

THE EFFECTS OF THE DRAFT ON U.S. PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RATINGS  
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, 1954 - 1975

by

BRETT E. MORRIS

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in the area of Political Science  
in the Graduate School of  
The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2006

# Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved*  
*OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>19 JUN 2006</b>	2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>	3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>The Effects Of The Draft On U.S. Presidential Approval Ratings During The Vietnam War, 1954 - 1975</b>		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
		5b. GRANT NUMBER	
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
		5e. TASK NUMBER	
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>The University of Alabama</b>		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>AFIT/CIA, Bldg 125 2950 P Street WPAFB, OH 45433</b>		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>			
14. ABSTRACT			
15. SUBJECT TERMS			
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>	<b>UU</b>
			18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>226</b>
			19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Submitted by Brett E. Morris in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy specializing in Political Science.

Accepted on behalf of the Faculty of the Graduate School by the dissertation committee:

---

Stephen A. Borrelli, Ph.D.

---

Barbara A. Chotiner, Ph.D.

---

Patrick R. Cotter, Ph.D.

---

Jamie DeCoster, Ph.D.

---

Donald M. Snow, Ph.D.  
Chairperson

---

David J. Lanoue, Ph.D.  
Department Chairperson

---

Date

---

Ronald W. Rogers, Ph.D.  
Dean of the Graduate School

---

Date

## DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many merit thanks for their patience and assistance. I especially want to thank committee chair, Dr. Donald M. Snow, for his support and persistence. Thanks go also to the other committee members for their sage advice. My compliments go to Drs. Stephen Borelli, Barbara Chotiner, Patrick Cotter, and Jamie DeCoster. Dr. Chotiner, your willingness to join the effort with such short notice, has been nothing short of superhuman. I appreciate the efforts each of you took in reading many successive drafts and providing the tools necessary to complete this dissertation.

Thanks also go to many of my Air Force colleagues. Foremost, I'd like to thank Dr. Charles Costanzo, Chairman of the Department of International Relations and National Security Studies at Air Command and Staff College, without whose help this dissertation may never have been completed. In addition, thanks are due to Majors Bill Polakowski, Matt Hurley, and Kenton Ruthardt, who bore the brunt of my dissertation travails. Thanks also go to Captain Tamara O'Donnell and her comrades at the Air Force Institute of Technology who helped get this product through the bureaucratic hoops.

Finally, those closest to my heart merit the greatest thanks as well as condolences for putting up with me over the years. Thank you for your continuous support and encouragement that allowed me to finish this dissertation and all that came before it. To you, I offer my most heartfelt thanks and undying love.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
ABSTRACT.....	xi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Why study the effects of the Vietnam draft on presidential approval?.....	9
Statement of the Problem.....	11
Purpose and Significance of the Research.....	12
Objectives and Outline of the Study.....	13
CHAPTER 2: VIETNAM.....	15
Early U.S. Involvement.....	17
1955 to 1963 – The Tide Changes and Policies Muddle.....	19
1964 to 1969: The Tide of War Rises.....	22
1970 to 1975: The Tide of War Ebbs.....	28
CHAPTER 3: THE DRAFT.....	32
Military Conscription.....	32
A National Draft: Product of the Civil War.....	34
World War I Cements a National Draft Structure.....	36
World War II Extends the National Draft.....	38
Korea Causes Adaptation of the National Draft.....	40
Vietnam and the Continuing Utility of the Draft.....	43
Challenges to the Vietnam-Era Draft System.....	45
Protests, Politics, and Draft Reform.....	47
The Turning of the Tide during the Nixon Years.....	50
CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	55
Existing Research on the Effects of the Draft.....	56
An Argument for the Impact of the Draft on Presidential Approval.....	59
Theoretical Underpinnings.....	63
Summary.....	87
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY AND DATA.....	88
Hypotheses.....	88

Research Design.....	91
Methodology.....	93
Statistical Analysis.....	96
Data.....	106
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS.....	118
Hypotheses Test Expectations.....	118
ARIMA Modeling.....	119
Univariate Analysis.....	122
Multivariate Models.....	130
Causality Testing.....	144
Summary.....	159
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION.....	161
Examination of Hypotheses.....	163
Findings.....	173
Implications.....	178
Limitations.....	183
Future Research.....	184
Conclusion.....	185
REFERENCES.....	188
APPENDICES	
Appendix A: Draft Classification Categories as of 1968.....	228
Appendix B: Critical Events Registers.....	229



## LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 6.1 Final Output Series Model Statistics.....	121
Table 6.2 Significant Results from Period 1 – 1954-1964.....	124
Table 6.3 Significant Results from Period 2 – 1964-1973.....	126
Table 6.4 Significant Results from Period 3 – 1973-1975.....	126
Table 6.5 Significant Results from the Overall Period – 1954-1975.....	128
Table 6.6 Results from Final Multivariate Model – Period 1.....	131
Table 6.7 Results from Final Multivariate Model – Period 2.....	134
Table 6.8 Results from Final Multivariate Model – Period 3 .....	136
Table 6.9 Results from Final Multivariate Model – Overall Period.....	139
Table 6.10 Cumulative Draft Decay Model Results.....	141

## LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 3.1. Cumulative and Draft-Induced Volunteer Rates.....	39
Figure 5.1. Presidential Approval Series.....	107
Figure 5.2. Comparison of Economic Series.....	108
Figure 5.3. Comparison of Military Casualty Series.....	112
Figure 5.4. Comparison of Draft Series.....	115
Figure 6.1. Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Period 1.....	132
Figure 6.2. Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Period 2.....	135
Figure 6.3. Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Period 3.....	138
Figure 6.4. Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Overall.....	144



## ABSTRACT

A gap exists in understanding and modeling the Vietnam War era for lack of qualitative studies into the political effect of the military draft. Using presidential approval ratings as a proxy assessment of the country's well-being and political strength, this work seeks to fill the void by evaluating the effects of the Vietnam-era draft on presidential approval between 1954 and 1975.

With a basis in rational theory, it uses Autoregressive Moving Average time series analysis, both univariate and multivariate, in a quasi-experimental design to detect significant changes. Further, it employs Granger Causality Testing to evaluate the degree and directionality of causation for those independent time series found to have a significant relationship with approval.

The study finds both direct and indirect effects of the draft upon presidential approval that vary by period. The draft shifts from having no impact on aggregated approval ratings to a negative impact as the conflict mounts. This suggests public resistance grew as conflict costs increased. Following the end of the draft, mixed results occur with significance shown for both monthly and cumulative draft series. The monthly series demonstrates a positive effect on approval while the cumulative series continues to demonstrate a negative effect. It is postulated that these divergent results indicate an immediate positive response to the end of the draft while the residual negative

effects still lingered. Finally, analysis of the results from the overall period shows a significant, positive effect.

Causality testing further supports the importance of the military draft as one of only three independent series that demonstrated statistical causality as well as a significant relationship with presidential approval in both univariate and multivariate testing. An interactive term representing the combined effects of casualties and the draft also met these criteria while other popular measures such as the economy and casualties failed to show such indisputable evidence of shaping presidential approval.

These results pertain to historical studies as well as subsequent examinations of involuntary conscription, either directly in a military draft or indirectly through presidential use of military reserve forces. There may also be relevance for civilian federal service programs.

## CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

In the wake of September 11, 2001, the United States faced a new challenge for which it was largely unprepared. While struggling to define future threats, the military remained a technology-heavy, Cold War-based force that had learned little from the changing defense climate implicit in the globalization of the 1990s. Attacks on U.S. government targets in the Middle East and Africa had quickly passed from the forefront of the American consciousness. However, a long simmering conflict in the Third World exploded upon the American consciousness in an undeniable way. Evidence that the world had changed was unavoidable after these attacks on key American institutions situated on American soil. Adding to the shock of these events was the apparent lack of readiness on the part of the U.S. government. As this new reality converged with the foreign policy aims of the American neo-conservative movement, changes were inevitable.

These changes demanded sufficient military manpower to meet a continuous global threat to include occupying two or more foreign countries. Given a military and a public accustomed to high-tech warfare employed by limited forces, a whole range of stop-gap measures were proposed: stop-loss orders, widespread use of the reserves and National Guard, recalls to active duty, and finally, suggestions for a military draft. Though the Department of Defense denies any interest in a new draft, it is clear that traditional means to recruit and retain military manning will, at best, be hard pressed to

attain satisfactory results if commitments continue to grow. Yet, this begs the question of whether the draft could work practically or politically. This paper addresses aspects of the latter.

Although the longest military draft in U.S. history ran from 1940 to 1972, no empirical study appears in the literature to predict the impact of such an eventuality. How would a draft affect the nation, especially in terms of the nation's view of the commander-in-chief? Could the president survive such a program, especially when popular support drops as conflict costs increase? Though the draft might be discussed in some defense circles, it would dramatically change large swathes of military policy and practice. This alone is counter to the "inherent conservatism of military planners and practitioners" who seek to manage change in large part by keeping all things under their control in a relative stasis (Snow, 1999, p. 96). This culture helped inspire repeated confrontations between DOD and Congress for at least a decade, as military leaders demanded technological improvements over personnel expansion. The more budget cuts loomed, the more expendable people became. Therefore, the likelihood of a renewed draft would seem unlikely.

The military's "intellectual and physical attachment to the Cold War" further reinforced this attitude since technology was seen as the savior of that period (Snow, 1999, p. 97). For nearly 30 years after WWII, the draft remained an accepted artifact limited consequence. High-tech weapons and professional militaries increasingly predominated. Despite massive standing armies on both sides of the Cold War divide, the true accounting almost always came down to the technologically-based components of the nuclear triad. People were secondary. That changed after the fall of the Berlin

Wall. However, the “lack of urgency in making military adjustments” kept most military leaders from advocating any long-range planning that did not respond directly to peer competitor threats (Snow, 1999, p. 97). The costs of Vietnam would drive another change in practice rather than philosophy. The protests and problems of the Vietnam era led political and military leaders to eliminate the draft and restructure the military. The new military posture continued to focus primarily on peer threats, but it employed a restructured military with major support components turned over to the National Guard and reserves. The aim was simple. Avoid another Vietnam by using public opinion as the brake on any large scale or long-term conflict since the military could no longer go to war without the reserves.

Until 2001, this mindset prevailed thus keeping a post-Vietnam military functioning with post-Desert Storm bravado. High-tech, professional militaries remained the answer regardless the question. As Barnett (2004, p. 139) notes, “in the early 1990s, all four services were already going out of their way to show how little their role in U.S. national security would change *simply* because the Soviets went away.” Finding new, imposing threats became an imperative for the service chiefs who hoped to protect their budgets. However, those who advocated change often came under tremendous pressure from entrenched interests. Even those who made it to the top of the heap were not immune as evidenced by the literal demise of Admiral J. M. Boorda, Navy Chief of Staff, and the political demise of General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff. Both had promoted changes that others deemed radical. Both paid the price. Ironically, Shinseki’s move toward a lighter, more readily deployable Army now seems prophetic. Post-9/11

warfare has demanded just such an approach. However, it has taken the slogging, manpower intensive combat of Iraq to bring other questions to the fore.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the immediate response of the national command authorities was to bring National Guard and reserve forces to ready status in preparation for further attacks. Initially, this came through a hodge-podge of efforts because the defense structure had never adequately planned for such a contingency. Despite ebb periods, the number steadily increased until it peaked at 183,621 in early February 2005 (DOD News Releases Archive, 2005). This came in addition to dozens of stop-loss orders that pushed military manpower levels beyond authorized end strengths. Both of these changes were authorized by Executive Order 13223 (2001). In terms of the Army, which had been the hardest hit by new demands, these efforts forced more than 81,000 soldiers to stay that would have otherwise left the service. Over 46,000 of these were National Guard or reserve members (Philpott, 2004). This process continues in various forms as the Army struggles to keep up its end strength. Not surprisingly, the result has been increasing dissatisfaction in the ranks as well as greater challenges in meeting recruiting and retention goals. This proved a prominent feature of the 2004 Presidential Debates with Senator John Kerry charging President George W. Bush with using stop-loss measures as a “back door” draft. Bush avoided a direct response to this charge in the second debate. In the third debate, he responded with a defense of volunteerism within the military ranks.

"This is like eating your seed corn," said Phillip Carter because the lack of volunteerism has encouraged the widespread use of stop-loss orders and involuntary activations (Krugman, 2004, p. A27). Opponents also cite the unprecedented use of the



National Guard, federal military reserves, especially the Inactive Ready Reserve, as de facto draft mechanisms. "It reflects the fact that the military is too small, which nobody wants to admit," said Charles Moskos, a military sociologist and one-time Army draftee (Hockstader, 2003, p. A1). A long-time advocate of obligatory service programs, Moskos argued that the "the military draft is a necessity now in the war against terrorism, and we need a new form of conscription for the 21st century" (Puskar, 2004, p. 1). In fact, Moskos' envisions a three-tiered draft that benefits not only the military but also homeland security and social programs through compulsory service. Though an increasing number of voices expressed concern over a return to military drafts, little has been done to reactivate the existing system or create a replacement.

The current registration system for males turning 18 seems little more than another federal paperwork requirement, but it has not been ignored. Since its reactivation in 1980 after being in deep standby since 1973, millions have registered. Others avoided registering; thereby leading many to call this the most ignored law since prohibition. In 1982, Congress added teeth to the effort with the Solomon Amendment that required registration of 18 to 25-year-old males as a precondition for federal student aid. The 1985 Thurmond Amendment became law with the aim of precluding non-registrants from federal jobs or, in the case of immigrants, citizenship. It allows provided penalties of up to \$250,000 in fines and five years in prison for those convicted of failing to register. In addition, many states have joined the federal government in promoting draft registration. Some find these activities lending credence to the possible return of a draft. As of Oct. 27, 2004, 41 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia had enacted their own legislation aimed at enforcing male registration with the SSS (SSS, 2004). In all, more

than 70 separate laws have been enacted with the purpose of forcing draft registration by threatening college enrollment, student aid, welfare payments, government employment, and driver's licenses. More than half were enacted since 2001.

The activities of the SSS also suggest it is far from moribund. It maintains a base of over 2,000 draft boards nationwide that receive annual training. Though implementing the draft would take an act of Congress and several months to produce the first inductions, it would take far longer without the current system in place. Further this system also services the recruiting functions of the military as it feeds every registrant's data into military recruiting channels (Garamone, 2001). Recently, this partnership has heightened concerns when "normal activities" spurred widespread concern such as the widely reported notice placed on the DOD website "Defend America" on September 23, 2003. The notice encouraged people to apply for positions on one of the more than 2,000 local draft and appeal boards. Members of these bodies "would decide which young men, who submit a claim, receive deferments, postponements or exemptions from military service, based on Federal guidelines" (Talk Of Military Draft Heating Up, 2003, p. A10). Protests came immediately, although the notice was withdrawn.

DOD officials said little and the president denied any interest in a new draft. Opponents saw their latent fears fanned to life. Fear of a renewed draft to support prolonged conflicts triggered many protests, though most were in the virtual domain. These included a wide-ranging e-mail campaign warning recipients that the election of George W. Bush would spell the reinstatement of the draft within 2005 (Mikkelson & Mikkelson, 2004). Though linked to pro-Kerry forces, other matters such as the DOD draft board appeal, recent arrests of Vietnam deserters, restrictions at the Canadian border

to curb new evaders, and other real or perceived actions heightened fears (Goldenberg, 2003; Farrell, 2003; Zaslofsky, 2006; Merritt, 2006). Recent federal legislation has also aroused concerns.

Recently, several bills were introduced in Congress but with little success. Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) introduced H. R. 163 on January 7, 2003 to call for a reinstatement of the draft. Despite widespread reaction to the bill, it was introduced as a vehicle to highlight inequality and protest the war rather than a serious attempt at returning to the draft. Rangel's bill failed in the house, 402-2, on October 5, 2004. Rangel himself voted against the bill. A similar measure was introduced in the Senate, but it never left committee. Notably, H.R. 4746, The Selective Service Termination Act introduced June 23, 2004, received far more support but did not reach the floor for vote. It would have defunded most Selective Service operations as well as suspending registration and draft boards. These actions helped keep draft fears alive.

Arguments by defense leaders that they have no interest in a draft were undermined by Representative Neil Abercrombie's (D-HI) inclusion of a DOD memo in the Congressional Record which detailed a meeting by senior leaders (*Congressional Record*, 2004). Though the conclusion of the meeting memo did not call for a reinstatement of the draft, it did suggest Selective Service Act modifications to include registration by women and self-reporting of critical skills that could serve to meet military, homeland defense, and humanitarian needs (*Congressional Record*, 2004). This may hint at more targeted draft options, perhaps like that of the "Doctor Draft" that began in the 1950s to provide nearly 66% of the medical professionals need by the Army in Korea (Salyer, 1954). Once created this manpower tool continued to be through 1972.

The meeting memo gave DOD's primary reason for opposing a draft as matters of cost effectiveness and efficiency. Draftees with less than two years retention were said to be a drain on military resources without providing much commensurate benefit.

Again, this fueled the arguments of draft opponents who pointed to more targeted or longer drafts as being consistent with DOD planning, especially since it parallels some recent work by the SSS. Among its projects, the service had worked on a critical skill database to meet national security needs as well as updates to its plans for emergency call up of health professionals via the Health Care Personnel Delivery System (HCPDS). The HCPDS was never fully developed, though the critical skills draft did reach final stages but was then mothballed (SSS, 2002). Together, these helped to bolster the view that a draft by another name might lie in the near future.

Others argue that the draft already exists in a different form. Just as the Vietnam era draft was said to have drawn its numbers largely from the poorer elements of society, so to the current military recruitment process relies on the economically disadvantaged to maintain end strength. This "economic draft" offers the military as the employer of last resort for many needy youth, thus negating the need for a return to the traditional draft (Hendrick, 2005).

Meanwhile, the services continue to downplay the need for more personnel in public statements including those involving budgets as evidenced in an exchange between Senator Carl Levin, senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Forces Committee, and General Peter Schoomaker, Army chief of staff. Levin upbraided Schoomaker for presenting a budget that intentionally hid manpower needs. Schoomaker explained he had been directed by the Bush administration to ask for the 30,000 manpower slots later.

Schoomaker later explained the need for nearly \$1.2 billion for every additional 10,000 troops brought on active duty. Further, each service chief swore to the committee that recruiting and retention were minor problems unlikely to prevent them from meeting their manpower quotas (*Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearing on the FY 2006 Defense Budget, 2005*).

Despite tremendous hype and speculation, there remains no clear evidence that a return to a military draft is imminent. However, the likelihood of its return is arguably greater today than in any time since its mothballing in 1973. Though parts of the military are struggling to meet manpower requirements, it seems likely that a draft will remain politically unacceptable unless other factors change. For example, as Brookings Institute researcher Michael O'Hanlon (2004) argues, the United States may be forced into reinstating the draft if long-term occupation further erodes military manning. His proposed solution would be to increase manpower levels using greater financial incentives under the current volunteer system. Although opposed by the Secretary of Defense, this could preempt the need for a draft. With some military units now deploying to Iraq for the third time and over 50,000 reservists now involuntarily activated twice, this would seem prudent albeit challenging (O'Hanlon, 2004). However, even with this, O'Hanlon acknowledges another conflict added to existing burdens might make a draft inevitable, especially when considering the requirements inherent in long-term occupation and nation building.

Given the administration's current handling of Syria, Iran, and North Korea combined with its amenability to neo-conservative advisors who favor military action against these states, another conflict could be a matter of when rather than if. From a

political viewpoint, the cost of a draft would seem far greater than any benefits derived from an increased manpower pool aimed at fighting rogue states. However, little understanding exists for the costs and benefits a draft might generate in terms of political approval and support. Thus, the study of the draft and its effects bears merit both from a historical viewpoint and as a practical matter for future debate.

#### Why Study the Effects of the Vietnam Draft on Presidential Approval?

Many cite the draft as a prominent factor of the Vietnam era, particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s. However, there is almost no scholarly work aimed at quantifying the national effects of the Vietnam-era draft. Historical references abound, but most discussion is at best anecdotal. Despite touching the lives of millions of young men, their families, and friends, there is little analysis detailing the effect the draft on most factors, including presidential approval ratings. Conversely, the issue of casualties has received a great deal of study. Thus, the system that sent most young men to deaths in Vietnam – either directly by induction or indirectly by pushing those most likely to be inducted into military service – remains ignored.

During the Vietnam War, the military inducted over 1.8 million young men. More entered as “draft-induced volunteers.” Though some joined out of patriotism or a desire for adventure, most volunteered as a means to minimize their risks when other avenues such as exemptions and deferments failed. Some hedged their bets by joining the National Guard. Others tried the federal reserves. Barring that, enlistment in the Air Force, Navy, or Coast Guard increased the odds of avoiding combat. Those who failed to follow any of these paths typically became soldiers. Inductees after 1968 were increasingly likely to serve in combat roles thus increasing their odds of dying. However, even when other

means failed, joining the Army or Marines provided a say in assignments that could reduce the risk of direct combat that was preferable to conscription. It appears that the longer this system continued, the greater the impetus became for men to avoid, evade, or manipulate it in order to avoid the consequences of conscription. Despite this, analysis of presidential approval during the Vietnam War typically ignores the impact of the draft.

By late 1968, polls were signaling a major shift in public opinion. Over half of the electorate indicated the war as the most important problem facing the United States going into the 1968 election (Converse, Miller, Rusk, & Wolfe, 1969). Apparently, many factors were reaching a nexus. Inflation was increasing in part because of spending on the war. Casualties were still mounting and among those were more draftees who were replacing career military members in Vietnam. Public debate and protest grew more rancorous. Some argue the Tet Offensive served as a trigger event and the election was the lightning rod. By some estimates, almost 30 percent of Americans had relatives in the military and serving in Vietnam by this time. Even more had relatives who served in the larger theater of war. This would seem a reasonable cause of increased involvement based on the personal interests of the American public (Lau, Brown, & Sears, 1978). However, many of these assumptions have not been tested.

#### Statement of the Problem

If the draft had a substantive effect, it should be quantifiable. If it affected the United States as widely as it appears, an effect on presidential approval ratings during the Vietnam War should be observable. It seems likely that awareness of the threat offered by the draft to America's young men would have activated a large portion of the population that might not have otherwise engaged in the public debate. Further, it would seem likely

that an interactive effect should exist between casualties and conscription since the draft alerted many to the system and its consequences, though only a fraction were ever inducted. This investigation seeks to test the direct and indirect effects of the draft upon presidential approval. To do so, it will analyze monthly variation in presidential popularity polls between 1954 and 1975 which covers the period from early U.S. involvement in Vietnam to final U.S. departure from it. This examination begins as the United States replaces the French just before the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. It ends with the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon in April 1975. Throughout this period, draftees comprised a sizeable minority within the military though there is little draftee presence in Vietnam at either the beginning or the end of the period under study.

#### Purpose and Significance of the Research

This research seeks to examine the direct and interactive effects of the military draft on presidential popularity during the years of the Vietnam War while controlling for casualties, economic conditions, and other environmental factors unique to each administration. A literature review of books, journals, and dissertations found no similar study. In fact, there was little systematic study of the draft or any of its effects. This work should extend existing studies of the Vietnam War era as well as add to the understanding of approval shifts during a conflict. In an era when a new draft is discussed and vast numbers of reservists serve on the frontlines as an expedient substitute, it seems relevant. Evidence garnered from this work may add to the information available on the costs and benefits of certain foreign policy choices. Though some might consider the issue moot, the relationship of public opinion activation as it relates to mass mobilization will always be relevant even if no new draft materializes. Even



without a resurrected draft, results from this work may provide the basis for a better understanding of the effects derived from the large-scale use of the National Guard and other military reserves in a hostile environment. Though more distant, it might also suggest responses to situations where extensive use of non-military groups in hostile environments, i.e. military contractors in Iraq, Peace Corps volunteers, etc. although the voluntary nature of such service might moderate the effect unless a national service requirement were authorized.

#### Objectives and Outline of the Study

The literature is replete with works on the sources of presidential approval shifts and other related topics. History is filled with valuable lessons. This work will examine elements of both to establish the relevance of the issue and of presidential approval shifts. These approval levels serve as a proxy indicator of support for presidential policies and behavior. This study will also examine the impact of several independent time series such as the draft, military casualties, the economy, and critical events. For each, an empirical reason and modeling scheme will be derived.

ARIMA modeling and statistical analysis will be used to examine data gathered from a number of government agencies and to test relationships between presidential approval shifts and the independent series. The study will control for other variables commonly cited in the literature, especially casualties and economic factors. In addition, variables that assess unique aspects of each presidential term and unique events, such as the Tet Offensive, will be used to evaluate their relevance. The primary questions examine the effect of independent variables as well as their interactive effects, especially between induction and casualty rates.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the development of the Vietnam War in order to establish the context. Chapter 3 examines the roots of the draft in the American context. Chapter 4 evaluates other literature relevant to this study. Chapter 5 outlines the research methods and variables to be used. Chapter 6 reports the results of these tests and provides an analysis of the findings. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the results and suggests implications.

## CHAPTER 2 – THE VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam War will be a major force in our lives until the entire baby boom generation dies out – and even after (Hellmann, 1986, p. 206).

The Vietnam War serves as a powerful test case in many ways. Within its context, the American public became polarized with some subgroups even becoming radicalized. Dramatic costs were paid in human terms – at home and abroad. The draft also brought about wide-reaching social change that would shape the United States for decades to come. Though casualties have been held to be a fundamental statistical measure of a war's cost for a state, the effects of the draft have largely been ignored, even though this was a vehicle that served to put millions in harm's way. Amongst the many explanations for changes in presidential approval during the Vietnam period, the draft has apparently slipped through the cracks of analytical research. This study seeks to remedy this shortfall by quantifying the effects of the draft. This chapter presents an encapsulated history of the Vietnam-era as a foundation for a more detailed discussion of the American draft experience in Chapter 3.

According to the Department of Veteran's Administration (DVA), 9.2 million served in the military between 1964 and 1975 (DVA, 2001). Nearly 3.5 million served in Vietnam theater of operations. From a pool of approximately 27 million, the draft raised 2,215,000 men for military service during the Vietnam era. It has also been credited with “encouraging” many of the 8.7 million “volunteers” to join rather than risk being drafted.

Of the nearly 16 million not engaged in active military service, 96% were exempted (typically because of jobs including other military service), deferred (usually for educational reasons), or disqualified (usually for physical and mental deficiencies but also for criminal records to include draft violations). Draft offenders in the last category numbered nearly 500,000 but less than 10,000 were convicted or imprisoned for draft violations (Chambers, 1999). Finally, as many as 100,000 draft eligible males fled the country (Chambers, 1999; Reeves & Hess, 1970).

Approximately 1,080,000 of those serving in Southeast Asia during this period were listed as casualties by the military. This includes deaths from all causes, wounds that required hospitalization, or other forms of incapacitation such as mental illness. Among the survivors, more than 150,000 returned home suffering from “non-mortal woundings” (DVA, 2001). Still more returned with psychological disorders, drug addictions, and other problems helping to account for the lowest rate of productivity for returnees from any U.S. war in the 20th Century (Current Population Survey, 1994). The subsequent impact on communities, families, friends, and acquaintances – though unmeasured – would seem staggering in terms of psychological cost in addition to any direct economic loss. Even many of those who did not serve nor were close to those that did, have vivid – even painful – memories of Vietnam, perhaps the most unpopular of American wars. However, it started as a far more distant and less threatening situation. The more common reference to casualties referring to those killed in action (KIA) accounts for nearly 47,000 deaths with approximately 10,500 more deaths from other causes (Summers, 1999). To establish the context for these losses, the following highlights from the Vietnam War era highlight some of the most pronounced events of

the conflict both at home and abroad. Each year cited ends with a summary of military manpower changes and presidential approval tallies to aid the reader in following the trends.

### Early U.S. Involvement

U.S. involvement in Vietnam pre-dates World War II. However, it did not become substantial until the Cold War in which stemming the tide of Communism dictated engagement in far-flung locales (Communism Hold Spreading in Asia, 1948). During the Cold War, each president from Eisenhower to Nixon took an increasingly more hands-on approach to the war, while shifts in the Cold War drove U.S. interests in Vietnam. Initially, the Communist threat in Eastern Europe and China kept American attentions elsewhere. Not until Eisenhower's second term would the fear of "dominos falling" drive a policy change that emphasized Vietnam as an essential arena in which to fight the Communists (Tucker, 2001; Lancaster, 1961). Until then, the record shows a slow but steady involvement.

In May 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson finalized negotiations to provide direct military and economic aid to French Indochina (Topping, 1950). To facilitate this, Secretary of Defense George Marshall formed a Military Assistance and Advisory Group with a personnel ceiling of 128. Its first members began arriving in August of 1950 (Eckhardt, 1974). By the end of the year, U.S. economic support covered the majority of French military expenses. Initially, the United States hoped to bankroll French troops to fight in Vietnam rather than placing U.S. combat troops there. Neither

first-term draftees nor U.S. casualties were part of the equation during this period. At home, Eisenhower's public approval ratings reached almost 70% (*Approval*, 2004)<sup>1</sup>.

By 1954, U.S. funding covered at least 86% (\$2.6 billion) of the French military expenditures in Indochina (*Vietnam War*, 2005; Herring, 1995). The Viet Minh took the first U.S. Prisoners of War (POWs) in June 1954, though they were released in August (Gaffney, 2000). This, and other factors, led to mounting concerns among some U.S. elites that the situation in Asia was deteriorating. Eisenhower clearly articulated this in his April 7, 1954 "Domino Theory" speech to the nation, designed to communicate the strategic value of Vietnam (Eisenhower, 1960). However, increased U.S. rhetoric, monies, and materiel failed to preempt the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. Some cite a failed strategy by the French commander. Others cite inadequate U.S. funding and support for a war-weakened France. Regardless, the subsequent collapse of the French government opened the door to a negotiated truce at the Geneva Conference in July. This agreement structured a temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel until a countrywide plebiscite could determine the leadership for a reunified state in 1956. To inhibit conflicts, foreign fighters and military materiel were proscribed though the powerhouses of the Cold War were not signatories (The Avalon Project, 2005). However, other ideas stirred within the Eisenhower administration. For example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote, "We have a clean base there now, without a taint of colonialism. Dien Bien Phu was a blessing in disguise" (Cutler, 2000, p. 9). Eisenhower finished the year with a 69% approval rating (*Approval*, 2004).

---

<sup>1</sup> The *Approval* dataset was created under the direction of Dr. George Edwards, in conjunction with Alec Gallup. This dataset encompasses presidential approval data from the Gallup and Roper polling organizations to cover

### 1955 to 1963 – The Tide Changes and Policies Muddle

In 1955, Communist land reforms and purges further steeled U.S. resolve to protect the newly recognized South Vietnam (Hue-Tam, 1992; Duncanson, 1992). Eisenhower pledged full U.S. support for Ngo Dinh Diem as South Vietnam's first president. Eisenhower's approval soared to 75% by year's end (*Approval*, 2004). With final French withdrawal slated for 1956, Eisenhower's emphasis on "nation-building" added more targets as Vietnam became home to the largest U.S. government presence outside U.S. territory by the end of his second term (Herring, 1995). Meanwhile, U.S. efforts succeeded preempting the nationwide plebiscite required in the Geneva Accord (Butterfield, 1971). On the domestic front, Vietnam remained a distant issue. Eisenhower's own approval ratings reached their height by the end of 1956 with 79% of the American public approving of his work – a level that would never again be achieved by any president during the course of the Vietnam War (*Approval*, 2004).

Throughout 1957, the Geneva Accords were manipulated to nearly double U.S. military strength in Vietnam (Cutler, 2000; Sheehan, Smith, Kenworthy, & Butterfield, 1971). During this time, Eisenhower experienced a drop in public approval to 58% in November of 1957. It dropped another percentage point by the end of 1958 (*Approval*, 2004). The demand for U.S. advisers grew exponentially as they took on more tasks in the fight against insurgent and North Vietnamese forces. This only grew as Eisenhower allowed U.S. forces to operate closer to combat operations (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1986). By the end of 1958, approximately 760 U.S. military members were stationed in South Vietnam (Summers, 1999). Over the next year, presidential approval

ratings for Eisenhower shot up to reach 77% in December 1959 (*Approval*, 2004). The Eisenhower era closed with approximately 900 advisers in Vietnam and a December 1960 approval rating of 59% and a farewell address to the nation in January 1961 (*Approval*, 2004; Summers, 1999).

The transition to John F. Kennedy ushered in a period of dramatic change in Vietnam policy, although many of these changes had roots in the Eisenhower years (Smith, 1971). Rapid escalation combined with policy shifts became the norm. Even before Kennedy's own inaugural, December gave rise to the new National Liberation Front movement aimed at unifying insurgents in South Vietnam. The increasing volatility in South Vietnam was hinted at when Kennedy was elected in November 1960 even as a coup was underway against Diem in South Vietnam. The apparent growth of the opposition signaled to Washington the need to step up efforts to combat it (*American Foreign Policy*, 1961). Yet, a better state of peace was far from likely as anti-Diem sentiment grew faster than Communist fervor.

Kennedy's military adviser, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, issued a white paper in December 1961 advocating an all-in or all-out strategy that would either radically increase aid in all areas or trigger the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. Vice President Johnson supported increased U.S. involvement (Schulzinger, 1997). However, other JFK confidantes urged caution rather than aggressive Americanization of the war. Ultimately, Kennedy took a middle road, and the U.S. presence continued to grow. More than 3,205 U.S. advisers were in South Vietnam by the end of 1961 (Summers, 1999). In this year, the "manpower crisis" was first noted by the administration. The increased demand for a



worldwide military presence to thwart Soviet aggression was growing, but the number of men brought into the military had not kept pace (Reeves & Hess, 1970). The draft provided the means for the president to meet looming problems in Berlin, the Congo, and other hotspots while also building up in Vietnam without apprising Congress or the public of the magnitude of operations there Basset & Pelz, 1989.

Ultimately, Kennedy increased support but not troop levels. This coupled with programmed increases ultimately doubled U.S. military aid and tripled the number of U.S. advisers. Over 11,300 advisers were in country by the end of 1962 (Summers, 1999; Bolt & Garrett, 1999). Further, Kennedy authorized U.S. troops to take a more active role in combat (Hunt, 1989). These increases also brought an increased media presence. A few negative stories concerning U.S. fighting shocked JFK into giving orders to “fix” the “press mess” that only multiplied the problem (Knightley, 2004). However, despite charges of lying to the public, presidential popularity ended 1962 at 77% (*Approval*, 2004).

The Kennedy administration continued to increase U.S. efforts in Vietnam through 1963, despite an increasingly contrary press. Buddhist immolations and evidence of active fighting by Americans increasingly entered the public sphere after battles like Ap Bac in 1963 (Gaspar, 1998; Halberstam, 1998; Prochnau, 1995). By November 1963, nearly 17,000 American advisers were in Vietnam and nearly 100 deaths had been recorded (Bolt & Garrett, 1999; [Southeast Asia] Combat Area Casualties Current File (CACCF) in the records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Record Group 330), 1998). In response to conflict escalation, the first mass public protests of the war began in the United States (Garfinkle, 1995). Kennedy’s efforts to remove Diem led to Diem’s murder only days before Kennedy himself was assassinated (Karnow, 1983; Prados, 2003). In his wake, a

mourning nation rallied behind Lyndon Baines Johnson with a 74% approval rating in December despite only serving as president less than a month (*Approval*, 2004).

### 1964 to 75: The Tide of War Rises and Falls

The peak of the Vietnam War costs came between 1964 and 1973 in personal, economic, and political terms. Many aspects of the war vary dramatically during this time from the insertion of the first ground combat forces in significant numbers to the ultimate evacuation of all non-covert forces. Of the nearly 3.5 million U.S. troops to serve in Southeast Asia, over 90% entered the war during this timeframe (Summers, 1999).<sup>2</sup> On the domestic scene, social and economic factors spurred negative public reactions (Johnson, 1997).

LBJ quickly made good on his plans to escalate the war with aim of a quick conclusion. Throughout 1964, he approved numerous plans that included bombing North Vietnam in response to increasing action by North Vietnamese regulars in the south. However, the fear of a backlash made him loathe to make these efforts public (Barrett, 1993). The imposition of a trade embargo and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 legally placed the United States on a war footing against North Vietnam. North Vietnamese capture of U.S. POWs underscored this change. The first direct attack on American forces occurred November 1, 1964 at Bien Hoa Air Base in a pre-dawn mortar assault that killed seven (five Americans) and wounded nearly 100 Americans and South Vietnamese. Though LBJ refused to retaliate with air strikes, he did approve the deployment of U.S. troops to protect airbases by 1965. At least 23,300 advisers are known

---

<sup>2</sup> Harry Summers, in his *Vietnam War Almanac*, defines “Southeast Asia” to include the countries of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and the waters of the South China Sea. There were many more

to have been in Vietnam by December (Summers, 1999). Johnson ended the year with 69% of the American public approving of his performance (*Approval*, 2004).

Returned to office in 1965 as the “peace candidate”, LBJ marked his inauguration with a speech that urged Americans to join his Great Society initiatives as well as remaining ready to fight foreign threats to the freedom of mankind. LBJ increased military pressure on the North Vietnamese including bombings campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder thus escalating the war and stirring anti-war protests as this became public in February (Barringer, 1998; Garfinkle, 1995). In March, the deployment of nearly 25,000 Marines marked the first official insertion of U.S. ground combat forces. Insurgents responded by bombing the U.S. embassy in Saigon. In April, Johnson authorized the use of U.S. forces in direct offensive operations (McCone Memorandum, 1965). Nevertheless, he continued to play to the masses at home with such populist appeals as "we are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves" (Karnow, 1983, p. 395). The increasing intensity and number of domestic protests frustrated Johnson. Former military members were increasingly evident in the ranks of protestors. Johnson pushed for and signed into law an act criminalizing draft card burning which had become a popular symbol of defiance. To Johnson's fury, chants such as "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" became common fare in protests (Garfinkle, 1995; DeBenedetti, 1990). By the end of the year, nearly 200,000 U.S. troops were in Vietnam (Summers, 1999). Nevertheless, LBJ's approval ratings remained strong closing out the year at 63% (*Approval*, 2004). However,

---

\_\_\_\_\_

serving in support roles that might have even led to some duty in or over Vietnam. This was especially true of forces based in the Philippines, Guam, and the surrounding bodies of water.

the problems associated with this escalation led to a year-long decline in approval that ended at 44% in December 1966 (*Approval*, 2004).

Little changed in 1967, although promises by military and civilian leaders were bolstered by a series of successful military operations and the promise of less corruption under a new, civilian government in South Vietnam. However, domestic protests continue to expand. Events such as “teach-ins” that had begun in 1965 now began to gain national attention (Garfinkle, 1995; Halstead, 1978). This, in part, reflected increased interaction between dissenting groups.

Increased interaction between opponents of the draft and the war was exemplified by the formation of national organizations such as “The Resistance” that sponsored draft card “turn-ins” and larger protests including more than 300,000 gathering in New York in April (Ferber & Lynd, 1971). This included a virtual siege of the Pentagon in October by more than 50,000 people. Ultimately such activity led the administration to abandon all but the most controlled speaking engagements (Garfinkle, 1995; DeBenedetti, 1990). The White House ordered General William Westmoreland home to lead a public relations campaign designed to bolster public support by convincing Americans that the United States was winning the war in Vietnam. This followed advice given to LBJ to “[e]mphasize [the] light at the end of the tunnel instead of battles, deaths, and danger” (Berman, 1991, pp. 98-99). In Westmoreland’s widely quoted speech to the National Press Club, he said the United States had succeeded in reaching the point “where the end comes into view” (Berman, 1991, p.116). By December, 485,600 U.S. military members were in Vietnam and more than 16,000 casualties had been recorded (Summers, 1999; CACCF,

1998). Johnson's approval ratings clawed their way up to 46% after dropping to their lowest to date -- 38% in September and October 1967 (*Approval*, 2004).

January 1968 began with the promise of a possible victory in Vietnam and ended with a defeat. The White House campaign to sell a "nearly won" war crumbled as 80,000 enemy troops besieged every major political center in South Vietnam during the Tet holiday cease-fire. By the end of February, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces had nearly eliminated the National Liberation Front or "Viet Cong" as a fighting force in the South (Oberdorfer, 2001). LBJ, the U.S. military, and the North Vietnamese initially considered this as a failure for the insurgency (Hess, 2001; Van Tra, 1982). However, the United States would ultimately suffer from an opinion shift some attribute to the explosion of negative coverage from a press recoiling against years of promises that the war would soon be over (Snow & Drew, 1994). Paris Peace Talks later in the month were said to further fuel public skepticism. The February "transfer" of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the World Bank added to the tumult.

LBJ announced a non-military solution to war with an appeal to the North Vietnamese to negotiate. In March, as a show of good faith, he called off bombing in much of North Vietnam. LBJ learned that many of his closest advisers did not support the war, and six days later, he announced his intention to decline reelection. Outside the White House, other presidential "peace candidates" gained widespread support while protestors kept vigil at the White House gates. This made Westmoreland's call for 200,000 more troops untenable. Similarly, requests to issue a call-up of reserve forces continued to be rejected (Brune & Burns, 2002). U.S. domestic tensions flared across the country with the assassination of Martin Luther King in April and again in June with the assassination of

Robert F. Kennedy. Domestic protests became common across the country with one of the most memorable being staged at the National Democratic Convention.

Talks broke down after a North Vietnamese-led “Mini-Tet” offensive was launched in May 1968 with attacks against 120 cities and military installations in South Vietnam. U.S. forces ultimately curbed the attacks and responded with air strikes into North Vietnam. As things quieted, Hanoi and Washington made a token exchange of prisoners, however, the war continued. The 900th U.S. airplane was downed in September (Clodfelter, 1989). Later in the month, LBJ halted all bombing of North Vietnam (Tucker, 1989). Nevertheless, U.S. political combat continued to escalate throughout the spring with campus protests, building seizures, and arson punctuating the anti-war rhetoric. Invasions of draft boards and industrial sites became common (Garfinkle, 1995; DeBenedetti, 1990). By December 1968, U.S. troops levels in Vietnam had topped 536,000 and casualties exceeded 30,610 (CACCF, 1998; Summers, 1999). By this time, draftees accounted for as much as 38% of all American troops in Vietnam (Leinwand, 1970). Johnson, now a lame duck, ended the year with an approval rating of 44% (*Approval*, 2004).

Vietnam became the central issue on which Richard Nixon took the presidency as the candidate most likely to get America out of Vietnam. However, change did not come immediately. Troop levels continued to rise. In March, Nixon extended the war into Cambodia to interdict Vietnamese supply lines. The largest of the search and destroy missions, popularized as the fight for “Hamburger Hill”, ended in May with a sense of futility. Increasingly, reports came of military drug use and “fraggings”. It was not until June that Nixon made the first public peace gestures in conjunction with a 25,000-man

force reduction in Vietnam as a first step towards the new policy of “Vietnamization”. Following the death of Ho Chi Minh in September, Nixon recalled nearly 35,000 troops from Vietnam. He also announced a reduction in the quotas for draftees (Nguyen, 1980). Meanwhile, the murder trial for Lt. William Calley’s actions at My Lai dominated the news.

The nation increasingly displayed signs of division with huge demonstrations drawing more popular support, i.e. the October “Moratorium Demonstration” in Washington D.C. drew nearly 250,000 and spurred subsidiary protests and school shutdowns nationwide. Many opponents of the war claimed to be driven by the dramatic escalation that sucked more young men into the military through the draft. The rapid change may have been exacerbated in part by the increased combat use of draftees. From virtually no draftees in Vietnam in 1964 to draftees comprising nearly 88% of the Army infantrymen and 50% of the combat deaths in 1969, the war increasingly reached into the U.S. populace (Chambers, 1999).

To curb this trend, Nixon appealed to the “silent majority” in a November speech to rise up and draw the country together in order to bring about an acceptable peace in Paris. He also declared his plans would remove all U.S. military members from Vietnam (Nixon, 1969). In December, Nixon recalled another 50,000 troops from Vietnam and changed the draft to a lottery system. From the peak of more than 534,000 troops in Vietnam reached in 1969, the year ended with approximately 475,200 in country (Summers, 1999). He ended the year with a 59% approval rating after scoring in the mid to high 60s throughout much of the year (*Approval*, 2004).

### 1970 to 1975: The Tide of War Ebbs

In 1970, the White House announced increased support to Cambodia to shore up its defenses in response to North Vietnamese incursions there that threatened Nixon's Vietnamization plan (Nixon, 1970b). However, a 150,000 men troop withdrawal was also announced in April (Bell, 1973). Attacks against Americans in South Vietnam rose. U.S. troops withdrew from Cambodia in June but bombings increased, especially in the DMZ. The last division-sized ground offensive by U.S. forces kicked off in early September. However, by late November, U.S. troop levels fell below 350,000 (Summers, 1999). Dissent at home continued to escalate, especially in the wake of the killings at Kent State in May. The stock market collapsed spurring unemployment and other economic factors that increased the pressure on the president (Johnson, 1997). The year ended with 334,600 U.S. military members posted to Vietnam. Approximately 44,245 were killed in the course of the conflict by the close of 1970 (CACCF, 1998; Summers, 1999). Nixon's approval continued a downward decline ending the year at 52% (*Approval*, 2004).

In early 1971, President Nixon encouraged the nation by citing positive trends in the Vietnamization process that signaled a positive end to U.S. combat in Vietnam. The last Marine division left in April. Nixon ordered all troops to take a defensive role leaving offensive ground operations to the South Vietnamese. Nevertheless, Nixon's approval ratings continued to decline. Publication of the *Pentagon Papers*, beginning in June, added further pressure on the White House. By the end of 1971, troop strength in Vietnam had been cut in half with approximately 156,000 remaining (CACCF, 1998; Summers, 1999). President Nixon's approval clung to a 50% approval in December (*Approval*, 2004).



Removal of the remaining combat divisions in 1972 dropped U.S. troop strength to nearly 70,000 by April. In response, attacks against U.S. and South Vietnamese targets increased, and little progress was made in the peace talks. Another bombing campaign against North Vietnam was launched with Operation Linebacker in March to stifle North Vietnamese aggressiveness and increase pressure to bring about a diplomatic solution. This escalated in response to the “Eastertide” invasion of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). U.S. aviation helped the South Vietnamese turn the tide (Clodfelter, 1989).

By late August, the last of the U.S. ground combat units had left the country. Increased bombings hindered North Vietnamese attacks. Nixon captured another term with a November landslide. The largest bombing campaign (the “Christmas” bombings) of the war began December 17 with the intent of forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate (Clodfelter, 1989). By year’s end, approximately 24,200 U.S. military members remained in country. The cumulative casualty reached nearly 46,000 (CACCF, 1998; Summers, 1999). At home, the Watergate scandal had become regular media fare. However, presidential popularity continued on a yearlong upswing hitting the 59% mark in December (*Approval*, 2004).

In his January 23, 1973 inaugural address, Nixon assured Americans that the war would soon end bringing “peace with honor” (Nixon, 1973). A peace accord was signed four days later. The military draft officially ended the same day. Operation Homecoming followed on February 13 with American POWs departing Hanoi for a return to the United States. In March, most of the remaining American troops left Vietnam. Left in the wake of the departure was a country devastated by war and divided by a peace accord that left a

South Vietnam checkered with zones controlled by the Viet Cong. Officially, the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam was limited to 50 by the Peace Accords. By this point, the cumulative casualty toll had reached nearly 46,200 (CACCF, 1998; Summers, 1999). Despite resolution in Vietnam, the Watergate saga continued to unfold at home. Nixon's approval ratings peaked at 67% in January, but then plunged dramatically to end the year at 29% – the lowest to date for any post-WWII president (*Approval*, 2004).

The increasing negative reaction to U.S. involvement in Vietnam reached a new level with the passage of the "War Powers Resolution" by Congress. The Watergate scandal also continued to rage. Amidst this furor, Congress refused to provide further support to South Vietnam. Ultimately, Nixon resigned rather than risking impeachment thus pushing Gerald Ford into the presidency on August 8, 1974. Presidential approval polls taken during Nixon's final week in office set a new record low with only 24% of the American public approving of his performance. The following week President Ford received a 71% approval rating (*Approval*, 2004). Ford pardoned Nixon on September 8, 1974. Congress restricted South Vietnamese aid to \$700 million (Kissinger, 2003). Despite a lull in North Vietnamese operations throughout much of 1974, attacks resumed in December. Ford saw his approval ratings drop to 44% in December (*Approval*, 2004).

South Vietnam crumbled under a sweeping North Vietnamese offensive that left the NVA holding most of the northern provinces of South Vietnam by April 1975. Both South Vietnam and Cambodia convulsed in upheaval as the enemy threatened. Their governments collapsed. The United States expedited efforts to evacuate Americans. The last American military member killed in Vietnam died during this process on April 29, 1975 as North Vietnamese troops poured into Saigon (Summers, 1999). The remaining

South Vietnamese government capitulated a few hours later to end the war with a unified Communist state on April 30. Overall, the war claimed more than 55,000 U.S. lives (CCACF, 1989). President Ford ended the year with his lowest career approval ratings as president – 39% (*Approval*, 2004).

Some see Vietnam as the key turning point at which a reluctant public finally had its fill of government policies that cost more than they produced. In response to increased public protest, political elites changed policies (Gelpi, Feaver & Reifler, 2004). A broad consensus also holds that Vietnam diminished respect for the presidency along with an increased public distrust of government in general. In part, this decline arguably followed the unexpected events and unintended consequences of the period in addition to the typical challenges faced by presidents. Certainly, the value of understanding changes in presidential approval is clear. As Richard Neustadt (1980) has argued, estimating the increased importance of presidential approval is critical to understanding the nature and operation of post-WWII presidencies. However, what factors drove the changes? It would seem the draft played a key role alone and together with other contextual elements. The next chapter examines the evolution of the draft that culminated during this period.

## CHAPTER 3 – THE DRAFT

Fear of the draft may not be the overriding constant concern of all youth, but it is one of their fears, and it is certainly contributive to their sense of estrangement. The draft applies to no one else. It is the skull in the playpen (Keats, 1969, p. 225).

Military drafts have been a missing variable in most past research but not in past conflicts. Though U.S. military drafts have their roots in the colonial period, the military draft of the Vietnam era was a central element of the social and political milieu. However, this history has been neither as successful nor as simple as some Selective Service propaganda suggests. Resistance has always accompanied American military drafts. Despite its popular appeal, even WWII had its protestors and resisters. Variation between drafts comes in the degree of public reaction. Thus, the history of the draft and the nature of American politics suggest measurable effects of the draft on presidential approval should be detectable. The centrality of presidents and their control of warmaking make an examination of this phenomenon relevant. This chapter briefly summarizes the history of the draft in America with an emphasis on the Vietnam War era.

### Military Conscription

Though the process of conscripting American men into military service has been practiced since the American Revolution, its sporadic nature and ability to spur public outcry keep it from being held as an exemplar of successful conscription programs. World Wars I and II generated broad acceptance because of perceived threats. Most American troops were drafted for WWI and nearly 10 million entered the American

military by draft for WWII. Never before or since have so many been so rapidly inducted into the U.S. military. But, if WWII was the high water mark for the draft, Vietnam was its ebb tide as rising dissatisfaction burgeoned into open protest and political expediency dictated its mothballing.

Though military drafts have existed since the earliest English colonies in America, their use and utility were limited before the 20th century. In fact, much of the history behind the tradition of American drafts was propagandized to bolster support for the creation of the SSS in 1940. From the beginning of World War II, the draft grew in prominence and declined in acceptance until its mothballing in 1973. From the formation of a federal government, drafts spanned less than nine years before 1945. However, the “peacetime” draft that followed WWII spanned 25 years from 1948 to 1973 (Anderson & Honegger, 1982).

Throughout the colonial period, drafts were used to cover militia shortfalls. This process continued through the confederation period until the constitution enshrined the national power “to raise and support armies” and the War of 1812 proved the utter failure of the existing system (Snow & Drew, 2000). Even in the formulation of the constitution, opponents warned of the violation of freedom, both of individuals and of the states, implicit in any form of mandatory national service (Leach, 1952). However, efforts to limit the creation of a standing army or of the nature of national conscription failed to gain sufficient support, thereby preventing any codification of these fears until the Civil War (Lindsay, 1968a).

### A National Draft: Product of the Civil War

The standing army maintained by the federal government mustered just over 15,000 men at the outset of the Civil War in 1861. It would swell to over a million men in the wake of Fort Sumter. However, drafting troops never proved fully successful and often spawned violent resistance (Lindsay, 1968b). Problems with recruiting led to the passage of the Militia Act of 1862 that empowered the president to require states to provide levies either by enlistment or conscription with a national draft set for one month later. This creation of this act had been spurred by the passage of the April 1862 “Not for Everyone” conscription act by the Confederate government (Murdock, 1971). This act sought to induct healthy, white males between 18 and 35 for up to three years of service. Exemptions and buy-out classes would be added to the bill over time that brought charges of class discrimination from those without recourse to exemptions. Some states, such as Georgia and North Carolina, actively opposed this draft effort throughout the war, largely by indirect means (Moore, 1924).

Because of delays in the federal draft schedule, the problems caused by this bill stretched through 1863. Since the act allowed substitution, the market grew furious with rates going as high as \$1,000 for men to take the place of others in military service. Professional deserters and brokers manipulated the system. Volunteer enlistment plummeted. Violent resistance increased. Most problems were further compounded by the passage of the Conscription Act of 1863 that extended the draft to men as old as 45, although it replaced substitution with a \$300 bounty paid directly to the federal government. This act was the first to do away with the pretense of militia levies to issue

a direct draft of individuals into federal service. State leaders and citizens alike continued to balk at the draft.

In response, Lincoln suspended the constitutional right of habeas corpus to allow military tribunals to judge protestors leading to the imprisonment of thousands. Those jailed even included members of Congress. Riots erupted in most large cities in the Union. Federal troops entered many cities to quell the protests often using brutal tactics to include firing on crowds. Protestors likewise looted and destroyed buildings and equipment associated with the draft (Murdock, 1967; Lindsay, 1968b). The worst violence occurred in New York City where it is also remembered as the worst racial incident in U.S. history because the majority of the nearly 1,000 African Americans were killed. The New York City riots alone caused more than \$1.5 million of damage (Bernstein, 1989; Cook, 1974). In 2005 dollars this would equal more than \$27 million.

Ultimately all draft initiatives failed though more dramatically so for the Union. Of the 250,000 to 300,000 men selected in the Union 1862-3 draft lotteries, less than 10,000 were inducted. About 75,000 more paid commutation fees or hired a substitute to avoid induction (Leach, 1952; Lindsay, 1968b; Faust, 1986). One positive effect did come in states and local communities adding to enlistment bounties in order to produce levies in order to avoid draft violence (Lindsay, 1968b). When compared to the damage done and the cost involved with deploying federal troops to quell discontent, the Army leadership classed the effort as an utter failure (Leach, 1952). In the south, sporadic application of the draft resulted in conscripts making up as much as one-third of the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi near the end of the War (Faust, 1986). Despite these results, national conscription had been nominally accepted. Events in

Europe would soon serve to reinforce the acceptability of a federalized draft. However, there would be no further compulsory military service legislation until 1917 (Duggan, 1946).

### World War I Cements a National Draft Structure

The success of the Prussian military from Frederick I through the 1870s had a significant impact on military manpower concepts. Frederick I instituted an annual draft that brought most able-bodied commoners into military service. After initial military training, they returned to civilian life 10 months out of the year. Refined over time, Prussian methods were considered scientifically based, efficient, and generally successful (Wawro, 2003; Ritter, 1968; Craig, 1964). This view ultimately led many nations to adopt national draft systems with similar components.

In the United States, the modern draft came with the passage of the Selective Draft Act of 1917 (Stewart, 2005). The law required all men from 21 to 30 years of age, and later 18 to 45, to register. Exemptions existed for those with dependent families, war critical duties, and physical or mental disabilities. It also allowed for conscientious objectors (COs), but only for members of a recognized pacifistic religious organizations who agreed to perform alternative service. Other war objectors faced imprisonment. By the war's end, nearly 2,800,000 men had been inducted from the pool of 23.9 million registrants. In the final tally, 72 percent of the 3.5 million man army came via conscription (Chambers, 1987).

It was during this period that the view of the draft as a necessary evil was largely replaced with a view of draft armies as being more effective and scientific (Duggan, 1946). The new law allowed the president to immediately draft up to 500,000 men



between 21 and 30 as well as creating a system for future drafts. All men between the ages of 18 and 45 were expected to register. The act specifically precluded the acceptance of volunteers. It also made exemptions difficult to gain. The aim was to prevent the inclusion of the wrong mix of men (Duggan, 1946; Lindsay, 1968b).

Though not as violent as the backlash in the Civil War north, this draft had protests as well. Little violent protest occurred, because even peaceful public demonstrations and letter writing were often swiftly punished with jail time. Thus, the primary means of protests came through evasion and indirect criticism. Up to three million men failed to register and another 338,000 failed to report or deserted shortly after reporting for duty. Another 64,700 sought Conscientious Objector status. Of these, nearly 21,000 were drafted into the army though nearly 4,000 refused to serve. About 450 served prison time. A unanimous ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court declared the draft constitutional though later rulings would restrict government abuses of free speech rights (Kohn, 1986; Chambers, 1987). This new model of conscription set the stage for World War II.

The military birthed the modern draft mechanism in 1926 and built it based on military needs in an era of pacifism. Working where Congress would not, it gathered a cadre of officers for its nascent Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee, most of who were commissioned based on social standing rather than military experience. This effort did not receive congressionally approved funding until 1934 when Major Lewis B. Hershey was assigned to the organization. However, much of its work was codified into law with the Selective Training and Service Act (STSA) of 1940 (Flynn, 1985).

## World War II Extends the National Draft

Roosevelt's signing of the STSA on September 16, 1940 began the first peacetime draft in the United States. It also established the SSS as an independent agency responsible for identifying and inducting young men into military service. Roosevelt named Hershey to head the Selective Service on July 31, 1941 where he remained until removed by Nixon in 1969 (Flynn, 1985). This preparatory act came when other preparations such as increased training and equipment production had not yet been approved. Nevertheless, it served as the basis for the conscription programs that would continue to the present. The act set a cap of 900,000 men to be in training at any given time and limited military service to 12 months. An amendment increased this to 18 months in 1941. Later legislation amended the act to require all men from 18 to 65 to register with those aged 18 to 45 being immediately liable for induction. Service commitments for inductees were set at the length of the war plus six months (Clifford & Spencer, 1986).

By 1942, the SSS moved away from administrative selection by its more than 4,000 local boards to a system of lottery selection. Rather than filling quotas by local selection, the boards now ensured proper processing of men selected by the lottery. This facilitated the massive requirement of up to 200,000 men per month and would remain the standard for the length of the war. The WWII draft operated from 1940 until 1947 when its legislative authorization expired without further extension by Congress. During this time, more than 10 million men had been inducted into military service. With the expiration, no inductions occurred in 1947 (SSS, 2003). However, the SSS remained intact.

Protests also arose against the WWII-era draft. Most of the violent events occurred in the northern states where African-Americans protested the injustice of the draft in the face of segregation and other civil rights abuses. Some Socialists and Communists also opposed support for the war until Germany attacked the USSR. Of the more than 72,000 men registering as Conscientious Objectors (CO), nearly 52,000 received CO status. Of these, over 25,000 entered the military in noncombatant roles, another 12,000 went to civilian work camps, and nearly 6,000 went to prison. Draft evasion only accounted for about 4% of the total inducted. About 373,000 alleged evaders were investigated with just over 16,000 being imprisoned (Chambers, 1987).

The second peacetime draft began with passage the Selective Service Act in 1948 after the STSA expired. The new law required all men, ages 18 to 26, to register. It also created the system for the “Doctor Draft” aimed at inducting health professionals into military service (Hershey, 1960). Unless otherwise exempted or deferred, these men could be called for up to 21 months of active duty and five years of reserve duty service. Congress further tweaked this act in 1950 although the post-WWII surplus of military manpower left little need for draft calls until Truman’s declaration of national emergency in December 1950 (SSS, 1953). Only 20,348 men were inducted in 1948 and only 9,781 in 1949. However, between June of 1950 and 1953, Selective Service inducted 1,529,539 men (SSS, 2003). Another 1.3 million volunteered. Most joined the Navy and Air Force (Chambers, 1987).

Public protests in the United States were few during the Korean War. However, the percentage of CO exemptions for inductees grew to 1.5% compared to a rate of just

5% in the past two wars. The Justice Department also investigated more than 80,000 draft evasion cases (Chambers, 1987; Flynn, 2000; Kohn, 1986)

### Korea Reshapes the National Draft

The new demands of the Korean Police Action drove Congress to replace the existing draft law with the Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951. It lowered the induction age to 18 ½ and extended active-duty service commitments to 24 months. Despite the early combat failures and later stalemate in Korea, the draft has been credited by some as playing a vital role in turning the tide of war. A February 1953 Gallup Poll showed that 70 percent of Americans surveyed felt the SSS handled the draft fairly. Notably, the demographic (males 21 to 29) that included all draft age men showed 64 percent believed the draft to be fair (Gallup, 1972). To increase equity in the system, Eisenhower signed an executive order on July 11, 1953 that ended the paternity deferment for married men (Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, 2004).

In large part, the change in the draft served the purposes of the burgeoning Cold War. From a program that had just barely passed Congressional muster during the fearful prelude to WWII, a more robust draft continued as fears now focused on the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, some dissenting voices in Congress continued to appeal to the dominant history of voluntary American military service as preferable for a democracy (Gilliam, 1968/1982; O'Sullivan & Meckler, 1974).


The United States breathed easier with the Korean Armistice in 1953; however, technology brought new promises and threats. U.S. air and nuclear power fueled the Eisenhower doctrine of “massive retaliation.” This strategy demanded more machines and fewer foot soldiers so the draft slipped to the back burner. However, the head of the

SSS, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, urged caution fearing the conflict looming in Vietnam. In May 1953, he told his state directors to do everything possible to keep SSS alive in order to meet upcoming needs (Hershey, 1953).

Following the Korean Armistice, Congress also passed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 with the aim of improving National Guard and federal reserve readiness while also constraining its use by the president. Towards this end, it mandated a six-year service commitment, in a combination of reserve and active duty time, for every line military member regardless of their means of entry. Meanwhile the SSS kept itself alive by devising and managing a complex system of deferments for a swelling pool of candidates during a period of shrinking requirements. The greatest challenge to the draft came not from protestors but rather lobbyists seeking additional deferments for their constituency groups such as scientists and farmers (Flynn, 1985).

Government leaders felt the potential for a draft was a critical element in maintaining a constant flow of volunteers. On numerous occasions Gen. Hershey told Congress that for every man drafted three or four more were scared into volunteering (House Committee on Appropriations Hearings, 1958). Assuming his assessment was accurate; this would mean over 11 million men volunteered for service because of the draft between January 1954 and April 1975 (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Cumulative Induction and Draft-Induced Volunteer Totals.



The policy of using the draft as a club to force “voluntary” enlistment was unique in U.S. history. Previous drafts had not aimed at encouraging individuals to sign up in order to gain preferential placement or less dangerous postings. However, the incremental buildup of Vietnam without a clear threat to the country bolstered this. Some estimates suggest the threat of conscription threatened almost one-third of all eligible men during the period of 1965-69 (Chambers, 1987; Flynn, 2000). This group represented those without exemption or resources to avoid military service. During the active combat phase, the possibility of avoiding combat by selecting their service and military specialty led as many as four out of 11 million eligible men to enlist (Useem, 1973; Oi, 1982). The military relied upon this draft-induced volunteerism to make its quotas, especially the

Army, which accounted for nearly 95 percent of all inductees during Vietnam. For example, defense recruiting reports show that 34% of the recruits in 1964 up to 50% in 1970 indicated they joined to avoid adverse placement via the draft (Angrist, 1991; Binkin & Johnston, 1973; Siu, 2004). These rates dwindled to 24% in 1972 and 15% in 1973 after the change to a lottery system. Accounting for other factors, it can be argued that up to 60 percent of those who served throughout the Vietnam Conflict did so directly or indirectly because of the draft (Useem, 1973).

In addition, deferments provided an incentive for men to follow pursuits considered useful to the government. This process, known as channeling, helped push men into educational, occupational, and family choices they might not otherwise have pursued. Undergraduate degrees were valued. Graduate work had varying value over time, though technical and religious training received near constant support. War industry support in the form of teaching, research, or skilled labor also received deferred or exempt status. Finally, marriage and family were exempted because of its positive societal consequences (Flynn, 1985; Marmion, 1968; Selective Service Orientation Kit, 1967). This included using presidential orders to extend exemptions again to fathers and others (Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, 2004). Channeling was also seen as a means of preempting the early loss of the country's "best and brightest" who had historically joined and died early in war (Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1963).

#### Vietnam and the Continuing Utility of the Draft

After the father and dependency deferments, student deferments proved to be the largest with over 1.8 million men so identified by the end of 1969 (SSS, 1970). These

student exemptions, which averaged about 15 percent of all exemptions, proved to be the most problematic for the SSS. Whereas higher education largely adapted to the war effort during WWII, resistance grew there throughout the Vietnam period. Many denounced the draft as inimical to democratic principles. The SSS sought to implement a system that would keep the best and brightest in school with a combination of class standing and Selective Service College Qualification Test scores. Though this produced more college graduates, it also created another constituency that demanded continued deferments. Protests over the loss of this deferment erupted in the wake of increased manpower needs in 1968 that required drafting students (Flynn, 1985).

The SSS also became a tool for social reform as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations used it to increase the participation of marginal candidates from underprivileged backgrounds. The system also became a vehicle for referral to government support services for those who could not meet even reduced standards. Both Kennedy and Johnson articulated concerns about the perceived equity of the draft. Both worried that a perception of inequality would wreak havoc on public support, and thus the general welfare of the country. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10984 on January 5, 1962 to help towards this end. It directed the elimination of class standing and test scores as a means of determining student eligibility. It also created a new classification – I-Y – for those who were physically deficient but trainable (For a complete list of SSS classifications, see Appendix A.). Johnson would later build on this to increase War on Poverty funding to improve nutrition and physical fitness programs. It also spurred programs by McNamara that respectively sought to provide opportunities for 20,000 and then 100,000 of the lowest functioning individuals to enter the military. These programs



sought increased support for the president's initiatives to the poor while defusing protests from families that would not have to send their sons to war (Chambers, 1987; Flynn, 2000).

### Challenges to the Vietnam Era Draft System

The first Vietnam-era challenge to the SSS came in the Berlin crisis when President Kennedy doubled the draft call and activated the reserves (Raymond, 1961). In the relative calm that followed and despite a growing United States presence in Vietnam, increasing calls came to end the draft. Though the draft was said to be obsolete in a technological era, inequities and societal costs often generated the most impassioned opposition. Representative Thomas Curtis (R-MO) was one of many who called for the study of alternatives to the draft since "there [was] no single force which causes more disruption in the education, training, employment, and personal lives of our youth today, than is set in motion by the Universal Military Training Act" (Raymond, 1964). Thus, the draft became an essential item in the 1964 presidential campaign and would continue to be a campaign staple until was mothballed in 1973.

The increasing number and use of draftees further fueled the debate. Within three years of active combat operations beginning in 1964, draftees constituted almost half of the U.S. Army enlisted corps. Initially, draftee use in Vietnam was eschewed. By 1964, it was slowly becoming accepted. As the demand for draftees increased, so did activity in the manpower pipeline. By 1966, Armed Forces Examining Stations were examining nearly 200,000 registrants a month (SSS, 1966). Draftee use in Vietnam grew rapidly until 1969 when draftees accounted for nearly 90 percent of the infantrymen in Vietnam and for more than 50 percent of all combat deaths (Chambers, 1999). This, combined

with the perceived unfairness of the draft biased against minority and lower income populations, fueled resistance to it to a degree unseen since the Civil War (Chambers, 1987; Flynn, 2000).

Many in government remained unswayed. They argued that the draft must remain in order to avoid great damage to military readiness ("Extension Of Draft For Four Years Asked," 1963; Little, 1969). This led to a continuation of the draft with only minimal tinkering. For example, the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) of June 20, 1967 added enforcement to registration requirements and again lowered induction age to 18 1/2. It also forced advocates to take great care in pushing change.

During Vietnam, studies by McNamara for Kennedy and Johnson, a blue-ribbon panel led by Burke Marshall for LBJ, and another led by Mark Clark for pro-draft forces in Congress all agreed that the draft remained a necessity. The studies all urged reforms. Equity was at the heart of most proposals. These ranged from simple improvements in informing registrants of their rights to doing away with deferments and moving to a lottery. All agreed that local boards needed more diversity since nearly all board members were older, white males from the upper socio-economic strata of their communities – even in ghetto and barrio areas. Though none found evidence of widespread discrimination, the minority publics suspected it. Most of the studies suggested increased uniformity of standards and increased efficiency through computer usage. In part, this was also aimed at minimizing preferential treatment for those with money and influence (Chambers, 1987; Flynn, 2000; Patterson, 1999; Davis & Dolbeare, 1969).

Some of these reforms made it into the MSSA of 1967 including measures to limit board member tenures and to add women to the boards. The act also suggested improved uniformity between local boards, but nothing was specifically spelled out (O'Sullivan & Meckler, 1974; Flynn, 1985; Davis & Dolbeare, 1969; National Advisory Commission On Selective Service, 1967). Further, the act limited the president's latitude in modifying the draft system with specific proscriptions against implementing a lottery system, removing undergraduate deferments, or establishing a more centralized Selective Service. Burke Marshall, the head of the most recognized presidential advisory board on the draft declared the new law, "made the system worse than it was before" (Poynter, Schorth, & McCord, 1968, p. 20). The debate spilled over into the 1964 presidential campaign. Realizing the political advantage of arguing for an end to the draft, Johnson did so even though he only sought to reform the system to better support his "Guns and Butter" plans (Sanders, 1966).

#### Protests, Politics, and Draft Reform

To many, the draft served as a clear target for protest as it represented the power of the state to "enslave" its people and to force them into combat against others, even when no clear threat to the United States seemed to exist. The local boards that had historically defused protests increasingly became targets of coordinated protests. Those protests also grew increasingly more violent. In the aftermath of the October 16, 1967 "Draft Protest Day," LBJ's patience could bear no more civil disobedience. In a letter to Lt. Gen. Hershey on Oct. 20, 1967, he directed the SSS to take aggressive action against protestors. Specifically, they were to be reclassified and moved to the front of the draft

line whenever feasible (Flynn, 1985). This ignited a nationwide firestorm bringing protests from academia, the media, the legal community, and the public at large.

Those who had the money or desire to escape the draft could usually do so. Some used socially acceptable means such as college or reserve duty. Not surprisingly, the more affluent had more means to avoid the draft. For the less well off, the most common means was simply to avoid registration. Some from every class opted for exile in Canada and other countries. The vast energies consumed in these processes added to the public angst (Baskir & Strauss, 1978). Through this turmoil “Vietnam wrought havoc on millions of lives” because the “war was, at root, the personal calamity of the generation called upon to fight it” (Baskir & Strauss, 1978, p. 13). Individuals turned much of this inward, but it also incited societal divisions that led to further conflict (Moskos & Chambers, 1993).

Although the apparent military successes in Vietnam meant dwindling draft calls in the waning months of 1967, protest activity continued to increase. Troop increases in 1968 only added more fuel. After a short rally in the wake of the Tet Offensive, protests again exploded in increasing ferocity and numbers. Draft quotas became increasingly more difficult for boards to fill as the judiciary increasingly supported disputants over the SSS. A few cases had nationwide consequence such as the *Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board* (No. 11, Cheyenne, Wyoming, et. al, 1968). In this case, the Solicitor General of the United States argued against the SSS. In 1968, the court found the SSS had exceeded its authority by punitively reclassifying Oestereich and moving him to the head of the draft line for simply returning his draft card. This and other cases at the federal level sapped SSS power. The unwillingness of the Department of Justice to

prosecute offenders further eroded the SSS position. Finally, local court leniency and activism gave many an avenue to escape the draft with impunity (Baskir & Strauss, 1978).

In addition to a plan for peace, every major candidate in the 1968 campaign seized on the increasing angst over the draft as a primary campaign plank. The Johnson administration's abolition of most deferments for graduate students and critical occupations in February further fueled this debate (Poynter, et. al, 1968). The Democrats argued for various reform efforts, largely based on previous study results. Nixon argued for a transition to an all-volunteer force.

During the years of low induction in the post-Korean War period, there had been little resistance. All but the Army routinely met their manpower requirements through volunteers (Hays, 1967). Therefore, there was little impetus to make changes. After the war heated up there was little alternative but to work with what existed in order to meet demands. The difficulty in calling up the National Guard and reserves made the draft the only viable option for rapid expansion of the military.<sup>1</sup> Hershey and his supporters believed their system of channeling had provided a "rational system of selection" and that

---

<sup>1</sup> Changes to the law after the Korean War made it more difficult to make large-scale reserve call-ups. Further, the political cost was high. Some suggest the latter was the more critical though. This was especially true in the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Johnson saw a reserve call up as likely to undermine his Great Society endeavors. It also flew in the face of some of his earlier statements such as his reference to Vietnam as "a limited war of short duration, which can be fought with little domestic dislocation" (Baskir & Strauss, 1978, p. 50). For Nixon, such a call up would have flown in the face of his peace pledges that included force reductions. Despite the substantial military involvement in Vietnam, only two reserve call-ups occurred during the period of the war and only one placed reservists in Vietnam. Both occurred in 1968. The first came in response to the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo. The second provided a strategic reserve in the wake of the Tet Offensive. Johnson called for both using Congressional support provided in the 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill that allowed him to call units and individuals to active duty without the declaration of a state of emergency (Johnson Uses New Authority, 1968). Given their terms of service, all those wanting to leave active duty were released by the end of 1969.

a lottery would only “substitute chance” for rationality without “substantially increas[ing] equity for individuals” while threatening to erode morale (Hays, 1967, p. 20).

Appreciation for this “scientific approach” seemed largely lost on the public. Yet some who did understand it argued it only served the military establishment by fueling combat via the bodies of the poor and minorities while the middle-class was scared into professions that also benefited the war effort (Reeves & Hess, 1970).

This draft continued even in years where there was little demand for troops. The SSS worked largely on autopilot with little regard for popular sentiment even as many boards became less representative of their communities. Boards that seemed to be run by outsiders and elitists only added to the rising tensions (Davis & Dolbeare, 1969; Walmsley, 1969; Baskir & Strauss, 1978). Nixon recognized these problems and responded to the political necessity it presented. People sought something that perceptually offered greater freedom while meeting the needs of the country. The lottery did this by providing greater sense of equity and reduced the constant fear that pervaded the draft eligible population as well as their families and friends.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Turning of the Tide during the Nixon Years

When elected, Nixon immediately tried to change the system but his efforts were stymied. Lt. Gen. Hershey, in particular, frustrated Nixon’s plans to implement the lottery and other reforms. Serious change only began after Nixon transitioned Hershey to the titular post of presidential advisor as a full general. This allowed Nixon to dismantle

---

<sup>2</sup> In fact, the change increased the likelihood of a college graduate being drafted from .33 in 1965 to .56 in 1970 (Aldrich, 1971). However with the rate still less than one percent of the total population, the psychological

Hershey's empire and replace his people with a younger set of faces with the hope easing tensions (Flynn, 1985; Baskir & Strauss, 1978). For many, the SSS under Hershey had served to encourage "cynical avoidance of service, a corruption of the aims of education, and a tarnishing of the national spirit" (Flynn, 1985. p. 246). In fact, Nixon removed Hershey just prior to the nationwide moratorium against the draft in hopes of attenuating negative public opinion (Chambers, 1999). Nixon further underscored his resolve to change the system and the approach to the war by ordering the first troop withdrawals beginning in June of 1969.

The Nixon administration made great fanfare in showcasing the return to a lottery drawing with live, national media coverage. Held on December 1, 1969 at the Selective Service's National Headquarters in Washington, D.C., it used the mothballed fish bowls last used during WWII. One bowl contained 366 capsules with each of the possible birthdates for the year. The second bowl included the 26 letters of the alphabet to determine the starting point and subsequent order of draft calls for 1970. Since those ages 18 to 26 were eligible, the lottery covered those males born between January 1, 1944 and December 31, 1950. With the lottery, the priority of induction shifted from the oldest to the youngest. Congressman Alexander Pirine (R-NY) of the House Armed Services Committee drew the first capsule. It contained the date September 14. This meant that every male within the eligible year groups born on September 14 was potentially liable to be among the first called to fill any military manning shortfalls in 1970. Of course, the supply of those deemed 1-A on all birthdates would have to be exhausted before other deferred groups could be used. In addition, the new policy focused primarily on 19 year

---

benefits of the change combined with a declining U.S. presence in Vietnam seemed to obscure any latent negativity this

olds. Unless manpower requirements grew, the pool of 19-year-old males would have to be exhausted before other age groups were called. The drawing continued with members of the SSS Youth Advisory Panels pulling numbers until all the remaining birthdates were similarly rank ordered. Using this rank ordering, local selective service boards would then fill quotas from their 1-A pools. As one date was exhausted, the next one would be used (SSS, 1969; Nixon, 1970a; SSS, 2002; Flynn, 1985). A follow-up Harris poll found that 73 percent of Americans approved of the new draft process. Further, 60 percent rated Nixon's handling of the draft as good or excellent (Harris, 1969).<sup>3</sup>

Comparatively few directly benefited from this change since the majority of those that would be drafted during Vietnam had already entered military service (Gerhardt, 1971). With at least 1,766,910 drafted for Vietnam, it was the fourth largest of five national military drafts (after the Civil War, WWI, and WWII but larger than Korea) and arguably the most contentious war in U.S. history. However, the apparent effect of the lottery on the nation's gestalt was remarkable. Presidential popularity jumped and many protests quieted.

---

might have aroused.

<sup>3</sup> Although the SSS has existed since 1940 and most males have been required to register with it during its lifetime, the president alone cannot implement a draft under current law. Both Congress and the President must follow the legislative process to pass law enacting any draft order. It was this process that first authorized the draft in 1940 and continued through 1973 although legislation authorized its continuance through 1974 (Flynn, 1985). When military manning needs could not be met through normal recruiting, a draft call was made to trigger SSS action. Legislation action, executive orders, or administrative direction could activate elements of the SSS to meet these requirements. Local volunteers, supported by reserve military officers, make up the bulk of the system. State, regional, and national components of the service work to identify registrants who meet physical, mental, and moral standards required for military service. Those who do not meet these standards are classified by the system according to the registrant's limitations that may delay their use or eliminate them from any service. Some will be excluded because of occupational or situational conditions that allowed for exemption or deferment of varying lengths.

From 1948 through 1969, the primary means of filling military manpower needs involved local boards meeting quotas set by the SSS national headquarters. This was done by selecting from those deemed eligible starting with the oldest first. Between 1940 and 1946 and then again after December 1969, a lottery served as the primary selection tool. After 1969, the bulk of those drafted came from 19 and 20 year olds. This system would hold today unless changed by new legislation.

Local and appeal boards tracked registrants. Those not exempted, deferred, or removed as unfit by the board were required to submit to evaluation. Those that passed further physical, mental, moral, and legal requirements would



Three lotteries followed the 1969 lottery. The drawing held on July 1, 1970 determined the order by which men born in 1951 would be called into the military. The August 5, 1971 lottery set the order for men born in 1952. The final lottery came on February 2, 1972, determined the order in which men born in 1953 would be inducted. Following small inductions in January and February, conscription was abolished in favor of an all-volunteer army. The last call occurred in February. The last man reported in on April 30, 1973. By June, the last 85 inductees were in the system (Induction Records, 2005). In all, 1,857,304 men were inducted into the military (SSS, 2003). The draft ended with Melvin Laird's "Zero Draft" speech to Selective Service Headquarters personnel on January 27, 1973 which coincided with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords (O'Sullivan & Meckler, 1974).

However, neither the end of inductions nor the end of the war put an end to debates about the draft. President Gerald R. Ford granted clemency to many draft resisters in 1974. President Jimmy Carter granted amnesty to draft resisters in 1977. In response to Soviet aggression, Congress reinstated draft registration for men 18 to 25 years old in 1980. If there were to be a crisis, registered men would be inducted as determined by age and a random lottery much as it had been done at the end of Vietnam. Thus, the issue of a draft for U.S. military forces continues to wait in the wings occasionally reemerging as the political and military context allows.

The draft brought on social change by intent and by accident. The very nature of exemptions shaped career and family decisions that produced long-term consequences. The draft spurred protest and political change. Many debates raged for and against the

---

then be certified as acceptable for military review. They would receive induction orders from the board as well as a

continuation of the draft. Ultimately, the program became moribund. However, many questions linger as to the nationwide impact. The following chapter outlines the existing literature on the draft. Then, based on the assumption that the draft should have an impact, it lays out a construct aimed at understanding how and why people reflected some of the effect upon the country's primary representative – the president.

## CHAPTER 4 – LITERATURE REVIEW

I got a letter from L. B. J.  
It said this is your lucky day.  
It's time to put your khaki trousers on.  
Though it may seem very queer  
We've got no jobs to give you here  
So we are sending you to Viet Nam

Well here I sit in this rice paddy,  
Wondering about Big Daddy,  
And I know that Lyndon loves me so.  
Yet how sadly I remember,  
Way back yonder in November,  
When he said I'd never have to go (Paxton, 1965).

Songwriters, politicians, and society all show evidence of being affected by the draft during this period. Since what broadly affects the masses tends to reflect in presidential approval ratings, this chapter examines the conceptual underpinnings and model components that might explain how and why. It begins with a survey of the existing literature on the effects of the draft before continuing with a discussion of presidential approval ratings. This is followed by a proposed conceptual basis by which the public might receive and respond to shocks caused by the draft in an increasingly volatile system. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the primary variables selected for use in this study based on past empirical studies.

### Existing Research on the Effects of the Draft

Despite the apparent widespread impact of the draft, no analytical study of its effect on nationwide public opinion or presidential approval during Vietnam is evident in the literature. Further, the Selective Service History Office can find no evidence of a quantitative evaluation of this type being done.<sup>1</sup> Yet, few seem capable of recounting the era without touching on the impact the draft played in their own lives, thus it seems unlikely that the draft occurred without some greater external impact. Because of the centrality of the president in military and foreign affairs, the assumption is made that such impact could reasonably be expected to reflect within presidential approval ratings as do other key factors.

Few analytical studies of any American draft exist, from the colonial period through Vietnam. A few books focus on the mechanics of the draft while more focus on draft resistance usually employing first-person reporting (Chambers, 1987; Useem, 1973). A search of the Digital Dissertations for “Vietnam and draft” or “Vietnam and conscription” revealed only 34 dissertations. Most only mention the draft in relation to the medical treatment or resocialization of veterans. Five discuss various aspects of resistance to the draft. One examines the transition from the draft to a volunteer military. None directly examine the effect of the draft on public opinion. Not a single dissertation examines the interaction of casualties and the draft. The broader academic literature answers some of this question but largely reflects a similar pattern of neglect. The existence of the draft is acknowledged but most studies are focused on anecdotal references. No significant works exist in any of the major social science journals. A

search of Books in Print produced less than 25 texts of even tertiary relevance. A search of the Library of Congress added only 10 more. As with the other literature, most emphasize interviews and biographies that examine the lives of resisters and protestors (Gottlieb, 1991/2004; Kusch, 2001; Perrin, 2001; Miller, 2001; Hagan, 2001; Todd, 2001; Yamasaki, 2001; Gilbert, 2000, Bingham & Wallace, 2000; Baskir & Strauss, 1978; Kellogg, 1972; Surrey, 1982; Haig-Brown, 1996; Dickerson, 1996). A few argue extensively on the morality of conscience (Finn, 1968; Thomas, 1972; Bannan & Bannan, 1974).

Three academic disciplines show any notable body of draft related literature: sociology, history, and economics. The sociological literature largely involves descriptive analysis or speculation. One of the common contributors to these works is Charles Moskos. Some of his earliest work involves questions involving the draft such as the racial composition of the draft military (Moskos, 1969). He has long held that the American public is more risk adverse today since few children of elites enter the military service. Since 2001, he has written and spoken extensively on the need to reinstate the draft. However, his work has appeared almost solely in popular newspapers and magazines (Moskos, 2003a, 2003b, 2001; Moskos & Glastris, 2001). Though he touches many points related to the draft, he does not develop a quantitative approach nor does he discuss presidential popularity except rather tangentially.

History is replete with references to the use of conscription over the life of the United States, though they are largely descriptive in nature. The infrequent references to the overall mood of the nation or public approval of the presidency are subjective and

---

<sup>1</sup> In an Aug. 13, 2003 e-mail from the Selective Service History Office, Janice Hughes acknowledges

tangential. Many works deal with the pre-Civil War period though more on the militia than conscription efforts. In addition to works already cited, these include a range of works (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955; Leach, 1952; Murphy, 1959; Anderson, 1984; Anderson & Honegger, 1982; Cress, 1982; Higginbotham, 1971). The Union draft efforts have the most relevant titles. Amongst these, the works of Eugene Murdock are the most extensive (Murdock, 1967; 1971/1980; 1965). Others also make notable contributions to the Union effort (Geary, 1991). Only one book focused solely on the Confederate draft (Moore, 1924). Works on later conflicts also outline the drafts executed in later conflicts such as O'Sullivan's (1982) overview of WWII or Clifford and Spencer's (1986) look at the post-WWII peacetime draft. However, most works focus on sub-groups within the population such as Shenk's (2005) look at women and the draft in WWI or Muller and Knouye's (2001) examination of the response of incarcerated Japanese-Americans to the WWII draft. Some of the most exhaustive general works on the modern draft have been done by Chambers (1987), Flynn (1985, 2000), and Kohn (1987). Despite the volume of available histories, none appear to focus on the greater political effect of changing public opinion and the draft.

Economists have produced the bulk of the works on the draft. Most of these works involve Vietnam. These tend to involve cost benefit analyses. One body focuses on the micro-economic effects of the draft on draftees, particularly in terms of careers, relationships, and negative social consequences (Angrist, 1990, 1993; Card & Lemieux, 2001; Fisher, 1969; Hansen & Wiesbrod, 1967; Hirsh & Mehay, 2003; Teachman, 2004; Teachman, 2005). The other body of literature takes on the macro-economic question of

---

that her office has never seen a study of this type but was very interested in such work being pursued.

whether or not a draft should exist, in what form, and with what costs and benefits (Amacher, Miller, Pauly, Tollison, & Willett, 1973; Braun & McGrattan, 1993; Siu, 2004; Fisher, 1969; Friedman, 1967; Oi, 1967; Cooper, 1977; Lacy, 1982; Warner & Goldberg, 1984). Most called for an end to the draft because of inefficiencies and hidden costs (Henderson, 2005).

One of the works closest to the topic of presidential approval was done by Altman and Barro (1971). They found that although the intensity of the war seemed to diminish rapidly, “the distributed lag effect of casualties on taste [student interest in joining ROTC and by extension the military] and the drop in draft probability produced a significant decline in enrollment rate in 1971” (pp. 661-662). The decline was approximately 40 percent instead of an anticipated 31 percent given anti-war sentiment and other factors (Altman & Barro, 1971). This may reflect changes in the body politic that drove changes in presidential approval. However, these do not answer the questions posed in this study. Apart from economists, most authors provide little information on the broad effects of the draft and nothing on the political consequences. Only one examines national opinion as it related to resisters and political elites in the Boston area (Foley, 2003). A pilot study conducted with multiple regression suggested the utility of examining the draft using national level data (Morris, 2004).

#### An Argument for the Impact of the Draft on Presidential Approval

Given the lack of existing research on this question, what theoretical basis might serve to undergird this study? The rhetoric and reality certainly show clear disconnects. Draft mechanisms in modern U.S. history have been touted as “voluntary” service expected of good citizens, but coercion has always been a component. What happens

when the patina of patriotism is rubbed off by the rough realities of death and destruction? Consider Woodrow Wilson's 1917 characterization of the WWI draft, "it is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling: it is, rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass" (Palmer, 1931, pp. 216-17). It would seem that such broad volunteerism would make the severe penalties for non-compliance enacted in the conscription law pointless. This study argues that the draft, like other economic and political processes, reflects negatively on presidential approval according to the degree it generates attention because of its negative consequences. When the cost of the draft outstrips its apparent positives, a public reaction should occur. Only the question of degree and means remain. Such variations can be seen in the draft history, which range from bloody riots in the Civil War to protests centered in fringe political and religious communities. However, it would seem unlikely that the draft would work alone to cause such reactions. Other factors are likely to interact with the draft to emphasize its cost or at least underscore its more negative possibilities, i.e. casualties.

Given this, it seems reasonable to suggest that military inductions may also be incisive, especially when casualties mount, because they directly touch the lives of millions. In terms of Vietnam for example, it would seem reasonable that the risk of losing a male relative or friend because they were draft might provide salience even when casualty counts alone might not have broken through. If so, it would be more than just sheer numbers that broke into the American zeitgeist and demanded a response.

In 1964, the United States acknowledged less than 25,000 military members in Vietnam. However, by 1968 this number peaked at nearly 545,000. This 2,200% increase tripled the probability of an eligible male being inducted. Not surprisingly,



public attention appears to have increased commensurately with increased information gathering, political activity, and protests. If primary campaign planks are any measure, presidential hopefuls apparently recognized the growing public dissatisfaction with plans for changing or ending the U.S. role in Vietnam. These planks became increasingly more central from 1964 to 1972.

In the early days of Vietnam, the increase in the number of men inducted was far lower than in comparable periods of WWI, WWII or the Korean War (Induction Records, 2005). However, induction did spike after a steady decline. The initial spikes came in response to military manpower shortage recognized in 1961 that ultimately led to the “Year of the Draft” by 1966. By this year, draft calls quadrupled from those made in 1964. This represented levels not seen since the peak of the Korean War (Foley, 2003). The failure to use other alternatives, such as the reserves and National Guard for fear of political backlash, helped fuel resistance (Miller, 1968). Further, there was an essential difference in the nature of the war.

Unlike the previous three wars, Vietnam did not involve the same response to open aggression with obvious negative consequences for the United States as seen in the previous wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, negative consequences for individuals became increasingly clear as the conflict escalated. U.S. military archives show that 58,152 died and 153,303 were seriously wounded in Vietnam (CACCF, 1998). Thus 1 in 10 Americans sent to Vietnam was killed or permanently injured. National archive records show the Army and Marines bore the brunt of this loss with 9.5% of the Army (134,982) and nearly 25% of the Marines (66,227) killed or wounded. Although less than one in eight troops served in front line positions and less than 1% of those died, these

factors made participation increasingly less popular (Sanders, 1966). Thus, the draft magnified the impact of an unpleasant, and apparently unproductive, war to many sectors of the public that would not otherwise have paid much attention. By the 1970s, each draft call threatened nearly a million men, ages 18-24. This pushed its effects well beyond those actually inducted.

No large-scale protests were evident in the United States before the increased use of draftees. Early protests involved elites with little likelihood of being drafted. However, later protestors were increasingly populated with members of the lower and middle class that would otherwise have had no apparent interest in protesting (Kohn, 1986). Mueller (1984) recognized the effect of such contextual elements but suggested that dramatic change in protestors arose primarily from the decline in radicalized protests. Thus, “normal folks” felt safe in voicing their opinions. If so, this denotes an evaluative process used by individuals to perform some form of cost-benefit analysis. However, this begs the question of why they cared in the first place. One possible answer is the draft. Further, it could be that the delay in public protest came in response to negative assessment of issues involving the war more than the nature of existing protest. Others suggest such a line of thought although they only use the casualty variable (Gartner, Segura, & Wilkening, 1997; Lorrell and Kelley, 1985).

A military draft is nothing new in the American experience, nor is public resistance to it. If anything, the widespread public acceptance of the draft from 1940 through 1964 may represent a unique chapter in the history of U.S. draft efforts. After 1964, resistance in terms of protest would steadily grow to exceed the levels of all previous drafts except the Civil War. However, the response time was longer. This

raises numerous questions. Why was this period different? Did Americans sublimate their historic repugnance to the draft because of the Cold War threat? Did Americans turn to non-violent means as a way to reject the draft long before more public and even violent means manifested themselves in the system? Before exploring this, prudence dictates testing for any quantifiable impact of the draft. This study seeks to add to the existing body of knowledge by plumbing the question, “What effect did the draft have on shaping public opinion as recorded in presidential approval polls?”

### Theoretical Underpinnings

The observable effects of the draft in terms of individual behavior and mass protest lend support to the assumption that the draft was significant, but what elements in the literature relate to this untested factor? A number of variables come to mind.

#### *Priming and Proximity*

The approval literature commonly appeals to priming theory. Though it is most often directed at media effects, priming may occur when any source triggers attention to something. It is this point that people “place special weight on it when constructing evaluations of overall presidential performance” (Miller & Krosnick, 2000, p. 301; Iyengar, Kinder, Peters, & Krosnick, 1984). Presidential popularity normally springs from the

prevailing economic, social, and political conditions of the times. Unemployment, inflation, economic growth, flagrant violations of public trust, the human toll of war, sharply focused international crises, dramatic displays of presidential authority – all affect the president’s standing with the public (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990, p. 497).

However, the mass media provides only some of the conduits for communication – not all. This was even truer during the Vietnam War era. Therefore, the role of it should not

be taken for granted. Rather, a method of transmittal that exists regardless of elite involvement and media focus would be preferable.

Undoubtedly, media effects play a role in transmitting this information and all the more so as media technology expands. Vast amounts have been written concerning media effects and the shaping of public opinion. Further, it seems logical that the media can act to accelerate, inhibit, or even set an agenda (Livingston, 1997). However, research has yet to yield a reliable consensus on the transmittal, receipt, and processing of that information. Mueller (1973) himself found no basis for the new medium of television to have an impact on public perceptions of the war. Subsequent media effects studies have returned mixed results (Perse, 2001; Wanta, 1997; Bartels, 1993). In looking at the Vietnam War and public opinion, Adam Berinsky (2001) argues the media was largely pro-war in its messages through 1968 with a notably tapering afterward. Yet, other studies have found sizeable anti-war responses before the media began transmitting them (Verba & Brody, 1970). Some evidence shows that casualties, and perhaps the draft by extension, create interpersonal communication that is faster and more efficient in spurring change than the direct intervention of the mass media (Gartner, et al., 1997). This relates to earlier work that found social avenues to be primary conduits for information flow (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). This makes application problematic. It is not even clear whether direct media contact or transmittal through others is the primary means of effective priming. Therefore, this study does not delve into the media effects debate. To do so would require an entire study in itself that may, or may not, derive an acceptable solution. Instead, it simply acknowledges the need for people to receive information. Regardless of the source, the salience of the content remains paramount.

This investigation does not examine the efficacy of non-media means to communicate salient messages, nor does it examine any effects of the media. It operates under the assumption that information did reach American adults who then formed opinions based on this information. Instead, it begins with the idea that opinions formed according to environmental changes regardless of the medium of transmittal. Rooted in the concept of humans as rational actors, this view is consistent with a large body of work on public support during conflicts that presupposes some form of cost-benefit analysis being used by the public (Mueller, 1973; Mueller, 2000; Larson, 1996; Klarevas, 2002, 2000).

This work also assumes that proximity play a vital role in communicating opportunity and risk or loss. This is consistent with much of Mueller's work that highlights the loss aspect as well as more research recent that focuses on the odds of positive returns. Such thinking has recently begun to permeate the conflict and foreign policy literature (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Eichenberg, 2005). Regardless, the receipt of salient information is expected to either reinforce or shift presidential approval. Further, the more proximal the issue, the more likely this will occur. In other words, there must be some relational, social, or physical link that connects the receiver with the issue. For example, significant results have been found for both ethnic and geographic communities in terms of responsive to casualties during the Vietnam War, even during the earliest phase (Gartner, 2004; Gartner & Segura, 2000; Gartner & Segura, 1998, Gartner, et al., 1997). Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1974) suggest individuals primarily use only the most readily available and relevant information. For most people, this information is called up without benefit of careful consideration of other factors though certain expectations may hold. For example, multiple studies have shown that the public expects

positive results from its government. Often when negative events occur, they are unexpected thus more likely to produce an exaggerated response. Therefore, a war that incurs too many costs runs counter to these expectations and garners more attention from the public (Lau, 1985; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Because this is a preliminary examination, the nature of these proximal relationships is assumed rather than measured. Aggregate level analysis using general questions cannot be expected to tease such nuances from the data. Further, it cannot be expected to answer questions of individual motivation, i.e. opinion shifts based on sociotropic or self-interest motives.

Finally, a third assumption is made that increasing awareness of risk and loss should lead to changes in public opinion. Before 1964, the U.S. presence in Vietnam was small, as was the risk of any significant, tangible loss, i.e. deaths. The expectation is that casualties broke through the noise of daily life and made the issue of the draft more salient as the need and negative potential for draftees grew to reach most American households. Although the level of threat varied dramatically between households based on demographic factors, there was a widespread threat of loss highlighted by increasing numbers of inductees. This would be consistent with research that early responses to Vietnam appear to be mixed, followed by a slight negative trend that only takes off in 1968 after the majority of the U.S. military casualties had already occurred (Gartner, et al., 1997). Though incisive, the cost had to reach a sufficient threshold to activate a sizeable portion of the populace. One of the simplest forms of response involves changing one's opinion of leaders deemed responsible. At the national level, this typically focuses on the president.

### *Presidential Approval*

The president serves many roles including that of figurehead, lightning rod, hero, and scapegoat for much of what transpires in the political life of the United States. Regardless of the specifics, the president invariably serves as the primary political figure in the country thereby receiving the lion's share of the public's attention in regard to national issues (Behr & Iyengar, 1985). Because of this, presidential approval serves as a barometer for measuring mood within the body politic. Fundamentally, the more a president's actions appear to mirror an individual's beliefs, the more the individual supports them within the self-imposed bounds of partisanship which itself has grown increasingly weaker in many quarters (Erikson, Mackuen, & Stimson, 2002; Gronke, 1999; Martin, 1988; Gronke & Brehm, 2002). Of course, a president's popularity may also facilitate his legislative agenda and other initiatives (Borrelli & Simmons, 1993; Neustadt, 1980).

Many argue that the relevance of presidential approval has only increased with time given cultural and technological changes, particularly in the last 60 years. Presidents now actively track poll numbers with the rise of "the public relations presidency" (Brace & Hinckley, 1993, p. 382). The impact of this "new referendum" (Brace & Hinckley, 1992, p. 18; 2003) process effects elections and political activities at many levels (Gronke & Newman, 2003; Gronke, Koch, & Wilson, 2003; Newman & Ostrom, 2002; Rivers & Rose, 1985; Sigelman, 1979). Because these ratings are "widely taken to approximate reality" (Neustadt, 1980, p. 81) their importance has only served to create vast public and private polling operations, including those within the White House (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). In the earliest studies, academics held that presidents must

suffer decline regardless of their efforts unless perhaps some good deed might boost approval (Mueller, 1973, Stimson, 1976). However, more recent works suggests that presidents may indeed sway public opinion, particularly indirectly, and may do so with the aim of diverting attention from their problem areas (Nadeau, Niemi, Fan, & Amato, 1999; Edwards & Wood, 1999; James & Rioux, 1998; Waterman, Wright, & St. Clair, 1999). Gronke and Newman (2003) summarize the fundamental relevance of presidential approval studies as something beyond “data-fitting exercises” (p. 507).

Presidential approval research speaks to larger questions rooted in democratic theory...if higher approval means greater power, the public would reward the president for meeting realistic and appropriate expectations. Then the president would have an incentive to meet those expectations and would benefit from doing so. However, if the public holds the president accountable for outcomes that he has little control over, or has unrealistically high expectations, then the president’s power depends on the whims of the economy and history, setting up the presidency for almost inevitable failure. On the other had, if presidents have *too much* [italicized in the original] control over approval, they could boost it without meeting appropriate expectations, manipulating their way to power (pp. 507-8).

In fact, the fundamental question embodied in this effort may be as old as the democracies of Greece but nevertheless still relevant. How citizens think may spell the long-term success or failure of any democratic government. Depending on the context and the players, presidents may sway the public or more often, they themselves may be swayed (Edwards & Wood, 1999; Foyle, 1999). Since presidential popularity has been tracked in much the same way since 1938, it serves as a unique barometer of changing political opinion and support for presidential policies. The use of a single question by the Gallup organization, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is handling his job as president?" improves reliability by reducing error associated with language changes found when comparing differing poll questions (Eisinger, 2003).



When providing valid responses rather than “non-attitudes” as a method of dealing with an interviewer, citizens typically use beliefs and values derived long before the issue arose or the question was asked. These often serve to shape simple evaluative tools to determine right from wrong with minimal cost. Thus, the average citizen may rightly be viewed “as a cost-conscious consumer and processor of political information who, while taking her duties seriously, has successfully reduced the impulse to be consumed by politics and political affairs” (Carmines & Huckfeldt, 1996, p. 250). Rather than being ignorant on key issues, American citizens often recognize their duty and the need to form opinions but choose a myriad of ways to do this. Implicit in this is the tendency to assign values intuitively to different processes and events so that changes in a more valued area trigger further investigation and data gathering. This often includes the use of less than optimal data sources and certainly tends to focus on personally salient but mundane categories such as finances, safety, etc. far removed from the more nuanced world of politics.

Recognizing this, certain areas of the political arena have been shown to be more reliable in predicting changes in public opinion including the popularity imputed to a sitting president. These factors represent both long and short-term effects within the political domain. One theory suggests the long-term elements establish a predisposition towards certain political parties or candidates. Researchers have found support for stability in public opinion (Ladd, 1978; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Page & Shapiro, 1982, 1992; Smith, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992) with coherent conceptual underpinnings (Holsti, 1996; Holsti & Rosenau 1979, 1984, 1996; Wittkopf, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1987). However, more immediate elements may shift this long-term predisposition thus

accounting for political shifts in voting (Finkel, 1993). Based on multiple findings on public evaluation and selection of politicians, similar mechanisms would like function when individuals are asked to assess presidential status.

John Mueller's seminal book, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (1973) investigated presidential approval within the context of the Korean and Vietnam Wars in which he found some durable predictors of popularity change. In studying post-WWII presidents, he found economic changes, time in office, rally points, and military losses as reliable predictors of presidential approval change. Casualties and economics were the most reliable measures after individual presidential administrations. Mueller used presidential opinion poll data as his primary dependent variable and outlined a system in which presidential popularity primarily fell with negative economic change. Conversely, Mueller showed that spikes in popularity came with crises, especially foreign policy events, in which citizens rallied to the president to derive security in uncertain times. However, crises that required long-term use of troops and generated casualties would drag down popularity. As the preeminent thesis on the matter, Mueller generated many critiques. Stimson (1976) argued that much of the change in popularity followed a cyclical pattern. This was harmonized with Mueller's work in later studies. Kernell (1978) raised opposition to using time as a substantive variable insisting that discernible events and actions serve as changepoints.

Subsequent empirical studies have generally supported Mueller's findings while refining or adding to them. This includes the articulation of the honeymoon, disillusionment, and forgiveness phases noted by Ragsdale (1998) that parallel earlier work by Brace and Hinckley (1992) and Neustadt (1980). Brace and Hinckley (1992)

also found a post-election flush of popularity followed by a steady decline usually ending with a slight bump up in ratings as a president enters the final stages of his first term. They also found the second term tends to follow similar, albeit exaggerated versions of this trend.

The public generally evaluates presidents in similar ways, though individual differences have been identified in contextual and personal distinctives that might cause altered responses, i.e. dramatic events during the presidency and the president's own behavior (Greene, 2001; Funk, 1999, 1995; Stoker, 1993; Brody, 1991; Kinder & Krosnick, 1990; Simon & Ostrom, 1989; Meyer, Wattenberg, & Malunchuk, 1986). However, these findings tend to beg the question as to what people are actually evaluating. The literature suggests at least four primary motivations behind answers to presidential approval polls: 1) a judgment on the overall job; 2) a judgment on presidential performance relevant to the policy interests of the individual; 3) a judgment on personal characteristics or behavior of the president; 4) a judgment on the perceived state of the country because the president stands out as the embodiment of national aspirations (Mueller, 1973; Stimson, 1976; Nuestadt, 1980; Brace & Hinckley, 1992; Ragsdale, 1998; Stuckey, 2004). . Of the four motivations, all but the second have direct relevance to this study. Further, these support the view that most respondents consciously evaluate the president based on personally held information. Certainly, finding someone to blame for critical failure is a common, albeit logically questionable, practice (Taylor & Fiske, 1975; Roesch & Amirkham, 1997; Jones & Davis, 1965; Heider, 1958). However, individual opinions often spring from similar sources. For example, apart from partisanship, many point to economic factors as the single largest source of data to inform the public's opinion of presidents.

### *Economics*

Social science literature widely employs economic variables as the bedrock from which social changes occur. Broadly, applicable economic measures typically account for nearly half the variance in any given study of opinion change. Work to isolate dependable economic factors and define how best to model them has been a continuous processes (MacKuen, 1983; Hibbs, Rivers & Vasilatos, 1982a, 1982b; Ostrom & Simon, 1985; Erikson, 1989; Chappell, 1991; Mackuen, Erikson, & Stimson, 1992; Clarke & Stewart, 1994). The most common factors employed include inflation, unemployment, and the Misery Index, which is an interactive term, derived from the first two. Though the first two may provide significant results individually, the Misery Index is often used because the two individual variables can exhibit an inverse relationship that may deflate their individual effects when correlated together (Lipset, 1982; Calleo, 1982). Nevertheless, this effect does not preclude their use in this way since both variables involve specific economic effects that cut across socio-economic groups, though with arguably greater impact on middle and lower classes.

These measures have been validated independently and together in the literature (Frey & Schneider, 1978, Kernell, 1978; Lewis-Beck, 1985; Koch, 1991; Marcus, 1988; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981). Though some like Sears and Lau (1981) have disputed such “checkbook politics”, these measures remain staples for statistical modeling. As Butler and Stokes (1969) wrote in an early study of this phenomenon, the economy is a valence issue beyond compare. Put simply everybody believes it is important and generally in the same ways, although externalities might make it appear otherwise.

Numerous studies have found important links between economic factors and the popularity of political leader, the most common form involving presidential popularity.

However, presidential popularity is far more likely to drop with economic downturns than rise with economic upturns. The literature demonstrates a wide range of direct and indirect links between the president and the public in terms of economics and conflict (DeRouen, 1995). As Monroe and Laughlin (1983) note, economic factors are second only to partisanship in providing a dependable predictor for predicting public opinion. In their study, unemployment proved to be the single most important influence on presidential approval. Thus, they argue that “for all presidents, macroeconomic conditions have greater political significance than do the government’s redistributive policies designed to influence economic well-being. And with minor exceptions, the economy’s political importance is equally strong for all economic classes in American society” (Monroe & Laughlin, 1983, p. 1). One study found presidents Nixon, Johnson, and Carter all suffered negatively in public opinion returns because of the performance of the economy when controlling for significant events and unemployment. Only Ford’s short-lived presidency seemed to gain any positive benefit from an economic rebound (Norpoth, 1984).

### *Military Casualties*

Casualties are commonly cited as the incisive factor that cut through noise in the system to alert the public to the costs of a conflict.<sup>2</sup> Since the pioneering work of John Mueller, casualties now serve as a standard variable in predicting shifts in presidential approval during periods of conflict. Casualties dominate the literature as an important trigger for turning public opinion against leaders, especially the president, because they

---

<sup>2</sup> Though casualties may be defined in many ways, the most common use in the literature limits it to those killed or missing. The military tends to categorize by all loss of manpower including wounds, illnesses, and accidents.

provide salience and clarity to the public that is then used by the public in assess leaders and their decisions (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 1988; Maoz and Russett, 1993).<sup>3</sup> Thus, casualties cut through the competing messages in the public domain to grab public attention. Events that break through the apparent ambivalence caused by narrow focus and cognitive miserliness of the average citizen normally begin with a major event that serves as the trigger. Often this takes the form of military conflict. As Mueller (1996) notes,

in the last 60+ years only a few events have significantly distracted the American public from its inward perspective: WWII, Cold War crises, i.e. Cuban Missiles prior to 1963, Korean War, Vietnam War, Iran Hostage/Soviet-Afghan War, increased perception of nuclear war in the 1980s, and the Gulf War. However, after these matters were resolved the public went back to full-time focus on domestic matters (p. 36).

The president serves as the primary focus of this research. More recently other factors have been discussed, such as policy decisions, conflict type, and media effects. Yet, casualties remain the most common independent variable to affect the public's assessment of presidential effectiveness during times of conflict. The primary argument focuses on casualties as a critical point in U.S. decision making because they provide salience and clarity to the public that is then used in assessing policy decisions. Thus, the impact of casualties cuts through the competing messages in the public domain to grab public attention. However, in doing so, evidence exists that other factors interact with casualties to accentuate the intensity and direction of the public's response.

---

For the purpose of this investigation. All those permanently lost -- all deaths (combat and non-combat) and MIAs -- will serve as the basis for the term casualties.

<sup>3</sup> Though the term "casualties" has many definitions may be defined in many ways, the definition most used in the literature refers to those killed or missing. The military tends to categorize by all loss of manpower including wounds, illnesses, and accidents. For the purpose of this investigation, all those permanently lost -- all deaths (combat and non-combat) and MIAs -- will serve as the basis for the term casualties.

Early research during the Vietnam era supported the “rally round the flag” effect showed casualties to have little constraint on the president (Waltz, 1967; Verba, Brody, Parker, Nie, Polsby, Ekman, & Black, 1967). Beginning with Mueller, later studies found quite the opposite. Ray (1995) points to this cost as the “first point” in the argument that the public in democracies will brake wartime ambitions because they pay the most immediate and highest cost. This pacifying effect also affects decisions to employ military might (Gartner, 1993) and to end military operations (Gartner, 1998). The perceived human costs reflected in casualties have been tied to a state’s ability to function because of the costs it subsequently imposes on public support and government legitimacy to the point of determining the lifespan of a state or government (Stam, 1996; Jackman, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, 1992; Walzer, 1977). In two separate studies, Bennett and Stam (1996, 1998) found similar confirmation. Not only do such responses affect the outcome of wars, they also affect the tenure of the executive (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). Reiter and Stam (1998), Maoz and Russett (1993), and others have developed this idea to highlight the importance of casualties, both directly and indirectly, in deciding who is in office.

Similarly, residual feelings derived from casualties interact over time might impact the opinion/policy nexus both within and between conflicts. Over time, a number of studies have found an increase in negative reaction to foreign policy stances related to the conflict. Mueller (1973) was the first to analyze this trend using Korea and Vietnam War data. He noted that in both conflicts, but especially in Vietnam, public opinion did not always improve after casualties dropped off. In fact, Gartner, et al. (1997), found evidence that the slope representing negative public reaction to Vietnam era casualties

had two major components. First, until 1967 the rise of negative opinion was steady but not steep. However, opinion polls in early 1968 began a steep climb in opposition. This came despite 80% of the casualties for the entire war predating 1967. The reason, the authors have suggested, was delayed response. Though incisive, the cost had to reach a sufficient threshold to activate a sufficient portion of the populace. Adjustments to this come from contextual changes. In contrast, Mueller (1984) suggests changes at home and in Vietnam made the difference. First, the decline of radical protests that allowed the average citizen freedom to voice dissatisfaction without fear of being associated with fringe elements.

Some have suggested that the change in approval came with changes to U.S. support for Vietnam in addition to casualties. For example, Jeffrey Milstein (1974) suggested that approval decreased as U.S. materiel support and casualties increased to South Vietnam. His conclusion was that Vietnamization reduced this pressure, thus stimulating positive presidential approval. However, this ignores other factors such as the greatly reduced number of men in harm's way that could also have accounted for the change.

This paper will later examine the effect that one such factor -- the draft -- might have had, especially with the dramatic increase in the use of draftees by late 1967. Such interaction of contextual cues and triggers is consistent with pivotal events in Vietnam such as the Tet offensive that appears to be an important point of opinion transition.

When marginal casualties are increasing, the change from support for administration policy to opposition should function largely as we have described. When marginal casualties are declining, however, the anticipated relationship between casualties and opinion is less clear. With cumulative casualties always likely to change their opinions back to support if marginal



casualty rates begin to decline, although the immediate aftermath of the Tet Offensive suggest that this is possible (Gartner, et al., 1997, p. 676).

In light of this, casualty totals are considered a reliable means to estimate the cost of a war. The incisiveness of casualties is expected to reach most respondents. The result is expected to be negatively related

to the probability that any individual respondent would register his or her approval of wartime policies controlling for individual characteristics...the nature of these relationships might systematically vary across segments of the war and would be stronger during periods when, in general, marginal casualties were increasing” versus decreasing” (Gartner, et al., 1997, p. 676).

The case study of Vietnam has certainly established the primary means by which to assess the impact of casualties. Even instances such as Somalis dragging a dead U.S. soldier through the streets of Mogadishu have been seen as vindication of the post-Vietnam gospel of inordinate wariness in regard to U.S. casualties. This has led some to declare the United States a “sawdust power” afraid to commit in any way that might incur casualties, at least until the Bush administration launched its “War on Terror” (Conversino, 1997). Certainly the Pentagon has historically resisted or delayed releasing specific casualty numbers for fear of discouraging public support (Knickerbocker, 2003). In recent conflict, this has been harder to do though. Another part of the equation is the nature of the conflict.

The degree to which the public restrains its government in the international arena will vary greatly with respect to the type of war being fought and citizens’ ongoing perceptions of how well their side is doing. In the eyes of democratic citizens, not all wars and, by extension, not all war costs are equally worth paying for (Gartner, et al., 1997, p. 691).

Many of the basic assumptions concerning casualties have remained constant since John Mueller’s (1971) initial work. Based on his analysis of the conflicts in Korea and

Vietnam he identified this tie between casualties and public reaction. He found a significant correlation between rising casualties and public disapproval for a conflict. In fact, he asserted this pattern reflects less public sensitivity at the start of a conflict and a tendency to grow more tolerant to them over time. Although applied broadly, it can be argued that this assessment, aided by mathematical manipulation, reflects neither of his cases. Even his own data show in the case of Vietnam, casualties dropped but opinion continued to grow in opposition to the war. A similar pattern exists in Korea. Further, these wars may be unique in their contextual settings. Other conflicts since have not had widespread support or even awareness at the outset and small setbacks have generated significant negative responses, i.e. Somalia. A second key point was Mueller's determination that no other factors had significant impact. This included the Tet and mini-Tet offensives that were arguably key turning points in the war.

Nincic and Nincic (1995) countered this formulaic approach by arguing for varying impacts on policy commitment. Subsequent research by Gartner, et al. (1997) also found evidence to the contrary. They argue that context does matter and that both casualty variables and conflict idiosyncrasies shape different response patterns. As Gartner and Segura (1998) argue, the original Mueller approach "homogenizes conflicts" with different characteristics to the point that the cumulative results do not reflect the nature of most conflicts. For example, some conflicts never outlive the initial "rally-around-the-flag" support evident in many conflicts (Holsti, 1996; Parker, 1995; Russett, 1990; and Mueller, 1973). Finally, they argue, it underestimates the importance of pivotal events that can shock or galvanize the public and policy makers alike. For

example, the United States has long fought “a war on terrorism” yet, September 11, 2001 served as a catalyst to extend and add to this “war” in a massive way.

The more recent literature has built on the casualty thesis to emphasize a conflict or policy differential to explain changes in public opinion. For example, Jentleson (1992) argues that popularity of a conflict is determined in part by the “principal policy objective.” He argues that the type of war matters. In his categorization, Americans show clear support when fighting engages an aggressor against the U.S. There is also support for humanitarian intervention. However, interventions in internal civil conflicts inherently start out with less support and that base tends to decline more quickly (Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Jentleson, 1992). Oneal, Lian, & Joyner (1996) dispute Jentleson’s initial hypothesis that the public effectively moves the hand of government, however, they do give the public credit for supporting military force to resist aggression while giving little support to internal changes.

Livingston (1997) proposes a more complex approach using eight conflict types while also attempting to control for the “CNN effect” which may bring more attention to some types of conflicts over others. A related work is that of Larson (1996) who shows evidence that public acceptance of casualties depends on the benefits and costs of a conflict as well as the degree of elite consensus in the public eye. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) add a related twist to this idea of perceived success as a director of public opinion, which in their view is heavily influenced by military veterans. Eichenberg (2003) gathered survey data that directly question U.S. respondents on their acceptance of casualties related to real and experimentally generated conflicts. He found support for Jentleson’s hypothesis with a clear differential between men and women, especially in

the case of humanitarian interventions that women overwhelmingly favor. Baum (2000) conducted statistical analyses of all U.S. post-WWII foreign crises and produced a case study of the 1992-94 U.S. intervention in Somalia to produce some related findings. He also showed evidence that an attentive public can inhibit presidents from escalating foreign crises, especially when strategic stakes are low. However, he found decreasing willingness to support military involvement in low-stakes military operations such as humanitarian intervention over direct protection of the country.

### *Presidential Terms*

Mueller's (1970, 1971, 1973) original work did not yield significant results for political, economic, or casualty factors until he included a dummy variable for administrations. This result led Mueller to underscore the importance of presidential variation. "Any analysis of presidential popularity cannot rely entirely on the [discrete variables easily measured by statistics]...it must also incorporate parameters designed to allow for the special character of each administration" (Mueller, 1973, p. 222).

Presidential administrations represent unique sets of events, behaviors, and actors during a discrete timeframe. Variations can be noted between presidents and even between a single president's first and second terms. Possible causes of such variation suggested in the literature include presidential idiosyncrasies, media effects, elite effects, issue fatigue, and events not otherwise specified among others (Woessner, 2005; Kagay, 1999; Zaller, 1998; Funk, 1995; Zaller, 2004; Meyer, et al., 1986; Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, & Sullivan, 1990). This includes important but intangible qualities such as presidential competence and integrity (Newman, 2003; Greene, 2001). For the purpose of this study, Eisenhower's first term serves as the baseline.

### *Critical Events*

Mueller (1973) suggested a number of variables to test for the effect of events that reflected important positive or negative results in the political arena. Though he found no substantive results, he did suggest that more refined efforts might prove more fruitful. Kernell (1978) first took up the challenge with an effort to operationalize economic and political events. Ironically, Kernell's work was criticized for an overdependence on time factors after he criticized Mueller for a similar failing (Monroe, 1978, 1979). Norpoth (1984) developed a list that received limited acceptance. The first widely accepted effort came from the hands of Brace and Hinckley (1992) who developed a simple -1 to +1 scale to note events monthly. They derived critical points of significant domestic and international activity for the United States ranging from presidential health problems, i.e. Eisenhower's heart attack, to race riots and war protests. On the international scene, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia represent some of the many events detailed. Major economic events are also reflected including employment woes and stock market crashes.

The primary argument against using such data involves the fear of skewing the data. Reification is certainly a legitimate concern since post hoc recognition of "critical" events may bear little resemblance to the experiences of the respondents at the time. However, in using these as a control, the odds of a false positive are far less likely while a false negative is increased. It is important to identify and control for such pivotal events for they add explanatory power to the model with minimal risk. For example, there is no

evidence of a significant effect on presidential approval before the appearance of declining U.S. fortunes in Vietnam, i.e. Tet, etc. Yet, few at the time realized the importance of Tet (Oberdorfer, 2001). Initially, the public responded angrily and rallied to the president, but this support eroded by the spring of 1968 (Page & Shapiro, 1992). The primary difference in the literature involves the use of a more theoretically based model such as Brace and Hinckley's 1992 work versus more atheoretical approaches that simply use datamining. Undoubtedly, care must be taken to avoid problems that might skew findings by emphasizing time rather than looking at events as pointed out by Kernell (1978). However, the approach proposed here seems consistent with Kernell's findings that presidential popularity is related to real-world events, conditions, and responds to changes over time. Brace and Hinckley (1992) argue that policy development may in fact represent more than the progress of time. In fact, some long-term issues may require more extensive operationalization. Watergate is one such issue given its long, drawn out nature (Lanoue, 1988).

This approach has not been without detractors. In response to Mueller's (1973) use of time (and its incumbent events) as a variable, Kernell (1978) argued that attempting to measure events by time simply covers the causal factors that brought the change. However, Norpoth (1984) suggests Kernell's removal of time as a variable would only trade one misspecification for another because Kernell's variables still relate to trends that are dependent upon time as a factor. Brace and Hinckley (1992) add to this by offering a proposal in which some time is weighted more heavily than other time when measuring political change. They found that some critical events are worth more – either negatively or positively in terms of presidential popularity – than the normal

passage of time. Intuitively, this argument is appealing and they find empirical support for their argument for the presidents during the period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. There is little doubt that the Tet Offensive of 1968 had wide-ranging impact. However, the danger in this approach comes in the dual tendencies to overlook meaningful events when one examines the past while also employing reification to derive more meaning from events than would those who lived through them.

#### *Excluded Variables*

Many variables have been tested as predictors of presidential approval shifts, and this study is far from exhaustive. For example, the “coalition of minorities” posited by Mueller (1973) seems intuitively appealing but has not held up empirically. Likewise, cultural change, media effects, and elite effects would likely add more noise than light to this investigation given their much debated theories and measures. For many, such as media or elite effects, the literature reveals more controversy than convergence. Other variables receive limited attention or acceptance such as the many possible economic variables. Some variables are excluded because of the aggregate nature of the study and limitations of the data such as partisanship, gender, and race. For the sake of clarity and parsimony, a line was drawn and a decision made to use only the most established variables found in the literature that fit the Vietnam era. For this reason, policy shifts was not used since Vietnam exhibited many concurrent, competing policies more so than other modern conflicts. The exclusion of other variables does not denigrate their possible effects, but rather relegates them to the administration dummy variables. This allows for analysis of the draft while providing a reservoir for other effects.

## Summary

The idea that opinions are formed based on receipt and evaluation of information leads to the idea that shifts in presidential approval may provide a measure of reaction to war related policies. Within the political context, many factors may enter in, including those just cited. To summarize, individuals must identify significant threats or opportunities. They then evaluate and choose a response, especially to significant threats. Variation in response comes from differing degrees of proximity and the nature of information available. When a sizeable portion of the populace feels proximal to an issue, especially one that involves undue risk, a response is evoked. This is consistent with past work that finds respondents to presidential approval surveys using a diverse set of considerations to draw upon when answering as well as variance in the answers based on individual uncertainty (Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Zaller, 1992; Alvarez & Brehm, 1995; Bartels, 1986; Alvarez & Nagler, 1998). However, this study examines aggregate versus individual level data. Therefore, it does not engage in further analysis of the cognitive processes of survey respondents. What will be assessed is the relative effect of contextual components in spurring presidential approval shifts. Based on the assumptions that proximity and evaluation of risk enter into the nature of these shifts, it is expected that a peacetime draft might generate little impact on presidential approval ratings while a wartime draft might increase the perceived costs thereby producing more negative responses.





## CHAPTER 5 – METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This chapter outlines the hypotheses to be tested using the research design and research methodologies detailed later in this chapter. It also explains the nature and source of time series data used.

### Hypotheses

As previously discussed, this study is unique since no evidence exists of similar research on effects of the draft on presidential approval. Therefore, its primary aim is to answer basic questions involving the direct and indirect effect of the draft on presidential approval between 1954 and 1973. Two hypotheses are postulated for testing.

*Hypothesis 1. The draft, in the form of inductions, will exhibit a significant effect on presidential approval.* Thus, the null hypothesis would state that no significant effect on presidential approval should be evident. From the information presented in Chapter 4, three expectations are derived:

- a) *The induction time series should show either no effect on presidential approval during the pre-combat draft period from 1954 to 1964.*
- b) *The “war-time” induction time series should exhibit a significant, negative effect on presidential approval from 1964 to 1973 as evidence of growing discontentment.*
- c) *A significant, positive shift in presidential approval should occur in relation to the induction variable after the curtailment of the draft in January 1973.*

A statistically significant result will be taken as evidence that this hypothesis cannot be disconfirmed. However, this alone is insufficient. Evidence must also exist for a series impact in a more complex system that mirrors normal human affairs. Evidence

of significance, non-collinearity, and causality must also be present for full acceptance of a series. These requirements help deal with concerns of shared information between the casualty and induction series. If a draft series proves significant while the casualty series do not, this would suggest that the draft predominates as a critical factor in shaping public approval of the president.

*Hypothesis 2. The draft will display a significant interactive effect upon presidential approval with casualties acting as a moderating agent.* Again, the null hypothesis would state the opposite: the draft will show no significant results in terms of interactive effects upon presidential approval. If inductions are incisive and evaluations of cost are made, then unique results are expected for each period of study. However, expectations similar to those in Hypothesis 1 exist for Hypothesis 2:

- a) *None of the multiplicative (induction x casualties) interactive series should show significant effect on presidential during the pre-combat draft period from 1954 to 1964.*
- b) *One or more of the interaction series should exhibit a significant, negative effect upon presidential approval during the combat draft period from 1964 to 1973.*
- c) *One or more of the interactive terms should show a significant, positive shift in presidential approval following the decline of inductions and casualties with the curtailment of the draft and the signing of the peace accords in January 1973.*

In the pre-test period, the expectation is that the public will not show a significant response to the non-combat phase of the draft in the Vietnam era when other economic and political matters predominated. Thus, consistent with the literature, matters of treasure should drive opinion formation until blood is spilled. Without something to cut through the noise in the system, this relatively bloodless phase should not produce any significant results for the draft. If significance does exhibit, it could be linked to

exogenous factors such as the Cold War and may even produce a positive result because of the rally phenomenon, i.e. response to the Berlin Crisis. Significant effects related to Vietnam should not arise until the deployment of combat troops that begins the test period. The insertion of a battalion or larger body of ground combat troops marks the divide between non-combat and combat periods. Public sensitivity should then increase as the war demands an increasingly larger military force fueled by the draft and accentuated by casualties. This should be especially true as war demands boost both casualty levels and induction requirements.

The combat draft period begins March 1964 and ends January 1973. This begins with the insertion of Marine ground forces and ends with the announcement of an end to the draft. The post-test begins with the announced end of the draft in January 1973. In this period, some form of approval should register with a significant positive result for inductions. Though the peace accords were also announced in the same month, the result is parallel. Young men will no longer be inducted and face the inherent risks previously noted. Both self and sociotropic interests could be served by the populace engaging this issue.

The second expectation poses a problem noted previously. What controls exist to deal with the potential collinearity of casualties and inductees? This may or may not be a problem. If analysis shows one or both to be insignificant, then the point is moot. If only the draft is significant, then Hypothesis 1 holds making Hypothesis 2 moot. If both prove significant, it becomes problematic. However, this is true only if both show significant casualty in the same direction. If this were to occur, multivariate analysis may rule out one or both time series. Nevertheless, there still remains the chance that the problem may

still exist. Even if this were the case and the safeguards already mentioned fail, it is far more likely that a Type II error occur than a Type I error. Thus, any error will likely occur in the direction of non-significance (Cohen, 1969).

The third expectation poses other problems. Based on the changing patterns of the casualty and draft series, the collinearity problem would seem less likely. However, it may still exist. Further, this period is fraught with challenges to the presidency at home and abroad. The War Powers Act and Watergate are two of the most obvious. In addition, the spectacle of South Vietnam falling may have spurred some response.

For both hypotheses, the relevant input series must show statistical causality in driving changes in presidential approval consistent with existing research or historical evidence. Evaluating this relies on the use of several significance tests as well as Granger Causality Tests. Since statistically independent time series will be eliminated from the model, this leaves only two options for effect between time series: one-way or two-way. This leads to a related research question. If evidence of impact is identified, which variable had the most impact? In other words, did casualties influence public sentiments about the draft or vice versa?

### Research Design

This study uses nationally aggregated time-series data in a quasi-experimental approach with a modified, pre-test/post-test design. Pooled presidential approval ratings drawn from national surveys serve as the dependent, or response, series. Military induction rates serve as the primary independent variable, or input, series. Other input series that will help control for the primary, contextual factors include economics, events, presidential terms, and casualty rates. Statistically modeled, lagged data within an

ARIMA framework is used to assess the effects of time on these correlated time series. Based on the social and psychological processes outlined in the previous chapter, this study compares the change in the public's approval ratings for presidents from three periods of active U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well as across the entire period.

Without question, the use of either casualty induction rates fails to operationalize fully the array of stressors within the political environment of Vietnam era. Both represent costs associated with policy decisions as they were impacted by other contextual factors. Therefore, they do not account for the intangibles across the populace or within specific sub-groups. However, as measures of policy these variables are relevant since their outcome may be expected to generate a political response at the national level. Such a response often focuses on the president and can be expressed as an approval rating. Again, this proxy for national acceptance of policy outworkings is far from comprehensive. However, it is accepted as a rough measure of changing political tides in terms of support for the president and presidential policies.

With this understanding elements of the Box-Tiao intervention strategy are employed to provide the foundational information for the quasi-experimental test of any changes to these factors (Box & Tiao, 1975). Foundationally, the noise pattern of the first period establishes the baseline readings from which all subsequent assessments in later periods will be analyzed. Such an approach follows the standard methodology for assessing effects over time when working with time series models (Yaffee & McGee, 2000). The aim is to detect changes between periods that might show evidence of shifts based on the use of conscripts or related factors. Because it is unclear what effect the draft had directly or in combination with other factors such as casualties, three periods

are established to test for changes over the course of direct, U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Analysis will also be done for the overall period to assess long-term impacts.

In the first period, a dearth of casualties and relatively stable induction rates hold from January 1954 to February 1964. This period represents the pre-combat draft period that ends with the arrival of U.S. large, ground combat units. Because conflict permeated most of the post-WWII period, no substantial period exists for a “peacetime” draft. Therefore, this period serves as the pre-test that establishes the baseline for this study.

The second period represents the period of active combat and the draft. It begins in March 1964 and continues through January 1973 when the draft officially ended and the Paris Accords were signed. This is the most active period of the war in terms of the draft and casualties. It serves as the test subject in this experiment.

The post-test period continues from the end of the draft to the end of the U.S. presence in Vietnam in April 1975. During this period, the number of draftees who had not voluntarily extended their service had dwindled to nil. Though a small number would continue to enter the service through June, the draft has largely ceased being a factor. Further, casualties also decreased as the military move to a defensive stance under orders from the White House.

An analysis of change between the three periods will be used to detect any significant change over time as the nature of the conflict evolves. This is consistent with Gartner and Segura’s (1998) arguments. The expectation would be that unless the draft had significant impact separate from Vietnam, there should be no significant findings from the first period. If, after the insertion of ground combat forces, significant results

appear, an interactive effect may be suggested. Further, if the draft is a significant factor in shaping presidential approval, it should decline in significance in the third period.

### Methodology

This study employs several time-series analysis methods to examine the hypotheses made concerning the draft and its effect on presidential approval. The three methods used are descriptive, cross-correlation, and intervention analysis. Descriptive analysis will provide a sense of patterns in the data to include trends, cycles, outliers, and significant shifts. Cross-correlation, or explanative, analysis examines the effect of one or more independent time series upon a dependent time series. The primary goal is to establish the existence and nature of any relationship between the series (Chatfield, 2003; Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1994).

Intervention analysis, also known as interrupted time series analysis, is also used to test whether certain events cause a change in the dependent time series. It uses dummy variables to replicate the presence of pulse and trend events. Pulse events would be events that occur rapidly and usually generate a response of limited duration. This mirrors the approach taken by those researchers that employ critical event variables such as Brace and Hinckley. Such events would be represented by a single observation, usually  $-1$  or  $+1$ , denoting the presence of an effect. The trend event may be a single event with long-term impact or a long-term event. Multiple datapoints would reflect the long-term nature of a trend change (Yaffee and McGee, 2000).

These methods should provide results superior to traditional linear regression analysis, because they deal with the problems inherent to time-series data, such as autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs as past results within a single time series effect



future results within the same time series.<sup>1</sup> Linear regression techniques generally fail to account for problems such as undue correlation. Mueller (1973) himself noted problems given his tests for serial correlation seldom reached optimal levels. At best, he said, his Durbin-Watson statistics never exceeded .70 (Mueller, 1973, p. 233). Since a valid estimate of independence using the Durbin-Watson test is normally expected to be between 1.5 and 2.5, this suggests problems existed within individual series and possibility with any estimation of crosscorrelations between series (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). Another problem arises with the use of Ordinary Least Square techniques that are more appropriately used in analyzing cross-sectional data. This compromises the underlying assumption of normality required in linear regression (Pickett, Reilly, & McIntyre, 2003). The failure of linear regression to ensure stationarity is another common problem. Even with extensive precautions, linear regression can produce spurious findings of significance and explanatory power (Newbold & Granger, 1974). However, even when more appropriate statistical methods have been employed, there still may be a failure to challenge past assumptions or flawed techniques (Gronke & Newman, 2003). For this reason, this study adds additional measures to account for such problems.

This study also has the advantages inherent to aggregate analysis. Though individual level studies may find some reasons why answers are given, they suffer from a significant problem of endogenous bias (Erikson, 2004; Kramer, 1983). At the individual level many issues are hard to untangle including those involving wars (Berinsky, 2004). One of the primary causes for these problems involves projection effects on the part of

---

<sup>1</sup> Autocorrelation refers to data correlated to previous or subsequent samples. This means redundant information is present making analysis less explanatory than when examining a series with the same number of

the respondents. Something they value in the candidate, often coupled with a lack of awareness of more important issues, leads to a projection of what the respondent wishes rather than a careful assessment (Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis, 2004). The use of aggregate analysis is not only consistent with a growing body of literature but also employs the data most often valued by political leaders (Waterman, et al., 1999). Though delicate shifts might be obscured, the norming found in aggregate results can facilitate our understanding of broad social shifts. This may be in part why many researchers have begun to make clear ties between public opinion, events, and policy (Erikson, Mackuen, Stimson, & Kuklinski, 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, & Erikson, 1995; Page & Shapiro, 1992).

#### Statistical Analyses

Because of the potential for autocorrelated input variables and the propensity for these variables to have long-term relationships, this study relies on Box–Jenkins time-series analysis methods that combine ARIMA modeling with later improvements to better assess the effects of the independent variables.<sup>2</sup> This process, known as linear transfer modeling (LTF), was originally developed by Liu and Hanssens (1982) and provides a method more robust to correlation problems and easier to apply given it does not require complicated steps such as data prewhitening (Yaffee & McGee, 2000). Prewhitening had originally been done because technology and theoretical limits made more precise methods unavailable or unduly expensive. However, advances in both have

---

independent observations. Thus, autocorrelated data must be considered less conclusive unless corrections are made to deal with the problem.

<sup>2</sup> The tools for executing this include SAS version 9.1 (SAS Institute 2004), SPSS version 13.0 and SPSS Trends version 13.0.

permitted more precise testing with less information less through means such as the LTF (Yaffee & McGee, 2000; Liu & Hanssens, 1982). It follows the basic steps of standard ARIMA identification, estimation, and diagnosis techniques to determine the specific nature of each variable. However, the tests at each stage are slightly more robust and a final meta-diagnosis stage is added to assess the nature of individual series and any final models. This study uses the LTF process recommended by Yaffee & McGee (2000).

After determining the noise model of each, the results will be used to study the interaction of each independent series with the dependent series – presidential approval. This process will again employ standard ARIMA techniques. Time series based on intervention analysis techniques will be added to examine the possible effects of related events not reflected in continuous data. The time series will be evaluated using both bivariate and multivariate methods to assess the impact of significant series. Finally, causality will be assessed to identify the true nature and direction of impact between time series.

### *ARIMA Modeling*

Early statistical modeling designed for the “hard” sciences was incapable of handling time series influenced by their own pasts as well as the past and present effects of other time series. To overcome this challenge, Box and Jenkins (1976) developed the ARIMA model that gave researchers the ability to model trends in the data with an Autoregressive (AR) measure.<sup>3</sup> It also allowed modeling of recurring shocks with the

---

<sup>3</sup> A single or dependent time series may be expressed as a data point for each time period:  $Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, \dots, Y_{t-1}, Y_t$ . Added to this would be any random shocks (a) at each time period:  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_{t-1}, a_t$ . However, the most common articulation of an ARIMA model comes in a p,d,q format. The p represents the AR function. The d represents any integration or differencing done, and the q represents any MA function. Thus, the most basic of ARIMA models would normally be written as (0,0,0) which could also be expressed as  $Y_t = a_t$ . If needed, a second set of terms may be appended to represent any regular, seasonal fluctuations. Autoregression refers to how important previous

inclusion of a Moving Average (MA) measure.<sup>4</sup> Along with these, a provision was made for a differencing factor to be included that eliminated noise by subtracting subsequent observations from the current observation to provide a series of levels rather than changes.<sup>5</sup> This process has similarities to centering and often produces a centered result. In using these tools, the aim is to produce a parsimonious model. Normally, a good explanatory model with fewer components reduces the likelihood of spurious measures being included as well as simplifying the interpretation of results. However, certain assumptions must also be met in order to use this procedure. Fundamentally, there must be sufficient data that also display stationarity and invertibility.<sup>6</sup> At least 50 equally-spaced datapoints should be present for optimal results with the Box-Jenkins procedures. Further, missing values, unaccounted for outliers, or other distortions must also be removed via smoothing, transformation, and differencing (Yaffee & McGee, 2000).

ARIMA processing usually entails four stages: identification, estimation, diagnosis, and metadiagnosis. However, it also starts with the selection and

---

values are to the current one over time. A value at  $t_1$  may affect the data value of the series at  $t_2$  and  $t_3$ . However, the value at  $t_1$  will decrease on an exponential basis as time passes so that the effect will decrease to near zero. It should be pointed out that  $f$  is constrained between -1 and 1 and as it becomes larger, the effects at all subsequent lags increase (Meyer, 2006).

<sup>4</sup> The moving average process [ARIMA (0,0,q)] recognizes the presence of serially correlated data composed of the current random shock along with residue from previous shocks. When stationarity holds, MA and AR functions can be interchangeable. This allows the use of the more robust AR related set of statistical tools (Yaffee and McGee, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> The integration process [ARIMA (0,d,0)] uses differencing to achieve weak stationarity when it is not already present or readily achieved through early transformations. Differencing allows the mathematical removal of trend and drift from the data by subtracting the first observation from the second and so on through the entire series. Thus, a series that required simple differencing without AR or MA processes would be recorded as an ARIMA (0,1,0) model. However, overdifferencing should be avoided since it creates spurious MA results (Yaffee and McGee, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> There are two forms of stationarity normally referred to in ARIMA modeling: weak and strict. Weak stationarity requires involves equilibrium in covariance that includes a constant mean, variance, and autocovariance. Strict stationarity adds the requirement of normality. Only weak stationarity is usually required in most analyses (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). Invertibility measures stability of MA models. It measures the ability to invert an MA series to return a convergent AR series (Yaffee & McGee, 2000). It is usually measured using unit root tests.

preparation of the data. A plot of each series will be generated to identify gaps, spikes, or other abnormalities. Evidence of missing data or unusual outliers may require data smoothing or correction. If the variance within the series is stable, no further transformation of the variable is required. Failure to show stationarity will initially be dealt with using logarithmic, Box-Cox, power, or other transformations.

Of the three stages of transfer function modeling – identification, estimation, and diagnostics – identifying the transfer function form for each input variable may be the most difficult, especially when dealing with multiple input variables. The LTF helps simplify this process since it can be used exactly the same way for one or many variables (Liu, 2005; Liu & Hanssens, 1982). Further, it is much easier and more reliable than the cross correlation function method originally employed by Box and Jenkins (1976; Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1994). This study employs a multiple-input, single-output model to describe the system referred to as a single-equation, transfer function model. This model approximates the essential functions in the system as well as inputs into it with the aim of evaluating the causes for activation and decay of public opinion.

In the identification stage, univariate testing is performed to determine stationarity, trends, and seasonality. Where necessary, differencing will be used to achieve stationarity. This process also eliminates trends such as the growth of inflation over time while leaving unique impulses for examination. This allows any remaining patterns to be accounted for using the ARIMA factors at the appropriate order. The examination of graphic models is the first step. These include time sequence graphs, autocorrelation function plots (ACF), partial autocorrelation function plots (PACF), and correlograms. These allow quick identification of patterns within the series. Next,

statistical diagnostic tests, such as standard error assessment and Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are applied to confirm assessments of stationarity and seasonality. These measures also provide the first sense of the ARIMA coefficient values referred to as parameters.

In the estimation stage, parameters of the specified numbers,  $p$  and  $q$ , of autoregressive and moving average terms are established. This is usually accomplished by implementing some form of regression analysis. Significance tests for these estimates help determine stationarity. In this study, both Conditional Least Squares (CLS) and Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation methods will be used. To increase the certainty of results being valid, all time series must achieve significance for both measures. Otherwise, they will be eliminated from the study.

CLS provides the greatest flexibility in handling data while ML provides the more conservative measures and therefore the most dependable measures. Further, since it is more robust to nonlinear forms commonly found in time series analysis, ML is better at dealing with any residual noise not captured in the noise model. However, there can be drawbacks. In the past, it has been avoided because of the computing power and time required. Also, MA movements can sometimes be obscured and thus not properly identified. However, this can be remedied by testing the values from different points within the series. If parameter estimates remain the same, the reliability of the proposed model is optimal (Yaffee & McGee, 2000).

The aim of the diagnostic step is to use both necessary and sufficient tests to ensure that within the range of statistical certainty, the parameters are reliable and the error process unpredictable by itself. To achieve this one of three constructs is required: causal measures using correct leading and lag indicators, an ARIMA model that correctly

models the memory function of the series, or dummy variables that correctly reflect pulses, shifts, or trends not otherwise handled by other independent time series (Reilly, 2004). This study focuses on the ARIMA model.

One of the first important questions for a proposed ARIMA model involves its fit. Diagnostics will be run to test the statistical fit of each model. This is accomplished using omnibus measures of fit, like the  $R^2$  measures commonly seen in linear regression. Time-series analysis also provides more robust measures. Two of the most popular are the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The SBC adds to its formula a weighting system that penalizes more complex models. Thus, the SBC is often the measure of choice for those seeking the most conservative estimation of the data. If these results are not smaller than the original returns, there may be no reason to remove a variable. The result of this phase of analysis will be a more robust estimation of the parameter values. Assessment of individual parameter estimates comes next.

Parameters must be tested for significance, magnitude, autocorrelation, stationarity, and invertibility. Non-significant time series will be removed. Less powerful time series may be evaluated for retention depending on what explanatory power they add. Durbin-Watson point out autocorrelation of the AR terms, especially AR(1). F tests and the Ljung-Box Test detect evidence of non-randomness in the residuals (a lack of white noise) that may indicate a need for remodeling since this suggests evidence of series functions or errors. Significant intercorrelation or lack of stability (stationarity or invertibility problems) may require further modification of the series or the model. If modifications are made, then both the estimation and diagnostic

stages are repeated. Finally, the models are underfitted and overfitted to ensure that no necessary parameters are included and no extraneous parameters retained. Parameter estimation requires multiple tests returning like results to ensure valid modeling. “A kind of convergent validation can be inferred from this multimethod approach. The model exhibits reliability, stability, and relative robustness to variations in the estimations” (Yaffee & McGee, 2000, p. 208).

After developing several viable ARIMA models, the final phase of metadiagnosis begins. Multiple factors need to be considered in order to achieve the best fitting and explanatory noise model with the most parsimonious construct. No model will be a perfect representation of reality. Therefore, the aim is to select the best representation based on theory, fit, precision, validity, and reliability. These generally require a comparison of measures and techniques already discussed. Once a noise model is established, the next phase begins.

### *Intervention Analysis*

In addition to time series drawn from continuous data, crude measures of event impacts can be modeled using intervention analysis. Dummy variables are normally used to establish the inception and conclusion of different events. These are referred to as intervention functions that are added to the ARIMA noise model of the independent time series to create impact response models. The dependent series is then regressed on these models to evaluate impact.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Intervention analysis examines the question of what effect an event had on a time series. It operates with the null hypothesis that the level of the series before an intervention ( $b_{pre}$ ) is the same as the level of the series after the intervention ( $b_{post}$ ). or  $H_0: b_{pre} - b_{post} = 0$ . After building the ARIMA model, an intervention term ( $I_t$ ) can be added and the ARIMA equation is now a noise component ( $N_t$ ):  $Y_t = f(I_t) + N_t$  (Meyer, 2006).



The key to this process lies in the meta-diagnosis phase of ARIMA modeling. First, it rests upon the assumption that a system remains stable unless caused to change. Second, it assumes that this change can be identified and modeled based on examination of the time-series data validated in the final stage of modeling. Changes in approval will be identified and modeled. The challenge comes in identifying actual changes from random outliers. This is why it is important to test the response series alone as well as with other independent time series to assure the most accurate predictors are used. Thus, this effort relies on both theory and empirical observations.

This study models two specific types of change to the structure in the dependent variable. The first involves pulses that have limited duration effects. The second involves steps that have long-term effects often referred to as innovational or trend change. Wherever possible, theoretical support for the change expected is preferred. This allows the formulation of null hypotheses from which deviations may validate significant changes. This would also provide a measure of the duration of effect expected since there are four types of change modeled in intervention analysis.

The first change involves the simple step function that shows an abrupt onset event with permanent duration. The second involves a process of abrupt onset and temporary duration. Abrupt onset and oscillatory decay represents the third type. The fourth is gradual onset with gradual decay. Each are represented with zeros before onset and after the effect ends. The remainder of the models use ones or some fraction of one to represent the presence of an effect. The parameter tests for these factors uses  $t$  tests

---

and more preferably likelihood ratio tests (Yaffee & McGee, 2000). Once these time series are developed, analysis may begin.

The analysis phase of this investigation begins with bivariate analyses. It follows with simple multivariate analysis to assess the relevance and relationship of the time series within a more representative model. This approach provides evidence of suppression and other effects that may change the significance and impact of the time series analyzed in the bivariate phase. Finally, those independent time series that prove significant will be subjected to causality testing using the Granger Causality Test.

#### *Bivariate Analysis*

Bivariate analysis entails a number of phases. First, each series will be examined to assess its basic nature and to correct any data problems. Then, the noise model developed for the dependent time series in the ARIMA process will be applied to each independent time series and the dependent time series to remove the autocorrelated noise from each series. The results from these evaluations will again be diagnosed based using the methods previously cited – parsimony, white noise, and efficiency. Parsimony is measured by the SBC. White noise is measured by the Box-Ljung Chi-Squared test. Efficiency involves the ability of a model to explain change in the dependent time series.

Models must be efficient in explaining change in the variance of the dependent series. This will be measured using stationary  $R^2$  methods. Like the more traditional  $R^2$  results, it measures the amount of variance change that can be attributed to the introduction of the independent variable. However, traditional  $R^2$  results are normally inflated when used in time series. Therefore, this measure only considers change that directly attributable to stationary components within the series. The results from this

measure may range from 1, reflecting complete explanatory power of the variance, to negative any result into infinity. A negative result indicates a fit worse than random results. The more negative the number, the more contrary the fit (SPSS Trends® 14.0, 2005). However, bivariate analysis alone may give a skewed view of matters since a single, independent series may pick up on the variance explained by other factors not present.

### *Multivariate Analysis*

The reason for using multivariate analysis in this study is to further test the relationships and significance developed in the bivariate analysis. Further, it examines the interaction of the diverse time series in order to identify any further compounding effects. The methodology and requirements largely mirror those outlined for the bivariate studies.

Multivariate autoregressive analysis of time series does not offer as many tools as the more common linear regression. However, techniques designed for time series analysis provide more reliable results (Yaffee and McGee, 2000; Hibbs, 1973-1974). This study uses an autoregression-based procedure that employs the Exact Maximum-likelihood process in order to estimate true regression coefficients from models with first-order autocorrelated errors (SPSS Trends® 13.0, 2004).

The first step in the multivariate assessment will be to demonstrate the interrelationship of the significant time series through iterative modeling. Beginning with all relevant series, nonsignificant series will be eliminated when they fall below the 90% confidence level, with the exception of economic control time series and any constituent series related to significant interactive terms in the model. Models will be run until all

non-control series meet the .05 significance level or have been dropped from the model. In removing non-significant series, the interactive terms will be removed first, because they may be masking the effects of the primary series. Intervention terms will be removed next, followed by all other non-significant series. If any competing models arise, the best model will be selecting using  $R^2$ , SBC and Q test results (Cromwell, Labys, & Terraza, 1994; Cromwell, Hannan, Labys, & Terraza, 1994). Semipartial correlation assessments will also be used to evaluate the explanatory power of models and their component series. This is done by subtracting the taking the  $R^2$  of a model from which a series has been deleted and subtracting it from the previous model to gain a percentage loss of explained variance (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2005).

Each period will be tested separately. In handling the overall period, a number of intervention terms will be included to assess further specific assumptions about the war. Also in the overall period, several different time models representing possible patterns of reaction to the draft will be tested. After this, the issue of causality will be examined in any significant time series from the bivariate or multivariate tests.

#### *Multi-collinearity and Causality Analysis*

Most modeling is based on assumptions of limited collinearity and clear causality. However, the very nature of the social sciences tends to militate against this view. Though multi-collinearity tests are relatively standard, causality tests seem far less common in social science research. This study will employ both to finalize the multivariate models.

Multi-collinearity will be tested using methods that produce Variance Inflation Factor results (VIF). The standard for this test will be that no series that exceeds a VIF of

10 will be retained in the model, unless some overriding reason demands it. In the case of series that model direct effects, this may mean the interactive effects must also be removed from the model. When VIF results are roughly equivalent, the series with less evidence of causality will be removed first.

The expectation of causality assumes that the hypothesized relationship between independent variables and dependent variables remains uni-directional with the independent affecting the dependent only. However, this is seldom tested. Often the nature of the series being modeled gives an intuitive sense that this practice may lead to misinterpretation. For example, a cursory assessment of presidential popularity suggests that uni-directional measures may not be the norm. Because presidents respond to approval ratings, it could be that the polls, and related actions by the public, might also shape presidential behavior.

To assess the directionality of relationship between the input series and presidential approval, this study will use the Granger Causality Test to test the direction of relationship with each independent series and the dependent series. An  $F$ -test and an asymptotically equivalent test will be run to evaluate whether the lagged information on a dependent variable produces statistically significant information about an independent variable in the presence of lagged  $X$  (SAS, 2006; Geweke, Meese, & Dent, 1983). If not, then it is said that ' $Y$  does not Granger-cause  $X$ '. If causality is not evident or flows in the wrong direction, the assumption of uni-directionality may not hold pending further examination (Granger 1969; Sims, 1972).

Granger testing relies upon the use of statistical methods to estimate which data series most affected the other. The more the input series appears to cause change in the

output series, the closer the result will be to +1. The more the output series appears to affect the input series, the closer the result will be to -1. Results between these two extremes suggest feedback or shared causality between the dependent and independent series (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). The significance level for this test will be .05. This test is best suited to AR(1) models. If the ultimate output series models uses higher-order AR or MA models. Other tests may be required (Granger & Newbold, 1977).

Standard practice requires all component series be tested for causality as well as the subsequent removal of all that fail to show causality, unless some overriding principle dictates otherwise (Cromwell, Hannan, Labys, & Terraza, 1994). The results from those series that prove significant at the .05 level or better in either direction will be reported. Non-significant results will be reported only as needed. Following the removal of series that exceed the VIF tests and fail to show clear, uni-directional causality, another assessment of the model's adequacy will be made using measures of overall correlation, standard error, and residual patterns (Granger & Newbold, 1977).

#### Data

This study uses presidential approval ratings as its output (dependent) time series variable and six categories of input (independent) time series: general economic, military casualties, critical events, presidential terms, military inductions, and interactive terms. The first four categories represent some of the most common data types used in creating statistical models for presidential approval change during times of conflict. The draft, measured by military inductions, represents the unique independent variable. The interactive terms pair casualty and induction data to test for the combined effect of these time series. Unless otherwise indicated, all data have been garnered from U.S.


government sources. In addition, all independent series use centered data when used in the bivariate and multivariate analysis.

To improve specificity, all variables are measured monthly. Where data smoothing is necessary, linear median averaging will be used unless otherwise noted. This approach yields 256 observations with 122 falling in the early phase, 107 in the middle phase, and 27 observations in the latter phase. However, the results in the final phase will be more speculative since the best modeling is done with 50 or more observations.

#### *Dependent Time Series – Presidential Approval*

This study uses presidential approval as a proxy for the national mood (NATAPA). Most of the data come from Gallup national, telephone surveys conducted between 1954 and 1977. Each survey used national samples of adults. Each category allowed for a response of approve, disapprove, or a do not know. These data are drawn from the Gallup polls accumulated by Dr. George Edwards at Texas A & M. The average standard error of the original survey responses in this study is approximately 3%. This database includes presidential approval data for most months from 1953 to 2000. The fluctuations within this series are evident in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Presidential Approval Series



Since some months have no data and others have multiple poll results, the results had to be averaged to reflect an overall effect for some months. In other cases, datum for some months was missing. Where datum was missing, other national polls were used to fill the gaps.<sup>8</sup> This left 14 observations unfilled. The largest gap involved three consecutive, missing observations; however, most of the gaps were only one month in length. Where reliable, alternative sources of data could not be found, linear interpolation was used to generate likely replacements. This function used the existing trends to create likely intermediary points between known values. This process was

---

<sup>8</sup> These included the months of October, 1955; December, 1957; and November, 1971 that were filled using Gallup Poll information found in *Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook* (Edwards & Gallup, 1990). Roper polling data was used for seven more months. The question Roper used for July 1964 asked, "How would you personally rate the (Johnson) administration in Washington? Would you say it is excellent, good, only fair, or poor?" (Lexis-Nexus searches). Respondents were asked to rate their opinion as excellent, good, fair to poor, and no opinion. The fair/poor assessments were equally divided with half going to the approve column and the other half going to the disapprove column. Roper poll results derived from Lexis-Nexus were also used for July, August, September, and October 1972. These polls asked the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon is handling his job as President?" Respondents could respond with approval, disapproval, or do not know. Louis Harris Poll questions were used for August and November 1976. The 1976 questions asked, "How would you rate the job President Ford is doing—excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor?" Respondents could respond with approval, disapproval, or do not know.




essential since ARIMA analysis cannot tolerate data gaps. As modified, these data provide a source by which to evaluate changes within the U.S. political landscape.

*Independent Time Series: Economics*

This study uses the three economic factors most often cited in the presidential approval literature: inflation (INFLATE), unemployment (JOBS), and the Misery Index (MISERY) derived from Department of Labor Statistics records for the Consumer Price Index (*CPI-U, U.S. City Average, All Items, 2005*) and unemployment (*Unemployment Rate - Civilian Labor Force, 2005*). The data used were seasonally adjusted. The Misery Index used in this study was derived by multiplying the CPI by the unemployment rate for each month. The overall trends of these series can be seen in Figure 5.2.

*Figure 5.2. Comparison of Economic Series*



The CPI data represent a monthly measure of cost for numerous consumer goods and services for all urban consumers that represented over 80% of the population during the time of this study. These data measure price changes from an established reference date. The prices on this date represent the starting, or 100%, mark for subsequent prices. Changes in prices for individual items, such as fuel or clothing, are recorded as increases or decreases from this reference point. Thus, a 9% price increase would register as 109%. In the measure used for this study, only the cumulative change above or below 100% is used. In this way, 109% would be reflected as 9% in the INFLATE time series. A dollar figure can be derived by multiplying the original price of a product by the CPI percentage and then adding that result to the original price. So if a gallon of gas cost \$1 in the reference period and had increased to 109%, the current price of that gallon should be approximately \$1.09 (Jackman, 2006).

The unemployment data were derived from the Current Population Survey performed monthly by the Department of Labor from 1948 to 2002. The rate reflects changes in unemployment for all residents of the states of the Union and the District of Columbia who were not institutionalized or serving in the military. The rate reflects the ratio of the unemployed to the employed as a percentage (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003).

#### *Independent Time Series: Military Casualties*

This study uses casualty statistics drawn from the Department of Defense datafiles maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration. These records represent formerly classified studies generated within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Record Group 330). The specific component of the datafile used in this

study is the [Southeast Asia] Combat Area Casualties Current File (CACCF) which was last updated in December of 1998. This file details all service records involving the death or disappearance (missing in action (MIA) or Prisoner of War (POW)) of military members within the Vietnam theater of operations from 1956-1998. This captures most deaths during the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War since virtually no U.S. military deaths are recorded in Vietnam before 1956.

This study uses both hostile and non-hostile deaths as well as MIAs and POWs though these present a special case in themselves.<sup>9</sup> Rather than using the strictly combat death measures like Mueller, this approach eliminates problems such as accounting for those wounded on the battlefield who die later in hospitals elsewhere. It also works on the presumption that few civilians delineate combat casualties from other causes of death. The reason behind this decision involves the reception of such news by civilians in other conflicts. The normal response seems to be that of attributing any loss to the war. Practical experience suggests that most Americans regard a death in a war zone as a war casualty regardless of the specifics. A neighborhood boy who died was often said to have died “in the war” with distinction given only to unique cases. Similarly, witnesses that are more distant would see most deaths as part of the war based on non-descript tallies of losses or third-hand stories.


As in Mueller’s studies, these data have been prepared using a monthly total and a running total for casualties. However, it relies on a far more complete record of

---

<sup>9</sup> They may in fact have more impact on opinion since they have likely generated more attention over time than those who were listed as dead. This has been seen in Gallup polls during the Vietnam War in which the majority of the public preferred an immediate end to the war unless it meant threatened U.S. POWs. It would seem such a change would reflect more than just a response to wording variation.

casualties than those found in Mueller's 1973 data, which no longer exist.<sup>10</sup> Unlike the ad hoc dataset developed by Mueller from *New York Times* articles and material from friends at the Pentagon, this source provides the most comprehensive source of all losses for this conflict. Monthly casualty totals (MONDEAD) and a measure of cumulative casualties (CUMDEAD) from the January 1954 to the month in question have been derived for use as independent series (see Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3. Monthly and Cumulative Casualties



### *Independent Time Series: Presidential Terms*

Presidential administrations represent unique sets of events, behaviors, and actors during a discrete timeframe. Variations can be seen between presidents and even between one president's different terms in office. Therefore, dummy variables will be

<sup>10</sup> In a Nov. 10, 2004 e-mail from John Mueller, he apologized that the data is no longer available but acknowledged that the Vietnam data was largely a compilation of New York Times reports.

used for each relevant presidential term (IKE\_2, JFK, LBJ\_1, LBJ\_2, NIX\_1, NIX\_2, and FORD). Eisenhower's first term in office will serve as the reference for subsequent terms. Consistent with Mueller's (1973) imperative, this variable captures the unique variance relative to each presidential term not otherwise accounted for in by other variables. This approach makes for better reliability because it based on other empirical work and done after a term ends unlike most presidential studies (Franklin, 2005). This approach also minimizes problems found in ARIMA modeling when terms are ignored or overlapped (Norpoth & Yantek, 1983).

*Independent Time Series: Critical Events*

These events represent critical points of significant activity for the United States, primarily related to foreign policy and conflict. The foundation for this variable is the original Brace and Hinckley (1992, pp. 185-188) critical events list. These events are modeled as intervention pulses in the system. To further develop this list, rally and critical events detailed by Mueller (1973, p. 211) and Norpoth (1984, pp. 270-271) have also been added (see Appendix B). Beginning with Brace and Hinckley's modeling, months that include positive events will be coded +1 and negative events will be coded a -1. However, this ignores compounding effects because only one event could at most be registered in a given month. If events are duplicated, the event is only counted once. Therefore, in months in which more than one event occurs, the sum of the events will be recorded. The result was no month exceeded -3 or 3.

*Independent Time Series: Watergate -- A Unique Critical Event*

Because of the unique and persistent nature of Watergate, a separate intervention series indicating pre- and post-Watergate periods is also included. Nixon's battle to

avoid detection and censure leaves no clear method to assess the relative value of each event over one and half years. Since there is no good way to assess the impact on presidential popularity during any given month, a more deterministic approach is taken. Each month from the public announcement in March 1973 linking Nixon with the Watergate burglary to his resignation in August 1974 are coded as 1. Months outside this window are coded as 0. This differs from the Brace and Hinckley events because this model reflects a level change beginning with the first public disclosure of White House ties to Watergate and ending with Nixon's resignation.

*Independent Time Series: Induction – The “draft”*


Monthly and cumulative totals have been extracted from SSS archives.

Inductions represent the number of draftees actually selected for military service after the initial screening process. As noted earlier, millions faced the threat of the draft each year. Far fewer actually received draft notices. Only about 8 in 100 of all draft age males were ever inducted into the military during the Vietnam War, though as noted in Chapter 2 this fails to recognize draft-induced enlistments. The induction totals represent the filling of the combined requirements for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. However, the bulk of requirements in most years came from the Army.

MONDRAFTVOLS estimates the number of monthly draft-induced volunteers.

CUMDRAFTVOLS estimates the cumulative total of draft-induced volunteers (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4. Monthly and Cumulative Inductions



Two series have been derived. MONDRAFT represents monthly inductions.

CUMDRAFT represents cumulative inductions as in Mueller's use of cumulative casualties. This variable follows Mueller's (1973) technique of carrying the end result out through the end of the analysis. This reflects his belief that a residual feeling remained though a process had ended. The variable CUMDRAFT0 is included to reflect the actual historical drop to zero inductions after the draft's conclusion. CUMDRAFT1 and CUMDRAFT5 reflect a midpoint between these two with a 1% and a 5% exponential decay in the totals after the end of the draft. Finally, two time series are used in an attempt to model the effect of draft-induced volunteerism. Both are derived from testimony by the head of the SSS before Congress. His research indicated three to four

men volunteered for every man that was inducted (House Committee on Appropriations Hearings, 1958). Using the average of 3.5 and multiplying the actual inductees, a very rough measure was created to evaluate any possible impact of such volunteers.

*Independent Time Series: Interaction Terms*

The conceptual basis for these terms is linked primarily to hypothesis two. These terms are designed to evaluate whether a moderated causal relationship exists such that inductions affect approval but with casualties as a human cost that regulated the overall effect. Thus, with presidential approval as the outcome series, inductions serve as the independent series. Casualties serve as the moderator series when combined in the interaction term. The integration of these two series into a new interaction terms eliminates the spurious problem that exists when two main effects both have direct impact on the outcome series (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2005).

Four multiplicative interaction terms will be created by multiplying the casualty rates by the induction rates. These terms reflect several means by which the response to induction changes might be moderated as they affect presidential approval. The four time series will reflect monthly inductions moderated by monthly casualties (MIMC), monthly inductions moderated by cumulative casualties (MICC), cumulative inductions moderated by monthly casualties (CIMC), and cumulative inductions moderated by cumulative casualties (CICC). These interaction terms link induction and casualty rates as a means to assess their mutual effect on presidential popularity.

However, without careful use such terms may provide little information that is statistically valid or relevant (Braumoeller, 2004). However, this does not preclude the careful use of such interactive terms. In fact, others have examined Braumoeller's



critiques and encouraged researchers to include such terms in their models given certain caveats (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).

First, a literature review is necessary to gather as much theoretical and empirical basis as possible. Second, there must be a conditional hypothesis to be tested. Third, all constitutive terms must be individually included in the testing in addition to being reflected in the interactive terms. This relates to the second point: these constitutive terms cannot be interpreted as having unconditional marginal effects. An interaction actually reflects the affect of a third variable that relies upon the changing value of the first two time series. Therefore, to treat an interaction term as an independent term with main effects is erroneous. Fourth, meaningful marginal effects require more than a standard data table. Some sense of changing impact over time must be derived from standard errors and confidence interval charts. With these accomplished, interactive terms may serve as valid and informative tools (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).

Since multiplicative, interaction terms may be used with care, such terms will be employed in this study. However, since this study focuses on hypothesis testing versus forecasting, it may be that each of these requirements will not be necessary as long as the existence of a significant presence can be determined. For example given the work entailed, the fourth caveat may be withheld unless prediction is required.

With these interaction terms, other adjustments may also be necessary. Multicollinearity between the main effect series, which provides the construction data for the interaction terms, and the interaction terms is a common problem in modeling. Unlike collinearity between main effects, this collinearity represents only a mathematical problem rather than a logical one. Logically, the multiplication of the two main effect

series completes the process of creating a unique, independent series with different meaning. However, the mathematical problem of collinearity must still be dealt with to produce the best results (Yu, 2000). Since this study seeks to explain the changes in presidential approval during a historic period, simple methods such as increasing the sample size is neither appropriate nor possible (Wickens, 1995). Two approaches are used. The first technique involves mean centering the data. This process not only improves the interpretability of the results but also minimizes collinearity problems (Yu, 2000). However, in cases where extreme collinearity arises, orthogonalization will also be used. Orthogonalization involves the “making right” of skewed data. This process involves simple vector space adaptations.<sup>11</sup> In this case, a partial orthogonalization will be used to modify only the interaction terms. The process used was suggested by Burrill (1997) and extended to SAS® applications by Yu (2000).

The result of orthogonalization is that the original variables will be partialled out leaving only residual data that retains the unique information of the interaction term. The data in this new series responds well to standard t-tests and other techniques used to obtain and test regression coefficients. “Consequently every such variable correlates zero with all the lower-order variables, and may be thought of as a “pure interaction” effect at its own level” (Burrill, 1997, p. 1). Such a result will facilitate the examination of impact of these series on the presidential approval.

---

<sup>11</sup> Orthogonalization in this study involves the estimation of the vectors for the X1, X2 and X1\*X2 series. If the X1\*X2 shows signs of strong relationship to either X1 or X2, then the vector of Y must be subtracted from the projected vector of X1\*X2. The result is used to create the new vector for the interaction term W. This provides

*Independent Time Series: Other Intervention Terms*

Several other intervention terms will be created to evaluate possible effects not incorporated in the series already listed. These include effects of the draft, the Tet Offensive, and combat operations. The regular use of draftees in Vietnam began in 1968. To reflect this change, an intervention variable reflects the start of large-scale draftee use that year and ending in 1972 (DRAFTEEIN). Since the Tet Offensive is regularly discussed as a pivotal event, two time series are created to represent it. The first is a spike (TETSPIKE) beginning in January 1968 and ending in April 1968. This reflects the beginning of the Tet Offensive and the point at which the bulk of the fighting ended, even though the military continued to run Tet related missions through 1969. The second test for a trend shift from the time of Tet to the signing of the peace accords (TETPEACE). The final two time series look for evidence that simply the large scale of deployment of ground forces to Vietnam had an effect. The first begins April 1964, after the arrival of the first battalion of Marines in March, and ends when Nixon orders the military to end offensive operations in June 1972 (GROUNDOPS). The second variable begins with the first combat battalion entering Vietnam, March 1964, and ends with the last combat battalion out in September 1972 (GROUNDIN).

## CHAPTER 6 - RESULTS

This chapter presents and discusses the results gathered using the methods discussed in Chapter 5. It begins with a quick summary of what results may falsify or support the hypotheses of the study. This would be followed by the results from the subsequent tests. First, the ARIMA modeling steps are discussed. Second, the ARIMA noise model for the dependent series is detailed. Third, the bivariate results derived from the interaction of the independent series with the presidential approval series are reported. Fourth, multivariate results are presented. Finally, the results are summarized.

### Hypotheses Test Expectations

This study looks for three simple things. First, it aims to determine whether inductions had any discernible, causal effect on presidential approval. Though seemingly obvious, the lack of research in this regard leaves a looming assumption and potentially large gaps in research into this period. Second, it seeks to identify whether any causal effect was direct or indirect. Although there is no reason to expect only one type of effect to be exhibited, it is expected that one type will predominate. Finally, it aims to determine the nature of any effects over time, given the significant contextual changes experienced. Assuming evidence of a causal relationship surfaces, determining the nature of effect will provide for a better understanding of this period as well as providing better information for future policy decisions.

The quasi-experimental nature of the study establishes four periods for analysis: pre-test, test, post-test, and overall. A significant finding at the .05 confidence level or better will be taken as support for either of the main hypotheses. Expectations have been articulated for both Hypothesis 1, which focuses on direct effects, and Hypothesis 2, which focuses on indirect effects. However, these expectations do not represent formal, subordinate hypotheses that establish necessary conditions for the main hypotheses. Rather, they reflect extrapolation from theory and empirical studies in related fields in the areas of conflict studies and rational choice research. This approach is necessary given a lack of quantitative research on conscription. If these principles apply to inductions, these subordinate hypotheses will be upheld using the same standards as applied to the main hypotheses. No hypotheses are postulated for the overall period analysis, since the expectations of mixed results across the entire period suggests limited utility to any cumulative result. The results are presented only as a possible measure of long-term effects.

Bivariate analysis provides the first step in this process. However, the inherent limitations of this approach will be minimized by the subsequent multivariate analysis. The final step is to examine the apparent causal nature of any significant variables. The purpose of this test is to reduce the importance given to those variables that do not show clear causal effect in moving presidential approval.

## ARIMA Modeling

### *Initial Data Preparation*

Every series was examined to see if normality and other factors could be improved through data transformation. Testing showed no need for this or other

transformations smoothing some unexplained outliers in the INFLATE and MISERY series. These modified series have been redesignated INFLATE3 and MISERY3 to denote the application of linear median smoothing using the three variables before and after each datapoint.

### *Identification*

The most critical step in any ARIMA time series analysis is proper determination of the noise model within the dependent series. This section details the examination and findings for this process. Borrowing from the Box-Tiao intervention methodology, the first period of the experiment was used to establish the baseline ARIMA noise model for the investigation.

Nineteen models were developed for the presidential approval series using both visual and statistical methods previously discussed. Initial examination of the correlogram suggested a random walk with drift but without a deterministic trend. Thus, AR and MA components could be present, but there is significant randomness consistent with a stochastic series. This suggests no evidence of consistent external manipulation of events in the system implicit to deterministic trends. However, these data also suggest the AR component may make up a larger component of the overall system. The ACF pattern showed more than white noise present in the form of an autoregressive decline from lag 1. The Ljung-Box confirmed the presence of other non-random information. The PACF suggested there was a highly significant spike at lag 1 with a possibly significant spike at lag 7 that might communicate some recurring MA function or seasonality.

*Estimation, Diagnosis, and Meta-Diagnosis*

Estimation eliminated 13 models because of non-significant parameters, excessive variance, failure to account for significant lags, or other problems. Diagnosis eliminated three more because they exceeded Box-Ljung thresholds, indicating the presence of coherent information in the residuals. Thus, they failed to meet the white noise assumption.

The remaining series were subjected to further diagnosis. The ARIMA (1,0,0) model was selected for further examination because it best balanced parsimony with goodness of fit (see the model statistics in Table 6.1). Meta-diagnosis found that the model met the standards outlined in chapter four. This included a finding of no

Table 6.1

Final Output Series ARIMA Model (1,0,0) (0,0,0) Results

<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Error</b>	<b>t Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
0.92	0.035	26.19	<.0001
<b>Variance Estimate</b>			
20.40	<b>Std. Error Estimate</b>	<b>SBC</b>	<b>Number of Residuals</b>
	4.52	725.59	122

significant seasonality that eliminated any concerns about the possible significant lag at month seven. Augmented Dickey-Fuller<sup>1</sup> (ADF) tests were run to confirm the Ljung-Box white noise assessments for this model. These confirmed the noise model had been reduced to random error with the application of the AR (1) signal thus discounting any

---

<sup>1</sup> Dickey-Fuller test is an econometric test for unit roots that evaluates the residuals of a given model, particularly in time series with autoregressive components. This includes both regular and seasonal effects. The D-F test requires the residuals to be white noise and to have any autoregressive terms included for the best estimation. It uses Ordinary Least Squares estimation and test statistics derived from Monte Carlo testing to perform and measure the probability of *t* test sample sizes from occurring. The null hypothesis is that the series is stationary. If the test does not prove significant, the null is rejected and the series must be treated as non-stationary. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test adds the ability to investigate effects beyond lag 0 (Yaffee & McGee, 2000; Meyer, 2006).

concern of lingering seasonality or other hidden functions within the series.<sup>2</sup> In addition to these diagnoses, another researcher's test of the presidential approval series from this period also supports this finding (Yaffee & McGee, 2000). Therefore, an ARIMA model with an immediate autoregressive function and no significant seasonality (1,0,0) (0,0,0) was confirmed for final use in this study. However, this model will require another modification for proper modeling. Since differencing was not required, a constant would be required in any subsequent models.

### Bivariate Analysis

The relationship of each input series with the presidential approval series was tested within each historic period to determine any change in affect over time. Estimation of parameters was done using conditional least squares (CLS) for the initial estimation and Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation to validate the CLS results. CLS was chosen as the primary because it is more flexible in its application. ML was added because it performs more restrictive testing and also tends to be more robust to volatility, as in Period 2, and smaller datasets, as in Period 3 (Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel, 1994).

---

<sup>2</sup> All ADF results for the NATAPA series are displayed in this table.

NATAPA	Test statistic	10% Critical Value	5% Critical Value	1% Critical Value
<b>Period 1 – Single Mean</b>	-3.43	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Period 1 – Seasonality</b>	-8.15	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Period 2 – Single Mean</b>	-2.53	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Period 2 – Seasonality</b>	-9.21	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Period 3 – Single Mean</b>	-1.92	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Period 3 – Seasonality</b>	-9.91	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Overall – Single Mean</b>	-2.82	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45
<b>Overall – Seasonality</b>	-14.04	-2.58	-2.88	-3.45



The findings for each series in any period that passed estimation and diagnostic tests are reported in separate tables by period. The rest were eliminated.

The results for each period report a number of measures. The first measure annotated as  $SR^2$  is the acronym for the results of a Stationary  $R^2$  Test. Like the more traditional  $R^2$  Test results, it measures the amount of variance change that can be attributed to the effect of independent series. However, it provides less inflated results than the traditional  $R^2$  when used in time series modeling. The results from this measure may range from one, reflecting complete explanatory power of the variance, to negative results to infinity. A negative result indicates a fit worse than random results. The more negative the number, the more contrary the fit (SPSS Trends® 14.0, 2005).

Several measures used in the tables reflect those discussed earlier. The SBC measure provides a standardized measure for comparing models. Also known as the normalized Bayesian Information Criterion, this measure penalizes more complex models with the underlying premise found in Occam's Razor: given more than one answer to a problem, the simplest will likely be the best. The Q reflects the result of the Ljung-Box Chi-Squared White Noise Test since this test is also known as the Q test. Any result that meets or exceeds the .05 significance level provides an assurance that the residuals of the model chosen have returned a white noise response. Thus, no hidden patterns remain within the data. The degrees of freedom ( $df$ ) are associated with this measure. The tables also use standard references for the  $t$  test results.

#### *Period 1 – 1954 to 1964*

The pre-combat draft phase of the conflict spans the period from January 1954 to February 1964 with 122 observations. During this period, the United States was

experiencing a boom given the primacy of American economic, political, and military might. Few series produced evidence of significance for this period, including measures that normally provide consistent results such as inflation and the Misery Index. Notably, many of the apparently world-changing events of the era, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, failed to register through the BHEVENT series. It is likely this is a result of the limitations and internal inconsistencies of the measure rather than a lack of effect on the populace. Only four measures proved significant during this period when using bivariate analysis (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2

## Significant Bivariate Results from Period 1 – 1954 to 1964

Series	$SR^2$	SBC	$df$	Q	Estimate	SE	$t$	Pr >   $t$
<b>MONDEAD</b>	0.66	3.07	17	0.19	0.236	0.126	1.87	***0.064
<b>IKE_2</b>	0.69	3.01	17	0.26	-8.532	2.089	-4.08	*<0.001
<b>MIMC</b>	0.68	3.02	17	0.22	.00003	.000012	3.15	*0.002
<b>CIMC</b>	0.67	3.07	17	0.19	.0000009	.0000001	2.09	**0.039

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\*.05, \*.01

Three of these significant measures involve casualties and inductions. The monthly casualty series (MONDEAD) produced a result just over the .05 significance level ( $p=0.064$ ). The positive result may suggest a possible rally effect bias in favor of the president. The interactive term reflecting monthly casualties and inductions (MIMC) returned a very significant result ( $B=0.00003$ ,  $SE=0.000012$ ,  $p=0.002$ ). The monthly casualties and cumulative inductions interactive term (CIMC) also proved significant ( $p=0.039$ ) with a positive effect ( $B=0.0000009$ ,  $SE=0.0000001$ ,  $p=0.039$ ).

These results are only significant at a specific point in time given the specific results of both casualties and inductions. Further analysis would be required to develop

an adjustable scale necessary to use these interactive terms in a predictive formula (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006; Braumoeller, 2004). Since this goes beyond the scope of this study, such a scale was not developed. However, the conditional marginal effects of both CIMC and MIMC should fluctuate with changes in monthly casualties and inductions although these measures do not appear to affect presidential approval directly. With tens of thousands being drafted monthly, this effect could be rather substantial, especially in the case of the CIMC series where the cumulative effect of previous drafts becomes a factor. Given the positive results for each, these may also be related to a small rally effect as the early evidence of conflict begins to make its way into the public consciousness.

*Period 2 – 1964 to 1973*

This period represents the most volatile of the three discrete periods outlined in this study. More factors and more volatility seem apparent given changes in the economic, military, political, and social arenas of this period. Given the evaluation process used, a Type I error is unlikely but some relevant measures might be excluded for lack of more complex modeling. Though 108 observations are available for this analysis, the return of only one significant measure may suggest the possibility of a Type II error (see Table 6.3). Only the BHEVENT series proved significant ( $B=1.302$ ,  $SE=0.357$ ,  $p=0.001$ ). This may effects of increased efforts by presidents to execute positive actions to counter negative events or the effect of uncontrollable positive events as suggested by Brace and Hinckley (1992).

Table 6.3

Significant Bivariate Results from Period 2 – 1964 to 1973

Series	SR <sup>2</sup>	SBC	df	Q	Estimate	SE	t	Pr >  t
<b>BHEVENT</b>	0.84	2.87	17	0.86	1.30	0.357	3.65	**0.001

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\*.05, \*.01

*Period 3 –1973 to 1975*

Within this post-test period, the draft and the war were coming to an end. In this sample, the small number of observations poses a challenge, given just 27 observations for analysis. This reduces the ability of both estimation methods. However, the methods used for analysis make a Type II error more likely than a Type I.

In this period, four input series showed significance: cumulative induction (CUMDRAFT), NIX\_2, FORD, and Watergate. The CUMDRAFT measure proves highly significant as well as returning a sizeable, negative coefficient ( $B = -0.0000024$ ,  $SE = 0.03$ ,  $p = 0.012$ ), especially given 1,787,177 men would be induction during this period (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.4

Significant Bivariate Results from Period 3 – 1973 to 1975

Series	SR <sup>2</sup>	SBC	df	Q	Estimate	SE	t	Pr >  t
<b>CUMDRAFT</b>	0.68	4.38	17	1	-.0000024	0.03	-0.000078	*0.012
<b>NIX_2</b>	0.68	4.21	17	1	-22.964	4.679	-4.908	*<0.001
<b>FORD</b>	0.68	4.21	17	1	22.968	4.679	4.909	*<0.001
<b>WATERGATE</b>	0.75	4.13	17	0.998	-9.255	2.681	-3.452	*0.003

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\*.05, \*.01

The NIX\_2 series shows a dramatic turn against Nixon during this period ( $B = -22.964$ ,  $SE = 4.679$ ,  $p = <0.001$ ). Given the lack of other significant variables, this may be linked to residual angst concerning the draft. However, the powerful return on the

Watergate variable may suggest moral failure in the White House as another reason for changing opinion ( $B=-9.255$ ,  $SE=2.681$ ,  $p=0.003$ ). The result for Nixon's successor also may also show some linkages. Despite any cumulative resentment towards Republicans specifically or government in general, the response to the Ford administration shows a positive coefficient ( $B=22.968$ ) that is highly significant ( $p<0.001$ ).

*Overall –1954 to 1975*

Using all 256 observations from across the three periods, testing returned 11 significant results for the overall period. Nine series met or exceeded the .05 significance level. INFLATE3 ( $B= -1.757$ ,  $SE=0.339$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) and MISERY3 ( $B= -1.606$ ,  $SE=70.326$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) proved highly significant with a negative effect on presidential approval. The CUMDEAD series had similar results ( $B=-0.001$ ,  $SE=0.00011$ ,  $p=0.002$ ) as did CUMDRAFT ( $B=0.000008$ ,  $SE=0.000002$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5

Significant Bivariate Results from the Overall Period – 1954 to 1975

Series	SR <sup>2</sup>	SBC	df	Q	Estimate	SE	t	Pr >  t
<b>INFLATE3</b>	0.89	2.93	17	0.25	-1.757	.339	-5.18	*<0.001
<b>MISERY3</b>	0.89	2.93	17	0.22	-1.606	70.326	-4.93	*<0.001
<b>CUMDEAD</b>	0.91	2.85	17	0.16	-0.001	0.00011	-4.18	*0.002
<b>CUMDRAFT</b>	0.91	3.02	17	0.68	-0.000008	0.000002	-3.66	*<0.001
<b>TETSPIKE</b>	0.88	3.16	17	0.26	4.253	2.631	1.62	0.107
<b>IKE_2</b>	0.88	3.16	17	0.22	-6.233	2.614	-2.39	**0.018
<b>LBJ_2</b>	0.88	3.17	17	0.20	-4.251	2.633	-1.62	0.108
<b>NIX_1</b>	0.88	3.18	17	0.14	4.989	2.625	1.90	***0.059
<b>NIX_2</b>	0.88	3.01	17	0.38	-12.341	3.095	-3.99	*<0.001
<b>Ford</b>	0.88	3.00	17	0.16	21.790	4.323	5.04	*<0.001
<b>WATERGATE</b>	0.88	3.03	17	0.41	-10.0437	3.135	-3.20	*0.002
<b>BHEVENT</b>	0.88	3.06	17	0.79	0.8612	0.376	2.29	*0.002
<b>CICC</b>	0.87	3.06	17	0.60	-0.0000000001	0.00000000004	-2.90	*0.004

Significance: \*\*\*,.10, \*\*, .05, \*.01

Three presidential series and the critical event series also proved significant, as did one interactive term. The significant presidential series included IKE\_2 ( $B=-6.233$ ,

SE=2.614,  $p=0.018$ ), NIX\_2 ( $B=-12.341$ , SE=3.095,  $p<0.001$ ), and FORD ( $B=21.790$ , SE=4.323,  $p<0.001$ ). The critical events series of WATERGATE ( $B=-10.0437$ , SE=3.135,  $p=0.002$ ) and BHEVENT ( $B=.8612$ , SE=.376,  $p=0.002$ ) both proved highly significant. Finally, the interactive series for cumulative casualties and cumulative inductions (CICC) also returned a significant finding ( $B=0.0000000001$ , SE=0.00000000004,  $p=0.004$ ).

Four other series showed notable results of varying strength: a spike effect model for the four months following the Tet Offensive start (TETSPIKE) was near the .10 significance level ( $B=4.253$ , SE=2.631,  $p=0.107$ ). The presidential series for LBJ\_2 ( $B=-4.251$ , SE=2.633,  $p=0.108$ ), and NIX\_1 ( $B=4.989$ , SE=2.625,  $p=0.059$ ) also came in near or under the same level.

All significant series followed previous directional patterns from earlier periods. With the exception of the FORD and BHEVENT series, each showed negative repercussions for presidential approval. As noted in Period 3 results, an “anybody but Nixon” effect again seems possible given the additive results from NIX\_2 and WATERGATE parallel the result for FORD. In addition, the effects of intentional acts by presidents may again be the key factor in the direction of this result. The absorption of other system shocks within the dummy variables for each administration also reflects previous findings in the literature.

Of the four variables with findings near the .05 significance level, three add little information. LBJ\_2 and NIX\_1 again show the tendency for presidential terms to be significant. These also hint at the tendency of public opinion to shift after the first term when compared with the other results as is consistent with the presidential approval

literature – quantitative and qualitative. Of more interest is the result of the TETSPIKE intervention. This measure suggests a notable, positive effect on presidential approval generated by the Tet Offensive. This lends credence to the oft-mentioned significance of Tet. Though most have proposed a long-term negative result, the short-term, positive nature of this reading would be consistent a rally effect.

The most remarkable change comes in the public's response to inductions and casualties. Consistent with rally event literature, the casualties in the pre-test period have a significant, and at the current level positive, effect on presidential approval. In the first period, the overall response to the draft and to casualties was positive. The Period 1 MONDEAD measure suggests a .236 increase in presidential popularity for each military member lost, although not beyond the accepted level of confidence ( $B=0.236$ ,  $SE=0.126$ ,  $p=0.064$ ). MIMC ( $B=0.00003$ ,  $SE=0.000012$ ,  $p=0.002$ ) and CIMC ( $B=0.000009$ ,  $SE=0.0000001$ ,  $p=0.039$ ) also showed small but positive returns for the level of casualties and inductions in this period of testing. Notably, there were no significant findings for either inductions or casualties during the combat phase. Cumulative inductions (CUMDRAFT) again appear significant in the third period ( $B= -0.0000024$ ,  $SE= 0.03$ ,  $p= 0.012$ ). Finally, CUMDEAD ( $B= -0.001$ ,  $SE= 0.00011$ ,  $p= 0.002$ ), and CUMDRAFT ( $B= -0.000008$ ,  $SE= 0.000002$ ,  $p=<0.001$ ) return significant, negative results in throughout the entire span of the study. No evidence of a positive rally appears outside the first period.

Though the negative result indicated for cumulative casualties throughout the war mirrors the most common finding within the literature, the draft results reflect a new measure that seems to support the hypothesis of this study. Thus, the bivariate analyses

suggests empirical evidence of the draft affecting presidential approval. However, other methods will be needed to further evaluate these findings.

### Multivariate Models

Several models were tested using multivariate methods appropriate to time series analysis. These methods do not provide as many tools as those found in the more common linear regression methodology. However, they can provide a better appreciation for the combined effects of multiple independent series on the presidential approval series.

To more evaluate the bivariate analyses more thoroughly, multivariate testing was performed. In each case, the economic series were retained as controls. The constituent series of any significant interactive terms were also retained. With the exception of these series, multiple model iterations were run with non-significant measures below the 90 percent confidence being eliminated at each step to develop the most parsimonious models.

#### *Period 1 – 1954 to 1964*

In every iteration, IKE\_2 and MIMC returned significant results, while CIMC quickly lost significance and was eliminated. CUMDEAD became increasingly more significant while MONDEAD diminished in significance. In the final model, economic issues showed significance as did several others. With all remaining variables returning significant results, the model was tested for multicollinearity and causality. Only two series exceeded the VIF threshold of 10: DRAM with a result of 5914 and MIMC with a result of 5935. Three series showed notable results from the Granger Test. MIMC proved significant ( $p_1=0.054$ ,  $p_2=0.045$ ). IKE\_2 showed even greater significance with



$p_1=0.006$  and  $p_2=0.004$ . MONDEAD failed to achieve the .05 confidence level but was the only other significant series even close ( $p_1=0.182$ ,  $p_2=0.165$ ). See Table 6.6 for overall model results.

Table 6.6

Results from the Final Multivariate Model for Period 1


<i>SR</i> <sup>2</sup>		<b>SBC</b>	<i>df</i>	<b>Q</b>	
0.70		3.15	17	.368	
<b>Coefficients</b>		<b>Estimate</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
<b>Constant</b>		-983.79	574.86	-1.71	0.090
<b>AR(1)</b>	(Lag 1)	0.59	0.08	7.17	*<0.001
<b>INFLATE3</b>	(Lag 0)	2.09	1.18	1.77	***0.079
<b>JOBS</b>	(Lag 0)	-2.12	1.18	-1.93	***0.056
<b>MONDEAD+</b>	(Lag 0)	0.26	0.14	1.79	***0.075
<b>CUMDEAD</b>	(Lag 0)	-0.06	0.03	-1.91	***0.059
<b>IKE_2+</b>	(Lag 0)	-11.95	1.79	-6.68	*<0.001

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\*.05, \*.01 + = significant in bivariate testing

In comparing models with semipartial correlations results, it was determined that the interaction term contributing 0.026 to the explanatory power of the entire model as represented in the *SR*<sup>2</sup>. Given the amount of explanatory power and the evidence of causality result, the series was orthogonalized and rerun in an attempt to eliminate the sizeable multicollinearity problem. Though this process did eliminate the problem experienced between MIMC and DRAM, the redirected MIMC vector then exhibited collinearity problems with the inflation series. The INFLATE3 VIF reached 48 while the orthogonalized, MIMC residual (R\_MIMC) had a VIF exceeding 37. Also, the R\_MIMC series failed to show significance suggesting the effects of multicollinearity. Therefore, it was eliminated from the model. Though more statistical manipulation could be done, this provides sufficient evidence to evaluate the bivariate findings for this time period. MONDEAD continued to show significance but not within the .05 level. IKE\_2 continued to return highly significant results. The interactive terms proved more a result of multicollinearity and were eliminated. The

importance of these results is not the creation of a predictive model as much as providing evidence to facilitate the testing of the hypotheses articulated earlier in this study. A graphic representation of the final iteration demonstrates a model that fits well within the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals indicating a good fit for the model in emulating the presidential approval series (see figure 6.1).

*Figure 6.1 -- Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Period 1*



*Period 2 – 1964 to 1973*

Many more series show signs of significance in the multivariate testing for this period versus the bivariate testing. Multicollinearity, as expected, played a significant role. The BHEVENT series continued to prove significant and was included in the final model. However, other series proved far less substantive.

Initially, INFLATE3, CUMDEAD, CUMDRAFT, and LBJ\_2 all showed signs of excessive collinearity. They returned VIF scores of approximately 70, 137, 148, and 11 respectively. Unlike the previous period, the interaction term showed no apparent

collinearity problems. Not surprisingly, the lack of clear impact also translated to the Granger testing. Only two series showed evidence of uni-directional causality. The most significant result was found for the interaction term – MICC. However, the result was opposite of the direction expected ( $p_1=0.971$ ,  $p_2=0.969$ ). CUMDRAFT gave limited evidence of uni-directional causality in the expected direction ( $p_1=0.213$ ,  $p_2=0.193$ ). Significant feedback was evident in the remaining series.

In evaluating the semipartial correlations, it was found MICC provided only .004% to the  $SR^2$ . This relative lack of explanatory power coupled with the reverse causality, led this term to be dropped from the model. In testing the contributions of CUMDEAD and CUMDRAFT, it was found that the draft series provided the greatest explanation of the variance at 0.054%. Though CUMDEAD proved it could provide nearly 0.02%, the removal of the CUMDRAFT series caused the CUMDEAD, INFLATE3, and UNM to become non-significant. Given the sizeable collinearity problem and lack of causality exhibited by CUMDEAD, it was removed. A subsequent test of the new model again returned indications of multicollinearity for INFLATE3 and CUMDRAFT. The economic terms were retained as required by design requirements. However, it was recognized that these factors provided little of the model's ability to explain presidential approval changes during this period, particularly the inflation series. Tests were also done to examine removing the remaining LBJ series for lack of significance in the Granger testing. However, these deletions showed notable loss in the explanatory power of the model as well as an increase in the SBC measure. Therefore, they were retained. The results of the final model may be seen in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7


Results from the Final Iterative Multivariate Model for Period 2

<i>SR</i> <sup>2</sup>		<i>SBC</i>		<i>df</i>	<i>Q</i>
0.90		2.70		17	0.66
<b>Coefficients</b>		<b>Estimate</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
<b>Constant</b>		-59.00	33.50	-1.76	**0.081
<b>AR(1)</b>	(Lag 1)	0.53	0.09	5.95	*<0.001
<b>INFLATE3</b>	(Lag 0)	4.31	1.01	4.28	*<0.001
<b>JOBS</b>	(Lag 0)	-3.06	1.30	-2.35	**0.021
<b>CUMDRAFT</b>	(Lag 0)	-0.000043	0.0000055	-7.83	*<0.001
<b>LBJ_1</b>	(Lag 0)	-16.30	3.80	-4.29	*<0.001
<b>LBJ_2</b>	(Lag 0)	-21.99	2.59	-8.50	*<0.001
<b>BHEVENT+</b>	(Lag 0)	1.48	0.40	3.76	*<0.001

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\*.05, \*.01 + = significant in bivariate testing

This period also provided support for the study hypotheses. CUMDRAFT again returned highly significant results but with a negative correlation ( $B = -0.000043$ ,  $SE = 0.0000055$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). This result gives further support for the hypothesis of direct draft effects. The expectations of direction were also met given the negative result. In contrast, little evidence emerged to support the indirect effects hypothesis given the limited results of the MICC. The graphic representation for the overall model shows it

Figure 6.2 -- Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Period 2



provides a good fit within the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals (see Figure 6.2).

*Period 3 –1973 to 1975*

The final iterative model for Period 3 again confirmed some of the results of the bivariate testing while highlight several other significant variables. The limited datapoints in this period of study did appear to cause a few problems, the initial iterations of the model lacked sufficient data to complete the full model. Only after the elimination of the interactive terms, NIX\_1, and FORD series did convergence allow full analysis of the model. However, the results largely showed a continued reaction to the direct effect of the draft (see Table 6.8).

Table 6.8

Results from the Final Multivariate Model -- Period 3

		<i>SR</i> <sup>2</sup>	SBC	<i>df</i>	Q
		0.96	2.91	17	0.66
Coefficients		Estimate	SE	<i>t</i>	Pr >   <i>t</i>
<b>Constant</b>		59578.66	25123.87	2.37	**0.028
<b>AR(1)</b>	(Lag 1)	0.51	0.23	2.20	**0.041
<b>INFLATE3</b>	(Lag 0)	-2.18	0.81	-2.69	*0.014
<b>JOBS</b>	(Lag 0)	-3.31	1.56	-2.12	**0.047
<b>MONDRAFT</b>	(Lag 0)	0.09	0.03	2.86	*0.010
<b>CUMDRAFT+</b>	(Lag 0)	-0.02	0.02	-2.31	**0.032
<b>NIX_2+</b>	(Lag 0)	-25.82	3.08	-8.39	*<0.001
<b>WATERGATE+</b>	(Lag 0)	-8.50	2.47	-3.44	*0.003

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\* .05, \*.01. The + symbol represents those series shown to be significant in bivariate testing.

The negative results for NIX\_2 ( $B= -25.81$ ,  $SE=3.08$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) and WATERGATE ( $B= -8.48$ ,  $SE=2.47$ ,  $p=0.003$ ) represent expected results in a period when presidential misconduct dominated the domestic political scene. However unlike previous periods, casualties do not prove significant. This is counter to the findings of Mueller and many researchers in the early phase of casualty studies but not some later

researchers, i.e. Feaver & Gelpi (2004), Larson (1996). Most researches have suggested until recently that a continued negative sentiment should continue long after casualties end. More recent studies, however, suggest the public largely exhibits the ability to shift opinion gears as the context changes (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004; Holsti, 2004; Moore & Lanoue, 2003; Mueller, 2002; Sobel, 2001; Larson, 1996). Here in the final stages of the war cumulative casualties had peaked, the monthly losses had diminished to virtually nil given Vietnamization and troop withdrawals. Consistent with more recent research, these findings may represent a response to the changing environment in which casualties and the war at large were ending.


The Granger Causality Tests again found limited statistical evidence for uni-directional causality amongst those series that demonstrated significance. In fact, only two series showed significant evidence of causality and one of these had the causal direction reversed. NIX\_2 returned evidence of uni-directional impact on presidential approval ( $p_1=0.116$ ,  $p_2=0.054$ ). MONDRAFT returned the most significant results ( $p_1=0.961$ ,  $p_2=0.951$ ) albeit in the direction opposite of expectations. Whether these results show evidence of a positive response to dramatic changes in the draft program is unclear.

Notably, the draft continued to show evidence of significance although with twists and limitations. For, example the finding of significance for both the cumulative and monthly draft terms had not been seen in earlier periods. Further, the reversed direction of causality from presidential approval to MONDRAFT left more questions than answers. . The decreased significance of CUMDRAFT ( $B= -0.04$ ,  $SE=0.02$ ,  $p=0.085$ ) to the .05 threshold and therefore fell outside of study parameters although still remaining notable,

especially in the absence of casualties and other factors.

The finding for significance in both monthly and cumulative inductions provides slight support for the direct effect hypothesis. However, the mixed results prove a little problematic. It was supposed that the growing cost of the war would result in negative consequences related to any direct draft effects. Perhaps this result represents the cumulative negatives of the draft in CUMDRAFT while also displaying a sense of relief with the imposition of a lottery and the subsequent abolition of monthly draft calls. The indirect effect hypothesis failed to receive support during this period given no interactive term showed evidence of significance. Overall, the model provided a good fit when plotted within the upper and lower confidence thresholds (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 -- Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Period 3



*Overall –1954 to 1975*

Given the depth and breadth of data over 21 years, it should not be surprising that

this period demonstrated the largest number of significant findings. However, it should be remembered that these results were generated only as a broad measure of long-term sentiment since the three component periods provide better measures of effect within specific contextual periods. Therefore, few issues should be expected to consistently move public opinion over such a span of time. Given this, the end result of only a few significant series in the final model should not be surprising.

Within this overall period analysis, there was significant evidence of multicollinearity. In the early models most series exceed the VIF threshold, many with exceeding 100. However, causality proved more evident. Granger testing did find better evidence of uni-directional causality in the expected direction.

In the first model in which all series proved significant the following series exceed the VIF threshold: INFLATE3 (VIF=130), CUMDEAD (VIF=440), CUMDRAFT (VIF=307), LBJ\_2 (VIF=16), NIX\_1 (VIF=29), NIX\_2 (VIF=22), FORD (VIF=16), CIMC (VIF=21), and CICC (VIF=139). Examining the interaction terms first, a semi-partial correlation comparison showed the two interaction terms (CIMC, CICC) added less than 0.003% to the  $SR^2$ . Therefore, these series were eliminated for lack of explanatory power, sizeable multicollinearity, and limited evidence of uni-directional causality. Because of the high degree of collinearity, the removal of these two series several other series proved non-significant in the subsequent iteration. JOBS became non-significant but was retained because of the study design. CUMDEAD and CUMDRAFT proved non-significant and were dropped. However, it should be noted that only CUMDRAFT returned a clear indication of unidirectional causality ( $p_1=0.056$ ,  $p_2=0.051$ ). GNDEND also proved non-significant and was therefore removed. Despite



the removal of these series, the total loss of explanatory power was only 0.015%.

Further processing, eliminated NIX\_1 for high collinearity and absence of clear causality. MONDEAD and NIX\_2 were also eliminated for non-significance. However, their elimination from the model decreased the  $SR^2$  by only 0.001. Not surprisingly, there were no notable collinearity problems in the final model. See Table 6.9 for the overall results.

Table 6.9


Results from the Final Multivariate Model -- Overall Period

		$SR^2$	SBC	$df$	Q
		0.90	2.94	17	0.47
Coefficients		Estimate	SE	$t$	Pr >   $t$
<b>Constant</b>		58.44	2.57	23.13	*<0.001
<b>AR(1)</b>	(Lag 1)	0.90	0.03	32.95	*<0.001
<b>INFLATE3+</b>	(Lag 0)	-1.56	0.36	-4.28	*<0.001
<b>JOBS</b>	(Lag 0)	-11-0	0.36	-4.28	0.305
<b>FORD+</b>	(Lag 0)	23.26	4.11	5.656	*<0.001
<b>WATERGATE+</b>	(Lag 0)	-9.36	2.94	-3.19	*0.002
<b>BHEVENT+</b>	(Lag 0)	0.86	0.35	2.45	*0.015

Significance: \*\*\*.10, \*\*.05, \*.01. The + symbol represents a series found to be significant in bivariate testing.

Overall, many of the bivariate measures again proved themselves in the multivariate analysis. The findings for this period suggest the long-term effect of factors that routinely impact the American environment, namely economic factors and presidential politics. However, the failure to demonstrate consistent results for the draft and casualties also suggests the limitations of a long-term analysis given the volatility of the political climate over time. Despite the limited number of independent series, the model still performed well in modeling the changes in the approval series (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4 -- Confidence Chart of Observed and Model Results – Overall Period



### Summary

This chapter outlined the results of testing to highlight a significant body of support for the direct effect of the draft on presidential approval but virtually no significant support for the indirect hypothesis. The test results for each period largely mirrored the expectations consistent with the direct effect hypothesis. The results found between the experimental periods supports the concept of contextual and conceptual changes driving presidential approval shifts. However, the causality evidence also gives caution to undue reliance on all but a few variables commonly used in presidential approval studies. These results show economics, the draft, and presidential terms to be the most consistently causal factors within the context of the Vietnam War. Whereas other commonly used measures, such as casualties, failed to show consistent effect or

causality over the period of the study. The final chapter outlines the confirmation of these hypotheses, the implications of the findings, and subsequent issues related to them.

## CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

‘They were only war casualties,’ he said. ‘It was a pity, but you can’t always hit your target. Anyway they died in the right cause...in a way you could say they died for democracy’ (Greene, 1955/1973, p. 179).

The casualties of war are not always measured in terms of lives and limbs. The range of consequences runs the gamut from personal to popular and from military to economic. The political motivations and evaluations of the elites and the masses encompass this. In Graham Greene’s *Quiet American* (1955/1973), the loveable but lethal American antagonist causes a bomb blast in a market square but dismisses the death and injury as part of the process of liberating Vietnam. At least, he says as a consolation, it was for the right cause. Soon after, the antagonist himself dies at the hands of those he came to liberate – presumably also for the right cause. This metaphor of American involvement in Vietnam reflects on many executive branch decisions that escalated the war with wide-ranging effects to include the ouster of at least two American presidents. The related question of this study asked what effects the draft generated in serving the “cause” of liberating Vietnam.

Though Americans supported the efforts in the early years of Vietnam, it has been argued the costs became too high. Early researchers suggested the American public reached a point at which the losses were unacceptable as measured by casualties. Certainly, this study shows evidence of a shift from support to opposition reflected in presidential approval ratings. However, it also gives evidence that casualties were not the

only issue shaping presidential approval. Not surprisingly, the statistical modeling of the Vietnam era shows what should have been obvious to an observer of history. Because Americans in the aggregate were concerned with the matters that placed the males of a generation at risk, the draft mattered.

The draft played a significant role in shaping presidential approval during the Vietnam War era. Obviously, it had diehard opponents and supporters. Yet, the findings of this study lend credence to the idea that the draft became a significant issue for Americans but with varying political effects. With the president serving as the lightning rod for public opinion, changes in the number of young men inducted show clear correlation with shifts in presidential approval. Further, this study has presented evidence that provides a high degree of statistical confidence that the draft not only had a statistically significant explanation for changes in presidential approval, but that it also had a causal effect on presidential approval.

It must be reiterated that statistics do not prove the matter. Linked with logic, observation, and history, statistics can only add support to the argument. Though many statistical studies seem rooted in the philosophical tradition of Physicalism, this work does not assume that all human action is quantifiable. Rather, it operates under the rubric of rational choice. A preponderance of evidence indicates likely patterns, but it does not predict them regardless of the context. Work such as this may falsify hypotheses or confirm likely courses of action, but it cannot establish fact with absolute certainty because of the complexity of human interaction.

With that in mind, this chapter reviews the evidence to evaluate the original hypotheses. It outlines some of its findings. A discussion of the implications and

limitations of this work follows. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research and a summary.

### Examination of the Hypotheses

This study began with the assumption that members of the public make rational responses when activated by salient factors. These responses may be motivated by self-interest or a sociotropic interest in the greater good. It continued with the premise that the process of the military draft should have affected the national psyche sufficiently and distinctly enough to have driven changes in presidential approval ratings during the Vietnam War. These ratings serve as proxy measures of public will and approval and have become increasingly important in the governance of the country and the promulgation of policy. In the introduction, it was argued that any measurable effects might not only serve as a historical study but could also provide information for decision-makers in the current context. An understanding of the draft's effects inform decisions about future drafts, but it could also inform decisionmaking on other matters in which citizens must serve involuntarily, such as activated military reserves or government service programs. The study delineated two primary hypotheses as measures to test for the effect of the draft in order to test the veracity of this premise. This chapter lays out the findings for these hypotheses as well as caveats to them.

#### *Hypothesis 1*

The first hypothesis proposed the draft significantly affected presidential approval during the course of the Vietnam War. Thus, the null would be that the draft had no effect on presidential approval. The findings of this study support the rejection of the null hypothesis given the statistical evidence of the draft's effect upon presidential

approval. The measure of cumulative inductions was one of only five measures to show significance in bivariate and multivariate testing as well as yielding strong, statistical evidence of causality upon presidential approval.

The draft responded largely as expected in each test period. Though not evident in the pre-test phase of the test, it arose as a measure of approval change that was superior to casualties in terms of significance, causality, and strength of explanatory power. The results of the post-test period proved problematic however. Evidence that the cumulative draft may have had lasting negative effects while the monthly draft yielded positive effects proved tenuous. Of course, the ultimate model eliminated both. Yet, this may point out a flaw in the original expectation. Rather than expecting a positive response to the draft, the better expectation of public response to the removal of a threat or hazard is acceptance. This is consistent with a variety of studies that find the American populace quick to punish but slow to reward positive actions by political leaders, since doing the right thing is what the public expects (Nadeau, et al., 1999; Neustadt, 1980). Overall, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the draft directly affected presidential approval when it became a liability, but it was accepted when no significant risk existed. Clearly, the draft had more direct effect on presidential approval than in interaction with casualties or with other series tested. Therefore, the effect can be seen but the actual mechanisms are unclear.

If this finding is upheld by other research, it would mean the dominant factor for predicting presidential approval change needs to be altered, at least in terms of Vietnam. Since this study focused on the Vietnam War, the findings may be unique to the period. However, there may be parallels that can be applied to other conflicts. Though casualties

were not completely eliminated as a factor, they never appeared as the singular force so commonly evoked. Casualties proved significant in shaping presidential approval during the early phase of the war, although with mixed results. The monthly casualty measure had a positive effect while the cumulative measure had a negative effect. Neither measure showed significant uni-directional causality, so a question exists as the full nature of these effects. However, they do follow some of the expectations for rally effects and casualty aversion. Surprisingly, cumulative casualties did not continue to show significant results for the remainder of the study. This finding is more consistent with the work of recent researchers that have argued the public tends to look to other factors such as the reason for conflict or the likelihood of success.

This also finds support in history and intuition. When the draft ended, protests largely subsided. Though protestors made moral arguments seemingly unrelated to the draft, many individuals acknowledged the draft as a motivator to action. It is no great leap to assume it motivated even more to change their opinion of the country's preeminent political figure.

One might argue that the concurrent end of the draft and the signing of the Paris Peace accords make the conclusion indistinguishable and thus invalidates the finding of significance for the draft. However, the data do not support this. In fact, several factors militate against it. First, the cumulative draft was highly significant in Period 3 as well as the overall course of the war. On the other hand, measures that attempted to test the peace hypothesis failed to show significance such as TETPEACE. Other intervention series that measured the decline in military members and combat also failed to show sufficient significance and causality, i.e. GROUNDIN and GROUNDOPS.



Another argument against the validity and reliability of these findings involves the question of whether the rise and fall of inductions is inextricably linked to the rise and fall of casualties. While a relationship certainly exists, the data show a far less homogeneous pattern than might be supposed. In fact, a number of factors militate against this argument. First, the pattern of inductions does not mirror the pattern of casualties as closely as some might presume. Second, inductions and casualties do not have comparable relevance throughout the period of study. In the pre-test period, there are few casualties and virtually no true combat casualties. However, inductions are quite active. In the post-test period, the draft program has ended and all inductees who wished to had left the service before the end of the third period. However, casualties continue. The use of the pre and post-test periods helps to further delineate differences between casualties and inductees. A third point involves the magnitude of each. Initially, it was expected that the numbers of inductees would only be slightly higher than the number of casualties. However, this view proved erroneous. When looking at cumulative numbers, inductions quickly proved to be more than double the number of casualties and more than quadruple the size of casualties by the end of the study. Of course magnitude alone proves nothing. However, this combined with the differentiation previously noted increases the distinctiveness of effect for the draft. Finally, the tests for multicollinearity and the removal of series plagued with collinearity and lacking in causality evidence should help to quell any lingering doubts. With these actions, the results themselves show distinct differences between the draft and casualties. In most of the periods of testing, inductions and casualties returned coefficients with different signs. Arguably, this suggests that different effects were being detected. As argued in Chapter 5, problems

with collinearity between casualties and inductions would be partially eliminated given the removal of the noise series from the models. Then, the results would also provide some indications as to remaining problems. When tested using bivariate analysis, casualties did not consistently demonstrate significance. Thus, even without the presence of the draft series, a more complete representation of casualties failed to show the expected results. Multivariate testing generally upheld this. However, both types of analysis validated the strength, significance, and causality of the cumulative inductions.

In addition to finding support for Hypothesis 1, the expectations for each period of the experiment generally proved correct. There was no apparent effect on presidential approval stimulated directly by the draft during the pre-test period. There was also evidence of significant, negative effect for the cumulative draft series in the test period. However, the mixed return in the post-test period merits an update of the original expectations. It seems the results of this experiment support the movement of attention to other matters when a negative component is removed from the political environment. This is consistent with the assumptions made about priming, proximity, and opinion shifts. Thus, the public tends to respond more to negatives than positives, which was expected. Other contextual factors may moderate this. Certainly in this study, the post-test period was punctuated by the Watergate scandal that quickly absorbed a great deal of the public's attention. This idea meshes with the understanding that conflicts leave residual ill-will, but that the American tendency towards ahistoricism tends to moderate the full effects (Snow & Drew, 1994). It is also consistent with the assumptions made concerning priming and evaluation of contextual changes.

In line with this, these findings suggest the draft may have long-term effects on the American zeitgeist. However, its nature changed over time. In the pre-test period, there were no significant direct effects of the draft on presidential approval. Prior to the onset of large military operations in Vietnam, the peacetime draft had become a largely status quo issue. For most inductees, it was a potential two-year liability. For some, it translated into two years of military service, but few died in the process. Therefore, the threat was low. The assumption is made that most of the population had little reason to question the efficacy of the draft since no undue risk or loss was apparent. However, escalation of conflict and the associated consequences rapidly changed the response to the draft. Increased risk with little evidence of opportunity moved the public against the draft. This continued until the threat abated.

In the test period, the nature of the draft's effects changed. Significant costs had become associated with the draft. For draft eligible men, this meant more than just two years of military service. Death and dismemberment had become a possible outcome of the draft. However, other factors may also have been at work. Loss, temporary or permanent, of students, workers, and friends might also have had some effect. In a more sociotropic vein, the division and cost within sub-groups and communities might also have played a role. This may be why the results in this study show the cumulative induction rate returning significant, negative effects for this period in multivariate analysis. This would be consistent with the argument of salience formation and transmission discussed in Chapter 4. The imposition of cost drove the need for identification of the threat. In this case, the draft, and its new perils serve as a likely candidate. However, the cumulative draft also shows significance in the bivariate study

when casualties do not. Being insulated from casualties in this way suggests other considerations may be at play beyond the salience induced by casualties. Tracking developments to certify this would be the next step. Here the increasing escalation of conflict with the commensurate surge in the draft and war-related casualty could serve to cement the assessment. Continued over time, the outlook would turn negative to any positive outcomes from the draft and alternatives would be formulated. The examination of the overall Vietnam War period certainly highlighted the unlikelihood of any single factor have long-term impact on presidential approval. Only inflation proved significant across the entire period. Several presidencies also showed lasting effects as did the most notable presidential scandal during the period – Watergate. Perhaps, the most of unusual of these would be the Ford administration, at least in terms of this test. Given the structure of this examination, the FORD series served as a singular variance predictor. However, this likely came more from the changes in the political environment not reflected in this study rather than the administration itself. It seems more likely that the very positive effects registered in this series reflect public opinion changes in the wake of Nixon’s ouster and the war’s end.

### *Hypothesis 2*

The second major hypothesis held that the draft would exhibit significant interactive effects with casualties in moving presidential approval. Thus, the null hypothesis would be that the draft would show no significant results in terms of swaying presidential approval through a moderating variable. In this study, the null cannot be falsified. The primary expectation was that casualties would serve as the moderating

variable that shifted feelings about the draft and thus indirectly helped to shift presidential approval.

At several points there were hints of an interactive effect with the most notable being in the first period. However, few interactive terms survived the early stages of testing. Those that did were plagued by collinearity problems despite attempts to remedy them. Further, there was limited causality demonstrated by the remaining terms. Among these, the most important was the MIMC series that also showed clear causality in moving the presidential approval series in the pre-test period. However, it was ultimately removed in multivariate testing because it appeared to be more an artifact of collinearity than a significant variable in its own right. Similarly, the CIMC and CICC series initially showed relevance in the final period. However, they were eliminated for collinearity problems and lack of causality. It could be that this study lacked sufficiently sensitive methods to measure the moderating effect of casualties on inductions effectively. It might also be that the wrong moderating terms was investigated. Nevertheless, the interaction terms used in this study failed to provide any substantive or significant evidence to support the indirect effect hypothesis.

### Findings

A number of findings can be drawn directly from the results of this study. First, this study provides statistical evidence of the draft's significance over the course of the Vietnam War. Second, it confirms some issues concerning casualties but questions others. Third, it brings into question the results of other studies based on either the choice of modeling components or the techniques employed. Finally, it presents an issue

involving the consequences of citizens in hazardous roles without other extenuating circumstances.

### *Draft significance*

The draft showed notable significance throughout this study. This gives plausibility to the claim of significance for the draft. Certainly, the evidence for the direct effect supports both the argument for direct effect as well as the principles behind the operation of these effects. The cumulative draft proved especially significant throughout the study. The monthly draft measure failed to demonstrate such significance however.

Overall, the cumulative draft series performed as expected. Following Mueller's design for public's memory of cumulative casualties, the cumulative draft began to play a role during the test period that dissipated in the post-test period before disappearing in the overall period.

These findings support the idea that a draft may not generate sufficient resentment if its consequences are low. In previous U.S. military drafts, the greatest resistance appears to have come when the cost in human life was the highest. How closely connected these factors may be remains uncertain. Contextual changes such as the centralization of power in the federal government certainly present a much different arena by the time of the WWI and WWII drafts. However, this study suggests a link between human cost and approval.

Theory development and further testing will be necessary to further understand these results. However, the bottomline is clear. The significance of the draft in evidence through this study suggests an important role for using conscription variables for this and

other relevant periods of conflict. These results commend draft variables to future researchers who seek to accurately model systems in which some form of draft is present.

### *Casualty significance*

The results suggest that casualties should continue to hold an important role in measuring shifts in presidential approval during conflicts. However, they cannot be declared the principal mover of presidential approval during the Vietnam period without invalidating the findings of this study. In addition, several variants of casualty measures that have been ignored merit reexamination. The results for monthly casualties in the first period suggest important evidence may have been overlooked in other studies. This may represent limitations of past studies either in terms of data availability or in the application of a theoretical construct that will not allow for casualty information to be communicated to the public through means other than the mass media. In this study, evidence appeared that even the low casualty numbers in a media backwater can affect presidential approval. However, the question of the most likely vehicle for transmission remains in question. Further, the issue of other moderating factors that cause some casualties to resonate more than others remains open for debate.

The related issue of interactive terms also merits further consideration. The results for the interactive terms showed little significance, especially in terms of causality. However, in other studies that do not test causality, these would likely be heralded as major findings. This may be reason enough to merit further examination, especially since their constituent components showed evidence of explanatory and causal significance throughout the study.

### *Statistical Modeling*

Linear regression and related methodology dominate the field of political science. However, other statistical tools may provide even better results when used on aggregate, time series data. Assuming this study is confirmed by other research, it highlights the need for integrated use of appropriate statistical and non-statistical methods. Statistics alone are not necessary and sufficient for good analysis. Further, more questions should be asked when facing obvious social constructs. Mueller (1973) recognized the draft as a possible variable. However, he dismissed it with only a cursory examination of a few poll questions. However, the construct of the draft spanned from 1940 to 1973. The changing contextual elements throughout this period precluded a couple of polling questions from fully addressing the issue. Apparently, subsequent researchers simply built on this flawed foundation or were simply blind to the obvious. In addition, this study highlights the problem of looking at a system over time as uniform. Apart from economic variables, the overall results differ dramatically from those of empirically established periods. Finally, the results of this study bring to mind questions of utility in terms of the presidential terms. They seem to serve as repositories for otherwise unexplained variance and little else.

#### *Using citizens*

How American citizens may be employed to achieve the ends of the state is at issue here. If conscription alone is not contrary to the American psyche despite many lofty arguments to the contrary, then what is acceptable and what changes the level of acceptability? The hypotheses in this study presupposed a corporate concern for the loss of life with the expectation that this concern would grow as casualties increased. Expectations were outlined that looked for this effect to begin as the draft shifted from a



relatively safe proposition in the pre-combat period to a more dangerous and uncertain endeavor. Oddly, the interaction terms and casualty measures did not provide any support for this position. However, this assertion seems to find support in the shift from Period 1 to Period 2. If so, this also supports the implicit argument for acceptable costs within these findings.

In the early stages, there were no significant draft series although there was a positive interactive series that showed some ephemeral significance. As the war escalated, the draft proved significant and negatively correlated to presidential opinion during the height of the war. In fact, the casualty measures showed a heavy dependence on these measures for their significance as seen in collinearity and correlation tests. It would seem the linkage would be one of costs in human terms. However, neither the direct or interactive terms involving casualties responded in way that would confirm this.

This argument has a number of inherent risks. For example, the most relevant pieces of the puzzle may have been missing from the equation. Certainly, media effects, party shifts, measures of policy success, and a myriad of other measures were intentionally left out. However, the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue already spelled out in the discussion of salience in Chapter 4. Human costs provide a significant measure of salience to political assessments when they are relevant to respondents.

Following this line of thinking, it would appear that American adults during this period were willing to pay the human costs as long as those costs remained low, but these costs were apparently not only measured in terms of casualties. As proximity increased with more draftees and draft-induced volunteers, the loss of life may have caused a shift

in the popular viewpoint. However, evidence suggests other factors may have been at play with the draft to shift public opinion.

Some contemporaneous, albeit limited, polling exists for this view. For example in a scientific sampling of Detroit residents in 1971, respondents were given an open-ended question to elicit their underlying reasons for opposing then current policies in Vietnam. Of the 1,263 interviewed, 46% cited U.S. involvement in a civil war as a primary reason for their disagreement with the handling of the war (Schuman, 1972). This is consistent with the findings of several later investigators, including Larsen (1996) and Jentleson (1992). The second most common response involved the undue loss of life. Nearly 41% of all respondents mentioned the loss of life and limb. Though this ranged from U.S. casualties to “innocent” individuals, the bulk of the respondents focused on U.S. troops. In fact, 28% of all respondents cited the death of U.S. troops as a central reason for their disagreement with the course of the war. This parallels the findings of Mueller (1973) and those who followed his approach. The third most common response involved the likelihood of success. Approximately 35% cited the “unwinnability” of the war. This included the spectrum of responses from those who thought it impossible to those that felt the government was simply not committed to winning. This argument is consistent with a number of research efforts. Eichenberg (2005) represents one of the most recent studies, but others are actively studying this avenue including Feaver and Gelpi. About 20% cited the wasteful use of resources – real or political – as a reason for disagreeing with the administration. Despite many protests to the contrary, only 11% cited a moral conflict as the reason for their disagreement with the course of the war. University of Michigan students were also polled as a comparison. The students more

frequently mentioned the loss of life, including more emphasis on the Vietnamese. They raised the issue of U.S. engagement in a civil war as a problem but with more support for the North Vietnamese viewpoint. Most notably little emphasis was given to winnability or resources, but a far larger number of students raised issues of morality (Schuman, 1972).

Perhaps the overall measure of the draft's effect across the period of the war shows one of two things. The lack of effect during less combative periods may indicate public acceptance of compulsory service as long as the human costs were low. However, it could show the positive results reflecting the dramatic shift in opinion elicited from the end of the draft. This combined with the generally neutral response during the first 10 years when the costs were low might have drowned out the effect of the nine war years. Given the historical response to the draft in America, the latter would seem more likely.

It was not until August 1965 that the Gallup organization began to ask the question that would become a staple throughout the war, "in view of developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" (Erskine, 1970; Lunch & Sperlich, 1979). At the time, 61% said they did not. Asked quarterly, the number who held this view dropped until the final polling in May 1971. By that time, only 28% still said the war was not a mistake. On a related note, Harris poll results showing support for escalation peaked in June 1967 at 58%. Only 6% supported withdrawal. However, those in support would steadily climb to nearly 75% in early 1971 and stay there until mid-1972 (Lunch & Sperlich, 1979).

Regardless of the reasons given, support for the war and for the president generally shows a long-term decline over the course of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Some attribute the slow decay in support more than to psychological risk rather than physical risks. Some like Elias Canetti (1960/1984) offer the philosophical view that the masses like to be unified around a common purpose. War only heightens this desire, thus making the “crowd” resistance to opinion change. The desire for revenge, retribution, or other intangibles only serves to heighten the singular focus of a nation in wartime (Stoessinger, 2001). It is sometimes the basest urges that motivate thinking during war.

The outbreak of war is primarily an eruption of two crowds. As soon as these crowds have formed, the supreme purpose of each is to preserve its existence through both belief and action. To abandon the crowd would be to abandon life itself...The curious and unmistakable high-tension which characterizes all the processes of war has two causes: people want to forestall death, and they are acting as a crowd (Canetti, pp. 72-73).

Fear plays a central role. However, “fear best thrives in the present tense” (Levitt & Dubner, 2005). Leaders have known and exploited this long before Sun Tzu and Machiavelli articulated their views on it. As long as the fear remains heightened and survival seems at stake, courage requires a good citizen to stand up and support efforts against those they fear. As long as the masses remain compliant, elites can direct the course of the war.

However, what happens when the sense of fear diminishes or alternate groups form in opposition to that of elites controlling a conflict? Defections from the crowd supporting the war may be inspired by interests with more relevance or more proximal to some and are often accompanied by the formation of other groups. Such shifts may not be readily detected by the elites. Often the “silent majorities” cited by Nixon are either disinterested or ready to be swayed by that which most appeals to their values. Slow or mistaken reading of such shifts may help further spur change (Canetti, 1984; Towle, 2004). This was in part what

Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse analyzed and tried to exploit in their 1970 *Dove's Guide*. Thus, counter movements arise that can cause policy shifts.

This line of thinking has ties to another related issue. If Americans balk when proximity and risk increase or other interests draw them away from a conflict, what factors might moderate this trend and allow an appropriate use of force even under unpopular conditions? The public response in the aftermath of 9/11 certainly shows an increased willingness to bear costs, at least to a point. However, the increasing decline in support also suggests limits even after direct attacks against the United States. Perhaps the use of professionals alone – either specialized military units or civilian contractors – would allow greater flexibility in terms of extended combat. Certainly the French Foreign legion provides one example of such a detached force. Certainly, the varying response to the deployment of full-time military members versus reserve members may be relevant in the U.S. context. Further the increased use of “security contractors” in Iraq and elsewhere may represent a tacit acknowledgement of this.

#### Implications

The question of relevance should be applied in any study and certainly quite reasonable here. It would seem that anyone with a limited understanding of the period would expect the draft to have an effect. Most writers seem to assume this when writing fiction and qualitative research of various kinds related to Vietnam. However, no one has qualified the broad political effects. Those who have tried to quantify aspects of the Vietnam War have universally failed to model it. Why such a glaring omission? Perhaps many researchers followed Mueller's lead and dismissed it as statistically insignificant without testing it themselves. If so, the results of this dissertation, if upheld, bring into

question the accuracy of their modeling. Likewise, any researcher who suggested the draft had an effect yet failed to model it would also have problems -- though no evidence of any such work emerged in this study. In many ways, this is no different from other efforts to challenge the idea that casualties are the paramount driver of opinion shifts. Before this study, the draft was another possible measure that merited a test. However, this study now provides clear evidence of significant, causal effect for the draft.

The finding for Hypothesis 1 and its subordinate hypotheses present statistically defensible evidence of something obvious to many that lived through the Vietnam era. The draft mattered. Though many implications may be drawn, a few are listed here. They primarily rely on the fundamental issues of blood and treasure expenditure and the subsequent effects on public will consistent with Carl von Clausewitz and many subsequent thinkers. If war, as Clausewitz argues, is a continuation of policy, then it involves political acts that must be understood to increase the likelihood that a better state of peace can be achieved. Clausewitz recognized the will as an essential element of war that cannot be denied (Clausewitz, 1832/1989). This includes the patriotic spirit and support of the people for the government's warfighting efforts. This moral force can trump physical strength and turn the tide of conflicts. Will and strength may also reach a culmination point in which the tide of a conflict turns. In the case of the United States in Vietnam, it won nearly every battle yet lost the war. This in part can be traced to a failure of will in leaders, such as LBJ's resignation, as well as in the public that is evident in the change of opinion concerning the draft.

The expenditure of citizens in any endeavor potentially threatens the corporate will. This study shows evidence that it certainly threatens the standing of the chief

executive. Perhaps maximizing positive gains in a conflict may counteract some loss in this arena. Evidence exists for this in the positive results from the pre-test period.

However, without further evidence, it remains speculative. The reengineering of the military in the aftermath of Vietnam also reflects an apparently intuitive understanding of the braking power inherent in a population's response to a prolonged or unpopular conflict.

Melvin Laird and General Creighton Abrams were the principal architects of the remodeled military that placed the bulk of support units and a large portion of the combat units into the reserves. The reasoning behind this "Total Force" initiative involved, in part, the failure of the public to count the cost soon enough. They reasoned that the use of self-contained and socially distant units of the professional military had allowed the war to continue until large-scale escalation was necessary. At that point, draftees began entering the theater of combat en masse and the popular mood turned against the war. Often referred to as the "Abrams Doctrine", this extra-Constitutional tripwire was aimed at using bureaucratic means to rein in presidential uses of power. Not only was it more subtle than the War Powers Act, it was arguably more effective (Carafano, 2005). Though other mitigating factors undoubtedly existed, this seems a logical position in light of the findings in this study. It certainly meshes with later research (Sobel, 2001; Ray, 1995; Gartner, 1993, Gartner, 1998).

A better understanding of this phenomenon could inform decisions about current and future military operations. Until 2001, no conflict escalated sufficiently to challenge this. Largely, Desert Storm was the only substantive conflict that demanded a large call up of the National Guard and the reserves. However, it was very short, very decisive, and

very successful from the U.S. standpoint. This was very different from the current conflicts in which the United States has become embroiled. The current conflict presents itself as a test case of the logic behind the military reorganization. However, without a good basis for what the draft really did in Vietnam, gaps exist in studying the nature and subsequent effects of the reorganization. This will limit effective assessments of current and future conflicts, unless the military again undergoes a major reorganization.

Along this line, decisions about military personnel policy and alternatives to personnel acquisition may benefit from the findings of this study. Currently, the level of U.S. military obligations exceeds the capacity of the active-duty military. Assuming these engagements must continue at current or greater levels, there are primarily five methods by which this situation can be maintained without “breaking” the military (Graham, 2005). However, each has some risks related to human cost and combat length, which have been shown in this study to yield negative results in presidential approval figures.

First, diplomacy could bring the troops of interested nations together and focus them on a shared cause. Though this was executed effectively in the first Gulf War by George H. W. Bush, the current use of coalitions has been far less effective. Thus, the bulk of military demands have fallen on the United States. Britain has arguably been the second largest provider of troops followed by NATO. However, many of the forces employed by NATO are also U.S. troops. The improved use of coalitions is consistent with the lessons of Vietnam. Avoiding the urge to go it alone in wide-scale conflict, limits the overall costs in terms of blood and treasure (Berman, 1982).



A second option for maintaining military engagement at current or higher levels rests in the growing use of contractors. Contractors providing services traditionally handled by the military, including combat, have found business booming. Some argue that the United States is currently using more contractors in de facto military roles than ever before. In fact, they comprise the second largest military force in Iraq today (Smith, 2005). Certainly, these contractors provide greater flexibility, reduced casualty fears, and even deniability. However, there are limits to their use. Further, the use of contractors often robs the military of its most capable talent since it encourages the best-trained and experienced to leave active duty. This may or may not limit the potential proximity effect of negative opinion formation. It certainly produces some distance given the volitional nature of contractors versus other types of troops. Of course, the use of mercenaries may bring other stigma.

Stop-loss orders and financial incentives have been used to stem this tide. Such measures also present a means of increasing military manpower through administrative action. Although Congress has established a cap on the total number of military members, executive policy can be modified to increase these numbers in times of emergency. Stop-loss has already been used extensively. Called a “back-door” draft by some, it readily provides trained troops with limited congressional interference. Incentives have also been added to keep in members deemed to have critical skills. However, such programs also have limits. Further, wide scale use of stop-loss can cause sizeable perturbations in the military personnel system. This again involves those who chose to be in the service despite arguments against the “economic draft” implicit in military recruiting (Hendrick, 2005).

When such programs are not enough, activation of the National Guard and federal reserves has been a tool of choice. The use of the military in the current system has no parallel since WWII. Not only have most states sent large portions of their National Guard, but the inactive reserve has also been used to recall former military members. These efforts increase the proximity since friends and neighbors are being used with varying degrees of willingness on the part of the troops. This certainly increases the proximity effects and makes the costs of war more evident.

The final option would be a draft, either general or targeted. Either would likely generate significant proximity effects and negative consequences. It seems inconceivable that a full-scale draft like after WWII could again be instituted without some cataclysmic event forcing such a move. Apart from the practical problems, the political costs of any significant human costs seem staggering, even if these costs do not include loss of life. Perhaps a more targeted draft aimed at health care professionals, as in the “Doctor Draft” of the 1950s or the Health Care Personnel Delivery System, could work but the liabilities still seem sizeable. However, it is here that a better understanding of the apparent long-term positive response to the draft might prove most valuable. Could military or other service be provided that meshes both government needs and public opinion? There may be some room for compromise between the public’s assessment of risk and benefit.

#### Limitations

Any study begins with limits. The very nature of modeling limits the choices of variables in order to meet demands of parsimony. This study has limitations in operationalization, in replicating past findings, in the applicability of its own findings, in the nature of its analysis, and in its ability to explain some results.

The operationalization of human costs in terms of casualties and inductions remains a rather crude proposition. Though numerous works have shown evidence that casualties cut through the noise of the everyday, the response to each is far less clear. The elements necessary to capture the cost element probably exceeds the ability of an aggregate study during a historic period, but it should be noted nevertheless.

Many studies have relied heavily on the early work of John Mueller. However, his dataset no longer exists making exact replication impossible. Recognizing this as well as the limitations of statistical methods, this study risks replacing one statistical artifact for another. The hope is that the multiple steps of analysis will minimize this, but the possibility remains. Since Mueller's study cannot be replicated exactly a change in central poll question is also made. Rather than the mistake question, this study uses the general approval question for the president to get a broader sense of the draft's impact.

This study examines the effects of the draft during a specific time and a specific conflict. Though the same general lessons may be drawn, care should be taken in applying them without considering contextual differences. Though some argue like Gronke and Newman (2003) that a single model can account to model the effects within every presidency, this seems a questionable proposition at best. Although this study gives rise to questions about previous modeling of Vietnam and possibly other conflicts, it does not represent the most advanced statistical modeling available. Further, it can be seen throughout the results section that the bulk of the explanatory power for every model rests heavily on the intercept and ARIMA terms. Since these terms largely capture the effects of the context not otherwise represented in the study, this means that the overall explanatory power is limited. However to be fair, it should be noted that this actually

reflects a positive over many linear regression attempts which simply, albeit erroneously, allot this variance to the stated variables rather than exogenous factors.

This work did not include complex modeling methods such as advanced intervention analysis, state space modeling, or non-parametric methods. These and other factors may be better able to evaluate the data. Though the use of these of these tools remains limited in the social sciences, they merit future consideration.

Finally, the failure of the interactive series may represent a failure of the modeling to capture moderating variables. More analyses of these measures are needed before fuller explanations can be gained from these results. Such work would include not only statistical but also qualitative measures. Certainly, the further development of relevant theoretical constructs is merited.

#### Future Research

The draft and its effects are far from a dead topic. Since this study lines up with a general line of rational theory that finds people when costs increase the salience of the issue, a number of questions seem linked. For example, can significant benefits preempt the resistance generated by human costs? This would certainly seem relevant in the current “War on Terrorism” that will likely be lengthy in duration and uncertain in battlelines.

Related to this may be the difference between forces used. What effects arise from the recent widespread use of the National Guard and contractors? Could part of the equation be a matter of who rather than how many? Some draft boards were accused of favoring certain groups over others. Could these “small boards of friends and neighbors” simply have been employing an intuitive sense of public opinion control as they made

their choices? This could involve not only ethnic and socio-economic factors but also matters of the degree of volition allowed individuals.

Given the likely need for more human resources in this or other conflicts, from what sources might the bodies be drawn from the populace without provoking undue negativity and resistance? Certainly variations between demographic group responses may not only provide further illumination into what groups supported the draft but also provide hints as to what groups might support policy changes today. Such examination may help explain some of the results such as the overall positive result registered for the Vietnam-era draft as well as opinion shifts today.

The competing nature of various mediums might prove an interesting extension of this work. For example, do mass media effects become more dominant as the conflict continues? At what point do non-media effects become outstripped by media effects in priming and framing the anti-draft or even anti-war message. Further, new techniques such as James' Stimson's Public Opinion Dimensional Extraction Algorithm might help to piece together disparate poll results to help further this end (Stimson, 2005).

Another related area of interest might involve the relationship between the draft of this period and the subsequent use of National Guard and reserve troops. Are there parallels? Certainly, the structure of the military had been done with a public restraint mechanism in mind. Has this worked as Laird and Abrams planned? If not, why not? Of course, many facets within the study itself merit additional work. For example, more extensive use of intervention analysis to identify key shifts in opinion might prove fruitful both alone and in identifying a better framework from which to analyze the data. The changing direction of causality results also presents some interesting possibilities.

## Conclusion

Building on the existing foundation of conflict and presidential approval research, this study found evidence that the inductions from the Vietnam-era draft showed significant correlation and causal effects on presidential approval. The direct effect hypothesis that articulated significant effects of the draft upon presidential was supported. In addition, the requirements of causality testing were met. Thus, the draft did not show significance before the large-scale combat phase of Vietnam. Amidst this phase, the effects of the cumulative induction proved significant in terms of explaining shifts in presidential approval. However, there was some bi-directionality in the causality measure. Though ambiguous results arose from the period after the draft ended, these results may be readily explained by the public's ability to shift gears to other issues in addition to its tendency to punish rather than reward its political leaders. The failure of any measure to arise from the overall period of the war likely demonstrates the problem inherent to engaging public opinion and directing it a singularly fashion over more than two decades. Economic and political factors predominated over time, while war-related concerns faded.

These findings suggest some rational process of cost assessment. Threats are identified only when they become evident. In this case, the reason for some of this remains unidentified although the cost in human terms certainly appeared to be part of the equation. Once identified, development of the matter ensues. Questions of potential gains versus potential loss are in some way assessed and ultimately selection of opinion or course of action is made. The data suggest a majority of Americans may have responded negatively to the cost or application of the draft after the combat phase began.

However, how the majority measured these matters cannot be discerned from aggregate data. Whether this continued through the post-draft phase is also unclear, since the draft series produced no significant results. Certainly, these factors fade over the period of the entire conflict.

This study also supports the increasing use of the causality testing of variables to increase the reliability of results. This is consistent with the early work in directionality by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) as well as later researchers (Miller, 1999).

Though not on par with these authors, the aim was to minimize “creative data analysis” (Achen, 1999, p. 144) and instead use the tools available to test such basic assumption as causality. Certainly, the use of Granger causality made the job more difficult, but one would hope, more accurate. This tool alone challenged many of the assertions made concerning the causal mechanism of casualties in generating negative approval.

In the end, an oft-held view was validated with the findings for the draft’s effect on presidential approval, although the presumptions of consistent negativity were invalidated. Casualties did not prove to be as significant or causal as long held. Further, economics appeared subordinated to people issues involving the draft, casualties, and presidential terms. This not only raises questions about historical models, but also the political consequences for using citizens in combat in future conflicts.

## REFERENCES

- (1961). Inaugural address of President Kennedy. *American foreign policy—Current documents* (p. 8). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- (1967). *Selective Service Orientation Kit*. (Available from Selective Service System, 1724 F. Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20435).
- (1986). Letter from the Commander in Chief, Pacific to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam, 25 May 1959. *Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960* (Vol. 1, pp. 199-200). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- (2005, February 9). *DOD news releases archive*. In *National Guard and Reserve mobilized as of 9 Feb 2005*. Retrieved February 19, 2006 from <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050209-2076.html>
- Achen, C. (1999). Warren Miller and the future of political data analysis. *Political Analysis*, 8(2), 142-146.
- Altman, S., & Barro, R. (1971). Officer supply: The impact of pay, the draft, and the Vietnam War. *American Economic Review*, 61(4), 649-664.
- Alvarez, M., & Brehm, J. (1995). American ambivalence towards abortion policy: A heteroskedastic probit method for assessing conflicting values. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(3), 1055-1082.



- Alvarez, M., & Nagler, J. (1998). Economic entitlements and social issues: Voter choice in the 1996 Presidential Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(4), 1349-1363.
- Amacher, R., Miller, J., Pauly, M., Tollison, R., & Willett, T. (1973). *The economics of the military draft*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corporation.
- Anderson, F. (1984). *A people's army: Massachusetts soldiers and society in the Seven Years' War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Anderson, M., & Honegger, B. (Eds.). (1982). *The military draft: Selected readings on conscription*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Angrist, J. (1990). Lifetime earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security administrative records. *American Economic Review*, 80(3), 313-336.
- Angrist, J. (1991). The draft lottery and voluntary enlistment in the Vietnam Era. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 86(415), 584-595.
- Angrist, J. (1993). The effect of veterans benefits on education and earnings. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 46(4), 637-52.
- Approval* [Excel Spreadsheet]. (2004). The Bush Center, Texas A & M University, College Station, TX: George Edwards [Producer and Distributor].
- Bannan, J. & Bannan, R. (On Demand). *Law, morality and Vietnam: The peace militants and the courts*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Books on Demand. (Original work published 1974).
- Barnett, T. (2004). *The Pentagon's new map: War and peace in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

- Barrett, D. (1993). *Uncertain warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam advisers*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
- Barringer, M. (1998). Antiwar movement, The United States. In *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (pp. 18-19). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bartels, L. (1986). Issue voting under uncertainty: An empirical test. *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(4), 709-728.
- Bartels, L. (1993). Messages received: The political impact of media exposure. *American Political Science Review*, 87(2), 267-285.
- Baskir, L. & Strauss, W. (1978). *Chance and circumstance: the draft, the war, and Vietnam Generation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Basset, L. & Pelz, S. (1989). The failed search for victory: Vietnam and the politics of war. In T. Paterson (Ed.), *Kennedy's quest for victory* (pp. 223-252). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Baum, M. (2000). Tabloid wars: The mass media, public opinion and the use of force abroad. *UMI ProQuest Digital Dissertations*, 61 (008), 3339.
- Behr, R., & Iyengar, S. (1985). Television news, real-world cues, and changes in the public agenda. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49(1), 38-57.
- Bell, W. G. (Ed.). (1973). *Department of the Army historical summary: Fiscal year 1970*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army.
- Bennett, D., & Stam, A. (1996). The duration of interstate wars, 1816-1985. *American Political Science Review*, 90(2), 239-257.

- Bennett, D., & Stam, A. (1998). Declining advantages of democracy: A combined model of war outcomes and duration. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3), 344-66.
- Berger, J. (Ed.). (1981). *The military draft*. New York: H. W. Wilson.
- Berinsky, A. (2004). *Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and the American public*. Manuscript submitted for publication.
- Berman, L. (1982). *Planning a strategy: The Americanization of the war in Vietnam*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Berman, L. (1991). *Lyndon Johnson's war: The road to stalemate in Vietnam*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Bernstein, I. (1989). *New York City Draft Riots: Their significance for American society and politics in the age of the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bingham, H. & Wallace, M. (2000). *Muhammad Ali's greatest fight: Cassius Clay vs. the United States of America*. New York: M. Evans & Company.
- Binkin, M., & Johnston, J. (1973), *All-volunteer armed forces: Progress, problems, and prospects, report by the Brookings Institution prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, 93<sup>rd</sup> Congress, First Session*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Bolt, E. & Garrett, A. (1999, Summer). The United States advisory experience: Early commitments, 1954-1965. In *Kennedy and Vietnam: The first escalation*. Retrieved Jan. 18, 2005 from <http://www.richmond.edu/~ebolt/history398/JFKEscalation.html>.
- Borrelli, S., & Simmons, G. (1993). Congressional responsiveness to presidential popularity: The electoral context. *Political Behavior*, 15(2), 93-112.

- Box, G. & Jenkins, G. (1976). *Time series analysis: Forecasting and control* (2nd ed.). Oakland, CA: Holden Day.
- Box, G., & Tiao, G. (1975). Intervention analysis with applications to economic and environmental problems. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 70(1), 70-79.
- Box, G., Jenkins, G., & Reinsel, G. (1994). *Time series analysis – Forecasting and control* (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Brace, P. & Hinckley, B. (2003). Public opinion polls: The new referendum. In J. Pfiffner & R. Davidson (Eds.), *Understanding the presidency* (3rd ed., pp. 168-174). New York: Longman.
- Brace, P., & Hinckley, B. (1992). *Follow the leader: Opinion polls and the modern presidents*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brace, P., & Hinckley, B. (1993). Presidential activities from Truman, through Reagan: timing and impact. *Journal of Politics*, 55(2), 382-98.
- Brambor, T., Clark, W., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analysis. *Political Analysis* 14(1), 63-82.
- Braumoeller, B. (2004). *Hypothesis testing and multiplicative interaction terms*. Manuscript submitted for publication in International Organization.
- Braun, R., and McGrattan, E. (1993). The macroeconomics of war and peace. *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, 197-247.
- Brody, R. (1991). *Assessing the president: The media, elite opinion, and public support*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.

- Brune, L. & Burns, R. (Eds.). (2002). *Chronological history of U.S. foreign relations* (Vol. 3). New York: Routledge.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Siverson, R. (1995). War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 89(4), 841-855.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Siverson, R., & Woller, G. (1992). War and the fate of regimes: A comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 86(4), 638-46.
- Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2003, April 17). Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Methods. In *Labor force data derived from the Current Population Survey* (chap.1). Retrieved April 4, 2006 from [http://stats.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1\\_a.htm](http://stats.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1_a.htm)
- Burrill, D. (1997). Articles. In *Modeling and interpreting interactions in multiple regression*. Retrieved 17 April, 2006 from <http://www.minitab.com/resources/articles/burril2.aspx>
- Butler, D., & Stokes, D. (1969). *Political change in Britain*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Butterfield, F. (1971). The Truman and Eisenhower Years: 1945-1960. *The Pentagon Papers* (pp. 1-66, 79-157). New York: Bantam Books.
- Calleo, D. (1982). *The imperious economy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Canetti, E. (1984). *Crowds and power*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. (Original work published 1960)
- Carafano, J. (2005, Feb. 3). Foreign Policy Research Institute E-notes. In *Total force policy and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled promise, uncertain future*. Retrieved Mar. 27, 2006 from

<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050203.military.carofano.totalforcepolicyabramsdoctrine.html>

- Card, D. & Lemieux, T. (2001). Going to college to avoid the draft: The unintended legacy of the Vietnam War. *American Economic Review*, 91(2), 97-102.
- Carmines, E. & Huckfeldt, R. (1996). Political behavior: An overview. In R. Goodin & H. Klingemann (Eds.), *A new handbook of political science*. (pp. 223-254). New York, Oxford University Press.
- Chambers, J. (1987). *To raise an army: The draft comes to modern America*. New York: Free Press.
- Chambers, J. (Ed.). (1999). *The Oxford companion to American military history*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chappell, H. (1991). Economic performance, voting, and political support: A unified approach. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 72(2), 313-20.
- Chatfield, C. (2003). *The analysis of time series – an introduction* (6th ed.). London: Chapman and Hall.
- Clarke, H., & Stewart, M. (1994). Prospecions, retrospections and rationality: 'The bankers' model of presidential approval reconsidered. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(4), 1104-23.
- Clausewitz, C. (1989). *On war* (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1832)
- Clifford, J., & Spencer, S. (1986). *First peacetime draft*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

- Clodfelter, M. (1989). *The limits of airpower: The American bombing of North Vietnam*. New York: Free Press.
- Cohen, J. (1969). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*. New York: Academic Press.
- Combat Area [Southeast Asia] Casualties Current File (CACCF) in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Record Group 330) (306742) [Data file]. 1998. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration.
- Communism hold spreading in Asia*. (1948, Jun. 27). *The Washington Post*, p. M9.
- Congressional Record. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 2004. Vol. 150, No. 130: E1938.
- Converse, P., Miller, W., Rusk, J., & Wolfe, A. (1969). Continuity and change in American politics: Parties and issues in the 1968 elections. *American Political Science Review*, 63(4), 1079-101.
- Conversino, Mark. (1997). Sawdust superpower: Perceptions of U.S. casualty tolerance in the post-Gulf War era. *Strategic Review*, 15(1), 15-23.
- Cook, A. (1974). *The armies of the streets: The New York City draft riots of 1863*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
- Cooper, V. (1977). *Military manpower and the all-volunteer force* (R-1450-ARPA). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Cowan, D. (1986). Developing a process model of problem recognition. *Academy of Management Review*, 11(3), 763-776.

- CPI-U, U.S. City Average, All Items* (5-18-2005 - Table containing history of CPI-U U.S. all items indexes and annual percent changes from 1913 to present) [Data file].  
Washington, DC: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
- Craig, G. (1964). *The politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cress, L. (1982). *Citizens in arms: The army and the militia in American Society to the War of 1812*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cromwell, J., Hannan, M., Labys, W., & Terraza, M. (1994). *Multivariate tests for time series models*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Current Population Survey. (1994). *Employment situation of Vietnam-era veterans* (U.S.DL 94-517). Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey.
- Cutler, T. (2000). *Brown water, black berets*. Newport, RI: Naval Institute Press.
- Davis, J., & Dolbeare, K. (1969). A social profile of local draft board members: The case of Wisconsin. In R. Little (Ed.), *Selective Service and American Society* (pp. 53-83). Hartford, CT: Russell Sage Foundation.
- DeBenedetti, C. (1990). *An American ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Department of Veteran's Affairs. (2001, May). America's Wars. In *Vietnam War (1964-1975)*. Retrieved Jan. 18, 2005 from <http://www.va.gov/pressrel/amwars01.htm>.
- DeRouen, K. (1995). The indirect link: Politics, the economy, and the use of force. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(4), 671-695.



- Dickerson, J. (1996). *North to Canada: Men and women against the Vietnam War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- Duggan, J. (1946). *The legislative and statutory development of the federal concept of conscription for military service*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.
- Duncanson, D. (1992, Feb.). The legacy of Ho Chi Minh. *Asian Affairs*, 23(1), 49-65.
- Eckhardt, G. S. (1974). *Vietnam studies command and control, 1950-1969* (CMH Pub 90-8). Washington, DC: Department of the Army.
- Edwards, G., & Gallup, A. (1992). *Presidential approval: A sourcebook* (2nd ed.). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Edwards, G., & Wood, D. (1999). Who influences whom? The president and the public agenda. *American Political Science Review*, 93(2), 327-44.
- Eichenberg, R. (2003). Gender differences in public attitudes toward the use of force by the United States, 1990-2003. *International Security*, 28(1), 110-141.
- Eichenberg, R. (2005). Victory has many friends: U.S. public opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005. *International Security*, 30(1), 140-77.
- Eisenhower, D. (1960). The president's news conference of April 7, 1954. *Public papers of the presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (pp. 382-83). Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.
- Erikson, R. (1989). Economic conditions and the presidential vote. *American Political Science Review*, 83(2), 567-73.

- Erikson, R. (2004). *Macro vs. micro-level perspectives on economic voting: Is the micro-level evidence endogenously induced?*. Paper presented at the 2004 Political Methodology Conference, Stanford, CA.
- Erikson, R., Mackuen, M., Stimson, J., & Kuklinski, J. (2002). *The macro polity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Erskine, H. (1970). The polls: Is war a mistake?. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34(1), 141-142.
- Executive Order 13223, Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to active duty and delegating certain authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, 66 Federal Register § 181 (2001, Sep. 14).
- Extension of draft for four years asked. (1963, March 2). *New York Times*, p. 4.
- Farrell, M. (2003, November 11). In *Would a second Bush term mean a return to conscription? Why dodging the draft would be trickier than you think*. Retrieved December 12, 2005 from <http://www.buzzflash.com/farrell/03/11/far03001.html>
- Faust, P. (Ed.). (1986). *Historical Times illustrated encyclopedia of the Civil War*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Feaver, P., & Gelpi, C. (2004). *Choosing your battles: American civil-military relations and the use of force*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Feldman, S., & Zaller, J. (1992). The political culture of ambivalence: Ideological responses to the welfare state. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(1), 268-307.
- Ferber, M., & Lynd, S. (1971). *The resistance*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Finkel, S. (1993). Reexamining the "Minimal Effects" Model in recent presidential campaigns. *Journal of Politics*, 55(1), 1-21.
- Finn, J. (1968). *A conflict of loyalties: The case for selective conscientious objection*. New York: Pegasus.
- Fisher, A. (1969). The cost of the draft and the cost of ending the draft. *American Economic Review*, 59(3), 239-54.
- Fiske, S., & Taylor, S. (1984). *Social cognition*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Flynn, G. (1985). *Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Flynn, G. (2000). *The draft, 1940-1973*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Foley, M. (2003). *Confronting the war machine: Draft resistance during the Vietnam War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Foyle, D. (1999). *Counting the public in*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Franklin, C. (1984). Issue preferences, socialization, and the evolution of party identification. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(2), 459-478.
- Franklin, C. (2005, May 8). *Presidential approval in perspective*. Retrieved Feb 6, 2006 from [http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/stuff\\_for\\_blog/perspective.pdf](http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/stuff_for_blog/perspective.pdf)
- Frey, B. & Schneider, F. (1978). An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the United States. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 72(2), 506-522.
- Friedman, M. (1967). Why not a volunteer army?. *New Individualist Review*, 4(1), 3-9.
- Funk, C. (1995). The impact of scandal on candidate evaluations: An experimental test of the role of candidate traits. *Political Behavior*, 18(1), 1-24.

- Funk, C. (1999). Bringing the candidate into models of candidate evaluations. *Journal of Politics*, 61(3), 700-720.
- Gaffney, D. (2000). American experience: Return with honor. In *Return with honor timeline*. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2005 from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/honor/filmmore/webcredits.html>.
- Gallup, G. (1972). *The Gallup Poll: Public opinion, 1935-1971* (Vol. 2). New York: Random House.
- Garamone, J. (2001, Jan. 31). Armed Forces Information Service news articles. In *This time, They're asking; DOD, Selective Service team up*. Retrieved Jan. 8, 2005 from [http://www.dod.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.dod.mil/news/Jan2001/n01312001\\_200101312.html](http://www.dod.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.dod.mil/news/Jan2001/n01312001_200101312.html)
- Garfinkle, A. (1995). *Telltale hearts: The origins and impact of the Vietnam antiwar movement*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gartner, S. (1993). Predicting the timing of Carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt: Modeling a dynamic information environment. *International Interactions*, 18(2), 365-86.
- Gartner, S. (1998). Opening up the black box of war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3), 252-258.
- Gartner, S. (2004). Making the international local: The terrorist attack on the USS Cole, local casualties, and media coverage. *Political Communication*, 21(2), 139-160.
- Gartner, S., & Segura, G. (1998). War, casualties, and public opinion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3), 278-300.

- Gartner, S., & Segura, G. (2000). Race, opinion, and casualties in the Vietnam War. *The Journal of Politics*, 62(1), 115-146.
- Gartner, S., Segura, G., & Wilkening, M. (1997). All politics are local: Local losses and individual attitudes toward the Vietnam War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(5), 669-694.
- Gaspar, C. (1998). Ap Bac, Battle of. In *The encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A political, social, and military history* (pp. 19-20). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Geary, J. (1991). *We need men: The Union Draft in the Civil War*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Gerhardt, J. (1971). *The draft and public policy*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Geweke, J., Meese, R., & Dent, W. (1983). Comparing alternative tests of causality in temporal systems: Analytic results and experimental evidence. *Journal of Econometrics*, 21(1), 161-194.
- Gilbert, M. (Ed.). (2000). *The Vietnam War on campus: Other voices, more distant drums*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- Gilliam, R. (1982). The peacetime draft: Voluntarism to coercion. In M. Anderson (Ed.), *The military draft: Selected readings on conscription* (pp. 97-116). Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. (Original work published 1968)
- Goldenberg, S. (2003, November 5). Appeal for draft board volunteers revives memories of Vietnam era. *The Guardian*. Retrieved December 12, 2005, from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1077906,00.html>

- Gottlieb, S. (2004). *Hell no, we won't go*. Ft. Worth, TX: Waltsan Publishing, LLC.  
(Original work published 1991).
- Graham, B. (2005, Jan. 6). General says Army Reserve is becoming a 'broken' force.  
*Washington Post*, p. A1.
- Granger, C. (1969). Investigating causal relations by econometric methods and cross-spectral methods. *Econometrica*, 34(3), 424-38.
- Granger, C., & Newbold, P. (1977). *Forecasting economic time series*. Academic Press: New York.
- Greene, G. (1973). *The quiet American*. New York: Penguin. (Original work published 1955)
- Greene, S. (2001). The role of character assessments in presidential approval. *American Politics Research*, 29(2), 196-210.
- Gronke, P., & Brehm, J. (2002). History, heterogeneity, and presidential approval.  
*Electoral Studies*, 21(2), 425-52.
- Gronke, P., & Newman, B. (2003). FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A field essay on presidential approval. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(4), 501-512.
- Gronke, P., Koch, J., & Wilson, J. (2003). Presidential approval, perceived presidential support, and representatives' electoral fortunes. *Journal of Politics*, 65(3), 785-808.
- Hagan, J. (2001). *Northern passage: American Vietnam War resisters in Canada*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Haig-Brown, A. (1996). *Hell no, we won't go: Vietnam draft resisters in Canada*. Vancouver, BC Canada: Raincoast Book Distribution.

- Halberstam, D. (1998). Ap Bac, Battle of. In *The encyclopedia of Vietnam: A political, social and military history* (pp. 19-20). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Halstead, F. (1978). *Out now! A participant's account of the American movement against the Vietnam war*. New York: Monad Press.
- Hansen, L., & Wiesbrod, B. (1967). Economics of the military draft. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 81(3), 395-421.
- Harris 1969 My Lai Vietnam survey, no. 196 (The Odom Institute  
<http://cgi.irss.unc.edu/cgi-bin/CAT/search.fullrec.cgi>) [Data file]. New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.
- Hays, S. (1967). A military view of Selective Service. In S. Tax (Ed.), *The draft: A handbook of facts and alternatives* (pp. 7-22). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Hellman, J. (1986). *American myth and the legacy of Vietnam*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Henderson, D. (2005). The role of economists in ending the draft. *Econ Journal Watch*, 2(2), 362-376.
- Hendrick, B. (2005, Jan. 9). Teens for troops; Promises of cash, college help draw youngsters to Georgia Guard; critics call it 'economic draft'. *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, p. 1LS.
- Herring, G. (1995). *America's longest war: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Hershey, L. (1953). Minutes of State Directors' Conference, 15-18 May 1953.  
(Available from Selective Service System, Lewis Hershey Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.)
- Hershey, L. (1960). *Outline of historical background of Selective Service and chronology*. (Available from Selective Service System, 1724 F Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20435)
- Hess, G. (2001). *Presidential decisions for war*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hibbs, D. (1973-1974). Problems of statistical estimation and causal inference in time-series regression models. *Sociological Methodology*, 5, 252-308.
- Hibbs, D., Rivers, R., & Vasilatos, N. (1982a). The dynamics of political support for American presidents among occupational and partisan groups. *American Journal of Political Science*, 26(2), 312-32.
- Hibbs, D., Rivers, R., & Vasilatos, N. (1982b). On the demand for economic outcomes: Macroeconomic performance and mass political support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. *Journal of Politics*, 44, 426-62.
- Higginbotham, D. (1971). *The War of American Independence: Military attitudes, policies, and practices, 1763-1789*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hirsh, B., & Mehay, S. (2003). Evaluating the labor market performance of veterans using a matched comparison group design. *Journal of Human Resources*, 38(3), 673-700.
- Hockstader, L. (2003, December 29). Army stops many soldiers from quitting. *Washington Post*, p. A1.



- Holsti, O. & Rosenau, J. (1984). *American leadership in world affairs: Vietnam and the breakdown of consensus*. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- Holsti, O. & Rosenau, J. (1979). Vietnam, consensus, and belief systems of American leaders. *World Politics*, 32, 1-56.
- Holsti, O. & Rosenau, J. (1996). Liberals, populists, libertarians, and conservatives: The link between domestic and international affairs. *International Political Science Review*, 17, 29-54.
- Holsti, O. (2004). *Public opinion and American foreign policy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Holsti, O. (1996). *Public opinion and American foreign policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- House Committee on Appropriations Hearings, 85th Cong., 218 (22 Jan. 1958) (testimony of Lewis B. Hershey).
- Huckfeldt, R. & Sprague, J. (1987). Networks in context: The social flow of political information. *American Political Science Review*, 32, 467-82.
- Hue-Tam, H. (1992). *Radicalism and the origins of the Vietnamese Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hunt, R. (1989). Strategic Hamlet Program. In *The encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A political, social, and military history* (p. 385). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Induction Records (Internal Data Analysis) [Data file]. Washington, D.C.: Selective Service Administration, 2005.

- Iyengar, S., Kinder, D., Peters, M., & Krosnick, J. (1984). The evening news and presidential evaluations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46(3), 778-787.
- Jackman, P. (2006, April 4). CPI Home. In *Consumer Price Index summary*. Retrieved March 16, 2006 from <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm>
- Jackman, R. (1993). Rationality and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(2), 279-90.
- Jacobs, L., & Shapiro, R. (2000). *Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- James, P. & Rioux, J. (1998). International crises and linkage politics: The experiences of the United States, 1953-1994. *Political Research Quarterly*, 51(4), 781-812.
- Jentleson, B. (1992). The pretty prudent public: Post-Vietnam American opinion on the use of military force. *International Studies Quarterly*, 36(1), 49-73.
- Jentleson, B., & Britton, R. (1998). Still pretty prudent: Post-Cold War American opinion on the use of military Force. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(4), 395-417.
- Johnson, P. (1997). *A history of the American people*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Jones, E., & Davis, K. (1965). From acts to dispositions: the attribution process in social psychology. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 219-266). New York: Academic Press.
- Kagay, M. (1999). Presidential address: Public opinion and polling during presidential scandal and impeachment. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 63(3), 449-63.
- Karnow, S. (1983). *Vietnam: A history*. New York: Viking.

- Keats, J. (1969). *The new Romans: The American experience*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Kellogg, W. (1972). *The conscientious objector*. Englewood, NJ: Jerome S. Ozer.
- Kernell, S. (1978). Explaining presidential popularity. *American Political Science Review*, 72(2), 506-522.
- Kinder, D. & Kiewiet, R. (1981). Sociotropic politics: The American case. *British Journal of Political Science*, 11(1), 129-161.
- Kissinger, H. (2003). *Ending the Vietnam War: A history of America's involvement in and extrication from the Vietnam War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Klarevas, L. (2000). Trends: The United States peace operation in Somalia. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 64(4), 523-40.
- Klarevas, L. (2002). The essential domino of military operations: American public opinion and the use of force. *International Studies Perspectives*, 3(4), 417-438.
- Knickerbocker, B. (2003, January 28). Pentagon's quietest calculation: the casualty count. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved April 30, 2003, from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0128/p01s02-woiq.htm>.
- Knightley, P. (2004). *The first casualty* (5th ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Koch, J. (1991). Explanations of group economic outcomes: Determinants and consequences. *American Politics Quarterly*, 19(2), 211-228.
- Kohn, S. (1986). *Jailed for peace: The history of American draft law violations, 1658-1985*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Kramer, G. (1983). The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate vs. individual-level findings on economics, elections, and sociotropic voting. *American Political Science Review*, 77(1), 92-111.
- Kreidberg, M., & Henry, M. (1955). *History of military mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army.
- Krosnick, J., & Kinder, D. (1990). Altering the foundations of support for the president through priming. *American Political Science Review*, 84(2), 497-512.
- Krugman, P. (2004, Oct. 19). Feeling the draft. *The New York Times*, p. A27.
- Kull, S., Ramsay, C., & Lewis, E. (2004). Misperceptions, the media, and the Iraq War. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(4), 569-98.
- Kusch, F. (2001). *All-American boys: Draft dodgers in Canada from the Vietnam War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Lacy, J. (1982). The case for conscription. In B. Scowcroft (Ed.), *Military Service in the United States* (pp. 195-219). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Ladd, E. (1978). Public opinion roundup: Left, right, or center -- Which way are we going?. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7(1), 33.
- Lancaster, D. (1961). *The emancipation of French Indochina*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Lanoue, D. (1988). *From Camelot to the Teflon President: Economics and presidential popularity since 1960*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Larson, E. (1996). *Casualties and consensus: The historical role of casualties in domestic support for U.S. military operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

- Lau, R. & Sears, D. (1981). Cognitive links between economic grievances and political responses. *Political Behavior*, 3(2), 270-302.
- Lau, R. (1985). Two explanations for negativity effect in political behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(1), 119-38.
- Lau, R., Brown, T., & Sears, D. (1978). Self-interest and civilians' attitudes toward the Vietnam War. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42(4), 464-483.
- Lau, R., Brown, T., & Sears, O. (1978). Self-interest and civilians' attitudes toward the Vietnam War. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42(4), 464-483.
- Leach, J. (1952). *Conscription in the United States: Historical background*. Rutland, VT: Charles Tuttle Publishing.
- Leinwand, G. (1970). *The draft*. New York: Washington Square Press.
- Levitt, S., & Dubner, S. (2005). *Freakonomics: A rogue economist explores the hidden side of everything*. New York: William Morrow.
- Lewis-Beck, M. (1985). Pocketbook voting in U.S. national election studies: Fact or artifact?. *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(2), 315-46.
- Lindsay, C. (1968a). Our national tradition of conscription: The early years. In J. Miller (Ed.), *Why the draft? The case for a volunteer army* (pp. 107-123). Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Lindsay, C. (1968b). Our national tradition of conscription: Experience with the draft. In Miller, J. (Ed.), *Why the draft? The case for a volunteer army* (pp. 124-145). Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Lipset, S. (1982). No room for the ins: Elections around the world. *Public Opinion*, 5(1), 41-43.

- Little, R. (Ed.). (1969). *Selective Service and American society*. New York: Sage.
- Liu, L. & Hanssens, D. (1982). Identification of multiple-input transfer function models. *Communications in Statistics A*, 11, 297-314.
- Liu, L. (2005). *Time Series Analysis and Forecasting*. River Forest, IL: Scientific Computing.
- Livingston, S. (1997, Jun). The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics & Public Policy. In *Clarifying the CNN Effect: An examination of media effects according to type of military intervention*. Retrieved Nov. 18, 2003 from [http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/Research\\_Publications/Papers.shtml](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/Research_Publications/Papers.shtml).
- Lorrell, M., & Kelley, C. (1985). *Casualties, public opinion, and presidential policy during the Vietnam War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Lunch, W., & Sperlich, P. (1979). American public opinion and the war in Vietnam. *Western Political Quarterly*, 32(1), 21-44.
- Lyles, M., & Mitroff, I. (1980). Organizational problem formulation: An empirical study. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25(1), 61-75.
- MacKuen, M. (1983). Political drama, economic conditions, and the dynamics of presidential popularity. *American Journal of Political Science*, 27(1), 165-192.
- MacKuen, M., Erikson, R., & Stimson, J. (1992). Peasants or bankers: The American electorate and the U.S. economy. *American Political Science Review*, 86(3), 597-611.
- Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review*, 87(4), 624-28.

- Marcus, G. (1988). Impact of personal and national economic conditions on the presidential vote: A pooled cross-sectional analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(1), 137-54.
- Marmion, H. (1968). *Selective Service: Conflict and compromise*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Martin, G. (1988). Gender and support for Reagan: A comprehensive model of presidential approval. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(1), 19-49.
- Memorandum, John McCone, Dir. of Central Intelligence, to the Secys of State and Defense, the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs, and Maxwell D. Taylor, ABM. to the Republic of Vietnam, Apr. 2, 1965. Austin, TX: Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, NSF, Countries, Vietnam, Vol. 32. TOP SECRET. Declassified Dec. 30, 1977
- Merritt, J. (2006, March 13). Talk left the politics of crime. In *Vietnam War deserter arrested at the Canadian border*. Retrieved March 27, 2006 from [http://talkleft.com/new\\_archives/014290.html](http://talkleft.com/new_archives/014290.html)
- Meyer A., Wattenberg, M., & Malanchuk, O. (1986). Schematic assessments of presidential candidates. *American Political Science Review*, 80(2), 521-540.
- Meyer, P. (2006). EconPort. In *EconTerms*. Retrieved February 11, 2006 from [http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=web\\_glossary&glossaryLetter=D](http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=web_glossary&glossaryLetter=D)
- Mikkelson, B. & Mikkelson, D. (2004, Oct. 6). Draft Fear. In *The U.S. military will be reinstating the draft by Spring 2005*. Retrieved Jan. 8, 2005 from <http://www.snopes.com/politics/military/draft.asp>

- Miller, D. (2001). *I didn't know God made honky tonk Communists: A memoir about draft card burning, witchcraft and the sexual meaning of ballgames*. Oakland: Regent Press.
- Miller, J. (Ed.). (1968). *Why the draft? A case for a volunteer army*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Miller, J., & Krosnick, J. (2000). News media impact on the ingredients of presidential evaluations: Politically knowledgeable citizens are guided by a trusted Source. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2), 301-315.
- Miller, W. (1999). Temporal order and causal inference. *Political Analysis*, 8(2), 119-140.
- Milliken, F., & Lant, T. (1991). The impact of an organization's recent performance history on strategic persistence and change: The role of managerial interpretations. In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, & J. Dutton (Eds.), *Advances in strategic management* (Vol. 7, pp. 129-156). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Milstein, J. (1974). *Dynamics of the Vietnam War: A quantitative analysis and predictive computer simulation*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Monroe, K. & Laughlin, D. (1983). Economic influences on presidential popularity among key political and socioeconomic groups: A review of the evidence and some new findings. *Political Behavior*, 5(3), 309-345.
- Monroe, K. (1978). Economic influences on presidential popularity. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42(3), 360-369.
- Monroe, K. (1979). God of vengeance and of reward?: The economy and presidential popularity. *Political Behavior*, 1(4), 301-329.



- Moore, A. (1924). *Conscription and conflict in the Confederacy*. New York: MacMillan.
- Moore, W., & Lanoue, D. (2003). Domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy: A study of Cold War conflict behavior. *Journal of Politics*, 65(2), 376-396.
- Morris, B. (2004). *Interacting effects on public opinion: An examination of economic activity, U.S. military casualties and military induction on public opinion concerning the Vietnam Conflict*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Moskos, C. (1969). The Negro and the draft. In R. Little (Ed.), *Selective and American Society* (pp. 139-162). New York: Sage.
- Moskos, C. (2001). Time to bring back the draft. *The American Enterprise*, 12(1), 16-7.
- Moskos, C. (2003a, Feb. 9). A new kind of draft for the 21st Century. *The Boston Globe*, p. D12.
- Moskos, C. (2003b, Feb. 9). Restoring draft would improve military on all fronts. *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, p. F1.
- Moskos, C., & Chambers, J. (Eds.). (1993). *The new conscientious objection: From sacred to secular*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moskos, C., & Glastris, P. (2001, Nov. 4). This time, a draft for the homefront too. *Washington Post*, p. B1.
- Mueller, J. (1970). Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. *The American Political Science Review*, 64(1), 18-34.
- Mueller, J. (1971). Trends in popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam. *American Political Science Review*, 65(2), 358-375.

- Mueller, J. (1973). *War, presidents and public opinion*. New York: John Wiley and Sons
- Mueller, J. (1984). Reflections on the Vietnam antiwar movement and on the curious calm at the war's end. In P. Braestrup (Ed.), *Vietnam as History* (pp. 151-57). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Mueller, J. (1996, April). Fifteen propositions about American foreign policy and public opinion in an era free of compelling threats. In *Proceedings of the International Studies Association*. Symposium conducted at National Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego.
- Mueller, J. (2002). Public support for military ventures abroad: Evidence from the polls. In R. Turner (Ed.), *The real lessons of the Vietnam War: Reflections twenty-five years after the fall of Saigon* (pp. 173-219). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- Mueller, K. (2000). Politics, death, and morality in U.S. foreign policy. *Aerospace Power Journal*, 15(2), 12-16.
- Muller, E., & Knouye, D. (2001). *Free to die for their country: The story of the Japanese American draft resisters in World War II*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Murdock, E. (1965). *Horatio Seymour and the 1863 draft*. Out of print..
- Murdock, E. (1967). *Patriotism limited, 1862-1865: The Civil War draft and the bounty system*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Murdock, E. (Ed.). (1971). *One million men: The Civil War Draft in the North*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois.

- Murphy, O. (1959). The American Revolutionary Army and the concept of levee en masse. *Military Affairs*, 23(1), 13-20.
- Nadeau, R., Niemi, R., Fan, D., & Amato, T. (1999). Elite economic forecasts, economic news, mass economic judgments, and presidential approval. *Journal of Politics*, 61(1), 109-35.
- Neustadt, R. (1980). *Presidential power* (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
- Newbold, P. and Granger, C. (1974). Experience with forecasting univariate time series and the combination of forecasts. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A*, 137(2), 131-165.
- Newman, B. (2003). *Explaining seat changes in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University.
- Newman, B., & Ostrom, C. (2002). Explaining seat changes in the U.S. House of Representatives: 1950-1998. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 27(2), 383-405.
- Nguyen, H. (1980). *Vietnamization and the cease-fire*. Washington, D.C.: Army Center for Military History.
- Nincic, D., & Nincic, M. (1995). Commitment to military intervention: The democratic government as economic investor. *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(4), 413-26.
- Nixon, R. (1969, Nov. 3). In *The pursuit of peace in Vietnam*. Retrieved March 2, 2005 from <http://libdata.lib.ua.edu:2915/america/article?articleId=387409&query=nixon+speech+1971+end+sight#cite>.
- Nixon, R. (1970a). The president speaks on the draft. In G. Leinwand (Ed.), *The draft* (pp. 96-7A). New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Nixon, R. (1970b, May 18). Annals of American history. In *The Cambodia Invasion*. Retrieved March 2, 2005 from <http://libdata.lib.ua.edu:2915/america/article?articleId=387429&query=nixon+speech+1971+end+sight>.
- Nixon, R. (1973, Jan. 23). Selected speeches and quotes. In *Address to the nation announcing conclusion of an agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam*. Retrieved March 2, 2005 from [http://www.nixonlibrary.org/Research\\_Center/Nixons/speeches/PeaceAddress.shtml#TopOfPage](http://www.nixonlibrary.org/Research_Center/Nixons/speeches/PeaceAddress.shtml#TopOfPage).
- Norpoth, H. (1984). Economics, politics, and the cycle of presidential popularity. *Political Behavior*, 6(3), 253-273.
- Norpoth, H., & Yantek, T. (1983). Macroeconomic conditions and fluctuations of presidential popularity: The question of lagged effects. *American Journal of Political Science*, 27(4), 785-807.
- Oberdorfer, D. (2001). *Tet! The turning point in the Vietnam War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11, Cheyenne, Wyoming, et al., 393 U.S. 233 (Supreme Court 1968).
- Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, Selective Service System. (2004, February 19). Fast facts. In *Effects of marriage and fatherhood on draft eligibility*. Retrieved August 11, 2005 from <http://www.sss.gov/FactSheets/FSeffects.pdf>

- O'Hanlon, M. (2004, Oct. 13). Nobody wants a draft, but what if we need one?; Adding volunteers now makes sense. *The Los Angeles Times*, p. B13.
- Oi, W. (1982). The economic cost of the draft. In M. Anderson (Ed.), *The military draft: Selected readings on conscription* (pp. 317-346). Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Oneal, John R., Lian, Brad, Joyner, James H. (1996). Are the American people "pretty prudent"? Public responses to U.S. uses of force, 1950-1988. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(2), 261-280.
- Ostrom, C., & Simon, D. (1985). Promise and performance: A dynamic model of presidential popularity. *American Political Science Review*, 79(2), 334-358.
- O'Sullivan, J. & A. Meckler. (Eds.). (1974). *The draft and its enemies: A documentary history*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.
- O'Sullivan, J. (1982). *From voluntarism to conscription: Congress and Selective Service, 1940-1945*. New York: Garland.
- Page, B. & Shapiro, R. (1982). Changes in Americans' policy preferences, 1935-1979. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 46(1), 24-42.
- Page, B. & Shapiro, R. (1992). *The rational public: Fifty years of trends in American policy preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Paletz, D., & Entman, R. (1981). *Media power politics*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Palmer, F. (1931). *Newton D. Baker: America at war*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.
- Parker, S. (1995). Towards an understanding of "rally" effects: Public opinion in the Persian Gulf War. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 59(4), 526-46.

- Patterson, J. (1999). *America in the 20th Century: A history*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Paxton, T. (1965). Lyndon Johnson told the nation. On *Best of Tom Paxton: I can't help but wonder* [album]. Los Angeles, CA: Rhino Records. (1965)
- Peffley, M. & Hurwitz, J. (1987). The means and ends of foreign policy as determinants of presidential support. *American Journal of Political Science*, 31(2), 236-258.
- Peffley, M. & Hurwitz, J. (1992). International events and foreign policy beliefs: Public response to changing soviet-American relations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(2), 431-461.
- Perrin, D. (2001). *G. I. resister: The story of how one American soldier and his family fought the war in Vietnam*. Victoria, BC, Canada: Trafford Publishing.
- Perse, E. (2001). *Media effects and society*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Philpott, T. (2004, Oct.). Stop stop loss. *Today's Officer*. Retrieved Feb 1, 2005, from <http://www.moaa.org/todaysofficer/columnists/Philpott/Stop.asp>
- Pickett, J., Reilly, D., & McIntyre, R. (2003). *The necessary and sufficient conditions for a time series model*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Poynter, N., Schorth, T., & McCord, M. (Eds.). (1968). *U.S. draft policy and its impact*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service.
- Prados, J. (Ed.). (2003). *The White House tapes: Eavesdropping on the president*. New York: The New Press.
- Prochnau, W. (1995). *Once upon a distant war*. New York: Vintage.
- Puskar, S. (2004, Apr. 28). Northwestern University newsfeed. In *Charles Moskos on "Reinstating the military draft"*. Retrieved Jan 8, 2005 from [http://www.northwestern.edu/univ-relations/broadcast/4\\_04/moskos.html](http://www.northwestern.edu/univ-relations/broadcast/4_04/moskos.html)

- Rabinowitz, G., & MacDonald, E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, 83(1), 93-121.
- Ragsdale, L. (1998). *Vital Statistics on the presidency: Washington to Clinton*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Ray, J. (1995). *Democracy and international conflict: An evaluation of the democratic peace proposition*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.
- Raymond, J. (1961, July 21). U.S. will double pool of eligibles for draft calls; But Kennedy won't declare emergency now -- Moves to improve the reserves. *New York Times*, p. 1.
- Raymond, J. (1964, March 13). Step to end draft gains in Congress; Abandonment or change in military policy studied. *New York Times*, p. 14.
- Reeves, T. & Hess, K. (1970). *The end of the draft*. New York: Random House.
- Reilly, D. (2004). *Autobox statistical principles guide*. (Available from Automatic Forecasting Systems, P.O. Box 563 Hatboro, PA 19040)
- Reiter, D., & Stam, A. (1988). Democracy and battlefield military effectiveness. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 259-77.
- Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service. (1967). *In pursuit of equity: Who serves when not all serve?* Burke Marshall, Chairman. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Ritter, G. (1968). *Frederick the Great: A historical profile*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Rivers, D. & Rose, N. (1985). Passing the president's program: Public opinion and presidential influence in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(1), 183-96.
- Roesch, S., & Amirkham, J. (1997). Boundary conditions for self-serving attributions: Another look at the sports pages. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 27(2), 245-26.
- Rosenberg, M., Verba, S., & Converse, P. (1970). *Vietnam and the silent majority: The dove's guide*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Russett, B. (1990). *Controlling the sword: The democratic governance of national security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Salyer, J. (1954, April 26). Training of medical officers. In *Medical Science Publication 4, Recent Advances in Medicine and Surgery (19-30 April 1954): Based on Professional medical experiences in Japan and Korea 1950-1953* (chap.2). Retrieved March 16, 2006 from <http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/korea/recad2/ch2-3.htm>
- Sanders, J. (1966). *The draft and the Vietnam War*. New York: Walker and Company.
- SAS. (2006). Statistics and Operations Research. In *Bivariate Granger Causality Test*. Retrieved April 17, 2006 from <http://support.sas.com/rnd/app/examples/ets/granger/index.htm>
- Schulzinger, R. (1997). *A time for war: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schuman, H. (1972). Two sources of antiwar sentiment in America. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(3), 513-536.



Selective Service System. (2002, Apr. 30). Fast facts. In *Medical draft in standby mode*.

Retrieved Jan. 9, 2005 from <http://www.sss.gov/FSmedical.htm>

Selective Service System. (2004, October 27). Fast facts. In *State/commonwealth*

*legislation*. Retrieved February 1, 2004 from <http://www.sss.gov/FSstateleg.htm>

Selective Service System. (1953). *Selective Service under the 1948 Act extended*

(212278-53-7). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Selective Service System. (1966). *Memorandum from General Lewis Hershey, Director*

*of the Selective Service System, on present operations of the system and local*

*draft boards* (50-011 0). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Selective Service System. (1969). *Semi-annual report of the Director of Selective*

*Service: for the period July 1 to December 31, 1969* (380-915-70-3).

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Selective Service System. (1970). *Semi-annual report of the Director of Selective Service*

*for the period of July 1 to December 31, 1970 to the Congress of the United States*

(380-915-70-2). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Selective Service System. (1971). *Perspective on the draft: A young man's rights and*

*responsibilities under draft law*. (Available from Selective Service System, 1724

F Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20435)

Selective Service System. (2002, April 30). History & records. In *The Vietnam lotteries*.

Retrieved August 8, 2005 from <http://www.sss.gov/lotter1.htm>

Selective Service System. (2003, May 27). Induction Statistics. In *Inductions (by year)*

*from World War I through the end of the draft (1973)*. Retrieved Aug. 11, 2005

from <http://www.sss.gov/induct.htm>

- Senate Armed Forces Committee hearing on the FY 2006 Defense Budget*, 109th Cong., 1 (2005) (testimony of Gen. Peter Schoomaker).
- Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *The nation's manpower revolution*, 88th Cong., 2817 (1963) (testimony of Lewis B. Hershey).
- Shapiro, A., & Striker, J. (1968). *Mastering the draft: A comprehensive guide for solving draft problems*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
- Sheehan, N., Smith, H., Kenworthy, E., & Butterfield, F. (1971). *The Pentagon papers* (Gravel ed., Vol. 4). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Shenk, G. (2005). *Work or fight! Race, gender, and the draft in World War One*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sigelman, L. (1979). Presidential popularity and presidential elections. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 43(4), 532-34.
- Simon, D. & Ostrom, C. (1989). The impact of speeches and travel on presidential approval. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 53(1), 58-82.
- Sims, C. (1972). Money, income and causality. *American Economic Review*, 62(4), 540-52.
- Siu, H. (2004). *The fiscal role of conscription in the U.S. World War II*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Smith, H. (1971). The Kennedy years: 1961-1963. *The Pentagon Papers* (pp. 79-157). New York: Bantam Books.
- Smith, M. (Writer), & B. Gold (Director). (2005). Private warriors [Television series episode]. In M. Gaviria & M. Smith (Producer), *Frontline*. Boston: WGBH.

- Smith, T. (1990). Liberal and conservative trends in the United States since World War II. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 54(3), 479-507.
- Snow, D. & Drew, D. (1994). *From Lexington to Desert Storm: War and politics in American experience*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Snow, D. (1999). *The shape of the future: World politics in a new century* (3rd ed.). Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- Snow, D., & Drew, D. (2000). *From Lexington to Desert Storm and beyond: War and politics in the American Experience*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Sobel, R. (2001). *The impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam: Constraining the colossus*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- SPSS Trends® 13.0. (2004). Chicago: SPSS Inc.
- SPSS Trends® 14.0. (2005). Chicago: SPSS Inc.
- Stam, A. (1996). *Win, lose, or draw*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Stewart, R. (Ed.). (2005). *American military history* (Vol. 1). Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army.
- Stimson, J. (1976). Public support for the American president: A cyclical model. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 40(1), 1-21.
- Stimson, J. (2005, December 13). Software. In *WCALC: Public Opinion Dimensional Extraction Algorithm*. Retrieved April 17, 2006 from <http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/resource.html>
- Stimson, J., MacKuen, M., & Erikson, R. (1995). Dynamic representation. *American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 543-65.
- Stoessinger, J. (2001). *Why nations go to war* (8th ed.). Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's.

- Stoker, L. (1993). Judging presidential character: The demise of Gary Hart. *Political Behavior, 15*(2), 193-223.
- Stuckey, M. (2004). *Defining Americans: The presidency and national identity*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Summers, H. (1999). *Vietnam War almanac*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Surrey, D. (1982). *Choice of conscience: Vietnam era military and draft resisters in Canada*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Talk of military draft heating up*. (2003, Nov. 9). *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, p. A10.
- Task Force on the Structure of the Selective Service System. (1968). *Report of the Task Force on the Structure of the Selective Service System* (1968-0 306-426). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Taylor, S., & Fiske, S. (1975). Point of view and perception so causality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32*(2), 439-445.
- Teachman, J. (2004). Military service during the Vietnam era: Were there consequences for subsequent civilian earnings?. *Social Forces, 83*(2), 709-30.
- Teachman, J. (2005). Military service in the Vietnam era and educational attainment. *Sociology of Education, 78*(1), 50-68.
- The Avalon Project of Yale Law School. (2005). Documents in law, history, and diplomacy. *In Indochina - Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954*. Retrieved Jan. 26, 2005 from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/indoch/inch001.htm>.
- Thomas, M. (1972). *Is conscience a crime?*. Englewood, NJ: Jerome S. Ozer.

- Todd, J. (2001). *Desertion: In the time of Vietnam*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company Trade & Reference Division.
- Topping, S. (1950, Feb. 15). *Aid bid by Vietnam pledges 'Red' rout*. *The Washington Post*, p. 4.
- Towle, M. (2004). *Out of touch: The presidency and public opinion*. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.
- Tucker, S. (2001). *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A political, social, and military history*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Unemployment rate - Civilian labor force (LFS21000000 (1)seasonally adjusted) [Data file]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
- Useem, M. (1973). *Conscription, protest and social conflict: The life and death of a draft resistance movement*. New York: Wiley, 1973
- Van Tra, T. (1982). *Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre* (Vol. 5) (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Trans.). Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe Publishing House.
- Verba, S., & Brody, R. (1970). Participation, policy preferences, and the war in Vietnam. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34(3), 325-332.
- Verba, S., Brody, R., Parker, E., Nie, N., Polsby, N., Ekman, P., & Black, G. (1967). Public opinion and the war in Vietnam. *American Political Science Review*, 61(1), 317-33.
- Vietnam War (1954-75). (2005, 17 Jan.). In *Canadian Mennonite Encyclopedia Online*. Retrieved Feb. 21, 2005 from

<http://www.mhsc.ca/index.asp?content=http://www.mhsc.ca/encyclopedia/content/s/V542ME.html>.

- Walmsley, G. (1969). Decision-making in local boards: a case study. In R. Little (Ed.), *Selective Service and American Society* (pp. 83-108). Hartford, CT: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Waltz, K. (1967). *Foreign policy and democratic politics: The American and British experience*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations..* New York: Basic Books.
- Wanta, W. (1997). *The public and the national agenda: How people learn about important issues*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Warner, J., & Goldberg, M. (1984). The influence of non-pecuniary factors on labor supply: The case of navy enlisted personnel. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 66(1), 26-35.
- Waterman, R., Wright, R., & St. Clair, G. (1999). *The image-is-everything presidency: Dilemmas in American leadership*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wattenberg, M. (1986). The Reagan polarization phenomenon and the continuing downward slide in presidential candidate popularity. *American Politics Quarterly*, 14(2), 219-45.
- Wawro, G. (2003). *The Franco-Prussian War: The German conquest of France in 1870-1871*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wickens, T. (1995). *The geometry of multivariate statistics*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

- Wittkopf, E. (1990). *Faces of Internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign policy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Woessner, M. (2005). Scandal, elites, and presidential popularity: Considering the importance of cues in public support of the president. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35(1), 94-106.
- Yaffee, R. & McGee, M. (2000). *Introduction to Time Series Analysis and Forecasting with Applications of SAS and SPSS*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Yamasaki, M. (2001). *Vietnam: Those who fought; Those who protested; Those who suffered*. Carlisle, Mass.: Discovery Enterprises.
- Yu, C. (2000). An overview of remedial tools for collinearity in SAS . *Western Users of SAS Software Conference*, 196-201.
- Zaller, J. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaller, J. (1998). Monica Lewinsky's contribution to political science. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 31(2), 182-89.
- Zaller, J. (2004). Floating voters in U.S. presidential elections, 1948-2000. In P. Sniderman & W. Saris (Eds.), *Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change* (pp. 164-214). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zaslowsky, L. (2006, March 11). CNW Group Releases. In *Vietnam War deserter arrested at border*. Retrieved March 27, 2006 from <http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/March2006/11/c1286.html>

## APPENDIX A

## SSS CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES AS OF 1968

Class I	Class II	Class III	Class IV	Class V
I-A: Available for military service	II-A: Occupational deferment	III-A: Hardship or parenthood	IV-A: Prior service or sole surviving son	V-A: Over the age limit
I-A-O: Conscientious objector available for noncombatant military service	II-C: Agricultural deferment		IV-B: Public official deferred by law	
I-C: Member of the military, Coast Guard, Geodetic Survey, or Public Health Service	II-S: Student deferment		IV-C: Alien not liable for military service	
I-D: member of the reserves or student in military training			IV-D: Minister or student of religion	
I-O: Conscientious objector available for alternative service			IV-F: Not qualified for any service	
I-S: Deferred student limited to high school graduation, age 20, or the end of the current academic year				
I-W: Conscientious objector active or having completed alternative service				
I-Y: Qualified for war only in time of war or national emergency				

The classification system had become standardized by this point with five main classes of registrants. Class I included all whom met the minimum qualifications for service. Class II included those covered by occupational or student deferments. Class III encompassed those who held hardship or paternity deferments. Class IV included those who were unfit or no longer eligible. Those over the age of liability were assigned to Class V (Task Force On The Structure Of The SSS, 1968; Shapiro & Striker, 1968). These categories would change slightly although strictures on them would increase as deferments were further limited by presidential reforms (SSS, 1971).

(Source: Selective Service System, 1970, 1971)



## APPENDIX B

## CRITICAL EVENTS REGISTERS

## Brace and Hinckley Events

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Coding</b>
07/1955	Soviets shoot down U.S. spy plane	P-ND
10/1955	Eisenhower has a heart attack	P-ND
06/1956	Eisenhower has major surgery	P-ND
10/1957	Eisenhower orders army to Little Rock	N-D
10/1957	Sputnik launched	N-ND
06/1958	Sherman Adams scandal breaks	N-ND
07/1958	Eisenhower sends Marines to Lebanon	P-D
07/1959	Steel strike	N-ND
11/1959	Eisenhower invokes Taft-Hartley	N-D
05/1960	U-2 incident	P-ND
05/1961	Bay of Pigs invasion	P-D
08/1961	Berlin Wall crisis	P-ND
11/1961	Second Berlin Wall crisis	P-ND
03/1962	First American orbits Earth	P-D
05/1962	Steel crisis	N-ND
10/1962	Integration crisis in Mississippi	N-ND
11/1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	P-ND
05/1963	Integration crisis in Alabama	N-ND
05/1965	Dominican Republic crashes	P-ND
08/1965	Vietnam draft doubled	N-D
04/1966	Vietnam protests	N-ND
08/1966	Race riots in Chicago	N-ND
09/1966	Race violence in Atlanta	N-ND
08/1967	Race riots	N-ND
11/1967	Vietnam protest	N-ND
02/1968	Tet offensive	N-ND
04/1968	Johnson announces end to bombing	P-D
05/1968	Campus protests	N-ND
09/1968	Soviets move into Czechoslovakia	P-ND
11/1968	Johnson halts bombings in Vietnam	P-D
12/1968	Lowest unemployment in fifteen years	P-ND
04/1969	Campus protests about Vietnam	N-ND
08/1969	Successful moon launch	P-D
12/1969	Huge antiwar rally	N-ND
06/1970	Cambodia invasion	N-D
06/1970	Protest and killings at Kent State	N-ND

02/1971	Laos invasion	N-D
04/1971	Antiwar demonstrations	N-ND
09/1971	Nixon imposes wage-price controls	N-D
02/1972	Vietnam peace proposal announced	P-D
04/1972	Increase in war and bombing	N-D
01/1973	Vietnam peace accord	P-D
02/1973	Watergate burglars convicted	N-ND
03/1973	McCord letter to Sirica	N-ND
05/1973	Ervin Committee begins	N-ND
06/1973	Price freeze announced	N-D
07/1973	Dean testifies	N-ND
08/1973	Agnew investigation revealed	N-ND
09/1973	Ehrlichman, Liddy, and others indicted	N-ND
10/1973	Saturday night massacre	N-D
11/1973	Gap in tape revealed	N-ND
11/1973	Six Watergate figures sentenced	N-ND
04/1974	House Judiciary hearings begin	N-ND
04/1974	Nixon ordered to pay back taxes	N-ND
05/1974	Judiciary hearings continue	N-ND
08/1974	<i>U.S. v. Nixon</i> announced (8/30)	N-ND
08/1974	Articles of Impeachment voted	N-ND
08/1974	Tapes incriminate Nixon	N-ND
10/1974	Ford pardons Nixon	N-D
05/1975	Cambodia falls	N-ND
06/1975	Mayaguez incident	N-ND

(Source: *Follow the Leader*, Paul Brace & Barbara Brace, New York: Basic Books, 1992, pp. 186-187)

## Mueller Critical Events

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Coding</b>
07/1955	Geneva conference of the Big Four	+
11/1956	Eisenhower reelected	+
10/1957	Sputnik I launched	-
07/1958	United States troops sent to Lebanon	-
09/1959	Talks with Khrushchev at Camp David	+
05/1960	U-2 incident, Paris Summit	-/+
01/1961	Kennedy inauguration	+
04/1961	Bay of Pigs invasion	-
06/1961	Vienna meeting with Khrushchev	+
08/1961	Berlin Wall erected, USSR resumes testing	-/-
10/1961	Berlin Wall crisis, tank confrontation	-
10/1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	-
11/1963	Kennedy assassination, Johnson takes office	-
08/1964	Bay of Tonkin episode (reelection campaign, no polls)	+
11/1964	Johnson reelected	+
02/1965	Retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam begun	+
04/1965	United States troops sent to Dominican Republic	+
06/1965	Extension of bombing to North of Hanoi (oil dumps)	+
07/1967	Glassboro summit	+
01/1968	Tet offensive	-
04/1968	North Vietnam agrees to talks after partial bombing halt	+
10/1968	Full bomb halt, talks to get substantive	+

(Source: *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*, John Mueller, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, p. 211)

## Norpoth Critical Events

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Coding</b>
02/1970	Cambodia Invasion	-
01/1971	Laos Invasion	-
01/1972	China Trip	+
02.1972	Mining of Haiphong, Moscow Summit	-/+
01/1973	Vietnam Peace Treaty	+
02/1973	Brezhnev Visit	+
04/1974	Vladivostok Summit	+
02/1975	Mayaguez incident	-

(Source: Norpoth, H. (1984). Economics, politics, and the cycle of presidential popularity. *Political Behavior*, 6(3), 253-273.)