. There is broad consensus about the activities of pirates in the Gulf of Aden, which has made them a force to reckon with as far as the peace and security architecture of the region is concerned. Apart from generalized conflicts and humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa, piracy in the Gulf of Aden has become a major threat to peace and security in the sub-region, and has the potential of undermining the prospect for human security.

The Gulf of Aden is located in the Arabian sea between Yemen in the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. The gulf is popularly known as the *Pirate Alley* due to the intensity of pirate activity in the area (Blundell, 2007:1). The Gulf of Aden is an important waterway for Persian Gulf oil, and also a shortcut for trade ships from Europe to Africa, making it an important water way in the world, as far as global trade and commerce is concerned. Despite the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden to the Horn of Africa and the global economy, in terms of the vast resources and potentials, all these are being undermined by multifaceted threats largely due to piracy. Thus, rather than contributing to security, stability, economic growth and development for countries that make up the Horn of Africa, endemic insecurity associated with the activities of Somali pirates has significantly constrained investment and reversal of the prospect of economic growth and development, with huge consequences of the wellbeing of the people.

The nexus between piracy and human [in] security

Piracy is no doubt a war-like act committed by a non-state actor, especially robbery or criminal violence committed at sea, on water or sometimes on shore. It does not include crimes on board a vessel among passengers or crew. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines Maritime Piracy 'as consisting of

a. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of degradation committed for private aircraft, and directed:
    - On the high seas, amongst another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
    - Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

b. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

c. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub paragraph (a) or (b) (UNCLOS, 1982)[1].

Furthermore, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as 'the act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime and with intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of the act'[2]. Piracy gained international recognition both as a concept and its consequence in view of the globalized nature in the obstruction of international maritime trade and the interest it has generated amongst nations states.

An understanding of human security is embedded on the premise that it goes beyond the traditional state-centric notion of security to encompass freedom from both fear and want (Thomas, 2007:108). The reality of the situation in the Horn of Africa is that human insecurity has been exacerbated as a result of piracy, which reinforces a condition of vulnerability, which in turn threatens the physical and material wellbeing of the people. In fact the two core strands of insecurity associated with piracy is reflected in the lack of protection for individuals and oil vessels from acts of violence on the one hand, and the inability of sub-regional economic bodies such as Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD) to protect the people from sudden economic downturn particularly in Somalia.

Growing crime rate and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden complicates the security architecture in the Horn of Africa, which has over the years facilitated hijack of oil vessels, oil theft and the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in the region. These threats and vulnerabilities compounds the regions human security challenges when viewed within the context of the setback it has for investment in health, education, shelter and poverty reduction programmes. In fact, the absence of a stable government, as well as strong legislative and enforcement mechanism against piracy in Somalia has contributed to this malaise, in terms of the inability of the Somali government to contain the activities of the pirates.

While there is wide spread criticism about the activities of pirates, which has heightened maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden, the concerns of the Somalis with respect to illegal fishing and the dumping of nuclear and chemical wastes need to be taken into consideration. The fact that less attention has been given to this issue has to a large extent, contributed to the proliferation of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden who claim to be concerned about maritime security of the waters.

Implications for Human Security

Due to acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the global economy has suffered huge loss of around US $13 to $16 billion yearly. Notwithstanding these huge losses, there are arguments in support of piracy, which is premised on the fact that it is an attempt aimed at protecting the Somali waters from illegal trawlers, and above all protecting the marine resources of Somalia (Hansen, 2009:8).

This perspective, in terms of explaining the principal causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is too reductionist, in view of the fact that most of the ships that are attacked by the Somali pirates are not involved in illegal fishing on the Somali waters but on transit via the Somali waters. Some of the proceeds from the activities of the Somali pirates are being used to support the insurgencies against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (Pham, 2008:2).

In a fundamental sense, the presence of a NATO Standing Force, named Operation Allied Protector, on one hand, as well as the European Union Naval Task Force, created within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy and the United Nations Security Council and christened EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation ATALANTA), with the task of undertaking an anti-piracy mission in Somalia and provide support to the World Food Programme (WFP) [4].

In fact, ensuring the safe passage of merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden, has more to do, in terms of checkmating piracy, which has made the Horn of Africa highly unsafe for trade and commerce, increased the cost of doing business, as well as resulted in a sharp increase in the global cost of oil due to insecurity and crime rate. All these have remarkable effect on the population within the Gulf States that make up the Horn of Africa in terms of wealth creation and economic development (Kraska & Wilson, 2009:2).

Reversing a regime of human insecurity: an agenda for action

Conditioned by the prevailing realities associated with maritime insecurity and piracy in the Gulf of Aden, these suggestions stand to mitigate or reverse its implications for human security if implemented.

First, a community and clan driven process should be given greater emphasis in designing a framework for sustainable peace and security in the Horn of Africa. This is one of the effective ways of breaking the regime of insecurity of both states and people in the region.

Second, under a regional security arrangement, the capacity of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union need to be strengthened, with the creation of a Standby Force that would be charged with the responsibility of ensuring maritime security in the both the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea, which currently poses grave maritime security risks as a result of the illicit activities of pirates.

Third, there is need for deliberate international cooperation in strengthening institutions of governance in Gulf of Aden states which would invariably reduce maritime insecurity and high crime rate.

Fourth, concrete efforts should be put in place by national, regional and global institutions so as to boost maritime security as it relates to preventing unlawful acts in the Gulf of Aden. One of the partnerships that can be explored in this context is the African Maritime Governance Initiative that was established in 2006 by the administration of George Bush in the United States.

Fifthly, the international community should put in place concrete measures that are aimed at checkmating illegal fishing as well as the dumping of nuclear and chemical wastes in the Gulf of Aden. Last, there is need for a strong commitment and coordination on the part of supra-national organizations such as IGAD, AU and UN in responding to the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which has undermined the prospect for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, thereby making the area one of the most in-secured in the world.

Conclusions:

In the final analysis, the activities of pirates in the Gulf of Aden has caused considerable damage and suffering to the reputation of the Horn of Africa internationally, with its attendant human insecurity. It is against the backdrop of this fact that a strong commitment towards containing the menace of piracy and the activities of the Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden is very critical to the over all search for peace and security in the Horn of Africa. This would no doubt have far reaching impact on human security of the people. While the activities of piracy in the Gulf of Aden need to be drastically contained, greater emphasis need to be placed on stabilizing the situation in Somalia, which is currently characterized by the absence of a strong institution of governance that has bolstered piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Ayuba T. Larab *is currently a lecture and lecturer with the Department of History and International Studies, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria.*

Chris M.A Kwaja *is Doctoral Candidate of International Relations and Strategic Studies, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria. He is currently a lecturer and researcher with the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria.*

1 See Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

2 1.This definition is from the International Maritime Bureau Report titled Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2006 (Barking: ICC Publishing).

3 For a chronological analysis on the spate of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, visit www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_of_Aden

4 1.See www.nato.int.docu/update/2008/12-december/e1215ahtml. Accessed 20th May, 2010.

References:

Blundell, S (2007) Re-Red Sea/Gulf of Aden Piracy, available at www.noonsite.com/General/Piracy/RedSea2007. Accessed 22nd May, 2010.

Hansen, J.S (2009) Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies, NIBR Report, 29.

Kraska, J & Wilson, B (2009) Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti Code and the Somali Coast Guard, Ocean and Coast Management (2009).

Pham, P.J (2008) Strategic Interests: Time to Hunt Somali Pirates, World Defence Review, available at www.worlddefencereview.com/pham092308.shtml. Accessed 23rd May, 2010.

Thomas, C (2007) Globalisation and Human Security, Cambridge, Polity Press.

www.mahalo.com/pirates-in-gulf-of-aden. Accessed 23rd May, 2010.

NEWS AND EVENTS

GENERAL

ICC needs credibility and support

What started as an ambitious attempt to establish, once and for all, a permanent international war crimes tribunal is still trying to gain credibility seven years after its birth. Although the International Criminal Court is slowly but surely sending a warning against those who commit crimes on a massive scale, it still lacks the support of the world's major powers and several key suspects remain at large. Of the five permanent Security Council members, the United States, Russia and China are not members. India, Indonesia, Israel and many Islamic countries have snubbed it as well.

Critics also point to its slow progress, starting its first trial in January 2009, stymied by evidence disclosure problems. A third trial is due to begin in July, but the court has not yet reached any judgement. One of the problems of the ICC is that it has no police force of its own and must rely on sovereign authorities to enforce its warrants. States have the right to refuse arresting suspects.

The U.S has said that the court has thus far not focused on prosecuting people for making mistakes and instead focuses on operations where the aim was to attack and murder civilians. The African Union reiterated at an ICC review conference that Sudanese arrest warrants regretfully came at a critical juncture in the nation's peace efforts. Sudan has accused the court of being a western conspiracy and all of the five 'situations' the court is investigating are in Africa, leading to wider criticism its focus is selective. At the review conference in Kampala, Uganda states also sought to agree on extending the court's already ambitious mandate by allowing it to prosecute crimes of state aggression.
Reuters

Sudan freezing its membership in the Nile basin initiative

The Sudanese irrigation minister Kamal Ali Mohamed announced on 27 June that his country is freezing its membership in the Nile basin initiative to protest other countries insistence on sticking to the Entebbe accord on reallocating water shares.

The water ministers of Egypt and Sudan, the largest consumers of the Nile's waters, were in the Ethiopian capital to discuss the increasingly contentious issue, which is pitting them against five other riparian countries.

Five countries in East Africa which signed the Nile basin initiative refused to back off from the accord despite strong objections by Egypt and Sudan. Both countries have refused any alteration to the pre-existing accords of 1929 & 1959 which gave it veto power over upstream projects. "The deal cannot be forced upon us. It will only be an obligation for those countries, not Egypt's," Mohamed Nasr Al-Deen Allam, Egypt's water resources minister said. He added that the problem could only be solved if the conditions of each country are appreciated.

The new deal would need at least six signatories to come into force with indications that DR Congo and Burundi may soon follow suit, but Egypt and Sudan have so far refused to give up the previous arrangement which gave them the lion's share of the river's flow. Many observers in Sudan have questioned the government's keen interest in siding with Egypt on the matter despite needing more water to meet growing demand.
Sudan Tribune

SUDAN

Sudan may witness new war if parties disagree over referendum results

A Sudanese minister on June 15 warned that any probable disagreement on the results of southern Sudan referendum could lead to a new war in the country. At different times since the general elections last April Sudanese officials from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) said they would be more vigilant about the organization and security issues related to the southern Sudan referendum stressing they would not accept any rigging or fraud.

"If we don't agree on the results of the referendum, this could cause a new war between northern and southern Sudan," said the newly appointed foreign minister, Ali Karti. He further added such conflict would be more disastrous than the past. The Sudanese parliament postponed the endorsement of the nine members of the Referendum Commission appointed by President Omar Al-Bashir. The SPLM objected the nomination of a member belonging to the Democratic Unionist Party.

The demarcation of North-South border is one of the pending issues that the CPA partners are grappling with. Observers fear a future war between the two signatories of 2005 agreement if they disagree on the boundary delimitation. President Omar Al-Bashir had earlier warned that the delimitation of some parts of northern-southern Sudan boundary could be explosive, adding that the unity remains the best option for the interests of the two parties.
Sudan Tribune

UN-African force in Darfur turn to music, reading as peace tools

The joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur has helped local civil society groups collect thousands of books through a music festival designed to highlight Sudanese culture and its role in maintaining peace in the war-torn area.

"The arts can play a crucial role, especially at this time in Darfur's history," said Paul Ebikwo, a regional representative of the UN mission, known by its acronym UNAMID, which was set up by the UN Security Council to protect civilians and quell the violence in Darfur. Nearly seven years of fighting in the area killed some 300,000 people and displaced 2.7 million others, some who are staying at the UN Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in the southern town of Nyala, where the concert was held.

The musical headliner at the Elbiheir Theater, where patrons sat on 27 June under the stars, was "Igd Algalad" a Khartoum-based group with roots in traditional Sudanese folk songs. In a twist to a typical concert, the "We read for the recovery of Darfur" event asked audience members to contribute books instead of tickets. The performances drew

crowds of people, including youth and state officials. The exact number of books has yet to be counted, but a similar event a few months ago raised some 9,000 books.

Organizers, who are members of the Afia Sudan Voluntary Organization, said the concert was part of a series of events aimed at collecting one million books for distribution throughout Darfur's universities and public libraries in the main cities. A similar event is soon anticipated for El Fasher, North Darfur.
UN News Services

KENYA

IDPs fear renewed violence

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) on 23 June expressed fears of renewed chaos in the post-election violence hotspots following inflammatory remarks by politicians in the ongoing referendum campaigns. Their worries have been worsened by the start of the International Criminal Court investigations into the 2007 violence and the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission process.

IDPs national chairman James Muchina and IDPs Network coordinator Kepha Mageni were, however, happy with the action being taken by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission on leaders accused of engaging in hate speech. They said the threats were as a result of deliberate misinterpretation of the land clause in the proposed constitution and the fact that suspected perpetrators of post election violence had not been arrested. The IDPs officials named Mt Elgon, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Kipkelion, Kuresoi and Kericho as the most affected by threats to violence and urged the government to beef up security.

They regretted that most of security personnel deployed to the areas at the height of the chaos that left 1,133 people dead and 650,000 displaced had since been withdrawn. Mr Muchina said the IDPs who had returned to their farms were contemplating returning to satellite camps for security reasons. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights commissioner Hassan Omar and a Centre for Human Rights and Governance official Kipseret Chepting regretted that some people were occupying houses and farms that belong to others especially in Nairobi and Rift Valley but the government was doing nothing to evict them.

An assistant director in-charge of resettlement at the Ministry of Special Programmes, Mr Michael Nyamai, said 798 IDPs families out of 6,082 have been resettled. The Minister blamed problems experienced in the resettlement programme to lack of legal constitutional framework for guidance in addressing issues affecting IDPs. He said his Ministry also appeared to be reactive and crisis driven rather than proactive and lacked adequate finances and staff.
Daily Nation

Park grenades linked to military

The grenades that exploded in Uhuru Park during a church rally on 13 June are suspected to have been stolen from the Kenya Army. Kenyan bomb experts have been examining the grenade fragments collected at the scene and from the dead and injured. In a possible investigative breakthrough, they have indicated that the grenades could have been taken from the military, according to police sources. Each grenade has a number which is used to enter it in the inventory maintained by the Kenyan Army. The investigators found the numbers on two grenade pins found at Uhuru Park. Two regular grenades and one stun grenade exploded around 6.30pm at Uhuru Park as the prayer meeting and No rally (against the proposed new constitution) was drawing to a close. Six people were killed and over 100 injured. The investigators believe that the grenades could have been stolen from the armoury of the artillery, infantry or 78 Tank battalions based in Isiolo.

The team believes that once they establish the source of the grenades, they will be able to identify the motive and possible suspects behind the attack. The team has

received no significant information or leads from the public despite the Sh500000 reward offered by Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere. On 28 June, police spokesman Erick Kiraithe declined to comment on the progress and only issued the standard statement, "Investigations are going on. We hope to unmask the people behind the attack." Multiple sources at both the Internal Security ministry, the police and the within the special investigations team said the briefings had not been held because there is nothing to report and not much progress.' They denied media reports that the Israelis were called in to assist in the investigations.
The Nairobi Star

UGANDA

Security tightened over ADF threat

On 28 June the army was put on alert in western Uganda to forestall an imminent attack by suspected Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels based in the DR Congo. The Congolese army recently launched an offensive to drive out the rebels from their territory, raising fears that the rebels might respond by attacking Uganda in turn. Already, rebels fleeing Congolese forces attacked a Congolese town of Mutwanga, 50km inside the DR Congo on the western slopes of the Rwenzori Mountains. The rebels were reportedly targeting Edwardo Nyamwisi, the brother of Congolese minister Mbusa Nyamwisi. They besieged the town, despite the presence of the UN peace-keeping forces called MONUC. Ugandan and Congolese military sources said Nyamwisi escaped unhurt.

The spokesman of the 2nd Division in Mbarara,Uganda Maj. Patrick Kamara, said the army would not allow the rebels to cross into Uganda and cause havoc. Kamara said the conflict in eastern Congo was an internal matter, which the Uganda People Defence Force (UPDF) would not get involved in.

The ADF rebels were flushed out of Uganda in 2002 after committing atrocities for nearly six years, including the killing of about 100 students of Kicwamba Technical College in Kabarole district. They also attacked St. John's Minor Seminary in Kasese district and displaced thousands of people in the Rwenzori region. The ADF, led by Kyagulanyi a.k.a. Jamil Mukulu, is suspected to be linked to al-Qaeda. The attack comes hardly a month after a joint meeting between Ugandan and Congolese military chiefs in Fort Portal, in which they discussed the rebel threat.
New Vision

SOMALILAND

Observers commend elections

A group of international observers on 29 June said that the recent concluded presidential election in Somalia's separatist region of Somaliland was free and fair. The group told reporters in Hargeisa that campaigns and polling were conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner dispute some irregularities such as misuse of public resources during the campaigns. "Despite some irregularities, the election process was fair, free and expressed the will of the people. We are looking to a speedy and clear result that is accepted by all the parties," said British observer Conrad Heine. On their part, U.S.-based group International Republican Institute (IRI) said the vote was peaceful, without major incident and generally met international standards. "Election Day is only one part of a larger and longer four part process, which includes the pre-election environment, pre-election administration, Election Day voting, and vote counting and post-election adjudication resulting in acceptance of legitimate results," it said in a statement. The group cautions the political parties and Somalilanders to wait for the final results to be released before conclusions are made regarding the election process.

Official results are not due for another week but Somaliland's National Election Commission (NEC) says a winner is expected to emerge with partial results over the next few days with votes counting almost finishing. The incumbent President Dahir Riyale Kahin of UDUB party is facing a stiff opposition from Ahmed Mohamed Silaanyo, the leader of Kulmiye party, which has the largest parliamentary seats and Faisal Ali Warabe of the Justice and Welfare party (UCID).
Garowe online

RESOURCES

GENERAL

"Climate change and natural resources conflicts in Africa" (June 2010)
This paper provides an overview of Africa's irregular, non-state threats, followed by an analysis of their strategic implications for regional peace and stability, as well as the national security interests of the United States. After reviewing the elements of the emerging international consensus on how best to address these threats, the conclusion highlights a number of new and innovative tools that can be used to build political will on the continent to confront these security challenges. This paper is intended as a background analysis for those who are new to the African continent, as well as a source of detailed information on emerging threats that receive too little public or policy-level attention. It is published by the institute for National Strategic Studies.
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/170/Mono170.pdf

"Small arms survey 2010: gangs, groups and guns" (June 2010)
This Survey reviews current knowledge on gang-related violence and efforts to curb it. It finds that measures that combine suppression – or its threat – with community outreach, social services, and treatment and prevention strategies are more effective than suppression alone. Recognizing and capitalizing on features of gangs that attract youths, such as social cohesion, mutual respect, and artistic expression, has also shown promise in some contexts. Apart from its focus on street gangs, this edition also explores non-state armed groups. Unlike gangs, armed groups may seek to advance an ideology or seize power, or simply take community security into their own hands. They span the spectrum from rebels and insurgents to vigilante groups and paramilitaries that support the state. Despite their differences, gangs and armed groups share a number of features, including the willingness to use violence to achieve their objectives.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/yearb2010.html

"Towards a broader view of the politics of global land grabbing"
(June 2010)
This paper by Jeniffer Franco and Jun Borras focuses on The phrase 'global land grab' has become a catch-all framework to describe and analyze the current explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions related to the production and sale of food and biofuels. Initially deployed and popularised by activist groups opposed to such transactions from an environmental and agrarian justice perspectives, the significance of the phrase has quickly moved beyond its original moorings, as it gets absorbed into mainstream development currents that push for 'win-win' arrangements and a 'code of conduct', which is critically examined in this paper.
http://www.tni.org/paper/towards-broader-view-politics-global-land-grabbing

KENYA

"Welcome to Kenya: Police abuse of Somali refugees" (June 2010)

Based on interviews with over 100 refugees, the 99-page report, "'Welcome to Kenya:' Police Abuse of Somali Refugees," documents widespread police extortion of asylum seekers trying to reach three camps near the Kenyan town of Dadaab, the world's largest refugee settlement. The report is by Human Rights Watch.
http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00020164:b1e31e7647229473f877e126b297b8db.pdf

UGANDA

"Politics, religion and the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Ugandan" (June 2010)

The war in Northern Uganda is one of the longest running conflicts in Africa and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), its main protagonist, one of the most inscrutable entities currently engaged in fighting. This paper examines the LRA as a fighting force and, using the lenses of religion and development, explains why conventional conflict analysis approaches cannot fully explain its motivation or characteristics. An examination of its developmental and religious dimensions adds to existing analysis of the conflict and leads to a better understanding of the LRA as a conflict group and its relationship to the local population. This perspective is important at a time when current peace talks threaten to collapse due to lack of understanding of local politics and world views.
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/RaD_PoliticsReligionAndTheLRAInNorthernUganda.pdf