

A Visionary proved Himself to be a Realist: Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Austria, and the “United States of Europe”, 1923-2003

Michael GEHLER

University of Innsbruck/Tyrol

- I. The man and his vision
- II. The Pan-European Movement, 1923 to 1938
- III. In the Exile from 1938 to 1946
- IV. Return to Europe (1946-1972)
- V. Conclusion

The term “Pan-European” is inextricably linked with the name Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi. Since the persona and the movement formed an entity, four questions come to light: *firstly*, what influence did Austria have in his thinking as a historical factor and political idea¹; *secondly*, what Austria-specific experiences motivated him and induced him to plead for a “United States of Europe”; *thirdly*, what lessons can be drawn from his thinkings and plans, and *fourthly* how can he be described from an ideological point of view?

In order to answer these questions, Coudenhove’s personality and his motives for the founding of the Pan-European movement will be outlined in order to subsequently present its history in the period between the two wars, his period of exile from 1938 to 1946, and its role after World War II.

I. The man and his vision

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s² father was an Austrian diplomat. Richard Nikolaus came into the

¹ For this see Michael Gehler, “Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa und Österreich 1923-1972,” in *Demokratie und Geschichte. Jahrbuch des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts zur Erforschung der Geschichte der christlichen Demokratie in Österreich*, ed. by Helmut Wohnout, 2 (Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 1998), pp. 143-193 and the first two chapters (I., II.) in Michael Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa. Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU*, Vol. 1: Darstellung, Innsbruck - Vienna - Munich - Bolzano 2002, pp. 16-50, 51-71. Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren*, Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 2004.

world on November 17, 1894. Two years later, the family moved into Ronsperg Castle (Pobečovice) in the western Bohemian forest. After the death of his father in 1906, Richard attended the Augustine Grammar School in Brixen (Bressanone), after which the family moved to Vienna, where the young count became a pupil at the Theresianum (1908-13). Richard did not feel at ease either there or within Viennese social circles, since “his ideas about the questions of life and politics were too different from those of his rank.”³

After graduation, he began studies in philosophy at the University of Vienna, from which he graduated in 1917. During his student years, he married the famous Viennese actress Ida Roland in 1915. His marriage to a divorced woman who was not a member of the nobility and was thirteen years elder led to a temporary split with Coudenhove’s family. Instead of being a member of a conservative caste, he turned into a modern man, a child of the twentieth century.⁴

His leaning towards social democracy could hardly be denied. Nevertheless, his aristocratic way of thinking continued to come out, since he wanted to create a new form of state in which “the best, the brightest, and the most intelligent” would be in power. This neo-aristocracy would take the place of democracy which, in his opinion, was only an interlude between “the feudal aristocracy of the sword” and “the social aristocracy of the spirit”.⁵

Later on, he confessed, “My ideas have always been aristocratic and never democratic.”⁶ For his entire life, Coudenhove would never be able to shake the image of wanting to create an aristocratic and conservative Europe. His admiration for Charles de Gaulle, especially in the 1960s, confirmed the view of many critics that he wanted to create a conservative-reactionary Europe which was more exclusive than inclusive.⁷

In fact, behind the Pan-European idea was the notion of saving Western or European culture, although not on the basis of the Reich’s idea or the restoration of the Habsburger multinational state, but rather on the basis of the sovereignty of the new nations.⁸ We can learn a first lesson from Coudenhove’s thinking: There is a certain individuality of every European nation state which has to be respected.

Coudenhove called upon all conservative Pan-Europeans to be republicans, since the peace

² Martin Posselt, Richard Nicolaus Graf von Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972) in John M. Spalek, Konrad Feilchenfeldt and Sandra H. Hawrylychak, eds., *Deutschsprachige Exilliteratur seit 1933*, Vol. 4: Bibliographien, Part 1 (A-G), Bern - Munich 1994, pp. 348-360.

³ R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Der Kampf um Europa. Aus meinem Leben*, Vienna 1949, p. 50.

⁴ R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Ein Leben für Europa*, Cologne - Vienna 1966, p.78.

⁵ R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Adel*, Leipzig 1922, p. 25.

⁶ R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Paneuropa und Faschismus,” in *Paneuropa* IX (1933), Nr. 5, p. 131.

⁷ Claus Schöndube, “Ein Leben für Europa: Richard Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi,” in Thomas Jansen/Dieter Mahncke, *Persönlichkeiten der europäischen Integration*, Bonn 1981, p. 50.

⁸ Guido Müller, “Rohan, Karl Anton Prinz” in Carl v. Schrenck-Notzing, ed., *Lexikon des Konservatismus*, Graz - Stuttgart, 1996, pp. 463-465.

for Europe that was hoped for lay only in republicanization.⁹ Having formally become a Czechoslovak citizen as a result of the end of the First World War, although with feelings that were patriotic toward Austria and, at the same time, European, he developed the plan of “excluding” Vienna, the former center of the multinational state, from Austria and making it the seat of the League of Nations on international and neutral territory.¹⁰ Although this plan remained only a draft, the founding of the Pan-European Union could nevertheless take place with its headquarters in the Hofburg of Vienna. Coudenhove soon recognized that the League of Nations was too weak to ensure peace in Europe, and so he conceived of a new plan that would lead to the formation of a “United States of Europe”.¹¹

For Coudenhove-Kalergi Vienna was not one capital of a small Alpine Republic like Bern from Switzerland but the capital from a former multinational empire with a big cosmopolitan European tradition. From such a place Paneuropean activities could be started. This is a second lesson we can learn from his thinking.

II. The Pan-European Movement, 1923 to 1938

As an author, Coudenhove made a breakthrough with the book *Paneuropa* which was printed by the publishing house of the same name that had been founded by him in Vienna in 1923. Coudenhove subsequently sought a European politician of stature who would turn his idea into the leading theme of European foreign policy. But both the Czechoslovak prime minister Thomas G. Masaryk and Benito Mussolini declined. In February 1923, Coudenhove had already publicly appealed to the Duce to convene a European conference in the name of youth!¹²

Beginning in April 1924, the journal *Paneuropa* was published ten times a year by its own publishing house as the official organ of the Pan-European Union. The main author was Coudenhove, who took a position on all current political themes. In 1925, the newly founded Pan-European headquarters moved its office to the prestigious rooms of the Hofburg (in the Adlerstiege

⁹ R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Paneuropa. Ein Vorschlag,” in *Neue Freie Presse*, November 17, 1922, pp. 2-3 (here p. 3).

¹⁰ R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Wien als Welthauptstadt,” in *Die Zukunft (Berlin)*, October 16, 1920, pp. 61-64; Martin Posselt, “Ich bin seit dem Zusammenbruch meines österreichisch-ungarnischen Vaterlandes ein überzeugter europäischer Patriot’. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa und Österreich 1940-1950” in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds., *Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945-1993. Aspekte einer wechselvollen Entwicklung*, Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 1993, pp. 367-404 (here p. 369).

¹¹ Michael Gehler/Anita Ziegerhofer, “Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung von ihren Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart,” in Robert Rill and Ulrich E. Zellenberg, eds., *Konservatismus in Österreich. Strömungen, Ideen, Personen und Vereinigungen von den Anfängen bis heute*, Graz - Stuttgart 1999, pp. 291-312 (here p. 292).

¹² R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Paneuropa und Österreich,” in *Neue Freie Presse*, April 25, 1925

area) which had been made available to it by the federal government and from which it established connections with the other institutions and committees throughout all of Europe. His strategy of also seeking out possible proponents for Pan-Europe at the socialist international level and in the Catholic Church fully paid off first of all in Austria: on the one hand, he won over the Christian Social Ignaz Seipel; on the other hand, the Socialdemocrat Karl Renner.¹³

In 1926, Coudenhove made his idea public on the occasion of an international congress in Vienna. It was attended by over two thousand participants from twenty-four countries.¹⁴ Chancellor Ramek declared that the paths and goals of the Pan-European movement (an international court of arbitration, protection of minorities, and free trade) were met with full understanding - Austria pursued the same goals. Beginning with the "recognition of the solidarity of interests", new ways would have to be sought in order to prevent a catastrophe like that which had occurred between 1914 and 1918.¹⁵

The first Pan-European Congress in Vienna in October 1926 took advantage of the less tense relations between Paris and Berlin which, with the Locarno Pact of October 16, 1925, had achieved a political high point that would not be repeated in the period between the wars.¹⁶ As a result of the Congress, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand became the international honorary president of the Pan-European Union in 1927. Coudenhove first had to push Briand about going public with his support of the founding of the "United States of Europe" until the latter finally did so at the tenth meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1929.¹⁷

Gustav Stresemann, a proponent of France's reconciliation with Germany, died immediately after the Geneva meeting of the League of Nations. In Germany, the Nazi party achieved its first election success. And in New York, the stock market collapsed. Briand only presented the desired memorandum to the governments on May 17, 1930, and on that occasion, Coudenhove opened the second Pan-European Congress in Berlin on the same day. The memorandum that

¹³ Gehler/Ziegerhofer, "Coudenhove-Kalergi," p. 293.

¹⁴ "Für ein versöhntes Europa. Der erste Wiener Paneuropa-Kongreß - Sechste Tagung der katholischen Verständigungsinternationale," in *Reichspost*, October 4, 1926.

¹⁵ *Wiener Zeitung*, October 3, 1926.

¹⁶ Peter Krüger, *Wege und Widersprüche der europäischen Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs 45), München 1995, pp. 18-25 (here pp. 21-22).

¹⁷ Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Paneuropäische Bemühungen um eine deutsch-französische Aussöhnung. Eine Rundfrage unter deutschen und französischen Parlamentariern anlässlich der Parlamentswahlen 1928," in *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte*, ed. at the Institut für Europäische Geschichte by Heinz Durchhardt in connection with Włodzimierz Borodziej, Peter Burke, Ferenc Glatz, Georg Kreis, Pierangelo Schiera and Winfried Schulze, Vol. 4, Munich 2003, pp. 215-241; For a critical approach concerning the attitude of Briand towards Coudenhove-Kalergi: Laurence Badel, "Le Quai d'Orsay, les associations privées et l'Europe (1925-1932)" in René Girault, Gérard Boussat, *Europe Brisée, Europe Retrouvée. Nouvelles réflexions sur l'unité européenne au XX^e siècle*, Paris 1994, pp. 109-131.

was celebrated by Coudenhove on the establishment of a “European Union” through a European security and alliance system on an economic basis and under the maintenance of territorial integrity as well as Briand’s insistence upon the territorial status quo gave the impression that the issue was primarily France’s security, that is, a policy that was to block the possibility of new political developments,¹⁸ for example German border revisionism.

Two years later, in 1932, the solemn inauguration of the third Pan-European Congress took place in Basel, at which the count announced the founding of a “European party”, the realization of which failed, however, due to lack of interest. Coudenhove’s increased agitation against the Soviet Union caused misgivings on the part of the Social Democrats, which led to a split between the party and the Pan-European movement. This meant the end of the “suprapartisanship” that was so highly praised by Coudenhove, and it initiated a crisis in the movement.¹⁹

The political arrangement in Germany had made necessary a change in the direction of goals. Coudenhove could still only rely upon France, the Small Entente, and Italy. His ambition now was increasingly dedicated to winning over Mussolini for Pan-Europe and convincing him to cooperate with France in order to form a “*PanEuropa en miniature*”. As a further result, it would have provided the basis for a future membership of Germany. Coudenhove first met Mussolini in May, 1933. The Duce was quite positive about the idea, but it in no way complied with his “Pan-Latin” idea, let alone with the Realpolitik conditions.²⁰

1933 became the year of destiny for Europe when, on January 30, Adolf Hitler was appointed the Chancellor of the German Reich. Coudenhove played everything on the Austrian card - with all of its political consequences. This decision was also to be that of the Austrian federal government - since the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß assumed that “without the help of Europe, Austria was lost” and that “everything depended upon declaring to the Great Powers that in Vienna, they would defend their own security and their own future.”²¹

After the death of his predecessor Seipel, Dollfuß took over the Honorary Presidency of the Pan-European Union. With Coudenhove, he made “Pan-European” plans which, however, no longer dealt with the political unification of Europe, but rather with its economic unification.²²

With the ban of the Pan-European Union in Germany in 1933, the priorities of the movement

¹⁸ Jan Tombinski, “Österreich und die europäische Integration 1926-1931,” in *Geschichte und Gegenwart* 8 (November 1989), Number 4, pp. 277-295, pp. 284-286; Anita Ziegerhofer, “Austria and Aristide Briand’s 1930 Memorandum,” in *Austrian History Yearbook XXIX* (1998), pp. 139-160.

¹⁹ Gehler/Ziegerhofer, “Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 296.

²⁰ Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” in John M. Spalek, Konrad Feilchenfeldt and Sandra H. Hawrylchak, eds., *Deutschsprachige Exilliteratur seit 1933*, Vol. 3: USA, Part 4, Zurich - Munich 2003, pp. 3-27 (here pp. 8-9).

²¹ Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa*, p. 53.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 51-55.

also changed. Through the political events, Coudenhove was compelled to substitute the priority of policy with the priority of economics. One expression of the new profile was the Pan-European economic conference in December, 1933 held in the Vienna Chamber of Commerce. The result was the creation of a Pan-European economic bureau which was to see to the preparation for the founding of the economic headquarters. The next conference was set for February, 1934 but had to be postponed as a result of the civil war.²³ A *third lesson* which can be learnt from this: There must always be a certain flexibility concerning integration politics and economic integration is the precondition for a later following political integration.

Coudenhove's relationship to the authoritarian government dictatorship and its highest representatives developed into complete identification without criticism. He acknowledged Dollfuß as a man who had fought against "two overpowering fronts" at the same time and had won "because he found the courage to believe in Austria when half of the world had given up on it. Because he fulfills his duty: his Austrian, his European mission. Because in this world of general doubt, he remains a believer." This "statesman" earned the thanks of Europe "beyond all party perspectives because he had not only saved Austria's independence but, along with it, the peace on our continent."²⁴

The murder of Engelbert Dollfuß in July, 1934 was most sharply condemned by Coudenhove, and at the same time he acknowledged his achievements. "Before him, Austria was a state, but only through him did it become a nation." The "glowing patriot" was at the same time "an enthusiastic early fighter for the idea of Pan-Europe. Dollfuß was a Pan-European as a believing Catholic, as a leader of farmers, and as a genuine Austrian."²⁵

Plans which Coudenhove had forged with Dollfuß were taken up and partially realized by his successor at the Ballhausplatz, Kurt Schuschnigg. He took over the honorary presidency from Dollfuß, and under Schuschnigg's aegis, the fourth Pan-European Congress took place from May 16 to 18, 1935 in the conference hall of the parliament building.²⁶

It was no accident, the chancellor emphasized, that Vienna was developing into the center of a movement that was attempting to "break down barriers that divide us", and it was taking on the task "of assembling the available forces willing to build and to use them to save Europe." In this fact lay "a recognition of Austrian individuality."²⁷

This is the *fourth lesson* which can be learnt from Coudenhove's ideas: Small states are very pro-European and more European than bigger ones. Small states need Europe, the also need inte-

²³ Gehler/Ziegerhofer, "Coudenhove-Kalergi," p. 297.

²⁴ "Weil er den Mut fand, an Österreich zu glauben," in *Reichspost*, March 16, 1934.

²⁵ "Präsident Graf Coudenhove über Doktor Dollfuß," in *Neue Freie Presse*, August 2, 1934.

²⁶ "Der Paneuropa-Kongreß," in *Neue Freie Presse*, May 17, 1935; "Der europäische Geist," in *Neue Freie Presse*, May 18, 1935; Gehler/Ziegerhofer, "Coudenhove-Kalergi," pp. 298-299.

²⁷ "Der Paneuropakongreß," in *Neue Freie Presse*, May 17, 1935.

gration for safeguarding their territorial integrity and their political independence as a kind of protection against threats from outside and larger countries.

If the balances of power at the time in Central Europe are examined, then Kurt Schuschnigg's expressions appear to be led by the "principal of hope". Coudenhove-Kalergi thanked president Wilhelm Miklas "for always having emphasized that the mission of Austria and Vienna was not limited to the destiny of the country's territory, but bore a European character." There was a "deep common destiny between the Austrian federal state of today and the European league of states of tomorrow." Miklas replied that "a free, independent, and economically consolidated Austria" was also "an indispensable precondition for a peaceful, unified, and blossoming Europe." And with a view toward potential aggressors: "Therefore, whoever lays a hand on Austria and Austrianism at the same time lays a hand on Europe."²⁸ In 1935, the establishment of Paneuropean Economic headquarters²⁹ in Vienna was another positive result.

The Pan-European Union had anchored nine points in its program:

1. the European league of states with the mutual guarantee of equal rights, security, and independence of all of states of Europe;
2. a European court of justice for the settling of all conflicts between European states;
3. a European military alliance with a common air force to safeguard peace and symmetrical disarmament;
4. the step-by-step creation of a European customs union;
5. the common development of European economies;
6. a common European currency;
7. the fostering of the national cultures of all European peoples as the basis for the European cultural community;
8. the protection of all of the national minorities of Europe against denationalization and repression; and
9. the cooperation of Europe with other groups of peoples within the framework of a world-wide league of nations.³⁰

Coudenhove seems to have been indecisive about the final form of Europe's future political structure. He vacillated between a league of states and a federal state. The count began with the principle of a political unification which a customs union would follow at the economic level. Coudenhove also recommended a cooperation between different regional treaty-systems in Europe, f.e. between the Small Entente founded in 1921/22 by Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia on the one hand and the Rome Protocols concluded by Austria, Hungary and Italy in

²⁸ "Die Kongressteilnehmer beim Bundespräsidenten," in *Neue Freie Presse*, May 18, 1935.

²⁹ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Kampf*, p. 191.

³⁰ "Paneuropa-Union Österreich, Programm und Beitrittskarte vom Februar 1936." Privat Property of the Author.

1934 on the other hand. These regional pact-systems would be part within the framework of bigger Pan-Europe. The count defined Pan-Europe as a foreign policy program. With internal matters, Coudenhove had made neutrality the highest principle.³¹

In 1937, under the honorary chairmanship of the Austrian Secretary of State for Education Hans Pernter, the Pan-European Union organized the first “European Education Congress” in Vienna with the strong participation of western European representatives.³²

The Anschluss of Austria to Nazi Germany meant not only the end of the union, but also a break in Coudenhove’s life. On the night of March 11, 1938, Coudenhove succeeded in fleeing to Czechoslovakia.³³ But the flight did not mean the end of the Pan-European activities of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. On the contrary: Berne was now the “technical” headquarters of his movement, Paris was the political center, and the journal *Panuropa* appeared under the title *Europäische Briefe* (“European Letters”).³⁴

After the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1939, Coudenhove became a French citizen, which he was to remain until his death. He fled through Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Italy into Switzerland, from where in 1940, passing through France, he emigrated to the United States.³⁵ He worked tirelessly for the establishment of a Paris-London axis. His friendly relationship with Winston S. Churchill dates back to this time. Only when Hitler marched into France did Coudenhove and his wife decide to flee to America.³⁶

III. In the Exile from 1938 to 1946

Coudenhove attempted to tackle his plan for a “united Europe *en miniature*” from Berne by trying to emphasize the necessity for the strengthening of the Paris-London axis. He was able to win over Churchill, who finally called for a British-French union project on June 16, 1940. But its realization failed upon the occupation of further portions of France by Hitler’s Germany and because of French politicians who were ready for collaboration.³⁷

During the period of the “western European” exile, Coudenhove also made the acquaintance of Otto von Habsburg. He got to know him in Paris after he had made contact with the Austrian émigré community there. Richard was very impressed by Otto. He allowed himself to be persuaded to support the restoration of the monarchy in Austria. From that, he hoped for a strength-

³¹ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 5.

³² Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Kampf*, p. 198.

³³ Erwin A. Schmidl, März 38. *Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich*, Vienna (2nd edition) 1988, p. 134.

³⁴ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Ein Leben für Europa*, p. 234.

³⁵ Posselt, “Patriot,” p. 372.

³⁶ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 10.

³⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Kampf*, pp. 217-220.

ening of Austrian national consciousness and an immunization against Pan-Germanism.³⁸

He participated with Otto Habsburg in the creation of an Austrian government in exile. The goal was the national recognition of Austria. In that regard, Coudenhove was among the first advocates of the victim status: Austria was to be viewed as the first victim of Hitler's aggression.³⁹ This can be a *fifth lesson*: National independence is an essential precondition for integration capability not only for Austria, but also for Czechoslovakia and especially with regard to the future "eastern enlargement" of the European Union.

After the announcement of the Atlantic Charter on August 14, 1941, he composed a memorandum entitled "Austria's Independence in the light of the Atlantic Charter" and sent it to Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In it, he took up the goals of the charter and recommended himself as head of the government in exile! Otto Habsburg, for whom Coudenhove functioned as a foreign policy adviser, was informed about this plan. Otto must have approved it. In addition, the Pan-European who was respected in nearly all political circles seemed to him to be the most suitable personality to convene this government in exile. But convincing the Social Democrats of that proved to be an impossibility. Coudenhove's demonstrations of sympathy for the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg state was, for them, unpardonable.⁴⁰

In the meantime, Churchill and Roosevelt had distanced themselves from Coudenhove's memorandum. He also failed in the impossible task of forming a common platform with all Austrians in exile. He therefore dedicated himself even more to the formation of a Pan-European committee and the preparatory work of a congress.⁴¹

In contrast to the between-war period, Coudenhove now did not attempt to win over the masses for Pan-Europe but rather, as he had learned from experience, he went to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt directly. But Roosevelt would not receive him, even though both the influential American diplomat William Christian Bullitt and Nicolas M. Butler intervened. Coudenhove could not really be convincing about Pan-Europe with the isolationist climate of American foreign policy, and even the discussions with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau were fruitless.⁴² Only John Foster Dulles, who would later be Secretary of State, showed interest in Pan-Europe.⁴³

As early as January, 1941, the count had presented Nicholas M. Butler with his request to support the research on a future framework for peace in Europe,⁴⁴ as well as the "Atlantic

³⁸ Posselt, "Patriot," p. 373.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 375.

⁴⁰ Gehler/Ziegerhofer, "Coudenhove-Kalergi," pp. 301-302.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 302.

⁴² Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Ein Leben für Europa*, p. 257.

⁴³ Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi," p. 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 22 (footnote, p. 36).

Union”⁴⁵ which Coudenhove supported. He formulated a total of six points for the Atlantic Union:

1. In order to save Europe for Western civilization, the United Kingdom would have to receive all support.
2. Western civilization, that is, America, Europe, Africa, and Australia, should be connected through a union of all English-speaking nations. The basis of this union should be formed by a Pan-American and Pan-European organization.
3. World peace and world security should be ensured by an American military with uncontested power.
4. In order to attain general affluence, all artificial obstacles with respect to international trade and traffic had to be remedied.
5. In order to facilitate international understanding, those states which did not have English as their native language had to learn it as their second-language.
6. The struggle against materialism, violent overthrow, and totalitarianism should be taken up through the emphasis of the values of a common Western civilization: idealism, heroism, and personal freedom.⁴⁶

As early as February, 1942, Coudenhove inaugurated a “Research Seminar for Postwar European Federation” along with the American political scientist Arnold Zurcher at New York University. In 1944, this institution appointed him professor of history. As such, he advocated a European federation along parliamentary-democratic lines whose completion ought to culminate in a federal state, the “United States of Europe”.⁴⁷

The first Pan-European rally in the United States took place on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Aristide Briand on March 28, 1942 in the auditorium of New York University.⁴⁸ One year later, under the auspices of the same institution, the fifth Pan-European Congress was held from March 25 to 27, 1943. The preconditions were conceivably good, since a few days before, Winston Churchill had already signaled his approval for the creation of a united Europe, probably as a result of an intervention by Coudenhove.⁴⁹

The conference committees resolved to meet continuously until peace was attained in Europe. The most important activity of this congress was the drawing up of a constitution for Europe after the World War. Its main principles were:

1. Pan-Europe declared its support for the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
2. Pan-Europe defined every European federation as being regional within a worldwide post-

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 22 (footnote, p. 37).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Gehler/Ziegerhofer, “Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 302.

⁴⁸ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 12.

⁴⁹ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan-Europa. Autobiography of a Man and a Movement*, New York 1943, pp. 224-225.

war organization on the basis of constant cooperation between the four great united nations.

3. Until that time, Europe would have to cooperate with the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union in a friendly manner.
4. A European system could only be accepted if it were able to resist the threat of German aggression and hegemony.
5. A united Europe had to be built on the basis of democratic principles.⁵⁰

The plan of having the Congress committees meet permanently could only partially be fulfilled. Instead of the General Assembly, only the Board of the Pan-European Conference met, which consisted of the three committee chairmen.⁵¹ The main task of the Legal Affairs Committee was a draft for a European constitution which was very strongly influenced by Arnold Zürcher. In 1944, the board finally published a draft constitution which can be seen as a legal formulation of minimal goals which the Pan-European union had already proclaimed before the war.⁵²

In March, 1945, Coudenhove summarized the guiding principles of the draft constitution under the title “Declaration of European Inter-Dependence”. He sent this declaration with the signatures of sixteen representatives of the European exiles to the president of the United States and the United States Congress. This action also went unheard and consequently had no result. The declaration contains the following points:

1. The requirement for a European Council and a Supreme Court, as well as for
2. a common European military force;
3. a declaration of civil rights,
4. a declaration of social rights, and
5. a step-by-step transformation of Europe into a single market with a common currency.

The German Reich was to be liquidated as a central power; only after the end of “Hitlerism” could Germany join the European federation. In addition to Coudenhove, the declaration was signed by, among others, Fernando de los Rios and Franz Werfel.⁵³

The fight around the division of Europe into spheres of interest increasingly pushed aside Coudenhove’s ideas about a European constitution. He wanted to prevent the division of Europe, since in it, he envisioned a strengthening of the Soviet Union. As a further result, a future Germany should function as the arbiter between the West and the East.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 23 (footnote 53).

⁵¹ Martin Posselt, *Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi und die europäische Parlamentarier-Union. Eine parlamentarische Bewegung für eine “Europäische Konstituante”*, ph. Th. Graz 1987, p. 82.

⁵² Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 13.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 24 (footnote 58).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

IV. Return to Europe (1946-1972)

When Coudenhove returned to Europe from America, he attempted to exert pressure on the governments by mobilizing the European members of Parliament.⁵⁵ The count first planned the founding of suprapartisan committees for a European federation in the European parliaments. After that, parliamentary delegates were to be invited to a congress which, as a further consequence, was to develop into a preliminary European parliament. The preliminary parliament would finally have to transfer its mandate to a European constitutional assembly which was to be elected by the citizens of the European democracies.⁵⁶

In July, 1947, from Gstaad in the Bernese Oberland, Coudenhove organized a conference of members of national parliaments. The European Parliamentary Union (EPU) was founded and called to a congress in September, 1947. Once he was back in Gstaad, the requirement was put forth to convene a European constitutional convention with the goal of drafting a federal constitution. In the resolution, it was determined to bring a European regional group to life as soon as possible, to establish a community of nations under the name of “the United States of Europe”, and to quickly convene a European constitutional assembly which would draw up a European constitution.⁵⁷ The desire was to prove to the world public that a supranational parliament could work constructively.

At the EPU Congress in Interlaken, supranational desires were formulated with respect to the Council of Europe that was to be founded, but these remained unfulfilled when it did come to life on May 5, 1949. In the end, the creation of the Strasbourg institution resulted in a real loss of significance of the EPU. Coudenhove was disappointed because he had hoped that the Council of Europe would develop into a European federation of states. Through the founding of the Council of Europe, the activities of the EPU would have ended. The members of the parliament would no longer meet at privately organized congresses, but rather in the official Council of Europe. When the third EPU Congress met in Venice a few weeks after the founding of the Council of Europe, the decision was made to keep the EPU alive “as a bridge between the national parliaments and the Assembly of the Council of Europe.”⁵⁸

Coudenhove continued to hold on to the reinstitution of Austria's independence that had apparently been promised by the anti-Hitler coalition in the form of the Moscow Declaration of

⁵⁵ Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Geschichte der Paneuropabewegung 1922-1962*, Basel - Wien 1962, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁶ Posselt, “Ich bin seit dem Zusammenbruch meines österreichisch-ungarnischen Vaterlandes ein überzeugter europäischer Patriot,” p. 398.

⁵⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Ein Leben für Europa*, p. 303.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

1943. On March 21, 1955, the seventh Pan-European Congress meeting in Baden-Baden directed an appeal to all members of the United Nations for one of these states to require from the International Court of Justice in the Hague an expert report about the matter of whether Austria could be held responsible for the wartime actions of the Reich government and whether the country could be compelled by the continuing occupation to take on obligations which could prejudice its economy and its internal life "in a damaging regard".⁵⁹ A few weeks later, the signing of the State Treaty along with the declaration of "everlasting neutrality" led to the country's independence in the autumn of 1955.

In the meantime, a union occurred between Coudenhove's EPU and the "European Movement" of Winston Churchill's son-in-law, Duncan Sandys. Both associations had long been in competition with each other, and they finally merged in 1952. Coudenhove was elected to the honorary board, along with Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Robert Schuman, and Paul-Henri Spaak. However, the "Parliamentary Council" of the European Movement that had come into existence through the merger could not achieve any political success. Because of its praise for Charles de Gaulle and his policy on Europe, there were differences within the European Movement, as a result of which Coudenhove resigned from the honorary board in 1965.⁶⁰

In the 1950s and 1960s, Coudenhove once again pleaded for the formation of a German-French union as the nucleus for a European amalgamation. A union pact would replace the peace treaty. He took Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungary as his model. Founded in 1867, it created a common empire out of two neighbouring peoples and showed the way in many aspects: ministries of foreign affairs, war, and finance were in common and were responsible to "delegations" that consisted of representatives from the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest. Austro-Hungary had formed both a customs union and a monetary union. The Austrian army was responsible to the Austrian government, and the Hungarian army to that of Hungary. The greater part of the army, though, was joint. All armies had a common general staff and a common supreme command. Only the collapse of the Central Powers divided Austria and Hungary, thus bringing about an external end to this union. It was only for the arrangement of the state executive that, in Coudenhove's opinion, a new form had to be sought in the case of Germany and France. If this were not possible, there would always be the opportunity of allowing the two state presidents to "alternate" in this function.⁶¹ But it seems very questionable if Austro-Hungary from the 19th century could serve as a model for a closer German-French-cooperation in the sixties of the 20th century. Adenauer had no Austria-liking and De Gaulle favoured French hegemony not only over

⁵⁹ "Paneuropa-Kongreß für Österreich," in *Wiener Zeitung*, March 22, 1955.

⁶⁰ Martin Posselt, "Pionier im Kampf um Paneuropa. Die ersten fünf Jahrzehnte der Bewegung," in *Paneuropa Österreich 1922-1992 - 70 Jahre Paneuropa*, Vienna 1992, pp. 16-23 (here p. 23); Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Weltmacht Europa*, Stuttgart 1971, p. 150.

Germany but also over Europe.

Coudenhove returned to Vienna in 1962. The occasion was the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the existence of the Pan European Union which was organized at the birthplace of the movement. The count spoke about the reunification of Europe and thus addressed the main goal of the Pan-European movement: the overcoming of the differences between West and East, between the defence alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In contrast to the anti-Bolshevik agitation of the Pan-European Union between the wars, he supported the friendly cooperation between Europe and the Soviet Union but still made reference to the threat of communism. The tenth Pan-European Congress in Vienna took place at the beginning of October on the day precisely forty years after the first Pan-European Congress. It would be the last one for Richard Coudenhove, and current topics such as European monetary union, political union, and the expansion of the European market were discussed, as well as “spiritual unity”, “scientific cooperation”, and the “fundamental revision” of the “Yalta system”, the latter of which Coudenhove viewed as being in crisis.⁶²

First Coudenhove was of the view that the matter of neutrality had become obsolete as a result of the existence of the atomic bomb. Austria therefore had to “conduct an active policy of peace”, that is, “fight against the Cold War and its continuation, the atomic war.” Coudenhove then developed ideas and suggestions for overcoming the Cold War on the part of Austria. In 1963, he presented a memorandum in which the thesis was proposed that the federal government could only keep its obligations to the people through an “active neutrality”, that is, getting involved in world politics in order to keep the peace. A “passive neutrality” would not protect the Austrian population from annihilation in a Third World War. Prior to this, Coudenhove had proposed Klessheim Castle near Salzburg to the Four Powers as a meeting place for a “Second Congress of Vienna”.⁶³ The count also suggested the establishment of a “Pan-European cultural institute” in Vienna which would establish contacts across the Iron Curtain between Western and Eastern Europe in order to foster the unity of a divided Europe at the cultural level. It was no accident that the tenth Paneuropean Congress took place again in Vienna from October 7-10, 1966.⁶⁴

In the autumn of 1969, Coudenhove sent a memorandum entitled “The Path toward the Unification of Europe” to the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United

⁶¹ “Memorandum der Deutschen Bundesrepublik und der Französischen Republik zur Frage der Gründung einer Deutsch-Französischen Republik,” Bern, September 20, 1955. Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (AdSD), Bonn, Nachlas Fritz Erler, Korrespondenz 1955-1956. Organisationen 2, 160 B, pp. 1-5 (here p. 4-5).

⁶² Gehler/Ziegerhofer, “Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 306.

⁶³ Gehler, “Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi,” pp. 172-174.

⁶⁴ Letter from Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Josef Klaus, March 27, 1966; Josef Klaus to Vittorio Pons, July 5, 1966; “Gedrucktes Programm des X. Paneuropa-Kongresses” [1966]. Archiv des Karl-von-Vogelsang-Instituts (AKVI), Vienna, Karton 2380, Mappe Paneuropa Union, Coudenhove-Kalergi.

Kingdom, and Italy. In it, he recommended negotiations between the “European Market” (EC) and the “Free Trade Zone” (EFTA), a project which would deviate from his original ideas. The future “European customs union” would have to be free of political and military connections. This suggestion would make it possible for Austria to join the customs union (EC) without the commitment of giving up its neutrality”.⁶⁵ The basis of this initiative was the consideration that the political unification of Europe should be separated from its economic unification, which, according to Coudenhove’s conviction, would be possible through negotiations between the EC and EFTA. He recommended the convening of a conference of the thirteen participating governments in Vienna “in order to examine this association”. The future of the community could only be insured through a monetary union. Such a union would hardly be possible without Switzerland, since the framework of an expanded EC would also be “unsuitable” for a monetary union.⁶⁶

The considerations named in Coudenhove’s memorandum took place in the run-up to the Hague summit, which was to pave the way for the EC membership of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The result was not only the expansion of the EC in 1972 to a community of nine nations, but also a series of free trade agreements with the remaining EFTA states.⁶⁷ Coudenhove died on July 27, 1972 in Schruns in the province of Vorarlberg, Austria. He was still able to experience the beginnings of Europe overcoming having been divided into EC and EFTA.⁶⁸

V. Conclusion

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was a go-getter spirit. No one could dissuade him from his conviction that Europe had to be united. He was a natural leader who demanded the absolute leadership within the private European associations only for himself. He viewed opposition to his ideas as a personal attack. He attempted to convince critics with factual arguments. With Pan-Europe, he did not tolerate any compromise. In the pursuit of his goal, he sometimes appeared insulting, proud, and arrogant, and at times even inaccessible. For his ideas, he made not only material sacrifices - all of the income from his speeches and probably also the salary of his first wife flowed into the implementation of his plan. He also made great personal sacrifices.⁶⁹

The Pan-European movement, which represents a considerable contribution to Austrian and European conservatism, was positively accepted by it since its founding. With the movement’s program and organization, the conservatism kept its cosmopolitan and transnational function.

⁶⁵ Letter from Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Josef Klaus, September 3, 1969 and “Memorandum,” September 5, 1969. Ibid.

⁶⁶ Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi an Josef Klaus, October 20, 1969. Ibid.

⁶⁷ Gehler/Ziegerhofer, “Coudenhove-Kalergi,” pp. 306-207.

⁶⁸ Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa*, p. 264.

⁶⁹ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” p. 20.

Pan-Europe thus formed a bridge between monarchy and republic. In spite of its visionary-revolutionary suggestions for European policy, the Pan-European ideology bore strong elements of conservative thought.⁷⁰

Coudenhove was not only close to both various exponents of authoritarian dictatorship and the most varied of conservatives, but also identified with them. In addition to Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg, Otto von Habsburg, Winston S. Churchill, and Charles de Gaulle are the most prominent examples. He counted himself among their followers, if not even their allies, and took advantage of every opportunity to acknowledge them and even mythologized them.

His political behavior that was both variable and flexible allowed him, after 1945, to dedicate himself for the time being to the parliamentary idea, while again emphasizing the idea of supra-partisanship. Similar to the period between the wars, a turn to the right once again occurred which was expressed in the foundation of the Pan-European Union and the dropping of the EPU concept. This once again caused a reorientation to conservatism.

As a result of the Coudenhove's second turn toward conservatism in the 1960s, he identified with de Gaulle as much as he had identified with the authoritarian regime in Austria under the leadership of Dollfuss. Because of his aristocratic origin and his elitist ideas that became evident time and time again, Coudenhove had a pronounced sense of leadership which is so missing in the EU in the period of the nameless after the era of François Mitterrand, Jacques Delors, and Helmut Kohl. As a creator of ideas, he was tireless. The Treaties of Athens in 2003 made the unification of the whole Europe possible. Starting with May 2004 ten further states became new members of the European Union, which then was grown to 25 member states. Eighty years after the publication of *PanEuropa* as a book, a Europe as a union of states from Portugal to Poland became a reality. The visionary therefore proved himself to be a realist.

70 Gehler/Ziegerhofer, "Coudenhove-Kalergi," pp. 308-309.