

# Naxalite Armed Struggles and the Annihilation Campaign in Rural Areas

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*The principal weakness of the Naxalites was their belief that the people of India would rise up in revolt as soon as they had lit the spark of armed struggle. In the tactic of individual annihilation they thought they had found an alternative to mass organisation and mass ideological propaganda. Initially, the annihilation policy was a success. As soon as two or three landlords were killed, the others ran away to the safety of the towns or became ardent supporters of the Naxalites overnight. These killings created a power vacuum in the villages and the Naxalites stepped in to fill the void. The Naxalites described these areas as "liberated" because they could move around freely within their boundaries. But soon the number of murders of class enemies became the criterion by which the Naxalites began judging the revolutionary tempo of a locality. Whenever an annihilation took place in a new area, the event was equated with the spread of revolution to that area.*

*The guerrillas did not take the masses into confidence in the "liberated" areas. The assassinations were done by a handful of activists, the criminal elements in the villages were drawn towards the movement and the economic demands of the villagers were ignored. All these factors alienated the Naxalites further from the masses. The Naxalites also underestimated 'white terror' and over-estimated their own strength. They had very few firearms, an utterly inadequate supply of ammunition, almost no training in guerilla warfare and ideology and, worst of all, the people were not on their side in their conflict with the police. The police force met with feeble resistance when it entered these "liberated" areas and was brutal in its suppression of the movement.*

THE brief history of the Naxalite movement can be divided into five periods. The first period would correspond to the Naxalbari episode itself. The second period began after the Naxalbari revolt collapsed and continued up to the formation of CPI(ML) in 1969. During this period the Naxalite movement was no more than a collection of individuals and groups who were united in their opposition to CPI(M) and loyalty to the Chinese path, but who differed amongst themselves on tactical issues. Their activities were co-ordinated by the All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries. The formation of CPI(ML) on 22nd April, 1969, as a party dedicated to peasant armed revolution led to the withdrawal of the Andhra group led by Nagi Reddy from the latter.

The third period, from early 1969 to April 1970, was characterised by the attempts made by CPI(ML) to form red bases in rural areas, and by its adoption of "annihilation of class enemy" as the only tactical line for revolution. In line with this thinking armed struggles were launched in several places like Srikakulam in Andhra and Debra in West Bengal.

In the fourth period the Naxalites retreated from the villages and made Calcutta and its neighbouring towns their main centre of operation. At the beginning their activities were restricted to raiding educational institutions, disfiguring the statues of national

leaders and organising boycotts of examinations. But afterwards the annihilation policy was also implemented in the city and the main targets became the personnel of CPI(M), police constables and petty businessmen. These actions brought a flood of publicity through the press and radio, nothing like which was obtained by the revolts in rural areas. But this shift in the area of operation — from rural to urban — was instrumental in furthering ideological differences within the party.

The fifth period began in July-August 1971, a few months after the 1971 election in West Bengal, when the government decided to destroy the Naxalite movement. Their task was made easier by the fact that by then the ruffians and teenage dropouts had replaced the college students as the main activist elements inside the movement, and through them the police and the informers had penetrated the organisation. The decentralised and loose nature of the organisation also worked against the Naxalites. In a matter of two or three weeks, through a series of swift armed operations, the serious elements in the movement were either killed or imprisoned, while the anti-social elements defected to the youth organisation of the Congress party. Overnight the "liberated areas" of the Naxalites became Congress strongholds. The Chinese attitude towards Bangladesh also demoralised some activists, while some others lost inte-

rest in CPI(ML) when the Chinese criticism of its policies became known.

The present paper covers the third and most important period in the history of the movement when the Naxalites moved into the villages and attempted to organise peasants' armed uprisings. In the first section we begin by discussing the annihilation theory, which was undoubtedly the most significant feature of these revolts. In the second section we discuss the Srikakulam uprising, where the annihilation theory was first, and most seriously, implemented. In the third section we cover the other revolts, in Debra-Gopiballavpur, Musahari, and Lakhimpore-Kheri. The fourth section attempts an appraisal of these uprisings. We have omitted the Birbhum uprising, which continued for three months following the 1971 general election in West Bengal, partly because it contained both urban and rural elements, and also partly because it is not clearly known who organised it, how it was organised, and more importantly, how it collapsed. The emphasis in this paper is on revolts where the Naxalites managed to have some territorial control, even if for a very short time. For this reason Punjab, where about 20 annihilations took place and some parts of Bihar where several stray killings took place under the auspices of the Naxalites, have been excluded from this survey.

Before we discuss the annihilation campaign of the Naxalites, it is im-

portant to summarise the Naxalite view on armed struggle. The main aspects of the Naxalite theory of armed struggle were:

- 1) The Congress administration represents the interests of the Indian feudal big landlords and bureaucratic-comprador capitalists. The economy is semi-feudal and the ruling class is a pawn in the hands of two external forces — United States imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. Of all the contradictions, the one between the feudal elements and the broad masses of the Indian people is the principal one.
- 2) There is no alternative to armed struggle. "Only by relying on violent revolution and taking the road of armed struggle can India be saved and the Indian people achieve complete liberation" (*People's Daily*, Peking, July 5, 1967). Other forms of activity like political propaganda, building mass organisations and participation in the struggles for raising economic demands, amount to revisionism and should be avoided. Similarly, all kinds of representative institutions — from parliament to panchayat — should be discarded and should not be used even tactically.
- 3) The conditions for waging armed struggle in India are excellent. There is no popular support for the government, which survives only by its military strength, while the people of India are ready for revolution. The spark of revolution, once lit, will spread like a forest fire and soon cover the whole country.
- 4) The main force of the democratic revolution is the peasantry. Among the peasantry the objective is to bring the poor and landless into the forefront of the struggle, while also trying to win over the middle peasantry and a section of the rich peasantry.
- 5) The revolutionaries will try to establish one revolutionary base after another, and "they will eventually develop such areas from isolated points into a vast expanse, from small areas into extensive areas, an expansion in a series of waves. Thus a situation in which the encirclement of the cities from the countryside will gradually be brought about in the Indian revolution to pave the way for the final seizure of towns and cities and winning nationwide victory". [*People's Daily*, July 5, 1967. Similar statements were made, also in Programme of the CPI(ML).]
- 6) The primary stage of the guerilla war is the act of annihilating class enemies through guerilla actions. The annihilation campaign will lead to the formation of red bases where the guerillas will be able to move about freely and the people will come forward in support of the guerillas. At a later

stage the liberation army will be formed as the end product of the annihilation campaign.

- 7) The leadership of the revolutionary movement in India is to be subordinate to the international leadership (which meant the Chinese party). The guerillas would be encouraged to study the thoughts of Chairman Mao and to propagate his ideas among the Indian peasantry.

## I

### The Annihilation Campaign

The primary objective of the annihilation campaign was to smash the feudal authority in the villages and to replace it by the authority of the peasants. The party thought that this objective could not be fulfilled without attacking individual landlords in the villages and annihilating them.<sup>1</sup> "The annihilation of class enemy does not only mean liquidating individuals, but also means liquidating the political, social, and economic authority of the class enemy". This was how the case for the campaign was presented by Charu Mazumdar in one of his articles. He also added, "the annihilation of class enemy is the higher form of class struggle while the act of annihilating class enemies through guerilla actions is the primary stage of the guerilla struggle".<sup>2</sup>

The second objective, which was closely related to the first one, was to create "red terror" as opposed to the "white terror" of the feudal elements. "The essence of our politics lies in annihilating the class enemies, and not in injuring them or hitting them in order to drive them out, that only annihilation can break the morale of the enemy."<sup>3</sup> These killings — accompanied by the brutal methods employed in the killings and in subsequent actions — were expected to produce an atmosphere of fear and to create panic among the feudal elements.<sup>4</sup> The Naxalites were immensely successful in pursuing this objective. Some feudal elements were killed, many left the villages in fear, and those who stayed on were quick to learn Naxalite jargon and become 'revolutionaries' overnight.<sup>5</sup> The police got little co-operation from the people in their search for the Naxalites, whom no one in these villages now wanted to antagonise. Even the wives and sons of victims of the Naxalites would not report murders to the police or seek assistance from them.<sup>6</sup>

This is how Charu Mazumdar sum-

marised one of the main advantages of creating "liberated areas": "Once an area is liberated from the clutches of class enemies (some are annihilated while some others flee) the repressive state machinery is deprived of its eyes and ears, making it impossible for the police to know who is a guerilla and who is not, and who is tilling his own land and who tills that of the jotedars."<sup>7</sup>

Through this campaign Charu Mazumdar expected the poor sections of the rural masses to come forward and to take over the leadership of the movement. To quote Charu himself, "Because the class hatred among them (i.e. petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, middle peasants) is not as intense as that among the poor peasants, the poor and landless can establish their leadership over the whole of the peasant masses only through the campaign for the annihilation of class enemy."<sup>8</sup> It was also reported that in several cases the middle class activists raised doubts and questions and withdrew themselves from the movement after the annihilation programme was launched.<sup>9</sup> Whether factually correct or not, in most cases of murder, the reports in *Liberation* emphasised that they were planned and executed exclusively by the landless and poor peasants. However, the leadership also assigned to its petty bourgeois activists a series of important tasks like organising annihilation squads, recruiting members for these squads and conducting follow up campaigns.<sup>10</sup>

Another objective was to encourage the common people to shake off their fear and inertia and to join the Naxalites.<sup>11</sup> The expectation was that the killing of a "hated oppressor" would receive the overwhelming support of the local people and would identify the movement with the poorer section of the population.<sup>12</sup> It was reported about Gopivallabpur that "after November 22, the party leadership could correctly gauge the extent to which initiative and boldness of the broad peasant masses were enhanced by the annihilation of class enemies and guerilla warfare".<sup>13</sup> Reports from several places such as Tripura, Gopiballavpur and Sompeta in Srikakulam — as reported in *Liberation* — spoke of the tremendous success of this campaign in enthusing the people to come forward and participate in the task of smashing the feudal authority in the villages.<sup>14</sup>

With these objectives — of smashing feudal authority, of creating red bases,

of encouraging the masses to join the revolutionary forces, and of establishing the leadership of the poorer section of the rural masses on the peasant movement — the campaign for annihilating class enemies was launched in early 1969. This line of action had serious ideological, tactical, and organisational implications for CPI(ML).

1) Whereas previously the need for economic struggles for politicising the masses was not overlooked, after this campaign was started, all forms of economic struggle were abandoned on the ground that "to attempt agrarian revolution without first smashing the state machinery is straightforward revisionism".<sup>15</sup> The extent of this shift in the tactical position of the party after the adoption of the policy of annihilation of class enemies can be seen from some of the statements made prior to the adoption of this policy.

For instance, in October 1968, Charu Mazumdar wrote "While the comrades who are working among the peasants should continue to propagate politics, they should never belittle the necessity of formulating common slogans on economic demands. For without this, broad sections of the peasantry cannot be drawn into the movement, nor can the backward sections of the peasantry be raised to a level where they can grasp our political propaganda, nor can their class hatred against their class enemy be sustained... 'peasants should seize the next harvest' is a slogan which will draw a broad section of the peasants into the fold of the movement".<sup>16</sup> He again wrote in the next month: "That is why economic struggles against the feudal class are necessary, not only in the present, but in the future also. That is why the movement to seize the crop is necessary".<sup>17</sup> In February 1969, it was written regarding the Musahari struggle, "that there cannot be a Chinese wall between the economic and political struggles".<sup>18</sup> It was written in connection with the Lakhimpur uprising, in April 1969, that "the armed struggle for land will become a mighty torrent when it is combined with these (political) struggles".<sup>19</sup>

But then the theory became that economic struggles would follow successful guerilla actions and the formation of red bases. After the landlords had been killed, driven away or subjugated and the feudal authority in the villages had been uprooted, the economic task of seizing crops could be accomplished without difficulty.<sup>20</sup> Launching of economic struggles without first capturing

power in the villages, it was thought, would encourage peasants — who had got possession of land — to drop out of active peasant struggles.<sup>21</sup> The struggle was to aim at capturing state power and not initially towards realising certain economic goals — like those relating to rents, wages, debts and interest, land ownership and so on.

2) Even the task of political campaigning was given a low priority during this period. In February 1970, Charu Mazumdar wrote, "Comrades, this is not the time to scatter our forces for carrying out propaganda. Let us not indulge in aimless political propaganda, the political propaganda must secure the aim of carrying out successfully the battle of annihilation".<sup>22</sup> So, not only were the economic struggles abandoned, but even political campaigning was avoided, and only the annihilation programme was pursued.

3) This policy also implied the rejection of the 'mass line' and mass organisations and the adoption of a secret organisation for party activities. It was clearly stated in December 1969, in an article by Charu Mazumdar, that "the revolutionary peasants have demonstrated that neither mass movement nor mass organisation is indispensable for waging guerilla warfare".<sup>23</sup> It was thought that "open mass movements and mass organisation are obstacles in the way of development and expansion of guerilla warfare".<sup>24</sup>

Very soon, confirmation of this line came from the front line revolutionaries. It was pointed out that in Sompet the absence of mass organisations in the past had produced no difficulty in launching guerilla warfare.<sup>25</sup> The CPI(ML) unit of West Dinajpur reported after annihilating one class enemy that this had confirmed "that in the present era guerilla struggles can be organised without mass organisations".<sup>26</sup> Similar confirmation also came from Tripura.<sup>27</sup>

What was needed, according to the Party, was the development of a secret party organisation with a handful of persons at the beginning. It was stated by Charu Mazumdar in July 1969, "what happens is that the advanced class conscious section of the peasant masses start the guerilla war. For this reason, guerilla war, at its initial stage, may appear as a struggle of only a handful of people".<sup>28</sup>

In an article published in February 1970, Charu Mazumdar gave a detailed account of the way the guerillas should function in the villages: "The

method of forming a guerilla unit was to be *wholly conspiratorial*. No inkling of such a conspiracy should be given out even in the meetings of the political units of the Party. The conspiracy should be between individuals and *on a person to person basis*. The petty bourgeois intellectual comrade must take the initiative in this respect as far as possible. He should approach the poor peasant who, in his opinion, has the most revolutionary potentiality, and whisper in his ears, 'Don't you think it is a good thing to finish off such and such jotedar?' This is how the guerillas have to be selected and recruited singly and in secret, and organised into a unit"<sup>29</sup> (emphasis mine).

A number of interesting points emerge from the preceding paragraph. First, the guerilla organisation had to be wholly conspiratorial and completely independent of the political unit. Secondly, the recruitment to the murder squad was made by the petty bourgeois intellectual member. Thirdly, the selection was made individually by the intellectual comrade, and the relationship within the murder unit was on a person to person basis. Fourthly, propaganda was solely related to the politics of annihilation. Fifthly, the choice of victims, as can be seen in another part of the same article, was also left to the subjective assessment of the intellectual member.

Who was the class enemy? The list of victims of Naxalite attacks in the countryside, besides landlords, rich peasants, money-lenders, police informers, included "landlord's agents" who were mostly persons drawn from the poorer strata of the village community. A typical victim was described as follows in *Liberation*: "Haradhan owned 100 bighas of first grade land for growing paddy and had a thriving money-lending business. He also dealt in cement-making equipment. This beast of a man made the lives of the peasants of the neighbouring villages miserable by his ruthless exploitation and oppression and took great initiative in helping the police in evicting people from the villages".<sup>30</sup>

As it is clear from the above description, the victim was not a very big feudal landowner and in any case, given his resources and the capacity for oppression, it could hardly be said that his crimes deserved a death sentence. In fact many of the victims were even humbler men who came under the definition "agent of landlord or police". The number of big landholders and money-lenders who were done to death

by the Naxalites constituted, on the basis of a rough estimate, less than a third of the total number of victims.

Although a whole variety of weapons were used by the Naxalites in their attacks, they showed a preference for conventional weapons, such as knives, choppers, swords, rods and spears. This policy of using conventional weapons — and not firearms — was justified on many grounds. Theoretically it implied more reliance on people and less on arms. In practice also, guns would have created many difficulties. "Firearm-consciousness would lead to the cadres assuming that no action could be undertaken without guns, at a time when it was not possible to supply every member of the guerilla squads with a gun. The carriers of guns also felt more nervous, and the chances of arrest and detection were greater if one carried these weapons."<sup>31</sup>

Another justification for using conventional weapons was that their use involved physical contact with the victims, which intensified the "revolutionary hatred" felt for the exploiters.<sup>32</sup> The form of weapon to be used became one of the important issues which separated Ashim Chatterjee from Mazumdar. The latter once forced Chatterjee, who was leader of Gopiballavpur, to destroy some guns he had procured.

In the early phase of the movement Charu Mazumdar's slogan was that he who had not helped the Party in collecting arms would not be considered truly revolutionary.<sup>33</sup> But after the launching of the annihilation campaign the battle cry became: "He who has not dipped his hand in the blood of class enemies can hardly be called a communist"<sup>34</sup>

## II

### The Srikakulam Uprising

Srikakulam is one of the twenty districts of Andhra Pradesh. Unlike most other districts of Andhra, Srikakulam was never a strong base for the communists in the past. The communists failed to gain a single seat from this area in any of the four elections — 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967 — and their percentage share of votes in these four elections was 4.9, 12.7, 5.6 and 4.4 (CPI(M) and CPI combined), respectively. The population was 23 lakhs according to the 1961 census, out of a total population of 359 lakhs for the whole of Andhra, that is about 6 per cent of Andhra's population.

The Naxalite revolt remained confined to several talukas of this district.<sup>35</sup> Apart from some stray incidents in one or two districts it did not spread to the Telengana region, a region which is

well known for the large-scale agrarian uprising of 1946-52.<sup>36</sup> The movement, however, spilled over into Koraput district of Orissa which borders Srikakulam and contains a large girijan population, mainly because of the efforts of Subbarao Panigrahi, a Naxalite leader of Andhra who originally came from Orissa.<sup>37</sup>

Within Srikakulam itself the revolt began in the hilly tribal areas under Parvathipuram agency, where girijans constitute 90 per cent of the population. At the height of the revolt it covered the six talukas — Parvathipuram, Pathapatnam, Palkonda, Sompeta, Ichapuram, Tekkali — the first three of these coming under Parvathipuram agency. It covered about 500 to 700 square miles of area, about 300 villages, and approximately a population of two lakhs, about one half of one per cent of the population of Andhra.

The movement in Srikakulam predates Naxalbari. It began in 1959 as a 'girijan struggle', meaning the struggle of hill tribals, under the leadership of the undivided Communist Party, in the Parvathipuram agency area.

The main issues in the struggle launched by the girijans in 1959 were related to the restrictions imposed by the forest officials on their method of cultivation. The tribals also opposed the low wage rates which were paid to them — the girijans earned a daily wage of less than half a rupee as labourers and only 59 kgs of grain per year as farm servants. Another issue was the refusal by the landlords and moneylenders (who mostly came from the plains) to return mortgaged lands to the girijans after the expiry of the mortgage period. The latter did not even have the means to secure relief from the law courts. Many other issues — like heavy debt — were also included in their charter of demands in 1964.<sup>38</sup>

The movement achieved a remarkable success within a short time. It secured a fivefold increase in the wage rate of farm servants, forced the distribution of two-thirds of the produce to the tiller, about 1,500-2,000 acres of previously mortgaged land were wrested from the landlords, about 5,000 acres of waste lands were made available to them free from the restrictions imposed by the forest officials, and loans amounting to about Rs 3 lakhs were annulled, all by 1967. The movement also scored many political gains. It also raised the consciousness of the people. And the mass organisation — the Girijan Sangham — became the focus of the political and cultural activities of the people. The main forms of struggle were group meet-

tings, campaign squads, public meetings, strikes and direct mass action in the face of police repression. A series of arrests were made, many police cases were instituted and police camps were set up in girijan areas. In early 1968, special armed police was employed to suppress the mass movement. Two girijans were killed and 1,500 were arrested and in many cases the police resorted to looting and destruction in tribal villages.

The leadership of the Srikakulam district of the undivided communist party joined CPI(M) after the split in 1964 and broke away from it in April 1968. The Srikakulam Communists then joined the All-India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) and later the CPI(ML).

The movement in Srikakulam took a decisive turn in October 1968, following an incident in Garudabhadra, in which a demonstration of girijans was attacked by landlords' men, who did not even spare the women and molested them. This angered the people of several neighbouring villages who assembled and forcibly harvested landlords' land. This was followed by severe police repression. This incident forced the Srikakulam movement to think about more effective ways of combating the repression unleashed by the police and landlords. Pachadi Krishnamurty, the leader of the movement in that district then decided to make direct contact with Charu Mazumdar and other leaders of AICCCR, bypassing the state leadership.<sup>39</sup>

Charu Mazumdar advised the Srikakulam leaders to forsake the line of building mass movements based on economic struggles and to start guerilla actions. He also suggested that the Srikakulam leaders should concentrate on actions for annihilating class enemies and destroying police forces. This new line inspired the leadership, according to Naxalite sources, and they immediately engaged themselves in planning a massive offensive based on guerilla organisation.

Phase one of the guerilla movement began on November 25, 1968, when 250 girijans from 25 villages attacked the house of a money-lender in Parvathipuram and took over his accumulated paddy and other grain worth Rs 20,000. This was the beginning of a series of raids on landlords, money-lenders or their agents in which the guerillas destroyed and burnt down their houses and decamped with money and other belongings. Alongside these activities, there took place several encounters with the police. It was claimed that by the end of January 1969, 29 policemen were

killed by the Naxalites in this area.<sup>40</sup> But despite raids on the houses of landlords and money-lenders, none was deliberately killed, apart from policemen in armed conflicts, during this phase of guerilla actions.

Phase two began in February 1969, when a landlord was killed as a part of the "annihilation of the class enemy campaign", which was now considered to be the "only" method to arouse peasant masses.<sup>41</sup> At the same time the movement was extended to the plains in Sompeta area, where mass organisations and party activities were previously almost non-existent. Most of these actions were carried out in a brutal fashion in order to terrorise opponents. In this, they certainly succeeded to a large extent. It was reported that even the relatives of the victims were afraid to lodge any complaint with the police and seek their help.<sup>42</sup> In some cases the landlords were killed following a trial before a people's court. In all, about 150, including policemen, were killed in this campaign by the Naxalites.

The foodgrains and other materials taken from the landlords were distributed to the girijans. At the beginning the girijans were afraid to take these materials, lest it subject them to police repression. But very soon this fear was overcome.

By March 1969, the Naxalites controlled 500 to 700 square miles of area where the administration had collapsed and the forest officials, revenue officials and other government functionaries were not allowed to enter. The Police could only enter in a large number, but the terror-stricken landlords or rich peasants who still continued living there were unable and unwilling to co-operate. The administration of the area was being run by the Ryotanga Sangram Samithi — the mass front of the Naxalites.<sup>43</sup> Charu Mazumdar visited Srikakulam in early March, 1969, and hoped that this district would become the "Yenan of India", the red fortress of the revolutionaries, from which the flame of armed struggle would spread to other areas.<sup>44</sup> Upto the third week of July 1969, 54 "class enemies" were killed.<sup>45</sup>

But very soon the Naxalite challenge to state power faced massive police repression in the area. The top leader of the movement, Pachadi Krishnamurthy, was killed in May 1969,<sup>46</sup> and in four encounters in November-December, 13 other important leaders and functionaries were killed.<sup>47</sup> At the same time the police resorted to large-scale arrests and tortures and it is generally known that most of the Naxalites were mur-

dered after their arrest by the police.

The movement suffered a grave setback when Vempatapu Satyanarayana and Kailashan, the two most important leaders in the girijan areas, were killed in July 1970,<sup>48</sup> and this was followed by the arrests of Appalasuri and Naga-bhusan Patnaik, two other leading personalities, within four days.<sup>49</sup> C Tejeswara Rao, the Secretary of the CPI(ML) unit of Srikakulam, was also subsequently arrested. By August 1970, 1,641 arrests were made in Andhra, an overwhelming part of this from Srikakulam alone.<sup>50</sup> Within 20 months the backbone of the movement was broken.

In an article summarising the experiences of the Srikakulam struggle, which appeared in *Liberation* in March 1970, it was admitted that "our present losses and setbacks are heavy". But then it drew inspiration from one of Mao's sayings, "If the enemy attacks us wildly and paints us as utterly black, and without a single virtue, it demonstrates that we are following the correct road".<sup>51</sup> But in fact already doubts and misgivings were being raised inside the party regarding the validity of both guerilla warfare and the annihilation of class enemy programme. It was reported after the death of Satyanarayana that in his diary he had expressed his doubts about the wisdom of abandoning mass struggles on economic demands. He was stated to have observed that the new tactical line was forcing the Naxalites to isolation, and the tribals were withdrawing their support because of severe police repression. In fact Satyanarayana was removed from his position as the leader of the hill areas a few weeks before his death — although it is not known whether it was because of his opposition to the party line.<sup>52</sup> Kailashan, who had succeeded Satyanarayana as the leader of the hill areas, also died with Satyanarayana.<sup>53</sup> It was also reported that Appalasuri and Patnaik had gone to Calcutta (where they were arrested) in July 1970, to register their opposition to the tactical line which was leading to their isolation from the masses.<sup>54</sup> There were also reports of conflict between the tribals and the people from the plains within the movement.<sup>55</sup>

A self-critical analysis made by the Srikakulam unit of CPI(ML) appeared in the *Frontier* of March 20, 1971. It stated: "We have gained a lot of experience in the last two years. We have made some tactical errors. We are trying to rectify these mistakes."<sup>56</sup>

This report made no mention of Charu Mazumdar — a serious omission in view of the fact that the Srikakulam

struggle was publicised as being conducted under his direct theoretical leadership, and it was a regular practice to mention his inspiration and guidance in the earlier reports on Srikakulam. The report also maintained a discreet silence on the subject of "annihilation of class enemy campaign", and, more importantly, worked out a programme for economic struggles:

"We act, accordingly, taking into consideration the objective political and social conditions that prevail. We have decided to mobilise the people under the leadership of the CPI(ML) for fighting all kinds of exploitation. Appropriation of excess land and land illegally occupied by landlords, refusal to pay interest on usurious loans, appropriation of stock of grain held by landlords and selling such grain at fair prices, refusal to pay the so-called dues being collected by the revenue officials of the forest department — these are some of the issues on which the people should fight."<sup>57</sup>

The wheel had turned full circle by early 1971 and the movement was back to its pre-November 1968 position, but without its leading cadres and without much of its powerful, broad-based mass support. Almost nothing had been achieved, whereas a high price had been paid in terms of human life and bloodshed during the two years of the Srikakulam revolt.

Who were the leaders of the movement? In the girijan area the leader was Vempatapu Satyanarayana who came from the plains in 1960 as a teacher. He was immensely popular among the girijans — among both the Jatapu and the Savara tribes. On his death the movement lost not only a key leader but also the only person who could be most useful in retaining the loyalty and support of the tribals in the face of mounting police repression.<sup>58</sup> The party leadership was however vested in Pachadi Krishnamurthy, an MA from the plains, and after his death, on C Tejeswara Rao. Subbarao Panigrahi, a famous writer of Andhra, who originally came from Orissa, helped to extend the activities of CPI(ML) to the border villages of Orissa. Appalasuri was another key figure in the struggle. An interesting feature of the movement was the participation of engineering and medical students from other districts, who formed the middle ranks of the leadership.<sup>59</sup> It was reported in July 1970, that the tribals resented the leadership of students and others from the plains and claimed leadership for themselves, and that there were disagreements between the tribals and non-tribals on

many issues.<sup>60</sup>

### III

#### Red Bases in Other Areas

Like Srikakulam in Andhra, Midnapore in West Bengal was not known in the past for communist activities and the Congress and other kulak parties had a firm grip over its population. Debra and Gopiballavpur are two police station areas of Midnapore bordering Bihar and Orissa, with a large tribal component in their population. A significant element of the population of Gopiballavpur are the Mallakhatriyas, a caste which earned fame for organising a rebellion (Paik-Bidroha) against the British Raj. Debra is easily accessible from Calcutta which is about 80 miles away. Gopiballavpur is less accessible because of the Subranarekha river which forms its northern boundary. Both of these areas are covered by forests.

In both these places the leadership was taken by the students who came from outside. In Gopiballavpur the leaders were Ashim Chatterjee and Santosh Rana, the former a student leader of Presidency College of Calcutta, the latter a local boy who earned distinction as a brilliant student. Rana's caste background — he is a Mallakhatriya — also helped him in organising local support. A local tribal leader — Gunadhar Murmu — was also prominent in this revolt. In Debra the leaders were Bhabadeb Mondal, an advocate at the local court who contested unsuccessfully in the assembly election in 1967 as a CPI(M) candidate from that area, and also participated in various economic struggles of the tribals for several years preceding the launching of their Naxalite programme, and Ashoke Maity, who came from another area of Midnapore and was an important student leader and then a leading CPI(M) functionary in the district. A number of students from Calcutta also joined these leaders in their campaign for taking over power.

The movement was launched in Gopiballavpur on August 21, 1969, and on October 1 of the same year in Debra.<sup>61</sup> The movement in Debra started in 1967 under the auspices of CPI(M) in the form of economic struggles against black-marketeers, hoarders, and on the question of wages for the agricultural labourers, but it failed to make much headway, according to the Naxalites. These activities also exposed the CPI(M) organisation and invited repression from the authorities,

according to the Naxalite view. In 1968, the Debra leadership switched its allegiance to CPI(ML). But it was only after Charu Mazumdar's policy of annihilation was implemented that the CPI(ML) could register significant progress. The first two actions against landlords failed, but nevertheless, "from the lessons of these two guerilla actions we realised the necessity to drive still deeper the politics of 'annihilation of class enemies' among the cadres."<sup>62</sup>

Unlike the Naxalbari uprising, nothing was left to chance in this area, and the movement was much more disciplined and planned, according to Naxalite sources.<sup>63</sup> The leadership gave more importance to the actual control of village committees of peasants than to land distribution or such other issues, after the red bases were established. However, the Naxalites also organised the seizure of crops, the return of mortgaged property of poor peasants from the money-lenders, and the fixing of the wages of the landless labourers. The feudal elements who remained in the villages after the establishment of bases agreed to abide by the dictates of the Naxalites and in return the latter did not attempt to divest them from land ownership.

As in the case of Srikakulam, the annihilation policy scored immediate success in these two areas. Some landlords were killed, some fled to the towns, and others sought adjustments with the Naxalites. The power vacuum in the area caused by the abdication of authority by the feudal elements was filled by the Naxalites. The Naxalites claimed that "with every action mass initiative and class hatred of the peasants started growing and so did rise the level of their political consciousness."<sup>64</sup> Very few came forward after the murders to assist the police, and the latter did not dare to enter in small numbers into some areas.<sup>65</sup>

When the Debra-Gopiballavpur action began, West Bengal was under a United Front Government in which the CPI(M) leader Jyoti Basu was in charge of the Police portfolio. Although some arrests were made during this period, and the Eastern Frontier Rifles was deployed to help the police in that area, for understandable reasons the Police Minister was unwilling to do everything possible for suppressing the revolt. Unlike Srikakulam, where the Naxalites were being shot after arrest and were being subjected to inhuman torture, the police action in Debra and Gopiballavpur did not go beyond containing the activities of the Naxalites and throwing

a cordon round the affected villages. But after the fall of the United Front Government in March 1970, and the assumption of power by the Governor, the police force walked into "liberated areas" in massive strength and crushed the revolt within a short period. Almost the entire leadership was captured, as also many activists.

#### MUSAHARI UPRISING

Musahari of Muzaffarpur district, a small block of 12 villages, covering an approximate population of 10,000, became the focal point of Naxalite activity in Bihar after April 1968.<sup>66</sup>

As in the case of Srikakulam, the movement began on the basis of a set of economic issues, but afterwards, according to a report in *Liberation*, it "took a qualitative leap towards political struggle".<sup>67</sup> The issues were related to the rights for cutting trees and owning lands.

At the start the Naxalites only worked in two or three villages and harassed the landlords. On August 15, 1968, they took over the harvests of the landlords and then took out an armed procession through the villages of the Musahari block.<sup>68</sup> This action brought severe police repression, and according to Satyanarayan Singh, the Bihar leader of CPI(ML), brought the movement to its second stage, that of guerilla warfare. A series of attacks were made on the houses of landlords of the area, and six of them were killed within two months. In these raids the Naxalites burnt government records documents and seized food and other crops. It was reported in May 1969, that the movement then covered 20 villages and about 50,000 people. In the following year it was claimed that the movement had spread into seven police station areas of Muzaffarpur, as well as Darbhanga, Champaran, and South Monghyr districts of Bihar and Purulia of West Bengal. But as a result of 600 arrests within a very short time the movement soon lost its momentum.

A report of the Bihar State Committee of CPI(ML), published in the May 9, 1970 issue of *Frontier*, summarised a set of mistakes which had been committed by it in the past. According to the report the "boycotting of elections" slogan was not properly propagated among CPI(ML) members, and as a result some units of Ranchi, Sahabad, and Monghyr joined the election campaign of one party or another in 1969.<sup>69</sup>

On the Musahari struggle the report listed four mistakes: (a) There was

economism in the ideas of the leadership and, as a result, the launching of guerilla warfare was delayed. (b) The Party was not fully prepared to face repression and when it came, the Party's resistance was weak. (c) The Party relied on experts for guerilla training. "As a result of this erroneous notion, some of our leading comrades sought allies even among pseudo-political criminals".<sup>70</sup> (d) The Party relied too much on modern weapons instead of convincing the activists about the need to use ordinary weapons.

#### LAKHIMPORE-KHERI

The Palia area of Lakhimpore, bordering Nepal, was at one time wholly covered by forest which was inhabited by Tharus, a tribal people. Afterwards people from the plains moved in and virtually drove out the tribals from this area. The peasants from other areas were encouraged to come to this area, clear the forest and undertake cultivation and were given the inducement of owning 10 to 12 acres of land. However, the possession of land passed on to rich peasants and landlords, and the poor did not get the benefit of their hard work in making the place habitable and cultivable.<sup>71</sup>

The movement began in the form of economic struggles for establishing the rights of the poor peasants. At the beginning it was confined to about 11 villages, but shortly its message reached another 20 villages. In May 1968, the movement succeeded in mobilising a mass upheaval which immediately brought police repression. All the 11 original villages remained under police occupation for two weeks and three of the police camps were maintained for three months. The organisation was too weak to face this police onslaught and resorted to "passive defence".<sup>72</sup>

In any case, the movement never assumed the proportions which could justify the publicity it received. The organisation of CPI(ML) was weak from the very beginning. Initially, there were only 12 members in the unit of which only three were prepared to fight. There was no mass organisation. Revolutionary committees were set up in only three villages and even these did not function properly. The Party, however, drew consolation from the fact that "nine members of our first squad have taken a vow with the red book in their hands to work as a disciplined party and lead the revolution through to the end".

There were a number of interesting

features in this microscopic revolt. Firstly, it did not abandon the path of economic struggle: "The armed struggle for land will become a mighty torrent when it is combined with these struggles". Secondly, the unit was self-critical of its failure to build a mass organisation: "We could not fully assimilate the teachings of Comrade Mao and thought that the 'rural base area of peasant struggle' could be built up only by a handful of revolutionaries sitting in the forest. Several months passed before we again cared to study the 'Mass Line' of Chairman Mao and began to go to the people." Thirdly, the policy of annihilation of class enemies was not popular with them. In fact the Uttar Pradesh state committee of CPI(ML) was always sceptical about the wisdom of this policy.

A report published in *Liberation* ("Swift Advances of Peasant Guerilla Struggle in Uttar Pradesh), May-July, 1970, admitted losses suffered in Lakhimpore-Kheri, but mentioned in explanation that in this area "rousing of the people for class struggle through annihilation of class enemy was not taken up as the general line of present-day activity. This also expressed lack of determination".

#### IV

#### Appraisal

An interesting aspect of the Naxalite movement in the rural areas was that while its leadership was vested in the hands of the old guards (that is those who had been in the communist movement for many years), the great majority of the activists were newcomers to the movement. The overall leader was Charu Mazumdar, who had been an active member of the Communist Party since the forties. We have already seen that Vempatapu Satyanarayana, leader of Srikakulam, was functioning on behalf of the united Communist Party in that area from the late fifties, and both S N Singh (leader of Bihar) and Shiv Kumar Misra (leader of UP Lakhimpore-Kheri revolt) were members of the Central Committee of the CPI(Marxist) before they joined the Naxalites. The two most important leaders of the Naxalites at Debra were also locally active for many years, and one of them even contested the 1967 election from that area in 1967. The only exception to that rule were Ashim Chatterjee and Santosh Rana, who jointly led the Gopiballavpur uprising, none of whom were members of CPI(M) or CPI before they became Naxalites, although both of them were very close to the former for some time.

The two major components among the cadres were the college students and the tribals. The students of Presidency College of Calcutta were mainly responsible for the Debra-Gopiballavpur uprising, medical and engineering students in Andhra joined the Naxalites in Srikakulam, and some students of St Stephen's College of Delhi played an important role in Bihar and Punjab. We have already seen that Charu Mazumdar assigned to this component of the movement the task of organising the annihilation campaign. Although the total number of elite students actually going to the rural areas for organising revolts was not large, the deficiency in their number was more than matched by their dedication and intelligence.

In all these areas of Naxalite revolt the support they received from the tribals became crucial, and like Naxalbari, all these areas, particularly Srikakulam and Debra, carried on the tradition of organised mass activity by the Communists among the tribals. At the beginning of the revolts the Naxalites succeeded in mobilising tribals for attacks on the houses of landlords, but with a growing emphasis on annihilation by a small number of guerillas, rather than on mass action, tribal participation lessened. The fact that the Naxalites were not interested in redistribution of land also discouraged tribal support. When eventually the police repression began, not only of the Naxalites but also of the tribals for their alleged sympathy, the latter turned against the Naxalite activists.

The tribal support also proved to be a liability for the Naxalites in these areas. These were tiny tribal areas surrounded by the vast sea of non-tribal peasants. Neither in Srikakulam nor in Debra-Gopiballavpur was there any tradition of mass work among the non-tribal peasants. As a consequence the Naxalites failed to expand their activities among the peasants. In Debra the rivalry between the tribals and peasants was pointed out as an important weakness of the movement there by Charu Mazumdar himself.<sup>73</sup> Both in Srikakulam and Debra-Gopiballavpur the tribals and college students clashed with one another, the former complaining that the latter were trying to dominate them.<sup>74</sup>

In contrast with the support they received from the tribals in these areas, the Naxalites found little response among the peasants. The students who were sent to the villages were considered outsiders by the villagers, no matter how best they tried to integrate themselves with the latter. A man from the

town is generally distrusted by the villagers and it takes a lot of patience to gain their confidence; the leaders among the tribals in Srikakulam and Naxalbari worked for many years in the villages before they could win their hearts. Both Satyanarayana and Sanyal could speak tribal dialects and the former married two tribal wives. In absence of local cadres and mass support it is difficult for any revolutionary party to survive in the countryside. The annihilation policy of the Naxalites in the non-tribal areas made things worse for them. The Naxalites expected the rural poor to shake off their inertia and fear and join them after the hated and oppressive moneylender or kulak had been murdered. But in actual practice the opposite happened. The murders and the conspiratorial nature of the Naxalite organisation generated fear among the landless and poor and repelled them from the movement. In the absence of political propaganda, the villagers saw in the campaign for the liquidation of class enemies nothing more than the murder of a co-villager by strangers from the towns. Furthermore, by their rejection of mass activity and organisation, the Naxalites invited their isolation from the masses. They refused to undertake those programmes which could bring immediate relief to the poor on the ground that these struggles would amount to economism. On the other hand, the call for seizure of power was difficult for the poor and politically backward peasants to comprehend. The Naxalites failed to gain the trust of the villagers because they put forward slogans which were too advanced for the backward peasantry to appreciate; while the latter did not find that the Naxalites associated with struggles whose purpose and meaning they could understand, such as the struggle for the redistribution of land in favour of the poor and landless. Slogans like "China's Chairman Is Our Chairman" were also out of tune with the reality of the countryside.<sup>75</sup> Ashim Chatterjee, who claimed to have conducted 120 annihilations in the Bengal border area with Bihar and Orissa, lamented a few months before his arrest in 1971 that despite so many murders his organisation had failed to recruit a single poor or landless peasant because its activities were not linked with the masses.<sup>76</sup>

A consequence of the annihilation campaign was the introduction of the lumpen element into the movement. Both Kanu Sanyal in his famous Terai report,<sup>77</sup> and S N Singh in his report on Musahari,<sup>78</sup> noted the presence of "pseudo-political criminals" or "vaga-

bonds" among leading activists, and would blunt the class hatred of the revolutionaries. This attitude, according to Chatterjee, amounted to cowardice on the part of the leadership and strengthened the machinery of the state.<sup>84</sup> Almost all these critics, barring S N Singh, indicated the blanket prohibition on mass activities as the most serious weakness of the movement. The annihilation policy also raised the theoretical issue about the suitability of "offensive tactics". Nagi Reddy, S N Singh and Kunika Narayan felt that people's war should begin not as an offensive but as resistance to the attacks and repression by the landlords. They quoted from Mao's writings to show that defensive actions were no less important in a revolutionary war, and only the most stupid person would not think of arranging defence when fighting against a mighty enemy in a desperate situation. To this criticism, Mazumdar's reply was simply that "the main dividing line between the revisionists and the revolutionaries is that the former demands the guarantee of success as precondition for embarking on struggles, whereas the revolutionaries courageously take up fighting and win victory."<sup>85</sup> Mazumdar was also criticised for distorting Mao's concept of annihilation, which was limited to combat with the armed forces of the enemy and never took the form of secret assassination. The critics quoted Mao to show that while he wanted the liquidation of landlords as a class, he opposed their annihilation as individuals.<sup>86</sup>

A second aspect of these uprisings and the annihilation campaign was the split it caused among the Naxalite ranks on various ideological and tactical points. Parimal Dasgupta, Asit Sen, and others branded the annihilation policy as "Guevarism" and "individual terrorism", as opposed to the idea of "people's war" and as having no support among the people. Mazumdar's reply to this criticism was that whereas Guevara was waging his struggle with the support of petty bourgeois intellectuals and weapons, the Naxalites relied on the co-operation of the masses for the success of their attempt.<sup>80</sup> Nagi Reddy was not opposed to individual murders as such, but wanted these to be linked with the mass movement which, according to him, was not what the Naxalites were doing.<sup>81</sup> Satyanarayana Sinha was also not opposed to annihilation as such. In fact he implemented this policy in a small way in Musahari and some other parts of Bihar. But he was opposed to the killing of rich peasants while Mazumdar considered the latter's relationship with the party an antagonistic one.<sup>82</sup> Sushital Rai-Choudhuri was opposed to "indiscriminate killings" while supporting the murder of police, military, informers and some selected class enemies.<sup>83</sup> Chatterjee was critical of another aspect of the annihilation campaign — its insistence on killing "class enemies" alongside its reluctance to attack the police and military establishments on the ground that such attacks

would blunt the class hatred of the revolutionaries. This attitude, according to Chatterjee, amounted to cowardice on the part of the leadership and strengthened the machinery of the state.<sup>84</sup> Almost all these critics, barring S N Singh, indicated the blanket prohibition on mass activities as the most serious weakness of the movement.

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The controversy over the annihilation theory within the Naxalite movement raised another tactical question related to the principle of guerilla warfare — whether the same tactic was equally applicable to all parts of India or not. While Mazumdar took the 'universalist' line that the annihilation campaign, which according to him was the first stage of guerilla warfare, was applicable everywhere in India, Nagi Reddy, Satyanarayan Singh, and Ashim Chatterjee emphasised the "uneven character of the Indian revolution".

All these differences had far-reaching implications for the party organisation. The state units of Bihar and UP withdrew from Mazumdar's organisation, and both Sushital Rai-Choudhuri and Ashim Chatterjee continued fighting against Mazumdar's line and leadership within CPI(ML) until the former's death and the latter's arrest. Nagi Reddy dissociated his organisation from CPI(ML) when it was formed, and the Srikakulam unit of Andhra also opted out of Mazumdar's leadership in 1970. Finally, the Chinese Party also criticised the an-

annihilation line in a secret message sent to CPI(ML) in 1970, whose circulation among the Party ranks was not allowed by Mazumdar. This message was circulated only after his death in 1972.

The annihilation line was subsequently applied to Calcutta when the Naxalites began their activities in a big way in that city in April 1971. In this campaign anti-socials and teenage school dropouts played an important role, while the college students — many of whom were now branded "doubtists" because of their opposition to the annihilation line — were pushed into the background.<sup>87</sup>

A third aspect of these armed revolts was that very little thought was given to planning and organisation before they were launched. Almost no prior thought was given to the all important question of how to react to massive police offensives. When the police came in large number no resistance could be offered by the Naxalites. In the case of the Srikakulam girijan area, no prior planning was done to spread the revolt to the surrounding plains where there was no tradition of left-wing activity. The areas and population covered by these attempts were extremely small — the number of villages affected by the Naxalite campaign did not exceed 200 in a country with 600,000 villages — and widely dispersed. So long as the revolts remained confined to some isolated pockets scattered over the whole country it was not difficult for the ruling class in India to suppress them without much difficulty.

There was no prior preparation because, according to the Naxalite theory of armed struggle, that was not necessary. In the Naxalite view the Indian ruling class consisted of comprador bourgeoisie and feudal elements, who were working as puppets of United States imperialism and Soviet social imperialism; this ruling class lacked popular support and was dependent on their military strength alone for survival.<sup>88</sup> On the other hand, the people of India were ready for armed struggle. What was needed in this situation was to light a "spark" somewhere in the country, which would then spread like "prairie fire" from one end of the country to another.<sup>89</sup> The Naxalites were encouraged by the response to the Naxalbari revolt, and expected Srikakulam to become the "Yenan of India". Mazumdar wrote in March 1971, "From the feet of the Himalayas in the north to the river estuary in the south and the sal forests in the south-west, West Bengal's countryside is resounding with the footsteps of brave peasant guerrillas",<sup>90</sup>

and predicted that the people's liberation army would march all over the sprawling plains of Bengal "by the beginning of 1971, if not in 1970".<sup>91</sup> Comparing the Chinese experience Mazumdar declared that the Indian revolutionaries were better placed than the Chinese during their years of struggle. Whereas the Chinese PLA was encircled by enemy troops from time to time, "every corner of India is like a volcano, the armed struggle at Srikakulam can not remain confined within that region only. And this struggle is spreading and will spread very fast into different areas of the country thereby making enemy encirclement impossible".<sup>92</sup> It was this excessive optimism about the subjective preparation of the people of India for revolution and the faulty understanding about the character of Indian state power and the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian ruling class, which made the Naxalites indifferent about the elementary technical aspects of guerilla warfare.

Lastly, we can summarise the experiences of these armed revolts in the rural areas. The principal weakness of the movement was its belief that the people of India would rise up in revolt as soon as a call for armed struggle was given. In Srikakulam, while the Naxalites received support from the tribals, their activities were not spreading into the surrounding plains. The occasional raids on the houses of landlords in the plains, while sustaining the movement in the tribal belt, failed to make much impact in the plains. The leadership was quick to realise that it was not possible to protect their gains in the tribal areas alone for long, since sooner or later the police force was bound to arrive. The leadership was obviously in a dilemma. It wanted to spread Naxalite activities to the plains without involving the CPI(ML) in mass movements and struggles which were time consuming. In the annihilation tactic they thought that they had found an alternative to mass organisation and activities for spreading their influence in new areas.

The annihilation policy was an immediate success. As soon as two or three landlords were killed the others ran away to the safety of the towns or became ardent supporters of the Naxalites overnight. These killings created a power vacuum in the villages and the Naxalites stepped in to fill the void. They described these areas as "liberated" because they could move around freely within their boundaries. They claimed success for this policy, because, even in the absence of mass organisation in the past, they now controlled

these areas because of the annihilation campaign. Soon the number of murders of class enemies became the criterion by which the Naxalites began judging the revolutionary tempo of a certain locality. Whenever an annihilation took place in a new area, the event was equated by the Naxalites with the spread of revolution to that area.

However, the guerillas did not take the masses into confidence in the "liberated areas". The assassinations were done by a handful of activists, the criminal elements in the villages were drawn towards the movement, and the economic demands of the villagers were ignored. All these factors alienated the Naxalites further from the masses. The Naxalites also underestimated 'white terror' and over-estimated their own strength. They had very few guns, an utterly inadequate supply of ammunition, almost no training in guerilla warfare and ideology, and worst of all, the people were not on their side in their conflict with the police. The police force met with feeble resistance when it entered these "liberated" areas and was brutal in its suppression of the movement. The police just killed off the Naxalite leaders and carried out inhuman tortures on the people. The same story was repeated in Debra, Gopiballapur and Musahari.

### Notes

- 1 S N Singh, "Building Up the Proletarian Party and Agrarian Revolution", *Liberation*, November 1969, and also "Agrarian Revolution and Crisis within the Reactionary Classes", *Liberation*, September 1969. Singh thought that to oppose annihilation was tantamount to preaching co-existence of landlords and peasantry in the villages.
- 2 Charu Mazumdar, "March Forward by Summing up the Experience of the Peasant Revolutionary Struggle in India", *Liberation*, December 1969.
- 3 "Revolutionary Armed Peasant Struggle in Debra, West Bengal" *Liberation*, December 1969.
- 4 *Ibid*.
- 5 From several reports appearing in *Liberation*.
- 6 "Srikakulam Guerilla Struggle Extends to the Plains, a Lesson", *Liberation*, October 1969.
- 7 Charu Mazumdar, "A Few Words about Guerilla Warfare", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 8 Charu Mazumdar, "March Forward..." *Liberation*, December 1969.
- 9 Several reports appearing in *Liberation*.
- 10 Charu Mazumdar, "A Few Words about Guerilla Actions", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 11 "Revolutionary Armed Peasant

- Struggle in Debra, West Bengal" *Liberation*, December 1969.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 See notes 28, 29, 30.
- 15 Charu Mazumdar, "Carry Forward the Peasant Struggle...", *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 16 Charu Mazumdar, "Undertake the Work of Building a Revolutionary Party", *Liberation*, October 1968.
- 17 Charu Mazumdar, "Develop Peasants' Class Struggle through Class Analysis, Investigation and Study" *Liberation*, November 1968.
- 18 "Revolutionary Armed Peasant Struggle of Musahari Region", *Liberation*, February 1969.
- 19 "Armed Peasant Struggle in the Palia Area of Lakhimpore", *Liberation*, April 1969.
- 20 Charu Mazumdar, "A Few Words about Guerilla Actions", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 21 Charu Mazumdar, "Carry Forward the Peasant Struggle...", *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 22 Charu Mazumdar, "A Few Words about Guerilla Actions", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 23 Charu Mazumdar, "March Forward by Summing Up the Experience of the Peasant Revolutionary Struggle of India", *Liberation*, December 1969.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 "Guerilla Warfare" by a peasant organiser, *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 26 *Liberation*, October 1969.
- 27 *Liberation*, January 1970.
- 28 Charu Mazumdar, "On Some Current Political and Organisational Problems", *Liberation*, July 1969.
- 29 Charu Mazumdar, "A Few Words about Guerilla Actions", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 30 *Liberation*, January 1970.
- 31 "Revolutionary Armed Struggle in Debra, West Bengal", *Liberation*, December 1969. Also, Charu Mazumdar "A Few Words about Guerilla Actions", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 32 Sanjoy, "Frankly Speaking", *Frontier*, March 28, 1970.
- 33 Charu Mazumdar, "Carry Forward..." *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 34 Charu Mazumdar, "A Few Words about Guerilla Actions", *Liberation*, February 1970.
- 35 There were some scattered incidents in Nellore, Guntur and Krishna districts. See, *Hindustan Times*, May 21, 1970.
- 36 See "Telengana is Rising Again", *Liberation*, May 1969, where the following appeared in connection with the separatist movement: "Heroic Telengana is rising again in revolt. From one end of Telengana to the other the people are on the march. The cry, 'We want a separate Telengana state' resounds throughout the nine districts, now a part of Andhra Pradesh. They are taking to the path of armed struggle to overthrow the rule of the landlords and other exploiting classes and establish their own state from which poverty, hunger, and unemployment, exploitation and oppression will be banished."
- 37 *Liberation*, January 1970.
- 38 "On the Girijan Struggle in Srikakulam", *Liberation*, December 1968.
- 39 *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 40 "The Revolutionary Girijans Are Learning Warfare Through Warfare", *Liberation*, February 1969.
- 41 *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 42 See section one of article.
- 43 *Liberation*, July 1969.
- 44 Charu Mazumdar, "Srikakulam — Will It Be the Yenan of India?", *Liberation*, March 1969.
- 45 *Liberation*, August 1969.
- 46 *Liberation*, July 1969.
- 47 "Avenge the Murder of the Heroic Martyrs of Srikakulam", *Liberation*, January 1970.
- 48 *Statesman*, July 13, 1970.
- 49 *Times of India*, July 27, 1970.
- 50 *Times of India*, July 27, 1970.
- 50 *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, August 8, 1970.
- 51 "Persecution Served to Intensify the Struggle; Experience of Srikakulam", *Liberation*, March 1970. See also, "Armed Guerilla Struggle Spreads in Srikakulam", *Liberation*, May-July 1970.
- 52 *Liberation*, July 1970; *Statesman*, July 13, 1970.
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 *Times of India*, July 27, 1970.
- 55 *Hindustan Times*, May 21, 1970.
- 56 "Report on Srikakulam by CPI(ML) Regional Committee", *Frontier*, March 20, 1971.
- 57 *Ibid.*
- 58 *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, July 16, 1970; *Liberation*, September 1969.
- 59 Mohit Sen, "Naxalites and Naxalism", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, 1971.
- 60 *Hindustan Times*, May 21, 1970.
- 61 "Revolutionary Armed Struggle in Debra, West Bengal" *Liberation*, December 1969; *Liberation*, January 1970.
- 62 "Revolutionary Armed Struggle in Debra, West Bengal", *Liberation*, December 1969.
- 63 Abhijnan Sen, "The Naxalite Tactical Line", *Frontier*, July 4, 1970.
- 64 *Liberation*, January 1970.
- 65 *Hindustan Times*, January 6, 1970 and June 6, 1970.
- 66 *Liberation*, February 1969, "Revolutionary Armed Struggle of Musahari Region".
- 67 *Ibid.*
- 68 Satyanarayan Singh, "Musahari and Its Lessons", *Liberation*, October 1969. See also, N K Singh, "CPI(ML) Report", *Frontier*, May 9, 1970.
- 69 N K Singh, "CPI(ML) Report", *Frontier*, May 9, 1970. See also "Peasant Guerilla Struggle Forges Ahead in Bihar", *Liberation*, May-July 1970, which mentions about seven annihilations in Musahari, Darbhanga, Monghyr, Purnea and Ranchi.
- 70 Satyanarayan Singh, "Building Up the Proletarian Party and Agrarian Revolution", *Liberation*, November 1969.
- 71 "Armed Peasant Struggle in the Palia Area of Lakhimpore", *Liberation*, April 1969.
- 72 *Ibid.*
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