Issue #13, Summer 2009

Mission Not Accomplished

Meet the press—and see why it failed at several critical points during the Iraq War.

Long after the Iraq War went south, when its failures could no longer be minimized, the elite newspapers and weeklies finally got around to offering sound analyses and asking the Bush Administration tough questions. It took them long enough–not until after December 2003, by which time the war was underway and its damage irreversible.

And yet the elite print press still hasn’t managed a serious evaluation of its own reporting in the early years of the war. There have been discrete examinations, focused on a specific newspaper or subject, such as Howard Kurtz’s review of The Washington Post’s pre-war reporting and The New York Times’ evaluation of its WMD coverage. But there has been no comprehensive effort to look at all the pre-war print reporting and draw conclusions about its successes, as well as its failures.

This article presents just such an appraisal, in the hope that journalism centers, and especially the elite press itself, will deepen their inquiries. The stakes could not be higher: Our public debate and our democracy hinge in good measure on how well our most prestigious print outlets cover matters of war and peace.

The "elite press" here includes three daily newspapers (The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal) and two weeklies (Time and Newsweek). As of 2008, they collectively reach around ten million people in print and millions more online, including the most influential government, business, media, and community leaders. Major articles in the elite press can trigger further attention on television news and in Congress. The five publications chosen here are, to a large extent, the ultimate centurions of our democracy.

We evaluate their performance in the early years of the Iraq conflict at several key moments. We looked at 576 news and opinion stories in all–104 articles written during the 2002 Congressional vote on the prospective use of force, 193 written during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation of Iraqi transgressions at the United Nations, 113 written during President George W. Bush’s "Mission Accomplished" speech, and 166 written immediately after Saddam Hussein’s capture. It is certainly fair to choose other early moments or to extend the timeline to the famous "surge" period. But the inquiry here is arbitrarily restricted to the early years.

Our findings may surprise both the media’s critics and defenders: In covering the early years of the war, the elite print press did not embarrass itself to the degree widely assumed–nor did it distinguish itself. Only episodically did our best news outlets provide the necessary alternative information to Administration claims, ask the needed questions about Administration policy, or present insightful analysis about Iraq itself. For the most part, the elite print press conveyed Administration pronouncements and rationale without much critical commentary.

We have objectified our judgments of stories with the following system:

0: A story is entirely slanted, suppresses skepticism, and is completely supportive of the Administration line

1: A story is somewhat slanted to the Administration’s side, with skeptical and questioning sentences over-weighted by supportive ones

2: A story dutifully reports both sides by balancing experts or political leaders

3: A story raises questions about official statements and events and generally projects skepticism

4: A story casts fundamental doubt on Administration explanations, policies, and claims

5: A story casts fundamental doubt and then reports the Administration’s reaction to such doubt

On matters of war and peace, an article with a score of 3.0 represents an acceptable level of skepticism. He said/she said reporting, while perhaps adequate when the stakes are lower, does not suffice when so much is on the line. Journalists ought not to be stenographers. In our evaluation process, we have penalized those stories that merely relayed the assertions of official Washington and its critics; conversely, we looked favorably upon those that held all assertions up to the light of scrutiny and fell on the side of the critics. For the critics were right.

Unfortunately, I was not one of them. On subjects as sensitive and important as war and peace, people in glass houses should be careful how they throw stones. I was a strong supporter of the Iraq War. I was sure Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons because he had used them against Iran and Iraqi Kurds. He had also attacked Iran and Kuwait. And I believed that he either had or was close to achieving nuclear weapons capability, and I favored getting rid of him before that day. I would have waited for more help from our friends and allies, as President George H.W. Bush did in the first Gulf war. And I would have limited the attack to the southern Shiite portion of Iraq, while we held onto the already protected Kurdish region in the North. This would have cut Hussein off from his oil supplies and, I believe, led to his ouster by the Iraqi military.

But for all the ands, ifs, buts, and maybes, the fact was I didn’t look hard enough at the country, its history and culture, the WMD facts, and above all, whether the Administration had thought through what to do with Iraq after defeating Hussein’s army. What’s more, I knew at the time that I wasn’t taking a hard enough look at these matters. To remedy this, I started two Council on Foreign Relations task forces on our policy toward Iraq, just before and after the outbreak of war.

I started seriously questioning the war within months of the fall of Baghdad, when it became obvious the Bush Administration had no idea what to do after its swift victory. My questioning soon hardened into opposition when it was clear that Hussein did not have WMD. But that was too little, too late. The same can be said for the print press.

The Story of the Press and the Iraq War

War Authorization Vote

Issue #13, Summer 2009
 
Post a Comment

disapointed:

As an admirer of Leslie Gelb, I'm disapointed by his research paper on fairness. I expected better.

The final rating describes the position of the major media a s "he said,she said". It ignores the fact that the choices of "he" and "she" greatly influenced the media into a gross bias in favor of the Administration.

The small press of the left and right produced columnists and reporters who were almost uniformly more skeptical and much closer to reality.

Perhaps Mr Gelb should pay more attention to the effect on journalists of the advantages of being well connected.

In order to keep their sources at the very top of the administration, (and the personal and career advantages that come from those relationships, the famous leading journalists became willing members of the administration's PR machine.

We ad Judith Miller working for Libby, but Greg Palast was ignored.

Furthwer. Any objective analysis should have considered that most public opinion was guided by local news outlets which had no independent reporting on national and international affairs. The AP wire served as a filtered news source so local papers and radio/tv stations repeated selected and biased reports as though they actually knew what was happening.

Example: When the pictures of the charred bodies of the "independent contractors" were posted with headlines and articles which described the Iraq population as murderers I suggested to the editors of my local paper that the "independent contractors"might be, in fact, mercenaries.

They looked up Blackwater and they were shocked.

They then went to the wire sources and found NOTHING so they had no story they could tell.

The resultant public fury and the assault on Falugia helped to shape of our mission in Iraq as a punishing occupation.

Jun 15, 2009, 6:44 AM
MurryMom:

Did Leslie Gelb ever hear the name "Scott Ritter" before now? Why no mention of the scepticism that Mr. Ritter expressed on numerous college campuses in the days leading up to the Iraq war? Mr. Ritter never hesitated in calling out the Bush Administration's lies, providing accurate details about what Bush was lying about.

Jun 15, 2009, 7:53 PM
guanxi:

This research is welcome and overdue. The failure of skepticism and opposition was, as much as the Bush administration's actions, the cause of so many evils and mistakes. But I don't think Gelb and Zelmati address the heart of the matter, which is, how do we form institutions that perform well even in the context of that time.



The context was an overwhelming tide of a mob, sparked by the fear of a crisis, and stoked and fanned to great heights by populist politicians. It is the cause of disaster after disaster in nations throughout history. It's a well known formula that works; it creates irresistible political might and sweeps away dissent.



The 'elite media', the foreign policy experts, the public, the Democratic party all failed to stand up against the tide. These were not independent failures that by coincidence occurred at the same time; the media didn't fail due to a lack of technique, the experts for another reason. They were the predictable results of being swept up in that tide. The solution is not for individuals or institutions to learn their craft better -- whatever practices we establish will be swept away as we all conform to the next great tide (I hope not in my lifetime). The solution must be political: How do we contain the populists and their mob?

Jun 18, 2009, 5:09 PM
Substantive Knowledge:

The comment that reporting reflected a lack of "substantive knowledge" of the situation, background and options is especially telling. The United States has been "at war" for about eight years, but the level of understanding of what the armed forces are actually doing remains abysmal. Few items in the "elite press" have addressed the strategic imbalance in US defense policy. When imbalances are addressed, the context is almost always budgetary. Are there any military or defense reporters left in the "elite press"?

Aug 10, 2009, 7:52 AM
paulh:

A book-length treatment of this topic by Mr. Gelb and Ms. Zelmati is a necesssity.

Sep 17, 2009, 10:31 AM
Priendsegrele:

I am glad you are asking to sleep these words, I can understand. This may be your choice to buy fine to the Conservative Party Burch, retribution have a try, solid phenomenon

Mar 11, 2011, 8:41 AM
Priendsegrele:

I like to have this specific problem in your frame plus it does give us some fodder to think about. However, from the observed of all, I come, I basically want as individuals continue to pile on the commentary, rather than embark on a soap box for other news du jour. However, thank you and this particular point, and I really can not go with it overall, I respect your point of view.

Mar 11, 2011, 10:47 AM

Post a Comment

Name

Email

Comments (you may use HTML tags for style)

Verification

Note: Several minutes will pass while the system is processing and posting your comment. Do not resubmit during this time or your comment will post multiple times.