The call to accelerate the transition to civilian rule in Egypt has taken on a new urgency this week.  A wide range of political forces are calling for the SCAF to cede power to an elected leadership by February 2012.  There are many different ideas about how to do this, perhaps through the new Parliament selecting an interim Prime Minister or perhaps by holding Presidential elections at the end of January.  All of the ideas have their problems. But those problems pale against the threat to the Egyptian democratic transition posed by the continuing misrule of and escalating resort to violence by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. I believe that the calls for a new President by February should be taken very seriously indeed. 

This weekend's anomic violence on Qasr el-Aini Street does not likely augur the rekindling of popular revolution, as the protests were almost completely contained to a few blocks and seem to have attracted little popular sympathy.  But the wildly disproportionate, undisciplined, and frankly brutal response by the army does show graphically why the SCAF is rapidly losing its legitimacy to rule among the political elite.  It really doesn't matter whether it ordered the violent crackdown against the Cabinet sit-in or undisciplined troops began the violence on their own, since both point to something deeply problematic.  Such crises will continue to recur and intensify as long as the underlying problem of military rule remains unresolved. 

The greatest political accomplishment during the last bout of violence in November was that the SCAF agreed to to hold Presidential elections and the transfer of power by June.  But as one of Cairo's savviest political analysts told me yesterday, "we can't take six more months of this." 

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 A demonstration outside the Cabinet building in central Cairo turned violent last night when soldiers attacked a sit-in which had been established three weeks ago.  Protestors were pelted with rocks and even furniture from the buildings above.  There are reports of almost 100 injured, and the battle continues to rage on.  At least three members of the Advisory Council appointed by the SCAF have resigned in protest, and the political fallout is likely only beginning.  After three weeks of orderly elections, Cairo once again looks like Bahrain. 

 When I walked through Qasr el-Aini street this afternoon it looked post-apocalyptic, with rubble strewn everywhere and an incredibly tense, unpleasant vibe.  It seems to have gotten worse since then.  The contrast from the orderly, calm voting stations I had visited over the last few days couldn't have been more stark. The violence should puncture any illusions that the SCAF's problems had evaporated with the high turnout and relatively smooth process of the Parliamentary elections now in their third week.  Elections are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Today's sudden deterioration and brutal violence shows clearly that Egypt will remain unstable as long as the Egyptian military leadership fails to address core political grievances or impose any meaningful accountability for violence by its security forces.  What the SCAF has thus far done is clearly not enough. Egypt can't wait for the SCAF to transfer real power to an effective civilian government, end its abusive security tactics, and hold those responsible for the violence accountable.  

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At a talk in Kuwait this week, I mentioned in passing that the leading Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Arab politics isn't likely to last and the Arab spring will certainly come to the Gulf. That seemed to spark quite a bit of skeptical debate -- which strikes me as a good discussion to have. There's no question about the new energy and effectiveness of the GCC this year, as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have pushed the regional organization forward as a key actor across the Middle East. But there is a certain triumphalism in the new narrative about the GCC which is unwarranted. History and current trends suggest that the GCC's current leading role will prove the exception, not the rule, and likely won't survive the coming years.

The argument for the GCC's new leadership role is grounded in both structural trends and in recent events. First, and foremost, the GCC states have a lot of money. That may not buy love, but it certainly does give them something to work with, especially as energy prices stay high. Most have responded to the Arab uprisings by throwing huge amounts of money at their own people in order to blunt the demands for political change. They have thrown even more money at their allies, offering up large financial packages to friendly regimes and sympathetic political movements in the Gulf and farther afield. At a time of global financial crisis and budget challenges which inhibit the ability of the U.S. and Europe to act, those bank accounts look like an especially desirable asset.

It's not only the money, of course. The GCC states have individually and collectively become much more politically effective than in the past. After many years of rivalry, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have closed ranks and been able to push a roughly shared agenda. Their approval of intervention in Libya, monopoly over the political mediation in Yemen, and evolving stance on Syria have driven the international agenda. Saudi and Qatari media outlets, especially but not exclusively al-Jazeera, have become an ever more potent source of power in their own right. Their intense focus on Libya and Syria have shaped the game, while their comparative avoidance of members such as Bahrain has helped shield their own from scrutiny. In an ideologically charged, media-driven age these media outlets matter.

Finally, there's a widespread sense that the Gulf monarchies have proven more resilient than their non-monarchical Arab counterparts. The wealthy Gulf states seem relatively immune to the popular mobilizations which have challenged most of the other regimes in the region. Advocates of the Gulf exceptionalism stance point to small citizen populations, huge government employment and patronage opportunities, and monarchical legitimacy as buffers against popular outrage. This relative immunity to domestic challenge becomes an important asset in regional politics, as other contenders for Arab leadership such as Egypt and Syria find themselves consumed with domestic challenges. It counts in the balance of power when you can interfere in the domestic affairs of your rivals and they can't reciprocate.

There's a lot to recommend this account of a structural shift of power to the Gulf. Wealth, domestic stability, popular media, and aggressive diplomacy obviously matter. It's become something of a truism that the GCC has replaced the Arab League as the most relevant inter-Arab organization. There has been a concerted effort in the Arab and international media to paint a picture of a Gulf which is uniquely immune to regional unrest and leading a revived Arab diplomacy. But I don't think it's going to last. The GCC's current position is a bubble, sustained by artificial conditions which are not likely to remain over the coming years.

Why am I skeptical?  First, I find it unlikely that Qatar and Saudi Arabia will continue their recent relatively cooperative foreign policy. The two states, and the two royal families, have a long history of rivalry and mutual suspicion which is not so easy to set aside. It was less than two years ago that Doha and Riyadh were sponsoring competing Arab summit meetings over the Palestinian issue. I suspect that this rivalry will reassert itself. And without Saudi-Qatari cooperation, the GCC becomes far less effective. There are many other ongoing rivalries and internal conflicts which history suggests will likely re-emerge.

Second, I don't see the states of the Gulf as somehow immune to the Arab uprisings. I was baffled by how frequently I was asked in Kuwait whether the Arab spring would come to the Gulf. It's clearly already there. It's true that Qatar and the UAE, with their vast wealth and tiny populations, seem safe. But Gulf youth are every bit as wired and every bit as politically frustrated as youth elsewhere in the region, and they are unlikely to be bought off over the long term if political reforms fail to materialize. Kuwaiti activists have been challenging the political order for more than half a decade, recently brought out one of the largest street demonstrations in the country's history, and contributed directly to the resignation of the Prime Minister. Bahrain's protest movement was per capita one of the largest anywhere in the region, with at one point more than half the population joining the demonstrations. Even Oman saw significant mobilization. And I remain convinced that Saudi Arabia has all the ingredients for the sudden emergence of very significant domestic challenges -- a large population, major economic complaints, a sectarian divide, an aging leadership consumed by issues of succession, an oppressive state control over public culture, and a very high level of media and internet penetration.

Third, several of the GCC's key "triumphs" look less lustrous up close. People too often confuse efforts with outcomes, but just because the GCC states are acting across the region doesn't mean that they are achieving their goals. The GCC mediation in Yemen has been a failure, contributing to ongoing instability without actually solving any of the political problems. Its increasingly active role against Syria hasn't yet produced results. Promised financial support to Egypt has rarely materialized quickly or in the full amount announced publicly. The invitation to Jordan and Morocco (and Egypt!) to join the GCC look, as expected, to be going nowhere fast. And it isn't clear that investments will pay off directly in political influence, as the outbursts of resentment against continuing Qatari and Saudi meddling in places such as Libya and Tunisia suggest.

By far the greatest hole in the GCC's resume remains its most direct and active intervention:  Bahrain. The GCC's, and particularly Saudi Arabia's, role in helping the Bahraini regime to crush its political challengers in March and beyond succeeded in buying short-term survival. But it came at the cost of a generation of deep societal fragmentation, alienation and rage. The scope and sweep of the Bahraini regime's repression of its population this year has long been reported by the media and by human rights NGOs, but now has been officially acknowledged and graphically detailed by the BICI report. The sectarianization of that conflict, as the minority Sunni regime moved to delegitimize a broad-based democratic opposition as sectarian Shia and Iranian pawns, poisoned not only Bahrain's politics but also every other Gulf country with significant Shia populations including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In short, what happened in Bahrain was the kind of short-term success which carries the seeds of long-term instability.

And then there's the artificial nature of the current balance of power. The Gulf states have been able to take the lead in large part because other contenders for regional leadership have been internally focused and unable to act effectively abroad. But for all their wealth, these are tiny countries with highly imbalanced economies. If Egypt gets its act together over the next year, it will almost certainly emerge again as a power broker. With more than 80 million people, a compelling story of revolution and transition to democracy, and a strategic location at the heart of the Arab world, an Egypt accustomed to regional leadership will almost certainly look to reassert itself and revive the Arab League. North Africa as a whole will likely become increasingly dynamic, especially if Tunisia completes its move to democracy and Libya emerges as a stable and effective state, shifting attention back from the Gulf.

I don't see Syria recovering from its isolation and internal struggles any time soon. But Iraq could emerge as a new regional power in the medium term if it overcomes its internal struggles. Over the medium term, I expect Iraq to return to its traditional role of balancing against Iranian power rather than becoming an Iranian protectorate. But to this point, the GCC has done almost nothing to bring Iraq back into the Arab order, in part because of the Saudi leadership's hostility towards Iran's role there and to the Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. That may come back to haunt them. There will be no gratitude towards the Gulf Arabs in Baghdad.

Even the media assets won't necessarily endure. Saudi Arabia spends a lot on media outlets, but the Saudi media has long been viewed as such a tool of Riyadh's foreign policy, which costs it credibility and influence. Al-Jazeera seems to many people to be going down the same road. The more that al-Jazeera appears to be a direct tool of Qatari foreign policy, the less appeal it will have as the voice of the Arab public. The rise of internet-based social media as a primary conduit for information may mean a declining role for such expensive, top-down media --- and it certainly means that viewers and readers can abandon media which they don't like and seek out alternatives.

And then, of course, there is the Iranian challenge, which drives so much of the foreign policy and domestic approach of most Gulf regimes. This isn't the place to get into the many levels of Iran's regional position and how it might evolve, but the broad lines are fairly obvious. If Israel or the United States launch a preventive war against Iran, the GCC states will be caught in the crossfire and will be the most likely target for Iranian retaliation. If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the frightened regimes will become even more scared and may well rush to get nukes of their own (although I wouldn't take this as a given -- there are plenty of reasons why the GCC states might prefer closer American security guarantees over the risks of a proliferation cascade). And if the status quo continues in roughly its current form, the GCC states will remain consumed with the perceived urgency of containment and will likely continue to pursue counter-productive domestic policies.

The American role is changing as well. The withdrawal from Iraq is a very positive development on its own terms, and something which few believed possible even a few years ago. The U.S. is redeploying some of those forces to its bases in the GCC states, to reassure nervous allies about its commitment and to keep enough forces in place in case they are needed in Iraq or elsewhere. But over the longer term, the ending of the Iraq war and the possible (albeit distant) winding down of the Afghanistan war will reduce the need for those bases. I don't think the U.S. is going anywhere, given how deeply entrenched it is in the Gulf security architecture, but priorities are changing as budget realities intrude and economic power continues to shift towards East Asia. But politically, it is hardly a secret that the Saudis and Washington have been on opposite sides of some big regional issues this year, and that introduces more friction.

None of this is to say that the GCC is irrelevant or that it isn't a key player in regional politics. Right now, it is indeed driving the regional agenda and it has a lot of cash to spread around and cards to play. But its power rests on much shakier foundations than is generally recognized. Its internal divisions will likely re-emerge, its domestic political stability likely won't last, and larger regional rivals will eventually return to the game. Yemen's ongoing travails will cause more and more problems. And Bahrain's horrible response to its domestic opposition, sectarianism, and ongoing repression will continue to poison the Gulf from within. There are limits to what money can buy, and regional leadership may well prove to be one of them.

"I think the Muslim Brotherhood [in Egypt] should govern by coalition that includes the people from secular parties and the Copts." That was the advice which Rached Ghannouchi, President of Tunisia's el-Nahda Party, offered his Egyptian Islamist counterparts during an interview with the editors of the Middle East Channel last Thursday. He warned pointedly against repeating the mistakes of Algeria when, as he put it, "the Islamists won 80 percent of the vote but they completely ignored the influential minority of secularists, of the army, of the business community. So they did a coup d'etat against the democratic process and Algeria is still suffering from that." Avoiding a replay of that catastrophe weighs heavily on Ghannouchi and his party.

Ghannouchi was in Washington at the invitation of Foreign Policy, after being named one of its Top 100 Global Thinkers. He took full advantage of the opportunity to visit the United States for the first time in twenty years, appearing at a wide range of think tanks including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Washington  Institute for Near East Policy and meeting with a range of U.S. government officials, journalists, and policy analysts. He had warm praise for the Obama administration as "supportive of the Arab Spring," and described the new willingness in the United States to talk about a more positive relationship between democracy and Islam, and between Americans and the Islamic world, as a very important new development. His reception in Washington is a sign of the times, as the United States struggles to adapt to the reality of Islamist electoral success and Islamist parties struggle to reassure those who fear their ascent while delivering on their own programs.

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Egypt's election commission has just announced that it will not be releasing official results from the first round of elections until tomorrow.  The early signs suggest high turnout, and a very strong performance by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. Don't forget that thus far we only have partial results.  Closely contested individual seats will go to a run-off election next week. It will take longer to calculate the allocation of the 2/3 of seats for lists. And the vote to date was only the first of three rounds, and the final results could change dramatically in the second and third rounds of voting. Few Egyptians will forget that in the last somewhat free Parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood's strong showing in the first round prompted the Mubarak regime to dramatically escalate its repression and fraud to save the NDP in the second and third rounds.

While we wait for all that to unfold, three other things for you to read:

First, Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations and I have just published an oped in the International Herald Tribune/New York Times calling on the United States to significantly increase its public pressure on the SCAF to implement a rapid transition to civilian rule; end practices such as emergency law, military trials for civilians, and escalating censorship of media and repression of protests; and hold those responsible for last week's violence against protestors accountable:

Egyptians lined up this week to vote in the first Parliamentary elections since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. The high turnout in a peaceful, orderly election contrasted sharply with the violence and chaos of the previous week, when hundreds of thousands returned to Tahrir Square after security forces killed at least 42 people and left 3,000 injured. But Washington should not be fooled by the peace that has returned to Egyptian streets. Even successful elections can not erase months of political mismanagement by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (S.C.A.F.) or the bloodshed committed under its auspices.

The U.S. State Department condemned the violence in Tahrir, and has called on the S.C.A.F. to transfer power to civilians as soon as possible. That is a good start, but is not enough. Egypt’s military rulers clearly believe that they have survived the political crisis, and have resisted calls for a more fundamental political change. The generals may prevail in the short term, as the numbers in Tahrir dwindle and Egyptians turn their attention back to the elections and political squabbles.

Still, the violence last week demonstrates that the S.C.A.F.’s leadership has created the conditions under which even small problems and challenges can spark massive instability. And it has shown that Washington’s present approach to Egypt, which has placed a premium on private diplomacy at the expense of public pressure, must change.

Overall, the Obama administration has done better with Egypt than most critics recognize. It has sought to shape the generals’ behavior by praising them in public while quietly pushing them from behind the scenes. This approach has sometimes worked, but it has lowered America’s status in the eyes of many Egyptians. Few Egyptians (or Americans) know what motivates U.S. policy toward Egypt or what it has done. Most revolutionaries assume that Obama is conspiring with the generals against them.

Until this week, arguments could be made either way on the balance between private influence and public pressure. Yet the unacceptable, systematic violence in Tahrir Square and the ratcheting repression across the country against protesters, journalists and foreigners changes that equation. The U.S. was virtually silent as dozens of Egyptians died and tons of U.S.-made tear gas bombarded Tahrir Square. Only after a few days did it muster a demand for restraint on both sides — which caused outrage among peaceful protesters — and a call for free and fair elections. Washington has toughened its language in recent days, including a White House statement calling on the S.C.A.F. to transfer power to a civilian government “as soon as possible.” But few Egyptians even noticed.

Read the rest here.  I would add only that the White House statement clearly did get the attention of the SCAF, which has responded quite sharply and negatively to the unprecedented public criticism. That's good.  Now that Washington has their attention, it should press them on what really matters. 

I would also add that the U.S. has done very well thus far to not panic in the face of likely Muslim Brotherhood success in the election, just as it has in Tunisia and Morocco.  It will be harder and harder to maintain that poise over the next few weeks, as Egyptian liberals, Israel, and many in the U.S. begin to freak out.  But it's important that it keep its cool, accepting the results of a free and fair election while also voicing its own clear expectations about the importance of the Islamist forces demonstrating their commitment to democratic rules, cooperation and tolerance.  

Second, the Project on Middle East Political Science has just released its seventh briefing on the Arab uprisings, this one titled "Election Season."   My introduction begins:

On Monday, November 28, Egyptians went to the polls for the first round of parliamentary elections. Those elections are perhaps the most momentous of a recent wave of Arab elections. Tunisia’s election on October 25 went almost unbelievably well. Oman’s went almost entirely unnoticed. Morocco’s played their assigned role. The announcement that Yemen would hold presidential elections in February has thus far been met mostly with disbelief. Elections may be on the horizon in Kuwait, after the resignation of its government, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has announced May 4, 2012 as the date for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. It’s election season in the Middle East.  But are elections the right way forward for these countries in transition? Will they change anything?

The Briefing collects great Middle East Channel articles on Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan and Oman, along with an original introductory essay by me.  It's great for use in classes or just to catch up on the context for the rush of events.  Download it for free here!

Finally, I have a lead story in the current issue of Foreign Policy magazine discussing the ideas of the Arab uprisings, focusing on the debates and discussion among Arab intellectuals and political activists rather than on Western narratives.   I argue that

while the Arab uprisings generated a marvelous range of innovative tactics (uploading mobile-camera videos to social media like Facebook and Twitter, seizing and holding public squares), they did not introduce any particularly new ideas. The relentless critique of the status quo, the generational desire for political change, the yearning for democratic freedoms, the intense pan-Arab identification -- these had all been in circulation for more than a decade. What changed with the fall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia was the recognition that even the worst tyrants could be toppled. It shattered the wall of fear. That is why hundreds of thousands of Egyptians came into the streets on Jan. 25. It's why protests broke out in Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan. It's why Syrians and Libyans took unfathomable personal risks to rise up against seemingly untouchable despots despite the near certainty of arrest, torture, murder, and reprisals against their families.

Read the rest here. 

And now, back to scouring Twitter for unreliable second hand reports of partial election returns from Egyptian precincts. 

Egypt's elections began today after a week of intense political conflict, violent clashes, and uncertainty.  Thus far, they seem to be going very well, with reports of long lines, high turnout, few of the expected security problems and great enthusiasm.  As someone who has been arguing in favor of these elections for months, I'm thrilled to see them off to a good start.  There is a long way to go, though, as voting will continue for six weeks, giving all too many opportunities for enthusiasm to fade, political forces to panic, or security problems to appear. Even successful elections won't change the fact that the SCAF needs to be held accountable for its unacceptable violence against protestors last week and still urgently needs to transfer significant power to an independent civilian transitional government.

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Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians are streaming into Tahrir Square today protesting the massive violence over the weekend and demanding that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) transfer power to a civilian government.  With huge numbers in Tahrir, it is difficult to see how this ends without major political changes:  violence now by the regime will almost certainly backfire badly, while token concessions won't satisfy the mobilized crowd.  The costs of the SCAF's incompetence have now become impossible to ignore, or to overcome. The Parliamentary elections which last week seemed the only workable route to a democratic transition have been overtaken by events -- and it's time for everyone to readjust. 

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Egypt erupted in violence over the weekend as protestors and police battled once again for control of Tahrir Square.  Genuinely shocking brutality by Egyptian security forces has left at least 22 dead and many hundreds wounded.  The chaos, still ongoing a week before the scheduled beginning of Parliamentary elections, has thrown Egypt's already extremely shaky political transition into doubt. It is not likely the second coming of the Egyptian revolution of which many enthusiastic participants and outside onlookers dream. But it shows with painful clarity the costs of the incompetence of Egypt's military leadership and the urgency of a rapid transition to civilian rule. 

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