

CHAPTER III

POLITICS OF OPPOSITION ALLIANCES IN POPULIST TURNED TOTALITARIAN REGIME

This chapter deals with the politics of alliance during the Bhutto regime that came into power after the dismemberment of East Pakistan. Political observers believed that the opposition and ruling parties would cooperate with each other after the tragedy. However, the old pattern of politics soon emerged and the political party in power and in opposition dragged out their swords of political rivalries based on personality clashes and interests. This period thus saw the emergence of a parliamentary opposition alliance united Democratic Front in order to show some resistance to Bhutto. Later at the time of national elections, the opposition parties allied themselves into an electoral alliance Pakistan National Alliance to counter Pakistan People Party. This electoral alliance was then transformed into opposition alliance, which resorted to agitational politics. However, through agitation, the alliance brought the Bhutto regime to come to terms with the alliance but at this critical juncture, a particular trait of the politics of alliance came to surface, played its role by sabotaging the entire efforts for the solution of the crisis and led to the imposition of martial law in the country.

A. The United Democratic Front (UDF)

The 1971 crisis ultimately resulted in the break up of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh. This was an anathema to a nation created in 1947 against domination by India's Hindu majority. After the fall of Dhaka, the army generals had no choice but to hand over the reins of the government to the civilian representatives. Yahya Khan would have liked to remain in power but the countrywide demonstrations against him and his colleagues forced them to resign. On 20th December 1971, Yahya Khan resigned and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over the charge as a civilian CMLA in less than three hours of setting foot on the soil of Pakistan. With the formation of Bangladesh, the situation in West Pakistan was simplified for Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party¹ (hereafter as PPP) emerged as the single largest party. Therefore, as a majority party leader, Bhutto was in a position to form his own government at the centre. In the provinces of Sindh and Punjab the PPP had also got clear majorities. Almost all the opposition parties considered Bhutto as one of the most important character of this national tragedy. After the debacle of Dhaka, the main task before the nation was the integrity of the rest of the country. On assuming charge, Bhutto identified the problems faced by the nation in his first address and appealed to the political parties for co-operation. The opposition parties welcomed Bhutto's address and offered their support for the solution of the problems faced by the nation. Thus, an era of cordiality and goodwill between the ruling party and opposition developed in the larger interest of the nation. However, after such a great victory in the 1970 elections, unfortunately some top rank PPP leaders as well as most of its workers started

believing as if they had been elected to govern the country forever. They started using the term "defeated elements" for the opposition, and denied their right to speak of the people's problems. The ruling party was not ready to hear any type of criticism, while the opposition continued criticizing the wrong policies of the regime. They attacked the personality of Bhutto and his role in the 1971 tragedy. The PPP leaders started threatening the opposition to stop criticism, or otherwise be ready for the harsh consequences. Bhutto had lust for power so after getting into power he was "anxious to introduce a system which would make him the main repository of power."² On the other hand, "he was conscious of the importance of institutions for maintaining political tranquillity."³ Therefore, Bhutto during the initial stage, as a head of the state seems to be caught up between the dilemma of institution building and quest for power⁴. In the choice between the two, Bhutto went on with his quest for power. He in spite of securing a popular majority at national level wanted to induct constitutional guarantees to perpetuate himself in power, as he was neither content nor satisfied with his own political rehabilitation as the chief executive⁵. Therefore, "Bhutto created a Bonapartist State to mobilize more effective and coercive power"⁶. In his drive towards power he, "resorted to coercive and suppressive tactics towards the opposition instead of following a democratic approach of competitive politics."⁷ However, in spite of formulating a democratic and constitutional system he maintained an authoritarian approach and style.⁸ As PPP's majorities were confined to only two provinces i.e. Sindh and Punjab, while in NWFP and Balochistan none of the parties held an absolute majority, so there would have to be coalition governments in these two provinces⁹. Bhutto appointed his party men as governors in these provinces¹⁰ in order to have control over the provinces. The JUI and NAP demanded that appointment of the governors in NWFP and Balochistan should be made after consulting them, because they were the majority parties there. Earlier, the NAP and JUI had agreed to support each other in forming the governments in Balochistan and NWFP. It is strange that both the parties followed different ideologies, yet they agreed to co-operate with each other in order to share power¹¹. The opposition parties including the NAP and the JUI pressurized Bhutto to lift martial law and restore democracy. Bhutto who himself had been an opponent of martial law, was vulnerable to such vociferous demands¹². He, therefore, made two accords with the NAP and the JUI one on March 6 and the other on April 27, 1972.¹³ Thus, because of the accords, the NAP-JUI coalition governments were formed in NWFP and Balochistan. As none of the NAP or the JUI leaders had held high public office before, they embarked upon their new careers with considerable enthusiasm, but they were not to have peace. Bhutto situated rival political forces in order to disrupt the NAP-JUI governments. He did not need Qayum Khan's (head of the PMLQ) support, but he took him as Interior Minister, probably because the latter had been a foe of the NAP leaders and could be relied upon to use the resources of his office to harass the NAP-JUI governments. Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, Minister for Water and Power in the central government, became at the same time, the leader of the opposition in the provincial assembly.¹⁴ As a central minister, he could deny the province funds and

cooperation and as a leader of the opposition in the provincial assembly, he could denounce the NAP-JUI governments for its failure or tardiness in solving the people's problems.¹⁵

Within weeks of his return from Simla,¹⁶ Bhutto began accusing the NAP-JUI government in N.W.F.P. of seeking a confrontation with the central government. Abdul Qayum Khan and other central ministers branded the NAP leaders as traitors, foreign agents, puppets of capitalists and exploiters of the Pakistani workers and peasants. At the same time, they condemned the NAP-JUI governments for failing in maintaining public order.¹⁷ Some irritating events and disruption of the public order took place in Balochistan also. The NAP-JUI government was not doing well, and to rehabilitate its prestige, it decided to do something out of the ordinary and a whipping boy was found in the form of outsiders in Government employ. The NAP-JUI government resolved to return to the province of their origin several thousand non-Baluchi public servants to make room for the local aspirants to jobs. The Bhutto regime denounced this plan as narrow parochialism that would set one Pakistani group against others.¹⁸

In December 1972, the NAP-JUI government arrested the leaders of the Jamote tribe in Lasbela. The Jamotes who had long been rivals of the Mengals, responded with an uprising. Pleading insufficiency of regular police force in the province, Attaullah Mengal, the Chief Minister raised a private force or *lashkar*, supplied it from government armories, and dispatched it to subdue the Jamotes. In the central governments version, this *lashkar* killed 42 Jamotes besieged 8000 of them in the adjoining hills, and proceeded to starve them by cutting off their supplies. On January 31, 1973, the central government called upon Mengal to halt his operation and on February 9, Bhutto ordered the army to intervene and disarm his *lashkar* and to relieve the Jamotes. The Governor of Balochistan Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo and Chief Minister Mengal opposed the use of federal troops in their province. Bhutto and his colleagues alleged that the NAP leaders were still secessionists at heart, and they had been smuggling weapons into the province to equip a secessionist force. On February 12, 1973, the Islamabad police forced its way into the Iraqi Embassy and discovered a cache of 300 Soviet made sub-machine guns and 48,000 rounds of ammunition, which the government alleged, had been intended for the NAP secessionists in Balochistan.¹⁹ Pleading the law and order situation, President Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan government on the night of February 14, 1973.²⁰ On the dismissal of the NAP-JUI government in Balochistan, the NAP-JUI coalition government in the N.W.F.P. tendered its resignation as a protest, which was duly accepted by the newly appointed Governor Aslam Khattak (who replaced Arbab Sikandar Khan) on February 21, 1973.²¹

A few months later, on August 16, 1973, the central government arrested Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Attaullah Mengal and Khair Bukhsh Marri, NAP leaders from Balochistan. These events and the continuous army action brought on a mini civil war in Balochistan which went on for more than four years and resulted

in many thousands of casualties²². Most of the opposition leaders rejected Bhutto regime's accusations against the NAP leaders. They asserted that Bhutto himself had provoked an insurgency in Balochistan and condemned his dismissal of the NAP-JUI government as a design to bring the province under his control through undemocratic means²³. The Bhutto regime thus showed itself capable of dealing sternly with dissidents and opponents. It shut down numerous news-papers and periodicals and arrested their editors. It suppressed groups of students and workers with a show of massive force and jailed their leaders. It disrupted the meetings of the opposition politicians, visited physical violence upon some and imprisoned many of them. Mian Tufail Mohammad of Jama'at-i-Islami (hereafter as JI) was said to have been assaulted in a Lahore jail. Malik Mohammad Qasim told the Lahore High Court that while he was in a cell at a Lahore police station, two constables made him lie on his stomach, jumped on his legs and back and injured his spine²⁴. Prominent politician and religious scholar Allama Ihsan Ilahi Zaheer was arrested. Jan Mohammad Abasi, Gulzar Malangi and Mohammad Afzal Budar all belonging to JI were arrested²⁵. Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, Asghar Khan, Shah Ahmad Noorani and Ahmad Raza Qasuri all were assaulted. Abdul Wali Khan charged that several attempts on his life had been made, and that the Bhutto regime had instigated them²⁶. Opposition leaders asserted that the PPP government had ordered the murder of Dr. Nazir Ahmad, a JI MNA from Dera Ghazi Khan in June 1972, and that of Khwaja Mohammad Rafiq in Lahore on 20 December, 1972.²⁷

Despite all these repressive measures of the government against the opposition, there seemed non co-operation between the opposition parties, which made the position of the ruling party stronger enough to dismiss even the NAP-JUI democratic government in Balochistan. But after the dismissal of the NAP-JUI governments the opposition realized that it was necessary to unite, in order, to survive politically and to face the PPP with one force. In this regard, the JI took the initiative in uniting the different opposition parties inside and outside the NA²⁸. The treatment of the NAP and the JUI at the hands of the PPP and relentless campaign of insinuation to which both the parties were subjected resulted in the NAP and the JUI co-operation with the JI and they agreed to the formation of a united front against the Bhutto regime.

Formation of the United Democratic Front

The atmosphere turned against Bhutto with the dismissal of a democratic government in Balochistan. In addition, resignation of Mufu Mahmood's cabinet in NWFP further deepened this wave of protest. To organize this protest and to confront the army action in Balochistan the opposition parties met at a convention on Feb 28 - March 1, 1973 at Rawalpindi and discussed the possibility of forming a united front against the government. A few days later on March 13, 1973 leaders of the opposition parties met at the residence of Choudhry Zahoor Elahi. After the meeting, formation of the United Democratic Front was announced.²⁹ It consisted of JUI, JUP, JI, NAP, KT, PML-Council, PML-Convention, PDM and a group of

independent members of the NA. Syed Mardan Ali Shah Pir of Pagara and Mufti Mahmood were elected its president and Vice President respectively. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad became the General Secretary and Wali Khan was selected as the convener of the alliance³¹.

The unity of opposition parties seemed to be an important political development in the history of Pakistan. The UDF was in fact formed to attract support of different shades of opinion. It is interesting to note that the socio-economic programmes of all the parties of this alliance were altogether different i.e. JI gave importance to Islam while NAP had always pressed its secular programme. The alliance included parties at the extreme ends of the political spectrum.³¹

Aims and Objectives of the UDF

The aims and objectives of the UDF were to evolve ways and means to restore democracy, check necessities of life to the common man and to protect provincial and parliamentary constitution.³² The UDF formulated a twelve-point "Islamabad Declaration" demonstrating their commitment to safeguard and protect the country's geographical entity and unity, and to achieve an Islamic, democratic, federal, parliamentary constitution. They pledged to secure fundamental rights for all citizens, to liberate the people from all forms of exploitation, provide basic necessities of life and to eliminate dictatorship and strive for an Islamic, democratic authority from encroachment of the centre, to combat all internal and external conspiracies against the ideology of Pakistan and to secure the revocation of the national emergency in force, which provided the government with authoritarian power. The UDF had to strive to eliminate fascism in all forms and dispense with all attempts to impose dictatorship in the country. Determination to struggle for the rights of students, intellectuals, journalists and labourers, release of civilian and army prisoners of war held in India and the promotion of healthy tradition in politics were some other points. The opposition also demanded a judicial probe in the finding of Russian arms cache in Iraqi embassy, and award of exemplary punishment to those involved in the heinous crime³³.

Soon after the promulgation of the 1972 Interim Constitution, a Committee of 25 members of the NA consisting of the parliamentary leaders of all political parties³⁴ was constituted on April 17, 1972, with a mandate to submit a draft constitution before August 1, 1972. It was a formidable political challenge for the political parties to frame a constitution true to the aspirations of the people and the principles of Islam. All political parties favoured a parliamentary form of government while Bhutto, as is described by Mujawar, while quoting Mahmud Ali Qasuri, "personally preferred a presidential form of government."³⁵

After a few meetings of the Committee, a disagreement occurred within the PPP leadership when Mahmood Ali Qasuri, the Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs and Chairman of the Committee, openly declared that Pakistan's new constitution would revolve around a popularly elected prime minister,

who would be responsible to the lower house of a bicameral legislature³⁶. It seems that not only the opposition but also Kasuri himself had reservations about the draft he had been asked to sponsor, and on October the 9th, he resigned from the Committee and accused Bhutto of seeking dictatorial powers under the pretext of a democratic form of government³⁷. Abdul Hafceez Pirzada replaced him but the opposition decided to stay away from the Committee. On October 17, Bhutto invited them for talks and after four days of discussion, he managed to reach an agreement with the parliamentary leaders of various parties in the NA on October 20, 1972³⁸ favouring the establishment of a parliamentary form of government. The committee prepared the draft constitution, to which all opposition parties appended notes of dissent. It was submitted to the NA on 31 December 1972. The opposition found that it did not fully correspond with the accord they had signed in October. They proposed amendments, but of no avail, because the PPP and its allies in the assembly were not accepting them.³⁹

Thus on March 13, 1973, the opposition parties came together in an alliance, called the United Democratic Front (UDF), to confront the PPP and to press for a more Islamic and democratic constitution. They wanted to strengthen its Islamic provisions, reduce the government's preventive detention and emergency powers, allow the superior courts to review passing a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister, lower the voting age to 18 years, make the election commission autonomous, rationalize the constitutional protection to be given to laws made during the operation of Martial Law and provide job security to civil servants.⁴⁰

The foremost reaction of the PPP to the UDF was to resist its sponsored amendments to various constitutional provisions. When most of the amendments moved by the constituent parties of the UDF were rejected, as a second alternate, a charter of amendments was released by the UDF on March 15, and was sent to Bhutto on March 16, 1973. They included referring of a bill to the Islamic Advisory Council if so requested by one fourth members of the parliament or a provincial assembly and postponing its enactment till the receipt of council's advice, elimination of all laws in conflict with *Quran* and *Sunnah* within a five years period, and thereafter provision to move this matter to the Supreme Court.

The UDF pleaded for elimination of clause on Islamic Socialism, protection of fundamental rights against political victimization, arrests without trial and their suspension only in case of foreign aggression. The state has to ensure provision of work to the citizens, to end iniquitous concentration of wealth and means of production in the hands of a few and protect the rights of workers. Immediate lifting of emergency and repeal of existing laws curtailing civil liberties, freedom of press, appropriate representation of all parties on the electronic media, making of executive answerable to the assembly, were also proposed. Democratizing the power of Prime Minister and Chief Ministers about dissolution of assemblies, bringing the foreign loans

and other loans treaties, development planning, currency, State Bank of Pakistan and semi-autonomous corporations under the control of parliament, appointment of Chief Justice of Pakistan by the President and independence of judiciary were some other points. The UDF suggested that the President may make the appointment of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) after consulting leader of the House and leader of the Opposition, and that the Election Commission (EC) should be independent of executive. The opposition sought amendments envisaging compulsory military training for all able-bodied citizens above 18 years of age, constitutional safeguards to the services and equal jurisdictional rights of both the Houses of parliament concerning bills about the concurrent list and adoption of a bill about federal list by majority of total members in a joint sitting.

The UDF also proposed the condition for the promulgation of emergency, on account of internal disturbances by the federal government, with request of the concerned provincial governments except in case of external aggression and finally suggested to hold the general elections within a period of six months of the adoption of constitution and reducing the age of voter to 18 years.⁴¹

The Liaquat Bagh Firing Case (1973) and Its Repercussions

The UDF announced holding of a public meeting at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi on March 23, 1973 on the occasion of Pakistan's Day. The aim was to inform the masses of the then political situation and the efforts of the UDF in the constitution making. The meeting was to be addressed by the UDF President, Pir Sahib Pagara and other leaders, which included Mufti Mahmood, Wali Khan, Shah Ahmad Noorani, Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Professor Abdul Ghafoor, Ch.Zahoor Ilahi, Asad Gilani and others.⁴² The PPP workers aided by the Punjab police as maintained by the opposition, opened fire at the meeting, killing several while, injuring hundreds, majority being the NAP workers.⁴³

The opposition parties accused the PPP government, the Punjab Governor Ghulam Mustafa Khar, and federal Interior Minister Abdul Qayum Khan for the "massacre" of the innocent people in Rawalpindi. The government, on the other hand, charged that the contingent of the NAP accompanying Wali Khan, especially his young armed volunteers *Pakhtun Zalmi*, was responsible for the bloodshed, which claimed 17 lives.⁴⁴ After this incident, the UDF decided to boycott the NA session.⁴⁵

However, the UDF succeeded in pressurizing the government and President Bhutto in his nationwide address on March 29, 1973, by inviting the opposition leaders to talks.⁴⁶ It was expected that the opposition leaders would be refusing to associate themselves furthermore with the PPP Government, but astonishingly, for the sake of the larger national interest, as Wali Khan put it, they decided to cooperate with the Government at that crucial moment.⁴⁷ They exercised remarkable self-restraint and showed their

willingness to talk to Bhutto at the conference table.⁴⁸ The talks were held at Rawalpindi during April 2-4, 1973. At the concluding session, Bhutto presented an *Aide Memoir*, making some fundamental concessions at vital constitutional matters. These included dropping of the two-third majority condition for a vote of no confidence against the PM, reduction of period about special provisions relating to democratic stability from 15 years to 10 years, as a goodwill gesture, which was not demanded. The PM and Chief Ministers will not seek dissolution of assemblies during the pendency of a no-confidence motion against them. The matter of difference of opinion between the Two Houses of the Parliament will be resolved by a majority of the total members, and not by a simple majority of the NA. The reduction of the age of voters to 18 years was agreed to after 1-4 Aug, 1977. Bhutto also consented to drop Islamic socialism from the constitution. The summoning of the legislature will be in the name of the President. The grace period of six months for non-members to become federal or provincial ministers was to be deleted after initial six months. An appeal against the findings of an administrative court will lie to the Supreme Court, *status quo* in respect of appointments, removal of judges was to be retained and their salaries protected even during a national financial emergency, were other points⁴⁹.

Bhutto argued that all the remaining points raised in the proposed amendments were already present in the Draft Constitution⁵⁰. The UDF in its rejoinder, dated April 9, 1973, however, did not accept Bhutto's logic and once again emphasized the importance of amendments proposed by them with a view to give wider national consensus to the constitution⁵¹. Bhutto's "*Aide Memoir*", therefore, could not impress the opposition, and the UDF continued boycott of the Assembly, which had commenced because of March 23, 1973 "violence". Negotiations were again taken up and at last minute, various amendments were incorporated⁵². Though still the demands of the UDF were not fully fulfilled, it decided to end boycott of the assembly by attending the concluding session for the sake of national interest. The constitution was finally passed on April 10, 1973. When the final vote was counted, one Sindhi and two Punjabi legislators, including Bhutto's former Minister of Law, Mahmood Ali Qasuri had cast the only three negative votes. Interestingly, the three dissident legislators were members of the PPP. With these three exceptions (negative votes) and few absentees, the remaining 137 members of the NA signed the new constitution and the President authenticated it on April 13, 1973.⁵³

Bhutto employed the stick, and the carrot to tempt, harass, intimidate, and exhaust the opposition. His government and party directed their moves primarily against the JI and the NAP. The government-controlled media intensified their campaign against Maulana Maududi, the founder of the JI. They recalled his pre-independence denunciations of the ML leadership and his opposition to the new state of Pakistan. They suggested that he and his party did not regard the country as "worth preserving" because it would not accept and follow their "obscurantist" notions. This intense questioning of the party's patriotism weakened its

posture. A similar campaign was launched against the NAP. Pro-government commentators pointed out that Abdul Wali Khan, his father, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others in the NAP, had once opposed the establishment of Pakistan and alleged that they remained unreconciled to its existence. The NAP leaders' denials of separatist intent and their declarations of patriotism were never given appropriate coverage in the national press and drowned in the noise of government propaganda against them.⁵⁴ The JUI was content with the proposed Islamic provisions of the constitution, and it did not want to fight for greater provincial autonomy. However, why the NAP representatives did not demand greater provincial autonomy? Two considerations may have weighed with them: Bhutto had caused the impression in the NAP-JUI circles that their governments in Balochistan and the N.W.F.P. would be restored.⁵⁵ Secondly, Abdul Wali Khan and his party hoped to shed their regional image and gain support in the Punjab and Sindh. If Wali Khan wanted to be a national leader, and if the NAP was to be a national party, they would have to step away from their traditional stand on provincial autonomy. The passage of the Constitution of 1973 is generally acknowledged to have been one of Z.A. Bhutto's most significant accomplishments because, unlike the two previous constitutions, it represented a broad national consensus.⁵⁶ Bhutto's bargaining skills played a role in producing this broader consensus. Nevertheless, the opposition's willingness to be reasonable and realistic also had a great role.

The 1973 Constitution and the aftermath

The national reconciliation that was witnessed in the unanimous adoption of the 1973 constitution, led to the hope that cordial relations and co-operation between the government and the opposition will develop. However, the delay in the promulgation of the constitution and the continuation of the emergency led to suspicions. The Front demanded the promulgation of the constitution, as soon as possible. The Front also contacted the masses to pressurize the government and in this connection, meetings were held at Peshawar, Quetta, Hyderabad and Lahore, in which a large number of people participated. Seeing the popularity of the Front the government started arresting the leaders and Mian Tufail Mohammad and Ch. Zahoor Ilahi were arrested. The editors of dailies *Dawn*, and *Jassart*, and Weekly *Zindagi* and other pro-opposition newspapers and journals were also arrested⁵⁷.

Murree Talks

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto throughout his rule kept the opposition in real quandary. He dubbed some of them as unpatriotic; traitors and foreign agents while many others were given blue and black beating.⁵⁸ Sometimes he even invited them for political parleys. On this occasion, he suppressed the opposition, treated them harshly on the one hand and invited them for a dialogue at Murree on the other hand. The opposition accepted this invitation. On June 28, Bhutto received the NAP and the JUI leaders Abdul Wali Khan, Mufti Mahmood, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Attaullah Mengal. On June 29, other opposition leaders Shah

Ahmad Noorani, Sardar Shukat Hayat Khan, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad joined the negotiations.⁵⁹ The UDF demand was that the rule of law should be restored, new constitution be promulgated, emergency be done away with and representative governments in NWFP and Balochistan be restored. Bhutto accepted these demands verbally but the actual course of the events, however, was the other way round and Bhutto was then getting very tough to the opposition. The opposition lost its confidence in Bhutto and on 3rd July, it announced, "No invitation of a dialogue shall be accepted before president's visit to the U.S.A." Because opposition thought that Bhutto was doing all this to make smooth his way for the U.S.A. tour and create an impression that he enjoyed support of the opposition.⁶⁰ The UDF organized meetings at Quetta, Multan, Karachi and Peshawar to press for the restoration of the NAP-JUI rule in Balochistan and NWFP, lifting of emergency and restoration of fundamental rights and informed the masses on "misdeeds" of the PPP government.

Soon after the Murree negotiations, the government arrested Maulana Shamus ud Din, Deputy Speaker Balochistan Assembly, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo in July, 1973. The central president of Islami Jamiat Talaba, a student wing of JI, Zafar Jamal Baluch and Shabeer Ahmad Rajput were also arrested.⁶¹ In July, too, the train in which the opposition leaders were travelling from Lahore to Rawalpindi was fired upon and attacked with hand grenades. Similar attacks were made at Gujranwala and Wazirabad railway stations also, to harass the opposition leaders.⁶²

The UDF leaders, in a meeting at Quetta, termed the induction of Mir Ghulam Qadir's "minority cabinet" by ignoring the established majority as "the very first undemocratic act" after the adoption of the new constitution.⁶³ They also criticized the call of Shah of Iran to India "to help Pakistan government in curbing autonomist movements in N.W.F.P. and Balochistan."⁶⁴ They termed it as his "adventurous design" about Pakistan's territorial jurisdiction under the pretext of Iraqi arms cache⁶⁵. The UDF assured the people of Balochistan at a reception in honour of the UDF leaders in Quetta, that UDF would fully support their cause against PPP's "repression and autocracy."⁶⁶ At the UDF meeting at Lahore Wali Khan made an interesting comment. He said that if the central government is not ready to accept the government of majority parties in the NWFP and Balochistan then the opposition will not recognize the central government of Pakistan.⁶⁷ The UDF observed July 20, 1973 as "Balochistan Day" and in its meetings held on the occasion, urged the federal government to restore the constitutional rule based on majority in the provincial assembly. The opposition also managed to bring the question of NWFP and Balochistan on the floor of the NA through an adjournment motion moved by Mohammad Azam Faruqi of the JI. Speaking on the motion Chaudhary Zahur Elahi proposed that a committee of the House or that of judges of the Supreme Court be constituted to look into the situation in Balochistan.⁶⁸ In his speech Mufli Mahmood, vice president of the UDF, said that the events, made a pretext for the dismissal of Balochistan government, did happen in Sindh,

but no action was taken against the government in that province. He alleged that the government was repeating the situation that gave birth to the disintegration of Pakistan.⁶⁹ Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo denied that they were secessionists.⁷⁰ The Federal Interior Minister Abdul Qayum Khan and the Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmad recounted to the "treasonable acts" sponsored by the NAP directed against the federal government.⁷¹ Leave to admit was refused to the motion, and to yet another one about disruption of a UDF public meeting, at Multan, by Federal Security Force, and a privilege motion regarding attack on Mufti Mahmood, Wali Khan, Maulana Noorani and Chaudhry Zahur Elahi at Wazirabad Railway station on June 6, 1973 in the NA.⁷²

The Civil Disobedience

By mid-1973, the UDF appeared to have finished its exploratory mission, and selected the month of August for a second offensive against the PPP government. The enforcement of the 1973 constitution, the election to the offices of prime minister and president, arrest of top NAP leaders and the launching of a civil disobedience move by the UDF, all put together, made the month of August of 1973 important in Pakistan's political history.⁷³

The UDF in its meeting at Chowk Yaadgar, Peshawar, fixed midnight August 24-25, 1973 as the dead line for the release of all political prisoners, and withdrawal of cases against them, calling back of Army from Balochistan to barracks and for the immediate steps to curb price spiral. They threatened that the UDF will start peaceful civil disobedience movement for the restoration of the people's rights.⁷⁴ The movement started on 25 August 1973, and in the first few days more than five hundred workers of the Front were arrested, while defying Section 144⁷⁵ in Multan and Lahore only. Similar was the case in other cities where processions were taken out in violation of the Section 144. The detainees were severely tortured and harshly treated during the arrests. Malik Mohammad Qasim, Syed Mohammad Qasuar Gurdezi, Khan Mohammad Ashraf, Qari Noorul Haq and other UDF workers were physically tortured at police stations. Also false cases against the opposition leaders, including Wali Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Chaudhry Zahur Ellahi and others, were filed.⁷⁶ But the movement continued despite the large scale arrests of various leaders and workers of various parties and the "humiliation" and "torture" by the police.⁷⁷ A writ petition was filed by UDF about its twelve leaders, in the Lahore High Court, which alleged that the detainees were being tortured.⁷⁸ During the movement, hundreds of the UDF workers and leaders of the component parties were arrested and "tortured."⁷⁹ The UDF campaign, however, proved a flop as in the UDF council meeting, held in Rawalpindi, in December 1973, there was not even a simple reference to it in the resolution that was adopted. Instead, a demand was made from the government to investigate the opposition charges from the Supreme Court judges so that the people should know the hard facts.⁸⁰ The large scale floods in Punjab were another factor which hampered the UDF move. The lack of confidence and co-operation among the

component parties of the Front, and the suppressive measures of the government were other factors responsible for the failure of the civil disobedience movement.

The *Ahmadi* Issue

After the collapse of the UDF civil disobedience movement, the national politics experienced a lull until mid 1974, when the *Ahmadi* (Also known as *Qadiyanis*) question dominated the political scenario, which finally paved the way for the Constitution (second) Amendment Bill.⁸¹ Declaring the *Ahmadis* outside the fold of Islam, was an old demand for which in 1952 a countrywide agitation was launched.⁸² In 1974, however, it was crowned with success. The first spark came from Rabwah, itself the centre of *Ahmadis*, the world over. On May 22, 1974, Nishtar Medical College (NMC) Multan students (160 in number) on an excursion trip, during their short terminus at Rabwah railway station, raised slogans in favour of the finality of Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH). Upon their return from Peshawar on May 29, they stopped at Rabwah where a mob of about 5,000 people claiming to be *Ahmadis*, attacked the boggy the students were riding. The assailants, armed with daggers, rods, swords and hockey sticks beat un-armed students and injured more than thirty of them⁸³. The incident, widely reported in the national press, reactivated the move against *Ahmadis*. As a result, the entire country in general and the province of the Punjab in particular came in the grip of protests, rallies and meetings, which led to some arrests. Protests in front of the NA building in Islamabad were baton charged and tear-gassed.

On May 31, 1974, Mufti Mahmood, Chaudhry Zahur Ellahi and Sahibzada Safiullah (JI) moved adjournment motions in the NA to discuss the incident. The Law Minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada opposed the motion on the ground of its being a law and order issue of provincial nature. Ch. Zahur Ellahi and Professor Ghafoor spoke in its favour, but the motion was ruled out with a statement of Bhutto that a court of inquiry would be appointed to look into the matter.⁸⁴ The opposition, however, did not feel satisfied and mobilized mass pressure on the government by inviting a convention of *Ulama*, *Masbaikh* and the leaders of various political parties, at Lahore and set up All Parties *Khatm-i-Nubuwwat* Action Committee (APKNAC). The convention threatened to observe a countrywide strike on June 14, 1974, if the following four demands were not accepted, namely; (i) Declaration of *Ahmadis* as a non Muslim minority; (ii) removal of *Ahmadis* from key positions; (iii) declaration of Rabwah as an open city with permission to Muslims to settle there; and (iv) *Ahmadi's* chief, Mirza Nasir Ahmed and others responsible for the students incident may be arrested forthwith.⁸⁵

The APKNAC consisted of Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Obaidullah Anwar, Maulana Taj Mahmood of JUIP, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi and Qazi Fazal Rasool of the JUP, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Chaudhary Ghulam Gilani of the JI, Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil and

Anurzada Khan of the NAP, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Rana Zafarullah Khan of the PDP, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari of Independents group in the NA, Agha Shorish Kashmiri editor *Chitani*, Maulana Ehsan Elahi Zaheer and a number of religious and political leaders, besides representatives of various students organizations. Most of the parties, associated with the Committee of Action, were component parties of the UDF. The government declined to meet their demands, and as a result, a countrywide strike was observed on June 14, 1974 to press for the acceptance of the four demands.⁸⁶ The country remained in the grip of protests, rallies, and processions along with large scale arrests to put pressure upon the government to accept the demands.

On June 30, 1974, the Federal Law Minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada moved a motion in the NA regarding appointment of a Special Committee of the whole House to: (i) discuss the question of the status in Islam of persons who do not believe in the finality of prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH); (ii) to receive and consider proposals, suggestions, resolutions etc. from its members within a period to be specified by the committee, etc. (iii) to make recommendations for the determination of the above issue as a result of its deliberations, examination of questions and perusals of documents; if any.⁸⁷ The motion was adopted unopposed. Soon after, Maulana Noorani moved a resolution on the status of *Ahmadis*. He requested to the House to declare the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, by whatsoever name they may call, as non Muslims and that an official bill be moved in the NA to make adequate and necessary amendments in the Constitution to give effect to such declaration.⁸⁸ The motion was unanimously passed and referred to a committee. It was co-sponsored by Mufti Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor, Maulana Abdul Haq, Chaudhary Zahur Ellahi, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Maulana Zafar Ahmed Ansari, Sahibzada Ahmad Raza Qasuri, Mohammad Azam Faruqi, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan and others. Prior to the finalization of the award of Special Committee, the UDF team consisting of Mufti Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor, Maulana Noorani, Ch. Zahur Ellahi, Ghulam Farooq and Maula Bakhsh Soomro had indepth discussions with Bhutto, and government team consisting of Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiar. The Special Committee finally recommended on September 7, 1974 to the NA that "non-believers in finality of Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH) are outside the fold of Islam."⁸⁹ The text of the amendment was sponsored by Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Hazarvi, Maulana Noorani, Professor Ghafoor, Ghulam Farooq, Ch. Zahur Ellahi and others.⁹⁰ All the 130 members voted for the amendment which ruled the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan both of *Qadiyani* and *Lahori* Group as outside the pale of Islam.⁹¹

Mufti Mahmood, Vice President of the UDF, on behalf of the APKNAC, congratulated the PM, his government and the members of parliament for taking a decision, which reflected the aspirations of the whole nation. He said it was not only a moment of great rejoicing for the people of Pakistan but also a matter of great satisfaction for the entire Muslim World.⁹² After this brief holiday, the pre-second amendment

confrontational posture was resumed by the PPP and by the opposition. However, the latter did not succeed in emerging from the disarray until the beginning of 1975.

Other Amendments and the UDF Campaign against the PPP Government

After the dismissal of the NAP-JUI ministry in Balochistan, the federal government resorted to army action in the province to arrest the anti-state activists while the NWFP was in the grip of terrorist acts. The terrorist activities also took place in Islamabad, Karachi, Quetta, Lahore, Okara, Gujrat, Kachi, Chaman, Gulistan, Sarnan and Pishin and claimed many lives. The law and order situation was worst in NWFP in general and the provincial capital Peshawar in particular.⁹³ In one such incident of terrorist activities on February 8, 1975, the provincial Home Minister Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao became the victim of a bomb blast.⁹⁴ Taking cognizance of the loss of life and property, the government moved the Constitution (third) Amendment Bill in the NA. The Amendment proposed to make clause 7 of Article 10 of the constitution about safeguard against arrest and detention "in-applicable to a person acting in a manner prejudicial to the security, safety, or integrity of Pakistan, or indulging in an anti-national activity".⁹⁵ About clause 7(b) of Article 232 on proclamation of emergency, the amendment proposed that "the emergency would end only on parliament adoption of a resolution for the purpose, in a joint session."⁹⁶ The Bill, moved on February 11, 1975, was referred to a select committee of Mufi Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Chaudhary Zahur Ellahi and six government members⁹⁷. The opposition members attended its meeting, and a report was submitted on Feb 12, 1975. A day before the introduction of the Bill, the NA adopted two bills allowing detention of MNAs and MPAs even during session of their respective legislatures, for reasons of statements connected with defence, external affairs or security of Pakistan, and banning of a party "operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty, or integrity of Pakistan."⁹⁸ Speaking on exemption of MNAs from preventive detention and personal Appearance (Amendment) Bill 1975, Mufi Mahmood Vice President of the UDF pointed out that this was an attempt to cut the popularity of the opposition in the masses and demanded that the representatives of the people may not be deprived of their rights by being placed behind the bars. Other members of the Front questioned that unless convicted by a court, how a person could be regarded as murderer. They said that this act of the government was indicative of its autocracy, which will ruin the country.⁹⁹ The Constitution (third) Amendment bill to be more precisely was readily addressed to the NAP, banned on February 10, 1975. The UDF and the NAP leader Abdul Wali Khan and a number of NAP workers were arrested after the murder of Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao. The Front, under the leadership of its new President, Mufi Mahmood, staged a walkout in protest against the amendment. They accused the government for not creating conducive conditions for the role of the opposition in the House.¹⁰⁰ From the ruling party Rao Khurshid Ali Khan too, opposed the Bill. He argued that the Bill was not circulated for eliciting public opinion whereas it involved fundamental changes in the constitution.¹⁰¹

It may be recalled that opposition boycotted the proceedings of the NA on January 31, 1975, when Ahmad Raza Qasuri made some objectionable remarks while speaking on the Terrorist Activities (special courts) Bill 1974 as a result of which the speaker suspended him from attending the session for the remaining period.¹⁰² The boycott ended because of an agreement reached at between the opposition and the government.¹⁰³ Professor Ghafoor Ahmad announced in the House on Feb 6, 1975 about ending of the boycott. In his comment, the Law Minister, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, assured the House to have liaison with the members of the Opposition, for the stabilization of democracy in the country.¹⁰⁴

The UDF justified the boycott, during the enactment of the Third Amendment Bill, on the floatation of the above agreement by the government, by not permitting Wali Khan and other members of the NA and Senate to attend the proceedings of their Houses.¹⁰⁵ However, the House adopted the Amendment Bill on February 12, 1975. When the Speaker ruled out a privilege motion of Mufti Mahmood about Feb. 6, 1975, the Opposition boycotted the budget session.¹⁰⁶ Later Mufti Mahmood conditioned the ending of boycott with the release of Wali Khan and his presence in the NA. Prof. Ghafoor signalled a warning, that the budget approved without opposition would be the budget of the PPP alone.¹⁰⁷ The UDF endorsed the boycott call in its national convention, held on June 14-15 at Muslim League House, Lahore, with Pir Pagara in the chair.¹⁰⁸

The opposition ended its boycott in the winter session. It was in this session that the ruling party introduced the Constitution (fourth) Amendment Bill 1975. The bill, in the form of a package, provided amendments to various articles. Under Article 199, the Amendment barred the High Court from stopping government from passing a future preventive detention order and granting bail to a person detained under the prevailing detention law. Under the second amendment to this Article the period of an injunction staying the recovery of public revenue was proposed not to be more than 60 days. The amendment to Article 10 provided increase of time limit for furnishing grounds for detention, and in the period for referring to the Review Board from one month to three months. Other amendments were related to protection of economic reforms, working days of the assemblies, representation of minorities and freedom of press.¹⁰⁹

The leader of the UDF Mufti Mahmood complained, that the opposition was not given sufficient time, to prepare themselves and speak on the bill with solid arguments. He demanded that the second session summoned on November 14, 1975 (Friday) might be held at 6 p.m. He accused the Treasury Benches for not keeping the spirit of Feb. 6, 1975, agreement that provided for taking the opposition into confidence, prior to the finalization of the programme of the session, and for the non-implementation of which the opposition boycotted the House for nine months. He severely criticized the government for not giving an opportunity to the opposition to study this important amendment in the Constitution, with a view to

propose amendments to it.¹¹⁰ Other opposition members Ch. Zahur Ellahi, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, and Ahmad Raza Qasuri also made a plea that the amendment may not be passed in haste, and that sufficient time may be given, to enable the members to discuss it and propose amendments to it.¹¹¹ After frequent interceptions by Opposition, the Speaker directed sergeant at arms to remove Ch. Zahur Ellahi, Ahmad Raza Qasuri and Malik Suleman from the House.¹¹² As a result, 12 members of the Opposition, including Mufti Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Ch. Zahur Ellahi, Malik Suleman, Dr. Ghulam Hussain, Ahmad Raza Qasuri, Nur Mohammad Qureshi, Maulana Mustafa Al Azhari, Maulana Abdul Haq, Sahibzada Safiullah and Ch. Zulfikar Ali Bajwa were forcefully removed from the House and the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Bill 1975 was adopted.¹¹³

The enactment of the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution, especially the way it was brought about, gave birth to a spree of condemnation of the PPP in the national press.¹¹⁴ The Lahore Bar Association, in a resolution, condemned the governments' attitude with opposition and termed it as "uncivilised and anti-democratic."¹¹⁵ As many as 300 lawyers of the Lahore District Bar Association brought out a procession against the Fourth Amendment, which terminated at Punjab Assembly.¹¹⁶ Lawyers in different parts of the country registered similar protests. The UDF Council of Action condemned the government for arranging ouster of opposition members through the Federal Security Force (FSF). The meeting declined to accept the Fourth Amendment Act, enacted after the ouster of Opposition. The most important feature of the meeting was a UDF call to the opposition members in the Senate and Assemblies to resign.¹¹⁷ The Opposition parliamentary group set up a five member committee to chalk out, future course of action. Mufti Mahmood, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Senators Khawaja Muhammad Safdar and Maulana Noorani were its members.¹¹⁸ The PPP responded that if the opposition opted for confrontation, the government would have no choice but to react strongly.¹¹⁹

The large-scale criticism of the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment though provided an opportunity to the UDF to flourish, but to its bad luck the ouster of the JUP from its fold further weakened it. The JUP did not agree to honour the UDF decision of boycotting the by-elections¹²⁰, by not putting up a candidate for the NA-Karachi-7 constituency, vacated by the resignation of Maulana Noorani on his election to the Senate¹²¹. When a delegation of the JUP failed to convince the UDF, to make the contesting of Karachi election an exception, the JUP, JI and JUI accused each other for destroying the UDF. However, the JUP's Hanif Tayyab lost to the PPP's Nuri Arifeen. Subsequently, the JUP was ousted from the UDF.¹²²

Winding Up of the UDF

The Opposition parties tried to keep the UDF alive and intact after the ouster of JUP. It showed its presence felt at the NA by way of "walk outs" from the Assembly or occasional statements in the national

press.¹²³ The then leader of the Front, Mufti Mahmood even admitted that the UDF failed to provide an alternative leadership to the country.¹²⁴ The daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, hitherto a generous spokesman of the Opposition too in an editorial note on June 25, 1976 argued that the UDF was nothing beyond "get together of the party leaders after every two months." In mid-1976, last effort was made to reinforce the UDF by drawing a 12 points charter keeping in mind the forth-coming general elections due later in 1976. The charter was related to guarantee for the free and fair polls, ending the state of emergency, lifting up of Section 144, release of political detainees and withdrawal of cases against them, freedom of press, restoration of the declarations of cancelled papers and issue of new declarations, release of arrested journalists, halting the character assassination of opposition, through Radio and TV, giving of suitable time to the opposition on Radio and TV to present their viewpoint, six months period for the election campaign, political solution to the Balochistan problem, guarantee for not using civil armed forces in the polls and holding of polls on one day.¹²⁵

In a joint statement Pir Pagara, Mufti Mahmood, Mian Tufail Mohammad, Nawabzada Nasrullah and Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi threatened to exert political pressure on the government if the rule of law was not observed and the powers of superior judiciary were not restored immediately. They urged the lawyers, intellectuals, government employees, students, workers, businessmen and industrialists, to dissociate themselves from the government which had crushed national institutions.¹²⁶ On the other hand, the PPP government launched the Constitution (fifth) Amendment Bill 1976, on September 1, 1976. It was in the form of a package, proposing amendments to 18 articles including 12 pertaining to judiciary. The main amendments were related to appointment of Governors, national finance commission, establishment and jurisdiction of courts, retirement age of judges of Supreme Court and acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, composition of High Court, a Chief Justice of High Courts, contempt of court, resignation of judges, administrative courts and Tribunals, continuance of proclamation of emergency, various definitions and laws exempted from operation of fundamental rights. The Bill was deferred for proposing amendments for two days.

Speaking on the Amendment, Professor Ghafoor pointed out that ever since the implementation of the Constitution on August 14, 1973, 60 amendments have been made after which the word "unanimous adoption" employed for it has become a contempt for the nation. He further added that such a process is leading the country to instability and a grave crisis. He recounted that for the passage of the Constitution (fourth) Amendment Bill, the opposition had been thrown out, which speaks of its worth. Lawyers had criticized the present (fifth) Amendment. Protecting Defence of Pakistan Rules under this Amendment, which were the offshoot of emergency were without any ground. He added that it specifically becomes meaningless when the government claims itself to have strengthened Pakistan's territorial integrity, and freed

from external dangers. He argued that the jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court of Pakistan has been curtailed by the setting up of tribunals through which justice will be wilfully delayed. It was not short of a great catastrophe. He continued that they have no objection to the setting up of High Court in Balochistan, but what really mattered was power without which institutions were meaningless.¹²⁷ Rao Khurshid Ali Khan, (PPP) besides Mian Mahmood Ali Qasuri, Mufti Mahmood, Mahmood Azam Faruqi, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Zafar Ahmad Ansari also criticized the Bill.¹²⁸ The opposition walked out from the House, after second reading of the Bill on the plea that their amendments were not accepted and the Bill was thereafter passed.¹²⁹ The constitution (Fifth) Amendment Bill was widely criticized by the national press and by the lawyers throughout the country.¹³⁰

After the enactment of the Constitution (Fifth) Amendment Bill, the opposition appeared to have been exhausted and fed up with their tactics of boycotts and walkouts from the House. This nerve shattering campaign probably convinced them to lose interest in the UDF but to look for another alternative of joint venture against the PPP regime. The statement of Mufti Mahmood at Lahore to the effect that negotiations are underway with the opposition parties on a collective election strategy was a proof of it because the UDF had already approved the manifesto for the polls.¹³¹ After the Fifth Amendment, the adoption of the Constitution (sixth) Amendment Bill 1976 further disillusioned the opposition. The Amendment pertained to four articles governing the retiring age of the judges of the Supreme Court and judges of High Courts and others. The amendments, moved by the opposition members were rejected.¹³²

The UDF though remained active and survived for about four years, yet it failed to become a challenge for Bhutto regime. Its component parties lacked co-operation and instead of working together they gave preference to their parties and worked individually. They even failed to give an agreed manifesto of the Front. It was believed due to these differences, that the opposition parties would fail to agree upon common candidates in the coming election and the vote bank of these parties would remain divided as was in the 1970 elections. With the announcement of the PM Bhutto that elections would be held in March 1977, the opposition parties started consultations. The UDF Parties felt the need of the formation of a broader alliance to confront the PPP. It was also decided to consult the parties outside the fold of the Front for this purpose.

The Opposition parties met on Jan 10, 1977, at Lahore and agreed to the formation of a new alliance known as the Pakistani National Alliance. TI and JUP also joined the new alliance. Asghar Khan announced on Jan 11, 1977, that with the formation of the PNA, the UDF ceased to exist. Thus the Jan 10, 1977 meeting of the Front proved to be its last meeting. It is believed that the UDF was a complete failure, because it failed to provide alternate leadership. However, the formation of the PNA was due to the Front because the opposition parties remained in constant contact for a long time, which made the formation of a

new alliance easy. Despite the fact that the UDF parties lacked mutual trust and confidence, yet they had achieved some thing in the form of 1973 constitution and the formation of the PNA, which later on became a mass protest movement resulting in giving a tough time to d Bhutto regime that ended due to the promulgation of the martial law.

b. Pakistan National Alliance

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had not as yet publicly announced when the elections would be held but wanted to be sure that his own side's "battle plans" were well and carefully drawn before alerting the "enemy" to a date.¹³³ Despite his confidence, Bhutto did all he could to strengthen his position and protect his planks before announcing the date of the new elections. At the beginning of 1976, Bhutto brought some crucial changes not only in the administrative officials but also in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. On 5th Feb, 1976, he reshuffled his cabinet. Next, he appointed chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan (Rtd) as a "Special assistant for National Security to the Prime Minister"¹³⁴. Then General Mohammad Zia ul Haq was appointed as Chief of the Army Staff on March 1, 1976.¹³⁵

Planning was also made to strengthen the propaganda machinery and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was assigned to arrange publicity on a large scale. The Ministry was asked to project the pivotal role of the PM Pakistan as a builder of Pakistan and a defender of its ideology, as an exponent of a new social economic order, as a great Muslim and Third World leader, as a world statesman, whose views got appreciation all over the world.¹³⁶ Directorate of News Documentaries, which had made eleven films on the achievements of the PM already, prepared five more films during 1976-77 to highlight the personality of Bhutto.¹³⁷ Also as a part of his party's pre-election propaganda plan, a little red-cover book, called *Bhutto says*, (a book of thoughtful quotations from selected speeches and writings of Bhutto), much in the character of Chinese leader Chairman Mao Zedong's *Red Book*, was published in several languages spoken in the country. Thousands of copies of this book were distributed widely in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and other big cities.¹³⁸ Bhutto expected and tried to win his forthcoming elections with a comfortable two-third majority and to host the first Third World summit, which would give him a valid claim to the sobriquet, some of his devotees already used to call him, not only as *Quaid-i-Azam*, but also as a leader of the Third World.¹³⁹ In view of his domestic as well as foreign policies, Bhutto was confident that he had strengthened his position because of which he decided to hold the general elections almost 18 months before the scheduled date i.e. August 14, 1978. In addition, it was believed that the opposition was divided and that Bhutto would win the elections easily whenever he decided to hold it.¹⁴⁰ This encouraged Bhutto to believe that the moment had finally come, to call new elections.¹⁴¹ In the meanwhile, on January 2, 1977, the Election Commission of Pakistan announced the final electoral list for both central and provincial assemblies¹⁴². Moreover, on January 7, 1977, Bhutto announced in the National Assembly (NA) that the general elections would be held within

two months. Three days later President Choudhry Fazal Elahi dissolved the NA at the PM's recommendations, reporting that a new NA would be elected on 7th March 1977 and for provincial assemblies voting would be held on 10th March, as provincial assemblies would stand dissolved on 13th January 1977¹⁴³.

Formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)

Soon after the dates for elections to the National and provincial assemblies were announced, majority of the opposition political parties, with their different religious and ideological orientations, came together due to their common antipathy for Bhutto and some of his domestic policies, to form a combined opposition front. Lawrence Ziring opines: "the quarrelsome and divided opposition acknowledging the few options in quiver, soon realized that only by uniting their several programmes and forming a joint command, would they have any chance of managing a meaningful campaign."¹⁴⁴ Earlier, the opposition leaders had started their struggle for a broad-based opposition to give a tough time to the ruling party. From January 4 to 6, 1977, the chief of JUI, Maulana Mufti Mahmud visited Sindh and met some of the political leaders including Professor Ghafoor Ahmad (JI), Sher Baz Mazari (NDP) and Wali Khan (NDP).¹⁴⁵

In this connection, the heads of the component parties of the United Democratic Front (UDF) met in Lahore on January 9, 1977. A UDF spokesperson told the reporters that the Front's decision to contest the election stood and that the UDF was determined to put up joint candidates. Their next target according to him was to evolve broader unity between the UDF and the parties outside it. He hoped that the talks would be held Air Marshal (Rtd), Asghar Khan, Chief of TI in that regard. Sherbaz Mazari and Prof. Ghafoor met Asghar Khan and requested him to join the alliance against the government. They finally decided to hold a meeting of the opposition leaders on January 10, 1977 at Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa's (JUP) house at Lahore. Bajwa announced some of the decisions taken at the meeting and said that no seat would be left uncontested. They would contest the polls under one platform and one symbol.¹⁴⁶ Asghar Khan made the formal announcement of the formation of an alliance, called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), on January 11, 1977, at a meeting held at the Muslim League House, Lahore.¹⁴⁷ Asghar Khan also announced that the PNA had adopted the plough as its election symbol and a green flag with nine stars on it, where each star would represent one party.¹⁴⁸ The emergence of the PNA was a major development, absolutely against the expectations of the PPP and Bhutto, and it led to polarized elections against the 1970 elections when these parties were divided against the PPP.¹⁴⁹

The formation of the PNA, a conglomeration of nine political parties, was an event of great significance in the political history of Pakistan.¹⁵⁰ The main parties of the PNA were JI, JUI, JUP, NDP, PDP, PKT, PML, and TI.¹⁵¹ This grand alliance represented almost the entire spectrum of the current

political thinking and ideological orientation in the country.¹⁵² The motive behind the formation of the PNA could be served as a source of tremendous strength for the political situation.¹⁵³ In the meeting of Jan 16, 1977, the organizational pattern of the PNA was announced by Asghar Khan.¹⁵⁴ While addressing a press conference he declared that a special committee was constituted, with Rafiq Ahmed Bajwa as its convener, for drafting a manifesto for the PNA. Maulana Mufti Muhmood was elected as its President, Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa as Secretary General, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as its Vice-President while the leader of Muslim League, Pir Pagara was elected as Chairman of the Central Parliamentary Board.¹⁵⁵ Among the nine constituents of the PNA, the JI, JUI and JUP were religious parties, which stood for the enforcement of the Shariah, and in the true sense, these three religious parties controlled the PNA. The PML and the PDP were Islamists modernists; the NDP's rank and file was secular and inclined to socialism. The KT fell somewhere between the religious parties and the Islamic modernist elements. TI was a secular party for all political purposes.¹⁵⁶ Bhutto did not believe that this coalition with the diverse views of nine political parties could get together. He was sure that the long-standing interpersonal rivalries, different religious and ideological orientations would make it extremely difficult for them to unite.

The Election Arrangements

Meanwhile the Election Commission of Pakistan on January 10, 1977 announced schedule of polls. January 19 and 22 1977, were fixed for the receipt of nominations to National and four provincial assemblies respectively. With this, the electioneering politics gained a momentum and the PPP and the PNA came out as opponents. On January 17, 1977 the ECP allocated symbols. The PPP got sword and the PNA was allocated plough.¹⁵⁷

The electioneering entered a crucial phase on January 19, when Bhutto was declared unopposed to the NA from his hometown Larkana. The opposition alleged that the PNA nominee Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi of the JI was kidnapped to a distant place and not released until the timing for filing of nomination papers was over.¹⁵⁸ This episode caused clouds on the fairness of the polls. The total number of unopposed candidates to the NA was nineteen. Among the 19 candidates declared elected unopposed 15 were from Sindh¹⁵⁹ and four candidates were elected unopposed from Balochistan.¹⁶⁰ In keeping with the tradition of these unopposed elections, all the four Chief Ministers of the provinces followed suit to render the entire situation even more farcical. All these developments placed the PPP in an awkward position. The PNA severely criticized these unopposed elections and used them as a lever to malign the PPP.

The Manifestoes of the PPP and the PNA

The manifestoes of the political parties are very important for the political process. They provide the programmes of the political parties to the people. Manifestoes are necessary for elections because they help

to form public opinion in terms of the issues and problems faced by the general masses. The credibility of the party is assessed by the people on the basis of the manifestoes. After the nomination process was over on Jan 22, 1977, the parties came forth with their programmes in term of manifestoes. Following is an account of the manifestoes of both the contesting political forces.

Pakistan Peoples Party's Election Manifesto of 1977

The PPP election manifesto announced on Jan 24, 1977 was quite different in style and content from its election manifesto of 1970. In 1970, the PPP promised revolutionary changes, while in 1977 it sought to preserve and consolidate the gains made in the previous six years. In the 1977 election manifesto, PPP promised to usher in an era of egalitarian society. The party promised to bring about 50% raise in national production, attaining self-sufficiency in steel, fertilizers, petroleum and wheat. The revolutionary restructuring of the economy that already took place was to serve as beacon to make the economic forces responsive to the requirement of an egalitarian social order. Resumption of land from 35,000 landowners for distribution among landless peasants, tax holiday to cultivators owning up to 25 acres of land and availability of agricultural inputs were its other salient features to turn the country into a granary of wheat, rice, cotton and sugar cane. Further nationalization of industry was denied. Improving transport and communications, holding down the price spiral, dealing severely with corrupt administrators, opening of new dispensaries especially in the rural-side, increasing enrolment in educational institutions to achieve the target of universal primary education for boys by 1983, and for girls by 1987 and more job opportunities in private and public sectors were some other highlights. The manifesto committed to pursue an independent foreign policy.¹⁶¹

The Manifesto of the PNA

As compared to the PPP, the PNA was late in announcing of its manifesto. The PNA manifesto issued on Feb 8, 1977, promised a firm faith in Allah's sovereignty, and the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH). It promised to enforce the Holy Quran and *Sunnab* within a period of one year. It promised to stop rape, race, gambling, immorality, obscenity, burglary and obscene literature. The PNA also promised elimination of interest, reinodelling of education on Islamic lines, curbing un-Islamic economic forces like hoarding, price hike, smuggling and corruption and closure of family planning centres.¹⁶² Another part of the manifesto addressed the opposition's dissatisfaction with the PPP's policies enforced from time to time, and amendments to the constitution. The manifesto pledged to end the state of emergency and restore fundamental rights, repeal Defence of Pakistan Rules and those curbing freedom of press. The PNA promised to pay the cost of nationalized industries and concerns to their owners and dispense with all amendments infringing upon fundamental rights, restrict unlimited powers of the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers, implementation of Urdu as official language and improve the socio-economic status of the poor. The PNA announced to confiscate large fiefs and their distribution among landless tillers, and to strengthen

national defence. In the domain of foreign policy the PNA pledged for an independent foreign policy, striving for plebiscite in the Jammu and Kashmir, dissociating from pacts such as Tashkent Declaration and Simla Accord, quitting West sponsored South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and promoting good friendly ties with Muslim countries.¹⁶¹

Manifestoes of both the parties contained high-sounding promises, economic strategies and sophisticated expressions. Interestingly, both the parties made significant adjustments, conceding to the political realities. Bhutto used the opposition's Islamic plank with a long list of his services to the cause of Islam, while the PNA pre-empted the PPP's socio-economic plank. In this connection the manifesto of the PPP promised to hold high the banner of Islam... making the teaching of the Holy Quran as integral part of eminence as a centre of community life. Actually, Bhutto wanted to defeat the opposition on ideological grounds and thus raised the slogan of *Musawat-i-Muhammadi*. Bhutto was a modern secular politician with an ideological bent towards socialism. However, events in Pakistan gradually caused Bhutto to progressively increase his appeal to Islam and then out of political expediency, to advocate Islamization.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, the PNA pre-empted the PPP's socio-economic plank. The PNA's major emphasis was on *Nizam-i-Mustafa*, which became very popular among the masses and they promised not to denationalize any of the nationalized industries except the agro-based micro rice milling, flour husking and cotton ginning factories and held out an assurance of better deal to peasantry, poor and the labour. In short, the PNA manifesto better revealed the compromises necessary to sustain the coalition of parties. In order to unite on one view, the PNA drafters turned out a document more notable for its prejudices and aspirations than its concrete proposals. It was more specific about the kind of changes it would introduce in furthering an Islamic way of life. While the PPP manifesto detailed how the government had redeemed virtually all its promises in election 1970 and how another term in office was necessary to consolidate these gains.

The Election Campaign

Although both the parties contained in their manifestoes high-sounding promises, economic strategies and sophisticated expressions yet the practical election campaign soon degenerated into unsophisticated personal attacks on each other. Thus, the negative approach of the leaders became one of the important aspects of the election campaign. Their speeches were mainly related to the personal attacks on the other party members. Approximately 44% of the speeches of the PPP leaders were devoted to scathing criticism of the opposition leaders, their past affiliation and their future designs, in contrast, 75% of the campaign speeches of the PNA leaders were directed against Bhutto and his policies¹⁶⁵. The offensive launched by the PNA was so powerful that it kept Bhutto on the defensive from the beginning. As the election campaign gathered momentum, the PNA being denied access to the mass media by the government, devised the successful strategy of holding meetings at well-known and popular places, organizing public

rallies and taking out large processions. The PNA often repeated promise to "enforce" Islamic law throughout Pakistan, if elected, and hence to ban the sale of wine and liquor, gambling of every kind, the payment of interest, and the use of "obscenity" was seen as a serious frontal challenge to Bhutto's leadership and the popularity of his party.¹⁶⁶

Seeing the Islamic thrust of the PNA's successful election campaign strategy, Bhutto instructed his party's workers to drop all references to even Islamic socialism and use the more appealing term of *Musawat-i-Muhammadi* instead.¹⁶⁷ Since both the PPP and the PNA realized the potency of Islam in establishing legitimacy and mass mobilization, it is not surprising that Islam became one of the major themes of the 1977 election campaign. The closing weeks of the spring campaign found each side asserting its past services to Islam and its promise to bring about an Islamic system of government more quickly or more effectively. The PNA election campaign was quite successful and had begun to draw unexpected large and enthusiastic crowds. These massive public audiences gave the PNA a sense of self-confidence and power, and a feeling that they could win the elections.

Bhutto too was in a strong position to contest the elections. He could confidently point to the stabilization and revitalization of Pakistan after the emergence of Bangladesh, Pakistan's regained honour and prestige in the world as a result of hosting the Islamic Summit Conference, the numerous Islamic programmes that he had instituted while in office, the improved financial condition in Pakistan as a result of his enlightened foreign policy, the populist nationalization policies, land reforms and eradication of the *Sardari* system that had broken the back of the rich and powerful industrial, commercial and landed elites and the 1973 Constitution on which there had been consensus by major political parties in Pakistan. His election campaign emphasized this and many of the traditional PPP ideas, cloaked in Islamic rhetoric for greater acceptability and promoted by a collection of less radical candidates. In contrast, the opposition was a divided, mutually antagonistic collection of groups lacking time, money, talent, organization and media access. The PNA presented a platform of political compromise, replete with promises and platitudes, channelled into an anti-Bhutto Islamic bent. As such their promises contrasted markedly with the PPP's demonstrated delivery.

The Results

The results of the March 7, 1977 polls were contrary to the prevailing aspirations, the PNA therefore took as astonishing. It had already boycotted the polls in Balochistan. The results of the election were bewildering to almost every one. The PPP had a landslide victory of 136 out of 173 seats under contest plus another 19 uncontested seats. It is worth mentioning that not only Bhutto but also all the four Chief Ministers and other important PPP leaders were among the members elected unopposed.¹⁶⁸ The PNA

conceded only 36 seats and the Qayum Muslim League could get only one seat. The final party position in the 200 members directly elected NA was as under:¹⁶⁹

Table: Party wise Position in National Assembly of March 1977 Elections

Political Parties	Punjab	Sind	NWFP/FATA	Balochistan	Total
Number of Seats	116	43	34	7	200
PPP	108	32	8	7	155
PNA	8	11	17	-	36
PML-Q	-	-	1	-	1
Independents	-	-	8	-	8

Source: *Dawn*, March 9, 1977.

In fact, Bhutto had a definite edge over the PNA, but the overwhelming landslide victory won by the PPP and the humiliating defeat suffered by the PNA was unbelievable. The PPP received less than 60% of the popular votes but won more than 75% of the seats in the NA. The PNA with more than 35% of the popular votes to its credit was allowed to translate that into less than 17% of the seats¹⁷⁰. The results actually surprised all parties. The PNA lost in three of four provinces. It won majority of seats in only one major city, Karachi, but was badly defeated in Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, Hyderabad and Rawalpindi. The PPP success in Punjab, (where it won 93% seats) surprised even the party leadership. Thus, it can be said that neither did the winners look like having won, nor the losers like having lost.¹⁷¹

Charges of Rigging

Inspired by the public response to their campaign, the PNA leaders declared even before the balloting date that anything short of a PNA victory would be unacceptable and clear evidence of rigged elections¹⁷². In this atmosphere of mobilized uncertainty, the election results of March 7 came as a severe blow to the PNA partisans, who could only interpret the results as a massive rigging.¹⁷³ Thus, the PNA refused to accept the results and charged that the election was "massively rigged according to a calculated plan."¹⁷⁴ Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa, Secretary General of the PNA at a press conference in Lahore, on March 8, 1977, alleged rigging of the election and announced to boycott the provincial assemblies election scheduled for March 10, 1977.¹⁷⁵ Other leaders of the PNA like Mufi Mahmood and Mian Tufail Muhammad also expressed similar views about elections. While Asghar Khan said that, "the PNA (which) had already boycotted from election in Balochistan will not only boycott the provincial assemblies' election but we will give it a thought whether we should or should not sit in the legislature." The PNA in its emergency meeting held in Lahore on March 8, demanded the immediate and unconditional resignation of the Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, removal of the Chief Election Commissioner and the holding of fresh elections under the supervision of the judiciary and the army.¹⁷⁶ Bhutto, in a press conference on March 8 denied that there had

been any manipulation and characterized the elections as "free and fair". He said that it was a genuine landslide victory for the PPP and that the elections to the provincial assemblies would be held on schedule i.e., on March 10, notwithstanding the PNA's decision to boycott them. He warned that if the opposition tried to stir up agitation on the streets the government was quite capable of dealing with the situation.¹⁷⁷

The PNA in a bid to enforce their demands boycotted the provincial elections. Nevertheless, undaunted Bhutto went ahead with the provincial polls where, the PPP once again won handsomely. However, interestingly less than half of those who had voted two days earlier bothered to return to their polling stations.¹⁷⁸ On 11th March 1977, the PNA decided to launch a civil disobedience campaign in the major cities of Pakistan to protest against the wide spread electoral fraud that had been perpetrated on the nation.¹⁷⁹

Post-Election Protests and the PNA Movement March-July 1977

The PNA leadership in response to the election results launched a massive movement against the government. They protested that there had been a systematic plan to deny them their victory. Polling stations were alleged to have been closed for hours, ballot boxes removed at gun points, marked ballots found on streets and on women polling stations the officials cast the ballots of illiterate voters and identity checks were selectively made¹⁸⁰. Thus the PNA leadership insisted upon re-elections under the supervision of army and judiciary and the formation of a caretaker government.¹⁸¹

The PNA, on March 9, announced that their elected members to the NA would resign to pave the way for free and fair elections.¹⁸² The alliance called upon the people to stage a countrywide strike on March 11, and warned the government that if their demands were not met, they would organize protest processions from March 14, which would continue until the objectives were achieved.¹⁸³ The government, a day prior to the strike-day, re-imposed through out the country Section 144, for a period of two months. According to Section 144 an assembly of five or more than five persons, taking out processions and holding of meetings were strictly prohibited.¹⁸⁴ However, the strike call of PNA for March 11 produced a massive response in major cities including Karachi, Lahore, and Hyderabad. In Karachi, alone five persons were killed, while a procession led by Mufti Mahmood was tear gassed in Peshawar.¹⁸⁵ The demonstrators also tried to stop the rail traffic at many places and army was called to remove the mobs from the railway tracks.¹⁸⁶ After Friday prayers, in Lahore and Rawalpindi, the PNA workers defied Section 144, and took out processions, which were baton charged by the police. Members of the Lahore High Court Bar Association boycotted court proceedings and joined the processions. All the main business centers also remained close. According to PNA, about thousand people were arrested under the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) for defying Section

144, while the official figure was two hundred.¹⁸⁷ This successful strike gave a confidence to the PNA to continue its movement and another strike call was given for March 14, 1977. Chief Election Commissioner, Sajjad Ahmad Jan took notice of the PNA movement, and asked them to file election petitions, and assured to set aside the results in constituencies where irregularities were committed.¹⁸⁸ The PNA, however, embarked on tougher line and demanded fresh polls. Bhutto in his address to the nation on March 12 warned the PNA against the consequences of their civil disobedience movement. He also made an offer of dialogue to the opposition but clarified that elections were a "settled matter". He continued that if "you take the law into your hands, there will be war between you and me. May be I am myself a weak person, but make no mistake, this chair that I am occupying is not weak". In the end, he warned the people not to fall prey to the opposition, who wanted to kill "a few people", and incite violence.¹⁸⁹

The continuous refusal to accept the blatant failure, on the part of the government to hold fair elections, compelled the PNA to bring their demands to the streets. On March 12, the PNA Council of Action (COA) decided to start the countrywide demonstration from March 14, 1977, in case its demands for declaring the polls of March 7, null and void, were not accepted. Maulana Mufti Mahmood announced the decision and further said, "We will not talk to Mr. Bhutto in any circumstances. We simply demand his resignation."¹⁹⁰ Despite the strict measures of the government, the PNA was able to organize protest rallies and processions on March 14, 1977. The movement got momentum at various cities where the people were baton charged and tear gassed. In Multan, the police dragged away many of the processionists, stripped them of naked and gave them merciless beating.¹⁹¹ The Federal Security Force (FSF)¹⁹² and army supported the police action. The protestors burnt property at various places. Karachi was the main target of the protestors.¹⁹³ On March 15, there was a huge demonstration outside the Masjid-i-Shuhada in Lahore. The crowd was tear gassed and *lathi* charged by the police. When they took refuge inside the mosque, the troops swooped in with their boots on and *lathi* charged the people.¹⁹⁴

The PNA movement got momentum and it transcended protests against ballot rigging and objectives of fresh, free and fair elections. It encompassed constituents from diverse social, economic and political orientations to demonstrate against what was regarded as a dictatorial and corrupt regime. Bhutto had alienated most groups in the country. The professionals were disturbed by media censorship, the emasculation of the judiciary, the purges of the allegedly corrupt civil servants, and the insertion of unqualified PPP loyalists into powerful positions in bureaucracy. The business community was already opposed to Bhutto's regime because of nationalization and anti-capitalist propaganda by the government. Landowners were also disappointed because of reduction of land ceilings and corruption of the PPP functionaries with respect to the distribution of seed, fertilizers, water and agricultural loans. The peasants and urban labourers were unhappy that they were not given what they were promised by the PPP. Rampant

inflation, which consumed increased wages, was a common concern. The abolition of *Sardari* system had also alienated *Sardars* of tribal areas. Religious groups were angered by the decline in public morality and the dominance of what they perceived to be westernized secular elite. Students did not get what they had expected and were disappointed. The PPP members who had been dismissed or pressurized to resign were frustrated and wanted to avenge the betrayal of their socialist cause by what they considered an opportunist regime dedicated to maintenance and expansion of power. The PNA criticized Bhutto's promise of *Roti, Kapra Aur Makan* for everyone, by saying that "instead of bread, people got bullets, instead of clothing, they got a burial shroud, and instead of shelter they were given a burial site to shelter them for ever". They argued that Bhutto had only given a lip service to Islam and there was no change for the common people under his rule. The significance of these events were greatly magnified by the suddenly apparent gulf between the PNA expectations and the election return.¹⁹⁵

Bhutto and the PPP were branded *Kafirs* (infidels) by the *ulama* for the rigged elections and other anti-Islamic deeds.¹⁹⁶ A call was made to launch a *Jihad* against Bhutto's anti-Islamic regime, which would corrupt and destroy the whole nation if not removed.¹⁹⁷ It is interesting to note that the PNA leaders to arouse religious sentiments against Bhutto's regime used mosques and Madrassahs. The *Ulama* and the mosques increasingly played a central role in mass politics¹⁹⁸. The *Fatwas* (verdicts) were issued by *Ulama*, who accorded the PNA's agitational politics, the status of *Jihad*. The rallying cry of the PNA, influenced by the Islamic political parties, was to replace the regime of "Whisky party leader" under whom "Islam was in danger" with the pristine purity of "*Nizam-i-Mustafa or Nizam-i-Islam*". Some devout followers followed the dictates of their *Ulama* and went out with copies of the Holy Quran in their hands or strapped to their bodies prepared to be beaten or shot, thereby becoming martyrs in the cause of Islam, and earning their place in paradise.¹⁹⁹

Bhutto repeatedly offered to the PNA for a dialogue to resolve the growing crisis. However, his offers failed to cut the ice, and the movement continued. In the process between March 13 and 24, 1977, 8 letters were exchanged between the PNA president, Mufti Mahmood and Bhutto, followed by a letter of Mufti Mahmood to President Fazal Ellahi Chaudhry on March 24, 1977.²⁰⁰ The theme of Bhutto's letters was invitations to the PNA to a dialogue,²⁰¹ but the dialogues as well as electoral grievances were confined to the precincts of the constitution. He reiterated overwhelming "confidence from the electorate", and dubbed the PNA view of rigging as "false". He accused the PNA of releasing hate and anger in the country, and disputed the success of strike held on March 10, on the eve of provincial polls. He held that the arrested (PNA workers) were not "peaceful citizens."²⁰² Mufti Mahmood in his replies conveyed that PNA was not in favour of a dialogue, the term of which was not clear.²⁰³ The March 7 polls, he said were reduced to a complete farce due to rigging, and as a result the electorate successfully boycotted the provincial assemblies

polls. He demanded that fresh elections should be held through an administration having their full confidence.²⁹⁴ He described the offer of dialogue as fruitless in the presence of the stand that "election to the NA was a closed matter". He continued that honest polling would have rejected PPP, and given a clear verdict in favour of the PNA. Mufu accused Bhutto of misleading the public through these letters, and committing violence against them. He denied any chances of just, fair and impartial polls under the PPP regime, and its anti-democratic policies. In this connection he cited curbs on press, and partisan use of Radio and TV to vilify opposition, suppression of civil rights, rendering the judiciary helpless and various political murders which took place. He castigated the application of Defence of Pakistan Rules against opposition, oppression against lawyers, teachers, students and peasants, firing on industrial labour, fabricated cases against families of political leaders and workers and crippling fundamental rights under the cloak of emergency. He also pointed out the letting loose of a reign of terror in Balochistan, use of state exchequer to further party objectives, local transfer of public servants to facilitate electoral irregularities, admission of ECP about a large electoral irregularities, price hike and corruption. The PNA reiterated their resolve not to accept anything short of Bhutto's resignation, independent ECP and fair conduct of elections with the assistance of judiciary and armed forces.²⁹⁵ Since there was no meeting point between the two sides, the exchange of letters proved a failure, to diffuse the complex political crisis.

Meanwhile the ECP notified the results on March 21 and the NA was scheduled to meet on March 26, 1977. The PNA rejected to accept the newly elected assembly as lawful representative of the nation. Mufu Mahmood conditioned the acceptance of government's offer of dialogue by them with acceptance of their three demands; resignation of Bhutto, appointment of non-controversial ECP and judiciary cum-army supervised elections. He continued that the NA meeting on March 26 will have no legal status, and the PM it will install²⁹⁶. The PNA issued a call for the nationwide strike on March 26. However, on March 25 almost all frontline PNA leaders including Mufu Mahmood, Mian Tufail Muhammad, Malik Mohammad Qasim, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and Begum Nasim Wali Khan were arrested. However, the NA met with all the elected on the PNA ticket, abstaining.²⁹⁷

On March 28, Bhutto was elected as PM for a second 5-year term. In his speech on this occasion, he once again invited the Opposition to talks, and reiterated that the NA will not be dissolved before its term. After arrests of the PNA leadership, the CAC met at Lahore on April 1, 1977 and elected Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as Acting President of the PNA. The second-line PNA leadership continued the movement against the PPP government, and later the campaign disseminated to the rural side of the country where processions were taken out and arrests courted. By the end of April, even the second line of the PNA was sent behind the bars. However, as Professor Ghafoor opined that since the Alliance was self-sufficient in term of workers, so the arrests never created a vacuum to provide leadership for the PNA.²⁹⁸ During this

period, Bhutto announced prohibition of intoxicants, banned gambling (in all its forms), and night clubs and reconstituted the Islamic Ideological Council (offering its membership to Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Mawdudi and Maulana Noorani) with a mandate to propose Islamization of laws in six months.²⁰⁹ However, these steps could not elevate his stature. Six weeks of the PNA mass movement had created an acute political crisis, which was getting still acute and both the parties were heading towards diametrically opposite directions. Arrests, processions, martial law, ban on press, baton charging, tear gassing and diversion of nation to the foreign news media especially BBC were salient features of the grave malady the country was engulfing.

Bhutto's own political camp too witnessed a crevice. Secretary General of the party Dr. Mubashar Hasan left the party. Khursheed Hasan Mir Federal Minister and Taj Muhammad Langah, once Deputy Secretary General of the party from the Punjab supported the demand of opposition for a new election. The regime legitimacy further eroded by the resignation of Sardar Shaukat Hayat and few other members of the NA, as well as the PPP members of the Punjab Assembly from the party and assemblies in sympathy with the protest movement.²¹⁰ Pakistan's ambassador to Spain Air Marshal Abdur Rahim Khan resigned against what he termed as Bhutto's "oppressive and dictatorial regime."²¹¹

The PNA movement of mass rallies gained momentum with throngs of cheering, chanting crowds vowing to defy the unfairly elected and vicious regime. The PNA movement entered a new phase on April 10, after adoption of its CAC resolution to the effect that MNAs and MPAs elected on the PPP tickets should be boycotted socially, and to accept nothing short of fresh elections to the NA.²¹² A call was also made to the people not to pay taxes, revenues, custom duty, excise, income tax, professional and property taxes.²¹³

On the other hand, the government adopted other tactics to level the score. On April 13, it lifted Section 144, with the objective of taking out its own supporters on the streets as a sort of counter veiling mob. This led to a series of armed clashes between the PPP and the PNA supporters with the riotous mob, attacking, burning and looting the public and private property.²¹⁴ Bhutto in the first phase tried to contain the agitation with force. The PSF and the police were fully used by the government. The Army was called to bolster the civil authorities. However, the situation had gone out of control. Both sides i.e. the PPP and the PNA were too adamant in their attitudes to reach any solution, and the agitation continued against Bhutto. The PPP failed to show the required strength and could not face the agitational politics of the PNA. The way was thus paved for partial imposition of martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore on April 21, 1977, which was extended to Lyalpur (now Faisalabad) on April 22, 1977.²¹⁵ On April 24, Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the acting president, vice president Jan Muhammad Abbasi and secretary general Malik Wazir Ali were

arrested under the DPR.²¹⁶ Due to the arrests of these moderate people, the movement went directly into the hands of the people and thus it became almost impossible now to control the agitation. The opposition movement against Bhutto forced him to invite the military back into the political arena. However, the Army's appearance on the streets too did not daunt the forces of the opposition. The opposition leaders said if they surrendered to Bhutto, then they would suffer for all times. A little more suffering at present time would guarantee a better future.²¹⁷ When Bhutto failed to defeat his opponents by intimidation and force, he attempted to discredit them in order to win the support of the people. Bhutto commented on this political topsy-turvy in his address to the parliament on April 28, 1977. He said that the PNA had nothing to do with the so-called rigging of the elections or *Shariah*- the slogan raised by the PNA to arouse passions. He said elephants (big powers) had long memories and all they wanted, at this stage, was to remove him from office because of their dislike, of what he had done to earn for Pakistan a honourable place in the world and to make it strong and prosperous. However, he added, he could not leave it in the hands of PNA's "*Ghundas*-vandalism or foreign intervention." Bhutto further said he did not protest when the other day two Americans talking on telephone shouted, "The party is over, the party is over. He is gone". On the contrary, he added, he held a dinner for the outgoing American ambassador. However, Bhutto said, "The party is not over and it will not be over till my mission is completed for this great nation". He asserted this was not a *desi* (indigenous) conspiracy, but an international conspiracy. "Let me make it quite clear for history" he added. He pointed out that this huge and colossal international conspiracy was against the Islamic State of Pakistan and it was his duty to make it clear to the people. The PM said "blood hounds" were after his blood, because he symbolized stability in Pakistan whose "tragedy or blessings" spring from the "key strategic position" it occupies in this region. He said these elephant had disliked Pakistan hosting the second Islamic Summit Conference in 1974. He also referred in this connection to Pakistan's agreement with France for the purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant and said that in spite of his repeated assurance that his government did not want to make atom bomb, Pakistan's right to acquire the capability to make advance in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was being questioned.²¹⁸

Two days later on April 30, Bhutto drove in an open jeep to the metropolitan Rawalpindi near American Centre Library. He showed a letter from US secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cyrus Vance, to the emotional crowd to prove his contention that the entire move of the opposition was US-sponsored.²¹⁹ The attempt of Bhutto failed. The PNA rejected his thesis and instead, on that very day the PNA moved a long march on Rawalpindi, which was baton-charged. Soon after, Bhutto called on the PNA acting president Pir Pagara in Hotel Intercontinental Rawalpindi where he was interned. In his hour-long meeting, he discussed with him prospects of negotiations with the PNA. Later, he met Mufu Mahmood, hospitalized in Combined Military Hospital (CMH) Rawalpindi and held similar discussions.²²⁰ However, Bhutto tried to show his control over the situation especially through the announcement of the Chiefs of Army, Navy and

Air on April 27 about their support for his government.²²¹ He was however, convinced that the PNA movement would not fizzle out. In the meanwhile another attempt to further the PNA objectives was made by Asghar Khan, who addressed a letter to the Chiefs of staff and officers of the Armed forces. He exhorted them not to obey the orders of the Bhutto's government as it was no longer a lawful government and he was ruling the country on the basis of rigging in 1977 polls.²²² The letter of Asghar Khan caused a stir in the ranks of the government. They regarded the letter a direct invitation to the army to intervene. Asghar Khan clarified his position by saying, "it is not an invitation to any body. I have always been saying that the job of the armed forces is to obey only "lawful" commands, as they have taken an oath to this effect. Now the word "lawful" has been removed. I stand by what I have written. This is for all times, yesterday, today and tomorrow."²²³ The letter written by Asghar Khan was something new in the political history of Pakistan.

Quest for Settlement

In fact, Bhutto believed that the agitational movement could not be sustained for a long period and that he would be able to curb it. Moreover, he relied heavily on the military support in order to quell the agitation. However, these expectations of Bhutto did not materialize and he was convinced that the PNA movement would not fizzle out. Therefore, he gave a serious thought to resolve the matter through political medium. Cognizant of the Islamic character of the PNA and its religious appeal to the masses, Bhutto sought the help of Muslim leaders to break the deadlock with his opposition. The involvement of the foreign hand as alleged by Bhutto drew the attention of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Thus, leaders of friendly countries including King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Fahd, UAE President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan and foreign minister Ahmad Al-Khalifa, Libyan foreign minister Ali Tariqi and the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chief Yassar Arafat, Hani Al Hassan made collective efforts to bring the government and the opposition to negotiation table. As a result, the efforts of Saudi Envoy Sheikh Riaz Al-Khatib bore fruit. The government managed to bring all the PNA leaders to Sihala Rest House, 15 Kilometres away from Rawalpindi, which was declared as sub-jail, and a formal dialogue commenced there.²²⁴

On May 3, 1977, Mufti Mahmood communicated a set of four proposals about immediate steps to be taken by Bhutto administration namely; re-constitution of the ECP, dissolution of assemblies, administrative steps to be taken in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, and, finally and resignation of Bhutto.²²⁵ Professor Ghafoor said the PNA also communicated to Bhutto that they would adopt a lenient view if at least their demand about holding of elections was accepted.²²⁶ The acting president of the PNA Pir of Pagara stated that the opposition had reduced their demand from Bhutto's full turban to its half; perhaps he meant to say that the demand for his resignation has been dropped.²²⁷ The PNA plan annoyed Bhutto and as a result a fresh wave of arrests came all over the country. In Lahore Mian Mahmood Ali Qasuri, Rana

Khudadad Khan, Chaudhry Muhammad Aslam Saleem, Habib Jalib, Mawlana Muhammad Ajmal and Malik Muhammad Akbar Saqi were arrested from the PNA office.²²⁸

The top PNA leaders released the proposals of the PNA to the press in the shape of 32-points for the resolution of the political crisis in the country, on May 5, 1977.²²⁹ These proposals were in five parts, beginning with the steps to be taken immediately such as lifting of martial law from major cities, lifting of emergency and Section 144, release of political prisoners, dissolution of special courts and removal of press curbs. The second part proposed the dissolution of the National and Provincial assemblies within seven days after an agreement was reached. The third part was related to the appointment of the new Chief Election Commissioner and constitution of new Election Commission by mutual consent. The fourth part was mainly concerned with the administrative steps. In the last part, the PNA proposed that Bhutto should resign immediately from the office of the P.M. after the dissolution of the NA and the caretaker government should be set by the President.²³⁰ Among the new demands, the PNA also called for the dissolution of the AJK assembly and the induction of a new caretaker president there in consultation with the AJKMC.²³¹ In response to the demands, Bhutto remarked, "the programme is even longer than the 14-points programme of the Quaid-i-Azam". He said that if the opposition would bring so many points, the whole thing would be complicated.²³² He urged the PNA to stop issuing calls for further demonstrations and reduce their 32-points, and remarked that the opposition had brought up the whole lot problems of the thirty years history of the country.²³³

The PNA observed a countrywide strike on May 9, 1977. In the meanwhile, the Saudi ambassador Riaz-ul Khatib continued his efforts to bring the PPP and the PNA to the negotiation table and on May 11, 1977, Bhutto went to Sihala to meet the leaders of the alliance. He was hopeful about the outcome of the talks and showed flexibility about the detained people.²³⁴ After the meeting, Mufti Mahmood addressed a letter to Bhutto, which sealed the fate of feeble dialogue. Writing to Bhutto from Sihala Camp Jail on May 12, 1977, Mufti Mahmood referred his (Bhutto) admission of "grave irregularities" and also that of the CEC in a published report circulated by Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) a government news agency to the effect that irregularities have been committed on such a large scale that scrutiny of particular cases is of no avail and that the only solution is holding of fresh general elections in the country.²³⁵ He denied the PM's charge on the PNA's involvement in international conspiracy against the country in his April 28, 1977 address to the NA and complained of imprisonment and humiliation of their political workers including women. He also charged the "so-called law enforcing agencies" of murder of a large number of innocent men, women and children including ghastly beating to death of a woman with rifle butts in Mirpur Khas in Sindh. Based on the above provocative acts, Mufti Mahmood wrote that the PNA has decided to close the portal of dialogue unless their demands were accepted.²³⁶

The PNA's stand moved the Bhutto administration to test a second option. The parliament met on May 16 and the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Bill 1977 was adopted. It provided for a referendum in favour, or in opposition of Bhutto. If the Prime Minister could not capture more than half of the total polled votes, it would be deemed as his resignation.²³⁷ Earlier the parliament adopted a motion reposing confidence in his leadership. The move of referendum did not attract much interest from the PNA, and it was shelved. This was followed by the dispersal of the PNA leaders to far off prisons except Mufti Mahmood and Pir Pagara who were interned at Rawalpindi. The situation was now very ambiguous. All the opposition leaders were behind the bars in different parts of the country. To contact all these leaders and to end the agitation and bring the opposition to negotiation table, the government sought the help of Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan of Azad Kashmir. He himself belonged to the PNA and was in jail but was released on May 19, 1977. He agreed to set out a long journey in a government provided helicopter²³⁸. The mission of Sardar Qayum was encouraging, only Asghar Khan was against the talks with the government. He was hopeful about the results of his letter to the Defence Forces. He preferred the agitation in place of dialogue. But Sardar Sahib warned him against the army intervention and persuaded him for talks.²³⁹ Finally, the ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan, the Foreign Ministers of UAE, Kuwait, Libya and the mission of Sardar Qayum succeeded and they persuaded the antagonistic parties to come to the negotiation table, to resolve their differences in the spirit of Islamic solidarity and brotherhood. These efforts brought both the PPP and the PNA to the negotiating table after 77 days of agitational politics.

Maulana Kausar Niazi, PPP Information Secretary and Federal Minister announced on May 30, 1977 that talks between the ruling party and the PNA would take place on June 3, 1977 at 4 P.M. The PNA had already suspended the agitational demonstration from May 26, 1977. The stalemate broke with a letter of Mufti Mahmood dated May 27, 1977 to Bhutto. He asked the PM to create conducive atmosphere for the opening of dialogue by releasing the political detainees, lifting of curbs on press and lifting of martial law in Lahore.²⁴⁰ As a result, Mian Tufail Muhammad, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi, Asghar Khan and his brother Tariq Khan, Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Professor Ghaffoor Ahmad, and Maulana Noorani were released. The detention of Begum Mian Tufail Muhammad, Begum Asghar Khan, Sahibzadi Mahmooda Begum, and Begum Muhammad Ashraf was also withdrawn. On June 2, Lahore High Court gave a judgement declaring martial law as extra-constitutional and the assigning of judicial duties to Army officers.²⁴¹ The decision came as a moral victory to the PNA, when they went to the negotiation table with Bhutto.

The PNA agitation from March to the end of May 1977 had attained such intensity and sweep never witnessed before, in any political movement in Pakistan. The official figures reflected a formidable movement against which brute forces could not have been used indefinitely without the risk of civil war.

Official figures indicated that the nationwide agitation led to 22 persons being killed and 369 injured up to March 7, and 242 killed and 1227 injured thereafter.²⁴² In addition, nine persons of the security forces were killed and another 536 injured. No less than 16,863 persons were arrested, 4290 processions were taken out by members of the general public, 262 by women, 95 by lawyers, 19 by *ulama*, 283 by students and 68 by children. 1623 vehicles were destroyed and the same was the case with 18 installations, 42 stores, 31 wine shops, 7 hotels, 58 bank branches, 11 cinemas, 7 factories, 23 railway carriages, 57 offices and 38 shops. Overall, the national economy came to a halt, during the summer months when the flames of violence spread all over the land.²⁴³ The atmosphere was vitiated by recurrent clashes between demonstrators and law enforcing agencies on the one hand, and between the militant followers of the rival camps on the other. Another disturbing development was that Ghulam Mustafa Khar, known for his preference for the use of force, resigned from the PNA and rumours were there of his return to the PPP which eventually proved true.²⁴⁴ In this tense and explosive atmosphere, Bhutto decided to resume negotiation with the PNA leaders at an amazingly leisurely pace. The negotiation spread over twelve sessions from 3rd June to 4th July 1977 to resolve the crisis the nation was suffering as an offshoot of the March 7, 1977 elections.

The dialogue started with a commitment from both sides to reach a solution in a positive fashion. The PNA team consisted of Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad while the government side was represented by Bhutto, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada.²⁴⁵

In the first session both sides expressed their determination to come to a settlement as early as possible. It was also decided that Maulana Kausar Niazi and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad would brief the reporters after every round of talks. Both the sides appealed to the people to suspend holding meetings and taking out processions while the talks were going on.²⁴⁶ During the second round of talks on June 4, 1977 Bhutto presented two formulas; "re-polling" only for those candidates who had contested the 7th and 10th March election to the National and Provincial Assemblies, and "re-election" by inviting fresh applications from the candidates so as to allow them to start their electioneering campaign.²⁴⁷ Since the PNA had boycotted the whole electoral process in Balochistan and the PPP had won 19 uncontested seats of the NA, so the PNA rejected the proposals.

In the third session held on June 7, 1977, a two members committee with Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada was nominated to plan a comprehensive programme for re-election²⁴⁸. A legal committee was also set up to assist Professor Ghafoor and Pirzada, under the leadership of Mahmud Ali Qasori.²⁴⁹ Bhutto also showed his willingness to hold elections in November 1977 and offered five ministries to the PNA candidates during the interim period, on June 9, at the end of fourth round of discussions. However, the PNA team wanted fifty percent representation in the cabinet.²⁵⁰ Later on, the PNA team dropped the idea of a coalition government. At the end of the fifth round of talks on June 10,

certain differences over the package remained. The differences were related to the arrangement, governing the conduct of fresh elections.²⁵¹ The government-PNA dialogue reached a crucial stage after the seventh round of talks on June 13. The PNA leaders demanded elections before August 14, 1977.²⁵² The government was not ready to hold elections before November 1977. A deadlock ensued again as no one was ready to change its stand.

In the 9th session of the negotiation held on June 15, 1977, the two sides reached an agreement on all basic issues. These included; general elections will be held in October 1977; the provincial assemblies polls will precede the NA polls; the state of emergency will be lifted on the day of signing of accord for which June 20 was agreed; special tribunals (including Hyderabad Tribunal trying Wali Khan) will be disbanded; Army will be recalled from Balochistan and constitutional amendments containing fundamental rights will be rendered in-effective. Other points of agreement were; Newspapers will be granted freedom; PNA will get equal publicity through Radio and T.V; an Implementation Council with five members each from the PNA and government will be created for monitoring the entire arrangement and in case of differences of opinions on the functioning of Implementation Council, final arbitration will rest in a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court. It was decided that Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada would finalize draft of the final accord.²⁵³ It was announced that the sub-committee would sign accord within a few days after its drafting. It was really a matter of great satisfaction for all but very difficult too. Because the words of the final accord were to be translated into an action to implement the accord whole heartedly. It was not an easy task.²⁵⁴ When both sides had agreed on an accord, another more mysterious delaying tactic on the part of Bhutto occurred, when, at a delicate stage of negotiations, he suddenly left the country on an unscheduled visit of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Iran.²⁵⁵ He said that after his return the accord would be signed with the opposition. It would give the legal experts more time to make a good draft of the accord, he added.²⁵⁶ It was to be a multi-purpose visit. Firstly, he wanted to express his gratitude to the brotherly countries for their deep concern over the crisis in Pakistan. Secondly, he wanted to show the Americans that he had successfully controlled the internal crisis. According to the American press, Bhutto had made this tour to collect funds for the nuclear programme.²⁵⁷ Other motive was to show military generals that he enjoyed great popularity internationally and lastly, by his tour he wanted to impress the PNA leaders that he had not given much importance to them and he knew how to deal with the opposition.²⁵⁸ Fazal Elahi, the former President of Pakistan said about the final phase of negotiations that an accord was ready to be signed but Bhutto went off to the Middle East.²⁵⁹ According to him, Bhutto was playing for time and his motives were to engineer some kind of disagreement among the components of the PNA as well as to muster support for his party either by direct participation of people with People's Party or through the use of force by the goons of the party who were now being collected and armed by the former Governor of Punjab Ghulam Mustafa Khar.²⁶⁰

The Final Phase of the Dialogue and Imposition of Martial Law

Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Pirzada could not complete their assignment owing to differences and as a result, the dialogue suffered a deadlock. The point of difference has been the PNA's demand to give constitutional protection to the accord to which Pirzada did not agree.²⁶¹ Meanwhile the PNA and the PPP drafted their own proposals, which came up for consideration before the 11th session on June 25,²⁶² held after the return of Bhutto from his foreign tour. In this session, the PNA draft was discussed thoroughly and the opposition team clarified the objections raised by the government, but the government was not satisfied and Bhutto presented a revised draft of the accord. On June 26, the PNA Central Council met and compared their draft with that of the PPP. As a result, the PNA prepared a new and "final" draft. The draft was accorded approval on June 27 and Mufi Mahmood was authorized to sign it with the government "as it is", otherwise the matter would have to be re-referred to the Central Council again.²⁶³

The 12th and final round of talks was held in two sessions. The first session was also attended by the Chiefs of the three armed services and explained the army's position on Balochistan issue, although the PNA had objected to the Army's involvement in the talks. The entry of army in this crucial juncture showed its great interest in the political problems of the country.²⁶⁴ The second session commenced on July 1, 1977 at 8.00 p.m. and lasted till 6:30 a.m. of July 2, 1977. Both the sides were claimed sincerity for an amicable settlement. They reached an agreement on all issues, large and small. They agreed on dissolution of assemblies on July 15, 1977, polling for NA will be held on October 6 and that of provincial assemblies on October 8. For its implementation formation of a council was agreed upon which will enjoy powers under this accord for free, just and impartial polls which are usually exercised by Governors, provincial governments, president and federal government. The agreement was also on it that no such law, ordinance custom or order will be issued that relates to election, or Implementation Council unless it is approved by it and the council will be competent to proceed against any federal or provincial government employee found interfering in the implementation of this accord, impeding the conduct of free elections. It further said that the Prime Minister will be bound to ensure implementation of the council's decisions. Appointment of new Governors will be made with mutual accord. The prisoners and detainees will be released excepting those facing trial in Hyderabad Tribunal. The state of emergency will be lifted on the signing of the accord, and its re-enforcement will be subject to the approval of the council. Finally the appointment of members of the ECP will be made in consultation with the PNA and the ECP will enjoy sufficient powers for the conduct of just elections.²⁶⁵

The government side also agreed on dispensing with the membership of Senators elected on the basis of March 1977 Polls; eliminating Constitutional amendments jeopardizing fundamental rights and application of Defence of Pakistan Rules on political activities only; financial assistance of families whose

members were injured or killed during the March 1977 post-election movement. No ban would be placed on political activities and curbs on press will be removed along with judicious use of TV and Radio. The ECP will declare results. Licenses of prohibited bore arms will be cancelled which are issued between 1972 till date. Another agreement was on proceeding against officers and representatives of the ECP found involved in election irregularities. The agreement subordinated Federal Security Force to General Headquarters (of Army). It was also decided that Mufi Mahmood would chair the Implementation Council in the absence of Bhutto.²⁶⁶

The above draft agreement caused various amendments in the PNA draft. In the preamble, the PPP proposed addition of "PM of Pakistan" with his name where the parties to the accord were specified. Their other amendments pertained to the removal of paragraphs having mention of "rigging in election" and adding the name of PLO to the roll of friendly countries who arranged the dialogue. The amendments in the text included provision for presidential rule in the provinces after dissolution of assemblies, revising time schedule for ending membership of Senate, return of Army from Balochistan in 45 days instead of 30 days, excluding Hyderabad Tribunal from the scope of clauses governing abolition of all special courts and tribunals, conditioning the revival of newspapers declarations on submission of application, subordinating the FSI to ministry of defence instead of General Headquarters and finally inclusion of entire arrangements (with the PNA) in the constitution by way of a temporary article-145A which will become in-effective on the election of the PM.²⁶⁷

The PNA negotiators Mufi Mahmood and Professor Ghafoor were unanimous that the accord satisfied their all-basic demands and the amendments proposed by Bhutto were of minor nature. Mufi Mahmood recommended to the PNA Council to accept the amendments, which will not result in any deviation from their principled position.²⁶⁸ Similar viewpoint was expressed by Professor Ghafoor and Maulana Niazi.²⁶⁹ With this, the phase of negotiated settlement of the grave crisis, Pakistan was suffering from, came to an end and the reins of nation's fate passed on to the hands of what Professor Ghafoor described "stupids" to let them demonstrate their "stupidity".²⁷⁰ Mufi Mahmood's recommendation to the Council to accept minor amendments of Bhutto fell on deaf ears. Asghar Khan was the first to reprimand the PNA negotiators for having exceeded their mandate by receiving Bhutto's amendments. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Begum Wali Khan used equally aggressive tone to denounce the PNA team.²⁷¹ Asghar Khan, who had made a call to the Armed Forces Chiefs, assured the PNA Council to guarantee that after the imposition of martial law, army will hold elections in 90 days.²⁷² Later Mazari, Begum Wali Khan and Asghar Khan collectively asked Mufi Mahmood not to enter into any undertaking with Bhutto and let the Army step in which will hold elections in 90 days. Mufi Mahmood disagreed with the wisdom of this

assessment.²⁷³ According to Kausar Niazi, he (Mufti Mahmood) told them that if the Army stepped in they will eliminate Bhutto and the PNA will get nothing.²⁷⁴ Asghar Khan reacted at this with contempt.

This shows a trait of the political alliances having heterogeneous political parties that how few components can pressurise the alliance internally by maintaining their extremist views. The major parties just for maintaining unity of the alliance normally try to accommodate such parties to the extent possible. Asghar Khan, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Begum Wali Khan they all fell in that category where they without caring for the gravity of the situation stick to their approach and the remaining components of the alliance accepted their viewpoint as a policy of the alliance. However, the conciliatory persuasions of Khan Ashraf, Shah Ahmad Noorani, Mian Tufail Muhammad and Pir Pagara prevailed and it was agreed to prepare a fresh draft for presentation to the government. The new nine points draft included; (i) mention of federal government, the PPP and the PNA as parties, and no room for the addition PM of Pakistan, (ii) The governors would enjoy executive and legislative powers, and they will be changed only through mutual agreement, (iii) The Implementation Council must have a constitutional protection, (iv) The FSF would be placed under the authority of the GHQ and not under that of ministry of defence, (v) Special tribunals would follow the ordinary court room procedure, (vi) Appointment of the members of ECP will be made with mutual consent, (vii) Preparation of draft of amendments to the constitution with consent of the PNA, prior to signing of the accord; and (viii) Pointing out of relevant laws which necessitate amendments for implementation of the accord, (ix) Section 28 of the first draft which was cancelled by the government would be accepted.²⁷⁵

Analysis of the new changes proposed by the PNA show nothing substantial except an effort of the extremists section within the alliance who's personal hatred against Bhutto demanded from them to get satisfied only if they disgrace him by compelling him to accept each and every demand of them no matter how senseless that is. The PNA negotiators reluctantly, as Professor Ghafoor admits, went to the PM House at 9.45 p.m. on July 3 to open a fresh account. Mufti Mahmood pointed out that final acceptance of the accord was conditional on the approval of the PNA council. The two sides met and the matter was adjourned apparently for consultation of Prime Minister with his aides but practically forever. On the morning of July 4, Bhutto addressed a press conference and criticized the PNA coming up with a fresh list after acceptance of all of their demands including amendments in the constitution, which was to him not short of self-guillotining of the NA members.²⁷⁶ With this, the negotiation went to the arena of an impasse. Prof. Ghafoor quoting Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Chief Minister Sindh, says, like the PNA, a lobby had become active in the Bhutto cabinet the chief protagonist of which appeared to be Abdul Hafeez Pirzada. This lobby was against signing of the accord with the PNA²⁷⁷. Kausar Niazi has also expressed a similar viewpoint about Pirzada.²⁷⁸

The PNA hardliners having finished their job now the ball was in the court of the PPP cabinet colleagues. Kausar Niazi writes, in the cabinet meeting on July 4, the PNA draft was discussed and he (Niazi), Muntaz Ali Bhutto and Jatoi argued in favour of its acceptance. Even at the last minute Pirzada opposed but Bhutto reprimanded him sternly saying, "Hafeez shut up. Enough is enough. I want to finish it."²⁷⁹ Thus, the PM reviewed his decision and announced at a press conference at 11.30 p.m. on July 4, 1977 to sign the accord tomorrow i.e. July 5, 1977²⁸⁰. By about the same time after the press conference was over, General Zia promulgated martial law.²⁸¹

Professor Ghafoor narrates, continuing mistrust against each other matured in the breakdown of talks. At this some leading political leaders, foreign and national dailies proposed to conglomerate the PPP and the PNA leaders under a roof which should be locked from outside and not opened until they reach a final agreement. Some innocent beings were happy that the Armed Forces might have accepted this piece of advice. History, however, proved that mid-night of July 4-5, 1977 was the climax of "stupidities" as Professor Ghafoor rightly diagnosed, which marred the prospects of democracy for over a decade. The political leaders could have avoided the imposition of Martial law, had the rigid stands from some of the members of both side would have not been taken. Both the sides had made it a point of their ego and prestige, not to soften their stands. This indicates the lack of political foresight on the part of both the PPP and the PNA's leadership.

After six years of Bhutto's rule i.e. Dec 1971-july 1977, the army once again had to step in to politics. Bhutto was accused of bringing the army back to the public corridors to maintain law and order particularly in Balochistan. Nearly all the opposition leaders welcomed the imposition of Martial law. They considered it as "unwanted but un-avoidable act" because at all costs they wanted to get rid of Bhutto's regime. Mian Tufail Muhammad, Amir of the JI, while welcoming the army for their stepping in, said that the country was standing on the verge of civil war and the army was the only force to save it.²⁸² Maulana Mufti Mahmood lauded the sincere efforts of Gen. Zia for the restoration of Islamic order in the country. He prayed for the success of Zia in his mission and appealed to the people to co-operate with him.²⁸³ The Pakistan Bar Council Lahore also passed a resolution assuring full support to the new administration.²⁸⁴ And finally the Supreme Court of Pakistan also accepted the legality of the martial law under "the Doctrine of Necessity."²⁸⁵ As per their declaration, the military government had chalked out its programme for holding free and impartial elections and had initiated necessary steps in this regard, though this proved to be a programme of empty promises as the promised elections never took place in the eleven years rule of Zia instead of 90 days. The Pakistan Peoples Party had also decided to participate in the elections. However, during this period, Bhutto was arrested in the murder case of Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan. On the other hand, some politicians were strongly demanding the task of implementation of the accountability process before holding the

elections. The CMLA himself said in an interview with the *Urdu Digest* that "the disease which he thought was only a boil; it turned out to be a cancer."²⁸⁶ In fact it was Pir Pagara, president of the PML, who had first demanded accountability of the former PM, ZA Bhutto and his colleagues, and then the elections be held. The PNA Chief Mufti Mahmood also stressed accountability before polls. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, president of the NDP also shared the same opinion.²⁸⁷ Asghar Khan also demanded that the fate of those politicians must be decided first who were required for trials. He said that it could be completed within three or four months. Abdul Wali Khan also asked for *Ihtisab*, accountability.²⁸⁸

Immediately after the imposition of Martial Law, it was reported that Asghar Khan intends to leave the PNA. However, he said that he would meet other Tehrik's leaders for consultation. He further said that he sided with the PNA just to remove Bhutto and the purpose had been achieved.²⁸⁹ At last on November 10, 1977, in a letter to Mufti Mahmood, Asghar Khan informed him of his decision i.e. leaving the PNA formally. To him "... the alliance in the present shape lacks the capability to fulfill the aspirations of the people and of forming a government that would be stable."²⁹⁰ The JUP (Noorani) left the PNA on May 26, 1978 due to minor differences with the alliance. Maulana Noorani termed the PNA leadership incapable and unconstitutional.²⁹¹ On August 16, 1978, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, the NDP Chief, also decided to leave the PNA, and explained his party's policy, that it would not oppose the government composed of political elements.²⁹²

In March 1978, Zia government invited some politicians to join the "National" government on the condition that the representatives of all the major political parties should be included in it. Mufti Mahmood, the chief of the PNA sharply criticized this condition and said, "We will never join a government which may have individuals like Kausar Niazi and others, who were a party to the crimes perpetrated by Bhutto's government."²⁹³ The PML, a component of the PNA on the other hand appreciated this proposal and started discussing ways and means to form the government. Nawabzada Nasrullah opposed this proposal from the beginning and had been publicly stressing that the military government should announce fresh schedule for holding elections as soon as possible and transfer the authority to the elected representatives. TI too refused to join such an "unrepresentative" government. In this connection, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan had mediatory talks with various political leaders but could not evolve a formula on which all the parties were unanimous in forming a "National" government. When this did not succeed, the idea of forming a coalition government was dropped down.

The PNA in one of its formal meeting at Lahore passed a resolution that no political party would join the government in its individual capacity. A letter stipulating the conditions, on which the PNA could join the government, was sent to Zia the CMLA. The process of negotiations with the regime started once

again and eventually the PNA joined the government.²⁹⁴ Twenty one Federal Minister and three Ministers of State were inducted in the cabinet. No representation was given to the Khaksar Tehrik. It was decided that the Tehrik be given representation in the provinces. Zia wanted the inclusion of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as a Federal Minister but he refused.²⁹⁵ In a meeting of the central council of the PNA it was decided that the component parties of the PNA would refrain from individual political activities. For political goals and activities, only the PNA platform will be utilized and in individual party meetings, the political problems will not be discussed. Mufti Mahmood made it clear that all the political parties in the PNA could participate only in non-political activities. They will not have separate manifestoes or any election manifesto. It was decided in the said meeting that any party if desirous of rendering political advises can do it only under the umbrella of the PNA. It was also decided that those who are supporting the cause of the PNA and do not belong to any political party, will be made members of the PNA. A committee was formed to formulate ways to recruit members and other relevant matters. The committee included Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan (PNL) and Habibullah Sa'adi. It was decided in a meeting that the 9 stars flag of the PNA will not be changed irrespective of the members of the parties joining or leaving the PNA. Similarly, the unanimously agreed manifesto of the PNA will remain the same.²⁹⁶

Differences between the PNA and the Martial Law Government

The martial law regime after consolidating its power informed the PNA leaders that the interim government would be sacked before the polls. This and some other issues were annoying to the PNA ministers. The leaders reached a consensus that it would be made impossible for them to keep smooth relations with the Zia regime. Eventually they decided not to cooperate with the Martial Law authorities anymore and resigned the ministries on April 21, 1979, only 17 days after the execution of Bhutto in the Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan's murder case.²⁹⁷ The Martial Law authorities under Zia announced that prior to the general elections, elections to the local bodies would held. The government announced that they would be holding the general elections in October 1979. Mufti Mahmood reacted and said it in strong words that "We will not allow holding of the local bodies elections."²⁹⁸ On the other hand Pir Pagara was optimistic about the steps taken by Zia, while Mufti Mahmood was critical about worsening law and order situation and continuous ban on political activities. He also stressed on parliamentary form of government.²⁹⁹ Despite the opposition from some prominent parties of the PNA, the government held the local bodies' elections. This was the first and fundamental difference, which emerged between the government and the PNA. About the same time, towards the end of July 1979, Zia government sent its proposals regarding proportional representation to all the political parties individually. The regime did not consider the PNA as a single party and thus sent proposals on the proportional representation individually to all the PNA components, thereby making their existence "more important". This was another serious matter and was discussed in one of the

crucial meetings of PNA. There occurred acute differences over the question of proportional representation in the said meeting held at Lahore on August 18, 1979.³⁰¹ Mufti Mahmood and Mian Tufail were in favour of proportional representation while Nasrullah Khan, Khan Ashraf and Pir Pagara opposed it. However, eventually the proposal of proportional representation was unanimously turned down. Mufti Mahmood later informed President Zia about the unanimous decision of the PNA in this particular connection.³⁰¹

In September 1979, the Zia regime made an announcement regarding the registration of the political parties and made it clear that the party which did not get registered would not be eligible for participation in the elections. Most of the parties were unanimous that this condition was an insult to the political parties and must be withdrawn. The PNA also held several meetings but no consensus was arrived at.³⁰² On September 2, 1979, the PNA Central Council met at Lahore and decided against the registration of the political parties and demanded the withdrawal of this condition and also decided not to take part in the elections.³⁰³ Some parties including TI, PML (Qayum), and JUP (Noorani) applied for registration. The Jama'at clarified its position by stating that although the Jama'at stand was that they did not want to be a party to the postponement of the elections and would do their utmost so that the elections be held on the due date i.e. 17th November 1979. If this aim could be achieved by means of registration, then they had no objection in registering their party with the Election Commission of Pakistan.³⁰⁴ Zia had promised holding of elections in November 1979. But from March 1979 onwards, some steps were taken gradually which made the political situation complicated. Local bodies' elections, proportional representation, implementation of *Nizam-i-Mustafa* prior to the elections and lastly the registration of political parties, all these debates were started so that the energy of the political parties, instead of formulating clear programme of the election, was consumed in these petty political issues.

The media remained busy to magnify the impression that a section of people did not regard timely election in the interest of the country.³⁰⁵ All these developments widened the gap among the PNA ranks and also with the Zia regime. At the same time when the government was applying these tactics, the attitude of the majority leaders of the PNA was bit strange. The regime succeeded in dividing the strength of the opposition and making itself more consolidated. Zia regime after postponing the elections and tightening further grip of martial law, imposed ban on all political activities. This proved fatal to PNA and soon disintegration process reached to its peak. Following can be summed up as the causes of the failure of the PNA; (i) The hatred against Bhutto's regime was so severe that it forced the opposition into forming an alliance. It was not possible for any major party to keep itself aloof from this popular wave but after the imposition of martial law some political leaders issued such statements that the PNA has achieved its objective i.e. ouster of Bhutto from power. This caused a serious dent to the PNA, (ii) although an effort was made to present a solid foundation by its support of the popular slogan of *Nizam-i-Mustafa*, nevertheless

some fundamental inconsistencies existing among some political parties and centre-evasive tendencies blurred the brightness of the PNA's unity, (iii) some parties represented by particular religious school of thought insisted that in the interpretation of Islamic injunctions, their word should be considered final and binding, (iv) some parties in the PNA were undemocratic in its own structure as they had never held an elected office bearer, (v) after achieving their objectives of the ouster of Bhutto from power, it was regarded as essential that the PNA should have an ideological base and real unity amongst its various components. On the contrary, the PNA leaders followed the path of confrontation and disorder among themselves. The differences first erupted on the issue of issuing tickets to members for contesting the elections i.e. the allocation of seats to various parties. This was followed by another important issue; priority to the elections or accountability. Later on, co-operation with the government became a cause of disagreement, (vi) at some occasions the support of government (in Zia's Period) to one faction of the PNA against another faction. This also led to the disintegration of the PNA, (vii) the tactics of the government also played a role in the disintegration of the PNA. It became clear that some of the PNA leaders had forgotten all the tall promises and pledges they made with the people, just for the sake of few ministerial seats. Repeatedly it was argued that most of the component parties of the PNA gave a cool response to the demands/pledges they made with the people during the elections and afterwards and showed their interest only in joining the government to get maximum benefits for their own self. This also tarnished the image of the PNA leaders and soon in the absence of the same public support which they enjoyed previously the PNA disintegrated.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 The PPP had secured 81 seats out of 138 seats of the NA in West Pakistan. For details about the 1970 elections see table in the Appendix.
- 2 Satish Kumar, "Problems of federal politics in Pakistan", in Pandave Nayak (ed) *Pakistan Society and Politics* (Karachi: sterling publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1983), p. 27.
- 3 Shahid Javid Burki, *State and Society in Pakistan 1971-77*, (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989), p. 3.
- 4 Khalid R. Sayed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of change*, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), p. 104.
- 5 Suresh Chandra Nath Kaushik, *Pakistan under Bhutto's Leadership*, (New Delhi: Lppal Publishing House, 1983), p. 116.
- 6 K.B. Sayed, *Politics in Pakistan*, p. 91.
- 7 Kaushik, *Pakistan under Bhutto*, p. 168.
- 8 Ibid., p. 169.
- 9 In NWFP, the PPP won 3, the PML (Q) 10, the NAP 13, and the JUI 4 out of total 40 provincial seats. While in Balochistan, the PPP nil, the PML (Q) 3, the NAP 8 and the JUI won 2 out of total 20 provincial seats. For further details see table in the Appendix IV.
- 10 Bhutto appointed Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao as Governor of NWFP on December 25, 1971, while Ghous Bakhsh Rasani was appointed on 29th December, 1971, in Balochistan. In Punjab Gulam Mustafa Khar and in Sindh Mumtaz Ali Bhutto were already appointed on Dec 13 and Dec 24, 1974 respectively.
- 11 *Pakistan Observer*, March 12, 1972.
- 12 Saeed Mojaaz Hussain Shah, "Religion and Politics in Pakistan 1972-88" Unpublished PhD dissertation (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Qandari-Azam University, 1994), p. 142.
- 13 *Dawn*, March 7 and April 28, 1973. For complete text of both these accords see appendices V and VI.
- 14 According to an article of the March 6, 1972 agreement, "Until new constitution is enforced any member holding membership of more than one assemblies shall be allowed to maintain his seats. This shall be valid until the promulgation of constitution in all respects". It was due to this article that Hayat Sherpao got the mentioned posts.
- 15 Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* (London: The Mac Millan Press Ltd, 1992) p. 183.
- 16 The Shimla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972. The opposition severely criticized its articles concerning the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, once again, both the government and opposition remained busy in criticizing each other.
- 17 *Zindagi*, September, 14, 1972 p. 5. Also *Jung*, May 4/6, and 21, 1972.
- 18 Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances during Bhutto and Zia Regimes 1971-1988" [Unpublished MA Thesis] (Peshawar: Pakistan Study Center, 1998) P. 50.
- 19 Selig S. Harrison, in *Afghanistan's Shakeup: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Withdrawal*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p. 33.
- 20 Government of Pakistan, *White paper on Balochistan*, (Rawalpindi: October 1974), p. 5.
- 21 *Nawa-i-Waqt*, February 22, 1973.
- 22 Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Bhutto*, p. 185.
- 23 Rafiq Dugar, *Pakistan: Jang-i-Ar-Sajwat*, (Lahore: Dood Shanceel Publications, 1990), p. 169. Also for details see statements to this effect made by Prof. Chaudhori and Mian Tufail Muhammad, (II), *Nawa-i-Waqt*, June 8, 1974, Asghar Khan, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, June 10, 1974, Chaudhry Zahur Iqbal and Mufi Mahmood, *Pakistan Times*, February 15, 1976.
- 24 *Zindagi*, October 23, 1973 p. 19.
- 25 *Nawa-i-Waqt*, Nov. 20, 1973.
- 26 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p. 53.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Chaudhri Ahmad, *Phir Mandali a la Casa*, (Urdu) (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990), p. 32.
- 30 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p. 48.
- 31 Ibid. p. 49.
- 32 *Constitution Making in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan publication, 1975), p. 19.
- 33 *Tarjuman-i-Islam*, March 9, 1973, p. 11.
- 34 Apart from the PPP and its allies, it included Mufi Mahmood (JUI), Maulana Shah Ahmad Noonani (UIP), Sardar Shukar Hayat and Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan (Juttana PML), Ammeezada Khan (NAP) and Prof. Chaudhri Ahmad (JI).
- 35 Mojaaz, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 150.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid., p. 151.
- 38 Chaudhri, *Phir Mandali a la Casa*, p. 32.
- 39 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p. 58.
- 40 Ibid., pp. 37-38, 43.
- 41 *Dawn*, March 25, 1973.
- 42 *Asa*, April 1, 1973 pp. 6-7.

- 43 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p.54
- 44 For details about other connected information see *Jang*, March 25, 1973. Also see text of a Telegram of Professor Ghulam Ahmad in *Dawn*, March 25, 1973. Statements of Arbab Sikandar Khan and Mr. Ghous Bakhsh Buzorgi in *Ibid.* of March 27, 1973. Also *White Paper on the performance of the Bhutto Regime* Vol. III, Government of Pakistan (Islamabad, 1979), pp 107-114
- 45 *Pakistan Times*, March 27, 1973.
- 46 *Dawn*, April 7, 1973.
- 47 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p.61.
- 48 Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Bhutto*, p.189.
- 49 Sayyid Abdul Samad Parzada, "Ulama in Politics: A case study of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-Islam 1971-77", Unpublished PhD dissertation (Islamabad: NIPS, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1994), p.196
- 50 *Ibid.*
- 51 *Pakistan Times*, April 10, 11 1973.
- 52 *Constitution Making in Pakistan*, p. 22. Also Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Bhutto*, p.175.
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- 54 Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Bhutto*, p.179.
- 55 *Zindagi*, March 11, and April 22, 1973 p.10 and 13 respectively.
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- 57 Ghulam, *Phir Auratul la Aq Gai*, p.46.
- 58 Bhutto in particular targeted NAP and its leaders Abdul Wali Khan and Attaullah Magsi and expressed words like unpatriotic traitors and foreign agents for them. Fazlur Rahman, "Mandara Magi Mahmood", Unpublished M.A. thesis. (Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1986), p.88.
- 59 *Ibid.*
- 60 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p.59
- 61 Ghulam, *Phir Auratul la Aq Gai*, p.52.
- 62 *Ibid.*
- 63 Our report of Quetta meeting see *Evening News*, and *Jang*, April 28, 1973.
- 64 *Dawn*, April 28, 1973.
- 65 *Jang*, April 27, 1973.
- 66 For details, see *Dawn*, April 30, 1973.
- 67 *Jang*, May 16, 1973.
- 68 *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, official publications of NA Vol- III, No.2, May 25 1973, Pp. 93-98. Hereafter Debates
- 69 *Ibid.*, Pp. 166-165.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 71 *Ibid.*, Pp. 109-117, 153-156, 141, 151
- 72 Parzada, *Ulama in Politics*, p.201.
- 73 *Ibid.*
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- 75 According to section 144 of Defense of Pakistan Rule the assembly of more than five persons for political purpose is prohibited.
- 76 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p.62.
- 77 White Paper on the performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol- III Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1979), pp. 76-77.
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- 79 *Ibid.*
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- 81 The constitution (first) Amendment defined the territories of Pakistan (after the establishment of East Pakistan into Bangladesh) namely, provinces of Balochistan, NWFP, Punjab and Sindh, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and such territories as may be included in Pakistan by accession, or otherwise, and Islamabad being the capital of the federation. Mahmood Azam Farooqi of the JI opposed it, on the argument that the door of coming back to Pakistan, of former East Pakistan should not be closed. *Debates* Vol.III, pp.1006-1007
- 82 Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Bhutto*, p.198
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- 85 *Parliamentary Debates*, June 7, 1974, p.4

86 Ibid., June 21, 1974 pp 15-17.

87 *Debates*, Vol IV, No. 26, June 30, 1974. Pp.1302-1305. Also *Jang*, July 1, 1974.

88 Ibid., Pp.1306-1309.

89 Ibid., Vol. V, No. 39, September 7, 1974.

90 Ibid., Also *Morning News*, September 8, 1974. For the text of the Second Constitutional Amendment see Appendix VII.

91 Muzawar, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, p.161.

92 *Pakistan Times*, September 9, 1974.

93 According to an official statement between September 3, 1974 and January 8, 1975, 129 terrorist incidents took place in the NWFP, including 36 in Peshawar. Besides 23 in Balochistan, 15 in Punjab and 3 in Sindh.

94 He was there to preside over a function of the students at the Faculty Department of the Peshawar University.

95 *Constitutional Amendments: Facts and Fiction*, official publication, Islamabad p. 6.

96 Ibid.

97 *Debates* Vol. II, No. 16, Feb 12, 1975. Pp. 253-254.

98 *Constitutional Amendments*, p. 7.

99 *Debates*, Vol. II, No. 14 February 10, 1975. Pp 178-181.

100 Ibid., Vol. II, No. 16, February 12, 1975. Pp.250-251.

101 Ibid., Pp.255-256.

102 Ibid., Vol. I, No. 2, Jan 31, 1975. p.406.

103 Some of its provisions were:

1. In respect of legislation,

- a. before the beginning of every session of the Senate and the National Assembly, Opposition should be consulted for finalizing the programme of that session;
- b. The suspension of rule should be asked for by the Treasury Benches, only when it is absolutely unavoidable;
- c. That the Treasury Benches should not ask for imposition of restrictions on them;
- d. that amendments moved by the Opposition, should be considered seriously;
- e. In all disputed bills, Opposition should be consulted prior to their passage in the House;
2. About Motions and privilege Motions, the government will take a more liberal attitude.
3. As regards the privileges of the members, they should not be victimized under trials, and detainees should be allowed to attend the session.

104 Ibid., Pp.95-96.

105 *Nimrod-Waqf*, March 21, 1975.

106 *Morning News*, May 27, 1975. Also see *Jang* and *Nimrod-Waqf*, May 28, 1975.

107 *Nimrod-Waqf*, June 3, 1975.

108 *Tajmaul-Islam*, June 27, 1975. Pp. 4, 20, 9-10, 12, 15, 16, 19-20.

109 *Constitutional Amendments*, Pp.8-15. Also *Debates*, Vol VI, No 9, Nov. 11, 1975. p.437.

110 *Debates*, Vol VII, No 12, Nov.14, 1975. pp.52-55.

111 For their speeches see Ibid., pp.2-13, 17-19, 26-43, 45, 48, 49-51, 58, 59-60.

112 For speaker's ruling, see Ibid., pp.62-64.

113 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p.82.

114 The opposition wanted to comment on the Amendment, which was denied by the speaker. The leaders of the UDF objected to it and protested against by raising their voices. In order to stop them from doing so the speaker ordered the security of the NA to remove them, which they resisted hence they were removed forcefully by dragging them, which injured Ch. Zahur Elahi.

115 *Jang*, November 19, 1975.

116 Ibid., December 11, 1975.

117 For detailed resolutions see *Nimrod-Waqf*, November 19, 1975.

118 Ibid., November 20, 1975.

119 Ibid., December 8, 1975.

120 For UDF decisions see *Nimrod-Waqf*, August 1, 1975. Also see report of Ghaffoor's press conference in *Dawn*, August 21, 1975.

121 The JUP declined to accept the decision of the UDF and announced to field its candidate. See statement of Maulana Nawazani in *Morning News*, August 8, 1975. The UDF, in its Central Action Committee Meeting, at Lahore, decided to leave the matter to the JUP to "abide by the Front's decision, or to adopt a separate course of action". See report of Nawazani's press conference in *Dawn*, August 19, 1975.

122 *Morning News*, October 14, 1975.

- 123 *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 1 February 27, 1974. Also *Jang*, June 27, 1976.
- 124 *Dawn*, April 2, 1976.
- 125 *Ibid.*, July 31, 1976.
- 126 Akhtar Hussain, *Political Alliances*, p.74.
- 127 *Deliber*, Vol VIII, No. 19, September 3, 1976, pp.590-597.
- 128 *Ibid.*, pp.524-586.
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- 131 *Tarjuman-i-Islam*, January 14, 1977, p.6.
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- 138 Lawrence Zaring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.408.
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- 140 *Ibid.*, p.263.
- 141 *Ibid.*, p.275.
- 142 Safdar Mahmood, *Important Political Parties of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd., 1993), p.255.
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- 144 Lawrence Zaring, *Pakistan in the 20th Century*, p.411.
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- 146 *Urdu Digest*, January 11, 1977.
- 147 *Nawa-i-Waqt*, January 12, 1977.
- 148 *Ibid.* Also in the *Dawn*, and *Khyber Mail*, January 12, 1977.
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- 152 Sharif ul Mujahid, "The 1977 Pakistan Elections" in Manzoor ul-Haq Ahmad (ed) *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p.66.
- 153 *Ibid.*, p.66.
- 154 *Dawn*, January 17, 1977.
- 155 Kausar Nisai, *An Uncertain Fate*, (Urdu) (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1987) p.42.
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- 235 President PNA, Muhi Mahmood's letter dated May 12, 1977.
- 236 *Ibid.*
- 237 The idea originated with Yahya Bhakhtiar. He proposed in early April, that polls of the provincial assemblies may be held afresh, and if the PNA could master a majority in these elections, the re-polling of National Assembly may also be held. However, it was readily rejected by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. See *Dawn*, Karachi, April 16, 1977.
- 238 Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, *Marquess Sir Abdul Latif Khan*, (Lahore: Jang publishers, 1988), p.88.
- 239 Interview with Sardar Qayum quoted by Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances," p.142.
- 240 For details see letter dated May 27, 1977.
- 241 Hamid Yusufi, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-77*, (Lahore: Afasia Publications, 1989) p. 164. Also for detailed judgment see *Pakistan Times*, June 3, 1977.
- 242 Details of casualties from March 7, 1977 onwards during the agitation

Province	Citizens			Security Forces	
	Killed	Injured	Arrested	Killed	Injured
Punjab	101	765	9755	4	313
Sindh	132	409	4208	3	168
NWFP	8	34	2700	1	40
Baluchistan	1	19	190	1	15
Total	242	1227	16853	9	536

Source: *Zindagi*, October 29, 1977.

- 243 *Pakistan Times*, October 13, 1977.
- 244 A.H. Kardar, *Pakistan Soldiers of Fortune*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd., 1988) p.19.
- 245 Interview with Nawabzada quoted by Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances," p.146.
- 246 Stanley Wolpert, *Zafar Bhutto of Pakistan*, p.295.
- 247 Ghafour, *The Martial Law*, p.88.
- 248 *Pakistan Times*, June 8, 1977.

- 249 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, p.187-188.
- 250 *Pakistan Times*, June 10, 1977.
- 251 *Ibid.*, June 11, 1977.
- 252 *Ibid.*, June 14, 1977.
- 253 For details see report of joint press conference of Prof. Ghafoor, and Kausar Niazi, in *Dawn*, June 16, 1977. Also in Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line*, p.165 & A29-A45.
- 254 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, p.198.
- 255 Interview with Sardar Qayum quoted by Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances," p.149.
- 256 *Dawn*, June 17, 1977.
- 257 Kausar Niazi, *PML Khattas*, pp.113-115.
- 258 *Ibid.*
- 259 A.H. Kardar, *Pakistan Soldiers of Fortune*, p.26.
- 260 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, p.199.
- 261 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, p.209. For PNA proposal see Pp.A 51-A 64.
- 262 *Ibid.*, Pp.224-225.
- 263 *Ibid.*
- 264 Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances," p.151.
- 265 *Ibid.*, Pp.234-236.
- 266 *Ibid.* Pp.212-222. And Pp.A51-A64.
- 267 *Ibid.*, Pp.236-238, Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line*, Pp.29-45.
- 268 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, Pp. 238-239.
- 269 *Nasser-i-Waqit*, July 3, 1977. Also see *Jang* of the same date.
- 270 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, p.256.
- 271 Interview with Nawabzada quoted by Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances," p.155.
- 272 Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line*, p.183.
- 273 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, p.241.
- 274 Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line*, p.183.
- 275 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, Pp.245-246. Ghafoor refer to 9 points agenda including one PNA (draft) item 28 about removal of difficulty clause. There is no mention of any such clause in the PNA "accord" quoted by Ghafoor, above in Pp.74A-91A.
- 276 Ghafoor, *Pir Marital Law*, Pp.247-248.
- 277 *Ibid.*, p.249.
- 278 Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line*, Pp.201-201.
- 279 *Ibid.*, Also Wikipedia, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, p.301.
- 280 Rafiq Durrani, *Pakistan: Five Years Since*, (Lahore: Iqbal Press Publications, 1990), p.260.
- 281 On the night between July 4, and 5 Gen. Zia promulgated martial law dismissed National and provincial assemblies and abrogated the 1973 constitution instead of amending it.
- 282 *Dawn*, July 9, 1977.
- 283 Mujtaba Arif, "The PNA Movement", p.109.
- 284 Akhtar Rashid, "Elections '77 and Aftermath", Pp.75-76.
- 285 *Ibid.*, p.91.
- 286 *Iskari Jahanian*, July 18-July 24, 1977 pp.5-6.
- 287 Akhtar Rashid, "Elections '77 and Aftermath", p.81.
- 288 Ghafoor Ahmad, *Aur Election, No Ho Shai*, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990), p.63.
- 289 *Ibid.*, p.120.
- 290 Akhtar Rashid, "Elections '77 and Aftermath", p.87.
- 291 Interview with Nawabzada quoted by Akhtar Hussain, "Political Alliances" p.161.
- 292 *Ibid.*, p. 270.
- 293 Ijaz-ul-Rehman, "Maulana Mufis Mahmood". (Unpublished, M.A. Thesis (Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1986) p.115.
- 294 *Zanjoor*, July 7 to 13, 1978, pp.16-18. The PNA chalked out a separate programme for sweetening in and the PNA ministers were sworn in with the following oath:
"Beholding Allah as omnipotent and omnipresent, I swear that after joining the cabinet, I will struggle for achieving the following objectives:
I will make all efforts for establishing an Islamic order.
I will not do anything which may cause deformation to my person, party or society."

I will keep away from gaining selfish ends except the normally established procedures, I will not utilize the state publicity media;
 I will work with the zeal and inspiration of services to the country and nation only. I will strive to accomplish lawful gains for every one and unlawful for none.
 I will resign from the ministry, the movement my party or the P.N.A order me to do so.
 Fazal-ur-Rehman, "Maulana Mufii Mahunood" p.115.

295 Mohammad Asif Ishaq, *Jamhuriyat Sair Matalapat*, (Urdu) (Lahore: Dastaviz publications, 1986), p.139.

296 *Zindagi*, November 17, to November 23, 1979 p.11

297 Ghafoor, *Arr-E-Ikhtlaam*, p.339.

298 *Chawkan*, July 2, 1979, p.9.

299 Ghafoor, *Arr-E-Ikhtlaam*, p.176.

300 *Ibid.*, p.356.

301 *Zindagi*, August 17 to August 22, 1979, p.9.

302 *Ibid.* September, 1979, p.14.

303 *Nama-e-Ill'iyat*, September 1, 1979

304 *Ikhtlaam*, October 12-18, 1979 p.41.

305 *Takbeer*, October 12-18 1979, p.7.

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