

Arguments for SHIRBRIG:

1. SHIRBRIG is the closest to a permanent UN peaceforce that ever existed

- Can not operate without a UN mandate
- Normally have been operating under Chapter 6 (peacekeeping)
- Only uses the UN-flag
- is open for all countries in the world, already have members from several continents and there are more countries coming in

2. SHIRBRIG has the expertise

- SHIRBRIG can be on scene very quickly (7 days alert)
- HQ ready in 30 days
- All personnel have UN experience
- SHIRBRIG cooperates with UN authorities such as the UN Logistics Base i Brindisi, Italy, the main base for shipping out UN equipment. HQCOY personnel can be trained in Brindisi.
- SHIRBRIG keeps close contact to the missions and regularly visits them.
- SHIRBRIG has evidently proven to support UN-centered Effective Multilateralism
- SHIRBRIG has a permanent HQ with permanent staff, which regenerates dialogue, information sharing, best practices and a natural platform for foreign- and defense policy cooperation between the member states.

3. SHIRBRIG has excellent relations to the Africans

- SHIRBRIG focuses particularly on the African continent for its crisis management operations
- SHIRBRIG has been a source of capacity building for the African Union and therefore makes an important contribution to the structural and long term stabilization of one of the worlds most war-torn regions.
- SHIRBRIG has a reputation amongst African military staffs, policymakers and military experts as an effective, experienced and impartial partner.
- SHIRBRIG's organizational structure and mandate has been a model for the establishment of the African Union's own rapid response mechanism
- In Africa, with the postcolonial history, it's very important that peacekeeping forces are seen as neutral and impartial. With SHIRBRIG under the UN mandate the troops are seen as such.

4. SHIRBRIG has accomplished UN-missions with an excellent result

- See quotation by Kofi Annan

5. SHIRBRIG is cheap

- A member pays DKK 350.000 – 400.000 kroner pr. year
- The only exception is the Host Nation (p.t. Denmark) that pays extra app. DKK 5 million kroner in the form of free rent, free transport etc.

Response to arguments against SHIRBRIG

1. Decision has been made already

- **No**, it could be made in November.

2. UN wants to close SHIRBRIG

- **No**, UN has never made such a statement. Some UN employees might have criticized SHIRBRIG, but other employees praise SHIRBRIG. UN can not close SHIRBRIG, only the SHIRBRIG members can do that.

3. SHIRBRIG has never been used

Not true. SHIRBRIG has participated in the following missions:

- UNMEE in Eritrea in 2000
- UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire in 2003
- UNMIL in Liberia in 2003
- UNAMIS in Sudan in 2004
- UNMIS in Sudan in 2005
- Darfur Planning Team in 2006
- AMISOM Planning Team in 2007 (African Union Mission in Somalia)
- MINURCAT in Chad in 2008

4. Members are reluctant to contribute troops to SHIRBRIG Force Pool

- **Not true.** There are contributors, as example Poland and Romania. And the Danish HQCOY has not been withdrawn, neither has the Swedish part of the security company been cancelled.

- The argument is invalid. In consensus at a Steering Committee Meeting it was decided that the Level of Ambition for 2006 to 2010 was to be able to send out: Planning Element (present), non-permanent PLANELM members (available), HQCOY (available), Security Company (available) – and more units etc. might be available during the Force Generation Process that always is carried out before a mission.

5. SHIRBRIG is expensive

- **Prove it!**

- The entire SHIRBRIG organisation and way of working is directed against the cheapest way to attain the optimal training and through that the optimal readiness.

- When SHIRBRIG goes on mission all financial matters is dealt with between UN and the single member nation.

- If this argument really matters why did Denmark (Host Nation) not ask the other members to change to a shared cost model?

6. Resources must be used properly

- **Agree**, so why leave the possibility to get expenses reimbursed by the UN and in stead send out troops that must be paid in full by the nations?

7. SHIRBRIG does not operate under chapter VII mandate and therefore not effective and up-to-date to deal with the challenges that the UN faces today.

- While initially restricted to Chapter VI missions, the Steering Committee has also agreed to expand SHIRBRIG's scope to more robust Chapter VII missions, dependent on a case-by-case analysis.

8. We now have the EU battle group concept and SHIRBRIG is not needed

- Although the Battlegroups are specifically designed for UN support, they are not exclusively formed for such a purpose. The EU reserves the right to decide on a case to case basis whether to reinforce UN undertakings or launch an autonomous operation irrespective of prior UN Security Council authorization. This means that there is a possibility of undermining with autonomous and unauthorized operations. The consequence could be that the EU could launch a mission with the declared goal of upholding the values of the UN Charter and at the same time violating it, when not respecting international law.

- UN would still be left in limbo, unable to plan ahead what kind of permanent troop-pool it could rely on, since the EU decides on a case to case basis.

- SHIRBRIG is in fact the most promising and successful developments towards an effective standing UN Peace Force.

- EU seems to have opted for copying the SHIRBRIG model for its own Battlegroups rather than for contributing to the UN brigade directly. EU should support SHIRBRIG in any way, despite its potentials on the one hand and its urgent need for more manpower and resources on the other.

Citations

From USA

"United Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001 - Requires the President to direct the U.S. representative to the United Nations (UN) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the UN to:

- (1) **establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF)** that is rapidly deployable under the authority of the UN Security Council, and that meets other specified requirements;
- (2) recruit UNRDPSF personnel; and
- (3) provide equitable and reliable funding.

Requires the President, in order to promote the development of human and material resources for UN peacekeeping operations as recommended by the August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), to: (1) direct the Secretary of State and the U.S. representative to the UN to encourage UN member nations to enter into partnerships with one another **to form Rapid Deployment Brigades** which could develop operational capabilities to fully deploy peacekeeping operations within a specified time."

From UN and Kofi Annan

"Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisting into entering into reliable standby arrangements... Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations 'rapidly and effectively' within the timelines suggested."

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000 (the Brahimi Report)

"Where the will is not there and the resources are not available, the UN peacekeepers will arrive late. It takes us **on the average 4-5 months to put troops on the ground** because we have no troops."

UN Secretary-General , Kofi A. Annan, 2000

"SHIRBRIG ... Has already proven its utility in the deployment of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea".

"There, a force that had trained together and developed a high degree of coherence was able to arrive and establish itself quickly in the theatre of operation, thereby sending a message of competence and commitment."

Secretary General Kofi Annan (January 2002)

Kofi Annan stressed the need for SHIRBRIG-like brigades in his Report 'In Larger Freedom' in 2005: "States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce United Nations missions, and should place them at the disposal of the United Nations."

2008 Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin

From British and German reports

'In this light, it is indeed rather puzzling and lamentable that the EU's 'big three' have so far persistently circumnavigated the issue of backing the already existing UN rapid deployment unit on which the EU Battle Group Concept seems to be modeled: SHIRBRIG.'

2007 The Oxford Council on Good Governance

As the retired Kenyan General Peter Marwa put it: "The concept of the Standby Force was developed with the assistance of the UN [...]. The SHIRBRIG model remains the best example for our regions to learn from. Indeed, when comparing the organizational structures of SHIRBRIG, ECOBRIG and EASBRIG, it becomes clear that they are almost identical.

2008 Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin

It is clear, however, that SHIRBRIG's reputation and image as a neutral and helpful capacity-builder has greatly enhanced SHIRBRIG's influence and effectiveness in the African regions.

2008 Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin

By replicating itself, SHIRBRIG has the potential to contribute to the creation of an interoperable network of regional rapid capability brigades with similar standards and operational procedures. Or, as a former Austrian General put it, "Eventually more regional 'SHIRBRIGS' would be available and a network for training and know-how transfer could be established. A SHIRBRIG network would also be a great asset in any real mission deployment."

2008 Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin

After relations have been strained for the past 3 years, the restructuring of the Military Office and the arrival of the new Military Adviser, Chikadibia Obiakor from Nigeria, could provide a fresh opportunity for more conducive relations. This change is particularly promising as General Obiakor was a Force Commander of the UNMIL Mission in Liberia, in which SHIRBRIG was previously involved. As a result, he will have a clear knowledge of SHIRBRIG's activities as well as of its involvement in the African Standby Force process.

2008 Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin

From other news sources

South Korea is considering organizing a 1,000-strong stand-by force to support international peacekeeping operations (PKO) at the request of the United Nations, an official of the Ministry of National Defense said Sunday.

Plans to support heavy equipment, transport helicopters and ships for U.N. peacekeeping missions are also under consideration, the official said, adding these plans are to be reported to the presidential transition committee Tuesday.

"The ministry plans to form a 1,000-strong ready troops for peacekeeping operations to rapidly respond to a U.N. request," said the official. "To that end, we will seek to revise laws pertaining to the deployment of peacekeeping troops to foreign countries."

(2008)